

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)	IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
)	
COUNTY OF CHARLESTON)	C/A No.: 2012-CP-10-4053
)	
Michelle Pollak, et al.)	
)	
Petitioners,)	
)	
v.)	<u>Order Affirming the Town of Mount Pleasant Board of Zoning Appeals</u>
)	
Town of Mt. Pleasant Board of Zoning Appeals, Seaside Farms, and The Beach Company, Co.,)	
)	
Respondents.)	

Date of Hearing:	February 22, 2013
Presiding Judge:	Hon. Deadra L. Jefferson
Attorney for Petitioners:	Melinda Lucka, Esq.
Attorney for Respondent Town of Mt. Pleasant Board of Zoning Appeals:	David G. Pagliarini, Esq.
Attorney for Respondent The Beach Co.:	Daniel S. McQueeney, Jr., Esq.
Court Reporter:	Francis Bakis-Ray

BY _____
 JULIE J. ARMSTRONG
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This zoning appeal came to be heard before the Court on February 22, 2013. Petitioners challenge the decisions of the Town of Mount Pleasant Board of Zoning Appeals (“BZA”) affirming the Town Zoning Administrator’s letter opinion regarding the permitted uses on a parcel of real property, referred to as “P-2,” privately owned by Respondent The Beach Company, Inc. (the “Property Owner”).

The Property Owner proposes to develop recreational uses including a swimming pool and volleyball court, with accessory parking on a *portion* of P-2. The BZA, like the Zoning Administrator, found that the recreational uses proposed on the pertinent portion of P-2 are permitted under the planned development (“PD”) zoning applicable to P-2, as reflected in the PD plan adopted in 1998 and the final subdivision plat creating P-2 in 2002. The BZA, like the

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Zoning Administrator, also found that the proposed recreational uses were permissible uses within a park or open space pursuant to the controlling zoning regulations.

The Court has reviewed the pleadings, the certified record of the BZA proceedings, and the memoranda, including exhibits, submitted by counsel for the parties. The Court has also considered the arguments of counsel for the parties. Based on this review, the Court finds and concludes that the BZA's decision is supported by ample evidence and is not controlled by any error of law. Accordingly, the BZA's decision is hereby affirmed.

Standard of Review

"The findings of fact by the board of appeals must be treated in the same manner as a finding of fact by a jury, and the court may not take additional evidence." S.C. Code Ann. § 6-29-840(A). "The factual findings of the jury will not be disturbed unless no evidence reasonably supports the jury's findings." Berberich v. Jack, 392 S.C. 278, 284, 709 S.E.2d 607, 610 (2011). "A court will refrain from substituting its judgment for that of the reviewing body, even if it disagrees with the decision." Clear Channel Outdoor v. City of Myrtle Beach, 372 S.C. 230, 234, 642 S.E.2d 565, 567 (2007).

"In determining the questions presented by the appeal, the court must determine only whether the decision of the board is correct as a matter of law." S.C. Code Ann. § 6-29-840(a). The decision of a board of zoning appeals will be overturned only when the board's decision is "arbitrary, capricious, has no reasonable relation to a lawful purpose, or if the board has abused its discretion." Bevivino v. Town of Mount Pleasant Bd. of Zoning App., 737 S.E.2d 863 (S.C. App. 2013); Rest. Row Assocs. v. Horry County, 335 S.C. 209, 216, 516 S.E.2d 442, 446 (1999).

Legal Analysis

I. The PD plan and final subdivision plat creating P-2 support the BZA's decision.

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In 1998, the Town of Mount Pleasant and the Property Owner entered into a development agreement (the "Agreement") for the development of more than 525 acres of real property (the "Property") known as Seaside Farms, which had been privately owned by the Darby and Way families for decades. At the same time, the Town annexed and rezoned the Property to PD, with the Agreement serving as the PD plan.

