THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Supreme Court

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S.C. SUPREME COURT

APPEAL FROM HORRY COUNTY

Court of Common Pleas

Honorable H. Steven DeBerry IV Circuit Court Judge

Case No.: 2019-CP-26-6842

Henry Dukes 347234..Petitioner

v.

State of South Carolina...Respondent

NOTICE OF APPEAL

The Petitioner Henry Dukes appeals the order of the Honorable H Steven DeBerry on February 22, 2023 granting an Appeal Pursuant to Austin v State. Undersigned counsel received notice of entry of the order on March 7, 2023. A copy of the order on appeal is attached to this notice.

Respectfully submitted

James Falk
Falk Law Firm
PO Box 1058
Charleston, SC 29402
Attorney for Petitioner

March 28, 2023

Other counsel of Record
Chelsey Marto, Esq
S.C. Attorney General's Office
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)
COUNTY OF HORRY)

Henry Dukes, #347234,
Applicant,

v.

State of South Carolina,
Respondent.

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
FOR THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

RECEIVED
APR 03 2023
SC SUPREME COURT

Case No.: 2019-CP-26-06842

ORDER GRANTING RELIEF PURSUANT TO *AUSTIN V. STATE* AND DISMISSING APPLICANT'S PCR APPLICATION

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2023 FEB 27 P 1:03
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CLERK OF COURT
HORRY, SC

This matter comes before this Court by way of Applicant's post-conviction relief application filed October 25, 2019. Respondent made its return on October 13, 2020, requesting an evidentiary hearing be convened. An evidentiary hearing was held on June 2, 2022, at Horry County Courthouse. James K. Falk, Esquire, represented Applicant. Assistant Attorney General Chelsey F. Marto represented Respondent.

Applicant testified on his own behalf at the evidentiary hearing. Counsel J. Eric Fox and Solicitor Jimmy A. Richardson, II, Esquires, also testified. After reviewing all records and evidence before this Court, this Court finds Applicant is entitled to *Austin* relief and that he cannot meet his requisite burden of proof of establishing he is entitled to post-conviction relief on the remaining claims. Accordingly, this Court affords Applicant a belated PCR appeal and denies and dismisses the remainder of the application with prejudice. Findings of fact and conclusions of law are set forth below.

Procedural History

Applicant is confined in the South Carolina Department of Corrections pursuant to orders of commitment of the Horry County Clerk of Court. Applicant was indicted at the August 2008 term of the Horry County Grand Jury for murder (2017-CP-26-01473). J. Eric Fox, Esq., represented Applicant. Jimmy A. Richardson, II., Esq., and Robert Paul Taylor, Esq., of the

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Fifteenth Circuit Solicitor's Office, prosecuted the case. Applicant proceeded to a jury trial before the Honorable Steven H. John. The jury found Applicant guilty as indicted on August 2, 2011. Judge John sentenced Applicant to imprisonment for a term of 47 years.

Applicant filed a timely notice of appeal and a direct appeal was perfected by Kathrine H. Hudgins, Esq. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed Applicant's convictions on June 26, 2013. *State v. Dukes*, 404 S.C. 553, 745 S.E.2d 137 (Ct. App. 2013). Applicant petitioned the Supreme Court of South Carolina for a writ of certiorari, which was denied by order dated July 25, 2014. The Remittitur was issued on August 2, 2014.

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First PCR Application: 2011-CP-26-7994

Applicant filed his first application for post-conviction relief on September 23, 2011 (2011-CP-26-7994) while his direct appeal was still pending. He alleged the following grounds for relief:

1. Identification by witness should have never made it to jury.
2. Arrest warrant in case was invalid.
3. Lead Detective wasn't at trial.

