

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE SUPREME COURT

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SC Court of Appeals

Certiorari to the Court of Appeals
Appeal from Greenville County
Edward W. Miller, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 5953 (S.C. Ct. App. Filed November 30, 2022)

Lower Court Case No. 2017-GS-23-01725, 2017-GS-23-01727

THE STATE,

RESPONDENT,

V.

NYQUAN TYKIE BROWN,

PETITIONER.

APPELLATE CASE NO. 2023-000166

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

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CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

Counsel for Petitioner certifies that the Petition for Rehearing was made and finally ruled on by the Court of Appeals on January 4, 2023.

QUESTION PRESENTED

Did the Court of Appeals err by holding the implied malice instruction given in this case—that malice can be inferred if one kills another during the commission of a felony—was not an impermissible comment on the facts and did not eliminate the state’s burden to prove malice, a crucial element of the offense of murder, beyond a reasonable doubt, and further that any error in giving the instruction was harmless because the only dispute was identity, not malice?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In December 2016, Karla Coleman and Whitney Parham, who were sisters, lived together in Apartment 31-B in Shemwood Crossing in Greenville. Coleman's two year old daughter and Parham's two young sons also lived in the apartment. R. 64, l. 13 – 65, l. 13; R. 82, ll. 11-23. Fred Anderson, a family friend, frequently slept on the couch in the living room downstairs. R. 65, ll. 14-20; R. 82, l. 24 – 83, l. 16. Anderson was known to sell marijuana. R. 72, ll. 9-14; R. 83, ll. 17-22.

Shortly after ten o'clock on the night of December 8, 2016, two masked men entered Coleman and Parham's apartment through the unlocked front door. R. 67, l. 20 – 68, l. 12. Anderson and Parham were sitting on a chair together with Coleman's daughter watching a movie. R. 66, ll. 2-14. Coleman and her boyfriend were upstairs along with Parham's sons. R. 66, ll. 15-21; R. 84, l. 16 – 85, l. 1. The masked men began demanding "weed and money" and ordered Anderson and Parham to get up. R. 71, ll. 3-25. The shorter of the two was armed with a pistol. R. 70, ll. 24-25. The men "went for the chair." Anderson stored his marijuana in a mason jar under a cushion in the chair. R. 72, ll. 1-19. Anderson ultimately gave the men the mason jar and thirty dollars in cash from his pocket. R. 73, ll. 5-16; R. 88, ll. 1-8.

Coleman's daughter was screaming. The men allowed Parham to bring the child upstairs. R. 73, l. 23 – 74, l. 6. After Parham gave the child to her mother and hid her sons in a closet, she went back downstairs so the masked men would not come looking for her. R. 74, ll. 7-19. Parham stood at the bottom of the stairwell. R. 74, ll. 20-22. While she could see the front door, her view of the living room was blocked. R. 74, ll. 23-25. The man with the gun was standing at the bottom of the stairs in front of Parham. R. 75, ll. 16-20. "He just stood there watching with the gun pointed" toward Anderson. R. 76, ll. 2-8. She heard the other man repeatedly ask,

“Where’s the wallet?” R. 75, ll. 1-5. Anderson said he did not carry a wallet. R. 75, ll. 6-8. Parham heard “commotion” and then “tussling.” R. 75, ll. 8-15. Anderson exclaimed, “I’m not going to fight you because your homeboy is going to shoot me.” R. 86, ll. 3-5. The armed man’s “hands started to shake.” R. 76, ll. 9-11. Parham started backing up because she “knew something bad was about to happen.” R. 76, ll. 12-17. As she was backing up, she heard multiple gunshots. R. 76, l. 21 – 77, l. 7. She ran upstairs and hid in the closet with her children. R. 77, ll. 8-14. She never looked back to see what happened. R. 77, ll. 12-14.

After the masked men fled, Coleman called 911. R. 77, ll. 15-20. Parham went back downstairs. She found Anderson laying at the bottom of the stairs near the front door. He was unresponsive. R. 78, l. 16 – 79, l. 7; R. 30, l. 11 – 31, l. 5. Anderson suffered three gunshot wounds, two to the chest and one to the left upper arm. R. 96, l. 23 – 97, l. 3. He succumbed to his injuries before emergency medical services arrived and was pronounced dead at the scene. R. 61, l. 23 – 62, l. 14.

