

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

RECEIVED

Dec 19 2022

SC Court of Appeals

Appeal from Greenville County
Honorable Alex Kinlaw, Circuit Court Judge
Appellate Case Tracking No. 2022-001709

The State,

Appellant,

vs.

John J. Mello,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM REGARDING APPEALABILITY

Appellant, through its undersigned counsel, would respectfully show unto this Court as follows:

I.

Respondent was originally indicted for custodial interference under section 17-17-495 of the South Carolina Code. He served a motion seeking a pre-trial determination the victim could not legally be considered a “legal custodian” pursuant to section 16-17-495 and also to quash the indictment charging him with custodial interference. (Motion attached as Exhibit A without attachments). The circuit court concluded the victim could not legally meet the definition of a “legal custodian” under the statute but declined to quash the indictment. (Court’s Order attached as Exhibit B). The State timely served and filed its Notice of Appeal from the circuit court’s Order. Thereafter, this Court requested memorandum regarding the appealability of the circuit court’s Order.

II.

The South Carolina Supreme Court has explained:

“The right of appeal arises from and is controlled by statutory law.” Rule 201(a) of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules provides in pertinent part, “Appeal may be taken, as provided by law, from any final judgment, *appealable order or decision*.” The determination of whether a party may appeal an order issued before or during trial is governed primarily by section 14-3-330 of the South Carolina Code.

State v. Ledford, 422 S.C. 244, 247–48, 810 S.E.2d 868, 869–70 (2018) (internal citations omitted and italics in original). “Absent some specialized statute, the immediate appealability of an interlocutory or intermediate order depends on whether the order falls within [section] 14–3–330 [of the South Carolina Code].” Ex parte Wilson, 367 S.C. 7, 13, 625 S.E.2d 205, 208 (2005) (citing Baldwin Constr. Co. v. Graham, 357 S.C. 227, 593 S.E.2d 146 (2004)).

Section 14-3-330 of the South Carolina Code provides, in pertinent part, that an immediate appeal may be taken in a law case from:

(1) Any intermediate judgment, order or decree in a law case involving the merits in actions commenced in the court of common pleas and general sessions, brought there by original process or removed there from any inferior court or jurisdiction, and final judgments in such actions; provided, that if no appeal be taken until final judgment is entered the court may upon appeal from such final judgment review any intermediate order or decree necessarily affecting the judgment not before appealed from;

(2) An order affecting a substantial right made in an action when such order (a) in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment from which an appeal might be taken or discontinues the action, (b) grants or refuses a new trial or (c) strikes out an answer or any part thereof or any pleading in any action.

S.C. Code Ann. § 14–3–330(1) and (2) (1976). This Court has explained: “the State’s right to appeal in criminal cases is a judicially created right” State v. Belviso, 360 S.C. 112, 115, 600 S.E.2d 68, 70 (Ct. App. 2004). The State’s right to appeal has been found in instances where

a judge's pre-trial ruling significantly impacts the State's ability to prosecute the appeal or when it finally decides the action. See e.g., State v. McKnight, 287 S.C. 167, 337 S.E.2d 208 (1985). Additionally, "an order which 'involves the merits,' [under section 14-3-330(1) is] an order which 'must finally determine some substantial matter forming the whole or a part of some cause of action or defense'" Mid-State Distributors, Inc. v. Century Importers, Inc., 310 S.C. 330, 334, 426 S.E.2d 777, 780 (1993).

III.

In this case, the State charged Respondent with violating section 16-17-495:

When a court of competent jurisdiction in this State or another state has awarded custody of a child under the age of sixteen years or when custody of a child under the age of sixteen years is established pursuant to Section 63-17-20(B), it is unlawful for a person with the intent to violate the court order or Section 63-17-20(B) to take or transport, or cause to be taken or transported, the child from **the legal custodian** for the purpose of concealing the child, or circumventing or avoiding the custody order or statute.

S.C. Code Ann. § 16-17-495(A)(1) (Supp. 2020) (emphasis added). A requirement of the statute is that the victim from whom the child was taken or concealed was the child's "legal custodian." In other words, the State would be required to demonstrate the victim met the legal definition of a "legal custodian" at the time Respondent took the child to Italy.