Respondent filed a return and motion to dismiss on November 18, 2011, arguing that the Application should be dismissed without prejudice while the direct appeal was pending in the South Carolina Court of Appeals. Thus, PCR relief was not available to him at that time. *See Al-Shabazz v. State*, 338 S.C. 354, 363, 527 S.E.2d 742, 747 (2000) ("The applicant may not bring a PCR action while a direct appeal is pending"); *see also* Rule 71.1(b), SCRCP. The Honorable Larry B. Hyman, Jr. granted Respondent's motion and dismissed the matter in an Order filed on November 30, 2011. Petitioner did not appeal from this Order.

Second PCR Application: 2013-CP-26-04699

Applicant filed his second application for post-conviction relief on July 9, 2013 (2013-

CP-26-04699), while his direct appeal was still pending. He alleged the following grounds for relief:

1. Ineffective assistance of counsel
   a. Counsel failed to investigate numerous aspects of the States case
   b. Counsel failed to put forth a proper defense included but not limited to one of alibi.
   c. Counsel failed to inquire about the defendants state of mind.

Respondent made its Return on June 2, 2014, and an evidentiary hearing into the matter was convened on February 11, 2016, before the Honorable D. Craig Brown. Applicant was present at the hearing and represented by Tristan M. Shaffer, Esq. Jessica E. Kinard, Esq., of the South Carolina Attorney General's Office, represented Respondent. Applicant testified on his own behalf, and J. Eric Fox., Esq., also testified. By written order dated March 7, 2016, and filed March 10, 2016, Judge Brown denied and dismissed the application. Applicant did not appeal the order denying relief.

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Third PCR Application: 2014-CP-26-05308

During the pendency of the above application, Applicant filed a third application for post-conviction relief on August 8, 2014. Respondent made its Return and Motion to Dismiss on or about August 14, 2014, requesting the application be summarily dismissed because the second application was still pending. The Honorable Larry B. Hyman, Jr., granted Respondent's motion and dismissed the matter by order dated August 27, 2014, and filed September 3, 2014.

Fourth PCR Application: 2017-CP-26-01473

Applicant filed his fourth application for post-conviction relief on March 7, 2017 (2017-CP-26-01473). He alleged the following grounds for relief:

1. Prosecutorial Misconduct
2. Court lacked jurisdiction
3. Ineffective assistance of counsel, in that:
   a. Trial Counsel failed to request a mistrial when testimony was offered to

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incite the passion of the jury.

b. Trial Counsel failed to have Solicitor recused after he made himself a witness

c. Solicitor pushed to have unrepresented Defendant Preliminary hearing waived when one was requested (see special rules of Prosecutor)

d. Court of General Sessions never had jurisdiction of case when Defendant requested a Preliminary hearing and never had one.

e. Trial Counsel never explained guidelines to sentencing in mandatory

In Applicant's request for relief, Applicant alleged that his appointed counsel never appealed the dismissal of his previous post-conviction relief application. Respondent made its Return and Partial Motion to Dismiss on June 29, 2017. Respondent requested an evidentiary hearing on Applicant's claims that he was denied his right to appeal the dismissal of his previous PCR claims, pursuant to *Austin v. State*, 305 S.C. 453, 409 S.E.2d 395 (1991). Respondent moved to dismiss all other allegations contained in the Application.

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Applicant was present at the hearing and was represented by Steven W. Fowler, Esq. Respondent was represented by Assistant Attorney General Johnny E. James, Jr. No testimony was taken at the hearing, but Respondent conceded Applicant was entitled to *Austin* relief based upon communications with Applicant's prior PCR counsel, Tristan M. Shaffer, Esq., that indicated that Applicant had not been informed of the entry of the order denying relief in the prior PCR action in a timely manner, and therefore had not been afforded an opportunity to either request or properly waive his right to an appeal. The Court granted Applicant's request for *Austin* relief while also finding that his remaining allegations were untimely and successive, and accordingly denied relief and dismissed those claims with prejudice. No notice of appeal was filed pursuant to the Court's grant of *Austin* relief.

