

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In the Supreme Court

CERTIORARI TO AIKEN COUNTY
Robert J. Bonds, Circuit Court Judge

Appellate Case No: 2022-001088

RECEIVED

May 24 2023

S.C. SUPREME COURT

HAROLD CARTWRIGHT,

RESPONDENT,

v.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

PETITIONER.

APPENDIX

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INDEX

TRANSCRIPT (November 13-14, 2012)	1
TRANSCRIPT (April 15-16, 2013).....	197
TRANSCRIPT (April 17-18, 2013).....	423
RECORD ON APPEAL	661
FINAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT	1092
FINAL BRIEF OF RESPONDENT	1122
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION	1170
PETITION FOR REHEARING.....	1173
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING.....	1179
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI	1181
APPENDIX.....	1210
RETURN TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI	1223
BRIEF OF PETITIONER.....	1259
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT	1294
SUPREME COURT OPINION	1340
REMITTITUR	1354
PCR APPLICATION.....	1355
AIKEN COUNTY CLERK OF COURT’S RECORDS.....	1365
ARREST WARRANTS.....	1404
SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS’ RECORDS	1458

RETURN	1490
ORDER AUTHORIZING DISCOVERY.....	1502
AMENDED PCR APPLICATION.....	1506
PCR HEARING TRANSCRIPT (February 3-4, 2022).....	1532
PCR HEARING TRANSCRIPT (February 25, 2022)	1715
PROPOSED ORDER GRANTING PCR.....	1903
PROPOSED ORDER OF DISMISSAL	1937
ORDER GRANTING PCR	1984
STATE’S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND.....	2049
MOTION TO RECONSIDER HEARING TRANSCRIPT (June 24, 2022).....	2092
AMENDED ORDER GRANTING PCR.....	2189

washing and drying sheets.

Mr. Routzong stated he thought that he had referenced Applicant's name during cross-examination of the jailer, James Hettich, who conducted an in-court identification of Applicant. Mr. Routzong testified that he does not believe that the pornographic picture Applicant alleged he found on the internet depicting Victim 3 and her friends was relevant or helpful to the defense. Mr. Routzong admitted that Judge Early would make faces and make it seem to the jury as if the lawyer is not prepared but claimed he could not remember the judge's exact demeanor during this trial. Mr. Routzong further testified that he had no strategic reason for not objecting to the Trial Court's instructions to the jury regarding his comments, "It is your duty to determine what the true facts are and what the truth is and who is telling the truth..." and "You're to make your decision based solely on what you determine the true facts are in this case."

LAW

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI. In a PCR action, Applicant bears the burden of proving the allegations in his application by a preponderance of the evidence. *Butler v. State*, 286 S.C. 441, 442, 334 S.E.2d 813, 814 (1985); Rule 71.1(e), SCRPC. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a Petitioner must satisfy the two-prong test set forth in *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishing the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims). "First, an [Petitioner] must show that counsel's performance was deficient. Under this prong, [t]he proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." *Cherry v. State*, 300 S.C. 115, 386 S.E.2d 624 (1989) (internal citations omitted). "The

second prong of the *Strickland* test requires a showing that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant to the extent that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." *Id.* at 118, 386 S.E.2d at 625 (internal citations omitted). Therefore, a Petitioner must prove that "counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result" when seeking relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel. *Butler v. State*, 286 S.C. 441, 442, 334 S.E.2d 813, 814 (1985) (quoting *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 692).

In a PCR action, "[t]he burden of proof is on the Petitioner to prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence." *Frasier v. State*, 351 S.C. 385, 389, 570 S.E.2d 172, 174 (2002) (citing Rule 71.1(e), SCRCP). Strategic "[d]ecisions made [by counsel] in ignorance of relevant, available information cannot be characterized as strategic." *Weik v. State*, 409 S.C. 214, 236, 761 S.E.2d 757, 768 (2014). "Ordinarily, the existence of 'overwhelming evidence' does not automatically preclude a finding of prejudice." *Smalls v. State*, 422 S.C. 174, 189, 810 S.E.2d 836, 844 (2018). Notably, "for the evidence to be 'overwhelming' such that it categorically precludes a finding of prejudice . . . the evidence must include something conclusive, such as a confession, DNA evidence demonstrating guilt, or a combination of physical and corroborating evidence so strong that the *Strickland* standard of 'a reasonable probability . . . the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt' cannot possibly be met." *Id.* 422 S.C. at 191, 810 S.E.2d at 845.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This Court viewed the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing, observed the witnesses at the hearing, assessed their credibility, and weighed the testimony accordingly based on the evidence and facts of the case. This Court also reviewed the Clerk of Court records regarding the Applicant's convictions and sentences, the trial transcript, the applications for post-conviction relief, and the legal arguments made by the lawyers. Therefore, the relevant findings of fact and conclusions of law are set forth below as required by Section 17-27-80 of the South Carolina Code of Laws. The Court shall address each of these allegations individually.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL

Allegation One: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to conduct a reasonable investigation, develop mitigating evidence, and interview critical witnesses to add to the credibility of the Applicant's case.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to interview critical witnesses who could have added to the credibility of the applicant's case and challenged the credibility of the State's witnesses when it was reasonable and necessary to do so while preparing for trial. (See *Wiggins v. Smith*, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); *Lounds v. State*, 380 S.C. 454, 670 S.E.2d 646 (2008); *McKnight v. State*, 378 S.C. 33, 46, 661 S.E.2d 354, 360 (2008); *Von Dohlen v. State*, 360 S.C. 598, 607, 602 S.E.2d 738, 743 (2004); *Hicks v. State*, 314 S.C. 280, 443 S.E.2d 907 (1994); *Reeves v. State*, 415 S.C. 366, 782 S.E.2d 747 (Ct. App. 2015).)

The Court finds these allegations to be without merit. The testimony provided to

the Court during the extensive hearing included references to potentially mitigating evidence or evidence that could reveal a potential bias of a State's witness. See, e.g., *Martin v. State*, 427 S.C. 450, 455, 832 S.E.2d 277, 279–80 (2019) (holding a PCR applicant who claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call certain witnesses must produce those witnesses or their testimony at the PCR hearing); *Taylor v. State*, 258 S.C. 369, 378, 188 S.E.2d 850, 854 (1972) (holding a PCR applicant's allegation that his trial counsel failed to adequately investigate his case was unsupported where the applicant failed to point out any beneficial evidence which could have been discovered by further investigation).

However this allegation does not explain with particularity what the witnesses may have said to add to the credibility of the Applicant or challenge the credibility of the State's witnesses. Additionally, no such witnesses were presented during the hearing for the Court's consideration. Therefore the Applicant has not presented enough information for the Court to determine that the failure to interview and present such witnesses likely prejudiced the Applicant. Therefore this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Two: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to hire an expert witness to conduct an independent review of the forensic evidence and provide rebuttal testimony.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to hire an expert witness to review the forensic evidence presented by the State and rebut the State's arguments and evidence, specifically the electronic evidence and DNA evidence. See *McKnight v. State*, 378 S.C. 33, 46, 661 S.E.2d 354, 360 (2008); *Von Dohlen v. State*, 360 S.C. 598, 607, 602 S.E.2d 738, 743 (2004); *Reeves v. State*, 415 S.C. 366, 782 S.E.2d 747 (Ct. App. 2015).

This Court finds these allegations to be without merit. Applicant did not present any expert testimony at the PCR hearing; therefore, any finding of prejudice would be merely speculative. See, e.g., *Dempsey v. State* 363 S.C. 365, 370, 610 S.E.2d 812, 815 (2005) (holding a PCR applicant failed to show prejudice from his Trial Counsel's failure to hire an expert because he failed to have an expert testify at his PCR hearing), abrogated on other grounds by *Smalls v. State*, 422 S.C. 174, 810 S.E.2d 836 (2018). Nor did Applicant make any attempt to show how reviewing SLED's documentation regarding its DNA testing of the bedsheet sample could have led Trial Counsel to discover evidence that would benefit the Applicant's case. See *Taylor*, 258 S.C. at 378, 188 S.E.2d at 854. In fact, Applicant admitted the semen found on the bedsheet was his, explaining that his then-wife had masturbated him on his son's bed. Since Applicant did not dispute the State's identification of the semen as his, Trial Counsel had no reason to hire an expert to rebut the State's DNA analysis. Finally, Applicant has not identified the "electronic evidence seized by the police" that he claims could have been rebutted by an expert witness. As Trial Counsel testified before this Court, the State did not rely on any electronic evidence; the heart of the State's case was the testimony of Applicant's children. Accordingly, the Court finds Trial Counsel was not ineffective as to Allegation two. Therefore, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Three: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to investigate a Victim's potential deal with the State.

The Applicant alleges that trial counsel failed to investigate a Victim's involvement in a drug investigation which could have resulted in a deal from the State and may have

prompted a statement implicating the Applicant of sexual abuse.

This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. At the PCR hearing, the Applicant failed to show there was any beneficial evidence that could have been discovered if Trial Counsel had further inquired into the Victim involvement in a drug investigation. See *Taylor*, 258 S.C. at 378, 188 S.E.2d at 854. In addition, Applicant's suggestion that one of the Victims was offered a deal by the State is not supported by any evidence presented at the PCR hearing. This Court will not find prejudice based on mere speculation that a more searching inquiry into the Victim's past would have been beneficial to Applicant's case. See, e.g., *Martin*, 427 S.C. at 455, 832 S.E.2d at 280 (holding an applicant's "mere speculation" as to what a witness's testimony would have been cannot, by itself, support a finding of prejudice). Therefore, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Four: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to investigate the timeline of the allegations.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to investigate and compare the timing of the allegations and the timeline of when the Applicant lived in the home.

At the PCR hearing, Applicant testified that he provided Trial Counsel with a timeline of when he was not living in the home, claiming he occasionally spent a few weeks working in Atlanta. However, Applicant has not adequately explained how any purported periods of absence from the home would have been inconsistent with the victims' disclosures of abuse occurring at uncertain times over many years. Trial Counsel testified he believed the timeline was not an effective alibi defense because the alleged

abuse occurred so often over such an extended period that Applicant's occasional absence from the home made no difference. The Applicant to show how this information would have been beneficial and the decision to not present the information does not raise the level of deficient performance and representation by Trial Counsel. Therefore the allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Five: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to review all discovery with the Applicant.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to obtain and review all discovery with him in preparation for trial. Counsel. Applicant claims this was due in part to the amount of time that Counsel had to prepare for the second trial, which was approximately one month. Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to review all the photographs with him prior to trial.

This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. Trial Counsel testified he spent hours going over discovery with Applicant. Without presenting further proof of Trial Counsel's alleged failure to review all the discovery with him, Applicant has failed to overcome the strong presumption that Trial Counsel rendered adequate assistance. See *Butler*, 286 S.C. at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814. In addition, Applicant has not presented any new evidence or defenses that could have been discovered by Trial Counsel's further review of the discovery. *Harris v. State*, 377 S.C. 66, 75-76, 659 S.E.2d 140, 145-46 (2008) (citing *Jackson v. State*, 329 S.C. 345, 353-54, 495 S.E.2d 768, 772 (1998)), abrogated on other grounds by *Smalls*, 422 S.C. 174, 810 S.E.2d 836. Furthermore, an Applicant must also show how the new evidence or defenses would have resulted in a

different outcome. Id. (citing *David v. State*, 326 S.C. 283, 288, 486 S.E.2d 747, 749 (1997); *Skeen v. State*, 325 S.C. 210, 214, 481 S.E.2d 129, 132 (1997)). Mere speculation as to how the alleged lack of preparation prejudiced an Applicant is not sufficient to support a grant of relief. Id., 377 S.C. at 75, 659 S.E.2d at 145 (citing *Glover v. State*, 318 S.C. 496, 498, 458 S.E.2d 538, 540 (1995)). Therefore this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Six: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to cross-examine and impeach witnesses.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to properly cross-examine and impeach the State's witnesses. Specifically, Counsel alleges that Counsel failed to address witnesses' inconsistent testimony from the first trial that ended in a mistrial.

This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. Applicant has not explained what prior inconsistent statements Trial Counsel should have used to impeach the State's witnesses. Without alleging specifically what Trial Counsel should have done to more effectively cross-examine and impeach the State's witnesses, Applicant has failed to overcome the strong presumption of adequate assistance or to prove the result of his trial would likely have been different. See *Butler*, 286 S.C. at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814; *Harrington*, 562 U.S. at 112. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Seven: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to adequately interview witnesses and put forth witnesses to testify to the Applicant's character.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to adequately prepare for trial. Specifically, the Applicant alleges that Counsel did not interview witnesses who could have testified regarding Applicant's good character and reputation when it was reasonable and necessary to present this evidence at trial and request a jury instruction on good character and reputation. See *State v. Harrison*, 343 S.C. 165, 539 S.E.2d 71 (Ct. App. 2000); Cf. *Stalk v. State*, 383 S.C. 559, 681 S.E.2d 592 (2009).

This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. Although Applicant named Sammy Morton, Larry Britt, and his ex-bosses as potential character witnesses, he failed to present any of them or offer any of their testimony at the PCR hearing. Failure to present purportedly favorable witnesses or evidence at the evidentiary hearing precludes a finding of prejudice. See, e.g., *Martin*, 427 S.C. at 455, 832 S.E.2d at 279–80; *Taylor*, 258 S.C. at 378, 188 S.E.2d at 854. In addition, Trial Counsel testified he was wary of calling character and reputation witnesses because putting Applicant's character at issue would have opened the door for the State to introduce Applicant's prior convictions. The Court finds Trial Counsel articulated a valid strategic reason for not inquiring further into Applicant's character at trial. See *Underwood*, 309 S.C. at 562, 425 S.E.2d at 22. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Eight: Trial Counsel's alleged erroneous legal advice regarding the Applicant's decision to testify.

Applicant alleges Trial Counsel provided erroneous legal advice regarding Applicant's decision to testify, which was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Specifically, Applicant alleges Counsel failed to explain all the risks involved in testifying as witness.

This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. Trial Counsel admitted he could not recall advising Applicant specifically of the risks involved in testifying; however, he testified that he always explains those risks to his clients, that Applicant would have known about cross-examination after watching the rest of the trial, and that the trial judge always informed defendants of their rights before they testified. In addition, Trial Counsel recalled Applicant wanted to testify, and Trial Counsel believed it would be valuable to have Applicant stand up and tell the jury he was innocent. The Court finds Applicant has not proved Trial Counsel failed to properly advise him concerning testifying in his own defense by a preponderance of the evidence. See *Butler*, 286 S.C. at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814; Rule 71.1(e), *SCRCP*. Furthermore, Applicant has not explained how he was prejudiced; Applicant never claimed that, but for Trial Counsel's alleged failure to properly advise him, he would not have chosen to testify. Therefore, Applicant has failed to show that, but for Trial Counsel's alleged errors, the result of his proceeding likely would have been different. See *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Nine: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to object to jury instructions.

Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review the Trial Court's jury instructions that improperly shifted the burden of proof and misstated the law.

This allegation raises the general issue of purportedly improper jury instructions but lacks any specificity as to what language the Applicant alleges with improper, and thus fails to state what language Trial Counsel failed to object to during trial. Thus the Applicant fails to show deficient performance and prejudice on behalf of Trial Counsel. Therefore this allegation is denied and dismissed without prejudice.

Allegation Ten: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to object to evidence.

Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel's failed to object and preserve for appellate review inadmissible and unduly prejudicial evidence during Applicant's trial. This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. This Allegation does not explain what "inadmissible and unduly prejudicial evidence" Applicant believes Trial Counsel should have objected to. Nor did Applicant clarify this allegation at the evidentiary hearing. To meet his burden, Applicant must assert facts, not mere conclusions. See *Land*, 274 S.C. at 246, 262 S.E.2d at 737. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Eleven: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to object to the State's closing argument.

Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review the State's improper closing argument that was a misstatement of the evidence and unduly prejudicial.

This Allegation fails to specify which comments the Applicant contends were improper and the Applicant did not clarify the allegation during the evidentiary hearing. Since Applicant has failed to identify with particularity the State's remarks to which he claims Trial Counsel should have objected, this Court finds Applicant has failed to meet his burden of proving those allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. See *Land*, 274 S.C. at 246, 262 S.E.2d at 737. Therefore this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Twelve: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to move to quash the indictments.

Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to move to quash the twenty-eight (28) indictments against Applicant as unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. Specifically, where each indictment for the alleged offenses occurred at unspecified times over an entire year, and the combined indictments covered a total period of over eighteen (18) years. See *State v. Baker*, 411 S.C. 583, 769 S.E.2d 860 (2015).

This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. The threshold for an indictment to be valid is not high. *State v. Lewis*, 434 S.C. 158, 173, 863 S.E.2d 1, 9 (2021) (citing *United States v. Bates*, 96 F.3d 964, 970 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Indictments need not exhaustively describe the facts surrounding a crime's commission nor provide lengthy

explanations of the elements of the offense.”). A court must examine the sufficiency of an indictment with a practical eye in view of the surrounding circumstances. *Id.* at 172, 863 S.E.2d at 8. In this case, the indictments each covered one-year time periods and adequately put the Applicant on notice of the charges he was facing and the time period with which the State claimed the incidents took place. See *State v. Tumbleston*, 376 S.C. 90, 101–02, 654 S.E.2d 849, 855 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding indictments that alleged acts of sexual abuse occurring “between 2001 and June 2004” were valid due to the stealth and repetitive nature of the alleged conduct and the fact that the victim was a young child who could not remember exact dates and times).

Applicant argues *State v. Baker*, 411 S.C. 583, 769 S.E.2d 860 (2015) compels a different result. In that case, Baker was initially indicted for committing lewd acts upon a minor during three specific summers; two weeks before trial, however, the State amended the indictments to allege the lewd acts occurred “between June 1, 1998 and September 1, 2004.” *Id.* at 586–87, 769 S.E.2d at 862. The South Carolina Supreme Court held the amended indictments were unconstitutionally overbroad, noting Baker had spent a year preparing an alibi defense and suddenly had only two weeks to prepare a new defense to the greatly expanded period alleged in the new indictments. *Id.* at 590–92, 769 S.E.2d at 864–65. Applicant alleges the Baker holding necessitates finding the indictments in his case unconstitutional.

This Court finds the facts of Baker are significantly different from the facts of this case. Applicant’s indictments have not been amended, and Applicant’s defense was based on attacking the victims’ credibility, not on an alibi. In addition, each of Applicant’s indictments alleged offenses occurring within a one-year period, a much more specific

time frame than the six-year period alleged in each of Baker's indictments. Finally, the Baker Court suggested that the indictments would have been sufficient if limited to just the summer months during those six years—a total of eighteen months per indictment, which would still have been broader than the twelve months alleged in each indictment against Applicant. *Id.* at 592 n.5, 769 S.E.2d at 865 n.5.

Viewing all the circumstances “with a practical eye,” this Court finds the indictments were sufficiently certain and particular to put Applicant on notice of the charges against him and, therefore, were not constitutionally defective. See *Lewis*, 434 S.C. at 172, 863 S.E.2d at 8 (holding the primary purpose of an indictment includes putting the defendant on notice of the elements of the offense and allowing him to decide whether to stand trial or plead guilty). Finally, Trial Counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that he did not move to quash the indictments because he did not view them as objectionable. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Thirteen: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to object to the legal standard used for qualifying the State's expert witness.

Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to object to the Trial Court's application of an incorrect legal standard for qualifying the State's expert witness in the field of child sexual abuse dynamics where the Court (1) limited Counsel to voir dire of the witness regarding “qualifications,” (2) qualified the witness as an expert in the given field, and (3) only permitted questioning of the witness on the reliability and validity of field itself—after the witness was deemed “expert” by the Court and the State's direct examination (all of which was held in the presence of the jury rather than in an in camera hearing). See Rule 702,

SCRE; State v. Council, 335 S.C. 1, 515 S.E.2d 508 (1999); *State v. Tapp*, 398 S.C. 376, 728 S.E.2d 468 (2012); *State v. White*, 398 S.C. 376, 728 S.E.2d 468 (2009); and *Watson v. Ford*, 389 S.C. 434, 699 S.E.2d 169 (2010).

The Court finds that Trial Counsel's failure to object to the standard used to qualify the State's expert witness, and the fact that this circumstances described above occurred in the presence of the jury amounted to deficient performance by Trial Counsel.

Allegation Fourteen: Trial Court's alleged failure to object and move to strike part of the testimony of the State's expert witness.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to object and move to strike the expert witness's testimony that went beyond the scope of her expertise. Specifically, the witness's admitted area expertise focused on the perspective of a child experiencing abuse, yet the witness improperly testified as a psychological "profiler" of the accused when the Prosecutor asked whether it was typical for an abuser to have a favorite age to sexually abuse, and the witness answered in the affirmative. See Rules 701 and 702, *SCRE; State v. Ellis*, 345 S.C. 175, 547 S.E.2d 490 (2001).

The Court finds that Trial Counsel's failure to object and move to strike the expert witness's testimony amounted to deficient performance by Trial Counsel. Dr. Benedetto's testimony that abusers are often interested in victims of a particular age went beyond the scope of her expertise, which was limited to the perspective of child victims. Although Trial Counsel objected to this line of questioning as "leading," he did not object on the ground that it exceeded the scope of Dr. Benedetto's expertise.

Allegation Fifteen: Trial Court's allegedly erroneous stipulation and failure to object to testimony.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel erroneously stipulated to a witness, Buffy [REDACTED] medical condition of stage 4 cancer before the second trial and failed to object to the admission of her prior testimony from the first trial, where at the time of the second trial the witness was still alive, still in Aiken County (hospice), still had the same cancer as when she testified at the previous trial, and Counsel's stipulation provided the foundation needed by the State to even seek admission of her prior testimony. See Rule 804, *SCRE*; *Dodd v. Berlinsky*, 344 S.C. 172, 543 S.E.2d 237 (Ct. App. 2001).

This Court finds these allegations to be without merit. The second trial was conducted approximately six months after the first trial, during which time [REDACTED] stage 4 lung cancer appears to have advanced to the point that she was taken off all treatments but palliative care and pain management. It is not likely the trial court would have ordered [REDACTED] to appear in that condition, even if Trial Counsel had not stipulated that she was medically unavailable. See Rule 804(a)(4), *SCRE*. In addition, Trial Counsel testified he thought [REDACTED] illness would make her a very sympathetic witness for the State. Because Trial Counsel articulated a valid strategic reason for not seeking [REDACTED] presence this Court finds Applicant has not proved Trial Counsel ineffective as to this allegation. See *Underwood*, 309 S.C. at 562, 425 S.E.2d at 22; *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625. Therefore this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Sixteen: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to hire a DNA expert.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to investigate and obtain all the necessary documentation from SLED regarding its policies, procedures, qualifications, laboratory bench notes, and overall testing of the purported semen stain from a fitted bedsheet for review by an independent DNA expert, and in cross-examination; failed to hire an expert in DNA analysis to independently review the documentation; and failed to demand independent testing by his DNA expert of clippings from the fitted bedsheet with the purported semen stain. See *McKnight v. State*, 378 S.C. 33, 661 S.E.2d 354 (2008), *Lounds v. State*, 380 S.C. 454, 460, 670 S.C. 646, 649 (2008); *Sneed v. Smith*, 670 F.2d 1348, 1353 (4th Cir. 1982) ("To meet this standard, an attorney must at a minimum, 'conduct appropriate investigations, both factual and legal, to determine if matters of defense can be developed, and to allow himself enough time for reflection and preparation for trial.'") (quoting *Coles v. Peyton*, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir. 1968)).

This Court finds these allegations to be without merit. Applicant did not present any expert testimony at the PCR hearing; therefore, any finding of prejudice would be merely speculative. See, e.g., *Dempsey v. State* 363 S.C. 365, 370, 610 S.E.2d 812, 815 (2005) (holding a PCR applicant failed to show prejudice from his Trial Counsel's failure to hire an expert because he failed to have an expert testify at his PCR hearing), abrogated on other grounds by *Smalls v. State*, 422 S.C. 174, 810 S.E.2d 836 (2018). Nor did Applicant make any attempt to show how reviewing SLED's documentation regarding its DNA testing of the bedsheet sample could have led Trial Counsel to discover evidence that would benefit his case. See *Taylor*, 258 S.C. at 378, 188 S.E.2d at 854. Thus, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Seventeen: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to request further voir dire of a specific potential juror.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to move for the Trial Court to conduct follow-up voir dire questioning of a potential juror who indicated he knew one of the investigating officers but was not asked how he knew the officer, whether he could determine the facts fairly to the Applicant, and the potential juror's number.

This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. At the PCR hearing, Trial Counsel was questioned about a juror who knew a member of the public defender's office, but no evidence was presented that the juror knew one of the investigating officers. Trial Counsel testified he had no worries about that juror's impartiality because the juror stated in the transcript that he could be fair and impartial. In addition, Trial Counsel believed it might be beneficial to have a juror who knew someone in the public defender's office, which was a valid strategic reason for failing to object to the juror. See *Underwood*, 309 S.C. at 562, 425 S.E.2d at 22. The Court finds Applicant has not met his burden to show that Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to move for additional voir dire of that juror. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Eighteen: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to make a Batson motion.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to move to quash the jury panel pursuant to *Batson* where the State utilized its statutory strikes to strike two white females from the petit jury, yet where the State sat eleven white jurors, six of whom were female. See *U.S. Const. amends. V, VI, XIV*; *State v. Adams*, 322 S.C. 114, 470 S.E.2d 366 (1996); *State v. Schuler*, 344 S.C. 604, 545 S.E.2d 805 (2001); *State v. Rogers*, 405 S.C. 520, 748

S.E.2d 247 (Ct. App. 2013).

This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. *Batson* held that the purposeful exclusion of jurors on racial grounds violates a defendant's right to equal protection and that a "pattern" of peremptory strikes against potential jurors of the defendant's race "might give rise to an inference of discrimination." *Batson*, 476 U.S. at 96–97. In this case, however, Applicant admits that, despite striking two white jurors, the State ultimately sat eleven white jurors. This is unlike *Batson*, in which the prosecutor struck all jurors of the defendant's race from the venire. *Id.* at 83. The Court finds the composition of the jury in this case is not consistent with a discriminatory pattern of striking jurors of Applicant's race. Trial Counsel had no reason to infer, from only two strikes out of numerous white jurors, that the State was employing its peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Nineteen: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to sequester witnesses.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to move to sequester any of the witnesses for trial where the State repeatedly referred to prior witness testimony when questioning later witnesses. See Rule 615, *SCRE*.

All the witnesses had been present at the prior trial and had already heard one another's testimony. Trial Counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that, because the witnesses were already familiar with the testimony from the previous trial, he believed sequestration would have achieved nothing. However, the Court believes that Trial Counsel was deficient in failing to sequester the witnesses during the second trial.

Although these witnesses had testified in the first trial, sequestration during the second trial would have ensured that the witnesses did not have the ability to hear other witnesses, especially, in a trial where the Defense's strategy was to attack the credibility of the State's witnesses.

Allegation Twenty: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to object during voir dire and move for further voir dire.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel by failed to object and move for individual voir dire when the Trial Court indicated to Counsel during the voir dire process that several jurors approached him regarding "similar types of behavior." Notably, Trial Counsel failed to preserve for appellate review the issue and any resulting prejudice because none of those conversations between the Trial Court and jurors was placed on the record, and none of those juror's numbers were placed on the record with whom the judge spoke. See *U.S. Const. amends. V, VI, XIV*.

Trial Counsel stated during the PCR hearing that having unrecorded conversations during voir dire was not his general practice and he would have asked for the conversations to be on the record if he had been made aware. The Court believes it is the clear responsibility of Trial Counsel to ensure that all aspects of the trial on record for appellate review and it would be obvious if these portions of the trial went undocumented by the court reporter. The Court believes that Trial Counsel was deficient for failing to ensure that conversations regarding juror fairness and impartiality were on the record to preserve the issue for appellate review.

Allegation Twenty One: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to preserve a juror's conversation with the Court.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to properly argue and preserve for appellate review that juror number 94's conversation with the Trial Court be placed on the record where, during jury selection, juror number 94 was called up and stated that she had a relative that was a victim "as the court knows." Notably, Counsel sought for this juror to be stricken for cause, which the Court denied, resulting in Counsel being forced to use a strike on this juror. See *U.S. Const. amends. V, VI, XIV*.

Trial Counsel admitted juror number 94 was struck using a peremptory challenge after the trial court denied the motion to strike her for cause. Trial Counsel testified he did not use up all of his peremptory strikes, because only nine jurors were struck in total, and he had ten strikes. However, Trial Counsel was deficient for failing to have these conversations on record, especially when Counsel moved to have a juror stricken for cause and had to strategically use one of his preemptory strikes on this juror.

Allegation Twenty Two: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to sever the Applicant charges.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to move to sever Applicant's charges where the three (3) primary complaining witnesses alleged conduct over three (3) distinct and large periods of time, did not arise out of a single chain of circumstances, and are not proved by the same evidence. See *State v. Middleton*, 288 S.C. 21, 339 S.E.2d 692 (1986); *State v. Smith*, 322 S.C. 107, 470 S.E.2d 364 (1996).

The Court finds that Trial Counsel was deficient for failing to sever the charges.

The Applicant's charges involved three separate victims over an extended period of time. Although at the evidentiary hearing, Trial Counsel testified that he was afraid multiple trials could result in a longer total term of imprisonment, the State's case was strengthened with the amount of victims presented to the jury at one time, especially when the credibility of the victims was a central issue of the Defense's case. The charges did not arise out of a single chain of circumstances and were not proved by the same evidence, however the State's case was potentially improperly bolstered by the testimony of these Victims together coupled with the State's expert witness commenting that the offenders typically seek out victims in a particular age range.

Allegation Twenty Three: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to object to the Court's preliminary instructions to the jury.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review the Trial Court's initial instructions to the jury that were tantamount to instructions to search for the truth, violative of Due Process, and burden shifting. Specifically, the Trial Court told the jury prior to opening statements, "you twelve collectively act as one, decide what the true facts are...", and "you will be in a position then to render a true and just verdict, an verdict that speaks the truth of the case", and "It's your civic responsibility to pay close attention and decide whose telling the truth." See *State v. Aleksey*, 343 S.C. 20, 538 S.E.2d 248 (2000), *State v. Daniels*, 401 S.C. 251, 737 S.E.2d 473 (2012).

Trial Counsel was deficient for failing to object to this language regarding "true" and "just" verdicts. At the time of this trial the South Carolina Supreme Court issued clear language in *Daniels*, that any reference to the word "true" must be removed from the

Court's comments to the jury.

Allegation Twenty Four: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to object to the State's opening statement.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review the State's improper opening statement when it invited the jury to utilize the unconstitutionally overbroad and vague indictments in its deliberations by saying, "These are the dates when all this is said and done", and "It's important to see how we grouped these indictments together."

