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SC Court of Appeals

IN THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In the Court of Appeals

APPEAL FROM YORK COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas

Teasa K. Weaver, Master-in-Equity

C.A. No.: 2020-CP-46-00549
Appellate Case No. 2022-001650

LB PARK, LLCRespondent,

v.

San Juan Holdings, Bret Osborne, the trustee; Brett Osborne as Trustee of San Juan Holdings; Ryan Powell; and John Doe and Mary Roe, representing all unknown persons having or claiming to have any right, title, or interest in or to, or lien upon, the real estate described as 250056 Timberlake Drive, York County, South Carolina, TMS 643-10-01-023, their heirs and assigns, and all other persons, firms, or corporations entitled to claim under, by or through the abovenamed Defendant(s), and all other persons or entities unknown claiming any right, title, interest, estate in, or lien upon, the real estate described as 25056 Timberlake Drive, York County, South Carolina, TMS 643-10-01-023 Defendants.

of whom Ryan Powell is theAppellant.

RETURN TO “EXPEDITED MOTION TO REDUCE OR ELIMINATE APPEAL BOND”

LB PARK, LLC (“LB Park” or “Respondent”) submits this return in response to the “Expedited Motion to Reduce or Eliminate Appeal Bond” submitted by Ryan Powell on March 7, 2023.¹ This is Powell’s fourth request for supersedeas relief. The Court denied Powell’s three

¹ LB Park incorporates by reference its opposition filed on December 8, 2022, February 9, 2023 and February 24, 2023 to Powell’s previous supersedeas requests.

prior motions/ petitions by orders dated December 15, 2022, February 9, 2023, and March 2, 2023. The Court should deny this request as well.

Powell's arguments lack merit. As set forth by LB PARK in its December 8, 2022 "Return to Verified Emergency Ex Parte Petition for Injunction" (and without reattaching the referenced exhibit):

This case stems from LB Park's years long efforts to quiet tax title and to obtain possession of 25056 Timberlake Drive, York County, South Carolina, TMS 643-10-01-023 (the "Property"). LB Park was the successful bidder for the Property at a tax sale held on November 6, 2017.

In its complaint, LB Park alleged:

16. Plaintiff is further informed and believes that upon the Court's issuance of its order declaring and confirming that Plaintiff's title is free and clear of such adverse interests and encumbrances or other claims to the Property, if any, as are or may be claimed or asserted by any of the defendants, Plaintiff is entitled to immediate possession of the Property, and that any tenants or parties in possession of the Property, must be evicted from and vacate the Property within a reasonable time to be determined by this Court.

(Complaint attached as Ex. 1). In its prayer for relief, LB Park sought the following:

1. With respect to Plaintiff's First Cause of Action, Plaintiff prays that judgment be entered in its favor against the defendants with a finding by the Court that any right, title, claim, interest, or lien in or to the Property arising from the interests of any of the defendants in the Property that they now claim or may claim in the future, be found to be junior or subsequent to Plaintiff's title, and that Plaintiff be provided a final and complete adjudication of the nature and extent of its title to the Property so that it may own, possess, and transfer clear title to the Property; *and that judgment be entered in Plaintiff's favor against the defendants and any other tenants or parties in possession of the Property with a finding by the Court that Plaintiff is entitled to immediate possession of the Property and ordering the York County Sheriff to evict and remove any tenants or parties in possession of the Property from the Property within a reasonable time as determined by the Court.*

2. With respect to Plaintiff's First Alternative Cause of Action, and only in the event that the tax sale of the Property is set aside or declared void, Plaintiff prays

that judgment be entered in its favor against the party challenging the tax sale with a finding by the Court that Plaintiff is entitled to a refund of the tax sale bid, all Property taxes paid, all costs justly chargeable against the Property, and legal interest on the tax sale bid at the rate of 12% from the date of the tax sale on November 6, 2017, until paid, as provided in S.C. Code Ann. §§ 12-51-90, -100, together with pre-judgment interest, and that the Court order the party challenging the tax sale of the Property to refund these amounts to Plaintiff.

3. With respect to Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action, Plaintiff prays that judgment be entered declaring and reforming the Tax Deed, the quitclaim deed to Plaintiff, and all previous deeds in the chain of title to reflect the correct recording information for the Plat, which is Plat Book 73 at Pages 23-26.