Federal Habeas Corpus Action: 4:19-cv-1211-TMC-TER

Applicant filed a *pro se* habeas corpus petition in federal court on April 26, 2019. In his petition, Applicant alleged several issues with the proceedings giving rise to his conviction, most

notably that the "post conviction relief was abandoned by counsel and appeal never filed." Applicant elaborated that he "was allowed a belated appeal" but that his "attorney refuses to file appeal."

On July 19, 2019, Respondent moved to summarily dismiss Applicant's claims, arguing that they were barred by the statute of limitations. Alternatively, Respondent requested that the federal court stay its proceedings and hold the case in abeyance to allow Applicant to exhaust his state court remedy of pursuing appellate review of the denial of his PCR relief pursuant to the *Austin* relief he had been previously granted. Applicant made his response to the motion for summary judgment on July 29, 2019, acknowledging that he had a state remedy available and reasserting his position that his appointed PCR attorney did not file a notice of appeal on his behalf. On October 9, 2019, the federal district court denied Respondent's motion to dismiss, but granted its motion to stay and hold the case in abeyance while Applicant exhausts his state remedies available under the previous grant of *Austin* relief, based upon his. The current application for post-conviction relief followed.

Summary of Relevant Facts

The South Carolina Court of Appeals found the following facts:

> A jury found Henry Dukes guilty of murder for the shooting death of Andrico Gowans. . . . On the morning of November 2, 2007, Cornelius Ford witnessed Gowans' murder. That afternoon, Ford met with Detective Sean Addison at the Conway Police Department and identified Dukes as the shooter.

Dukes, 404 S.C. at 555, 745 S.E.2d at 138.

Current Action Before this Court

In his current PCR application, Applicant alleges he is being held in custody unlawfully because of ineffective assistance of counsel in that:

1. Brady violation and noncompliance with court order.

a. Trial judge ordered the state to turn over NCIC of its witnesses Carolyn Heester had multiple check fraud convictions which was not disclosed to the Defense which prejudiced the Defendant.

2. Belated appeal.
   a. Never got to properly appeal PCR.

At the PCR hearing, Applicant proceeded forward on the allegations listed above, as well as ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to search Heester's name on the public index for a prior record and newly discovered evidence of these records. All other allegations available to Applicant are deemed waived and abandoned and, accordingly, will not be addressed in this order.

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Summary of the Testimony

Applicant Testimony

Applicant stated that Heester testified at trial that she saw a black man with a white coat running around the crime scene. He stated that she was used to corroborate the testimony of the man and son who testified. He stated he found out about her criminal history in 2019. He stated that he found out through a fellow prisoner that Heester pled to fraudulent check charges. He stated he did not know her, and they did not have any mutual friends. He stated that this evidence could have been used to impeach her.

Counsel Testimony

Counsel testified that the State handed over all the NCIC records associated with the case. He stated that he showed Applicant everything he had associated with the case. He stated he did not recall being given Ms. Heester's records. He stated that her fraudulent check charges were qualifying impeachment convictions and would have impacted her credibility. He stated that her testimony corroborated Ford's testimony. He stated that this testimony was important for the State. He stated that Ford's testimony and actions were suspicious because he did not call the

police, just his father, and remained hidden for several hours after the killing.

On cross-examination, he testified that the State's case was primarily based on the son's and father's testimonies and Heester was used to corroborate those testimonies. He stated that he was unsure whether the criminal record would have led to an acquittal but stated it would have impacted her credibility. He stated that another witness stated he saw a black man in a white coat nearby, but that the timeframe he produced was not exact. He stated he usually gets NCIC records before trial.

Prosecutor Testimony

Prosecutor testified that his general practice is to turn over all NCIC records on all witnesses before they are called to the stand. He stated he ran a NCIC search on for this witness on August 4, 2011, and nothing came up as part of her record. He stated that the public index showed that Heester was charged because of several bad checks. He stated these charges did not appear on her NCIC record. He testified that the public index is accessible by the public.