, this Court finds there were no grounds for Trial Counsel to object to the State's reference to the indictments during its opening statement. The indictments each alleged the offenses occurred within a one-year period, dated based on the age of the victims; the State simply mentioned that fact in its opening statement to explain why the indictments were dated in that manner. Applicant has not explained how he was prejudiced by the State's brief and innocuous reference to the dates on the indictments. Even if the State's explanation of the indictments' dates was somehow improper, any error would have been cured when the trial court correctly charged the jury that the indictments were not evidence and that nothing should be inferred from the mere fact Applicant was indicted. See, e.g., *State v. Brown* 274 S.C. 48, 51, 260 S.E.2d 719, 721 (1979) (holding a trial court's "unfortunate" reference to the grand jury's returning a true bill was cured by the court's subsequent instruction that the grand jury proceedings were irrelevant and the State had the burden to prove the defendant guilty). The Court finds Applicant has failed to prove Trial Counsel's assistance was ineffective. Therefore this

allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Twenty Five: Trial Counsel's alleged improper argument during opening statements.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel improperly argued in his open statement that “[i]f they’re telling the truth, [the Applicant] can’t be innocent...,” and where the State used that same quote against the defense in its close, saying, “As Mr. Routzong [Trial Counsel] said in his opening statement, if you believe the victims, the Applicant’s guilty,” and where use of such a statement could not be considered a reasonable trial strategy.

Trial Counsel was deficient for the comments made to the jury and could not articulate any strategy for these comments.

Allegation Twenty Six: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to object and strike victim impact testimony.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to object and move to strike under Rules 401 and 403, SCRE, when the State delved unopposed into victim impact on direct examination of the complaining witness (Victim), “Now, sitting here today, telling these events to these 13 strangers, how are you doing?” to which the witness responded, “I would rather be at home with my children, but it’s something that needs to be done; I’m glad I finally get to tell what happened.” See *State v. Livingston*, 327 S.C. 17, 488 S.E.2d 313 (1997).

This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. Applicant cites *State v. Livingston*, 327 S.C. 17, 488 S.E.2d 313 (1997), in support of his position. In that case,

which involved a DUI car crash resulting in death, the prosecution introduced “poignant” testimony that the crash victim was recently married and photographs depicting the victim and her husband. *Id.* at 19, 488 S.E.2d at 314. The Supreme Court held the evidence was irrelevant, highly inflammatory, and likely affected the outcome of the trial because the other evidence of guilt was inconclusive. *Id.* at 20, 488 S.E.2d at 314. In this case, however, the State’s brief inquiry into how the Victim was doing, though irrelevant, was not, by itself, likely to arouse the sympathy or prejudice of the jury. Furthermore, the Victim’s response to the State’s question—that she “would rather be home with [her] children, but it’s something that needs to be done”—was not “highly inflammatory” victim impact evidence like the evidence at issue in Livingston. This Court finds Applicant was not prejudiced by the State’s brief inquiry or the Victim’s response. See *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Twenty Seven: Trial Counsel’s alleged failure to objection to bolstering.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review the Prosecutor’s improper bolstering when Melinda Lively (mother of Victim) answered in the affirmative to the State’s question, “Did you just hear [the other Victim] testify?” and later indicated that she did not contact police because of threats from the Applicant “as [the other Victim] stated.”

This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. Improper bolstering occurs when a witness conveys to the jury that the witness believes the victim. See, e.g., *Briggs v. State*, 421 S.C. 316, 324, 806 S.E.2d 713, 717 (2017). Here, however, Lively never

claimed to believe the Victim; she merely corroborated the Victim's account of Applicant's threatening behavior. There was, therefore, no ground for Trial Counsel to object to improper bolstering. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Twenty Eight: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to object to hearsay and bolstering.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review unfairly prejudicial hearsay that went beyond the scope of time and place, and constituted improper bolstering, when the Prosecutor asked Melinda Lively on redirect examination, "In 1999, had you learned that your daughter, had been abused by the Defendant?" to which the witness replied, Yes, when she was four." See *State v. Barrett*, 299 S.C. 485, 386 S.E.2d 242 (1989); *Smith v. State*, 386 S.C. 562, 689 S.E.2d 629 (2010); Rule 801(d)(1)(D).

This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. All Lively said was that (1) the Victim did disclose she had been abused by Applicant, and (2) the Victim's alleged the abuse occurred when she was four. The Victim's age when the abuse occurred is clearly relevant to the "time of the assault" and is, therefore, within the scope of time and place. In addition, Rule 801(d)(1)(B), SCRE, allows the admission of prior consistent statements by a testifying declarant when the declarant is charged with fabricating her testimony; in the trial in this case, Applicant accused the Victim of fabricating abuse allegations against him in 2011 because she bore a grudge. Therefore, the evidence of the Victim's prior statement would have been admissible even if Trial Counsel had successfully argued it went beyond the time and place of the assault, so Applicant was not prejudiced by Trial

Counsel's failure to make that objection. See *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Twenty Nine: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to strike hearsay testimony.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to move to strike hearsay testimony of a complaining witness (Victim) when the witness said, "My mom told me to lie then....," and Counsel's hearsay objection was sustained by the Trial Court. See *State v. Bealin*, 201 S.C. 490, 23 S.E.2d 746 (1943).

Trial Counsel's failure to move to strike hearsay after an objection was sustained is not deficient performance. Although Counsel did not articulate a strategy for not striking this testimony, there are many reasons Counsel may choose to not do so. Even if this failure was deficient performance, it would not rise to the level of prejudicing the Applicant. Therefore this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Thirty: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to strike testimony following an objection.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to move to strike leading testimony of a complaining witness (Victim) when Counsel's objection to specific and detailed alleged conduct of the Applicant was sustained by the Trial Court. See *State v. Bealin*, 201 S.C. 490, 23 S.E.2d 746 (1943).

Again, Trial Counsel's failure to move to strike testimony after an objection was sustained is not deficient performance. Although Counsel did not articulate a strategy for not striking this testimony, there are many reasons Counsel may choose to not do so.

Even if this failure was deficient performance, it would not rise to the level of prejudicing the Applicant as the State continued to ask questions about the same subject matter without leading. Therefore this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Thirty One: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to preserve an issue for appellate review.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to properly argue and preserve for appellate review Counsel's objection, when during the testimony of a complaining witness about alleged threats and demands for oral sex, Counsel objected, "Your honor, I'm having a real hard time hearing her testimony," and the Court ordered her to speak up.

There is no indication that Trial Counsel's ability to effectively represent Applicant was compromised by this minor inconvenience. The Court finds Applicant has not met his burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Trial Counsel was ineffective as to this allegation. See *Butler*, 286 S.C. at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814; Rule 71.1(e), *SCRCP*. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Thirty Two: Trial Counsel's alleged ineffective assistance regarding recanting statements.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel provided ineffective assistance by reaffirming the complaining witness's version of events regarding her initial recantation of the allegations by asking her, "[Y]ou're saying it was your mom, Buffy Cartwright that ultimately convinced you to recant?", and the Victim responded, "Yes." Applicant alleges that this highly prejudicial questioning reaffirmed the State's case against Applicant and

cannot be deemed a reasonable trial strategy. See *U.S. Const. amends. V, VI, XIV*.

This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. This Victim had already testified that she originally recanted because her mother told her to, so allowing her to “reaffirm” that claim was not likely to be prejudicial to Applicant. Trial Counsel’s question followed a series of questions suggesting that the Victim had already denied the abuse occurred in private conversations with her mother, which (if believed by the jury) would have rebutted the State’s theory that her mother’s request for her to recant was made in bad faith. Therefore, asking the Victim about the circumstances of her recantation was not an unreasonable trial strategy. This Court will not nitpick whether Trial Counsel employed the perfect phrasing in pursuing this strategy; the Sixth Amendment does not require perfect advocacy as judged with the benefit of hindsight. See *Yarborough*, 540 U.S. at 6. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Thirty Three: Trial Counsel’s alleged failure to acquire a transcript of the Applicant’s first trial.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to adequately prepare for trial where he attempted to impeach a complaining witness through use of prior testimony at the first trial, yet it appears failed to have a copy of the transcript to use in the present trial, and where the Trial Court ordered Counsel to move on to another line of questioning.

Trial Counsel was deficient if failing to obtain the transcript of the Applicant’s first trial. The Applicant’s second trial had the same witnesses and the credibility of the complaining witnesses was central to the Applicant’s defense. Trial Counsel’s failure to obtain this transcript amounted to a failure to impeach these witnesses

Allegation Thirty Four: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to object to the DSS case worker's allegedly prejudicial testimony.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to object and move to strike the DSS case worker's unfairly prejudicial testimony that DSS only becomes involved in a case "[i]f it meets the legal statute in the State of South Carolina, we take it as a report and go interview family". The Applicant alleges that this improper testimony violates Due Process and lowers the State's burden in the eyes of the jury as it appears to indicate the statutory law for such cases has already been satisfied. See *State v. Ellis*, 345 S.C. 175, 547 S.E.2d 490 (2001); Rules 701 and 702, *SCRE*.

At the evidentiary hearing, Trial Counsel admitted the possibility that the jury may have inferred DSS made a determination of guilt, although DSS does not need to meet any burden of proof to start an investigation. He maintained he found nothing objectionable in Price's phrasing because there are not many ways to say what Price was trying to say. However, the Court disagrees and finds that Trial Counsel was deficient for failing to object these comments as they amounted to a comment on a legal issue and was prejudicial to the Applicant because it lowers the State's burden in the eyes of the jury.

Allegation Thirty Five: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to object to the DSS case worker's testimony as hearsay and bolstering.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to object and move to strike unfairly prejudicial hearsay that went beyond the scope of time and place, and to improperly

bolstering and hearsay within hearsay, when the DSS agent testified that she “received a call from her supervisor saying we received a report of sexual abuse concerning [Victim] and her step-father Harold Cartwright.” See *State v. Barrett*, 299 S.C. 485, 386 S.E.2d 242 (1989); *Smith v. State*, 386 S.C. 562, 689 S.E.2d 629 (2010); Rule 801(d)(1)(D).

This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. Bolstering requires a witness to convey that she believes the victim; merely announcing that the Victim made a report does not imply that Price believed the report. See, e.g., *Briggs*, 421 S.C. at 324, 806 S.E.2d at 717. In addition, prior consistent statements of a testifying declarant may be admitted, notwithstanding the rule against hearsay, to rebut the charge that the declarant fabricated her testimony. Rule 801(d)(1)(B), *SCRE*. The Court, therefore, finds Trial Counsel had no grounds to object to this statement by Price. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Thirty Six: Trial Counsel’s alleged failure to object to the Court’s preliminary instructions to the jury.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review the issue of burden shifting and violation of Due Process when the Trial Court’s initial instructions to the jury indicated that Trial Counsel would provide an opening statement and that opening statements were “what lawyers contend the facts will be, the issues will be what they’re asking you to look for to keep tuned into what they intend to prove, what the case is about.” See *U.S. Const. amends. V, VI, XIV*.

The Court finds it unlikely that the jury might have misinterpreted this isolated phrase to mean Applicant had some obligation to prove his innocence, the trial court’s

jury instructions, considered as a whole, were free from error and cured any conceivable prejudice. See *Id.* at 26–27, 538 S.E.2d at 251. Consequently, Trial Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to this language. Therefore this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Thirty Seven: Trial Counsel's allegedly ineffective impeach of a witness.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel provided ineffective assistance by attempting to impeach the testimony of one of the Victim's disclosures of abuse, yet Counsel's questions reinforced the State's theory that this witness previously disclosed the abuse to several people. Notably, the State immediately capitalized on Counsel's error on redirect by stating, "Mr. Routzong [Trial Counsel] talked a whole lot about you telling people about what happened. So lets talk about that." This unfairly prejudicial line of questioning reaffirmed the State's case against Applicant and cannot be deemed a reasonable trial strategy. See *U.S. Const. amends. V, VI, XIV.*

This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. Trial Counsel was attempting to show inconsistencies between the stories the Victim told various people about Applicant's abuse. In order to pursue that reasonable impeachment strategy, Trial Counsel necessarily had to question the Victim about the multiple reports she made to different people. The Court finds Trial Counsel's questioning of the Victim was part of a valid trial strategy, even though, with the benefit of hindsight, it may seem imperfect. See *Yarborough*, 540 U.S. at 6; *Underwood*, 309 S.C. at 562, 425 S.E.2d at 22. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Thirty Eight: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to review and object to the admission of prior testimony.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review the admission of Buffy [REDACTED] prior testimony (ex-wife of Applicant, and mother of two Victims) where the witness was still alive, purportedly had the same disease, and no foundation was made by the State showing any reasonable efforts to have her present to testify at the second trial. Furthermore, the Applicant alleges the transcript was not simply published to the jury; rather, it was acted out by a person on the witness stand as Buffy, the prosecutor for direct questions, and Counsel for cross, wherein inflections and mannerisms would likely be as the prosecution saw fit rather than as it actually occurred at the previous trial.

Applicant, however, has not identified which inflections or mannerisms the solicitor is alleged to have improperly adopted. In addition, the solicitor only "acted out" her own role; Trial Counsel portrayed Applicant's defense counsel in the first trial, and [REDACTED] was played by Ms. Emma Dicks. The solicitor, therefore, could not have inserted improper inflections and mannerisms into their performances, which greatly limits the scope of potential prejudice.

Trial Counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that he had the same ability to alter mannerisms. He also testified he could not remember the solicitor making any exaggerated or excessive mannerisms. This Court finds Applicant has not met his burden to prove that the "acting out" of [REDACTED] testimony was harmful to his case. See *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625.

Allegation Thirty Nine: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to object to prior testimony on the grounds of presentation, hearsay, and bolstering.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to object during the "acting-out" of Buffy [REDACTED] prior testimony as unfairly prejudicial hearsay that went beyond the scope of time and place, and to improper bolstering where the Prosecutor asked if she and the police found out that Applicant had been molesting the Victim, to which she replied in the affirmative. See *State v. Barrett*, 299 S.C. 485, 386 S.E.2d 242 (1989); *Smith v. State*, 386 S.C. 562, 689 S.E.2d 629 (2010); Rule 801(d)(1)(D).

At the evidentiary hearing, Trial Counsel testified he believed it would be futile to object to portions of [REDACTED] testimony, because it was admitted and presented to the jury as a whole; he also believed the trial judge would not agree to strike the whole thing, because [REDACTED] unavailability made the prior trial transcript admissible. This Court finds Trial Counsel was not ineffective because he articulated a valid strategic reason why he did not object to the question. See *Underwood*, 309 S.C. at 562, 425 S.E.2d at 22.

Allegation Forty: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to object.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review pursuant to Due Process and to the admission of Applicant's consent to search form (State Exhibit #9), the buccal swab obtained by the State from the search (State Exhibit #10), and the DNA testing derived from the same where no *Denno* hearing was requested or held regarding the voluntariness of the Applicant's waiver, which if involuntarily made would render the subsequent buccal swab and DNA testing fruits of the poisonous tree. See *U.S. Const. amends. IV; V, VI, XIV*; *Jackson v. Denno*, 378 U.S.

368 (1964).

The Court finds that Trial Counsel was deficient for failing to object to the admission of this evidence under *Jackson v. Denno*. Counsel's only explanation for this was that he did not think a hearing was needed because the evidence at issue was not a statement.

Allegation Forty One: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to object and strike the State's redirect examination of the State's DNA expert.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to object and move to strike the State's redirect examination of its DNA expert as it went beyond the scope of cross-examination. Specifically, the State immediately asked whether DNA can be destroyed, what effect washing and drying sheets would have on DNA when Counsel never inquired about the destruction of DNA, and where the State alleged through other witnesses that Applicant sought to destroy his DNA on the sheets by having them laundered.

On cross-examination, Trial Counsel asked Gallman whether she detected a mixture of DNA on the bedsheet, and Gallman testified she only found Applicant's DNA. At the PCR hearing, Trial Counsel testified he was attempting to show Applicant's DNA from the bedsheet was not mixed with one of the Victim's DNA, which might have cast doubt on the State's theory that the semen was from Applicant's abuse of the Victim. Trial Counsel believed the State brought up whether laundering the sheets could destroy DNA in order to explain why the Victim's DNA was not found on them. Trial Counsel perceived that line of redirect questioning as a permissible response to the line of questioning he pursued on cross-examination, which is why he did not object. The Court finds Applicant has failed to prove Trial Counsel's decision not to object to the State's line of questioning

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. See *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 687–88. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Forty Two: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to object to the State's redirect examination of the Corrections Officer.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to object and move to strike the State's redirect examination of the jailer who purportedly saw Applicant hanging in his cell as beyond the scope of cross-examination where the State failed to have the witness identify Applicant during direct examination, and where Counsel asked no questions regarding Applicant's identification on cross-examination, and where on redirect examination, the State immediately asked whether the witness saw the man that was hanging in his cell present in the courtroom.

This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. There was patently no prejudice from Hettich's identification of Applicant as the hanged man on redirect examination because he had already testified on direct examination that he saw "Inmate Cartwright" hanging by a sheet tied around his neck. Applicant has failed to prove any prejudice. See *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Forty Three: Trial Counsel's alleged ineffective assistance for failing to inquire about a discrepancy between the first trial and the second trial.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel provided ineffective assistance where Applicant stated in camera at the end of the State's case that in the first trial, the State

proffered evidence and pictures of the sheets that tested for DNA were taken from one of the Victim's actual room, yet in this trial, the State elicited testimony based on different pictures that the same sheets were taken from a different bedroom (victim's brother's old bedroom), where Counsel failed to cross-examine the State's witnesses regarding this discrepancy (the location of evidence critical to the State's case, and it is unknown whether Trial Counsel obtained a complete copy of the prior trial transcript before the second trial. However, if true, then failing to examine this area cannot be a valid trial strategy). The Court finds that the Trial Counsel was deficient for failing to inquire about this discrepancy.

Allegation Forty Four: Trial Counsel's alleged ineffective assistance regarding an impeachment strategy.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel provided ineffective assistance where Counsel's theory for why one of the Victims lied was that Applicant discovered pornographic pictures of her on the internet and publicly said so, where State witnesses repeatedly indicated the Victim was not in any such pictures, and where Counsel failed to proffer any such photographs into evidence to support his theory.

Trial Counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that he—like everyone else who testified having seen the photographs, except Applicant—did not believe the model in the photographs was the Victim. In addition, during his closing argument, Trial Counsel argued that this Victim was motivated to retaliate against Applicant for falsely accusing her of posing for pornographic images. Therefore, proving the person in the photographs was actually the Victim was not necessary to Applicant's defense. Therefore, this Court

finds Applicant has failed to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, either Trial Counsel's deficiency or any resulting prejudice from the alleged error. See *Butler*, 286 S.C. at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814; *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625; Rule 71.1(e), *SCRCP*. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Forty Five: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to object to the Court stopping the Applicant's testimony.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review the Trial Court repeatedly stopping Applicant's testimony before the jury suasponete, admonishing Applicant, and instructing the Prosecutor to object more; thus, usurping the role of the prosecutor and giving the improper appearance partiality before the jury. Counsel's abandonment of Applicant to the Court's relentless unfairly prejudicial comments and actions cannot be deemed a valid trial strategy. See *U.S. Const. amends. V, VI, XIV*; Fundamental Due Process (right to be tried before a fair and detached tribunal

Trial Counsel was deficient for failing to object the Court's comments and the only reason articulated to the Court to explain this deficiency was Counsel's perception that if he objected he would fall out of favor with the trial judge. This fear of objecting to avoid what Counsel deemed as upsetting the trial judge was referenced multiple times in the PCR hearing and is not an objectively reasonable strategic choice to explain Counsel's failure to object on behalf of his client.

Allegation Forty Six: Trial Counsel's alleged to object to the Court's closing instructions.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review the Trial Court's closing instruction to the jury as a charge on the facts (as improperly infecting the jury with the Court's opinion on the case): "You've got a version of facts by some witnesses and a complete different version of the facts by other witnesses."

To the extent this isolated statement could be interpreted as an improper comment on the facts, this Court finds Applicant has shown no prejudice. In Applicant's testimony and in Trial Counsel's closing argument, the defense expressly claimed the complaining witnesses' accusations of sexual abuse were untrue; in fact, that claim was the heart of Applicant's defense. Trial Counsel had no reason to object to the trial court's express affirmance of a point that was necessary to his own client's theory of the case. In addition, there is no way any juror could have failed to notice that some witnesses gave a "different version of the facts" than others. Therefore, the trial court's statement was so obviously true that, even if Trial Counsel had made an objection on that ground, it could not possibly have changed the result of the proceeding. *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625. Thus this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Forty Seven: Trial Counsel's alleged to object to the Court's closing instructions.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review the Trial Court's closing instructions to the jury that were tantamount to instructions

to search for the truth and violative of Due Process: “It is your duty to determine what the true facts are and what the truth is and who is telling the truth...,” and “You’re to make your decision based solely on what you determine the true facts are in this case.” See *State v. Aleksey*, 343 S.C. 20, 538 S.E.2d 248 (2000), *State v. Daniels*, 401 S.C. 251, 737 S.E.2d 473 (2012). The Court believes that Trial Court was deficient in failing to object to the reference to the truth language despite the clear case law on these type of comments.

Allegation Forty Eight: Trial Counsel’s alleged failure to objection to a jury instruction.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review the Trial Court’s jury instruction that, “pursuant to our state law, the testimony of the victim in these cases need not be corroborated.” See *State v. Stukes*, 416 S.C. 493, 787 S.E.2d 480 (2016). Trial Counsel was deficient for failing to object to these comments made during jury instructions as a misstatement of the law.

Allegation Forty Nine: Trial Counsel’s alleged failure to object to comments make in the State’s closing argument.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review the Prosecutor’s improper comments during closing argument. Specifically, the

Applicant alleges that the Prosecutor's comments were calculated to arouse the jurors' passions or prejudices and vouched and bolstered the credibility of the State's witnesses. See *State v. Northcutt*, 372 S.C. 207, 222, 641 S.E.2d 873, 881 (2007) (internal citation and quotation omitted); *State v. Rudd*, 355 S.C. 543, 549, 586 S.E.2d 153, 156 (Ct. App. 2003) (citation omitted); See *State v. Copeland*, 321 S.C. 318, 324, 468 S.E.2d 620, 624 (1996) (finding a solicitor's closing argument must be carefully tailored so as not to appeal to the personal biases of the jury); *State v. Shuler*, 344 S.C. 604, 545 S.E.2d 805, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 977, 122 S.Ct. 404 (2001) ("[A] solicitor: cannot vouch for the credibility of a witness by expressing or implying his personal opinion concerning a witness' truthfulness Improper vouching occurs when the prosecution places the government's prestige behind a witness by making explicit personal assurances of a witness' veracity, or where a prosecutor implicitly vouches for a witness' veracity by indicating information not presented to the jury supports the testimony[.]") (citations omitted); *Gilchrist v. State*, 350 S.C. 221, 227, 565 S.E.2d 281, 285 (2002) ("[b]ecause a jury must make its own assessment on the credibility of witnesses, it is inappropriate for the State to assure the jury of a government witness's credibility.").

The Court finds this allegation without merit, as the Applicant failure to specify which comments the Applicant contends were improper and the Applicant did not clarify during the evidentiary hearing. Since Applicant has failed to identify with particularity the State's remarks to which he claims Trial Counsel should have objected, this Court finds Applicant has failed to meet his burden of proving those allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. See *Land*, 274 S.C. at 246, 262 S.E.2d at 737. Therefore this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Fifty: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to prepare for trial and present a reasonable trial strategy.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing by not adequately preparing for trial and having an unreasonable trial strategy. See *United States v. Cronin*, 466 U.S. 648 (1984); *Roseboro v. State*, 317 S.C. 292, 294, 454 S.E.2d 312, 313 (1995) (finding "counsel must articulate a valid reason for employing a certain strategy to avoid a finding of ineffectiveness, and where counsel articulates a strategy, it is measured under an objective standard of reasonableness"); *Stacy v. Solem*, 801 F.2d 1048, 1051 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding that "labeling counsel's actions as "trial strategy" does not automatically immunize an attorney's performance from sixth amendment challenges.").

The Applicant does not explain with particularity what aspects of Trial Counsel's preparation or strategy were inadequate or unreasonable; rather, Applicant cites *United States v. Cronin*, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), and claims Trial Counsel "failed to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing." This bare conclusion, devoid of supporting facts, is insufficient to merit a determination by this Court. See *Land v. State*, 274 S.C. 243, 246, 262 S.E.2d 735, 737 (1980) (holding a PCR applicant must assert facts, as contrasted with conclusions, to meet the burden imposed upon him). Therefore this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE COUNSEL

In analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, courts must apply the *Strickland* test just as they would when analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. *Bennet v. State*, 383 S.C. 303, 309, 680 S.E.2d 273, 276

(2009). Therefore, a PCR applicant alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must prove counsel's performance was deficient and the applicant was prejudiced thereby. *Id.*

Allegation One: Appellate Counsel's alleged failure to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.

Applicant alleges Appellate Counsel should have filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court on the issue of whether evidence of attempted suicide is admissible as evidence of guilt in South Carolina. This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. First of all, there is no right to discretionary review by the United States Supreme Court. See *Douglas v. State*, 369 S.C. 213, 216, 631 S.E.2d 542, 543–44 (2006) ("We find that the decision whether to pursue certiorari is a matter left solely to the appellant's attorney's professional discretion.") Cf. *Jones v. Barnes*, 463 U.S. 745 (1983) (Appellate counsel must be allowed to exercise reasonable professional judgment in determining which non-frivolous issues to raise on direct appeal). In addition, the admissibility of evidence in a state criminal trial is not generally an issue of federal law, unless it implicates constitutional concerns. Applicant has not explained any basis for seeking review of his direct appeal by the United States Supreme Court on what is facially an issue of state law. Therefore, Applicant has not met his burden of showing Appellate Counsel was deficient for failing to request such review, or that he likely would have obtained review had he requested it. See *id.*; Rule 71.1(e), SCRCP. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Two: Appellate Counsel's alleged failure to raise issues related to Dr. Benedetto's qualification as an expert in child sexual abuse dynamics.

Applicant alleges Appellate Counsel should have raised the issues of Dr. Benedetto's qualification as an expert as set forth in Allegation 13 discussed above. This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. As discussed in response to Applicant's Allegation 13, the trial court's decision to conduct Dr. Benedetto's qualification in the presence of the jury was within the sound discretion of the trial judge. See *Fields*, 363 S.C. at 25, 609 S.E.2d at 509. In addition, the jury could not have been improperly influenced by Dr. Benedetto's pre-qualification testimony because the trial court refused to allow the attorneys to question her about the substance of her testimony until later, so any error in holding the qualification procedure in the jury's presence was harmless. See *State v. Rivera*, 402 S.C. 225, 246, 741 S.E.2d 694, 705 (2013). Applicant has failed to prove that Appellate Counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue on appeal. See *Bennet*, 383 S.C. at 309, 680 S.E.2d at 276. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Three: Appellate Counsel's alleged failure to raise issue of Dr. Benedetto's testimony that abusers typically seek victims of a particular age

Applicant alleges Appellate Counsel should have raised the issue of Dr. Benedetto's testimony that abusers typically seek victims within a certain age range as going beyond the scope of her expertise. This Court finds this allegation to be without

merit. As discussed in response to Applicant's Allegation 14, Dr. Benedetto's statement could not have prejudiced Applicant. Victims 1, 2, and 3 testified that Applicant began abusing them at ages five, nine, and thirteen, respectively. Therefore, the State's theory of the case required the jury to believe that Applicant did *not* target victims of a similar age. Dr. Benedetto's statement, therefore, was not consistent with the State's theory of the case, and any deficiency in failing to raise it on appeal did not prejudice Applicant. See *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625; *Bennet*, 383 S.C. at 309, 680 S.E.2d at 276. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Four: Appellate Counsel's alleged failure to raise issue of Trial Counsel's objection to the trial court's refusal to question jurors about sexual molestation

Applicant alleges Appellate Counsel should have challenged the trial court's refusal to ask Defense Questions 1 and 3 during *voir dire*, where Question 1 ("Have you, any member of your family, or friend been impacted in any way by Sexual Crime or Sexual Assault or Child Molestation?" and Question 3 ("Does any member of the jury panel believe that anyone charged with crimes involving Sexual Molestation of a child is more likely guilty than not?") would have elicited potential bias among the jurors. This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. Appellate Counsel testified he raised four issues on appeal; counsel is not required to raise every non-frivolous issue on appeal but may select among them to maximize the likelihood of a favorable outcome. See *Bennet*, 383 S.C. at 309, 680 S.E.2d at 276. The Court finds Appellate Counsel attempted to raise

those issues he believed were most likely to obtain a favorable result. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Five: Appellate Counsel's alleged failure to raise issue of Applicant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal.

This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. On appeal from the denial of a directed verdict, the appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the State; if there is any evidence from which the defendant's guilt can be fairly and logically deduced, the jury verdict will not be disturbed. See *State v. Brown*, 360 S.C. 581, 586, 602 S.E.2d 392, 395 (2004). Here, there was substantial evidence of Applicant's guilt: the three victims' detailed testimony. It would likely have been fruitless for Appellate Counsel to challenge the sufficiency of the State's evidence on appeal, and he was not ineffective for declining to try. See *Bennet*, 383 S.C. at 309, 680 S.E.2d at 276. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

CONCLUSION

The Applicant has submitted an extensive list of alleged errors on behalf of Trial Counsel and Appellate Counsel. The Court finds that Trial Counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel based on cumulative error. *State v. Johnson*, 334 S.C. 78, 93, 512 S.E.2d 795, 803 (1999); See *Tennant v. Marion Health Care Foundation*, 194 W.Va. 97, 459 S.E.2d 374 (1995) (cumulative error doctrine provides relief to a party when a combination of errors that are insignificant by themselves have the effect of preventing a party from receiving a fair trial and it requires the cumulative effect of the errors to affect

the outcome of the trial). Here, the Applicant has suffered prejudice warranting a new trial based on cumulative trial error. The Court has identified fourteen (14) errors that individually and cumulatively create prejudice against the Applicant. "As we have stressed on more than one occasion, the Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one." *State v. Mitchell*, 330 S.C. 189, 199–200, 498 S.E.2d 642, 647–48 (1998) (quoting *Delaware v. Van Arsdall*, 475 U.S. at 681, 106 S.Ct. at 1436, 89 L.Ed.2d at 684). These errors have created a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional error, the result would have been different.