As reflected in the Agreement, the PD plan includes six separate development tracts, including, in pertinent part, the Single Family Homes Tract, the Marsh and Creek Front Homes Tract, and the Park Tract. The Single Family Homes Tract and the Marsh and Creek Front Homes Tract primarily contemplate the development of residential uses; however, the permitted uses on these tracts unambiguously include and specifically provide for swimming pools, play lots, play fields, and playgrounds. The permitted uses on the Park Tract, which is intended to provide "park and recreational areas" as described in the Town's subdivision regulations at the time, include active recreation areas, regulation soccer, a "large range of passive and active uses," passive park, promenade, strolling, biking, jogging and driving.

In 2002, P-2 was subdivided as a separate parcel as part of the final subdivision plat for the Marais development within Seaside Farms. The final plat, which is part of the record, indicates that portions of P-2 lie within the three separate development tracts referenced above. The Property Owner's amenity plan indicates the proposed recreational uses on P-2 would only be developed on the portions of P-2 lying on the Single Family Homes Tract and the Marsh and Creek Front Homes Tract. The proposed recreational uses would not include the portion of P-2 lying within the Park Tract.

Based on the foregoing, the Zoning Administrator concluded that the underlying zoning permitted the recreational uses reflected in the Property Owner's amenity plan on the portion of

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P-2 lying outside the Park Tract. The BZA agreed. Since the PD plan and the 2002 plat creating P-2 unambiguously permit the Property Owner's proposed recreational uses on P-2, the Court finds and concludes that the BZA's decision in this respect is supported by the evidence and correct as a matter of law. See Austin v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 362 S.C. 29, 33, 606 S.E.2d 209, 211 (Ct. App. 2004) ("In reviewing the questions presented by the appeal, the court shall determine only whether the decision of the Board is correct as a matter of law.").

II. The BZA properly relied on the final subdivision plat for P-2 to determine the intentions of the parties regarding the creation of P-2. Moreover, evidence supports the BZA's determination that there was never any agreement to restrict all of P-2 to park and open space. Finally, the PD plan supports the BZA's conclusion that the proposed recreational uses on P-2 are permissible within park or open space.

In 2000, the Property Owner submitted a preliminary subdivision plat for the development known as Marais to the Town's Planning Commission for approval. As reflected in the final subdivision plat for Marais, this preliminary plat subdivided Tracts A-1 and A-3 within Seaside Farms into Parcels P-1, P-2, P-3, and further subdivided Parcel L to create Phase I of the Marais subdivision. Parcels P-1, P-2, and P-3 were therefore residual with respect to the development of Marais (Parcel L) set forth in the preliminary plat.

Petitioners assert that the Town and planning staff agreed to a minor modification of the approved preliminary plat creating P-2 to restrict all of P-2 to "park land and open space." The recorded final plat for P-2, which is dispositive, belies this argument. Additionally, evidence supports the BZA's determination that the parties never agreed to restrict all of P-2 to "park land and open space." Furthermore, as set forth in the PD plan, the recreational uses currently proposed for P-2 qualify as park or open space.

A. The BZA and Zoning Administrator properly relied on the recorded final subdivision plat creating P-2, which is dispositive of the parties' intentions in 2000.

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The Planning Commission minutes and subsequent correspondence between the parties in 2000 ultimately led to the 2002 final subdivision plat referenced above, which is the only competent record evidence of the finalized agreement between the parties. See, e.g., Gilliland v. Elmwood Props., 301 S.C. 295, 302, 391 S.E.2d 577, 581 (1990) (“The parol evidence rule prevents the introduction of extrinsic evidence of agreements or understandings contemporaneous with or prior to execution of a written instrument when the extrinsic evidence is to be used to contradict, vary, or explain the written instrument.”).

While Petitioners attempt to challenge the accuracy or validity of the final plat, Petitioners never timely appealed the approval of the final plat and also failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. See S.C. Code Ann. § 6-29-1150(C), (D)(1) (staff approval of final plat may be appealed to planning commission and planning commission’s decision may be appealed to circuit court within 30 days); Moore v. Sumter County Council, 300 S.C. 270, 274, 387 S.E.2d 455, 458 (1990) (property owners’ action challenging zoning decision is premature because property owner must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief).

B. The extrinsic evidence relied upon by Petitioners supports the BZA’s decision regarding the existence and terms of any purported agreement in 2000.