Shortly after the robbery, law enforcement viewed the surveillance footage from the apartment complex. It showed the two masked men flee the scene on foot. As they were running, the suspects were flagged down by an individual from Apartment 329-C. R. 140, ll. 5-20; R. 32, ll. 2-12. The suspects entered this apartment and remained inside for nearly two minutes before leaving again on foot. R. 140, ll. 20-25. Given this evidence, officers conducted a “knock and talk” at Apartment 329-C. R. 32, ll. 8-17; R. 141, ll. 7-14; R. 208, ll. 1-15.

When officers knocked on the door, they could see individuals running toward the back of the apartment. R. 38, ll. 2-14. Two women eventually answered the door. R. 32, l. 18 – 33, l. 5; R. 38, ll. 15-17. They admitted there were also two men inside. After the officers called to

the men, they ultimately came out as well. R. 33, ll. 1-6; R. 38, ll. 18-21. The men were identified as Jonathan Suber-Perry and Jovante Dodd, who were brothers. R. 209, ll. 13-16.

Both Suber-Perry and Dodd, who were placed in investigative detention, denied that any individuals entered their apartment prior to the officers knocking on the door. R. 210, l. 25 – 211, l. 9. Dodd’s girlfriend, the lessee, consented to a search of the apartment. However, law enforcement found nothing of evidentiary value inside. R. 209, ll. 5-23.

Two or three days later, an investigator was watching the surveillance footage from the apartment complex around the timeframe of the shooting. R. 215, ll. 8-17. About thirty minutes before the shooting, he observed a car park in front of Building 329. The passenger from this car met with a man, later identified as Suber-Perry, standing at the open door of Apartment 329-C. The two entered the apartment. R. 215, ll. 22. A couple of minutes later, the two left the apartment and walked down the street “just a little bit.” Suber-Perry then pointed toward Coleman’s apartment where Anderson was staying. R. 215, l. 22 – 216, l. 9. The passenger then returned to the car, which drove off, and Suber-Perry went back into Apartment 329-C. R. 216, ll. 10-13.

Suber-Perry was arrested on December 13, 2016. He gave multiple inconsistent statements to the police. However, he ultimately identified Petitioner as the individual to whom he met with before the shooting. R. 221, l. 9 – 222, l. 18; R. 229, l. 2 – 231, l. 7.

Suber-Perry, who was eighteen in December 2016, was charged with murder, armed robbery, and obstruction of justice related to this case. The day before Petitioner’s trial, he pled guilty to obstruction of justice. However, his sentencing was deferred until after he testified against Petitioner. R. 158, l. 3 – 159, l. 5. Suber-Perry admitted he hoped his pending murder and armed robbery charges would be dismissed as a result of his cooperation. R. 177, ll. 8-10.

In addition to his charges related to this case, Suber-Purry also had two pending burglary charges for which he was out on bond for when this incident occurred. R. 158, ll. 16-21; R. 175, ll. 3-6.

Suber-Purry's brother, Jovante Dodd, lived in Apartment 329-C in Shemwood Crossing. R. 159, ll. 6-18. On December 8, 2016, Suber-Purry was at the apartment with his brother, his brother's girlfriend, Natalie Norris, and another woman. R. 159, l. 17 – 160, l. 8. Suber-Purry knew Fred Anderson. Anderson was his cousin. He knew Anderson stayed at Apartment 31-B and he knew he sold marijuana. Suber-Purry also knew Coleman. He had gone to high school with her. R. 161, l. 15 -162, l. 9.

Suber-Purry testified that his brother had an "altercation" with Anderson. They had argued "about something." R. 164, ll. 5-9. Suber-Purry later clarified that the disagreement concerned Anderson "selling a little weed and getting a little money." R. 165, ll. 2-5. Dodd "wanted to knock Fred [Anderson] off his high horse." Suber-Purry claimed Petitioner "was the person" who was "sent up there to rob Fred [Anderson]." R. 164, ll. 5-12. About thirty minutes before the shooting, Suber-Purry admitted he pointed out Coleman's apartment, where Anderson was staying, to Petitioner. R. 162, l. 16 – 163, l. 5; R. 165, l. 17-19.