Respondent asked the circuit court to make a legal declaration the victim could not be considered a "legal custodian" of her child. The circuit court interpreted the custodial interference statute and determined the victim could not qualify under the definition intended by the legislature of "legal custodian." Specifically, the circuit court concluded: "[T]he court holds that Ms. Parcell is exempt from the definition of 'legal custodian' as contemplated in S.C. Code § 16-17-495(A)(1)."

The result of the circuit court's pre-trial determination is the State cannot prove every element of the crime of custodial interference because the circuit court has ruled as a matter of law the State cannot show Respondent took the child from the "legal custodian." The ruling in effect ends the State's ability to prosecute the case because the ruling "involves the merits," and "finally determine[s] some substantial matter forming the whole or a part of some cause of action." It determines as a matter of law an element of the offense which must be proven and leaves nothing further for the State or court to do as it relates to the element that the victim be the child's "legal custodian" at the time the child is taken. The issue should be appealable under section 14-3-330(1).

Even if it is not immediately appealable under subsection 1, the ruling substantially impairs the State's ability to prosecute the case and clearly meets the requirement under McKnight. See e.g., State v. Belviso, 360 S.C. 112, 116, 600 S.E.2d 68, 70 (Ct. App. 2004) (finding State could appeal from ruling suppressing critical evidence). The ruling precludes the State's ability to even argue the victim in this case was the "legal custodian" at the time Respondent removed the child, which precludes the State's to go forward without facing certain directed verdict on the charges—a directed verdict would obviously preclude the possibility of the State ever appealing the determination by the circuit court as it would be tantamount to an acquittal and result in double jeopardy implications. As a result, even if not immediately appealable under subsection 1, the ruling by the circuit court must be appealable under section 14-3-330(2).

WHEREFORE, the State asks this Court to find this appeal is a proper interlocutory appeal of the trial court's pre-trial ruling that the victim cannot meet the definition of "legal custodian" because it precludes the State's ability to prosecute the case unless an immediate appeal is allowed under either section 14-3-330(1) or (2); to allow the appeal to proceed; and for any other further relief the Court determines.

Respectfully submitted,

ALAN WILSON
Attorney General

WILLIAM M. BLITCH, JR.
Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General

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BY:



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ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT

December 19, 2022

EXHIBIT A

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COUNTY OF GREENVILLE

The State of South Carolina,

vs.

John J. Mello,

Defendant.

IN THE COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS
THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

Indictment #: 2022-GS-23-002160

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO
QUASH INDICTMENT**

22 MAY 5 PM 3:34
Paul Hickenstiner COC 601 SC

TO: ASSISTANT SOLICITOR RYAN HOLLOWAY.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned, as attorney for the Defendant, moves this honorable court for an opportunity to be heard on the Defendant request for order quashing, or otherwise disposing of, the above captioned indictment. The bases for this motion are as follows:

BACKGROUND

1. The Defendant is biological father of a minor child, A.M.
2. The Defendant in the case was charged with Custodial Interference (S.C. Code § 16-17-495) on October 21, 2021, by the Greenville County Sherriff's Office.
3. S.C. Code § 16-17-495(A)(1) states that, "[w]hen a court of competent jurisdiction in this State or another state has awarded custody of a child under the age of sixteen years or when custody of a child under the age of sixteen years is established pursuant to Section 63-17-20(B), it is unlawful for a person with the intent to violate the court order or Section 63-17-20(B) to take or transport, or cause to be taken or transported, the child *from the legal custodian* for the purpose of concealing the child, or circumventing or avoiding the custody order or statute." (emphasis added).

4. The Defendant was granted sole custody of A.M. by the Honorable Thomas Hodges of the Greenville County Family Court by way of a Final Order on February 17, 2019 (2017-DR-23-3369).
5. The Defendant's ex-girlfriend, Christina Parcell, now deceased, was granted visitation by the same order.
6. According to the State, the Defendant violated S.C. Code § 16-17-495 when the Defendant departed the United States¹ with A.M. in October of 2021 and failed to return the child to Mr. Parcell, for her court ordered visitation.
7. At the time this alleged offense occurred, the Defendant had *sole* custody of the minor child.