Even if the BZA were required to look beyond the final plat to attempt to determine the parties’ intentions in 2000, the extrinsic evidence relied upon by Petitioners is ambiguous at best. Consequently, the Court affirms the BZA’s determination that the parties did not intend to restrict all of P-2 to “park land and open space.”

The existence of a contract is a question of fact. See Armstrong v. Collins, 366 S.C. 204, 223, 621 S.E.2d 368, 377 (Ct. App. 2005) (“If the evidence as to the existence of a contract is conflicting or raises more than one reasonable inference, the issue should be submitted to the jury.”). The construction of an ambiguous contract is also question of fact. See Soil Remediation

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Co. v. Nu-Way Env'tl., Inc., 325 S.C. 231, 234, 482 S.E.2d 554, 555 (1997) (“Although as a general rule contracts are to be construed by the court, where a contract is capable of more than one construction, the question of what the parties intended becomes one of fact to be submitted to jury.”). In this zoning appeal, the BZA sits as the finder of fact, and the Court will not disturb the BZA’s findings as to these issues unless they are unsupported by the evidence. See S.C. Code Ann. § 6-29-840(A).

The Planning Commission minutes from 2000 discuss the inclusion of a *portion* of P-2 in the Park Tract, not all of P-2 as Petitioners contend. There is no competent evidence that the Planning Commission recommended approval of any limitation on the uses for the *remainder* of P-2 or conditioned approval of the preliminary plat on such a limitation. These minutes also reflect uncertainty about the Commission’s scope of authority and clearly authorize the Town’s attorney, Town planning staff, and the Property Owner to work out any necessary details of how to proceed with respect to P-2 as a “residual tract.” See S.C. Code Ann. § 6-29-1150(A) (Supp. 2000) (permitting planning commission *or* designated staff to approve preliminary and final plats).¹

After the determination by the Planning Commission, Town planning staff and representatives of the Property Owner exchanged correspondence proposing a “minor modification” to the site plan and development provisions pursuant to section 34 of the Agreement. See S.C. Code Ann. § 6-29-740 (“The adopted [PD] plan may include a method for minor modifications to the site plan or development provisions.”).² This proposed “minor

¹The 2003 amendments to section 6-29-1150, effective June 2, 2003, did not affect this portion of the statute.

² Section 6-29-740 of the South Carolina Code suggests that minor modifications to a development plan on a staff level without notice or a public hearing are intended to permit flexibility where circumstances arise which are outside the contemplation of the parties at the time a development agreement incorporating the PD plan is adopted. See id. (recognizing the objectives of PD zoning include “flexibility in development” and accommodating a “flexibility in the arrangement of uses. . .”). The term “minor modification” is undefined in either section 6-29-740

modification” included a slight adjustment to the boundaries of the Single Family Homes Tract and the Marsh and Creek Front Homes Tract in light of the “natural break” of the land and arose from “perfecting the plan” during development.

During this time, the Property Owner also corresponded with planning staff about restricting a portion of P-2 to “park land or open space” or “park areas” or “park space.” The maps attached to this correspondence propose different locations where the restrictions would apply and use different terminology for the restrictions being discussed. As previously mentioned, the final plat exhibits a slight adjustment to the boundaries between the Single Family Homes Tract and the Marsh and Creek Front Homes Tract and the inclusion of only a portion of P-2 in the Park Tract.

The Zoning Administrator, and later the BZA, reviewed these documents and concluded that the final plat creating P-2 establishes the only portion which was included in the Park Tract. This finding is supported by the evidence and, therefore, the Court affirms the BZA’s decision in this respect.

C. The PD plan supports the BZA’s determination that the proposed recreational uses on P-2 constitute park or open space.

As required by applicable law, the BZA liberally construed the undefined terms “park” and “open space” in favor of the Property Owner. “[O]rdinances in derogation of natural rights of persons over their property are to be strictly construed as they are in derogation of the common law right to use private property so as to realize its highest utility and should not be impliedly extended to cases not clearly within their scope and purpose.” *Id.* at 302, 75 S.E.2d at 607. “It follows that the terms limiting the use of the property must be liberally construed for the

or the PD plan. The Court finds that such a decision is inherently subjective and will turn on the facts and circumstances of each case. As such, deference to the conclusions of planning staff and the BZA is appropriate.