After the shooting, Suber-Purry and Dodd were waiting at the back door of their apartment, 329-C. They saw Petitioner and the other masked man running. Suber-Purry stopped them. All four men entered the apartment. Dodd asked them what happened. Before they could respond, Suber-Purry claimed he went upstairs. R. 167, ll. 9-25. When he came back downstairs, he saw Petitioner and the other man leaving. R. 170, ll. 4-9. Suber-Purry claimed he never saw a gun, either before or after the shooting. R. 170, ll. 1-25.

The state argued Petitioner was the shooter based on his height. Parham identified the shooter as the shorter of the two men. She claimed the shooter was shorter than her. She was

five feet and five inches tall. R. 68, l. 11 – 71, l. 2. Suber-Purry claimed Petitioner was short. R. 168, ll. 22-23. The other suspect was never identified. R. 168, ll. 9-21.

A Greenville County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner on October 31, 2017 for murder, armed robbery, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. R. 358. His case was called to trial on September 3, 2019 before the Honorable Edward W. Miller, and a jury. R. 1. Assistant Solicitor Mark Moyer represented the state, and Thomas Quinn represented Petitioner. R. 1. On September 5, 2019, the jury found Petitioner guilty as indicted. R. 353, ll. 3-17. He was sentenced to forty-five years for murder, thirty years for armed robbery, and five years for the weapons offense. The judge ordered all sentences be served concurrently. R. 357, ll. 12-17.

How the Issue was Presented Below

During the charge conference, the state requested the trial judge charge the jury that “malice can be inferred if one kills another during the commission of a felony.” R. 290, ll. 6-7. Defense counsel objected to the proposed instruction arguing the charge reduced the state’s burden of proof. He contended the instruction relieved the state from having to prove malice, an element of murder, beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury could merely infer malice if the killing occurred during the commission of a felony. R. 290, ll. 8-20. Defense counsel also argued the instruction was an impermissible comment on the facts. R. 290, ll. 21-22. He asserted the proposed instruction informed the jury that the offense before them is a felony and improperly suggested that a felony had been committed. R. 290, l. 23 – 291, l. 2. In so arguing, defense counsel emphasized that our Supreme Court “is starting to make clear [its] difficulty with inferences” such as the one proposed. R. 290, ll. 12-13.

Referencing the felony murder rule, the assistant solicitor argued “the law is pretty well settled that if a homicide happens during the course of a . . . felony, then it is murder. Your Honor is going to instruct the jury that armed robbery and murder are violent crimes.” R. 291, ll. 13-19.

The judge acknowledged that defense counsel “could be correct with respect to the direction in which the Supreme Court’s headed” but maintained the Court had not “gotten there yet” and this case could give it the “opportunity to get there.” R. 291, ll. 22-24. He ultimately overruled Petitioner’s objection to the state’s proposed charge finding ‘it’s the current state of the law.’ R. 291, l. 25 – 292, l. 2.

State’s Closing Argument

During his closing argument to the jury, the assistant solicitor argued:

Now, what is murder? Murder is the killing of a person [with] malice aforethought, either expressed or implied. Armed robbery is taking goods or property from the person of another through force or violence while armed with either a real gun or a fake gun. I would spend some time going over that. I don’t see the need to in this case because **I don’t think there’s any question that Fred Anderson was murdered. And it happened during an armed robbery. That means the element of malice has already been subsumed [sic] due to the fact that it [the killing] happened during a felony.**

In other words, *if you kill somebody while committing the type of felony where death is a possible or foreseeable outcome, it’s homicide. It’s a murder. We have all of that here.* Fred was robbed of money, he was robbed of a little marijuana, probably his phone. His phone was gone, that was probably gone as well. **He was robbed and then he was shot.**

R. 316, l. 21 – 317, l. 14 (emphasis added).

Jury Charge

When instructing the jury on murder, the trial judge explained the state must prove malice. R. 347, ll. 22-25. The judge defined malice as “hatred, ill will, or hostility towards another person. It is the intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse and

with an intent to inflict an injury or under circumstances that the law will infer an evil intent.” R. 347, 1. 25 – 348, 1. 5. He further instructed the jury that:

[M]alice aforethought may be expressed or inferred. These terms expressed and inferred do not mean different kinds of malice but merely the manner in which malice may be shown to exist. That is either by direct evidence or by inference from the facts and circumstances which are proved. Expressed malice is shown when a person speaks words which express hatred or ill will for another or when the person prepared beforehand to do the act which was later accomplished. Malice may also be inferred from conduct showing a total disregard for human life. **Malice can be inferred if one killed another during the commission of a felony.** Now, [if] the facts are proved beyond a reasonable doubt sufficient to raise an inference of malice to your satisfaction, this inference would be simply an evidentiary fact to be considered by you, along with all the other evidence in the case. And you give it the weight that you decide it should receive.