In determining whether the Applicant has proven prejudice, the PCR court should consider the specific impact counsel's error had on the outcome of the trial. See *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 695-96, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698-99 (explaining that the court must analyze how individual errors of counsel affect the important factual findings in a particular case). In addition, the PCR court should consider the strength of the State's case in light of all the evidence presented to the jury. See generally *Jones v. State*, 332 S.C. 329, 333, 504 S.E.2d 822, 824 (1998). The Applicants first trial ending in a mistrial and the analysis of the evidence presented to this Court over the multi-day PCR hearing supports the Court's finding of prejudice.

Based on all the foregoing reasons, this Court finds and concludes that Applicant has established constitutional violations and deprivations that would require post-conviction relief. This Court finds that Trial Counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. See *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 687-88. This Court also finds that Trial Counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Petitioner because it "so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process

that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result.” Butler, 286 S.C. at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814 (quoting *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 642). The Court has concluded that Trial Counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel because “there is a reasonable probability that but for [trial] counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 118, 386 S.E.2d at 625 (internal citations omitted); See *U.S. Const. amends.* VI, XIV; S.C. Const. art. I, §§ 3 and 14; S.C. Code § 17-27-20(A)(1), (4), and (6). Therefore this PCR application must be granted and Applicant shall receive a new trial.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Applicant’s application for Post-Conviction Relief is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED!

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Robert J. Bonds", written over a horizontal line.

The Honorable Robert J. Bonds
Presiding Judge

June 1, 2022

Walterboro, South Carolina

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF AIKEN

Harold Cartwright, #355084

Applicant,

v.

State of South Carolina,

Respondent.

) IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
) FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
)

) Case No.: 2019-CP-02-01582
)

) **RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO ALTER OR**
) **AMEND THE ORDER GRANTING POST-**
) **CONVICTION RELIEF PURUSANT TO RULE**
) **59(e), SCRPC**

FILED 6-13 20 22 1:15 PM

Robert J. White
C.C.P. & G.S.
Shadell Parks
Deputy Clerk

This matter comes before the Court by way of an application for post-conviction relief ("PCR") filed by Harold Cartwright ("Applicant") on June 26, 2019. Respondent made its return on October 3, 2019. The Court convened an evidentiary hearing into the matter on February 2-3, 2022, and February 25, 2022, via the WebEx Virtual Courtroom of the Honorable Robert J. Bonds. Applicant was present at the hearing and represented by Dayne C. Phillips, Esq. Michael J. Neubauer, of the South Carolina Attorney General's Office, represented Respondent.

Applicant testified on his own behalf at the evidentiary hearing. Applicant's trial counsel, Michael Routzong, Esq., and David Hayes, Esq. ("Trial Counsel"), and Applicant's Appellate Counsel Robert Dudek, Esq. ("Appellate Counsel") also testified. The Court had before it Applicant's records from the South Carolina Department of Corrections, a copy of the original trial transcript, the records of the Aiken County Clerk of Court regarding the subject convictions, and the pleadings.

Following the hearing, this Court asked for proposed orders from both parties. Following submission and review of these orders, this Court granted post-conviction relief to Applicant. The Court found Trial Counsel deficient as to fifteen of the allegations raised in Applicant's PCR

application and found that Applicant was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of Trial Counsel's errors. As relief, the Court ordered that Applicant receive a new trial.

Respondent respectfully submits that the Court has overlooked or misapprehended material points of law and fact that necessitate the opposite result. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCRPC, Respondent now makes the following motion to alter or amend this order and requests this Court issue a revised or amended order denying relief and finding that Trial Counsel was not ineffective.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Applicant is currently confined in the South Carolina Department of Corrections pursuant to orders of commitment of the Aiken County Clerk of Court. During its February 2012 term, the Aiken County Grand Jury indicted Applicant for criminal sexual conduct, first degree (2012-GS-02-00304), eight counts of criminal sexual conduct with a minor, first degree (2012-GS-02-00306, 319, 321, 323, 325, 327, 329, 331), nineteen counts of lewd act upon a child (2012-GS-02-00307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 320, 322, 324, 326, 328, 330, 332), and criminal sexual conduct, third-degree (2012-GS-02-01682). On November 12–13, 2012, Applicant proceeded to a jury trial before the Honorable Thomas A. Russo. Applicant was represented by Robert J. Harte, Esq. The case was prosecuted by Assistant Solicitors Kevin N. Molony and John W. Weeks of the Second Circuit Solicitor's Office. A new trial was ordered due to a hung jury.

On April 15–18, 2013, Applicant proceeded to a second jury trial before the Honorable Doyet A. Early, III. Applicant was represented by Michael Routzong and David Hayes. The case was prosecuted by Assistant Solicitors Kevin N. Molony and Ashley Agnew of the Second Circuit Solicitor's Office. Following trial, the jury found Applicant guilty as indicted. Judge Early

sentenced Applicant to concurrent sentences of thirty years for criminal sexual conduct, first degree, and each count of criminal sexual conduct with a minor, first degree, and a concurrent term of fifteen years for each count of lewd act upon a minor, along with a consecutive ten-year sentence for criminal sexual conduct, third degree.

Applicant subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal. On appeal, Applicant was represented by Chief Appellate Defender Robert M. Dudek and Appellate Defender Susan Hackett of the South Carolina Commission of Indigent Defense, Appellate Division. In an unpublished opinion, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed Applicant's conviction and sentences following oral arguments. *State v. Harold Cartwright III*, No. 2013-UP-000894 (Ct. App. filed September 30, 2015). Applicant filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the South Carolina Supreme Court, which was granted. On September 26, 2018, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed Applicant's convictions and sentences. *State v. Harold Cartwright III*, Op. No. 278842 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed September 26, 2018).

Summary of Trial Testimony

Applicant had three children with Melinda Lively, his first wife: a daughter ("Victim 1") and two sons. After Applicant's divorce from Lively in 1997, he married Buffy [REDACTED] in 1999. Prior to marrying Applicant, [REDACTED] had two daughters ("Victim 2" and "Victim 3").

At trial, Victim 1 testified Applicant began making her perform oral sex on him when she was four years old. At age five, she told Lively about the abuse, but Lively did not contact police because Applicant threatened to kill her, Victim 1, and himself.¹ Eventually, Victim 1 spoke with DSS about Applicant's abuse, but Applicant convinced her to recant. Applicant testified the abuse

¹ Lively recalled Victim 1 mentioning the abuse and corroborated her testimony that Lively did not contact law enforcement because she was too afraid of Applicant. (April 15-16, 2013, Trial Tr. p.95, line 7-p.96, line 3).

continued multiple times every year until 1995, when she was ten. Applicant did not mention the alleged abuse again until she was contacted by detectives from the Aiken County Sheriff's Department in 2011 as part of an ongoing investigation into the alleged abuse of Victims 2 and 3. She testified that she waited from 1995 until 2011 to disclose the abuse because she was afraid of Applicant. (April 15–16, 2013, Trial Tr. pp.72–94).

Victim 2 testified Applicant began abusing her in 2000, when she was nine, by making her perform oral sex on him. The abuse continued until 2001, when Victim 2 disclosed the abuse to DSS. As a result of her disclosure, Applicant was arrested. However, Victim 2 testified she recanted at the urging of her mother, Buffy [REDACTED]. Victim 2 testified that, beginning in 2002, Applicant started going into her room and “humping” her, rubbing his penis on her legs; this abuse occurred several times a week until 2006. In addition, Victim 2 testified Applicant sometimes bribed or forced her to agree to have sexual intercourse with him and threatened to kill her, her mother, Victim 3, and himself. (April 15–16, 2013, Trial Tr. pp.104–35).

Victim 3 testified Applicant began abusing her in 2008, when she was thirteen, by coming into her room before school and “humping” her. She testified he threatened to kill all of them and himself. In addition, Victim 3 testified Applicant began forcing her to have sexual intercourse with him when she was fourteen. She testified Applicant stopped having sex with her in 2010, when Hoss Cartwright, Applicant's son, moved into the house, but continued humping her in her room before school.² When investigators questioned Victim 3, she initially denied being abused by Applicant because she was afraid of him. Later, however, she told investigators Applicant molested her. (April 15–16, 2013, Trial Tr. pp.141–80).

² Hoss testified he could hear Applicant enter Victim 3's room every morning and stay for an extended period of time. (April 17–18, 2013, Trial Tr. p.11, lines 18–24).

The State and Trial Counsel stipulated that Buffy [REDACTED] was medically unavailable due to stage 4 cancer. The State introduced her prior testimony from Applicant's first trial without objection. In that testimony, [REDACTED] stated she remembered Applicant would spend ten to twenty minutes waking up Victim 2 every morning before school. She admitted pressuring Victim 2 to recant after Victim 2 initially reported the abuse because Applicant convinced [REDACTED] he had done nothing wrong. [REDACTED] testified Applicant confessed to her on February 19, 2011, that he might have molested Victims 2 and 3. She claimed he told her to wash Victim 3's bedsheets to remove his DNA. [REDACTED] however, did not wash the bedsheets; instead, she consented to a police search of the house and seizure of the bedsheets on February 25, 2011. (April 15–16, 2013, Trial Tr. pp.182–97). DNA recovered from semen found on the bedsheets matched Applicant's DNA. (April 17–18, 2013, Trial Tr. pp.31–42; pp.79–92).

The State also called clinical psychologist Dr. Alicia Benedetto. Over Trial Counsel's objection, the trial court qualified Dr. Benedetto as an expert in child sexual abuse dynamics. She acknowledged that she had not spoken to any witnesses or victims in the case. She explained that "Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome" could cause abused children to exhibit behaviors that may not make sense to adults, such as delaying or falsely recanting allegations of abuse because of bribes, manipulation, and fear. (April 17–18, 2013, Trial Tr. pp.47–79).

Finally, the State called James Hettich, a guard at the Aiken County Detention Center. He testified Applicant attempted to commit suicide while detained prior to trial. (April 17–18, 2013, Trial Tr. pp.100–04).

Applicant took the stand in his own defense. He denied molesting any of the children and claimed the semen found on the bedsheets came from Buffy [REDACTED] masturbating him on his son's bed. He explained that he attempted suicide because he had been detained for thirty days, couldn't

get a bond, was charged with heinous crimes, and had just learned of new charges based on Victim 1's accusations. He suggested that each of the victims had a motive for lying: Victim 1 bore him a grudge for reporting her husband for statutory rape, Victim 2 had been kicked out of his house, and Victim 3 became angry when Applicant confronted her about finding her picture on a pornographic website. (April 17-18, 2013, Trial Tr. pp.129-60).

Present Application

In his PCR application, Applicant alleges he is being held unlawfully for the following reasons:

a. Ineffective assistance of Trial Counsel

1. Failure to interview critical witnesses and to challenge the credibility of the State's witnesses
2. Failure to hire expert witnesses to rebut the State's arguments based on an independent review of the forensic evidence
3. Failure to adequately investigate Victim 2's involvement in a drug investigation and any deals or offers possibly made to her by the State
4. Failure to adequately compare the timeline of when Applicant lived in the home to the timing of the allegations
5. Failure to obtain and review discovery with Applicant
6. Failure to properly impeach the State's witnesses based on inconsistencies between their statements at Applicant's second trial and their testimony at his first trial or their statements to police
7. Failure to interview witnesses regarding Applicant's good character and reputation and to request a jury instruction on good character and reputation
8. Providing erroneous advice regarding Applicant's decision to testify and failing to explain the risks involved in testifying as a witness
9. Failure to object to the trial court's erroneous and burden-shifting jury instructions
10. Failure to object to object to the admission of inadmissible and unduly prejudicial evidence
11. Failure to object to the State's improper closing argument that misstated the evidence and was unduly prejudicial
12. Failure to move to quash the twenty-eight indictments as unconstitutionally overbroad and vague because, apart from giving the year, they did not specify the dates on which the alleged offenses occurred, and the combined indictments covered a period of over eighteen years
13. Failure to object to improper qualification of the State's expert witness in the field of child sexual abuse dynamics where the trial court (1) limited counsel to *voir dire* of the witness regarding qualifications, (2) qualified the witness as an expert in the given field, and (3) only permitted questioning of the witness on the reliability and

- validity of the field itself after the witness was deemed an "expert" by the court and directly examined by the State, all of which occurred in the jury's presence
14. Failure to object to and move to strike the expert's testimony that went beyond the scope of her expertise, which was focused on the perspectives of abused children, when the expert testified abusers typically seek victims of a particular age
 15. Erroneous stipulation to a witness's medical unavailability due to stage 4 cancer and failure to object to admission of the witness's testimony from the previous trial
 16. Failure to hire an expert to perform independent DNA testing of a bedsheet with a purported semen stain or to obtain documents from SLED regarding its policies, procedures, qualification, laboratory bench notes, and overall testing of the purported semen stain in order that the documents could be reviewed by such an expert
 17. Failure to move for the trial court to conduct follow-up *voir dire* questioning of a potential juror who indicated he knew one of the investigating officers but was not asked how he knew the officer, whether he could be fair to Applicant, and the potential juror's number
 18. Failure to move to quash the jury panel pursuant to *Batson v. Kentucky*, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), when the State struck two white female jurors from the petit jury but sat eleven white jurors, six of whom were female
 19. Failure to move to sequester any of the witnesses for trial where the State repeatedly referred to prior witness testimony when questioning later witnesses
 20. Failure to object and move for individual *voir dire* when the trial court told Trial Counsel several jurors had approached him about "similar types of behavior," none of the conversations between the trial court and those jurors were placed on the record, and none of those jurors' number were placed on the record
 21. Failure to properly argue that juror number 94's prior conversation with the trial court be placed on the record where juror number 94 indicated the court knew she had a relative who was a victim and the court denied Trial Counsel's motion to strike the juror for cause
 22. Failure to move to sever Applicant's charges where the three primary complaining witnesses alleged conduct over three distinct periods of time, not arising from a single chain of circumstances, and not proved by the same evidence
 23. Failure to object to the trial court's initial jury instructions that frequently mentioned "truth" and were, therefore, tantamount to instructions to search for the truth, violative of due process, and burden shifting
 24. Failure to object to the State's opening statement inviting the jury to utilize the unconstitutionally overbroad and vague indictments in its deliberations
 25. Arguing to the jury that Applicant couldn't be innocent if the victims were telling the truth, where that statement could not be considered a reasonable trial strategy
 26. Failure to object and move to strike when the State delved into victim impact on direct examination by asking Victim 1 how she was doing
 27. Failure to object to improper bolstering when Melinda Lively affirmed she had heard Victim 1 testify and later referred to Victim 1's statement when testifying she did not contact police due to Applicant's threats

28. Failure to object to hearsay when the prosecutor asked Melinda Lively whether she had learned that her daughter, Victim 1, had been abused by the Applicant and the witness replied, "Yes, when she was four"
29. Failure to move to strike Victim 2's hearsay testimony after the trial court sustained Trial Counsel's hearsay objection
30. Failure to move to strike Victim 2's testimony in response to a leading question after the trial court sustained Trial Counsel's objection
31. Failure to properly argue and preserve for appellate review Trial Counsel's objection to the quietness of a complaining witness's testimony
32. Prejudicial questioning of Victim 2 by phrasing a question in such a way as to reaffirm her version of events and strengthen the State's case against Applicant
33. Failure to adequately prepare for trial by bringing a copy of a complaining witness's prior testimony at the first trial to support his attempt to impeach the witness, causing the trial court to order Trial Counsel to move on to a new line of questioning
34. Failure to object to and move to strike a DSS case worker's testimony that DSS only becomes involved in a case if it "meets the legal statute," lowering the State's burden to prove Applicant's conduct satisfied the statutory elements of the charged offense
35. Failure to object to and move to strike the DSS agent's hearsay testimony that she received a call from her supervisor saying DSS had received a report of sexual abuse concerning Applicant and one of the alleged victims
36. Failure to object to the trial court's burden-shifting initial jury instruction that Counsel's opening statement would include "what they intend to prove"
37. Unreasonably attempting to impeach Victim 3 by questioning her about her various disclosures of abuse, reinforcing the State's theory that the victim previously disclosed the abuse to several people
38. Failure to object to the admission of Buffy [REDACTED] testimony from Applicant's first trial where Buffy [REDACTED] was alive and the State had not shown that it made reasonable efforts to obtain her presence at the second trial and where the testimony was admitted, not by a portion of the prior trial transcript, but by "acting out" the testimony, permitting the prosecution to add inflections and mannerisms that may not have occurred at the previous trial
39. Failure to object to hearsay testimony during the "acting out" of Buffy [REDACTED] prior trial testimony where she affirmed she and the police had found out Applicant was molesting Victim 2
40. Failure to object to admission of Applicant's consent to search form, buccal swab, and DNA evidence derived therefrom, where no hearing was requested or held regarding the voluntariness of Applicant's waiver as required by *Jackson v. Denno*, 378 U.S. 368 (1964)
41. Failure to object to and move to strike redirect testimony of the State's DNA expert as beyond the scope of cross-examination where the State asked if DNA evidence could be destroyed or affected by washing and drying sheets, despite Counsel never inquiring about the destruction of DNA
42. Failure to object to and move to strike redirect testimony of the jailer who purportedly saw Applicant hanging in his cell where the State failed to have the

witness identify Applicant during direct examination and Trial Counsel never asked about Applicant's identification on cross-examination

43. Failure to cross-examine the State's witnesses regarding the discrepancy between the testimony given at the first trial that the DNA evidence was taken from Victim 3's room and the testimony at the second trial that the DNA evidence was taken from the victim's stepbrother's room
 44. Failure to proffer pornographic photographs discovered by Applicant to support the defense's theory that Victim 3 lied because Applicant publicly accused her of appearing in those photographs and to rebut the testimony of the State's witnesses that Victim 3 did not appear in any of the photographs
 45. Failure to object to the trial court's repeated interruption and admonishment of Applicant during his testimony and request that the prosecutor object more often, which gave the impression of partiality before the jury
 46. Failure to object to the trial court's comment, during closing jury instruction, that "You've got a version of facts by some witnesses and a complete different version of the facts by other witnesses"
 47. Failure to object to the trial court's closing jury instructions that frequently mentioned "truth" and were, therefore, tantamount to instructions to search for the truth and violative of due process
 48. Failure to object to the trial court's jury instruction that testimony of the victim did not need to be corroborated
 49. Failure to object to the prosecutor's improper comments during closing argument that vouched for and bolstered the credibility of the State's witnesses
 50. Failure to subject the State's case to meaningful adversarial testing by not adequately preparing for trial and having an unreasonable trial strategy
- b. Ineffective assistance of Appellate Counsel
1. Failure to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court on the issue of whether evidence of attempted suicide is admissible as evidence of guilt
 2. Failure to raise and argue the issue of the improper qualification of the State's expert witness in the field of child sexual abuse dynamics where the trial court (1) limited counsel to *voir dire* of the witness regarding qualifications, (2) qualified the witness as an expert in the given field, and (3) only permitted questioning of the witness on the reliability and validity of the field itself after the witness was deemed an "expert" by the court and directly examined by the State, all of which occurred in the jury's presence
 3. Failure to raise and argue the issue of whether the expert's testimony went beyond the scope of her expertise, which was focused on the perspectives of abused children, when the expert testified abusers typically seek victims of a particular age
 4. Failure to raise and argue the issue of the trial court's refusal to ask Defense Questions 1 and 3 during *voir dire*, where Question 1 ("Have you, any member of your family, or friend been impacted in any way by Sexual Crime or Sexual Assault or Child Molestation?") and Question 3 ("Does any member of the jury panel believe that anyone charged with crimes involving Sexual Molestation of a child is more likely guilty than not?") would have potentially disqualified biased jurors

5. Failure to raise and argue Applicant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal where the motion was timely raised to and ruled on by the trial court.

As relief, Applicant requested his convictions and sentences be vacated and his indictments be remanded for a new trial.

II. ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND THE ORDER GRANTING POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

In its order granting post-conviction relief, this Court found Trial Counsel was deficient on fifteen grounds: Allegations 13, 14, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 33, 34, 40, 43, 45, 47, and 48. The Court made specific findings of prejudice on only two of those allegations: Allegations 34 and 45. The order concludes with a general finding of prejudice based on "cumulative error." The remaining thirty-five allegations of ineffective assistance of Trial Counsel, as well as all five allegations of ineffective assistance of Appellate Counsel, were denied and dismissed as meritless. Each dismissal was with prejudice, except for Allegation 9, which was dismissed without prejudice.

The Court's reliance on "cumulative error" was improper. The appellate courts of South Carolina have never recognized "cumulative error" as a substitute for individualized, specific findings of prejudice as to each act or omission of counsel challenged in a PCR application. A majority of federal appellate courts, including the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, have expressly *rejected* the application of "cumulative error" to ineffective assistance claims. In addition, Applicant failed to prove both deficiency and prejudice resulting from Trial Counsel's conduct as to each allegation on which this Court granted relief. Finally, the Court's order contains internal inconsistencies that undermine its findings of ineffective assistance. Accordingly, Respondent respectfully asks this Court to issue an amended order denying and dismissing each and every allegation with prejudice.

Improper “Cumulative Error” Analysis

In a PCR action, Applicant bears the burden of proving the allegations in his application by a preponderance of the evidence. *Butler v. State*, 286 S.C. 441, 442, 334 S.E.2d 813, 814 (1985); Rule 71.1(e), SCRPC. Where the application alleges ineffective assistance of counsel as a ground for relief, Applicant must prove that “counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that [it] cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result.” *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); *Butler*, 286 S.C. at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814.

In evaluating allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, the reviewing court applies the two-pronged test outlined in *Strickland*. First, Applicant must prove that counsel’s performance was deficient. *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 686; *Cherry v. State*, 300 S.C. 115, 117, 386 S.E.2d 624, 625 (1989). Under this prong, the court measures an attorney’s performance by its “reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117, 386 S.E.2d at 625 (quoting *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 690). The proper measure of performance is whether the attorney provided representation within the range of competence required in criminal cases. *Butler*, 286 S.C. at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814. “Counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” *Id.* (citing *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 690). “When counsel focuses on some issues to the exclusion of others, there is a strong presumption that he [or she] did so for tactical reasons rather than through sheer neglect.” *Yarborough v. Gentry*, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (citing *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 690). The Court, in determining deficiency, must affirmatively entertain the range of possible reasons counsel may have had for proceeding as they did. *Cullen v. Pinholster*, 563 U.S. 170, 196 (2011); *Harrington v. Richter*, 562 U.S. 86, 109–10 (2011). When counsel articulates a valid reason for

employing a certain trial strategy, such conduct will not be deemed ineffective. *Underwood v. State*, 309 S.C. 560, 562, 425 S.E.2d 20, 22 (1992). “[E]ven if an omission is inadvertent, relief is not automatic. The Sixth Amendment guarantees reasonable competence, not perfect advocacy judged with the benefit of hindsight.” *Yarborough*, 540 U.S. at 6; *see also* *Murphy v. Davis*, 901 F.3d 578, 592 (5th Cir. 2018) (“[C]ounsel’s performance need not be optimal to be reasonable.”). Applicant must overcome this presumption to receive relief. *See Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 118, 386 S.E.2d at 625.

Second, counsel's deficient performance must have prejudiced Applicant such that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” *Id.* at 117–18, 386 S.E.2d at 625. “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” *Harrington*, 562 U.S. at 112. “The prejudice analysis requires the court deciding the ineffectiveness claim to consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.” *United States v. Basham*, 789 F.3d 358, 371–72 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting *Elmore v. Ozmint*, 661 F.3d 783, 858 (4th Cir. 2011)). A court need not first determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies; if it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, that course should be followed. *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 697.

The United States Supreme Court has clearly held that, before any individual act or omission of counsel may be deemed a constitutional error, it must satisfy both the “deficiency” and “prejudice” prongs of the *Strickland* analysis. *See Lockhart v. Fretwell*, 506 U.S. 364, 369 n.2 (1993) (“[U]nder *Strickland v. Washington*, . . . an error of constitutional magnitude occurs in the Sixth Amendment context only if the defendant demonstrates (1) deficient performance and (2) prejudice.”). Therefore, unless the acts and omissions of counsel are *individually* shown to be both

deficient and prejudicial, they do not constitute “errors,” no matter how many of them are added together. See *Wainwright v. Lockhart*, 80 F.3d 1226, 1233 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that, regarding ineffective assistance claims, the “cumulative error” doctrine is no longer good law after *Strickland* because “[e]rrors that are not unconstitutional individually cannot be added together to create a constitutional violation”); *Jones v. Stotts*, 59 F.3d 143, 147 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding “cumulative error” analysis evaluates only the effect of matters determined to be errors, not the cumulative effect of non-errors); *Hunt v. Smith*, 856 F.Supp. 251, 258 (D. Md. 1994) (“[T]he fact that many claims of counsel error are pressed does not alter fundamental math—a string of zeros still adds up to zero.”), *aff’d*, 57 F.3d 1327 (4th Cir. 1995). For these reasons, a majority of federal appellate courts have expressly rejected “cumulative error” analysis for ineffective assistance claims. E.g. *Fisher v. Angelone*, 163 F.3d 835, 852–53 (4th Cir. 1998) (collecting cases and holding, “in agreement with the majority of our sister circuits that have considered the issue,” that “ineffective assistance of counsel claims . . . must be reviewed individually, rather than collectively.”).

The “cumulative error” doctrine is at odds with *Strickland* in other ways as well. First, *Strickland* expressly permits a judge to deny an allegation of ineffective assistance merely for failing to prove prejudice, without even reaching the deficiency prong. *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 697. A “cumulative error” analysis, however, requires deficiency to be adjudicated as to all allegations of ineffective assistance—regardless of whether the alleged deficiency, by itself, had any prejudicial effect on Applicant’s rights—because the judge must still assess the *cumulative* effect of all deficient acts or omissions combined.

Second, one reason the *Strickland* court required proof of prejudice was “to ensure that ineffectiveness claims not become so burdensome to defense counsel that the entire criminal justice system suffers as a result.” *Id.* The court cautioned that “intrusive post-trial inquiry into

attorney performance . . . would encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges. . . . Intensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for acceptable assistance could dampen the ardor and impair the independence of defense counsel, discourage the acceptance of assigned cases, and undermine the trust between attorney and client.” *Id.* at 690. By requiring applicants to show deficiency *and* prejudice as to each allegation of ineffective assistance, the *Strickland* court intended that post-trial review of counsel’s conduct would encompass only those errors that jeopardized an applicant’s right to a fair trial. As this Court’s order acknowledges, however, “cumulative error” analysis requires courts to scrutinize even “errors that are insignificant by themselves” in order to determine if their cumulative effect is prejudicial. The “cumulative error” requirement to cavil even the *insignificant* missteps of defense counsel runs directly contrary to the United States Supreme Court’s public policy rationale articulated in *Strickland*: protecting “the entire criminal justice system” from the burdensome impact of unlimited allegations that counsel’s performance was deficient. *Id.* at 697.

That burdensome impact is evident in this very case: Applicant raised a staggering *fifty-five* total allegations of ineffective assistance in his amended PCR application. For most of his allegations, Applicant did not even attempt to articulate a prejudice argument, relying instead on the “cumulative error” doctrine. Responding to this glut of claims required Respondent, Trial Counsel, Appellate Counsel, and this Court to endure multiple days of hearings. Ultimately, the overwhelming majority of Applicant’s claims were correctly dismissed as meritless. However, by finding prejudice based on the “cumulative error” doctrine—which our appellate courts have never approved in the ineffective assistance context—this Court rewards Applicant’s vexatious behavior. As long as PCR courts allow applicants to substitute “cumulative error” arguments for the prejudice analysis required by *Strickland*, PCR applicants will be incentivized to multiply claims

against defense counsel based on insignificant defects in performance, wasting judicial resources and burdening the courts with frivolous allegations. This is exactly what the United States Supreme Court warned of in *Strickland*: that unless courts required particularized showings of prejudice, ineffectiveness claims would “become so burdensome . . . that the entire criminal justice system suffers as a result.” *Id.*

The Court’s order cites only two cases—*State v. Johnson*, 334 S.C. 78, 93, 512 S.E.2d 795, 803 (1999), and *Tennant v. Marion Health Care Foundation*, 194 W.Va. 97, 459 S.E.2d 374 (1995)—for the proposition that “cumulative error doctrine provides relief to a party when a combination of errors that are insignificant by themselves have the effect of preventing a party from receiving a fair trial.” Neither case supports the application of “cumulative error” doctrine to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in PCR actions. *Johnson* concerned a direct appeal alleging error in the trial court’s admission of evidence, while *Tennant*, a West Virginia case, concerned a direct appeal in a medical malpractice case. Furthermore, both opinions held that a party seeking to invoke the doctrine must still show *how* the combination of alleged errors affected his trial. *Johnson* held that, although the trial court committed multiple errors, a defendant “must demonstrate more than error in order to qualify for reversal under this ground. Instead, the errors must adversely affect his right to a fair trial.” *Johnson*, 334 S.C. at 93. *Tennant* declined to apply the doctrine, clarifying that “the doctrine should be used sparingly” and is not appropriate when the alleged errors “are insignificant and inconsequential.” *Tennant*, 194 W.Va. at 118, 459 S.E.2d at 395.

Except as to Allegations 34 and 45, the Court’s order does not specifically find prejudice as to any of the allegations upon which it grants relief. In the order’s conclusion, however, the Court finds that “Applicant has suffered prejudice warranting a new trial based on cumulative trial

error.” The Court’s general finding of prejudice lacks the necessary analysis of how Trial Counsel’s alleged deficiencies, individually or in combination, adversely affected Applicant’s right to a fair trial. Absent any individualized analysis of how each purportedly deficient act prejudiced Applicant, there is no support for the Court’s finding that Trial Counsel was ineffective under *Strickland*.³

Respondent respectfully asks the Court to amend its order to replace its improper “cumulative error” analysis with specific analysis of prejudice as to Allegations 13, 14, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 33, 40, 43, 47, and 48. To the extent the Court finds Applicant has failed to make a specific showing of prejudice as to any of those allegations,⁴ Respondent requests the Court amend its order to reflect that those allegations are denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation 9: Improper jury instructions

The Court correctly found Applicant’s Allegation 9 was meritless; however, the Court dismissed the allegation “without prejudice.” A PCR applicant receives only “one bite at the apple”; successive PCR applications are generally precluded. *See Odom v. State*, 337 S.C. 256, 261, 523 S.E.2d 753, 755 (1999); S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-90. Applicant is barred by statute from raising, in a successive PCR application, any grounds that were or could have been raised in his initial application. Therefore, Applicant is not entitled to re-raise Allegation 9 in a future PCR

³ Despite making no specific, individualized findings of prejudice, the Court goes on in the very next paragraph to acknowledge that *Strickland* requires PCR courts to “consider the *specific* impact counsel’s error had on the outcome of the trial” and to “analyze how *individual* errors of counsel affect the important factual findings in a particular case” (emphasis added). This language is inconsistent with the generalized nature of the Court’s “cumulative error” prejudice analysis.