FIRST ARGUMENT

8. For his first argument, the Defendant would argue that the indictment is facially deficient in that it fails to state all of the necessary elements of S.C. Code § 16-17-495(A)(1) and must be quashed.
9. A circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction if: "(1) there has been an indictment which sufficiently states the offense; (2) there has been a waiver of indictment; or (3) the charge is a lesser included offense of the crime charged in the indictment." *Carter v. State*, 329 S.C. 355, 362, 495 S.E. 2d 773, 777 (1998). "The true test of the sufficiency of an indictment is not whether it could be made more definite and certain, but whether it contains the *necessary elements of the offense* intended to be charged and sufficiently

¹ The Defendant left the United States with A.M. to protect his daughter from sexual assault. Upon information and belief, Ex-girlfriends' boyfriend, Bradley E. Post, was charged with multiple counts of criminal sexual conduct for sexual batteries committed upon A.M. and contributing to the delinquency of a minor for producing/creating child pornography involving A.M. That case is being prosecuted by the Attorney General's Office.

apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet." *Browning v. State*, 320 S.C. 366, 368, 465 S.E.2d 358, 359 (1995) (emphasis added). A circuit court lacks subject matter jurisdiction if the indictment fails to allege an essential element of the offense charged. *Mathis v. State*, 355 S.C. 87, 92, 584 S.E.2d 366, 368-69 (2003) (holding where State's indictment for first-degree burglary failed to allege an aggravating circumstance, the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction).

10. The elements of S.C. Code § 16-17-495(A)(1) require the following: (1) the awarding of custody of a child under the age of 16 to a person or people, (2) that the person charged intended to violate the custody order by taking the child, transporting the child or by causing the child to be taken or transported, (3) from the legal custodian, (4) for the purpose of concealing the child, or circumventing the custody order.
11. Mr. Mello was indicted on April 19, 2022, by the Greenville County Grand Jury.
12. The indictment, attached hereto as **Exhibit A**, alleges:

That JOHN JOEY MELLO did in Greenville County, on or about the 5th day of October, 2020, willfully and unlawfully take or transport A.M., a child under the age of 16, in violation of a custody order by the Greenville County Family Court, a court of competent jurisdiction, for the purpose of concealing the child, or circumventing or avoiding that Family Court custody order when the defendant took or transported A.M. to Italy and failed to return her to the United states after more than 72 hours.
13. The indictment fails to mention element #3. It fails to state that Mr. Mello took the child from her legal custodian.
14. The Defendant would argue that if the State proved everything that is alleged in the indictment, it still would not constitute a crime.
15. As such, the indictment fails to allege all of the necessary elements of the crime and must be quashed.

SECOND ARGUMENT

16. Assuming *arguendo*, even if the indictment did list all of the necessary elements, he cannot be legally found to have taken the child “from” the child’s “legal custodian” because he was the child’s sole “legal custodian.”
17. Attached hereto as **Exhibit B**, the court will find the Defendant’s February 19, 2019, custody order awarding Mr. Mello sole custody.
18. The order not only awards sole custody to Mr. Mello, but it also labels or designates Ms. Parcell the “non-custodial parent” numerous times.
19. Counsel for the Defendant believes that the State will attempt to argue that visitation rights are a form of custodial rights or that the deceased mother had some form of custodial rights during her visitation periods. This argument is without merit.
20. The State will not and cannot produce a single South Carolina case or statute that supports this assertion.
21. The State of South Carolina only recognizes three forms of custody: sole, joint ², and divided ³. *5 Marital Litigation in South Carolina § 10-D*.
22. Joint custody and divided custody were clearly not awarded in this case, leaving sole custody as the only possible custody award.
23. In 2012, the General Assembly defined “sole custody” to mean “*a person...who has...the rights and responsibilities for major decisions concerning the child...*” S.C. Code § 63-15-210. The operative word(s) in this statute would be “a person”, as in one person, not two, who have the right and responsibility to make major decisions on behalf of a child.

² Custody split between two people.

³ Where one parent gets custody of one child(ren) and the other parent gets custody of the other child(ren).