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benefit of the property owner.” Id.; cf. Seabrook Island Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Marshland Trust, Inc., 358 S.C. 655, 662, 596 S.E.2d 380, 383 (Ct. App. 2004) (“Restrictions on the use of property will be strictly construed with all doubts resolved in favor of free use of the property.”).

Petitioners interpret the term “park land or open space” to include only “passive” parks or natural green areas; however, the PD plan contemplates the development of active recreation areas such as swimming pools and volleyball courts to qualify as “parks,” “recreational areas” or “private open space.” For instance, Exhibit 10.2 to the Agreement states that “public recreational facilities” qualify as “park and recreational areas” and that “private open space for park and recreational purposes” may be “privately owned and maintained by the future residents of the subdivision.”

In addition, Petitioner McGinn attached one page from the Covenants and Restrictions for Seaside Farms acknowledging the development of “private open space” on the Property. Even the permitted uses for the Park Tract include “active recreation areas” and a “large range of passive *and* active uses.” See also Charleston County Parks & Recreation Comm’n v. Somers, 319 S.C. 65, 66, 459 S.E.2d 841, 842 (1995) (interpreting Isle of Palms zoning ordinance and recognizing proposed development of “park” includes “playgrounds, a picnic area, a jogging path, lagoons, a parking area, and beach access” applying rules of statutory construction to zoning ordinance).

Finally, as the Zoning Administrator recognized in the appeal hearing before the BZA: “[T]here are no definition[s] for park and recreational areas either in the Town code or the Seaside code, nor is there one [for] open space.” “[M]any subdivisions in the Town of Mt. Pleasant, Brick Yard, or (inaudible) Plantation, Hamlin Plantations, they have used their on-site

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recreational amenities to meet those requirements.” The BZA relied on this opinion in affirming the Zoning Administrator’s decision, and the BZA’s decision is therefore supported by evidence.

IV. As a matter of law, the BZA correctly determined whether the proposed recreational uses on P-2 complied with the underlying PD zoning notwithstanding neighboring property owners’ speculation about the potential for future noise, traffic, safety issues, and a decline in property values.

Petitioners contend that the BZA should have analyzed the proposed uses for P-2 in the context of neighbors’ concerns about the potential for future noise, traffic, safety issues, and a hypothetical decline in surrounding property values from these recreational uses. Petitioners cite to testimony at the BZA hearing and more than a hundred e-mails from residents of adjacent residential subdivisions in support of their speculative contentions.

The Property Owner owns P-2, pays taxes on P-2 as a developable parcel, and has the right to develop P-2 subject to the Agreement. South Carolina appellate courts have repeatedly held that neighbor testimony regarding the potential for a decline in property value, traffic, noise, and safety concerns from a proposed development does not justify the denial of a permit for a proposed development. See Strong v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 240 S.C. 244, 254-56, 125 S.E.2d 628, 633-34 (1962) (neighbor complaints about the potential for noise, pollution, trash, increased traffic, and a decline in adjacent residential property values from the proposed development of a grocery store is insufficient to enjoin such halt the proposed development); Wyndham Enterprises, LLC v. City of N. Augusta, 401 S.C. 144, 735 S.E.2d 659, 661 (Ct. App. 2012) (neighbor testimony about traffic and decreased property values is incompetent to warrant denial of special exception permit to use property for fireworks store).

In this case, Petitioners concede that every residential subdivision within Seaside Farms has a community pool and recreational amenities similar to the ones proposed to be developed on P-2. As in Wyndham, none of the residents properly explained why an additional amenity area

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would cause a decrease in property values when there are so many similar amenity areas located in their respective subdivisions. See id. (“[N]one of the residents properly explained why Appellants’ business would cause a decrease in property values when one fireworks store is located across the street from the property and another store is located nearby.”).

Based on the foregoing, the BZA’s determination finding the proposed recreational uses were permitted uses on P-2 was correct, as a matter of law.