⁴ Respondent submits that Applicant has failed to show both prejudice and deficiency as to every allegation in his PCR application, as discussed in subsequent sections of this Motion. Therefore, Respondent argues that none of Applicant’s allegations merit relief. *See Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117–18, 386 S.E.2d at 625.

proceeding. Respondent respectfully asks that the Court amend its order to deny and dismiss Allegation 9 with prejudice.

Allegation 13: Alleged failure to object to the qualification of the State's expert in child sexual abuse dynamics

This Court found Trial Counsel failed to object to the trial court's qualification of Dr. Benedetto as an expert in child sexual abuse dynamics. The Court's order states the qualification procedure was improper because the court limited Trial Counsel to questioning the witness about her qualifications, rather than the reliability and validity of the field itself, and because the qualification procedure occurred in the presence of the jury. The Court found Trial Counsel's performance was deficient, but it did not specifically find prejudice or explain how the result of Applicant's trial would likely have been different but for Trial Counsel's conduct.

Respondent submits this allegation is without merit. First of all, Trial Counsel *did* object to Dr. Benedetto's qualification on the ground she failed to show the reliability of the field her opinion was based on. (April 17–18, 2013, Trial Tr. p.55, lines 1–12). The trial court overruled Trial Counsel's objection. (April 17–18, 2013, Trial Tr. p.55, lines 13–18). The Court has not explained how Trial Counsel's objection was unreasonable or how he could have obtained a different result by raising the issue again. *See State v. McDaniel*, 320 S.C. 33, 37, 462 S.E.2d 882, 884 (Ct. App. 1995) (quoting *Dunn v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.*, 311 S.C. 43, 46, 426 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1993)) ("So long as the judge had an opportunity to rule on an issue, and did so, it was 'not incumbent upon defense counsel to harass the judge by parading the issue before him again.'").

Second, "the reliability of a witness's testimony is not a prerequisite to determining whether or not the witness is an expert." *State v. Tapp*, 398 S.C. 376, 388, 728 S.E.2d 468, 474

(2012).⁵ Trial courts may, in their sound discretion, omit unnecessary reliability examination from expert qualification proceedings. See *Kumho Tire Company v. Carmichael*, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999) (holding trial judges must be able to exercise “discretionary authority . . . to avoid unnecessary ‘reliability’ proceedings in ordinary cases where the reliability of an expert’s methods is properly taken for granted”). Even if Trial Counsel had more insistently demanded an inquiry into the reliability of the child sexual abuse dynamics field,⁶ the trial court would have had no obligation to conduct one. Likewise, the fact that Dr. Benedetto was qualified in the presence of the jury was not objectionable; like other matters of courtroom procedure, holding a qualification examination in the jury’s presence is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. See *Fields v. Regional Medical Center Orangeburg*, 363 S.C. 19, 25, 609 S.E.2d 506, 509 (2005).⁷ The challenged aspects of the qualification proceeding are not matters of right, but of sound judicial

⁵ The Court’s order cites *Tapp*, among other cases, in support of its finding that Trial Counsel was deficient for failing to adequately raise this issue. However, *Tapp* clarifies that reliability is relevant to the *admissibility* of expert testimony, not to whether the witness may be *qualified* as an expert. See *Tapp*, 398 S.C. at 388–89, 728 S.E.2d at 474–75; see also *State v. Council*, 335 S.C. 1, 20, 515 S.E.2d 508, 518 (1999) (holding scientific evidence is admissible if “the expert is qualified” and “the underlying science is reliable,” implying that qualification and reliability are separate inquiries). The Court’s finding that Trial Counsel should have challenged Dr. Benedetto’s qualification proceeding—as opposed to the admissibility of her subsequent testimony—on reliability grounds, therefore, is contrary to the express holding of *Tapp*.

⁶ Despite claiming Trial Counsel should have attacked the reliability of this field during the qualification proceeding, Applicant has not introduced any evidence or argument that would support such an attack. Therefore, Applicant has failed to prove he was prejudiced by Trial Counsel’s failure to challenge the reliability of child sexual abuse dynamics.

⁷ In the portion of its order denying and dismissing Applicant’s Allegation 2 of ineffective assistance of Appellate Counsel, this Court stated, “As discussed in response to Applicant’s Allegation 13, the trial court’s decision to conduct Dr. Benedetto’s qualification in the presence of the jury was within the sound discretion of the trial judge,” citing *Fields*. However, the Court’s discussion of Allegation 13 did *not* mention the discretion of the trial judge.

discretion; Applicant's rights, therefore, were not violated by Trial Counsel's alleged failure to object to them.

In addition, the jury could not have been improperly influenced by Dr. Benedetto's pre-qualification testimony because the trial court refused to allow the attorneys to question her about the substance of her testimony until *after* she was qualified. Therefore, no prejudice could possibly have resulted from conducting the qualification examination in the presence of the jury.

Because Applicant failed to prove either deficiency or prejudice as to this allegation, Respondent respectfully asks this Court to reconsider its order granting relief on this ground.

**Allegation 14: Failure to object to and move to strike Dr. Benedetto's statement
that abusers typically seek victims of a particular age**

The Court found Dr. Benedetto's testimony that abusers are often interested in victims of a particular age went beyond the scope of her expertise, which was limited to the perspective of child victims. Although Trial Counsel objected to this line of questioning as "leading," he did not object on the ground that it exceeded the scope of Dr. Benedetto's expertise. The court's order does not explain how Applicant was prejudiced by this alleged error.

Dr. Benedetto's statement did not exceed the scope of her expertise. As an expert in child sexual abuse dynamics, Dr. Benedetto would necessarily know more about the typical attributes of child sexual abusers than the average layperson. All that is required for a witness to testify as an expert is that the witness must have acquired, through study or experience, such knowledge or skill that she is more qualified than the jury to form an opinion on the particular subject of her testimony. *Gooding v. St. Francis Xavier Hosp.*, 326 S.C. 248, 252–53, 487 S.E.2d 596, 598 (1997); *see also Graves v. CAS Medical Systems*, 401 S.C. 63, 78, 735 S.E.2d 650, 657–58 (2012) (holding it was error to exclude a witness's opinion testimony merely because the witness did not

consider herself an “expert” in the field; the relevant inquiry is not whether the witness is a specialist in the field, but whether her experience and knowledge qualified her to give an opinion on the subject). The mere fact that Dr. Benedetto specializes in helping child abuse victims does not render her unqualified to opine concerning the characteristics of child abusers.

In addition, Dr. Benedetto’s statement could not have prejudiced Applicant. Victims 1, 2, and 3 testified that Applicant began abusing them at ages five, nine, and thirteen, respectively. Therefore, the State’s theory of the case required the jury to believe that Applicant did *not* target victims of a similar age. Dr. Benedetto’s statement, therefore, was not consistent with the State’s theory of the case. Accordingly, Trial Counsel would have had no strategic reason to move to strike it, and his failure to do so did not prejudice Applicant. *See Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117–18, 386 S.E.2d at 625.⁸

Because Applicant failed to prove either deficiency or prejudice as to this allegation, Respondent respectfully asks this Court to reconsider its order granting relief on this ground.

Allegation 19: Failure to move to sequester witnesses

The Court found Trial Counsel was deficient for failing to move to sequester the witnesses, because sequestration was necessary to ensure that the witnesses did not have the ability to hear one another’s testimony. *See* Rule 615, SCRE (“[A] court may order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses”); *see also State v. Huckabee*, 388 S.C. 232,

⁸ In the portion of its order denying and dismissing Applicant’s Allegation 2 of ineffective assistance of Appellate Counsel, this Court stated, “As discussed in response to Applicant’s Allegation 14, Dr. Benedetto’s statement could not have prejudiced Applicant” because the victims testified they were abused at different ages. However, the Court’s discussion of Allegation 14 does not mention prejudice or acknowledge that the three victims were allegedly targeted for abuse at different ages. The Court’s express finding that Dr. Benedetto’s statement could not have prejudiced Applicant is completely inconsistent with its granting of relief on Allegation 14.

241, 694 S.E.2d 781, 785 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding the purpose of Rule 615, SCRE, is to prevent the possibility of one witness shaping his testimony to match that given by other witnesses at trial). However, in that same paragraph, the Court acknowledges that “[a]ll the witnesses had been present at the prior trial and had *already* heard one another’s testimony” (emphasis added). The Court does not explain why Trial Counsel was deficient for failing to seek a sequestration order that the Court itself concedes would have been futile.

Moreover, a party is not entitled to the sequestration of witnesses as a matter of right. *State v. Caldwell*, 378 S.C. 268, 662 S.E.2d 474 (Ct. App. 2008); *State v. Fulton*, 333 S.C. 359, 375, 509 S.E.2d 819, 827 (Ct. App. 1998). The trial court, therefore, had no obligation to order sequestration even if Trial Counsel had requested it.

In addition, “[a] person must not be sequestered from a proceeding adjudicating an offense of which he was a victim.” S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-1550. Therefore, Trial Counsel would not have been able to sequester the three victims even if he had made a motion to sequester the witnesses. Since those victims were the State’s chief witnesses, there is no “reasonable probability” that the result of Applicant’s trial would have been different but for Trial Counsel’s alleged error.

Trial Counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that, because the witnesses were already familiar with the testimony from the previous trial, he believed sequestration would achieve nothing. As Trial Counsel has articulated a valid reason for not moving to sequester the witnesses, and as sequestration would not have prevented the witnesses from knowing each other’s testimony anyway, this Court should find Applicant has failed to prove his counsel was deficient or that the result of his trial would likely have been different if the witnesses had been sequestered. *See Underwood*, 309 S.C. at 562, 425 S.E.2d at 22; *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117–18, 386 S.E.2d at 625.

Accordingly, Respondent requests this Court issue an amended order reflecting that this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation 20: Failure to move to individually question jurors after the trial judge noted some jurors had approached him about “similar types of behavior”

The Court found Trial Counsel was deficient for failing to move to individually *voir dire* jurors whom the trial court noted had approached him about “similar types of behavior” or to preserve the issue by putting those jurors’ numbers and their conversations with the trial court on the record. The Court does not explain how Applicant was prejudiced by Trial Counsel’s alleged omission.

Prior to jury selection, the trial court asked if any member of the jury panel “has been a victim or subjected to similar types of behavior, i.e. sexual misconduct or abuse.” (April 15–16, 2013, Trial Tr. p.41, lines 5–7). The court went on to state, “Now, I’ve had several jurors who have come forward expressing to me some of their past and how it affected them. I don’t need you to come back forward, but do I have anyone else who has not come forward that has been a victim or experienced this type of behavior in your family? . . . Anyone else other than the ladies who have come forward?” (April 15–16, 2013, Trial Tr. p.41, lines 9–15). Later, during jury selection, Trial Counsel moved to strike Juror No. 94 for cause, arguing that “[s]he has a relative that was a victim, as the court knows.” (April 15–16, 2013, Trial Tr. p.48, lines 4–7). The trial court stated, “And she did advise us of that and I asked her could she be fair and impartial and try the case based solely on what she heard in the courtroom. She adequately said she could, respectfully denied.” (April 15–16, 2013, Trial Tr. p.48, lines 8–11). Trial Counsel then used a peremptory strike to have Juror No. 94 excused. (April 15–16, 2013, Trial Tr. p.48, lines 12–14).

Although the trial transcript indicates that some jurors had informed the trial court, outside the record, about “their past and how it affected them,” it also shows that Trial Counsel was aware of those jurors and took appropriate action to have them removed from the jury pool. In addition, it shows that the trial court had examined the jurors to ensure they could try the case “fairly and impartially.” The mere fact that those jurors’ interactions with the court and Trial Counsel were not included in the record is not sufficient to establish prejudice; the jury is presumed to act according to law. *See Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 694–95 (“In making the determination whether the specified errors resulted in the required prejudice, a court should presume . . . that the judge or jury acted according to law. . . . The assessment of prejudice should proceed on the assumption that the decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying the standards that govern the decision.”). Applicant still bears the burden to show that, but for Trial Counsel’s failure to record those interactions, the result of his trial would likely have been different. Absent such a showing, it will not be presumed that the interactions were harmful to Applicant’s case or that the jury acted improperly. Applicant presented no evidence to overcome the presumption that the jury was fair and impartial; therefore, he has failed to meet his burden. *See Butler*, 286 S.C. at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814; Rule 71.1(e), SCRPC. Accordingly, Respondent requests the Court issue an amended order denying and dismissing this allegation with prejudice.

Allegation 21: Failure to properly argue and preserve issues related to Juror No. 94

This Court found Trial Counsel failed to properly argue and preserve his request that Juror No. 94’s conversation with the trial court be placed on the record after that juror revealed she had “a relative that was a victim, as the court knows.” However, the Court acknowledges that Juror No. 94 was struck using a peremptory challenge after the trial court denied the motion to strike her for cause. The Court also acknowledges that Trial Counsel did not even use up all of his

peremptory strikes; only nine jurors were struck in total, and Trial Counsel had ten strikes. Nevertheless, the Court found Trial Counsel was deficient for failing to put Juror No. 94's conversation on the record because Trial Counsel "had to strategically use one of his peremptory strikes on this juror."

Respondent submits Applicant could not possibly have been prejudiced by Trial Counsel's alleged error because Trial Counsel still had peremptory strikes left over after all the jurors were selected. In other words, Trial Counsel struck every juror he wanted to strike, including Juror No. 94. Since the use of a peremptory strike on Juror No. 94 manifestly did not prevent Trial Counsel from striking any other juror, there is no possibility that the ultimate composition of the jury would have been different had Trial Counsel more vigorously argued for Juror No. 94 to be struck for cause. Therefore, Applicant was not prejudiced. *See Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117–18, 386 S.E.2d at 625. Respondent respectfully asks that the Court issue an amended order denying and dismissing this allegation with prejudice.

Allegation 22: Failure to move to sever Applicant's charges

The Court found Trial Counsel should have moved to sever his charges into three separate trials because the charges involved three separate victims and conduct occurring over three distinct periods of time, did not arise out of a single chain of circumstances, and were not proved by the same evidence.

Where counsel articulates a valid strategic reason for his conduct, that conduct will not be deemed ineffective. *Underwood*, 309 S.C. at 562, 425 S.E.2d at 22. In the words of the *Strickland* court:

Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel

was unreasonable. . . . A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. . . . There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.

466 U.S. at 689. Counsel's performance is not deficient unless it falls "outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." *Id.* at 690. Furthermore, "strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable." *Id.*

The Court found Trial Counsel was deficient for failing to sever the charges because the State's case was strengthened by the number of victims presented to the jury. However, the Court's order acknowledges that Trial Counsel articulated a strategic reason for not moving to sever the charges: at the evidentiary hearing, Trial Counsel testified that he was afraid multiple trials could result in a life without parole sentence. Trial Counsel faced a serious dilemma: if he allowed Applicant to be tried in a single proceeding, the State's case might be strengthened by the number of victims; on the other hand, if he tried to sever the charges into three trials, he increased the risk that his client might be sentenced to life in prison. Trial Counsel made the difficult choice to go forward in a single trial. This was not an objectively unreasonable decision: Applicant's first trial—which covered the same charges and victims—had ended in a hung jury, so Trial Counsel had reason to believe Applicant might be acquitted in the second trial, notwithstanding the strength of the State's case. "This is precisely the sort of calculated risk that lies at the heart of an advocate's discretion." *Yarborough*, 540 U.S. at 9. Though it may be tempting to second-guess Trial Counsel's performance with the benefit of hindsight, *Strickland* requires a more deferential review. The mere fact that this Court might have reached a different decision in those same circumstances does not, by itself, render Trial Counsel's decision deficient.

Moreover, if Trial Counsel had moved to sever the charges, the motion would likely not have succeeded. Even where the charges do not arise out of a single, isolated incident, joinder will be allowed when the crimes involve connected transactions closely related in kind, place, and character. *State v. Beekman*, 415 S.C. 632, 637, 785 S.E.2d 202, 205 (2016) (providing examples). In this case, the charged offenses were closely related in numerous ways: the victims were all Applicant's daughters or stepdaughters; the abuse almost always occurred in Applicant's home, typically in the victims' bedrooms before school; Applicant performed the same kinds of acts on multiple victims (oral sex on Victims 1 and 2, "humping" on Victims 2 and 3); Applicant would abuse each victim for years, then move on to the next victim after the previous victim moved away; and Applicant coerced each victim with threats of murder and suicide. Therefore, despite the number of different victims and large time period during which the abuse occurred, for the purposes of joinder, it was all one "chain of circumstances." In addition, overlapping evidence was used to prove multiple charges; for example, Buffy [REDACTED] testified regarding Applicant's abuse of Victims 2 and 3, the testimony of Dr. Benedetto was used to explain the delayed disclosure and recantation of Victims 1 and 2, and the evidence of Applicant's suicide attempt in prison was used to prove his guilt regarding all three victims. *See, e.g., State v. McGaha*, 404 S.C. 289, 297, 744 S.E.2d 602, 606 (Ct. App. 2013) (holding severance was not required where "a substantial portion of the testimony the State presented at trial to prove the crimes against one child was the same evidence it would have used to prove the crimes against the other"); *State v. Caldwell*, 378 S.C. 268, 278, 662 S.E.2d 474, 479–80 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding separate trials were not warranted, for crimes committed at different times against multiple different victims, because some evidence pertained to multiple charges). Therefore, the joinder requirements were met in this case, and Trial Counsel had no ground to seek severance of the charges.

Because Trial Counsel articulated a valid reason for not moving to sever the charges and because he would not have succeeded if he did so move, Applicant has not proved Trial Counsel was ineffective. *See Underwood*, 309 S.C. at 562, 425 S.E.2d at 22; *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117–18, 386 S.E.2d at 625. Consequently, Respondent asks that this Court amend its order to deny Allegation 22 and dismiss it with prejudice.

Allegation 23: Failure to object to truth-seeking language in trial court’s preliminary instructions to the jury

The Court found Trial Counsel deficient for failing to object to a portion of the trial court’s preliminary jury instruction in which the court told the jury to “decide what the true facts are,” to “render a true and just verdict, a verdict that speaks to the truth of the case,” and to “pay close attention and decide whose [*sic*] telling the truth.” (April 15–16, 2013, Trial Tr. p.59, line 22–p.60, line 13). The Court’s order cites *State v. Daniels*, 401 S.C. 251, 737 S.E.2d 473 (2012), for the proposition that “any references to the word ‘true’ must be removed from the Court’s comments to the jury.”

However, that proposition does not appear anywhere in *State v. Daniels*, even in paraphrase. Respondent submits the Court may have intended to refer to *State v. Beaty*, 423 S.C. 26, 813 S.E.2d 502 (2018). In that decision, the Supreme Court of South Carolina held “a trial judge should refrain from informing the jury, whether through comments or through a charge on the law, that its role is to search for the truth, or to find the true facts, or to render a just verdict.” *Id.* at 34, 813 S.E.2d at 506. However, the court acknowledged that the general sessions benchbook promulgated by the court to all circuit judges contained language virtually identical to the disapproved language used in the lower court. *Id.* at 34 n.2, 813 S.E.2d at 506 n.2.

The trial in this case occurred in 2013, many years before *Beatty* was decided. Trial Counsel would not have known that, years afterward, a change in the law would render the trial court's instructions objectionable. PCR courts may not find counsel ineffective for failing to object to a jury instruction in the absence of any case law rendering the instruction improper per se. *Teamer v. State*, 416 S.C. 171, 183, 786 S.E.2d 109, 115 (2016); see *Gilmore v. State*, 314 S.C. 453, 457, 445 S.E.2d 454, 456 (1994) ("We have never required an attorney to be clairvoyant or anticipate changes in the law. . . ." (citing *Thornes v. State*, 310 S.C. 306, 309–10, 426 S.E.2d 764, 765 (1993))), *overruled on other grounds by Brightman v. State*, 336 S.C. 348, 520 S.E.2d 614 (1999).

In addition, the trial court's comments were all made in the context of the jury's role in evaluating witness credibility—the court explained that, if witnesses give conflicting testimony, the jury must judge "their believability or their credibility. . . . [Y]ou determine whose [*sic*] telling the truth, the believability of the witnesses, the credibility; . . . [I]t's your civic duty to pay close attention and decide whose [*sic*] telling the truth." (April 15–16, 2013, Trial Tr. p.59, line 12–p.60, line 13). At the time of Applicant's trial, references to "truth" were permitted by the Supreme Court in the context of instructions on witness credibility. See *State v. Aleksey*, 343 S.C. 20, 27–29, 538 S.E.2d 248, 251–53 (2000).

In addition, the fact that the challenged language appeared in the credibility context, and *not* in the context of the presumption of innocence or the State's burden of proof, defeats any claim that Applicant may have been prejudiced by Trial Counsel's failure to object. See *id.* at 28–29, 538 S.E.2d at 252 ("There is not a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the challenged instruction in a manner inconsistent with the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court's instructions concerning seeking the truth were given in the context of the jury's role in determining the credibility of witnesses."). Furthermore, if the jury instructions, considered as a whole, are

correct, isolated portions that may be misleading do not constitute reversible error. *Id.* at 27, 538 S.E.2d at 251. The trial transcript reflects that the trial court repeatedly and emphatically instructed the jury that the State bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and that Applicant must be presumed innocent and need not offer any proof of his innocence. The trial court's jury instructions, considered as a whole, were free from error and cured any conceivable prejudice.

For these reasons, Applicant has not met his burden of proving that Trial Counsel's failure to object to the trial court's "truth" language during its preliminary jury instruction was deficient, nor has he proved that the result of his trial would likely have been different if Trial Counsel had objected. *See Butler*, 286 S.C. at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814; *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117–18, 386 S.E.2d at 625. Accordingly, Respondent requests this Court amend its order to reflect that Allegation 23 is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation 25: Improper argument in Trial Counsel's opening statement

The Court found Trial Counsel was deficient for arguing, in his opening statement, that Applicant could not be innocent if the victims were telling the truth. The Court's order points out that the State used that quote against the defense in its closing argument, stating, "As Mr. Routzong said in his opening statement, if you believe the victims, the defendant's guilty." The order does not explain specifically why Trial Counsel's argument was deficient or how Applicant was prejudiced by it.

Trial Counsel began his opening argument by emphasizing the presumption of innocence. He stated "the presumption of innocence means . . . that the accusers in this case are either mistaken or untruthful. That's the position you have to take as you're sitting all the way through this trial because that's what the presumption of innocence means. If they're telling the truth, he can't be innocent. If he's innocent, they can't be telling the truth" (April 15–16, 2013, Trial Tr. p.68,

lines 19–25). He concluded by attacking the credibility of the victims, claiming they had “axes to grind” and were “either mistaken or telling untruths.” (April 15–16, 2013, Trial Tr. p.69, lines 9–13). In context, it is clear that Trial Counsel was urging the jury *not* to believe the victims, but to start from the presumption that the victims were either mistaken or lying in order to get revenge on Applicant.

Clearly, if the jury believed the victims—who testified in detail about the crimes perpetrated by Applicant—it would also have to believe Applicant was guilty of those crimes. The heart of the case, for both sides, was the credibility battle between the victims and Applicant. Focusing the jury’s attention on the fact that the State’s case depended on the credibility of the victims was an integral part of Trial Counsel’s defense strategy.

The mere fact that the solicitor was able to use Trial Counsel’s words in his own closing argument does not mean Trial Counsel was deficient for making the argument in the first place. The solicitor would have been able to argue that the victims’ testimony implied Applicant’s guilt even if Trial Counsel had never brought it up; the victims’ testimony was the crux of the State’s case. Therefore, there is no reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been more favorable to Applicant if Trial Counsel had not made the challenged statement. *See Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117–18, 386 S.E.2d at 625.

Furthermore, the fact that the victims’ testimony was inconsistent with Applicant’s innocence was so obvious that no prejudice could have resulted from either Trial Counsel or the State pointing it out to the jury. *See Underwood*, 309 S.C. at 562, 425 S.E.2d at 22; *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117–18, 386 S.E.2d at 625. Accordingly, Respondent respectfully asks this Court to amend its order to reflect that this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation 33: Alleged failure to properly impeach a complaining witness with the transcript of the witness's prior testimony

The Court found Trial Counsel failed to have a copy of the first trial transcript with him when he attempted to impeach a complaining witness with her prior testimony, causing the trial court to order him to move on when he was unable to point to inconsistencies in the witness's testimony. The Court's order does not identify which witness Trial Counsel allegedly failed to impeach or what portion of the prior trial transcript was allegedly inconsistent with the witness's testimony.

Respondent assumes the Court is referring to Trial Counsel's questioning of Victim 2.⁹ At the prior trial, Victim 2 testified she would stay "at a friend's house" to avoid having to come home to Applicant. Defense counsel asked her if that friend "was Tim Bowman who was the person you were involved with drugs with?" Victim 2 responded "Yes sir. Well" before being cut off by defense counsel's next question. (Nov. 13–14, 2012, Trial Tr. p.47, line 3–p.48, line 3).

At the second trial, Trial Counsel asked Victim 2 if she was ever involved with drugs, which she denied, claiming her boyfriend was the one involved with drugs. (April 15–16, 2013, Trial Tr. p.130, lines 10–18). Trial Counsel stated, "But you actually testified in the other proceeding that you were involved," and then showed Victim 2 a document.¹⁰ (April 15–16, 2013, Trial Tr. p.130, lines 19–25). The trial court told Trial Counsel to show Victim 2 the "line and verse," and Trial Counsel stated he had neglected to mark it. (April 15–16, 2013, Trial Tr. p.131,

⁹ Applicant's amended PCR application identifies this victim as the subject of Allegation 33.

¹⁰ Trial Counsel's reference to Victim 2's testimony from "the other proceeding" implies that this document was the transcript of the prior trial. Therefore, the Court's finding that Trial Counsel "fail[ed] to obtain the transcript of the Applicant's first trial" is not supported by the record.

lines 1–4). The trial court then told Trial Counsel to move on to his next question. (April 15–16, 2013, Trial Tr. p.131, lines 8–15).

Although Trial Counsel was unsuccessful in his attempt to confront Victim 2 with her testimony from the prior trial, Applicant suffered no prejudice. Victim 2’s statement at the prior trial was given in response to a complex leading question and was cut off before she could clarify it. (Nov. 13–14, 2012, Trial Tr. p.48, line 3). If she had been able to respond to Trial Counsel’s insinuation, she likely would have given the same explanation she gave elsewhere in the trial: that Tim Bowman was her boyfriend, that he was involved with drugs, but that she was not involved in his drug-related activities. (April 15–16, 2013, Trial Tr. p.130, lines 10–18; p.131, lines 22–24; p.135, lines 10–13; Nov. 13–14 Trial Tr. p.38, lines 14–18). Absent any indication that Victim 2 would have been caught in a lie had Trial Counsel properly confronted her with her prior testimony, Applicant has failed to meet his burden to prove the result of his trial likely would have been different but for Trial Counsel’s inadequate preparation. *See Butler*, 286 S.C. at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814; *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117–18, 386 S.E.2d at 625; Rule 71.1(e), SCRPC. Respondent requests the Court issue an amended order denying and dismissing Allegation 33 with prejudice.

Allegation 34: Failure to object and to move to strike Michelle Price’s testimony that implied the statutory elements of Applicant’s offense had already been proved

The Court found Trial Counsel should have objected when Michelle Price testified DSS only becomes involved in a case “[i]f it meets the legal statute in the State of South Carolina.” (April 15–16, 2013, Trial Tr. p.138, lines 15–16). The Court stated this language was prejudicial because it lowered the State’s burden of proof in the eyes of the jury by suggesting the statutory elements of the offense have already been proved.

At the evidentiary hearing, Trial Counsel acknowledged that the jury might conceivably have misinterpreted the statement to mean DSS made a determination of guilt, although DSS does not need to meet any burden of proof to start an investigation. He maintained he found nothing objectionable in Price's phrasing because there are not many ways to say what Price was trying to say. The Court has not explained why Trial Counsel's explanation for not objecting was unreasonable.

However, even if Trial Counsel's stated reason for failing to object was deficient, Applicant suffered no prejudice. The test for prejudice is whether an error "undermines the reliability of the result of the proceeding," not whether it "conceivably could have influenced the outcome." *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 693. Applicant must show a reasonable probability—that is, "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome"—that the result of his trial would have been different but for Trial Counsel's alleged error. *Id.* at 694.

Although it is perhaps "conceivable" that the jury misinterpreted Price's statement, it is more likely that the jury correctly interpreted her statement to mean that DSS is required to initiate investigations based only on statutory parameters—not based on some belief in the strength of the evidence against the accused or the credibility of the accuser. Price also clarified that the next step would be to "interview the family," which would have alerted the jury that DSS had not yet investigated the report or made any determination of guilt. Far from being prejudicial to Applicant, therefore, Price's statement would likely have conveyed to the jury that the mere fact DSS opened an investigation did not mean DSS believed Applicant was guilty.

In addition, Price's statement was brief and was not specifically related to Applicant's case, and the solicitor did not dwell on it. Even an unusually attentive jury would be unlikely to assign any importance to such a statement. Finally, the trial court's thorough instruction on the State's

burden of proof, the presumption of innocence, and the reasonable doubt standard would have cured any possible confusion before the jury began its deliberations. Accordingly, Applicant has failed to show a probability “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome” that, but for the alleged error of Trial Counsel in failing to object to Price’s statement, the result of his trial would likely have been different. *See id.*; *see also Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117–18, 386 S.E.2d at 625. Therefore, Respondent respectfully asks this Court to issue an amended order reflecting that this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation 40: Failure to request a *Jackson v. Denno* hearing to challenge the voluntariness of Applicant’s consent to the buccal DNA swab

The Court found Trial Counsel was deficient for failing to request a *Jackson v. Denno*, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), hearing to challenge the voluntariness of his consent to the buccal swab that was later used to match his DNA to that of the semen on the bedsheet or to object to the admission of that evidence. The Court’s order notes Trial Counsel’s stated reason for failing to object was that he did not think a *Jackson v. Denno* hearing was necessary because the evidence at issue was not a statement.

The Court has not explained why Trial Counsel’s stated reason for not objecting was improper. *Jackson v. Denno* requires a hearing only to determine the admissibility of a defendant’s confession. *Id.* at 380 (“A defendant objecting to the *admission of a confession* is entitled to a fair hearing in which both the underlying factual issues and the voluntariness of his *confession* are actually and reliably determined.”) (emphasis added). Respondent is unaware of any precedent suggesting that a *Jackson v. Denno* hearing may be held when the challenged evidence is not a confession or similarly self-incriminating statement. The only legal authorities cited in this portion of the Court’s order are *Jackson v. Denno* and various provisions of the United States Constitution,

none of which support the Court's conclusion that Trial Counsel was professionally obligated to request a hearing on the admissibility of DNA evidence.