24. Additionally, "Sole custody describes the most common form of custody. One parent (the *custodial* parent) is awarded legal and physical custody of the child and the other parent (the *noncustodial* parent) has visitation with the child, typically on alternating weekends, portions of holidays, and a few weeks in the summer." *5 Marital Litigation in South Carolina § 10-D* (emphasis added).
25. Any argument, assertion, or insinuation by the State that Ms. Parcell had even a scintilla of custodial rights should be disregarded and deemed inconsistent with South Carolina law as custody is binary. Either you have custody or you do not and, in this case, Ms. Parcell's did not.
26. The Defendant respectfully reminds the court that because the court is being asked to interpret a statute that is penal in nature, it must be strictly construed against the State and in favor of the defendant. *State v. Blackmon*, 304 S.C. 270, 273, 403 S.E.2d 660, 662 (1991).
27. As such, the court should find that Ms. Parcell cannot be legally found to have been a legal custodian of A.M. per S.C. Code § 16-17-495(A)(1) and quash the indictment for all of the aforementioned reasons.

THEREFORE, the Defendant prays for an order of this court quashing or otherwise judicially dismissing the above captioned charge with prejudice.

(SIGNATURE BLOCK ON PAGE 6)

BANNISTER, WYATT & STALVEY, LLC



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May 4, 2022
Greenville SC, South Carolina

EXHIBIT B

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF GREENVILLE
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

vs.

JOHN J. MELLO,

Defendant.

IN THE COURT OF GENERAL SESSION
THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

CASE NUMBER: 2022-GS-23-02160

ORDER
(AMENDED)

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Dec 06 2022

SC Court of Appeals

22 SEP 26 PM 4:13
Paul Wickens/Sheriff CDC 601 SC

This matter was before the court on the Defendant's motion asking (1) that the court make a pre-trial determination that the victim in this matter cannot be considered a legal custodian as contemplated in S.C. Code § 16-17-495(A)(1) and then, (2) to quash the indictment. The parties appeared before the court on June 10, 2022. Present at the hearing were Marcelo Torricos, attorney of record for the Defendant and Ryan Holloway, Assistant Solicitor, on behalf of the State.

Based upon the Defendant's written motion, the State's written response, oral arguments, a review of all pertinent files, and applicable law, this Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

1. The Defendant is the biological father of minor child, A.G.M.
2. The Defendant was charged with Custodial Interference (S.C. Code § 16-17-495) on October 21, 2021, by the Greenville County Sherriff's Office.
3. S.C. Code § 16-17-495(A)(1) states that, "[w]hen a court of competent jurisdiction in this State or another state has awarded custody of a child under the age of sixteen years or when custody of a child under the age of sixteen years is established pursuant to Section 63-17-20(B), it is unlawful for a person with the intent to violate the court order

or Section 63-17-20(B) to take or transport, or cause to be taken or transported, the child *from the legal custodian* for the purpose of concealing the child, or circumventing or avoiding the custody order or statute.” (emphasis added).

4. The Defendant was granted sole custody of A.G. M. by the Honorable Thomas Hodges of the Greenville County Family Court by way of a Final Order on February 4, 2019¹ (2017-DR-23-3369).
5. The Defendant’s ex-girlfriend and biological mother of A.G.M., Christina Parcell, now deceased, was granted visitation rights by the same order.
6. According to the State, the Defendant violated S.C. Code § 16-17-495 when the Defendant departed from the United States to Italy with A.M. in October of 2020 and failed to return the child to Mrs. Parcell, for her court ordered visitation.
7. The Defendant left the United States with A.G.M. because he was the minor child’s sole custodian, and thus cannot have taken the child in violation of S.C. Code § 16-17-495(A)(1).
8. At the time this alleged offense occurred, there was no order modifying or altering Mr. Mello’s sole custodian status.

I. ~~The court may settle pretrial questions of law. As such, the court finds that Ms. Parcell does not fit the legal definition of “legal custodian” as contemplated in S.C. Code § 16-17-495(A)(1).~~

9. First, the Defendant moved this court for a pretrial finding that Ms. Parcell could not legally fit the definition of “legal custodian” as contemplated in S.C. Code § 16-17-495(A)(1).
10. The State raised the argument that the determination of what is and what is not a “legal custodian” per S.C. Code § 16-17-495(A)(1) is a question of fact for a jury to

¹ The order was signed by Judge Hodges on February 1, 2019 and clocked February 4, 2019.

determine. The court respectfully disagrees and finds that it is a question of law, ripe for pre-trial determination.