4. Plaintiff also prays that the Court award it such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

(*Id.* (emphasis added)). Thus, possession of the Property has always been at issue in this case.

The matter was referred to the Master without limitation by order dated August 20, 2020. As such, the Master had "all power and authority which a circuit judge sitting without a jury would have in a similar matter." Rule 53, SCRPC.

The Master's order treats Powell's litigation history with respect to the Property in detail, including his repeated efforts to avoid the payment of property taxes dating back to 2014 and his efforts to delay a merits determination as to LB Park. (Order at 4-14). In the meantime, LB Park has not been able to take physical possession of the Property, nor has it received any payments for the fair rental value of the Property.

In the order on appeal, the Master granted the requested relief to LB Park, including ordering the delivery of possession of the Property. (Order at 26-28). Orders of this type are exceptions to the automatic stay that generally attaches with

a notice of appeal. *See* Rule 241(b), SCACR; S.C. Code Ann. § 18-9-170. The Master specifically addressed the issue of a stay as follows:

In the event that Powell appeals any ruling in this Final Order and as requested by Plaintiff at the hearing, the Court finds that there is no automatic stay applicable and the Property must be delivered to the Plaintiff. *See generally* Rule 261, SCACR. The ordered relief will only be stayed if Powell provides the bond required by S.C. Code Ann. § 18-9-170, which provides in relevant part:

If the judgment appealed from direct the . . . delivery of possession of real property, the execution of the judgment shall not be stayed unless a written undertaking be executed on the part of the appellant, with two sureties, to the effect that during the possession of such property by the appellant he will not commit or suffer to be committed any waste thereon and that if the judgment be affirmed he will pay the value of the use and occupation of the property from the time of the execution of the undertaking until the delivery of possession thereof pursuant to the judgment, not exceeding a sum to be fixed by a judge of the court by which judgment was rendered and which shall be specified in the undertaking.

S.C. Code Ann. § 18-9-170.

The Court finds that a bond in the amount of \$180,000.00 is appropriate. This amount is based on a monthly rental value of \$3,000 per month for a period of five years.

(Order at 23-24).

Those conditions have not been met by the Appellant. Powell has yet to make any real attempt to comply with S.C. Code Ann. § 18-9-170 or the trial court's order.

In setting the amount of the required bond, the trial court accepted the rental value presented by LB Park at the hearing. No evidence was presented to the contrary. The five-year period was taken from Powell's "Reply to LB PARK's Memorandum in Opposition to Ryan's Powell's Motion for Continuance" (attached as Exhibit A), which states that there would be "2 to 5 years or more for appeals and collateral attacks" if the merits hearing went forward. Based on

Powell's timeline and the rental value suggested by LB PARK, the Court settled on \$180,000.² The trial court's ruling was well within its discretion pursuant to Rule 62, SCRCP and Rule 241, SCACR and is consistent with S.C. Code Ann. § 18-9-170.

This is just another in a series of efforts by Powell dating back many years to retain possession of the property in question without paying a dime. LB PARK asks that the motion be denied immediately, and for such other and further relief as may be awarded by the Court, including, but not limited to, an award of sanctions pursuant to Rule 269, SCACR.

Respectfully submitted,

HAYNSWORTH SINKLER BOYD, P.A.

s/ Sarah P. Spruill

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Attorneys for Respondent

LB PARK, LLC

March 9, 2023

² There is no basis for accepting Zillow as the arbiter of real estate values as a matter for judicial notice pursuant to Rule 201, SCRE. Real estate values are not a matter “not subject to reasonable dispute.” Nor are they generally known and capable of “accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be questioned.”

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF YORK

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

Case # 2020-CP-46-00549

LB PARK, LLC, Plaintiff

v.

San Juan Holdings, Brett Osborne, the trustee;
Brett Osborne as Trustee of San Juan Holdings;
Ryan Powell; and John Doe and Mary Roe,
representing all unknown persons having or
claiming to have any right, title, or interest in or
to, or lien upon, the real estate described as
25056 Timberlake Drive, York County, South
Carolina, TMS 643-10-001-023, their heirs and
assigns, and all other persons, firms, or
corporations entitled to claim under, by or
through the above named Defendant(s), and all
other persons or entities unknown claiming any
right, title, interest, estate in, or lien upon the
real estate described as 25056 Timberlake Drive,
York County, South Carolina, TMS 643-10-01-023,
Defendants.