R. 348, 1. 12 – 349, 1. 5 (emphasis added).

Appeal

On appeal, Petitioner argued the trial judge erred by charging the jury that “malice can be inferred if one kills another during the commission of a felony” since the instruction eliminated the state’s burden to prove malice, a crucial element of the offense of murder, beyond a reasonable doubt, and was an impermissible comment on the facts. After hearing argument, the Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentence. State v. Brown, 438 S.C. 146, 881 S.E.2d 771 (Ct. App. 2022).

In its published opinion filed on November 30, 2022, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that “a line of cases suggests [the charge] may be improper because it arguably emphasizes a particular fact in evidence—the commission of a felony.” Id. at 149, 881 S.E.2d at 772. However, the court refused to “reach that question” and instead held that if the charge was error, the error was harmless. Id. The court determined that the “core dispute in this case was identity.” Id. at 151, 881 S.E.2d at 773. It contended that nobody disputed that the “killing was

unprovoked and deliberate,” that an armed robbery occurred, or that the decedent’s “killing lacked malice.” Id. While recognizing the state always bears the burden of proving all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, the court stated it was “not persuaded that an instruction about drawing an inference of malice had any bearing on a case where the undisputed evidence is that an unarmed victim was shot multiple times after he expressly disclaimed any intent to defend himself.” Id.

Despite acknowledging that the court “need not go further to resolve this case” given its holding that any error was harmless, the Court of Appeals proceeded to analyze whether the challenged instruction was an impermissible comment on the facts or burden shifting. Id. at 151, 881 S.E.2d at 774. The court concluded the charge was not a comment on the facts because the instruction did “not imply the circuit court believed Brown [Petitioner] committed an armed robbery.” Id. at 152, 881 S.E.2d at 774. Additionally, the charge did “not suggest the court was attempting to influence the jury to find malice in this particular way, nor did it encourage the jury to give evidence of the robbery any special weight.” Id. After discussing this Court’s opinions in Gore v. Leeke, 261 S.C. 308, 199 S.E.2d 755 (1973), State v. Norris, 285 S.C. 86, 328 S.E.2d 339 (1985), and Lowry v. State, 376 S.C. 499, 657 S.E.2d 760 (2008), the Court of Appeals emphasized that it was unable to “read Gore together with Lowry and Norris and reach a clear conclusion about how felony murder applies in South Carolina and what (if anything) a circuit court should charge with respect to that doctrine.” Id. at 153, 881 S.E.2d at 775.

As to burden shifting, the Court of Appeals maintained that “inference charges are not burden-shifting if they are permissive and not mandatory.” Id. at 154, 881 S.E.2d at 775. In support of this holding, the court cited to Lowry v. State, 376 S.C. 499, 657 S.E.2d 760 (2008); State v. Norris, 285 S.C. 86, 328 S.E.2d 339 (1985), *overruled by* State v. Belcher, 385 S.C. 597,

685 S.E.2d 802 (2009); and State v. Wilds, 355 S.C. 269, 584 S.E.2d 138 (Ct. App. 2003), all of which preceded this Court’s decisions in State v. Burdette, 427 S.C. 490, 832 S.E.2d 575 (2019) (holding courts could no longer instruct juries that they may infer malice from the use of a deadly weapon); State v. Cheeks, 401 S.C. 322, 737 S.E.2d 480 (2013) (invalidating the instruction that knowledge of the presence of drugs is strong evidence of intent to control the disposition or use of drugs); State v. Stukes, 416 S.C. 493, 787 S.E.2d 480 (2016) (invalidating the instruction that the accuser’s testimony in a criminal sexual conduct case need not be corroborated); State v. Stewart, 433 S.C. 382, 858 S.E.2d 808 (2021) (involving an instruction about knowledge or possession of drugs when drugs are found on property under the defendant’s control); and Pantovich v. State, 427 S.C. 555, 832 S.E.2d 596 (2019) (involving an instruction on good character alone). Id.