Prosecutor stated that Heester was not familiar with the victim or Applicant. He stated her testimony consisted of her visiting a friend of hers from where the victim was killed on the side porch. He stated she did not inform the police of this. He stated that she saw a young black male, roughly twenty-nine years of age, run away from the house with a white hood over his head. He testified that other evidence in the case consisted of the police initially speaking with Applicant, followed by Applicant's nephew, while at the police station. He stated that a young man came by and he stated that they got the wrong guy and the man responsible was Applicant. He stated that an officer went back to talk to Applicant, but discovered he packet everything up and left. He stated he stayed at a crack house for a short period of time and that he called a cab back to Darlington. He stated that the cab driver testified at trial. He stated that Applicant's

mother gave him money. He stated that Applicant went to Miami. He stated a confidential informant called and stated that if they were looking for Applicant, he was at the police station. He stated that Applicant told the confidential informant that he was laying low after killing someone. He stated that Heester was not an important witness. He stated that the checks charges were admissible.

On cross-examination, Prosecutor testified that Heester's prior record was impeachment evidence. He stated he did not recall mentioning this witness in closing argument but stated that it was only helpful testimony concerning time and manner because he did not know Applicant or the victims.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

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This Court has had the opportunity to review the record in its entirety and has heard the testimony and arguments presented at the PCR hearing. Before this Court are the Horry County Clerk of Court Records, Applicant's South Carolina Department of Corrections Records, the trial transcript, direct appeal records, prior PCR and habeas records, and this PCR action's records. This Court has further had the opportunity to observe each witness who testified at the hearing, and to closely pass upon their credibility. This Court has weighed the testimony accordingly. Set forth below are the relevant findings of fact and conclusion of law as required by South Carolina Code Annotated Section 17-27-80 (2003).

Austin Relief

Applicant contends that PCR Counsel was ineffective for failure to timely file a notice of appeal. "An indigent defendant has the right to be informed of an appeal and the manner and method for taking the appeal." *Cherry v. State*, 300 S.C. 115, 119, 386 S.E.2d 624, 626 (1989); *Austin v. State*, 305 S.C. 453, 409 S.E.2d 395, 396 (1991). In *Austin*, the South Carolina Supreme

Court framed the inquiry as whether the PCR applicant "requested and was denied an opportunity to seek appellate review." *Austin* at 454, 409 S.E.2d at 396. Under *Austin*, an Applicant is entitled to appeal the denial of a PCR application when they have not voluntarily waived the right to appeal. An applicant may waive the right to appeal by making a "knowing and intelligent decision not to pursue the appeal." *Simuel v. State*, 390 S.C. 267, 271, 701 S.E.2d 738, 739-40 (2010).

"The right to seek appellate review of the denial of PCR is expressly authorized by state law." *Austin,* 305 S.C. at 454, 409 S.E.2d at 396; S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-100 (2014). Pursuant to *Austin*, a post-conviction relief applicant may petition the South Carolina Supreme Court for belated discretionary review of the dismissal of his or her application in some circumstances. A PCR applicant is entitled to an *Austin* appeal if the PCR judge affirmatively finds either: (1) the applicant requested and was denied an opportunity to seek appellate review; or (2) the right to appellate review of a previous PCR order was not knowingly and intelligently waived. *Odom v. State*, 337 S.C. 256, 262, 523 S.E.2d 753, 756 (1999).

This Court finds Applicant wanted an appeal from his prior PCR action and did not waive this right. The State consented to his request. Accordingly, Applicant is entitled to a belated appeal of his prior PCR matter.

Prosecutorial Misconduct

Applicant claims the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by withholding NCIC records on Ms. Heester, which he claims constitutes a *Brady*[1] violation. *Brady* violations occur if four conditions are met: "the evidence was favorable to the accused", "it was in the possession of or known to the prosecution", "it was suppressed by the prosecution", and "it was material to guilt

[1] *Brady v. Maryland,* 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

or punishment." *Gibson v. State,* 334 S.C. 515, 524, 514 S.E.2d 320, 324 (1999). Further, whether a mistrial is warranted remains contingent on "'(1) the cumulative effect of such misconduct; (2) the strength of the properly admitted evidence of the defendant's guilt; and (3) the curative actions taken by the court.'" *State v. Inman*, 395 S.C. 539, 565, 720 S.E.2d 31, 45 (2011) (quoting *United States v. Anwar,* 428 F.3d 1102, 1112 (8th Cir. 2005)).