In addition, the Court's order does not explain how Applicant was prejudiced by Trial Counsel's conduct. At trial, Applicant admitted the semen found on the bedsheet was his, explaining that his then-wife had masturbated him on his son's bed. Therefore, even if all the DNA evidence was excluded, the semen would still have been identified as his. Moreover, Applicant has not even asserted, much less proved, that his consent to the buccal swab was obtained involuntarily. Applicant, therefore, has not met his burden to show that, but for Trial Counsel's failure to request a *Jackson v. Denno* hearing, the result of Applicant's trial would have been different. See *Butler*, 286 S.C. at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814; *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117–18, 386 S.E.2d at 625; Rule 71.1(e), SCRCP. Accordingly, Respondent requests the Court issue an amended order denying and dismissing Allegation 40 with prejudice.

Allegation 43: Failure to cross-examine the State's witnesses about discrepancies as to whose bedroom the bedsheets were taken from

The Court found Trial Counsel should have cross-examined the State's witnesses about whose bedroom the bedsheets were taken from that had Applicant's DNA on them. Applicant alleged that the State claimed the sheets were taken from Victim 3's room at the first trial but claimed they were taken from Hoss's room at the second trial. The Court found Trial Counsel deficient for failing to expose this discrepancy because the location of the sheets was critical to the State's case. However, the Court's order does not explain why this evidence was "critical."

Courts give great deference to counsel's decisions concerning the cross-examination of witnesses. See, e.g., *Brown v. Uttecht*, 530 F.3d 1031, 1036–37 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding counsel was not ineffective for failing to cross-examine an expert witness); *Skeen v. State*, 325 S.C. 210,

216–17, 481 S.E.2d 129, 132–33 (1997) (“We see no ineffectiveness in counsel’s failure to cross-examine [the State’s witness] about the supposed discrepancy in her testimony and her statement to the police. . . . [O]ne could only speculate whether a ‘better’ cross examination would have helped Skeen.”).

The heart of the State’s case was the testimony of the victims as corroborated by other witnesses, not the physical evidence like Applicant’s semen on the bedsheets (for which Applicant was able to offer an innocent explanation). In addition, Victim 3 testified Applicant continued abusing her after she had started sleeping in Hoss’s bedroom when Hoss moved out, so the presence of Applicant’s semen on the sheets of Hoss’s bed was not inconsistent with Victim 3’s testimony. (April 15–16, 2013, Trial Tr. p.158, line 6–p.159, line 13). Since both Hoss and Victim 3 used the bedroom at different times, whether that room is characterized as “Hoss’s bedroom” or “Victim 3’s bedroom” is a semantic quibble, not a material factual discrepancy. *See Huggler v. State*, 360 S.C. 627, 635, 602 S.E.2d 753, 757 (2004) (holding counsel was not ineffective for failing to cross-examine witnesses based on “meaningless inconsistencies,” such as whether a particular incident of sexual abuse occurred in the living room or the bathroom), *abrogated on other grounds by State v. Smalls*, 422 S.C. 174, 810 S.E.2d 836 (2018).¹¹

In addition, Applicant bases this allegation on alleged differences in the photographs introduced in his two trials, claiming the State introduced photographs of Victim 3’s bedroom in

¹¹ In fact, attempting to refute the State’s claim that the bedsheets were found in Hoss’s room could easily have backfired against the defense: Applicant offered a potentially innocent explanation for how his semen ended up on Hoss’s bedsheets but did not offer any explanation for how it might have ended up in Victim 3’s room. Trial Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to conduct a cross-examination that might have negated an aspect of Applicant’s defense. *See, e.g., Brown*, 530 F.3d at 1036–37 (holding counsel was not ineffective for failing to cross-examine the State’s expert because doing so could have “backfired” and hurt the defendant’s mitigation case).

the first trial but then introduced a photograph of Hoss's bedroom in the second trial. (April 17–18, 2013, Trial Tr. pp.116–18). However, Applicant did not present either photograph to this Court at the evidentiary hearing to substantiate this claim. *See Harris v. State*, 377 S.C. 66, 75–76, 659 S.E.2d 140, 145–46 (2008) (holding, in a case where a PCR applicant received a second trial after his first trial ended in a mistrial, the applicant was required to present a copy of the first trial transcript to substantiate his allegation that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to point out discrepancies in the testimony given at the two trials), *abrogated on other grounds by Smalls*, 422 S.C. 174, 810 S.E.2d 836. Applicant has failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to further develop this line of inquiry. *See Butler*, 286 S.C. at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814; *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117–18, 386 S.E.2d at 625; Rule 71.1(e), SCRPC. Accordingly, Respondent respectfully asks this Court to amend its order and deny and dismiss Allegation 43 with prejudice.

Allegation 45: Failure to object to the trial court's interruptions of Applicant's testimony

The Court found Trial Counsel was deficient for failing to object when the trial judge repeatedly interrupted Applicant's testimony, admonished Applicant for giving hearsay testimony, and instructed the prosecutor to object more often to Applicant's improper statements. The Court found that the trial judge's comments were unfairly prejudicial and that Trial Counsel's failure to object was not a valid trial strategy.

During direct examination by Trial Counsel, Applicant's testimony often deteriorated into irrelevant tangents. (April 17–18, 2013, Trial Tr. p.129, line 21–p.130, line 10; p.131, line 8–p.132, line 11; p.132, line 25–p.133, line 8; p.133, lines 14–16; p.138, line 24–p.139, line 7; p.145, line 14–p.146, line 3). He also frequently attempted to testify to statements made by third parties. (April 17–18, 2013, Trial Tr. p.136, lines 1–2, 14; p.138, lines 1–2; p.141, lines 15–16; p.144, lines

3–4; p.145, line 25–p.146, line 3; p.150, lines 9–12). The trial court admonished him multiple times to give responsive answers to Trial Counsel’s questions and to refrain from testifying as to what other people said. (April 17–18, 2013, Trial Tr. p.130, lines 11–15; p.133, lines 17–18; p.136, lines 16–18; p.139, lines 10–21; p.141, lines 14–24; p.142, lines 8–9; p.143, line 7; p.144, line 5; p.146, lines 4–19; p.150, line 19–p.151, line 5). At one point, the court admonished Trial Counsel for asking speculative questions and told the solicitor to “object to those speculation type of questions and answers.” (April 17–18, 2013, Trial Tr. p.136, lines 10–11).

A trial judge’s inherent power to maintain order and decorum in the courtroom includes the authority to admonish, rebuke, or warn a witness because of the witness’s language or conduct. *State v. Beckham*, 334 S.C. 302, 314, 513 S.E.2d 606, 612 (1999), *abrogated on other grounds by State v. Wright*, 391 S.C. 436, 706 S.E.2d 324 (2011). Applicant’s repeated failures to abide by the rules necessitated the court’s increasingly emphatic remonstrances. At the PCR hearing, Trial Counsel admitted he had difficulty controlling Applicant on the stand, and he testified that he did not believe the trial judge’s attempts to maintain order were prejudicial to Applicant. Therefore, Applicant failed to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, either Trial Counsel’s deficiency or any resulting prejudice from the alleged error. *See Butler*, 286 S.C. at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814; *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117–18, 386 S.E.2d at 625; Rule 71.1(e), SCRCP. Respondent requests that this Court issue an amended order denying and dismissing this allegation with prejudice.

Allegation 47: Failure to object to “truth-seeking” language in the trial court’s jury charge

The Court found that Trial Counsel was deficient for failing to object to two of the trial court’s jury instructions: “[I]t is your duty to determine what the true facts are and what the truth

is and who is telling the truth” and “You’re to make your decision based solely on what you determine the true facts are in this case.”¹²

As discussed in response to Allegation 23, “truth-seeking” language in jury instructions was promulgated by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in the general sessions benchbook and was not condemned until *State v. Beaty*, many years after Applicant’s trial concluded. *See Beaty*, 423 S.C. at 34 n.2, 813 S.E.2d at 506 n.2. Trial Counsel was not deficient for failing to anticipate a future change in the law. *See Gilmore*, 314 S.C. at 457, 445 S.E.2d at 456. In addition, the trial court’s statement that, “[I]t is your duty to determine what the true facts are and what the truth is and who is telling the truth,” appeared in the middle of an extended discussion on the jury’s role in determining witness credibility. (April 17–18, 2013, Trial Tr. p.203, line 3–p.204, line 13). At the time of Applicant’s trial, “truth-seeking” language was permissible in the context of witness credibility instructions. *See Aleksey*, 343 S.C. at 27–29, 538 S.E.2d at 251–53.

Furthermore, these isolated statements, in the context of the entire jury charge, were not objectionable. *See id.* at 27, 538 S.E.2d at 251 (holding if the jury instructions, considered as a whole, are correct, isolated portions that may be misleading do not constitute reversible error).

¹² The full paragraph in which this statement appears is as follows:

Obviously you have no friends to reward, no enemies to punish. You’re to make your decision based solely on what you determine the true facts are in the case and determine and apply those facts to the law as I give it to you, and from those facts, if you determine that the State has proven each of the elements that I gave to you beyond a reasonable doubt, then the verdict would be guilty. If not, it would be not guilty.

(April 17–18, 2013, Trial Tr. p.212, line 23–p.213, line 5). In context, therefore, it is clear that the trial court was instructing the jury to set aside passions and prejudices and decide the case objectively, bearing in mind the State’s burden of proof and the reasonable doubt standard. This instruction correctly conveyed the appropriate standard of proof to the jury, notwithstanding its references to the “true facts” in the case. Therefore, Trial Counsel was not deficient for failing to object to it, and Applicant suffered no prejudice.

The remainder of the trial court's jury charge adequately instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence, the State's burden of proof, and the reasonable doubt standard. Any possible confusion based on the court's isolated "truth-seeking" statements was cured by the court's thorough instruction on the correct standard, so there is no reasonable probability that the result of Applicant's trial would have been different had Trial Counsel objected to the statements.

For these reasons, Applicant has not met his burden of proving that Trial Counsel's failure to object to the trial court's "truth" language during its closing jury instruction was deficient, nor has he proved any prejudice resulting from Trial Counsel's conduct. *See Butler*, 286 S.C. at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814; *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625. Accordingly, Respondent requests this Court amend its order to reflect that Allegation 47 is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

**Allegation 48: Failure to object to the trial court's jury instruction that the
testimony of a victim need not be corroborated**

The Court found Trial Counsel was deficient for failing to object to the trial court's jury instruction that, "pursuant to our state law, the testimony of the victim in these cases need not be corroborated." (April 17-18, 2013, Trial Tr. p.210, lines 23-24). Although that proposition is correct as a statement of law, its use as a jury instruction has been condemned by the South Carolina Supreme Court. *State v. Stukes*, 416 S.C. 493, 500, 787 S.E.2d 480, 483 (2016) (holding jury instructions that victims' testimony need not be corroborated in prosecutions for criminal sexual conduct should no longer be given). However, at the time of Applicant's trial in 2013, that instruction was expressly permitted by Supreme Court precedent. *See, e.g., State v. Rayfield*, 369 S.C. 106, 115-18, 631 S.E.2d 244, 249-50 (2006) (holding the trial court did not err in charging that a victim's testimony need not be corroborated), *abrogated by Stukes*, 416 S.C. 493, 787 S.E.2d

480. Trial Counsel is not required to be clairvoyant and was not deficient for failing to anticipate a change in the law. See *Teamer*, 416 S.C. at 183, 786 S.E.2d at 115 (holding trial counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to object to a jury instruction at a time when no case law rendered the instruction improper per se); *Gilmore*, 314 S.C. at 457, 445 S.E.2d at 456 (“We have never required an attorney to be clairvoyant or anticipate changes in the law. . . .” (citing *Thornes*, 310 S.C. at 309–10, 426 S.E.2d at 765)), *overruled on other grounds by Brightman*, 336 S.C. 348, 520 S.E.2d 614. In addition, the *Stukes* opinion expressly states that its holding does not apply to PCR cases. *Stukes*, 416 S.C. at 500 n.5, 787 S.E.2d at 483 n.5. Accordingly, Trial Counsel was not deficient for failing to object to this instruction, and Respondent respectfully asks this Court to amend its order and deny and dismiss Allegation 48 with prejudice.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on all the foregoing, Respondent respectfully requests this Court issue a revised or amended order denying and dismissing every allegation in Applicant's amended post-conviction relief application with prejudice.

Respectfully submitted,


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By:


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June 10, 2022

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF AIKEN

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

2019-CP-02-1582

HAROLD CARTWRIGHT, #355084

Applicant,

vs

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE BY MAIL

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

Respondent.

FILED

6-13

20

22 1:15
SP

Robert J. Bonds
C.C.P. & G.S.

Shadell Parks
Deputy Clerk

1. I am an employee of the Respondent in the above-captioned action.
2. Regular communication by mail exists throughout the State of South Carolina and that this is a proper circumstance of service by mail.
3. I have this day served a copy of the Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment the order granting post-conviction relief in the above-captioned matter on the following person by depositing same in the United States mail, postage prepaid:

The Honorable Robert J. Bonds
14th Circuit Judge
Post Office Box 2120
Walterboro, SC 29488

Mr. Dayne C. Phillips, Esquire
Price Benowitz, LLP
1614 Taylor Street, Suite D
Columbia, South Carolina 29201

DATED this 10th day of June, 2022.

Joshua Osborne
Joshua Osborne, Legal Assistant for
Respondent

1 STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
2 COUNTY OF AIKEN
3 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
4 FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

5 Harold Cartwright, #355084

6 Applicant,

7 v.

 Transcript of Record
 Case No.: 2019-CP-02-01582

9 State of South Carolina,

10 Respondent.

13 June 24, 2022
14 Aiken, South Carolina

15 B E F O R E:

16 The HONORABLE ROBERT BONDS

17 A P P E A R A N C E S:

18 Zachary Jones, Representing the State of South
19 Carolina

20 Dwayne C. Phillips, Representing the respondent

24 SHARON G. HARDOON, CSR
25 Official Circuit Court Reporter, III

1 THE COURT: All right, Counsel. Good
2 morning.

3 MR. CARTWRIGHT: Good morning.

4 THE COURT: Mr. Cartwright, good morning,
5 sir.

6 We are here today on respondent's motion
7 to alter or amend the order granting
8 post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 59(e) of
9 the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. So
10 let me do this, for the record, could I get my
11 attorneys to introduce themselves, please,
12 beginning with the attorney for the respondent?

13 MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor. My
14 name is Zachary Jones. I'm an assistant attorney
15 general with the Attorney General's Office, PCR
16 Division.

17 THE COURT: Yes, sir. Thank you very
18 much. And for Mr. Cartwright?

19 THE COURT: His mic may not be working.
20 Mr. Phillips?

21 MR. PHILLIPS: Can you hear me now?

22 THE COURT: All right, great.
23 Mr. Phillips, could you introduce yourself, sir,
24 for the record.

25 MR. PHILLIPS: Yes, Your Honor. Good

1 morning. It's Attorney Dwayne Phillips for the
2 petitioner -- or the applicant, Mr. Cartwright,
3 Harold Cartwright.

4 THE COURT: All right. Attorney General,
5 since this is your motion, sir, I have -- for the
6 record, I want you to know I have reviewed your
7 brief and I'm happy to hear from you, sir.

8 MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor.

9 Before I begin, I was wondering how Your
10 Honor would like us to conduct this hearing, if
11 you'd want me to go through each of the 15 issues
12 I addressed in the brief one by one? I tried to
13 be as thorough as possible in the brief. But we
14 can do that, or if Your Honor had any specific
15 questions.

16 THE COURT: No. I'll tell you, let's
17 just go through them one by one. I think that's
18 the best way to knock this out because you were
19 thorough, and I appreciate that. Because, quite
20 frankly, there are a lot of different issues that
21 I think that we need to address. A lot of issues
22 were raised, and I think we're under an obligation
23 to address each one.

24 MR. JONES: Yes, sir.

25 THE COURT: So I'm happy to hear from

1 you, sir. We'll discuss one issue at a time. You
2 want to address that issue and then have
3 Mr. Phillips respond to that issue, sir?

4 MR. JONES: Whatever Your Honor would
5 prefer.

6 THE COURT: Mr. Phillips, is that
7 satisfactory, sir?

8 MR. PHILLIPS: Yes, Your Honor.

9 THE COURT: Honestly, I think that would
10 -- yeah, I really think that's going to be
11 easiest for me as we go through it. It will help
12 me with my notes that I may be taking. So let's
13 go ahead and do that, Attorney General, if that's
14 all right. When you finish with that argument,
15 just let us know. And then I will allow
16 Mr. Phillips to respond, sir. Okay?

17 MR. JONES: Okay.

18 THE COURT: Yes, sir. Go right ahead.

19 MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor.

20 The first general overarching issue that
21 I'd like to address is the applicant's cumulative
22 error doctrine arguments. As I pointed out,
23 the -- this case involved 55 total allegations of
24 ineffective assistance of counsel. And for many
25 of them, there were no specific findings of

1 prejudice made in the order, including in the 15,
2 and I believe 13 out of the 15 issues on which
3 this Court actually granted relief.

4 And then the Court's order concludes with
5 a general finding of cumulative prejudice based on
6 the total number of errors alleged. So, of
7 course, I'm going to go through each of those 15
8 issues and try to explain why they were not
9 errors.

10 But, just in general, I wanted to point
11 out that our State has not recognized cumulative
12 error as grounds for post-conviction relief. And,
13 are -- and, in fact, that doctrine has been
14 rejected expressly by the Fourth Circuit and by
15 the majority of Federal Circuits who have dealt
16 with the Federal equivalence of ineffective
17 assistance claims.

18 I also further believe that -- and submit
19 that the -- that the cumulative error standard is,
20 in fact, contrary to the policy rationale of
21 *Strickland* and to the straightforward reading of
22 *Strickland*, which requires for each allegation of
23 ineffective assistance of counsel a showing of
24 both deficiency and prejudice individualized to
25 that allegation.

1 So the idea that one -- one general
2 finding of cumulative prejudice based on
3 multiple alleged deficiencies can substitute for
4 that as no basis in *Strickland*, or in any other
5 precedence relied on by the State Supreme Court or
6 the State Appellate Courts or the Federal Courts.

7 So with that out of the way, that alone,
8 I believe, merits at least a new order setting
9 forth specific findings of prejudice. However, I
10 don't believe that any of the issues merit that
11 treatment in the first place.

12 First of all, we have the allegation of
13 the failure to object to the qualification of the
14 State's expert in child sexual abuse dynamics.

15 Now, this Court's order found that a --
16 that the failure to object to the qualification of
17 Dr. Benedetto as an expert in child sexual abuse
18 dynamics was deficient because the trial court
19 limited Trial Counsel to questioning the witness
20 about her qualifications rather than about the
21 reliability and validity of the field itself.

22 First of all, it's worth pointing out
23 that Trial Counsel did object to the qualification
24 of the expert witness on the grounds that she had
25 not shown the reliability of the field, and then

1 the trial court overruled that objection.

2 So raising the issue again, I submit,
3 would not likely have resulted in a different
4 result, which is, of course, the test for
5 prejudice under *Strickland*.

6 Second, it's -- the difference between
7 the qualification of an expert and the
8 admissibility of an expert's testimony is -- that
9 distinction is important in this case because the
10 reliability questioning goes to the admissibility
11 of the expert's statement rather than the
12 qualification.

13 So to the extent Mr. Cartwright is
14 arguing that the expert should not have been
15 qualified because she failed to show her -- the
16 reliability of her field, that's erroneous because
17 of the precedent regarding the reliability issue.
18 It goes to admissibility, and I rely on the basis
19 I've cited in my brief for that.

20 Furthermore, there was no --
21 Mr. Cartwright stills bears the burden of showing
22 in his PCR proceeding that there could be some
23 evidentiary basis to attack the reliability of
24 child sexual abuse dynamics as a field. And I
25 submit that there is no such basis. It's

1 routinely -- these kind of experts are routinely
2 called in child sexual abuse cases and CSE cases
3 of all kinds.

4 And so, presumptively, again, at the PCR
5 stage, there's a presumption that Trial Counsel's
6 performance was not ineffective and it's up to the
7 applicants to produce evidence rebutting that
8 presumption.

9 So, in this case, without evidence that
10 the field could have been shown to be unreliable,
11 there was no ground to grant PCR in this -- as to
12 this allegation.

13 THE COURT: All right.

14 MR. JONES: I'll let Mr. Phillips respond
15 to that.

16 THE COURT: Hold on one second, Mr. Jones.

17 What was the last -- without evidence to
18 show the field was not unreliable, what was the
19 last statement, sir? Because that -- actually,
20 that kind of resonated with me, and I was writing
21 that down and I didn't get the rest of it.

22 MR. JONES: Okay. Yes, Your Honor.

23 Generally, of course, anytime in any
24 allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel,
25 the burden is on the applicant to show, again,

1 both the deficiency and the prejudice and to
2 introduce any necessary evidence to suggest that,
3 as in this case, an objection would be successful.

4 So in order to show that an objection in
5 this case to the reliability of Dr. Benedetto's
6 testimony would be successful, the applicant would
7 have to introduce at the PCR evidentiary hearing
8 some evidence that child sexual abuse dynamics is
9 not a valid or reliable field, and the applicant
10 failed to do that.

11 THE COURT: I understand. I've got it
12 down. Thank you.

13 All right. Mr. Phillips, sir, I'm happy
14 to hear from you in response to the information --
15 the argument of the attorney general.

16 MR. PHILLIPS: Thank you, Your Honor.

17 I'll deal with the cumulative error
18 analysis first. Specifically as to the individual
19 specific findings of deficient performance that
20 were there, the main argument, obviously, is the
21 second part that those counsels' errors were so
22 serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair
23 trial, which affected the reliability of the
24 ultimate result.

25 Now, we don't have the specific findings

1 of fact for each specific one of those allegations
2 that were raised with that, quote/unquote,
3 "cumulative error analysis." Part of that would
4 be argued, I would say, as a *United States vs.*
5 *Cronic*, that's 466 U.S. 648, which has the
6 presumption of prejudice. The companion case to
7 *Strickland* is *United States vs. Cronic*, which
8 identifies three distinct situations that you have
9 the presumption of prejudice. And arguably, we
10 would say per se prejudice occurred when there's
11 been a constructive denial of counsel.

12 The opposition would be, one, although
13 South Carolina hasn't officially recognized based
14 on what the attorney general has submitted, the
15 cumulative error doctrine, they haven't not
16 applied it. It is not controlling -- other
17 jurisdictions are not controlling case law that
18 dictate how this order would be crafted from a
19 cumulative error analysis. There's nothing that
20 says that that is wholly improper as controlling
21 the law in South Carolina.

22 With that being said, under *Cronic*, a
23 presumption analysis, per se prejudice analysis, I
24 believe when you add up all of these things, you
25 have a constructive denial of counsel, which is

1 akin to a cumulative error analysis.

2 So whether it's maybe improperly worded
3 on my part when I drafted the order, however,
4 specifically I still think that each
5 individual allegation -- or each finding of
6 deficient performance still crosses the threshold
7 and meets that burden of proving that there was
8 actual prejudice that the counsels' errors were so
9 serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair
10 trial, what's required to prove prejudice.

11 But also, in addition to there not being
12 any controlling case law, a cumulative error
13 analysis could be presented into the order. It's
14 nothing that's controlling that says it's not.

15 Now, again, a backstop to that would that
16 under that *United States vs. Cronin*, the per se
17 prejudice analysis, it could be also argued that
18 under the same rationale, that the prejudice was
19 presumed.

20 THE COURT: All right.

21 MR. PHILLIPS: As to -- I believe it was
22 Allegation 13, the failure to object to the legal
23 standard used for qualifying a State's expert
24 witness, the specific argument was that Trial
25 Counsel failed to object to the trial court's

1 application of an incorrect legal standard, not so
2 much on the actual basis of whether the child
3 abuse dynamics is appropriate.

4 Yes, there are plenty of experts who have
5 been qualified as that. But as far as the legal
6 standard for which -- that were used that the
7 judge made his determination to qualify that
8 expert witness in that field, where the court --
9 and this is a unique situation, a case-by-case
10 basis based on this specific trial, where the
11 court limited counsel's voir dire of the witness
12 regarding the qualifications improperly, qualified
13 the witness as an expert in the given field
14 without having gone through that correct proper
15 analysis, and only permitting questioning of the
16 witness, it limited -- and this is an opportunity
17 to question the witness on the reliability and
18 validity after the witness was already deemed an
19 expert improperly, as far as the order of how this
20 is supposed to be done, and the State's direct
21 examination, all of which was held in the presence
22 of the jury instead of in an in camera hearing.

23 Highly prejudicial situation where an
24 incorrect legal standard was presented. The
25 proper procedure wasn't followed in any way,

1 shape, or form. It was done all in front of the
2 jury without any objection from Trial Counsel as
3 to that specific issue.

4 Not whether they could qualify that
5 person as an expert in child abuse dynamics, but
6 from the legal standard itself and the procedure
7 that it was used in qualifying that expert. We're
8 not arguing that as an absolute bar, that you
9 can't have child abuse dynamic experts from being
10 qualified or having them being -- a witness being
11 qualified as a child abuse dynamic witness.

12 But in this specific case, what occurred,
13 the procedure and everything -- counsel's failure
14 to object to that incorrect standard and the
15 overall procedure was deficient performance and
16 was highly prejudicial and ultimately would affect
17 the outcome of the case.

18 THE COURT: All right.

19 MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor.

20 THE COURT: Yes, sir.

21 MR. JONES: Did you want to have a brief
22 rebuttal by the State?

23 THE COURT: Yes, sir. I'll give you a
24 brief rebuttal, of course. Yes.

25 MR. JONES: Thank you.

1 I would just point out that the United
2 States Supreme Court precedent, and that's the
3 Compo (ph) Tire Company case that I cited stating
4 the trial courts may, in their discretion, omit
5 unnecessary reliability examination from expert
6 qualification proceedings.

7 And again, that's because qualification
8 and admissibility are different inquiries, and the
9 qualification hearing -- or proceeding does not
10 have -- reliability does not have to be addressed
11 at that stage. It can be addressed at the
12 admissibility stage. So I would submit there was
13 no error in the trial court's conduct of the
14 qualification proceeding.

15 THE COURT: All right.

16 MR. JONES: I'll move on now to
17 allegation 14 which is Trial Counsel's failure to
18 object and move to strike Dr. Benedetto's
19 statement that abusers typically seek victims of a
20 particular age.

21 Your Honor, first of all, the -- the
22 applicant objects -- or raises that issue based on
23 the scope of Dr. Benedetto's expertise. I would
24 submit that it is within the scope of
25 Dr. Benedetto's expertise to testify about the

1 characteristics typical of child abusers.

2 Again, the mere fact that her subfield
3 does not specialize in the profiling of child
4 abusers doesn't mean that she lacks the necessary
5 expertise to qualify about the characteristics of
6 child abusers. As an expert in child sexual abuse
7 dynamics, she certainly would be familiar with
8 that to a greater degree than the average juror,
9 which is the test for qualification as an expert.

10 However, I would say that even if there
11 was some impropriety in that statement, it could
12 not have prejudiced Mr. Cartwright because the
13 testimony in this case did not suggest that he
14 sought victims of one particular age. It's -- the
15 different victims in this case testified that he
16 began abusing them at ages 5, 9 and 13,
17 respectively.

18 So I fail to see how Mr. Cartwright could
19 have been prejudiced by the State's introduction
20 of a statement that child abusers typically target
21 victims of a particular age.

22 For that reason, I would suggest there's
23 no ineffective assistance of counsel here.

24 Furthermore -- and this goes to both
25 allegation 14 and 13 -- the court's order later in

1 discussing the ineffectiveness of appellate
2 counsel rejects the -- Mr. Cartwright's
3 ineffectiveness claims for appellate counsel on
4 these same issues by stating that there was no
5 prejudice as to either of them. That, of course,
6 is -- and, therefore, no reason to appeal them.

7 That, of course, is inconsistent with
8 this court's grant of relief on Allegations 13 and
9 14.

10 So, if nothing else, the order would have
11 to be amended to resolve that inconsistency, I
12 submit.

13 That's my position as to allegation
14 number 14.

15 THE COURT: Mr. Phillips?

16 MR. PHILLIPS: Yes, sir, Your Honor. One
17 moment.

18 Yes, Your Honor. Specifically addressing
19 the issue was whether the witness's amended area
20 of expertise focused on the perspective of a child
21 experiencing abuse. But when you have that extra
22 layer, when you go beyond the expertise that's
23 provided, it is necessary for Trial Counsel to
24 object.

25 I guess I maybe need to clarify

1 whether -- it the State's position that they
2 believe there's deficient performance and failure
3 to object, but they don't believe it's
4 prejudiced -- or prejudicial?

5 MR. JONES: No, Your Honor. The State's
6 position is that there was not deficient
7 performance because this was within the scope of
8 Dr. Benedetto's expertise.

9 Second of all, there was no prejudice
10 even if there had been deficiency because the
11 substance of her testimony was not harmful to
12 Mr. Cartwright.

13 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Phillips?

14 MR. PHILLIPS: So, specifically,
15 certainly the applicant's position is that it was
16 improper testimony as a psychological -- you know,
17 what we would refer to as a profiler when asking
18 about is it typical for an abuser to have a
19 favorite age to sexually abuse when -- and it
20 is -- we argue it's outside the scope of the
21 expertise and has an influential -- as an expert
22 witness, you know, that higher level of
23 influential persuasion on a jury by having that.

24 Obviously, the case from the specific
25 victims themselves have different ages. However,

1 with providing that testimony that's outside the
2 expertise of the specific witness, as well as with
3 that profiler type of language, our position is
4 that not only is it deficient performance due to
5 failure to object and move to strike that
6 testimony, but it's also prejudicial that it would
7 deprive him of ultimately the defendant's right to
8 a fair trial.

9 THE COURT: So, Mr. Phillips, the -- what
10 is the statement -- or what was the testimony that
11 the doctor made that you contend exceeded the
12 scope of her expertise, sir? Remind me of that,
13 sir.

14 MR. PHILLIPS: Specifically, if you'll
15 give me a second, Your Honor, it's when she
16 essentially testifies that -- the prosecutor asked
17 the question, What was the typical -- What was
18 typical for an abuser to have -- *Is it typical for*
19 *an abuser to have a favorite age for sexual abuse?*

20 THE COURT: Right.

21 MR. PHILLIPS: I think that's -- and then
22 the testimony -- the witness answers in the
23 affirmative. I think that specific set of -- if
24 you need me to pull up the transcript real quick,
25 I can --

1 THE COURT: No, no. And so just tell me,
2 sir, so why is it your contention that that is
3 outside her scope of expertise? Because what I'm
4 hearing from the State is, as I understand,
5 Attorney General, you would submit that
6 that's not -- initially, I think you would submit
7 that's not outside her scope of expertise.