11. In its February 4, 2019 order, the Greenville County Family Court clearly and unambiguously granted and awarded Mr. Mello sole custodial rights as to A.G.M. and only granted Ms. Parcell noncustodial visitation rights.
12. The State's argument that a party to a custody order granting visitation rights becomes a legal custodian pursuant to S.C. Code § 16-17-495(A)(1) is inconsistent with South Carolina law, specifically Title 63 of the S.C. Code.
13. The State has failed to provide this court with any statute or case/holding that supports their argument that a parent with only visitation rights can, under these facts and circumstances, be considered a "legal custodian."
14. Our State recognizes three forms of custody: sole, split, and joint. Split and joint custody were not mentioned in the Defendant's February 4, 2019 Order and are therefore not relevant. Sole custody, however, was given to Mr. Mello and the General Assembly has defined "sole custody" to mean "a person...who has...the rights and responsibilities for major decisions concerning the child..." S.C. Code § 63-15-210. The operative word(s) in this statute would be "a person", as in one person, not two, who has the right and responsibility to make decisions on behalf of a child.
15. Additionally, "Sole custody describes the most common form of custody. One parent (the *custodial* parent) is awarded legal and physical custody of the child and the other parent (the *noncustodial* parent) has visitation with the child, typically on alternating weekends, portions of holidays, and a few weeks in the summer." *5 Marital Litigation*

in *South Carolina § 10-D* (emphasis added). Therefore, the court finds that any argument or insinuation that the Ms. Parcell had any form of custodial rights is inconsistent with our state law.

16. Subsequently, the State argued that the General Assembly's definitions of terms such as custody or custodian in Title 63 of the S.C. Code as cited above are inapplicable to Title 16 of the S.C. Code and that the referencing of definitions from title to title is not permissible.

17. I respectfully disagree with the generalized premise put forth by the State that relevant definitions found in one title, such as Title 63 of the S.C. Code, are inapplicable to another title, such as Title 16 of the S.C. Code. *Sonoco Prods. Co. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue*, 378 S.C. 385, 391, 662 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2008) (Holding that when a term is not defined in a statute, the court may glean an appropriate definition by reviewing secondary sources, our state statutes, and our state appellate decisions which deal with the concept.)

18. Our General Assembly has statutorily declared that the Family Courts of our State maintain exclusive jurisdiction to determine the custody of a minor child ². As such, ~~this court is compelled to rule consistently, and define terms consistently, with the~~ Greenville County Family Court.

19. During oral arguments, this court challenged the State to identify where one would find more accurate or relevant definitions pertinent to the determination of custodial rights if not in Title 63. In response, the State argued that the court must apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the term "legal custodian" in lieu of any definitions found in other parts of our law. I disagree.

² S.C. Code § 63-3-530

20. Even if that were true, after applying the plain and ordinary meaning of "legal custodian," the court still concludes that Ms. Parcell does not fit that definition as the plain and ordinary meaning of "legal custodian" would be the parent that was awarded custody by a family court, which in this case, again, is solely Mr. Mello.

21. The one area where the State and the Defense agree is that because the court is being asked to interpret a statute, its goal must be to ascertain the legislative intent. I also agree.

22. The State argued that the legislature could not have intended this statute to be enforced by law enforcement on behalf of legal custodians exclusively, as it would leave noncustodial parents with visitations rights stranded and without protection or recourse in situations such as these. However, the legislature has not left noncustodial parents with visitations rights stranded and without a remedy in situations such as these because noncustodial visiting parents such as Ms. Parcell do have a remedy: contempt.

23. On the other hand, the Defendant's argument as to the legislative intent behind this statute is more convincing. The Defendant argued that violating a visitation order or a child support order or any other order from the family court is certainly problematic, however, ~~it is far more egregious or flagrant to violate someone's custodial rights.~~

Therefore, it makes sense that the legislature formulated criminal liability pursuant to S.C. Code § 16-17-495 to deter violations of one's custodial rights versus allowing actions for contempt, through the Family Courts, to deter and punish violations of other rights, such as visitation rights.