**Reply to LB PARK's Memorandum
in Opposition to Ryan Powell's
Motion for Continuance**

FILED-RECEIVED
2022 SEP 19 PM 1:43
DAVID HAMILTON
C.C.P. & GS
YORK COUNTY, SC

Ryan Powell, the owner of the property at issue ("Owner") makes this Reply to LB PARK's Memorandum in Opposition to Ryan Powell's Motion for Continuance. This Court must grant Owner's Motion for Continuance as shown in that motion and also as further shown herein.

Granting of a Continuance

LB PARK's Memorandum in Opposition is 8 pages long and has 176 pages of frivolous exhibits attached to it. The entire 184 pages of that memorandum fraudulently accuses Owner of being solely responsible for the time this case has taken to reach a final hearing.

Plaintiff blames Owner for the time and costs of an appeal that he was required to take in Plaintiff's 2019 case because Plaintiff and the trial court refused to allow Owner to intervene into that case. Owner had a right to be in that case so that he could protect his property from being stolen. Had Plaintiff allowed Owner to be in that case, it could have avoided the time and expense of Owner's appeal, the remand of that appeal, the Plaintiff's taking a voluntary dismissal of that case, and the Plaintiff's filing and service of its 2020 case, i.e., this case.

Plaintiff falsely blames all of the costs and time expended on its 2019 case on Owner by falsely stating that Owner didn't PROVE he had a claim to the property when he attempted to intervene. Owner attached an affidavit to his motion to intervene showing he had a bona fide claim to the property. A movant attempting to intervene into this type of case does not have the obligation to prove he owns the property, he just has to be one who is "claiming to have a right title or interest" in the property [see list of defendants in caption of this case]. That is why it is call a "claim" and not "proof"! Had Owner entered proof he was the sole owner of the property at issue at the hearing of his motion to intervene, the case would have had to have been immediately dismissed for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case leaving Plaintiff unable to get a "refund" of the bid monies it states it did not pay!

Plaintiff also fraudulently blames Owner for having to take an appeal of this Court's order denying Owner of his Constitutionally protected and guaranteed right to a trial by jury. Since Owner's affirmative defense of having a Paramount Title was never stricken, when his right to a trial by jury was illegally denied, that affirmative defense **transformed** this case into a title dispute case. Owner had a right to take that appeal because he clearly had a right, and still does, to a trial by jury for this title dispute case and that order was a final appealable order. That appeal was dismissed, not because Owner was incorrect that he has a right to a trial by jury, but because of the coordinated efforts of judges in this State who are clearly protecting the Plaintiff and directing this case.

Plaintiff is now fraudulently blaming Owner and speculating that Owner's request for a continuance for 1.5 months is just Owner's way of causing additional costs and unnecessary delays because that is Owner's "desire" [LB PARK's Memorandum in Opposition, page 3, para. 2, sentence 1]. That is utterly frivolous nonsense that cannot be supported by any evidence.

Not only is Plaintiff to blame for the "delays" shown above, but Plaintiff is entirely to blame for the entire cost and entire time that both of its cases have taken. Plaintiff is responsible for bringing this case that is frivolous, non-justicible, and based entirely on a forged tax title that Plaintiff's managers caused to be falsely made¹. Therefore Plaintiff knew before it even brought either of its two cases that it had NO legal right to claim any relief from any court! Further, what possible "additional costs" will the Plaintiff suffer from a short continuance IF it is ready to go to

¹ See SC Code of Laws 16-13-10 Forgery. "(A) It is unlawful for a person to: (1) ... cause or procure to be falsely made, ...; or wilfully act or assist in the false making, ... of any writing or instrument of writing".

trial? Owner cannot be held responsible for ANY costs or ANY time this fraudulent, frivolous, criminal case has taken to reach a final hearing because non-justicible claims can NEVER legally reach a merits hearing!

It is way past time for the Plaintiff to stop placing all the blame on Owner for the relatively short time it has taken to litigate this extremely unique case and start accepting responsibility for its own actions. Especially since the Plaintiff could have avoided all the costs and all the time it has spent on its two cases had it done its due diligence, that is required of every purchaser of real property. If the Plaintiff was actually concerned about the time and expense it has taken to litigate this case, what does it think will happen if a continuance is denied? If Plaintiff's request is granted it is going to have to endure **2 to 5 years or more** for appeals and collateral attacks to undo the unnecessary and illegal damage that will be done to Owner in his unavoidable absence!