8 Am I understand that correctly, sir?

9 MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honor.

10 THE COURT: So, Mr. Phillips, explain to
11 me why -- or remind me why you believe this is
12 outside the doctor's scope of her expertise,
13 sir.

14 MR. PHILLIPS: So, based on the
15 qualification of child abuse dynamics, there is a
16 specific range -- at least what our contention is,
17 there's a specific range of things that are proper
18 for them to testify about when you have
19 specifically the blind experts that think that
20 it's improper to testify about.

21 When you go into the profiler-type
22 questions that doesn't deal specifically with
23 any -- especially in this case, even relevance to
24 this case, which is why Rule 701 was cited,
25 specifically that it goes beyond the scope of the

1 testimony that's allowed by a child abuse dynamics
2 to be talking about what a typical abuser is to
3 have a favorite age to sexually abuse when, again,
4 you probably should actually include it in a
5 Rule 403 as well as far as being improperly
6 prejudicial or unduly prejudicial.

7 With that being said, that -- in that
8 situation, it's not about whether -- specifically,
9 again, they're not testifying as to the specifics of
10 the evidence in the case, but it's beyond the scope of
11 what she was qualified as an expert to do.

12 I guess it somewhat goes back to the
13 limited qualifications and the basic of when
14 the -- this specific witness was qualified on
15 child abuse dynamics, what was the range of what
16 this witness was limited to testify about in child
17 abuse dynamics.

18 That essentially testifying about a
19 typical -- what's, quote/unquote, a "typical
20 abuser to have a favorite age," our position is
21 that it's outside the scope of the expertise or at
22 least the qualification of the expertise in this
23 case and that it was improper for it.

24 Again, we would argue that -- you know,
25 now that I'm fleshing it out, I would also say

1 that it's unduly prejudicial, that any probative
2 value of that -- the answer to that question is
3 substantially outweighed by the danger of its
4 unfair prejudice to the jury.

5 So not only is it not relevant and not
6 proper under Rule 701 and 702 as far as the
7 qualification of the expertise, but also under
8 Rule 403 of the rules of evidence.

9 THE COURT: Mr. Phillips, thank you.
10 Counsel?

11 MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor.

12 Just to briefly respond to that, once
13 again, there was no express limitation preventing
14 Dr. Benedetto from testifying as to the
15 characteristics of child abusers. And because
16 that would necessarily be something she would have
17 special training and experience in due to being an
18 expert in child sexual abuse dynamics, once again,
19 we submit that there was no reason for Trial
20 Counsel to object to that statement.

21 Second of all, Mr. Phillips has argued
22 that the statement was unduly prejudicial. Again,
23 I fail to see how it could be prejudicial to
24 Mr. Cartwright since it was actually inconsistent
25 with part of the State's theory of the case, which

1 was that these children had been targeted at
2 different ages.

3 MR. PHILLIPS: Your Honor -- I apologize.
4 I thought he was done.

5 I was just going to clarify the Rule 403.

6 THE COURT: Hold on one second. Hold on
7 one second.

8 Attorney General, what else do you want
9 to tell me in reply, sir?

10 MR. JONES: That's all, sir. Thank
11 you.

12 THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

13 All right. Mr. Phillips, very briefly,
14 sir.

15 MR. PHILLIPS: Yes, sir. I apologize if
16 the State was not done.

17 Just that under Rule 403, it also
18 includes confusion of issues to the jury. If it's
19 not relevant, as the State's conceded, then it was
20 improperly presented and prejudicial by being
21 asked by the prosecutor to try to present that
22 into the trial. It's not relevant, as the State's
23 just said.

24 THE COURT: What is next, Attorney General?

25 MR. JONES: Next is allegation number 19

1 on Trial Counsel's failure to sequester -- or to
2 move to sequester the witnesses.

3 THE COURT: Right.

4 MR. JONES: The State's position there is
5 that, first of all, moving to sequester the
6 witnesses would not have accomplished anything
7 because there had already been a trial. The
8 witnesses had already heard each other testify.

9 So, again, the purpose of sequestration
10 is to prevent witnesses from hearing each other so
11 that there can't be any coordination of their
12 testimony. But that ship had sailed by this
13 point. This was the second trial, and all the
14 witnesses had already heard everything every other
15 witness was going to say.

16 Second of all --

17 THE COURT: Yeah. But, I mean, my
18 experience over the years has been, Lord, have
19 mercy, just because one witness said something in
20 the first trial, I mean, it's no indication that
21 that witness is going to say it in the second
22 trial, or they can add something to a question.

23 I mean, how many times do you go in a
24 deposition and take a deposition from somebody and
25 they then go and come to court and they say

1 something -- I mean, my point is that a sworn
2 statement where someone's making a statement and
3 then they come and they change their statement --
4 I don't know if they were specifically -- I don't
5 know if they were specifically -- I don't know if
6 they said exactly the same thing, you know, in
7 both trials.

8 But, I mean, my experience as an
9 attorney -- do we know whether or not the
10 witnesses were sequestered in the first trial?

11 MR. JONES: I believe they were not.
12 However, I'm not a hundred percent sure on that,
13 Your Honor.

14 THE COURT: Okay.

15 MR. PHILLIPS: Your Honor, I don't have
16 the answer for that.

17 THE COURT: I mean, that certainly is an
18 issue. If they were sequestered, then it's
19 possible that they may not have heard what was
20 said, and then maybe they could have then asked or
21 had conversations with attorneys or transcripts,
22 or whatever the case may be.

23 But go ahead, sir. I'm just thinking to
24 myself. Go ahead.

25 MR. JONES: And, again, Your Honor, there

1 were different defense attorneys at the first
2 trial versus the second trial. So Trial Counsel
3 in this case inherited the case. If there was no
4 sequestration in the first case, our position is
5 that the damage would already have been done, if
6 there was any damage.

7 However, it's also true that the -- it
8 should also be borne in mind that, first of all,
9 sequestration of witnesses is not a matter of
10 right. It's in the discretion of the Court.

11 And, in fact, there is State statute that
12 says in cases where one of the witnesses is a
13 victim, the -- that victim may not be sequestered
14 from the proceedings.

15 In this case, the State's three chief
16 witnesses were the three purported victims. So
17 there is a State statute preventing them from
18 being sequestered. Moving to sequester them would
19 not have been successful as a matter of law.

20 For that reason, the State suggests that
21 there was no -- there could not have been any
22 prejudice even if, perhaps, the best -- the ideal
23 course of action might have been to seek
24 sequestration, it wouldn't have been granted as to
25 the State's three chief witnesses whose testimony

1 was the most damning.

2 THE COURT: All right. Thank you,
3 Attorney General.

4 Mr. Phillips, what about that? They get to
5 stay in.

6 MR. PHILLIPS: Not to put the cart before
7 the horse, but I think this only enhances the
8 prejudice of the -- our severance issue. So one
9 of the more reasons why this -- defense counsel
10 should have moved to sever the charges.

11 Now, again, staying on task to this
12 specific one, there are many additional witnesses
13 that testified in this case. Credibility is the
14 linchpin of this case. It's the key as to
15 whether -- based on the first trial being a hung
16 jury due to a mistrial, ultimately a mistrial.

17 With that being said, because credibility
18 is the key in the case, although those three
19 individuals were victims, there are family members
20 who, you know, you could make the assumption that
21 they were able to speak. However, there are many
22 additional witnesses beyond those three who
23 testified whose testimony is key to hearing all
24 the other people testify and be consistent with
25 that and taking away that ability from the defense

1 side -- well, the opportunity through
2 cross-examination to prove inconsistencies and
3 biases and motives that otherwise would be able to
4 be hopefully fleshed out where the defense can --
5 unfortunately, you'll never know because they
6 weren't sequestered.

7 With that being said, again, with there
8 being two different defense attorneys in a very
9 short amount of time that the second lawyer had to
10 prepare for the case and coming off the heels of a
11 mistrial due to a hung jury, and credibility being
12 the real key issue in the case, sequestration, in
13 my opinion, although it is generally -- it is a
14 judge's discretion. In this case, I feel if the
15 lawyer would have made the motion, then it would
16 have been granted had that argument been made.
17 And if not, that would have been an issue that
18 would have been reserved for appellate review. It
19 could have been reviewed on direct appeal.

20 However, because that argument was not
21 made, that failure to object ultimately deprives
22 him of his right to a fair trial by having these
23 witnesses being able to stay in the courtroom.

24 MR. JONES: Once again, Your Honor, I
25 would just -- I would just suggest that the

1 existence of the statute -- of that victim
2 protection statute negates any possible prejudice
3 as to this allegation.

4 The other victim -- or, sorry, the other
5 witnesses in this case, most of their testimony
6 was very minor and not nearly as harmful to
7 Mr. Cartwright as the testimony of the three
8 victims. None of them could have been excluded or
9 sequestered even had Trial Counsel made such a
10 motion.

11 THE COURT: Let me ask you, Mr. Phillips,
12 any time a lawyer does not or forgets to ask that
13 witnesses be sequestered, then would it be your
14 position that that's --

15 MR. PHILLIPS: I think I can answer this
16 directly.

17 THE COURT: That the individual has been
18 prejudiced? Because, I mean, you think about it,
19 that could happen lots of times.

20 MR. PHILLIPS: Sure. But this case
21 specifically -- again, we're doing everything on a
22 case-by-case basis with discretion. This case is
23 a highly volatile credibility case.

24 Again, you obviously know that
25 credibility is an issue when you couldn't have a

1 unanimous jury either way decide the first trial.
2 That shows and proves and illustrates how
3 credibility was. Because you couldn't have a
4 unanimous jury in the first trial. You ultimately
5 had a hung jury.

6 So coming off the heels of a hung jury --

7 THE COURT: Well, I think credibility --
8 I think you're right. Credibility is the issue
9 here. Because one of the attorneys basically said
10 in either opening or closing, If you believe
11 her -- *If you believe them, he's guilty.*

12 MR. PHILLIPS: I think there's an
13 ineffective assistance issue that was kind of --

14 THE COURT: Right. But it was done in
15 that fashion. Someone, I don't know who --
16 said -- I remember Mr. Cartwright's attorney did
17 got and basically created this or couched this
18 case as a complete credibility argument by saying
19 that to the jury. That's -- I think that's my
20 recollection.

21 Is there any hard evidence in this
22 case -- let me just ask the attorney general.
23 When I say "hard evidence," what I mean is beyond
24 a he said/she said. I don't remember --

25 MR. JONES: Your Honor --

1 THE COURT: -- it being an issue with
2 these types of things.

3 MR. JONES: Your Honor, the only
4 evidence -- hard evidence beyond the witness
5 testimony was the evidence of the -- of
6 Mr. Cartwright's semen found on one of the bed
7 sheets taken from one of the children's rooms.

8 THE COURT: Right, right, right. Which
9 they got into another issue about what room, as I
10 recollect.

11 All right. Thank you. Is there anything
12 else, Attorney General, that you want to say as it
13 relates to this one, sir, this matter? Or are we
14 ready to move to the next?

15 MR. JONES: Your Honor, I'm ready to move
16 to the next issue.

17 THE COURT: That would be great, sir.

18 MR. JONES: So the next is allegation 20,
19 which is the failure to move to individually
20 question jurors after the trial judge noted some
21 jurors had approached him about
22 experiencing similar types of allegations in their
23 past.

24 Again, that was where the trial court
25 asked if any -- in jury collection whether any

1 member of the jury panel had been a victim or had
2 been subjected to sexual misconduct of some kind.

3 And then the Court suggested that some
4 number of the jurors had already disclosed that
5 they were -- that they were so affected.

6 Then later in the trial -- later in the
7 jury selection process, Trial Counsel pointed out
8 one of the jurors, Juror Number 94, and said, Your
9 Honor, we move to strike this juror because this
10 is one of the ones who approached you about having
11 experienced that sort of behavior in the past.

12 And that's its own issue, what happened
13 to Juror Number 94. But I would submit that it
14 proves Trial Counsel was aware of which jurors
15 were affected or had approached the Court and did
16 take the appropriate steps to have them removed.

17 Similarly -- however, even if there was
18 some sort of impropriety there, or in failing to
19 have those jurors' numbers and their statements to
20 the Court put on the record, I would submit that
21 it wasn't -- that it can't be presumed to be
22 prejudicial just because we don't have it in the
23 transcript.

24 *Strickland* says that jurors are presumed
25 to act according to the law and not to be -- not

1 to act with bias or prejudice. It's -- as it
2 always is in the case -- in these PCR cases, it's
3 the burden on the applicant to establish that the
4 result of his trial would have been different
5 had -- had Trial Counsel acted differently.

6 And I -- there is no evidence in here
7 that the -- that any of the those jurors who
8 approached the trial court were subsequently sat
9 on the jury pool or that they allowed those
10 experiences to color their appreciation of the
11 evidence in the case or that they were prejudiced
12 against Mr. Cartwright or in favor of
13 Mr. Cartwright or any kind of -- any kind of proof
14 of their impropriety at all.

15 So again, with the presumption of
16 lawfulness that's established by *Strickland*, the
17 State submits that the applicant has not met his
18 burden as to this allegation.

19 THE COURT: Thank you.

20 Mr. Phillips?

21 MR. PHILLIPS: Thank you, Your Honor.

22 Being specific with it, under the State's
23 rationale, the Trial Counsel's failure to make
24 these arguments and to make these motions has
25 deprived us with having the very evidence that the

1 State's saying that we can't prove prejudice
2 with.

3 In other words, the deficient performance
4 is the very thing that causes us not to have any
5 evidence related to these issues. Had Trial
6 Counsel properly made the motions to do this and
7 proffered the testimony, made sure that this
8 specific -- all the specific answers and
9 questioning -- individual questioning by the judge
10 that was done of these potential jurors, then we
11 would have the very evidence that the State is
12 saying we don't have to prove prejudice.

13 So the deficient performance in this very
14 nature is ultimately what would, under the State's
15 theory, prevent us from being able to prove
16 prejudice.

17 So our argument, again, to me in that
18 specific, it's impossible because of the deficient
19 performance. Because the Trial Counsel failed to
20 move to do those things, we don't have that
21 evidence. It makes it impossible to prove the
22 prejudice on that specific issue because of Trial
23 Counsel's failure.

24 And based on that, it was serious enough
25 to deprive the defendant of his right to a fair

1 trial and challenge that the result of that trial
2 as being reliable.

3 THE COURT: All right. Attorney General,
4 anything you want to reply, sir?

5 MR. JONES: I'd just, once again, point
6 out that in addition to the presumption that the
7 jurors acted appropriately, there's the
8 presumption that Trial Counsel -- Trial Counsel's
9 performance was adequate. Trial counsel moved to
10 strike several jurors and was successful in
11 striking several jurors and did not give his
12 reasons as to all of them.

13 However, it can be presumed and, in fact,
14 according to *Strickland* should be presumed that if
15 there was any legitimate reason to suspect the
16 impartiality or the partiality of any jurors, that
17 those were the jurors that Trial Counsel struck.

18 And I believe that's borne out by the
19 fact that we'll get to in the next allegation as
20 to Juror Number 94 where Trial Counsel did explain
21 that he was moving to strike that juror for cause
22 for having approached the trial court in response
23 to the trial court's earlier questioning.

24 So again, it's -- it can be tough if it's
25 not on the record, but we have -- that's what we

1 have the presumptions in *Strickland* for.

2 THE COURT: All right. So do you want to
3 move then to -- or does that address your issues
4 concerning allegation 21, or is there anything
5 else you want to say about allegation 21, sir?

6 MR. JONES: Your Honor, the only other
7 thing I would say about allegation 21 is that
8 Juror Number 94 was, in fact, struck. The only
9 problem that Mr. Phillips has pointed out with it
10 is that the counsel had to use a peremptory strike
11 rather than -- and did not succeed on the motion
12 to strike for cause.

13 Your Honor, Trial Counsel did not even
14 use up all of his peremptory strikes. He had ten,
15 and only nine jurors were struck in total. So
16 it's impossible that he could have been
17 prejudiced. He still had peremptory strikes left
18 over and did not move to strike -- did not move to
19 use any of them in the rest of the jury selection
20 process.

21 So the State submits that even if there
22 was a problem in his failure to properly preserve
23 and argue the issues related to Juror Number 94,
24 it couldn't have prejudiced Mr. Cartwright because
25 he was able to strike Juror Number 94 and he still

1 had peremptory strikes left over at the end of the
2 jury selection.

3 THE COURT: All right, thank you.

4 Mr. Phillips?

5 MR. PHILLIPS: Specifically to that, our
6 primary issue was, I believe -- pretty much as far
7 as the applicant's position's been pretty well
8 fleshed out. I mean, it's in the order that Trial
9 Counsel testified that he didn't use up all his
10 peremptory strikes because only nine jurors were
11 struck in total and he had some strikes.

12 The specific issue was that Trial Counsel
13 was deficient for having -- for failing to have
14 those conversations on the record for the argument
15 that Juror Number 94 should have been struck with
16 cause. Obviously, that still has the issue of
17 there being an additional peremptory strike
18 available.

19 I have nothing else to add to that, Your
20 Honor.

21 THE COURT: All right. Attorney General,
22 you ready to move to your next contention, sir?

23 MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honor. That would
24 be Allegation 22. This court found Trial Counsel
25 should have moved to sever the charges in two

1 separate trials involving the separate victims.

2 Your Honor, I would submit that these --
3 all these incidents arose out of a single chain of
4 circumstances, the -- for the reasons set forth in
5 my brief.

6 However, before I get to that, I would
7 like to point out that the main reason to deny
8 relief on this issue is because it was an exercise
9 of a valid trial strategy by Trial Counsel.

10 There was -- again, the first trial had
11 ended in a hung jury. So it was far from a sure
12 thing that any subsequent trial would result in a
13 conviction even if it proceeded according to
14 mostly the same -- in the same way with the
15 charges not being severed.

16 So, first of all, there was no guarantee
17 that Mr. Cartwright would be convicted on the
18 second trial since, like the first trial, all the
19 charges were held in the same proceeding.

20 Second of all, the Trial Counsel was
21 faced with this dilemma that if he moved to sever
22 the charges and Mr. Cartwright was convicted on
23 multiple -- in multiple trials, that that wouldn't
24 lead to a longer total prison sentence, including
25 potentially life without parole.

1 So Trial Counsel was put in a very
2 difficult position where on the one hand, again,
3 he could have moved and, perhaps, there was an
4 argument to be made that this was not a single
5 chain of circumstances. Mr. Phillips is making
6 that argument.

7 However, on the other hand, if he was
8 successful in that, he could expose his client to
9 a greater total prison term, which would have, of
10 course -- you know, we might be sitting here in an
11 alternate universe where Mr. Phillips is arguing
12 that that was deficient performance.

13 So the -- so I would suggest that it's
14 not the Court's -- it's not proper for the Court
15 to second-guess with the benefit of hindsight the
16 reasonableness of trial counsel's valid trial
17 strategy. All trial strategies involve some
18 degree of risk, and this one was no different.

19 He was put in a difficult position, and
20 he took a calculated risk that, well, if I go
21 forward with all the charges in this one
22 proceeding, maybe -- you know, there's no
23 guarantee it will result in a conviction because
24 it resulted in a hung jury last time. So,
25 perhaps, this jury will acquit my client and that

1 he'd be acquitted on all the charges. Or if he
2 was not acquitted on all the charges, he would at
3 least be -- at least escape the harshest possible
4 sentence.

5 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Phillips?

6 MR. PHILLIPS: Yes, Your Honor. Well,
7 being direct, not arguing any other -- again, one
8 of the main things that the State has presented
9 here is that we're not speculating on certain
10 things as far as the alternate universe part of
11 it.

12 But Under *Roseboro v. State*, 317 S.C.
13 292, it's a 1995 case finding that counsel must
14 articulate a valid reason for employing a certain
15 strategy to avoid finding ineffectiveness where
16 counsel articulates a strategy is measured under
17 objective standard of reasonableness.

18 Our argument is that when looking at this
19 under objective standard of reasonableness, that
20 it is unreasonable not to move to sever these
21 charges given the significant nature of, one, the
22 number of charges -- really, just walking through
23 the test itself, but just the sheer number of
24 charges in looking at the indictments spanning --
25 to have three different victims, in this case

1 three primary complaining witnesses that allege
2 conduct -- there were three distinct large periods
3 of time. Distinct and large periods of time that
4 did not arise out of a single chain of
5 circumstances, that are not proved by the same
6 evidence. It just doesn't fit the test.

7 And I think when looking at the problem
8 of prejudicial standpoint, how it would affect the
9 outcome of the case, because that's the prejudice
10 standard. There's no way under the standard of
11 reasonableness that it would be reasonable for a
12 defense lawyer not to make a motion to sever given
13 the facts that we have in this case.

14 As far as saying that he could have been
15 LWOP'd, I mean, he got a 40-year sentence. I
16 mean, that's essentially a life sentence for him
17 as is. Given the very nature of the number of
18 charges, they could have practically LWOP'd him --
19 in fact, they LWOP'd him on just having one set of
20 charges if he went to trial. Again, it just does
21 not fit the test.

22 There were two -- two of the main issues
23 that we presented in this PCR that really for
24 me -- personally I felt were incredibly strong,
25 this is certainly one of them, the severance

1 motion now that -- I think one that Your Honor
2 actually didn't agree with, the Baker indictment
3 issue. But this specific one, Trial Counsel's
4 alleged failure to sever the charges, I believe
5 it's just -- in my opinion, does not fit the test.

6 When it comes to specifically prejudice
7 in itself, this issue alone is enough of
8 ineffective assistance of counsel that would
9 ultimately result in the requirement of a new
10 trial as far as deprivation of the defendant's
11 right to a fair trial.

12 Again, I mean, by failing to move, we
13 have the three primary complaining witnesses --
14 and again, it's not as if it's a small amount of
15 time. There's three distinct large periods of
16 time. They're not all happening at the same time.

17 They did not arise out of a single chain
18 of circumstances. They're not proved by the same
19 evidence. That's just based on the testimony that
20 was presented at trial by witnesses that were
21 necessary to -- again, when you look over this, I
22 know Trial Counsel said he was afraid about a long
23 term of imprisonment. But, ultimately, any -- if
24 you had the motion to sever, he's facing a long
25 term of imprisonment if it was just for one

1 alleged victim's case by itself, especially given
2 the very nature and the number of charges, you
3 can't -- where there's smoke, there's fire. The
4 whole argument for propensity evidence --

5 THE COURT: I would -- Mr. Phillips, I'll
6 tell you, I've just got to agree with you on that
7 one, sir.

8 Attorney General, I understand your
9 argument. I appreciate your argument. But, I
10 mean, I just -- it's just beyond me why -- to me,
11 of course -- like you said, I'm sitting here in
12 this nice office, and I have to be able to go back
13 and look at everything that took place. I
14 understand that.

15 But I've also practiced law a long time.
16 You've got three children at the same trial
17 saying -- I don't want to say essentially the same
18 thing, but basically alleging six allegations that
19 the jury ultimately ends up finding Mr. Cartwright
20 guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

21 I -- in fairness, Attorney General, you
22 know, I haven't given a whole lot of thought to
23 your whole LWOP argument, sir. And, you know,
24 that -- I haven't really -- I haven't really given
25 a lot of thought to that as part of a trial

1 strategy, sir, which is I think one of your
2 arguments, or, perhaps, a main argument as it
3 relates to this matter, that that was a
4 potentially valid strategy. But that's a tough
5 one for me. I'll have to do some more thinking on
6 that.

7 But anything else you want to say,
8 Attorney General, concerning this?

9 Mr. Phillips, I think I understand your
10 position, sir.

11 MR. JONES: The only thing I'd like to
12 add, Your Honor, is that there's no guarantee
13 that all -- that even if there had been a motion
14 to sever these charges, there's no guarantee that
15 all three of the victims would have -- it would
16 have been severed into three separate trials, if
17 it was severed at all, if the motion was granted
18 at all, especially as to, I would say, Victims 2
19 and 3, the second and third chronological victims,
20 who they lived in the same household. They were
21 both stepdaughters of Mr. Cartwright. They both
22 alleged a very similar and rather idiosyncratic
23 form of abuse. These -- that was proved by the
24 same evidence in the case.

25 You had the testimony of the mother and

1 testimony of the various investigators who handled
2 both cases at the same time.

3 I'm sorry, sir.

4 THE COURT: No, that's all right.
5 Listen, I appreciate you addressing my question.

6 But in one of them, didn't we have some
7 crazy stuff about photographs and all this
8 evidence about somebody being nude and
9 pornographic stuff on the Internet?

10 To me, you know -- you know, to me, that
11 one is so completely different than the other two.
12 Not necessarily the abuse, but these other things
13 that are just swirling around out there, they're
14 so different than the other two, aren't they?

15 MR. JONES: I would submit -- I think,
16 Your Honor, those -- that evidence was only -- was
17 not admitted, but those allegations of
18 pornographic images were brought up by
19 Mr. Cartwright's to explain -- by Mr. Cartwright's
20 attorney to basically explain why he believed
21 his -- I believe that was Victim -- the third
22 chronological victim, fabricated these accusations
23 against him.

24 THE COURT: I thought he went to the
25 police about that. There was something in the

1 police -- I can't remember --

2 Mr. Phillips, did he go to the police
3 about that?

4 MR. PHILLIPS: He also went on the news
5 in that specific one. It became a very -- that
6 was obviously one of the big arguments by defense
7 counsel as to why the allegation occurred, the
8 motive.

9 Mr. JONES: Yes, Your Honor. But it was
10 not relied on by the State as proving any element
11 of the charged conduct. Again, it was offered by
12 the defense to explain his theory that that victim
13 was fabricating her allegation.

14 But as far as, you know, proving the
15 similar elements of the offenses by similar
16 evidence, that was accomplished by overlapping
17 evidence, especially as to Victim's 2 and 3, but I
18 would submit also as to the first victim. And
19 there are other similarities and the timing of
20 the -- of when different periods of abuse began
21 and ended, which suggest that this was one single
22 chain of circumstances. This was just how the --
23 how the applicant proceeded in this overarching
24 scheme over many years to abuse his daughters and
25 stepdaughters. That's what the evidence

1 suggested.

2 THE COURT: All right. Anything else
3 concerning this one, Attorney General?

4 MR. JONES: No, Your Honor. If
5 everyone's happy, I can move on the next one.

6 MR. PHILLIPS: I just want to be able to
7 say that the last -- just as far as from the
8 applicant's position, that that goes to the
9 unreasonableness. That it's not trial strategy.
10 That the defense's -- the defense's arguments in
11 presenting that specific -- with that one, again,
12 it's very case-specific or to that one specific
13 alleged victim, making that a big part of their
14 defense only highlights, again, the prejudice
15 which would make it unreasonable to have -- to not
16 move to sever and try these individually.

17 THE COURT: All right. What's next,
18 Attorney General?

19 MR. JONES: The next is allegation 23,
20 Trial Counsel's failure to object to truth-seeking
21 language in the Trial Court's preliminary
22 instructions to the jury.

23 Your Honor, the main thrust of this
24 argument is that those statements were not
25 rejected by the Supreme Court until the case of

1 *State v. Beaty*. And, in fact, they were a part of
2 the Supreme Court's bench book charging
3 instructions for Circuit Court judges -- for
4 general sessions judges at the time of
5 Mr. Cartwright's trial.

6 *State v. Beaty* was not decided until
7 after Mr. Cartwright's trial. There's no
8 requirement that Trial Counsel has to be
9 clairvoyant or anticipate future changes in the
10 law to appropriately represent their client.

11 And *State v. Beaty* was not -- was not
12 decided. This Court doesn't cite *State v. Beaty*
13 in its order. It cites *State v. Daniels*.
14 However, *State v. Daniels* does not say -- I mean,
15 I looked through *State v. Daniels*. The Court says
16 that *State v. Daniels* stands for the proposition
17 that any references to the word "true" must be
18 removed from the Court's comments to the jury.

19 That does not appear in *State v. Daniels*
20 anywhere that I could find. So -- and forgive me
21 if I just missed something.

22 In fairness to Mr. Phillips, there was
23 the case of *State v. Aleksey*, which called into
24 question general statements about the jury's role
25 in the search for the truth in the burden of proof

1 context.

2 However, that case expressly held that it
3 was not improper to charge the jury on their role
4 to determine who's telling the truth in the
5 context of witness credibility. And, of course,
6 how can you instruct the jury on what credibility
7 even means if you're not allowed to use the word
8 "truth" or talk about who's telling the truth?

9 So in that limited context, *State v.*
10 *Aleksey* said there was error in the trial court
11 instructing the jury about determining who's
12 telling the truth. And that's exactly the context
13 in which the trial judge made these statements.

14 The general context was saying that, *The jury*
15 *must judge the believability or credibility of the*
16 *witnesses. You determine who's telling the truth, the*
17 *believability of the witnesses, their credibility.*
18 *It's your civic duty to pay close attention and decide*
19 *who's telling the truth.*

20 Again, those are the truth-seeking
21 statements that Mr. Phillips pointed out, and this
22 Court's order, I believe, addressed in the trial
23 court's preliminary instructions. Those, I
24 submit, are clearly within the context of witness
25 credibility, which was expressly permitted by

1 *State v. Aleksey*, which was the controlling law at
2 the time of the trial.

3 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, sir.

4 Mr. Phillips?

5 MR. PHILLIPS: Thank you, Your Honor.

6 I'll go back and check whether I got the quotation
7 from *Beaty* and *Daniels* mixed up, but I've got
8 *State v. Daniels* pulled up here.