On December 15, 2022, Petitioner filed a petition for rehearing. App. 8. By order filed January 4, 2023, the Court of Appeals denied the petition. App. 19.

Because the Court of Appeals erred by holding the implied malice instruction given in this case—that malice can be inferred if one kills another during the commission of a felony—was not an impermissible comment on the facts and did not eliminate the state’s burden to prove malice beyond a reasonable doubt, and further that any error in giving the instruction was harmless, this petition for writ of certiorari follows.

ARGUMENT

The Court of Appeals erred by holding the implied malice instruction given in this case—that malice can be inferred if one kills another during the commission of a felony—was not an impermissible comment on the facts and did not eliminate the state’s burden to prove malice, a crucial element of the offense of murder, beyond a reasonable doubt, and further that any error in giving the instruction was harmless because the only dispute was identity, not malice.

As the Court of Appeals recognized, “this is the first case that has called on [the appellate court] to apply [this Court’s] ‘elevating a fact’ cases to felony murder.” Brown, 438 S.C. at 151, 881 S.E.2d at 774. After discussing this Court’s opinions in Gore v. Leeke, 261 S.C. 308, 199 S.E.2d 755 (1973), State v. Norris, 285 S.C. 86, 328 S.E.2d 339 (1985), and Lowry v. State, 376 S.C. 499, 657 S.E.2d 760 (2008), the Court of Appeals emphasized that it was unable to “read Gore together with Lowry and Norris and reach a clear conclusion about how felony murder applies in South Carolina and what (if anything) a circuit court should charge with respect to that doctrine.” Id. at 153, 881 S.E.2d at 775. Respectfully, pursuant to Rule 242(b), this Court should grant certiorari for the benefit of the bench and the bar, hold the implied malice instruction given in this case is erroneous, and it should no longer be permitted.

The trial court erred by charging the jury that “malice can be inferred if one kills another during the commission of a felony” since this instruction eliminated the state’s burden of proving malice, a critical element of the offense of murder, beyond a reasonable doubt and was an impermissible comment on the facts. See S.C. Const. art. V, § 21 (“Judges shall not charge juries in respect to matters of fact but shall declare the law.”); State v. Stukes, 416 S.C. 493, 499, 787 S.E.2d 480, 483 (2016).

The Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution require the state prove each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Brown, 360 S.C. 581, 595, 602 S.E.2d 392, 400 (2004) (“[T]he United States Supreme Court recently has re-emphasized the constitutional protections of surpassing importance contained in the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause and the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, which indisputably entitle a defendant to a jury determination that he is guilty of every element of the crime which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (“[W]e explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”). When a jury charge creates a mandatory presumption and impermissibly shifts the burden of proof to the defendant, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524 (1979); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 703-704 (1975).

In 1985, this Court promulgated a jury charge on implied malice and the felony murder rule. State v. Norris, 285 S.C. 86, 92, 328 S.E.2d 339, 342-343 (1985). The underlying felony in Norris was criminal sexual conduct. Id. at 89, 328 S.E.2d at 341. The trial court in Norris gave the following felony murder charge:

The law also allows the jury to infer malice if you conclude that the homicide was a proximate, direct result of the commission of a felony. And for that regard, criminal sexual conduct in the first degree would be a felony under our law. You can imply that malice existed if a person is in the commission of a felony at the time of the fatal blow.

Id. at 91, 328 S.E.2d at 342 (emphasis removed).

While this Court found no error in the trial court’s instruction, it suggested its own “proper charge on implied malice.” Id. at 92, 328 S.E.2d at 343. The instruction stated:

The law says if one intentionally kills another during the commission of a felony, the implication of malice may arise. If facts are proved beyond a reasonable doubt, sufficient to raise an inference of malice to your satisfaction, this inference would be simply an evidentiary fact to be taken into consideration by you, the jury, along with other evidence in the case, and you may give it such weight as you determine it should receive.

Id. (citing State v. Elmore, 279 S.C. 417, 308 S.E.2d 781 (1983) (suggested charge on implied malice from use of a deadly weapon)). This Court’s citation to Elmore for its implied malice instruction indicates it created the charge from the inference of malice from the use of a deadly weapon. Id.