V. Evidence supports the BZA’s decision with respect to the remaining arguments raised by Petitioners.

Petitioners also raise a number of “miscellaneous” arguments in this appeal, which were correctly rejected by the BZA, as a matter of law, or which fail to support a reversal, as follows:

1. Petitioners assert arguments based on excerpts of sections 155.024, 155.027, and 155.073 of the Mount Pleasant Zoning Code. As the Zoning Administrator explained at the hearings before the BZA, these sections are inapplicable to development of the Property, including P-2. See S.C. Code Ann. § 6-31-80(A) (recognizing that, with limited exceptions, “the laws applicable to development of the property subject to a development agreement, are those in force at the time of execution of the agreement.”).

2. Petitioners contend that section 28(b) of the Agreement requires the Property Owner to develop all of P-2 as a park. To the contrary, section 28(b) of the Agreement provides the minimum requirements for “park and recreational areas” on the Property and specifically provides the Property Owner with the discretion to change the location where such areas will be developed as development progresses. Moreover, as discussed above, the proposed uses on P-2 constitute “parks and recreational areas.” Finally, there is no evidence the Property Owner fell short of these minimum requirements.

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3. Petitioners argue that the Property Owner should be required to dedicate all of P-2 to the master association for Seaside Farms pursuant to the Agreement. Section 20 of the Agreement and Exhibit 20.1 specify the four-acre portion of the Property which is required to be dedicated to the master association. This does not include the portion of P-2 on which the proposed recreational uses will be developed.

4. Without citing any legal or factual basis for their argument, Petitioners claim that the proposed uses on P-2 may not be developed unless and until the residential project which will use this area has first been constructed. "South Carolina law clearly states that short, conclusory statements made without supporting authority are deemed abandoned on appeal and therefore not presented for review." Glasscock, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 348 S.C. 76, 81, 557 S.E.2d 689, 691 (Ct. App. 2001). Moreover, Exhibit 10.2 to the PD plan contemplates the development of recreational areas and private open space to serve and be maintained by the future residents of the property.

5. Again without citation to legal or factual authority for the proposition, Petitioners contend that the proposed recreational uses on P-2 fail to comply with applicable setback requirements. Even if this issue were preserved, however, the amenity plan does not appear to violate any applicable set back requirements, which apply to lots, not zoning districts.

6. Petitioners contend the two, 9-page decisions of the BZA denying the pertinent appeals and the 4-page decision rejecting Petitioner Catherine McGinn's request for rehearing are insufficient to permit appellate review. See S.C. Code Ann. § 6-29-800(F). The Court has reviewed the hearing transcripts, certified record, and written decisions. These documents are more than sufficient to permit the Court to determine if the BZA's decision is supported by evidence and correct as a matter of law, as set forth above. See Vulcan Materials Co. v.

Greenville County Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 342 S.C. 480, 494, 536 S.E.2d 892, 899 (Ct. App. 2000) (circuit court's reliance on transcript and letter confirming BZA's decision is sufficient); Austin v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 362 S.C. 29, 34, 606 S.E.2d 209, 212 (Ct. App. 2004) (letter from Town's planning director informing party of decision and transcript sufficient for appellate review).

7. Petitioners contend that each of them has standing to challenge the BZA's decision in this appeal. The Property Owner contends that only Petitioner Catherine McGinn exhausted her administrative remedies by seeking review of the Zoning Administrator's decision before the BZA and, in addition, that the Petitioners added in the Amended Petition for Judicial Review failed to timely appeal the BZA's decision.

The BZA mailed its written decisions denying the appeals of the Zoning Administrator's letter decision on May 22, 2012. Petitioners McGinn, Thomas Wolfe, Ron Schiappa, the SFSF Homeowners' Association, Inc., incorrectly identified as the Seaside Farms Single Family Homeowners Association, and others filed a Petition for Judicial Review of these decisions on June 20, 2012. On August 14, 2012, Petitioners filed an Amended Petition for Judicial Review, adding several parties and claims to their original Petition.

S.C. Code Ann. § 6-29-820(A) (Supp. 2010) provides, "A person who may have a substantial interest in any decision of the board of [zoning] appeals or an officer or agent of the appropriate governing authority may appeal from a decision of the board to the circuit court..."