9 In the conclusion, our Court -- again,
10 that's 401 S.C. 251, *State v. Daniels*. And the
11 conclusion said -- the Court says, judicial
12 instructions to the jury in a criminal case,
13 *Whatever verdict you reach will represent the*
14 *truth and justice for all parties, that we must*
15 *see to it that the trial is fair and the verdict*
16 *is just verdict, that you and I are 'in it*
17 *together,' that may seem at first blush to be*
18 *simply harmless phrase intended to put the jury at*
19 *ease and portray the judge as a "regular guy."*
20 *However, the constitutional framework governing*
21 *criminal trials is a highly technical body of law*
22 *developed by the United States Supreme Court and*
23 *by state courts operating under the Supreme*
24 *Court's guidance. It's inappropriate to*
25 *jeopardize the constitutionality of the trial by*

1 *instructing the jury this way.*

2 So again, with *whatever verdict you reach*
3 *will represent the truth and justice for all*
4 *parties, in 2012, our State Supreme Court made it*
5 *clear that, It's inappropriate to jeopardize the*
6 *constitutionality of the trial by instructing the*
7 *jury this way.*

8 And I'm reading it directly from the
9 "Conclusions" section: *It is critical that jurors*
10 *understand the proper application of reasonable doubt*
11 *standard. The standard does not change with ensuring*
12 *justice for all parties.*

13 And, of course, it goes into Justice
14 Pleicones's -- his -- essentially at the end of it,
15 it's essentially, "Justice Pleicones correctly notes
16 that this language" --

17 THE COURT: Hold on. Slow down a little
18 bit for the court reporter.

19 MR. PHILLIPS: I apologize.

20 THE COURT: That's all right.

21 MR. PHILLIPS: "Justice Pleicones
22 correctly notes that this language could result in
23 jurors substituting concepts of justice or
24 fairness for the State's constitutional duty to
25 prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

1 "Thus, I join Justice Pleicones's
2 admonition to the Trial Court to restrict the
3 jury's instructions to the matters of law and from
4 issuing instructions which run the risk of
5 depriving defendants of their right to a fair
6 trial."

7 So I apologize if I -- I must have put
8 the quote from *State v. Beaty* and had *State v.*
9 *Daniels*, because I state *State v. Beaty*, I think,
10 after that potentially in my proposed order.

11 But I think it's pretty clear that the
12 law in 2012 from *State v. Daniels* was clear that
13 the standard is -- when you're doing jury
14 instructions for the judge not to shift the burden
15 of proof in any way, that the burden must stay on
16 the State the entire time.

17 And any references that the jury's
18 verdict will be based on anything other than the
19 evidence presented at trial, such as representing
20 the truth and justice for parties, ultimately is
21 an improper burden-shifting argument.

22 THE COURT: All right.

23 MR. JONES: Again, Your Honor, I would
24 just repeat that this statement was not made in
25 the context of telling the jury that their verdict

1 had to be true and just. The Court here was
2 telling the jury that in determining witness
3 credibility, they had to decide who's telling the
4 truth, which is just the definition of witness
5 credibility. And that's why *State v. Aleksey* said
6 that's fine. Asking -- telling the jury --
7 mentioning the word "truth" when talking about
8 what credibility actually means is appropriate in
9 judicial instructions.

10 THE COURT: Just to let you gentlemen
11 know, the bench book that I received still has
12 truth throughout the charges. And they just hand
13 it to you and say, "Here." So what happens is
14 you've got to go through it. And every time I see
15 the t-word, that's like a four-letter word. I
16 just etch it out.

17 So I've done that numerous times. So
18 it's 2020 -- was it this year? 2022, they're
19 still handing out stuff loaded with "truth." But
20 that's another story for another day.

21 What are we ready to move on to now,
22 Attorney General?

23 MR. JONES: I'm ready to move on to
24 allegation 25, improper arguments in the Trial
25 Counsel's opening statement. And this is where

1 the Trial Counsel said in his opening statement
2 that, "If the victims are telling the truth, then
3 the applicant cannot be innocent."

4 Again, that was Trial Counsel framing the
5 issue in terms of the -- in term so of, again,
6 what the State was going to try to prove and what
7 the applicant's theory of the defense was going to
8 be, which is that the victims were not credible,
9 they all had motivations to lie. Their
10 allegations did not match up with the other
11 evidence.

12 And so, of course, the Trial Counsel
13 could not have established those defenses without
14 pointing out that the victims' testimony was
15 inconsistent with applicant's innocence and vice
16 versa. Applicant's guilt -- or applicant's
17 innocence was not consistent with the victims'
18 testimony.

19 So you had to set out at the beginning of
20 trial that the jury should not believe these
21 victims. They were motivated to fabricate their
22 accusations and he set out different motivations
23 for each of them in the course of the trial.

24 And, again, that's proof by -- his whole
25 statement of -- the small statement that appeared

1 in Mr. Phillips's proposed order, I submit, was
2 taken somewhat out of context. His whole
3 statement is, "The presumption of innocence means
4 that the accusers in this case are either mistaken
5 or untruthful. That's the position you have to
6 take as you're sitting all the way through this
7 trial, because that's what the presumption of
8 innocence means. If they're telling the truth, he
9 can't be innocent. If he's innocent, they can't
10 be telling the truth."

11 Again, so he's stating that because of
12 the presumption of innocence, the jury has to
13 approach these victims critically and reject
14 anything they say that doesn't prove beyond a
15 reasonable doubt Mr. Cartwright's guilt.

16 I submit that that was a perfectly
17 appropriate argument to make. And the mere fact
18 that the solicitor made the same statement,
19 basically, that if these victims are believed,
20 then Mr. Cartwright isn't innocent. I mean,
21 that's just the -- that was the State's theory of
22 the case and the State was going to make that
23 argument anyway.

24 So I would suggest there was neither
25 deficiency, nor prejudice, as with regard to

1 allegation 25. It should have been dismissed.

2 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Phillips?

3 MR. PHILLIPS: Yes, Your Honor. The
4 specific here was that -- his quote was, *If*
5 *they're telling the truth, then Mr. Cartwright*
6 *can't be innocent*, is I believe the quote.

7 The whole point of raising the issue,
8 although it does play in context with some of the
9 other issues that are raised, was essentially that
10 there are things that the complaining witnesses
11 could say that are true that do not go to proving
12 any of the elements of the offense for which he is
13 charged.

14 So for defense counsel in his opening to
15 say "If they're telling the truth," clearly, I
16 mean, I understand what defense counsel was trying
17 to mean in that whether specifically to the --
18 whether there's evidence to satisfy each and every
19 element. But, ultimately, that statement, in and
20 of itself, all the credibility is absolutely at
21 issue.

22 And the key to me, it's a very reckless
23 statement without him providing the additional
24 context with it. And that's why it was raised.

25 THE COURT: I'm sorry, but the additional

1 context being what?

2 MR. PHILLIPS: Again, specifically the
3 lack of evidence. And again, just because there
4 are other things that they can prove to be as true
5 of things that the girls are saying, but not
6 specifically as to there being no evidence of the
7 actual allegations themselves, I guess that's --

8 THE COURT: To me it's certainly saying,
9 You've got to believe them in whole. If they're
10 telling the truth, there's only one truth.

11 And so, I mean, you know, the first thing
12 I tell a jury, they can believe all, some, any, or
13 none. And so I don't know. That kind of --
14 that's one of the things that concerned me about
15 this is because it sets up these dueling -- I
16 mean, that's it. It sets up one or the other.

17 MR. JONES: Right.

18 THE COURT: And my -- you know, that's
19 what struck me, Attorney General, is that it sets
20 up this dynamic that they have to accept one or
21 the other. And I understand what you're doing
22 when you're finding somebody guilty, or a jury is
23 sitting there, guilty or not guilty.

24 But as it relates to the truth of a
25 particular witness, I mean, they can believe some

1 of what the witness is saying. They can believe
2 that the witness is lying about certain things.

3 And so, I don't know, that concerned me
4 about the -- just -- you know, he just -- he laid
5 it out, it's one or the other, and I think -- I
6 don't know -- that's one of the things that
7 concerned me.

8 I'll let you answer anything in rebuttal
9 to what Mr. Phillips said, sir.

10 Mr. JONES: Yes, Your Honor. And I would
11 just -- I would say, his position -- Trial
12 Counsel's position that the argument he made was
13 based on the presumption of innocence saying that
14 you have to assume that all of what they're
15 saying, that could implicate my -- that could
16 implicate my client. To the extent it implicates
17 my client is false under the presumption of
18 innocence. Or, In other words -- so, you know, to
19 the extent that he did not say, you have to find
20 that it's all false in order to find my client not
21 guilty. He simply said that, you should start
22 from the presumption that it is all false, and
23 then the State will have, you know, its
24 opportunity to prove it.

25 But that has to be how you start this

1 examination, is viewing it with a critical eye and
2 not automatically assuming any of it is true.

3 So it's a negative version of, I
4 believe -- it's the inverse of what Your Honor was
5 complaining about.

6 He's not saying, *You have to find it all*
7 *false in order to find my client innocent.* He's
8 saying, *You should not -- the State has to prove*
9 *it all true in order for you to find my client*
10 *guilty,* which I submit would -- is -- and again,
11 as we all know, jurors can find this or that
12 witness truthful or false or individual statements
13 true or false. That's their prerogative.

14 But I don't think it's an improper
15 argument for Trial Counsel to make to say that,
16 *The witnesses who are testifying against my*
17 *client, don't automatically believe anything they*
18 *say. Let the State -- the burden is on the State*
19 *to prove that everything they say that could*
20 *implicate my client is true. It's not my client's*
21 *burden to show anything that they say is false.*
22 *That just has to be your starting assumption.*

23 That's all I believe he said.

24 MR. PHILLIPS: I'll be brief, Your Honor.
25 I think we had three -- each one of us articulated

1 it a different way I think shows how, again,
2 potentially prejudicial this comment is where you
3 have three lawyers who didn't see it exactly the
4 same way.

5 And based on, again, Your Honor's
6 position that it's really -- could be almost be
7 akin to a misstatement of law in the sense that a
8 jury does have the ability under the law to
9 believe some of the testimony and disregard some
10 and believe some and not the entire testimony as a
11 whole.

12 To have all three of us kind of
13 articulate a little bit different shows the
14 confusion that would have been created in a
15 layperson juror's mind right out of the gate in
16 the opening statement.

17 THE COURT: All right. Attorney General,
18 what you got next?

19 MR. JONES: Next, I have allegation 33,
20 Trial Counsel's alleged failure to properly
21 impeach a complaining witness with a transcript of
22 the witness's prior testimony.

23 THE COURT: Yes, sir.

24 MR. JONES: So this instance occurred
25 when -- I believe the witness was Victim 2, the

1 second chronological victim. Trial Counsel --
2 again, the order doesn't specify which -- what
3 part of the trial this took place in. I'm
4 assuming -- and Mr. Phillips can correct me if I'm
5 wrong -- that this refers to when the Court --
6 when Trial Counsel was questioning Victim 2.

7 At the prior trial, Victim 2 was
8 testifying about staying at a friend's house, and
9 there was questions about whether this friend was
10 her boyfriend who was involved in drugs.

11 And then in the second trial, Trial
12 Counsel again tried to question her about whether
13 her boyfriend was involved in drugs and whether
14 she was involved in drugs.

15 At some point, he brought up a document
16 which was not identified, as far as I could tell,
17 in the record and said, "You see this document?"
18 And was -- I believe, being as charitable as
19 possible to Mr. Phillips, was trying to indicate
20 that there was some sort of inconsistency with
21 what she was testifying at that trial and whatever
22 appeared in this document, but he was unsuccessful
23 in pointing that out.

24 Again, I'll let Mr. Phillips say what
25 exactly he believed was inconsistent with that

1 victim's testimony. It was not clear to me, at
2 least from reading -- from reading Mr. Phillips's
3 proposed order or this Court's order. So if
4 nothing else, I would suggest an amendment to
5 clarify what exactly that issue was.

6 However, again, it's -- as with all these
7 allegations, it's Mr. Cartwright's burden to prove
8 that he was prejudiced by it. And without showing
9 what the inconsistency was alleged to be, the
10 State submits he hasn't met that burden.

11 So even if there was some deficiency,
12 which could be -- which I don't know see how there
13 was, if there was no actual inconsistency, then
14 there couldn't be any prejudice. Or at least none
15 was proved by the applicant.

16 I'll turn it over to Mr. Phillips and
17 I'll try to address anything he says in any
18 particular area.

19 THE COURT: Mr. Phillips?

20 MR. PHILLIPS: Thank you, Your Honor. I
21 was just reading the State's response.

22 So specifically, I think here is the
23 situation where -- unfortunately, I don't see in
24 my notes where I questioned Trial Counsel exactly
25 what he had in his hand. I believe he did say he

1 had the first trial transcript with him, but
2 didn't drill down into the specifics as to what
3 exactly in his -- what was the specifics he was
4 trying to impeach as far as that specific issue.

5 As far as not being able to identify the
6 specific failure as to the inconsistency, I don't
7 have, as the State noted, anything specific to add
8 to that. There is no that this was a direct
9 inconsistency, which clearly Trial Counsel
10 believed he had because of the way the questioning
11 occurred and obviously the document that he had.

12 And ultimately, the Court basically
13 hurries him up and says he needs to move on.

14 But unfortunately, as far as having the
15 specifics to show what his intent was as far as
16 the impeachment of an inconsistency, I don't that
17 specific information.

18 Now, again, deficient performance on the
19 failure to properly impeach in the sense that he
20 started to initiate it, that he had the -- at
21 least with the first trial transcript, that's
22 exactly what he had in his hand at the time. The
23 document that's referenced would have put him in a
24 position to properly cross-examine and impeach and
25 point out any inconsistencies in the witness's

1 testimony -- prior testimony.

2 But as the State pointed out, there's
3 nothing specific that we have that would show
4 exactly what that inconsistency was. I believe
5 that's fair to say.

6 THE COURT: All right. Attorney General,
7 anything else, sir?

8 MR. JONES: Your Honor, I would just
9 reiterate that without knowing specifically what
10 the alleged inconsistency was, the allegation
11 cannot support a finding of a grant of relief
12 under *Strickland* because there's no clear
13 establishment of prejudice or even of deficiency.

14 I mean, I grant that Trial Counsel got up
15 there, started to ask a question, and then was
16 told to move on by the Court when he didn't get
17 the response he wanted. But that on its own,
18 Your Honor, without more, there just can't be a
19 finding of ineffective assistance based on that.

20 THE COURT: What about that,
21 Mr. Phillips?

22 MR. PHILLIPS: You know, as far as, you
23 know, not having the silver bullet specifically,
24 as pointed out by the State, because we don't know
25 directly what Trial Counsel's intent was on the

1 impeachment, the actual content of the
2 inconsistency, I -- I don't have any additional
3 response, Your Honor.

4 THE COURT: All right. I may be leaning
5 toward reconsidering that matter.

6 All right. What's next, sir?

7 MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor.

8 The next allegation is allegation 34,
9 which is the Trial Counsel's failure to object and
10 move to strike the DSS caseworker Michelle Price's
11 statement. This was her statement where she
12 said -- where she said that DSS only becomes
13 involved a case --

14 THE COURT: Oh, yeah. Yeah, yeah.
15 Breaks the law, or the statute, yeah, yeah.

16 MR. JONES: *If it meets the legal*
17 *statute*, were her exact words. So -- and the
18 Court found that this language was prejudicial
19 because it lowered the State's burden of proof in
20 the eyes of the jury by suggesting the statutory
21 elements of the offense have already been proved.

22 Of course, the Trial Counsel maintained
23 he found nothing objectionable in that. And we --
24 the State would submit that even if there was some
25 deficiency, there couldn't have been prejudice

1 from just this statement.

2 The -- there has to be a reasonable
3 probability, of course, that Trial Counsel's
4 failure to object actually caused a different
5 result than what would have happened if he hadn't
6 objected.

7 The mere possibility -- Trial Counsel
8 admits that it's conceivable that the jury could
9 have misunderstood what the DSS caseworker was
10 saying as suggesting that there had been some
11 independent investigation when there hadn't been.

12 A merely conceivable possibility that the
13 jury misinterpreted some testimony is not enough
14 to find that Trial Counsel was ineffective for not
15 moving to strike it.

16 THE COURT: How do you know what weight
17 the jury put on this? I mean, a jury sitting
18 there can hear this, it makes it sound like the
19 box has been checked by a State agency. So, I
20 mean, you're basically saying that maybe the jury
21 could have conceived this having heard that,
22 right?

23 MR. JONES: Again, like anything could
24 have happened. The fact that something could have
25 happened does not mean it's reasonably likely that

1 it did happen.

2 THE COURT: On this one, short of a
3 special interrogatory, you don't know what's going
4 to happen. I mean, this one -- I mean, you've got
5 somebody working for a State agency basically
6 saying something along the lines of they're
7 complying with the statute. I don't know.

8 MR. JONES: In my --

9 THE COURT: Go ahead. I'm listening, sir.

10 MR. JONES: All right. In my motion, I
11 tried to set out that, in the alternative, if the
12 -- the jury could have been moved by the statement
13 more in favor of Mr. Cartwright because the
14 statement essentially says, we don't start an
15 investigation based on any proof of these -- of
16 these claims. We start an investigation just
17 based on whether it meets statutory criteria.

18 That's the correct way that statement
19 should have been interpreted, and we would submit
20 is the most natural way to interpret the
21 statement, and that, of course, would have been
22 beneficial to Mr. Cartwright because it would have
23 suggested that the mere fact DSS opened an
24 investigation has nothing to do with whether he
25 was actually guilty or not. It could not support

1 that inference.

2 So our position is that this statement
3 was just as likely, if not more likely, to help
4 Mr. Cartwright by dispelling what might otherwise
5 be an improper inference, that just because DSS
6 investigated him meant he had some sort of --
7 meant there was some sort of finding of guilt by
8 DSS.

9 According to this case worker's
10 testimony, that's not the case. It was based on
11 the statutory criteria only, not based on the
12 investigation. And she goes on to explain that
13 then we began interviewing the families and then
14 we began our investigation.

15 So in this case -- so that would have
16 clarified -- that would have clinched it that the
17 investigation had not taken place. There was no
18 independent evidence of this. It was just based on
19 the statutory criteria.

20 THE COURT: Okay, sir.

21 Mr. Phillips?

22 MR. PHILLIPS: Yes, Your Honor.

23 The applicant's position is that anytime you
24 have a criminal sexual conduct with a minor -- or a
25 criminal sexual conduct case, that certainly in this

1 type of context with children and DSS is involved,
2 that it is inherently prejudicial by having DSS there.
3 It's -- again, it's, in itself, almost propensity
4 evidence that's being brought in that can either help
5 bolster the State's case, or -- again, depending on
6 the facts of each case. In this case, we have the
7 quote of, "If it meets the legal statute in the State
8 of South Carolina, we take a report to benefit the
9 family.

10 In other words, what was presented to the
11 DSS worker was enough that they believed it met
12 the elements of the offense and that they were
13 going to start the full investigation.

14 Which, again, we agreed with Your Honor's
15 assessment in what we presented, that it violated
16 due process and improperly shifted the burden
17 based on the fact that you had a DSS worker, who
18 in itself is, although in a limited context, able
19 to testify in a CSC trial. There are limitations
20 to that testimony.

21 And this specific testimony not only goes
22 beyond that, adds additional to the charge itself.
23 As Your Honor pointed out, it's impossible to know
24 how the jury understood or tried to, but if you
25 just take it from the plain language, what the

1 jury heard was that the DSS case worker believed,
2 like an improper bolstering or vouching almost,
3 but it's bolstering of believing -- that they
4 believed there was sufficient evidence to initiate
5 an investigation. It met the statute.

6 They don't understand what statute is
7 being referenced or what that even means. So in
8 and of itself, Trial Counsel's failure to object
9 and move to strike is not only deficient
10 performance, but certainly highly prejudicial that
11 could deprive Mr. Cartwright of his fair -- of a
12 fair trial.

13 THE COURT: All right. Anything else,
14 Attorney General, on this one, sir?

15 MR. JONES: Your Honor, I would just rely
16 on the arguments set forth in my motion.

17 THE COURT: Yes, sir. What else?

18 MR. JONES: As to allegation 40, which is
19 Trial Counsel's failure to request a *Jackson v.*
20 *Denno* hearing to challenge the voluntariness of
21 applicant's consent to the buccal DNA swab, that,
22 I submit, fails for multiple reasons.

23 THE COURT: Okay. First of all, there's
24 is no evidence that applicant did not consent to
25 the buccal DNA swab, which could have -- again,

1 we've had the evidentiary hearing. We had the
2 opportunity to introduce some additional evidence.
3 And no evidence was introduced that a *Jackson v.*
4 *Denno* hearing or equivalent proceeding would even
5 have resulted in the suppression of this evidence.

6 Second, the Court's order does not
7 explain -- and perhaps I'm missing something --
8 Trial Counsel's stated reason for failing to
9 request as *Jackson v. Denno* hearing was that he
10 did not believe it was appropriate when it was --
11 when dealing with physical evidence rather than a
12 confession or an incriminating statement.

13 And, Your Honor, I've researched this and
14 I cannot find any precedent that suggests
15 *Jackson v. Denno* hearings apply to non-statements.

16 Again, this was the DNA evidence that was
17 later used to connect the semen found on the bed
18 sheets with Mr. Cartwright. It was not an
19 incriminating statement or a confession. So it
20 should not -- I would submit there's no reason for
21 a *Jackson v. Denno* hearing to consider the issue
22 at all, and Trial Counsel could not have been
23 deficient for failing to request something that
24 there was no precedent suggesting it would be
25 appropriate.

1 THE COURT: Right.

2 MR. JONES: Finally, at the trial
3 Mr. Cartwright admitted that the semen found on
4 the bed sheets was his. So the DNA evidence was
5 clearly harmless and could not have prejudiced him
6 even if it could have been excluded, which, again,
7 there's no indication based on precedent or any
8 other law that it would have been excluded. Or,
9 based on any evidence presented at the evidentiary
10 hearing, that it was not obtained consensually.

11 That's about all I have to say on that
12 one, Your Honor.

13 THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

14 Mr. Phillips?

15 MR. PHILLIPS: On this specific issue,
16 Your Honor, we would rest on what was presented in the
17 proposed order.

18 THE COURT: All right. Let's take ten
19 minutes.

20 MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.

21 THE COURT: It's 11:38. We'll be back on at
22 about ten to 12:00, okay?

23 MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honor.

24 MR. PHILLIPS: Thank you, Your Honor.

25 (A break was taken at 11:38 a.m. to 11:55 a.m.)

1 THE COURT: All right. Attorney General,
2 are we going to move on to allegation 43, sir?

3 MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honor.

4 THE COURT: I'm happy to hear from you,
5 sir.

6 MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor.

7 Allegation 43 is Trial Counsel's failure
8 to cross-examination the State's witnesses about
9 alleged discrepancies as to whose bedroom the bed
10 sheets were taken from.

11 First of all, the -- as with every other
12 allegation, the applicant has the burden in PCR to
13 provide proof of what these discrepancies actually
14 were. And, you know, there's a reference to
15 different photographs taken of the different
16 bedrooms. None of those were presented to the --
17 at the PCR evidentiary hearing to establish that
18 there was, in fact, a discrepancy.

19 All we have is that in one trial, it was
20 referred to as the daughter's room. And in the
21 subsequent trial, it was referred to as the son's
22 room.

23 In reality, according to the testimony of
24 the victims, it was at different times both the
25 son's room and the daughter's room. It was the

1 son's room while he was staying at the house, and
2 then the daughter claimed in her testimony that
3 she moved into it and that the abuse continued
4 while she was staying in that room.

5 So the State submits that it's not
6 material whether it's semantically identified as
7 his room versus her room. The point is, it's a
8 room in which she was staying, according to her
9 testimony, and in which she was abused, and that's
10 the room that the bed sheets were taken from that
11 had Mr. Cartwright's DNA on them.

12 So the State's position is that
13 Mr. Cartwright has not established any -- first of
14 all, the existence of any discrepancy through the
15 alleged photographs. And, second of all, the
16 existence of any prejudice from not pointing out
17 the discrepancy since it does not appear to have
18 been disputed that the bed sheets were taken from
19 a room in which Victim 3 claimed to have been
20 abused.

21 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Phillips?

22 MR. PHILLIPS: Yes, Your Honor. Just to
23 make sure I provide the proper response, just to
24 try to make sure -- I mean, the applicant's
25 position is that Trial Counsel had the duty to

1 conduct a thorough in- -- excuse me -- a thorough
2 cross-examination of these witnesses when the
3 State presented in the first trial one --
4 essentially one theory in regards to this
5 evidence, and then in the second trial elicited,
6 again, as the attorney general is pointing out,
7 there's testimony that goes that there's two
8 different times.

9 But, ultimately, the way it was presented
10 from the first trial to the second trial, the
11 applicant's position was that the
12 cross-examination was not adequate in showing,
13 again, essentially the discrepancy of the location
14 of evidence that was credible to the State.

15 And I guess as far as being specific as
16 to what was presented, again, even at the
17 evidentiary hearing, I know there was a
18 considerable amount of time on this issue, some
19 discussion, obviously, that I remember with
20 Your Honor regarding that specific -- that
21 specific --

22 THE COURT: Yes, sir.

23 (Sound interruption.)

24 THE COURT: Mr. Phillips, I'm waiting on you.

25 MR. PHILLIPS: Yes, Your Honor.

1 So, specifically, our argument as far as
2 what was presented in the proposed order, we're
3 going to certainly rely on that and how it was
4 presented going, again, as far as the
5 discussions -- actually, I have to try and
6 remember exactly what Your Honor's specific
7 comments were about this exact issue during the
8 evidentiary hearing. I think that would,
9 obviously, provide additional context as to
10 Your Honor's ultimate ruling in deciding the
11 deficient performance and prejudice in this very
12 nature.

13 But our specific position is that defense
14 counsel -- Trial Counsel had obviously the duty to
15 conduct a proper cross-examination and failed to
16 do so in pointing out the discrepancies of this
17 evidence.

18 Now, as far as having properly outlined
19 everything -- because I understand what the
20 State's position is in regards to that. I
21 certainly understand that. That's why I'm trying
22 to be very specific in how I provide my response.
23 Because I don't want to be -- unfortunately, what
24 I'm being now, generalizing everything as far as
25 what was presented, as far as what his position

1 is.

2 THE COURT: Well, exactly, Mr. Phillips.

3 MR. PHILLIPS: I know. I had to candid
4 about it. I understand what his position is. I'm
5 trying not to entirely, obviously, ignore that. I
6 want to specifically address it.

7 THE COURT: To be honest, the bed sheets
8 were important, as I recollect. But now I did not
9 recall this issue about the two-bedroom deal that
10 the attorney general just brought up. When I say
11 "just brought up," I don't mean that he just
12 dumped this on me now. It's just that I didn't --
13 I just don't remember that.

14 MR. PHILLIPS: The Attorney General's
15 Office can correct me if I'm wrong, if he has a
16 different recollection of it. But essentially, in
17 the first trial, the State presents evidence
18 regarding, again, the bedroom. And then in
19 this -- basically, in the second trial, they're
20 saying it's not the same bedroom, the difference
21 between one being the daughter versus the son --
22 in other words, that the rooms were entirely
23 different between the first trial and the second
24 trial.

25 And I think what the State's arguing is

1 that that's not what occurred.

2 Is that -- and if he clarify that and I'll
3 try to --

4 MR. JONES: Yes. The State's argument
5 is -- I mean, again, I wasn't at the first trial.
6 I've been going off the transcript. And, of
7 course, the transcript is what controls. So
8 Your Honor is entitled to rely on that.

9 But my recollection is that in the first
10 trial, the sheets were characterized as coming
11 from the daughter's room. And in the second
12 trial, they were characterized as coming from the
13 son's room.

14 The problem is that the room in which the
15 daughter claimed she was being abused, one of the
16 rooms, was what used to be son's room before he
17 moved out, and then she started sleeping in there.

18 So according to that, it could be
19 characterized either as the son's room or as the
20 daughter's room. I don't see that there's a
21 material discrepancy in characterizing it one way
22 or the other.

23 Now, maybe there might be a discrepancy
24 if there was an actual -- if we had the actual
25 photographs of the different rooms and had some

1 proof that these different photographs were shown
2 and indicated, that might establish a discrepancy.
3 I still submit it wouldn't be a material
4 discrepancy because, again, the daughter testified
5 she was being abused in both rooms.

6 However, we don't have those photographs.
7 So even if -- so we don't even need to go that
8 far. As with every other issue, it's applicant's
9 burden to provide any evidence substantiating that
10 there was an actual discrepancy that would have
11 come out on cross-examination if his attorney had
12 more vigorously cross-examined.

13 So without that proof of discrepancy, I
14 don't see how he can prevail on this issue.

15 THE COURT: All right. Anything else,
16 Mr. Phillips?

17 MR. PHILLIPS: No, Your Honor, other than
18 just that I believe the specific response from our
19 position is that Trial Counsel had the duty to try
20 to make sure he drilled down through his
21 cross-examination the fact that the State
22 presented essentially inconsistent evidence the
23 way it was presented.

24 Obviously, there's testimony saying that it
25 happened in the same bedroom, but with different

1 individuals; one being the daughter in the first
2 trial, the son being in the second. And that Trial
3 Counsel's failure to properly cross-examine to, at
4 least, extract that fact is the crux of the
5 argument.

6 THE COURT: Okay.

7 All right. Attorney General, how about
8 number 45, sir?

9 MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor. As to
10 allegation 45, that's the Trial Counsel's alleged
11 failure to object to the Trial Court's
12 interruptions of applicant's testimony.

13 The transcript of the trial indicates
14 that there were frequent cases where
15 Mr. Cartwright, on his direct examination, would
16 either go off on a tangent or attempt to testify
17 to something that someone else had told him.

18 And the Court in those -- in a few of
19 those instances, at least, admonished him to get
20 back on track or to not testify to what other
21 people were saying. I couldn't find any instances
22 in which the Court sort of went beyond that
23 limited role of just correcting this irrelevant or
24 inadmissible testimony.

25 Mr. Phillips pointed out in his proposed

1 order that there was one point where the -- after
2 that, kind of, exchange had already occurred, the
3 judge turned to -- or actually, it might have been
4 a leading question by Trial Counsel. The judge
5 said to the solicitor to object more often when
6 you hear leading questions like this.

7 Again, Your Honor, the State's position
8 is that this was all a valid exercise of the trial
9 judge's inherent power to maintain order and
10 decorum in the courtroom. The -- that includes,
11 and I've got cases cited in my motion for that,
12 the authority to admonish or rebuke or warn a
13 witness because of the witness's language or
14 conduct or to control -- in other words, control
15 the witness if the witness needs to be controlled.

16 Trial counsel admitted that
17 Mr. Cartwright was not being -- was being rather
18 uncontrollable in terms of giving these
19 non-responsive answers to the questioning or
20 trying to testify as to what someone else had told
21 him, which would be inadmissible.

22 So in order to keep the trial back on
23 track, the judge had to admonish the -- admonish
24 Mr. Cartwright several times. That might have
25 been -- that might have gone a certain distance

1 towards giving an impression of what the judge
2 thought of his testimony, but it was unavoidable.
3 I mean, it was just -- there was no -- there was
4 no other way to keep Mr. Cartwright on track. And
5 that's what I submit from -- is evident from the
6 transcript.

7 Of course, when we're reading the
8 transcript, we don't know the inflection in which
9 these admonishments were given. We don't know the
10 volume at which they were given. I would just,
11 again, submit that -- the presumption that
12 everything was proper, that the judge was not
13 acting improperly, and that Trial Counsel was not
14 inadequate for failing to object to it.