This Court set the final hearing without either party even requesting a final hearing be set. From whence does this Court get the authority to dictate that a final trial should even be set when neither party even requested one? Owner knows the answer - Judge Weaver was directed by Chief Justice Beatty to immediately take this case to trial! The date chosen for the final trial did not even take into consideration either party's schedules. From whence does this Court get the authority to set a trial date without first determining the availability of the parties? The answer is the same as the previous answer.

Most importantly, had Owner been first asked if he was available on the date chosen for the final hearing, he would have informed the Court of his contractual obligation without having to prove a conflict. Therefore, this Court cannot justly deny Owner's Motion for Continuance based on Owner's inability to be able to schedule an in person hearing so that he can enter evidence that proves he has a schedule conflict with the date chosen by this Court.

Giving this Court's Agreement for Owner's Mother to Assist Owner

Owner requests this Court take mandatory judicial notice pursuant to Rule 201(d) SCRE of an Order from the Supreme Court of South Carolina entitled In Re Unauthorized Practice of Law, 309 S.C. 304 (1992). The fourth paragraph of that Order states that any individual can represent any other individual if the tribunal agrees and the individual is not compensated. A copy of that Order is attached as Exhibit A and fully incorporated herein by reference.

Plaintiff spent most of its 184 pages on frivolous nonsense attempting to convince this Court to deny Owner's right to have assistance of counsel provided by his mother who is not a

"licensed" attorney. Plaintiff's frivolous arguments are misplaced and frivolous for at least the following five (5) reasons:

First, the Supreme Court of South Carolina made an ORDER, not a case opinion, that allows any individual to represent any other individual if the tribunal agrees and the individual is not compensated. See Exhibit A.

Second, Mr. Mende is also not a "licensed" attorney. The BAR card that he holds is not a license issued by any governmental entity, it is only evidence that he is a dues paying member of a private organization. The South Carolina BAR Association is a non-governmental private association like the Actor's Union, Painter's Union, etc. No other association, not even for medical doctors, issues their own licenses. All licenses are always issued by a governmental entity. If Mr. Mende has a "license" to practice law, then Owner demands that he produce it for Owner's inspection!

Third, the certificate of admission from the State Supreme Court that Mr. Mende possesses only authorizes him to represent Wards of Court according to Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 7, Section 4. According to Black's Law Dictionary, 6th edition, page 1584, "Wards of Court" is defined to include infants or persons of unsound mind. Owner is neither an infant nor a person of unsound mind so no "licensed" attorney could even "represent" him.

Fourth, Owner's mother should have been named as a party or allowed to intervene in this case since she has a valid, enforceable lien against the property at issue.

Fifth, Owner's mother is not "practicing law" because that definition means a person without a "license", is assisting "clients" which are paying customers. Owner is not a paying customer of his mother and therefore he is not her client -

"The generally understood definition of the practice of law embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, and the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts.", Roberts v. LaConey, 650 SE 2d 474 (2007).

Owner's Due Process Rights Will be Violated if This Court Denies A Continuance

The basis of the right to due process is notice and an opportunity to be heard -

"It is a fundamental doctrine of the law that a party whose personal rights are to be affected by a personal judgment must have a day in court, or opportunity to be heard, and that without due notice and opportunity to be heard a court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such personal rights.", Brown v. Malloy, 546 SE 2d 195 (2001).


Since opportunity is not defined in any legal dictionary, one must look to a ordinary dictionary in common use to decipher its meaning. Dictionary.com defines opportunity to mean "*an appropriate or favorable time or occasion*". The Collins Dictionary defines opportunity to mean "*a situation in which it is possible for you to do something that you want to do.*". Owner has moved this court to grant a continuance because the date this Court *sua sponte* chose does not provide Owner an appropriate, favorable, or even a possible time for him to attend the final hearing. Accordingly, this Court denying Owner's Motion for Continuance will violate Owner's due process rights to have an opportunity to be heard at the final hearing.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff will not suffer any prejudice if the Court grants Owner's Motion for Continuance **before** the final trial. Plaintiff obviously desires Owner's Motion for Continuance to be denied so that Plaintiff will be unimpeded in its illegal and criminal quest to steal Owner's private property. Therefore, this Court must grant Owner's Motion for Continuance now and then reschedule the final hearing to take place within the only window of time that Owner has available this year, that being November 7 - November 18. This must be done so that Owner's due process right to an opportunity to be heard in defense of his property is not violated.