In State v. Belcher, 385 S.C. 597, 612, 685 S.E.2d 802, 810 (2009), having carefully scrutinized the historical antecedents of the charge, this Court held trial courts could no longer give the inferred malice from the use of a deadly weapon instruction in cases in which evidence was presented that would reduce, mitigate, excuse, or justify a homicide or an assault and battery with intent to kill. The Court recently extended the holding in Belcher in State v. Burdette, 427 S.C. 490, 503, 832 S.E.2d 575, 582 (2019), to prohibit trial courts from ever instructing juries that malice may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon “regardless of the evidence presented at trial.”

Burdette was indicted and tried for murder and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime after he shot and killed Evan Tyner. Id. at 493, 832 S.E.2d at 577. Burdette maintained the shooting was an accident. Id. The trial court ultimately charged the jury on murder, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, and accident. Id. at 493-494, 832 S.E.2d at 577. Citing Belcher, Burdette objected to the court’s proposed instruction that inferred malice could arise when a deadly weapon is used arguing the instruction was improper because there was evidence presented that could reduce, excuse, justify, or mitigate the homicide. Id.

The jury found Burdette not guilty of murder but guilty of voluntary manslaughter and the weapons offense. Id. at 494, 832 S.E.2d at 578.

This Court held the trial court erred in charging the jury that malice could be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon in light of Belcher since there was evidence presented at trial that tended to reduce, mitigate, or justify Burdette's killing of the decedent. Id. at 495, 832 S.E.2d at 578. The Court further held this error was not harmless given the jury instructions as a whole because even though Burdette was acquitted of murder and found guilty of voluntary manslaughter, the trial court did not specifically inform the jury that malice was not an element of voluntary manslaughter. Id. at 501, 832 S.E.2d at 581.

This Court emphasized that it had previously "held in other settings that it is improper to give examples of conduct the jury may consider when determining whether the State has proven an element of a crime or when determining whether certain other facts have been proven or disproven." Id. at 502, 832 S.E.2d at 582 (citing State v. Grant, 275 S.C. 404, 407-408, 272 S.E.2d 169, 171 (1980) (holding it was improper for the trial judge to charge the jury that the defendant's flight may be considered as evidence of guilt); State v. Hughey, 339 S.C. 439, 452, 529 S.E.2d 721, 728 (2000) (holding, in a voluntary manslaughter case, the trial court correctly refused the defendant's request to charge the jury specific examples of conduct that might be considered as evidence of legal provocation, as the giving of such examples would be an impermissible charge on the facts), *overruled on other grounds by* Rosemond v. Catoe, 383 S.C. 320, 680 S.E.2d 5 (2009); State v. Cheeks, 401 S.C. 322, 328-329, 737 S.E.2d 480, 484 (2013) (holding, in a drug trafficking case, that the trial court must not charge the jury that actual knowledge of the presence of a drug is strong evidence of a defendant's intent to control its disposition or use)).

The Court asserted, “In Cheeks, we noted, ‘Simply because certain facts may be considered by the jury as evidence of guilt in a given case where the circumstances warrant, it does not follow that [the jury] should be charged that these facts are probative of guilt. It is always for the jury to determine the facts, and the inferences that are to be drawn from these facts.’” Id. at 502, 832 S.E.2d at 582 (quoting Cheeks, 401 S.C. at 328, 737 S.E.2d at 484). The Court further explained, “When the trial court tells the jury it may use evidence of the use of a deadly weapon to establish the existence of malice, a critical element of the charge of murder, the trial court has directly commented upon facts in evidence, elevated those facts, and emphasized them to the jury. . . . A jury instruction that malice may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon is an improper court-sponsored emphasis of a fact in evidence—that the deed was done with a deadly weapon—and it should no longer be permitted.” Id. at 502-503, 832 S.E.2d at 582.

Despite holding the trial court should never instruct the jury that it may infer malice when the deed was done with a deadly weapon, the Court made clear that the state and the defendant are free to argue the existence or nonexistence of malice based on the evidence in the record, including evidence that the act was done with a deadly weapon and “any other facts that would naturally and logically allow a jury to conclude the defendant acted with malice aforethought.” Id. at 503, 832 S.E.2d at 582.