This Court finds Prosecutor credible in his assertion that he handed over Heester's NCIC records to Counsel. This Court also finds Prosecutor's statement that no charges appeared on her NCIC record credible. Thus, even if they were not handed over, the error was harmless and not material. Accordingly, relief is denied on this ground.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In a PCR action, the applicant bears the burden of proving allegations contained in the application. *Butler v. State*, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985). Effective assistance of counsel does not mean perfect or mistake-free representation. *See Weaver v. Massachusetts*, 137 S. Ct. 1899 (2017) ("[A] defendant has a right to effective representation, not a right to an attorney who performs his duties 'mistake-free.'" (citation omitted)); *Burt v. Titlow*, 571 U.S. 12, 24 (2013) ("[T]he Sixth Amendment does not guarantee the right to perfect counsel; it promises only the right to effective assistance[.]"); *Yarborough v. Gentry*, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) ("The Sixth Amendment guarantees reasonable competence, not perfect advocacy judged with the benefit of hindsight."). Instead, it simply means assistance that was objectively reasonable under prevailing professional norms. *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 687-688.

When an applicant asserts ineffective assistance of counsel as a ground for relief, the applicant must show "counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that [it] cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result." *Strickland v.*

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); *Butler*, 286 S.C. at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814. Ineffective assistance of counsel is governed by the Sixth Amendment, as explained by the United States Supreme Court in *Strickland v. Washington.*

Pursuant to the first prong of the *Strickland* analysis, the applicant must prove defense counsel's performance was deficient. *Id.* at 686; *Cherry v. State*, 300 S.C. 115, 117, 386 S.E.2d 624, 625 (1989). To show deficiency, the applicant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel's actions fell outside of the zone of "reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 688. S*ee also* Rule 71.1(e), SCRCP ("The applicant has the burden of establishing his entitlement to relief by a preponderance of the evidence."). Reasonableness is determined by the "variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how to best represent a criminal defendant," and the scope of the reasonableness inquiry is limited to facts counsel had available at the time of representation. *Id.* at 689. "Counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." *Yarborough v. Gentry*, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (citing *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 690); *see Dunn v. Reeves*, 141 S. Ct. 2405, 2410 (2021) (noting counsel's strategic decisions are to be afforded "'strong presumption' of reasonableness that the defendant must overcome); *Cullen v. Pinholster*, 563 U.S. 170, 189 (2011) (explaining a defendant must show defense counsel failed to act reasonably considering all the circumstances in order to overcome the presumption of adequate representation). Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance remains highly deferential towards defense counsel with a strong presumption that counsel acted competently, because competent representation may be executed in virtually "countless" ways. *Strickland,* 466 U.S. at 688-89.

Second, counsel's deficient performance must have prejudiced the applicant so that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117-18. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 694. The court makes this determination based upon the totality of the evidence. *Id.* at 695. Importantly, "[t]he likelihood of a different result must be *substantial*, not just conceivable." *Harrington v. Richter*, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011).

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The standards do not establish mechanical rules; the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged. *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 696. A court need not first determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies; if it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, that course should be followed. *Id.* at 696-97.

Applicant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel for "failure to investigate" Heester's prior record on the public index. *Strickland* makes clear that counsel "has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." 466 U.S. at 691. When highlighting failure to investigate as a ground for a larger ineffective assistance of counsel claim, judicial determination of this claim's validity is evaluated for "reasonableness [under] all the circumstances" with "a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments" applied. *Id.* However, counsel is required to, at minimum, "interview potential witnesses and make an independent investigation of the facts and circumstances of the case", *Ard v. Catoe*, 372 S.C. 318, 331-32, 642 S.E.2d 590, 597 (2007) (quoting *Troedel v. Wainwright*, 667 F.Supp. 1456, 1461 (S.D.Fla.1986), *aff'd*, 828 F.2d 670 (11th Cir.1987)),

including aggressively re-examining all the government's forensic evidence and conducting analyses of all other available forensic evidence." *Id.* (quoting *American Bar Association Guidelines For The Appointment And Performance Of Defense Counsel In Death Penalty Cases, reprinted in* 31 Hofstra L.Rev. 913, 1015 (2003) (emphasis added)).