Submitted

9/19/22
Date


Ryan Powell
c/o 25056 Timberlake Drive
Fort Mill, South Carolina

309 S.C. 304 (1992)
422 S.E.2d 123

**IN RE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW RULES PROPOSED BY the
SOUTH CAROLINA BAR.**

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

September 21, 1992.

ORDER

In June 1991 the South Carolina Bar through a special subcommittee of the Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee (Committee) submitted to the Supreme Court a set of proposed rules governing the unauthorized practice of law (Proposed Rules). This comprehensive set of Proposed Rules represents the Committee's collective wisdom accumulated during its thirteen years of existence, as well as the efforts of the special subcommittee which spent over a year drafting these rules. The Proposed Rules attempt to define and delineate the practice of law, and to establish clear guidelines so that professionals other than attorneys can ensure they do not inadvertently engage in the practice of law.

It is impossible for anyone not familiar with the scope of the issues embraced by the Proposed Rules to truly appreciate the enormity of the task undertaken by the special subcommittee. After careful review of the Proposed Rules, the documentation in support of these rules, and the tremendous amount of memoranda in opposition to their adoption, we conclude that the Proposed Rules should not be adopted. We commend the subcommittee for its Herculean efforts to define the practice of law. We are convinced, however, that it is neither practicable nor wise to attempt a comprehensive definition by way of a set of rules. Instead, we are convinced that the better course is to decide what is and what is not the unauthorized practice of law in the context of an actual case or controversy.

The Constitution commits to this Court the duty to regulate the practice of law in South Carolina. S.C. Const. art. V, § 4; *see also* S.C. Code Ann. § 40-5-10- (1986). We take this opportunity to clarify certain practices which we hold do not constitute the unauthorized practice of law.

First, we recognize the validity of the principle found in S.C. Code Ann. § 40-5-8 (1986): any individual may represent another individual before any tribunal, if (1) the tribunal approves of the representation and (2) the representative is not compensated for his services. We have refused, however, to allow an individual to represent a business entity under the statute. *See State ex rel. Daniel v. Wells* 191 S.C. 468, 5 S.E. (2d) 181 (1939). We modify *Wells* today to allow a business to be represented by a nonlawyer officer, agent or employee, including attorneys licensed in other jurisdictions and those possessing Limited Certificates of Admission pursuant to Rule 405, SCACR, in civil magistrate's court proceedings. Such representation may be compensated and shall be undertaken at the business's option, and with the understanding that the business assumes the risk of any problems incurred as the result of such representation. The magistrate shall require a written authorization from the entity's president, chairperson, general

partner, owner or chief executive officer, or in the case of a person possessing a Limited Certificate, a copy of that Certificate, before permitting such representation.

Second, we hold that State agencies may, by regulation,¹¹¹ authorize persons not licensed to practice law in South Carolina, including laypersons, Certified Public Accountants (CPAs), attorneys licensed in other jurisdictions and persons possessing Limited Certificates of Admission, to appear and represent clients before the agency. These regulations are presumptively valid and acts done in compliance with the regulations are presumptively not the unauthorized practice of law. We recognize, however, that such an agency practice could be abused, and reserve the authority to declare unenforceable any regulation which results in injury to the public.

Third, our respect for the rigorous professional training, certification and licensing procedures, continuing education requirements, and ethical code required of Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) convinces us that they are entitled to recognition of their unique status. We hold that CPAs do not engage in the unauthorized practice of law when they render professional assistance, including compensated representation before agencies and the Probate Court, that is within their professional expertise and qualifications. We are confident that allowing CPAs to practice in their areas of expertise, subject to their own professional regulation, will best serve to both protect and promote the public interest.

We also take this opportunity to reaffirm the rule that police officers may prosecute traffic offenses in magistrate's court and in municipal court. Only the arresting officer may prosecute the case, although if the officer is new or inexperienced, he may be assisted at trial by one of his supervisors. State v. Sossamon, 298 S.C. 72, 378 S.E. (2d) 259 (1989); see also State ex rel. McLeod v. Seaborn, 270 S.C. 696, 244 S.E. (2d) 317 (1978).