24. For the reasons set forth above, the court holds that Ms. Parcell is exempt from the definition of "legal custodian" as contemplated in S.C. Code § 16-17-495(A)(1).

II. (1) The indictment was not deficient and (2) a trial court generally has no power to dismiss a properly drawn indictment issued by a properly constituted grand jury before trial unless a statute grants that power to the court.

25. The Defendant then moved to quash the indictment on two grounds: (1) deficiency in the indictment and (2) that because Ms. Parcell was non-custodial parent, the State had lacked the probable cause necessary to indict.

26. First, the indictment was not deficient. After a review of the record and argument, the court finds that the language in the indictment is plainly clear and understandable as to the nature of the crime for which the Defendant is charged and what judgment this court is to pronounce. *See State v. Lewis*, 863 S.E.2d 1, 8-9 (S.C. 2021); *State v. Means*, 626 S.E.2d 348, 353-54 (S.C. 2006); *State v. Shoemaker*, 275 S.E.2d 878 (S.C. 1981); *State v. Guthrie*, 572 S.E.2d 309, 312 (S.C. Ct. App. 2002). *See also State v. Gentry*, 610 S.E.2d 494, 500 (S.C. 2005) ([W]hether the indictment could be more definite or certain is irrelevant). The court finds that the indictment allows the Defendant to decide whether or not to plead guilty or stand trial and puts the Defendant on notice as to what elements the State must meet.

27. Second, while the court is inclined to legally determine that Ms. Parcell does not meet the element or definition of "legal custodian" pre-trial, I do not believe I have the authority to quash this indictment. "[A] trial court generally has no power to dismiss a properly drawn indictment issued by a properly constituted grand jury before trial unless a statute grants that power to the court. The prosecutor may, of course, request the dismissal of an indictment or charge." *State v. Needs*, 333 S.C. 134, 146, 508 S.E.2d 857, 863 (1998), *modified on other grounds, State v. Cherry*, 361 S.C. 588, 606 S.E.2d 475 (2004).


28. A statute may authorize the court, either of its own motion or on the application of the prosecuting officer, to order an indictment or prosecution dismissed. But in the absence of such a statute, a court has no power . . . to dismiss a criminal prosecution except at the instance of the prosecutor. *State v. Ridge*, 269 S.C. 61, 65, 236 S.E.2d 401, 402 (1977) (quoting *Ex parte State*, 263 S.C. 363, 366, 210 S.E.2d 600, 601 (1974)). The Defendant has failed to identify what statute, if any, would provide this court the authority to quash this indictment.

29. For these reasons, the Defendant's motions to quash are denied.


NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:

1. Ms. Parcell does not meet the definition or is otherwise exempt from the definition of "legal custodian" as contemplated in S.C. Code § 16-17-495(A)(1); and
2. The Defendant's motions to quash the indictment are denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.


The Honorable Alex Kinlaw
Thirteenth Judicial Circuit

Greenville, South Carolina

 2022

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

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SC Court of Appeals

Appeal from Greenville County
Honorable Alex Kinlaw, Circuit Court Judge
Appellate Case Tracking No. 2022-001709

The State,

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vs.

John J. Mello,

Respondent.

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Caroline Collins, certify that I have served the Memorandum Regarding Appealability on Respondent by emailing a copy to Respondent's counsel of record, Marcelo Torricos, III, at his primary email address as provided by the Attorney Information System (AIS).

I further certify that all parties required by Rule to be served have been served.

This 19th day of December, 2022.



CAROLINE COLLINS
Administrative Coordinator
Office of Attorney General
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Caroline Collins

From: Caroline Collins
Sent: Monday, December 19, 2022 11:19 AM
To: mtorricos@bannisterwyatt.com
Cc: William Blicht
Subject: The State v. John Joey Mello (2022-001709)
Attachments: MELLO John - Memorandum Regarding Appealability - 2022-001709 (03179667xD2C78).PDF

Good Morning Mr. Torricos,

Attached please find the State's Memorandum Regarding Appealability in The State v. John Joey Mello (2022-001709). This will be submitted to the South Carolina Court of Appeals via the AIS One Drive System.

If you will, please reply to this email to confirm receipt.

Thank you!

CAROLINE COLLINS, Administrative Coordinator
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