According to Newton v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals for Beaufort County, 396 S.C. 112, 719 S.E.2d (Ct. App. 2011), "[S.C. Code Ann. § 6-29-820(A)] does not require the appellant to attend a public hearing on the Board's decision or even to communicate his concerns to the Board prior to filing his petition with the circuit court."

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An amended petition for judicial review may not be filed after the 30-day period referenced in section 6-29-820(A) of the South Carolina Code has expired. See Austin v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 362 S.C. 29, 39, 606 S.E.2d 209, 214 (Ct. App. 2004) (“[W]e find the circuit court correctly refused Austin’s request to amend the petition after the expiration of 30-day period for filing the appeal.”); see also Newton v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals for Beaufort County, 396 S.C. 112, 117, 719 S.E.2d 282, 284 (Ct. App. 2011) (“[T]he sole preservation requirement for a first-level appeal of a zoning board’s decision is that an appellant must set forth his issues on appeal in a written petition and file that petition with the circuit court before the thirty-day filing period expires.”). Consequently, the Court finds that the only proper parties to this appeal are Petitioners Catherine McGinn, Thomas Wolfe, Ron Schiappa, and the SFSF Homeowners’ Association, Inc. The remaining parties are hereby dismissed.³

Petitioners’ Motion to Amend Caption, filed February 21, 2013, also came before the court in order to remove the names of Petitioners George Seeley, Jason and Anne Marie Smallwood, as they have moved from the community, and to modify Petitioner Seaside Farms Single Family Homeowners Association, Inc. to be SFSF Homeowners Association, Inc., and The Beach Company Inc., to be The Beach Co. To the extent not inconsistent with this ruling, the Court grants without objection the Petitioners’ motion to amend the caption in this case and the caption should be modified to reflect such changes.

8. On February 21, 2013, the day before the present hearing, Petitioners filed a memorandum in support of their Amended Petition for Judicial Review which, for the first time, raised an issue regarding the sufficiency the certified record filed by the BZA. While Petitioners

³ Petitioner McGinn is the only party who filed a petition for rehearing of the BZA’s decision. This petition was denied by decision mailed to McGinn on September 25, 2012. While nothing in section 6-29-820(A) of the South Carolina Code prohibits such a petition, there is also nothing in section 6-29-820(A) extending a party’s time to appeal when a petition for rehearing is filed.

failed to include any information on when the clerk of court notified the secretary of the BZA of the notice of appeal, the transcript of the underlying BZA hearing was filed on September 17, 2012. See S.C. Code Ann. §6-29-830(A) (certified copy of transcript and decision of board must be filed by BZA's secretary within 30 days of being notified by clerk of court). On February 19, 2013, the BZA filed additional documents which the BZA certified were included in the record at the BZA's hearing on April 30, 2012.

Petitioners claim the certified record is incomplete. Petitioners specifically assert that the certified record should include the entire Development Agreement and more than 100 letters and e-mails from local residents opposing the Zoning Administrator's decision. There is no indication in the transcript that the BZA considered the entire Development Agreement. See Austin v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 362 S.C. 29, 39, 606 S.E.2d 209, 215 (Ct. App. 2004) ("After canvassing the entire transcript of the hearing, we cannot discern from this fleeting reference sufficient indication that the additional plat was introduced into the record or that the zoning board relied upon it."). While Petitioners and the Zoning Administrator submitted several portions of the Development Agreement to the BZA, nothing in the transcript indicates that the remaining portions of the Development Agreement were submitted. Moreover, to the extent Petitioners attempt to raise new arguments based on other provisions of the Development Agreement, Austin precludes them from raising new issues after the expiration of the 30-day appeal has expired.

While the BZA transcript indicates that the BZA considered more than 100 letters and e-mails from local residents opposing the Zoning Administrator's decision, the Court has previously held that the amount of opposition to the development is not relevant. The BZA was

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only required to determine whether the proposed recreational uses on P-2 complied with the PD zoning for P-2, which the BZA did.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby affirms the BZA's decision that the applicable zoning permits the recreational uses proposed by the Property Owner on P-2.

DL Jefferson

The Honorable Deadra L. Jefferson
Presiding Judge, Ninth Judicial Circuit

April 9, 2013
Charleston, South Carolina

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