Finally, we recognize that other situations will arise which will require this Court to determine whether the conduct at issue involves the unauthorized practice of law. We urge any interested individual who becomes aware of such conduct to bring a declaratory judgment action in this Court's original jurisdiction to determine the validity of the conduct. We hope by this provision to strike a proper balance between the legal profession and other professionals which will ensure the public's protection from the harms caused by the unauthorized practice of law.

Let this order be published with the Administrative Orders of this Court.

It is so ordered.

¹¹¹ A copy of the proposed regulation shall be filed with the Supreme Court Clerk at the same time it is filed with Legislative Council.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF YORK

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

Case # 2020-CP-46-00549

LB PARK, LLC, Plaintiff

v.

San Juan Holdings, Brett Osborne, the trustee; Brett Osborne as Trustee of San Juan Holdings; Ryan Powell; and John Doe and Mary Roe, representing all unknown persons having or claiming to have any right, title, or interest in or to, or lien upon, the real estate described as 25056 Timberlake Drive, York County, South Carolina, TMS 643-10-001-023, their heirs and assigns, and all other persons, firms, or corporations entitled to claim under, by or through the above named Defendant(s), and all other persons or entities unknown claiming any right, title, interest, estate in, or lien upon the real estate described as 25056 Timberlake Drive, York County, South Carolina, TMS 643-10-01-023, Defendants.

PROOF OF SERVICE

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DAVID HAMILTON
C.C.P. & GS
YORK COUNTY, SC


I, Ryan Powell, hereby certify that I have served the above listed parties with my Reply to LB PARK's Memorandum in opposition to Ryan Powell's Motion for Continuance and this Proof of Service on the below date by depositing it in the United States mail, with sufficient postage affixed, and addressed as follows:

Alexander G. Mende
P.O. Box 11889,
Columbia, SC 29211-1889

San Juan Holdings, Brett Osborne, trustee; and
Brett Osborne as trustee of San Juan Holdings;
190 Aviation Lane
Gold Hill NC 28071

This the 19 day of September 2022.

Sincerely,


Ryan Powell
c/o Timberlake Drive
Fort Mill, South Carolina

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Mar 09 2023
SC Court of Appeals

IN THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In the Court of Appeals

APPEAL FROM YORK COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas

Teasa K. Weaver, Master-in-Equity

C.A. No.: 2020-CCP-46-00549
Appellate Case No. 2022-001650

LB PARK, LLCRespondent,

v.

San Juan Holdings, Bret Osborne, the trustee; Brett Osborne as Trustee of San Juan Holdings; Ryan Powell; and John Doe and Mary Roe, representing all unknown persons having or claiming to have any right, title, or interest in or to, or lien upon, the real estate described as 250056 Timberlake Drive, York County, South Carolina, TMS 643-10-01-023, their heirs and assigns, and all other persons, firms, or corporations entitled to claim under, by or through the abovenamed Defendant(s), and all other persons or entities unknown claiming any right, title, interest, estate in, or lien upon, the real estate described as 25056 Timberlake Drive, York County, South Carolina, TMS 643-10-01-023 Defendants.

of whom Ryan Powell is theAppellant.

PROOF OF SERVICE

I certify that I have served *Respondent's Return to "Expedited Motion to Reduce or Eliminate Appeal Bond"* on all parties of record by depositing a copy of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, on March 9, 2023, addressed to:

Ryan Powell
25056 Timberlake Drive
Fort Mill, SC 29708

Stacey Carberry

Stacey Carberry, Legal Assistant
HAYNSWORTH SINKLER BOYD, P.A.
864.240.3223

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March 9, 2023

VIA EMAIL

The Honorable Jenny Abbott Kitchings
Clerk, South Carolina Court of Appeals
1220 Senate Street
Columbia, SC 29201

RECEIVED
Mar 09 2023
SC Court of Appeals

Re: LB Park, LLC v. San Juan Holdings (2)
Appellate Case No. 2022-001650

Dear Ms. Kitchings:

This firm represents the Respondent LB Park, LLC in the above matter. Enclosed for filing, please find *Respondent's Return to "Expedited Motion to Reduce or Eliminate Appeal Bond"* together with our Proof of Service for the same.

If you have any questions, please give me a call. Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,

HAYNSWORTH SINKLER BOYD, P.A.



Sarah P. Spruill

SPS/sac
Enclosures

cc: Ryan Powell (via U.S. Mail)