Counsel is not obligated to "investigate lines of defense that he has chosen not to employ at trial." *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 682 (quoting *Washington v. Strickland*, 693. F.2d 1243, 1255 (5th Cir. 1982)). Further, "[w]hen counsel focuses on some issues to the exclusion of others, there is a strong presumption that he [or she] did so for tactical reasons rather than through sheer neglect." *Yarborough*, 540 U.S. at 5 (citing *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 690).

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Counsel acted reasonably in concluding that Heester's criminal history would be documented on the NCIC report and reasonably relied on that when building his understanding of her prior record. However, even if this Court were to find Counsel deficient, no prejudice was suffered. This Court finds there was overwhelming evidence of guilt in this case, so that additional impeachment on a minor State witness would not change the outcome of the proceedings. Accordingly, because deficiency nor prejudice was established, relief is denied on this ground.

Newly Discovered Evidence

This Court finds Applicant's claim of newly discovered evidence of Heester's prior criminal history must be dismissed. A person may institute a PCR action if "there exists evidence or material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice." S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-20(A)(4). If the applicant contends there is evidence of a material fact not previously presented, under the discovery rule, the PCR application must be filed within one year after the date of actual discovery of the facts by the

applicant or after the date when the facts could have been ascertained by the exercise of reasonable diligence. S.C. Code Ann. §17-27-45(C). To prevail, Applicant must show the newly-discovered evidence:

> (1) is such that it would probably change the result if a new trial were granted;
> (2) has been discovered since the trial;
> (3) could not in the exercise of due diligence have been discovered prior to the trial;
> (4) is material; and
> (5) is not merely cumulative or impeaching.

State v. Spann, 334 S.C. 618, 619–20, 513 S.E.2d 98, 99 (1999).

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HORRY COUNTY, SC

This Court finds that this evidence could have been discovered prior to trial through exercising due diligence. Additionally, this evidence not material, is merely cumulative and impeaching, and most likely would not change the outcome at trial. Accordingly, relief is denied on this ground.

Conclusion

Based on all the foregoing, this Court finds and concludes that Applicant is entitled to a belated appeal of his prior PCR action but has not established any constitutional violations or deprivations that would require this Court to grant his application as it pertains to the remaining allegations. Therefore, this PCR application allegations, with exception of the belated PCR appeal issue, must be denied and dismissed with prejudice.[2]

This Court notifies Applicant that he must file and serve a notice of appeal within thirty days of receipt by counsel of the judgment entry's written notice to secure appropriate appellate review. *See* Rule 203, SCACR. Pursuant to *Austin v. State*, 305 S.C. 453, 409 S.E.2d 395 (1991),

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[2] This Court elected to proceed forward to a full evidentiary hearing, rule on the merits, and dismiss the State's motion to dismiss as moot.

an Applicant has the right to appellate counsel's assistance in seeking review of the denial of PCR. Rule 71.1(g), SCRCP provides that if the Applicant wishes to seek appellate review, PCR counsel must serve and file a notice of appeal on Applicant's behalf. Your attention is directed to South Carolina Appellate Court Rule 243 for appropriate appellate procedures.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. Applicant be afforded a belated PCR appeal;
2. The remainder of the PCR application be denied and dismissed with prejudice; and
3. Applicant be remanded to the custody of Respondent.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED this 22nd day of February, 2023.



H. STEVEN DEBERRY, IV
Presiding Judge
Fifteenth Judicial Circuit

Florence, South Carolina.

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