Subsequently, in State v. Smith, 430 S.C. 226, 845 S.E.2d 495 (2020), this Court held the trial court erred by instructing the jury on implied malice. Smith shot a young woman in Five Points in downtown Columbia. It was undisputed that Smith did not intend to harm her. Id. at 228, 845 S.E.2d at 496. Rather, Smith maintained he was acting in self-defense by shooting at a group of men who had threatened him. Id. Smith missed his intended target and hit the young

woman by accident. Id. Smith was charged with the attempted murder of the young woman and a host of other gun related charges, including possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony. Id. At trial, Smith conceded guilt to the felon in possession offense, but denied the attempted murder charge arguing he acted in self-defense. Id. at 229, 845 S.E.2d at 496. In so doing, Smith implicitly acknowledged he had an express intent to kill the men at whom he was shooting, but asserted his actions were justified. Id.

Despite conceding Smith presented evidence that he acted in self-defense, the state requested the trial court charge the jury on implied malice. Id. Pursuant to Belcher, the law at the time of trial precluded an implied malice charge (based on the use of a deadly weapon) when a viable self-defense claim existed. Id. “Perhaps recognizing this, the State sought to create a new category of implied malice for ‘felony attempted murder,’ with the predicate felony being the felon in possession charge.” Id. The Court held, in requesting this charge, the state essentially circumvented then existing law expressly precluding an implied malice charge. Id. The trial court ultimately charged the jury:

“Now, the law also allows you to infer malice if you conclude that the attempted murder was a proximate direct result of the commission of a felony. And for that regard, two of the gun charges, possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a crime of violence and possession of a weapon by a person convicted of a violent felony, would be felonies under our law. You can imply that malice existed if a person in the commission of a felony at the time of the attempted fatal blow - - if one attempts to kill another during the commission of a felony, the inference of malice may arise.

Id. at 232, 845 S.E.2d at 498.

This Court concluded the trial court erred by instructing the jury on implied malice given the holding in Belcher and the fact that felony attempted murder is not a recognized crime. Id. at 232-233, 845 S.E.2d at 498. Further, the Court held the error could not be harmless because the implied malice instruction “essentially eliminated [the state’s] burden to prove all of the

elements of attempted murder beyond a reasonable doubt, specifically that Smith acted with malice aforethought.” Id. at 233, 845 S.E.2d at 498.

Moreover, this Court held trial courts may no longer give an implied malice charge when there has been evidence presented that the defendant acted in self-defense. Id. at 234, 845 S.E.2d at 499. The Court noted that this holding is slightly different than the holding in Burdette where the Court found an implied malice charge based on the use of a deadly weapon could never be given. Id. at 230 n.3, 845 S.E.2d at 496 n.3.

In this case, the trial court violated Petitioner’s right to due process of law pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, by shifting the burden of proof to Petitioner and eliminating the state’s burden to prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The implied malice instruction given in this case, like the instructions in Burdette and Smith, alleviated the state from having to prove malice. Instead, all the state was required to prove was that Anderson was killed during the commission of a felony.

The Court of Appeals erroneously found the charge given in this case was not burden shifting because it was “permissive and not mandatory.” Brown, 438 S.C. at 154, 881 S.E.2d at 775. However, the instruction in Smith held to be improper by this Court in part because it eliminated the state’s burden to prove malice beyond a reasonable doubt also included the permissive language charged in this case. See State v. Smith, 425 S.C. 20, 43-44, 819 S.E.2d 187, 199 (Ct. App. 2018). Consequently, unlike the Court of Appeals concluded, despite the permissive language, the charge was erroneous because it eliminated the state’s burden to prove malice beyond a reasonable doubt.

Moreover, by instructing the jury that it could use evidence of the commission of a felony to establish the existence of malice, the trial court directly commented upon facts in evidence,

elevated those facts, and emphasized them to the jury. A jury instruction that malice may be inferred if one kills another during the commission of a felony is an improper emphasis of a fact in evidence—that the act was done during the commission of a felony—and it should no longer be permitted. See Burdette, 427 S.C. at 502-503, 832 S.E.2d at 582.

Harmless Error

Additionally, unlike the Court of Appeals held, the error in charging the jury on implied malice could not be harmless. “An erroneous instruction alone is insufficient to warrant this Court’s reversal.” Burdette, 427 S.C. at 496, 832 S.E.2d at 578. “Errors, including erroneous jury instructions, are subject to harmless error analysis.” Id. (quoting Belcher, 385 S.C. at 611, 685 S.E.2d at 809) (internal quotation marks omitted). “When considering whether an error with respect to a jury instruction was harmless, [this Court] must determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict.” Id. (quoting State v. Middleton, 407 S.C. 312, 317, 755 S.E.2d 432, 435 (2014)); See State v. Kerr, 330 S.C. 132, 144-45, 498 S.E.2d 212, 218 (Ct. App. 1998). “In making a harmless error analysis, [the] inquiry is not what the verdict would have been had the jury been given the correct charge, but whether the erroneous charge contributed to the verdict rendered.” Id. (quoting Middleton, 407 S.C. at 317, 755 S.E.2d at 435).

The assistant solicitor’s argument in closing is sufficient evidence that the erroneous charge on implied malice contributed to verdict. After defining murder, the assistant solicitor argued there was no “question that Fred Anderson [the decedent] was murdered” because the element of malice was presumed given that the killing happened during the commission of a felony. R. 316, l. 21 – 317, l. 6. He asserted, “In other words, *if you kill somebody while committing the type of felony where death is a possible or foreseeable outcome, it’s . . . a*

murder. We have all of that here. Fred was robbed of money, he was robbed of a little marijuana, probably his phone . . . **He was robbed and then he was shot.**” R. 317, ll. 7-14 (emphasis added). Given the solicitor’s argument, there is a reasonable probability the jury understood the instruction to mean that the element of malice was met simply because the killing occurred during the commission of an armed robbery, a felony.

Moreover, while the evidence suggested that the armed robbery was planned, there was no evidence that the killing was likewise planned. Despite what the Court of Appeals concluded, there was evidence that the decedent and one of the perpetrators were engaged in a struggle when the shots were fired and that the shooter’s hands were shaking immediately before the shooting took place, suggesting the shooter was nervous and only fired because he did not know what else to do or was trying to protect his associate, not because he was acting with malice. See R. 75, ll. 8-15; R. 76, ll. 9-11.

Respectfully, given the erroneous jury instruction, which was an impermissible comment on the facts and eliminated the state’s burden of proving every element of the offense of murder beyond a reasonable doubt, this Court should grant certiorari, reverse Petitioner’s convictions and sentence, and remand for a new trial.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing argument, Petitioner respectfully requests this Court grant the petition for writ of certiorari and order full briefing on the question presented. Petitioner ultimately requests this Court reverse his convictions and sentence and remand for a new trial.

Respectfully Submitted,

s/ Lara M. Caudy
Lara M. Caudy
Appellate Defender

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

This 21st day of February, 2023.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE SUPREME COURT

RECEIVED
Feb 21 2023
SC Court of Appeals

Certiorari to the Court of Appeals
Appeal from Greenville County
Edward W. Miller, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 5953 (S.C. Ct. App. filed November 30, 2022)
Lower Court Case Nos. 2017-GS-23-01725, 2017-GS-23-01727

THE STATE,

RESPONDENT,

V.

NYQUAN TYKIE BROWN,

PETITIONER.

APPELLATE CASE NO. 2023-000166

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to Rule 262(a)(3) and Rule 262(c)(3), SCACR, the undersigned hereby certifies a true copy of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeals and a copy of the Appendix in this case have been served on Julianna E. Battenfield, Esquire, at the primary email address listed in the Attorney Information System (AIS); and Nyquan Tykie Brown, #381299, at Evans Correctional Institution, 610 Highway 9 West, Bennettsville, SC 29512; and the South Carolina Court of Appeals, this 21st day of February, 2023.

s/ Lara M. Caudy

Lara M. Caudy
Appellate Defender

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

From: [Bryant, Hannah](#)
To: juliannabattenfield@scag.gov; [Angela Brown](#); [Caudy, Lara](#)
Subject: Nyquan Brown Petition for Writ of Certiorari Appellate Case No. 2023-000166
Date: Tuesday, February 21, 2023 3:11:00 PM
Attachments: [2023-000166 - State v. Nyquan Brown - Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeals.pdf](#)
[2023-000166 - State v. Nyquan Brown - Appendix.pdf](#)

Dear Ms. Battenfield,

Please find attached for service a copy of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari and accompanying appendix in the above referenced case, which will be filed with the Supreme Court today.

Hannah Bryant

Administrative Assistant
South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense
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