15 So, for that reason, we would submit that
16 there was no grounds for relief on this
17 allegation.

18 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Phillips?

19 MR. PHILLIPS: Thank you, Your Honor.

20 In fairness to the attorney general who
21 wasn't there for the hearing, the testimony that
22 was presented provided by Trial Counsel addressing
23 these issues explained, I think, in terms of how
24 specifically the trial judge and his demeanor
25 and --

1 THE COURT: Mr. Phillips, is this where
2 the witness got into basically describing his
3 dealings with Judge Early and went and, basically,
4 was trying to explain, for lack of better words,
5 why he did not want to object to things? Is that
6 where that came up? There was a bunch of
7 conversation about that, sir.

8 MR. PHILLIPS: That's where my
9 recollection of it occurred. Because that was
10 part of it when we were asking, you know, as far
11 as failing to object. And then, of course, it got
12 brought up again. Because you had -- we had two
13 different defense counsels in this case, and we
14 addressed the issue with both of them.

15 Initially, the first -- and both lawyers
16 said similar things about -- I think one of the --
17 I can't -- this is a paraphrase, not a direct
18 quote, you know, of Judge Early. It's just the
19 way Judge Early was. That's how he ran his
20 courtroom. You knew not to basically object any
21 further or make certain arguments or motions or
22 say certain things because of the way it would
23 come across to the jury, and how he would
24 basically treat you for the remaining portion of
25 the trial.

1 And again, none of that makes it proper.
2 And given -- just walking through that set of the
3 scenario where a jury sees a judge interjecting --
4 instead of being a neutral and detached
5 gatekeeper, but asserting himself into the trial
6 and telling the prosecutor to object more, and
7 specifically, you know, challenging or -- again,
8 no doubt judges have a responsibility to maintain
9 order and decorum.

10 However, applicant's argument is that
11 this went far beyond that, that it exceeded that
12 inherent power and it ultimately became highly
13 prejudicial in such that Trial Counsel had a duty
14 to object and to try to -- again, failure to
15 object to stop the Court from conducting this type
16 of inherently prejudicial conduct with the
17 defendant directly as well as with counsel
18 himself.

19 THE COURT: Attorney General?

20 MR. JONES: Your Honor, I would just
21 submit that there is no -- that the only
22 possible -- that any potential inference of
23 impartiality is purely speculative based on all of
24 this.

25 Again, we don't know -- first of all, the

1 judge never said or make any suggestion he didn't
2 believe Mr. Cartwright or he didn't think
3 Mr. Cartwright was innocent, or anything like
4 that. It was simply trying to keep him on track.

5 And the fact that he had to do it a bunch
6 of times and had to admonish Mr. Cartwright and
7 the solicitor to try and keep Mr. Cartwright's
8 testimony on track, that was necessitated by -- in
9 pursuance of the Court's responsibility to
10 maintain decorum in the courtroom.

11 Without further evidence that there was
12 some egregious violation of that, of the judge's
13 partiality or appearance of violation, again, we
14 submit that the record simply establishes there
15 was a breach of decorum. The Trial Court
16 corrected the breach of decorum. And that's --
17 that was within the Trial Court's authority and
18 was not objectionable.

19 THE COURT: All right. What's next,
20 Attorney General?

21 MR. JONES: Next, I believe this is the
22 last one, Your Honor, allegation 48, the failure
23 to object to the Trial Court's jury instruction
24 that the testimony of a victim need not be
25 corroborated.

1 THE COURT: Yes, sir.

2 MR. JONES: That instruction was recently
3 rejected in *State vs. Stukes*. I say recently, but
4 2016. But the point is, it was rejected after the
5 close of the case, after the end of
6 Mr. Cartwright's trial.

7 So, once again, Trial Counsel has no
8 responsibility to foresee future changes in the
9 law and object on that basis even if he could.

10 But, again, at the time of applicant's
11 trial, the instruction was expressly permitted by
12 Supreme Court precedent, and that case is
13 *State v. Rayfield*, which expressly held that
14 jurors may be instructed that a victim's testimony
15 need not be corroborated.

16 So again, Trial Counsel had no basis to
17 object on the express precedent that was available
18 to him at the time. The fact that that has later
19 been rethought is simply not enough to
20 establish defense --

21 THE COURT: I understand your argument.
22 What about that, Mr. Phillips?

23 MR. PHILLIPS: Going directly to the
24 responses, although Trial Counsel does not have to
25 be clairvoyant or have to anticipate, I think they

1 do have a reasonable duty to anticipate reasonable
2 changes in the law, challenges that -- clearly in
3 the law that are based -- that are inherently --
4 that are unconstitutional based on a review on the
5 standard or reasonableness if that's what we would
6 say, touched on many things on the law as
7 reasonableness.

8 Many lawyers back at that point were
9 challenging that statute for many years. I know
10 even myself. But under a standard of
11 reasonableness, clearly the lawyers in
12 *State v. Stukes* didn't have to be clairvoyant to
13 make the argument to challenge that instruction as
14 being unconstitutional. And they were successful
15 in doing so, and ultimately that changed the law.

16 So although the -- Trial Counsel doesn't
17 have to be clairvoyant, I think Trial Counsel has
18 a duty to have a reasonable anticipation of
19 potential changes in the law and identifying
20 things that are unconstitutional in the law in
21 making those arguments. This was
22 unconstitutional -- held later unconstitutional,
23 and a reasonable attorney would have made that
24 objection.

25 THE COURT: All right.

1 MR. JONES: Your Honor, just to rebut
2 that, I would suggest that if Your Honor adopted
3 that, that would totally abrogate the clairvoyance
4 doctrine in every case. It's very common for, you
5 know, this or that instruction or this or that
6 action of the Trial Court to, from time to time,
7 be declared unconstitutional. And it's true that
8 that is the result of enterprising attorneys who
9 raise those issues.

10 However, if we adopt Mr. Phillips's
11 version of the clairvoyance doctrine, it would
12 just impose a duty on every attorney to object
13 every time there is -- like there is any
14 conceivable argument even if it has been -- even
15 if there's been a case like this one where what
16 he's objecting to was expressly permitted by
17 binding Supreme Court precedent. We submit that
18 that's taking the doctrine much too far and
19 essentially abrogating it completely.

20 THE COURT: All right.

21 MR. JONES: Your Honor, I want to
22 apologize. I skipped right over allegation 47.
23 That's just another objection to the truth-seeking
24 language in the Court's jury instructions. This
25 time the closing jury instructions. It's very

1 similar to the earlier one, and most of the same
2 law applies.

3 THE COURT: All right. Anything else you
4 want to tell me, Attorney General?

5 MR. JONES: There were some minor issues.
6 One was in regards to Allegation 9, which was a
7 very general objection, I believe, to closing --
8 to jury instructions.

9 This Court dismissed that allegation
10 without prejudice in its order. And I would
11 submit that any allegation that's denied and
12 dismissed should be dismissed with prejudice
13 because a PCR applicant only gets one bite at the
14 apple. So...

15 THE COURT: I think that would be
16 correct, Mr. Phillips.

17 MR. PHILLIPS: Understood.

18 THE COURT: All right. That's fine.

19 Yes, sir. What else?

20 MR. JONES: The only other things are the
21 inconsistencies in, again, Your Honor's
22 disposition of Mr. Cartwright's claims of
23 ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. I
24 believe the first and second argument -- or
25 allegation alleged, Your Honor correctly, in my

1 view, denied and dismissed those.

2 But in the order, Your Honor states that
3 the -- that as discussed in Allegations 13 and 14,
4 there was no deficiency shown from either of
5 these statements of Dr. Benedetto or problems with
6 Dr. Benedetto's testimony. That's inconsistent
7 with Your Honor's actual disposition of
8 Allegations 13 and 14, which did not address the
9 prejudice. And, in fact, found that
10 Mr. Cartwright was entitled to relief based on
11 those grounds.

12 So I would suggest that if Your Honor
13 submits an amended order that that inconsistency
14 be resolved.

15 THE COURT: Mr. Phillips, let me hear
16 from you on that.

17 MR. PHILLIPS: I really specifically want
18 to make sure -- could he clarify that one time? I
19 apologize. I want to make sure I'm -- I don't
20 want to go off a tangent myself.

21 MR. JONES: Forgive me if I'm getting the
22 numbers wrong, but I believe it's ineffective of
23 appellate counsel, Allegations 1 and 2. Your
24 Honor's order states -- I'm mistaken. I'm sorry.
25 It's Allegations 2 and 3. Your Honor's order

1 states, and I quote, "As discussed in response to
2 applicant's allegation 13, the Trial Court's
3 decision to conduct Dr. Benedetto's qualification
4 in the presence of the jury was within the sound
5 discretion of the trial judge." And, therefore,
6 there could not have been -- the jury could not
7 have been improperly influenced, et cetera.

8 So that discussion does not actually
9 appear in the Court's disposition of
10 Allegation 13. It's possible that this is just a
11 clerical error where the Court copied and pasted
12 perhaps from the State's proposed order as to
13 these appellate allegations and without
14 addressing the --

15 THE COURT: Are you saying in the
16 appellate I said one thing, and on the trial I
17 said the other? There's an inconsistency of those
18 two?

19 MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honor.

20 THE COURT: I should be consistent one
21 way or the other? Is that what you're telling me,
22 sir?

23 MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honor. And I would
24 prefer it if it was consistently in favor of the
25 State, but, of course, that's up to you.

1 THE COURT: Good one. Good one.

2 All right. Mr. Phillips, what about the
3 position that he states that the order is
4 inconsistent and that, basically, if I find that
5 the appellate lawyer, for lack of better words,
6 didn't mess up, then the same type of thing and I
7 would be found to show that the trial lawyer
8 didn't mess up? Is that correct, Attorney
9 General?

10 MR. JONES: Well, specifically, I think
11 the glaring problem from our perspective is that
12 each of those allegations in the appellate section
13 expressly reference the earlier allegations and
14 say that there was no problem with it. That's the
15 inconsistency. There might be some reason to
16 distinguish the appellate performance from the
17 trial performance. That's up to Your Honor.

18 THE COURT: All right.

19 MR. JONES: But those sections there, of
20 course, are --

21 THE COURT: What about that,
22 Mr. Phillips? What about between the appellate
23 and the trial?

24 MR. PHILLIPS: We have no issue in
25 resolving the inconsistency. Now, as a whole, the

1 issues of ineffective assistance of appellate
2 counsel are not outcome determinative on
3 ineffective assistance of Trial Counsel. The way
4 they were couched, at least the allegations, were
5 in the event Trial Counsel had properly preserved
6 those issues where they would have been able to be
7 appealed.

8 Whether the issues were preserved for
9 appellate review is really kind of step one. And
10 then the next step was if they were preserved for
11 appellate review, then it was ineffective
12 assistance of counsel not to raise those issues.

13 So I certainly have no issue with the
14 State's argument as far as resolving any
15 inconsistency in the order regarding that.
16 However, the issues themselves, outside of the
17 inconsistency -- just because, again, that you
18 have ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
19 issue that directly relates to an ineffective
20 assistance of Trial Counsel issue, in and of
21 itself, does not automatically render the other
22 one improper other than to clarify any
23 inconsistency that directly cuts at, you know, at
24 the ineffective assistance of trial.

25 But the specific allegation was whether

1 if it was preserved, then the appellate counsel
2 had a duty to raise it.

3 And obviously, the standard -- the case
4 law is different for ineffective assistance of
5 appellate counsel, definitely much more latitude
6 in deciding what issues to raise than basically
7 the burden that's on Trial Counsel.

8 THE COURT: All right. What else,
9 gentlemen?

10 MR. JONES: I believe that's all from the
11 State. In fairness to Mr. Phillips, I would agree
12 broadly that it could be possible to have
13 consistent findings in the appellate section and
14 in the trial section of this order. The only I
15 would say facial inconsistency is the explicit
16 references to Allegations 13 and 14 in the
17 appellate section of the order.

18 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Phillips,
19 anything else?

20 MR. PHILLIPS: Yes, Your Honor. In
21 closing, the applicant doesn't waive any of the
22 issues raised and argued at the evidentiary
23 hearing and raised in the proposed order. I
24 wanted to preserve that for appellate review as
25 well. All the other issues that were raised, and,

1 obviously, that the Court decided differently on,
2 if it was raised in the applicant's proposed
3 order, that we're not waiving any of those issues
4 and that we stand fast, obviously, with those
5 issues.

6 The other issue that Your Honor -- one of
7 the issues that Your Honor disagreed with the
8 applicant on that -- as I noted earlier, that I
9 feel is a very strong issue related to ineffective
10 assistance of counsel is the indictment issue
11 arguing under *State v. Baker*.

12 If Your Honor gives me one moment, I'll get
13 it.

14 The argument was that the Trial Counsel
15 failed to move to quash the 28 indictments against
16 the applicant is unconstitutionally over broad and
17 vague, specifically arguing that Trial Counsel was
18 ineffective in failing to make those allegations
19 to -- or failing to make the motion to quash the
20 indictments because each indictment for the
21 alleged offenses occurred at unspecified times
22 over an entire year. The combined indictments
23 covered a total period of over 18 years. And our
24 argument was that in looking at *State v. Baker*,
25 that did occur after that case -- that specific

1 case. There's certainly case law that goes prior
2 to *State v. Baker*. But *State v. Baker* is a good
3 case to, kind of, outline the law from 2015 that
4 counsel was ineffective for failing to move to
5 quash.

6 Personally, again not waiving any of the
7 other issues, the two issues that applicant's
8 counsel believes to be very strong issues was one
9 that Your Honor agreed with, the motion for
10 severance, that Trial Counsel failed in moving to
11 sever. And then, of course, this other issue on
12 the failure to move to quash the indictments.

13 THE COURT: All right. Attorney General?

14 MR. JONES: Your Honor, just, you know,
15 Mr. Phillips had the same opportunity to file a
16 Rule 59 motion addressing that specific issue,
17 that the State had to address the other 15 issues
18 that we addressed, and is bringing it up for the
19 first time here on this motion for
20 reconsideration.

21 Well, I suppose not for the first time
22 since it was addressed earlier. But we still have
23 not had notice that this would be considered at
24 the -- at this hearing.

25 However, I would just submit that this

1 Court's order considered the *State v. Baker* issue
2 very thoroughly in its discussion of the
3 indictments and rejected that allegation and
4 denied it -- dismissed it with prejudice I believe
5 correctly, and I believe that the Court's analysis
6 was proper.

7 THE COURT: All right. Thank you-all.
8 You-all did a very thorough job of this case for
9 and against Mr. Cartwright on that. And the
10 State's done a great job. And Mr. Phillips,
11 you've done a good job. It's been interesting.
12 I've enjoyed it.

13 What I'm going to do is, I'm going to
14 probably for the next two weeks -- I'm on vacation
15 next week, but I'll be in chambers the following
16 week. I'll try to put together -- I may
17 supplement my order and just address the matters
18 that came up today in a supplement. I'll decide
19 how I'm going to deal with that. I'll work with
20 Monica and we'll come up with something. But I
21 hope to have the answer to you-all in the near
22 future. Okay?

23 MR. PHILLIPS: Yes, Your Honor.

24 MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor.

25 (End of hearing.)

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

I, SHARON G. HARDOON, Official Circuit Court Reporter, III for the State of South Carolina at Large, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, accurate and complete Transcript of Record of the proceedings had and evidence introduced in the hearing of the captioned case, relative to appeal, in General Sessions, Richard County, South Carolina.

I do further certify that I am neither kin, counsel, nor interest to any party hereto.

February 15, 2023

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Sharon G. Hardoon". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a large initial 'S'.

Sharon G. Hardoon, CSR
Official Circuit Court Reporter, II

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)

COUNTY OF AIKEN)

Harold Cartwright,)

Applicant,)

v.)

State of South Carolina,)

Respondent.)

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

Case No.: 2019CP0201582

AMENDED
ORDER GRANTING APPLICANT
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF AIKEN
I, Robert J. White, Clerk of Court, do hereby certify that the foregoing constitutes a true and correct copy of the original document which have been filed in my office.

JUL 27 2022

Robert J. White
C.C.P. & G.S., Aiken County, S.C.
Charla Griffioen Plouffe
Deputy Clerk

This matter comes before the Court on Harold Cartwright's application for Post-Conviction Relief (PCR). Applicant appeared before the Court on February 3, 2022, for a virtual hearing on the above-captioned PCR action. Dayne Phillips represent Applicant, and Assistant Attorney General Michael Neubauer represented Respondent. Chief Appellate Defender Robert Dudek, Public Defenders David Hayes and Michael Routzong, and Applicant testified at the evidentiary hearing. However, Mr. Routzong was unable to complete his testimony during the February 3 hearing due to technical difficulties with Applicant's internet connection. The hearing was continued to the following day but ended prematurely due to technical issues with the court reporter's internet connection.

On February 25, 2022, Mr. Routzong finished his testimony. At the close of evidence and hearing arguments from counsel, the PCR Court requested that the parties submit proposed orders for his review and consideration. After careful consideration the Court granted the Applicant's PCR application requesting a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; S.C. Const. art. I, §§ 3 and 14; S.C. Code § 17-27-20(A)(1), (4), and

(6). In June 2022, the State filed a Rule 59(e) SCRCP, motion to alter or amend the

FILED July 27 2022

Robert J. White CJP
C.C.P. & G.S.

Charla Griffioen Plouffe
Deputy Clerk

Court's order granting post-conviction relief to Harold Cartwright. On June 24th, 2022 the Court has a hearing on the matter via Webex. After considering the arguments posed by the parties and weighing the evidence presented at the hearings, this Court respectfully denies the State's Motion to Alter or Amend, however the Court has made several clarifications and modifications to its previous order.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Aiken County Grand Jury indicted Applicant for eight (8) counts of criminal sexual conduct with a minor, first degree; sixteen (16) counts of lewd act with a minor; two counts (2) criminal sexual conduct with a minor, second degree; one (1) count of criminal sexual conduct, first degree; and one (1) count of criminal sexual conduct, third degree.

On April 15, 2013, Applicant proceeded to trial before the Honorable Doyet A. Early, III, and a jury. Michael Routzong and David Hayes represented Applicant, and Assistant Solicitor Kevin Molony prosecuted the case on behalf of the State. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all charges on April 18, 2013. The Trial Court sentenced Applicant to *concurrent* sentences of thirty (30) years imprisonment for criminal sexual conduct in the first degree conviction and criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the first degree conviction; twenty (20) years imprisonment for the criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the second degree conviction; and fifteen (15) years imprisonment for the lewd act upon a child convictions. However, the Trial Court imposed a *consecutive* sentence of ten (10) years for the criminal sexual conduct in the third degree conviction.

On September 30, 2015, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed Applicant's convictions and sentences. *State v. Harold Cartwright, III*, 2015-UP-466 (S.C. Ct. App.

filed September 30, 2015). Chief Appellate Defender Robert M. Dudek and Appellate Defender Susan Hackett represented Applicant, and Assistant Attorney General David Spencer represented the State on Direct Appeal.

On September 26, 2018, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed Applicant's convictions and sentences. *State v. Harold Cartwright, III*, Op. No. 27842 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed September 26, 2018).

On June 26, 2019, Applicant filed an application requesting post-conviction relief (PCR), alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Applicant also filed a motion for leave to obtain a discovery on September 9, 2019. Respondent filed a Return and Motion for More Definite Statement on October 3, 2019. The Honorable Courtney Clyburn Pope issued an order authorizing discovery on December 19, 2019.

On June 29, 2020, Applicant filed an amended application requesting PCR. Applicant also filed a redacted amended application on July 9, 2020:

Trial Counsel denied Applicant's right to effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 3 and 14 of the South Carolina Constitution. See S.C. Code § 17-27-20(A)(1), (4), and (6). Specifically, Trial Counsel's unreasonably deficient performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness "under prevailing professional norms" and prejudiced Applicant because there is a reasonable probability that, but for Trial Counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishing the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims); see also *Cherry v. State*, 300 S.C. 115, 386 S.E.2d 624 (1989) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, "counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result". *Butler v. State*, 286 S.C. 441, 442, 334 S.E.2d 813, 814 (1985) (quoting *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 692).

Appellate Counsel denied Applicant's right to effective

assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 3 and 14 of the South Carolina Constitution. Specifically, Appellate Counsel's unreasonably deficient performance prejudiced Applicant because there is a reasonable probability that, but for Appellate Counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); *Evitts v. Lucey*, 469 U.S. 387 (1985); *Simpkins v. State*, 303 S.C. 364, 401 S.E.2d 142 (1991).

Specifically, Applicant alleged the following acts or omissions of ineffective assistance of Trial Counsel:

- (1) Trial Counsel failed to conduct a reasonable investigation and to develop all available, relevant, and admissible or mitigating evidence in preparation of Applicant's defense. Specifically, Trial Counsel failed interview critical witnesses who could have added to the credibility of Applicant's case and challenged the credibility of the State's witnesses when it was reasonable and necessary to do so in preparation for trial. See *Wiggins v. Smith*, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); *Lounds v. State*, 380 S.C. 454, 670 S.E.2d 646 (2008); *McKnight v. State*, 378 S.C. 33, 46, 661 S.E.2d 354, 360 (2008); *Von Dohlen v. State*, 360 S.C. 598, 607, 602 S.E.2d 738, 743 (2004); *Hicks v. State*, 314 S.C. 280, 443 S.E.2d 907 (1994); *Reeves v. State*, 415 S.C. 366, 782 S.E.2d 747 (Ct. App. 2015).
- (2) Trial Counsel failed to hire expert witnesses to conduct an independent review of the forensic evidence presented by the State and to testify in rebuttal of the State's evidence and arguments when it was reasonable and necessary to do so in preparation for Applicant's second trial. See *McKnight v. State*, 378 S.C. 33, 46, 661 S.E.2d 354, 360 (2008); *Von Dohlen v. State*, 360 S.C. 598, 607, 602 S.E.2d 738, 743 (2004); *Reeves v. State*, 415 S.C. 366, 782 S.E.2d 747 (Ct. App. 2015). Specifically, the electronic evidence seized by the police and DNA evidence.
- (3) Trial Counsel failed to adequately investigate Victim 1's involvement in a drug investigation by the police (that prompted the unrelated statement implicating Applicant of sexual abuse) and any possible deals/offers that were possibly provided to her by the State.
- (4) Trial Counsel failed to adequately investigate and compare the timeline of when Applicant lived in the home, and the timing of the allegations.
- (5) Trial Counsel failed to obtain and review with Applicant all discovery in preparation for trial.

- (6) Trial Counsel failed to properly cross-examine and impeach the State's witnesses based on their inconsistent testimony from the first trial in the second trial; including the witnesses' prior inconsistent statements to the police.
- (7) Trial Counsel failed to adequately prepare for trial by not interviewing witnesses who could have testified regarding Applicant's good character and reputation when it was reasonable and necessary to present this evidence at trial and request a jury instruction on good character and reputation. See *State v. Harrison*, 343 S.C. 165, 539 S.E.2d 71 (Ct. App. 2000); Cf. *Stalk v. State*, 383 S.C. 559, 681 S.E.2d 592 (2009).
- (8) Trial Counsel provided erroneous legal advice regarding Applicant decision to testify that was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases for not explaining all the risks involved in testifying as witness.
- (9) Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review the Trial Court's jury instructions that improperly shifted the burden of proof and misstated the law.
- (10) Trial Counsel's failed to object and preserve for appellate review inadmissible and unduly prejudicial evidence during Applicant's trial.
- (11) Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review the State's improper closing argument that was a misstatement of the evidence and unduly prejudicial.
- (12) Trial Counsel failed to move to quash the twenty-eight (28) indictments against Applicant as unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. Specifically, where each indictment for the alleged offenses occurred at unspecified times over an entire year, and the combined indictments covered a total period of over eighteen (18) years. See *State v. Baker*, 411 S.C. 583, 769 S.E.2d 860 (2015).
- (13) Trial Counsel failed to object to the Trial Court's application of an incorrect legal standard for qualifying the State's expert witness in the field of child sexual abuse dynamics where the Court (1) limited Counsel to *voir dire* of the witness regarding "qualifications," (2) qualified the witness as an expert in the given field, and (3) only permitted questioning of the witness on the reliability and validity of field itself—after the witness was deemed "expert" by the Court and the State's direct examination (all of which was held in the presence of the jury rather than in an *in camera* hearing). See Rule 702, SCRE; *State v. Council*, 335 S.C. 1, 515 S.E.2d 508 (1999); *State v. Tapp*, 398 S.C. 376, 728 S.E.2d 468 (2012); *State v. White*, 398 S.C. 376, 728

S.E.2d 468 (2009); and *Watson v. Ford*, 389 S.C. 434, 699 S.E.2d 169 (2010).

- (14) Trial Counsel failed to object and move to strike the expert witness's testimony that went beyond the scope of her expertise. Specifically, the witness's admitted area expertise focused on the perspective of a child experiencing abuse, yet the witness improperly testified as a psychological "profiler" of the accused when the Prosecutor asked whether it was typical for *an abuser* to have a favorite age to sexually abuse, and the witness answered in the affirmative. See Rules 701 and 702, SCORE; *State v. Ellis*, 345 S.C. 175, 547 S.E.2d 490 (2001).
- (15) Trial Counsel erroneously stipulated to a witness's medical condition of stage 4 cancer before the second trial and failed to object to the admission of her prior testimony from the first trial, where at the time of the second trial the witness was still alive, still in Aiken County (hospice), still had the same cancer as when she testified at the previous trial, and Counsel's stipulation provided the foundation needed by the State to even seek admission of her prior testimony. See Rule 804, SCORE; *Dodd v. Berlinsky*, 344 S.C. 172, 543 S.E.2d 237 (Ct. App. 2001).
- (16) Trial Counsel failed to investigate and obtain all the necessary documentation from SLED regarding its policies, procedures, qualifications, laboratory bench notes, and overall testing of the purported semen stain from a fitted bedsheet for review by an independent DNA expert, and in cross-examination; failed to hire an expert in DNA analysis to independently review the documentation; and failed to demand independent testing by his DNA expert of clippings from the fitted bedsheet with the purported semen stain. See *McKnight v. State*, 378 S.C. 33, 661 S.E.2d 354 (2008), *Lounds v. State*, 380 S.C. 454, 460, 670 S.C. 646, 649 (2008); *Sneed v. Smith*, 670 F.2d 1348, 1353 (4th Cir. 1982) ("To meet this standard, an attorney must at a minimum, 'conduct appropriate investigations, both factual and legal, to determine if matters of defense can be developed, and to allow himself enough time for reflection and preparation for trial.'") (quoting *Coles v. Peyton*, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir. 1968)).
- (17) Trial Counsel failed to move for the Trial Court to conduct follow-up *voir dire* questioning of a potential juror who indicated he knew one of the investigating officers but was not asked how he knew the officer, whether he could determine the facts fairly to the Applicant, and the potential juror's number.
- (18) Trial Counsel failed to move to quash the jury panel pursuant to *Baston* where the State utilized its statutory strikes to strike two white females from the petit jury, yet where the State sat eleven white jurors, six of whom were female. See U.S. Const. amends. V, VI, XIV; *State v. Adams*, 322 S.C. 114,

470 S.E.2d 366 (1996); *State v. Schuler*, 344 S.C. 604, 545 S.E.2d 805 (2001); *State v. Rogers*, 405 S.C. 520, 748 S.E.2d 247 (Ct. App. 2013).

- (19) Trial Counsel failed to move to sequester any of the witnesses for trial where the State repeatedly referred to prior witness testimony when questioning later witnesses. See Rule 615, SCRE.
- (20) Trial Counsel by failed to object and move for individual *voir dire* when the Trial Court indicated to Counsel during the *voir dire* process that several jurors approached him regarding "similar types of behavior." Notably, Trial Counsel failed to preserve for appellate review the issue and any resulting prejudice because none of those conversations between the Trial Court and jurors was placed on the record, and none of those juror's numbers were placed on the record with whom the judge spoke. See U.S. Const. amends. V, VI, XIV.
- (21) Trial Counsel failed to properly argue and preserve for appellate review that juror number 94's conversation with the Trial Court be placed on the record where, during jury selection, juror number 94 was called up and stated that she had a relative that was a victim "as the court knows." Notably, Counsel sought for this juror to be stricken for cause, which the Court denied, resulting in Counsel being forced to use a strike on this juror. See U.S. Const. amends. V, VI, XIV.
- (22) Trial Counsel failed to move to sever Applicant's charges where the three (3) primary complaining witnesses alleged conduct over three (3) distinct and large periods of time, did not arise out of a single chain of circumstances, and are not proved by the same evidence. See *State v. Middleton*, 288 S.C. 21, 339 S.E.2d 692 (1986); *State v. Smith*, 322 S.C. 107, 470 S.E.2d 364 (1996).
- (23) Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review the Trial Court's initial instructions to the jury that were tantamount to instructions to search for the truth, violative of Due Process, and burden shifting. Specifically, the Trial Court told the jury prior to opening statements, "you twelve collectively act as one, decide what the true facts are...", and "you will be in a position then to render a true and just verdict, an verdict that speaks the truth of the case", and "It's your civic responsibility to pay close attention and decide whose telling the truth." See *State v. Aleksey*, 343 S.C. 20, 538 S.E.2d 248 (2000), *State v. Daniels*, 401 S.C. 251, 737 S.E.2d 473 (2012).
- (24) Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review the State's improper opening statement when it invited the jury to utilize the unconstitutionally overbroad and vague indictments in its deliberations by saying, "These are the dates when all this is said and done", and "It's

important to see how we grouped these indictments together.”

- (25) Trial Counsel improperly argued in his open statement that “[i]f they’re telling the truth, [the Applicant] can’t be innocent...,” and where the State used that same quote against the defense in its close, saying, “As Mr. Routzong [Trial Counsel] said in his opening statement, if you believe the victims, the Applicant’s guilty,” and where use of such a statement could not be considered a reasonable trial strategy.
- (26) Trial Counsel failed to object and move to strike under Rules 401 and 403, SCRE, when the State delved unopposed into victim impact on direct examination of the complaining witness (Victim 2), “Now, sitting here today, telling these events to these 13 strangers, how are you doing?” to which the witness responded, “I would rather be at home with my children, but it’s something that needs to be done; I’m glad I finally get to tell what happened.” See *State v. Livingston*, 327 S.C. 17, 488 S.E.2d 313 (1997).
- (27) Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review the Prosecutor’s improper bolstering when Melinda Lively (mother of Victim 2) answered in the affirmative to the State’s question, “Did you just hear Victim 2 testify?” and later indicated that she did not contact police because of threats from the Applicant “as [Victim 2] stated.”
- (28) Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review unfairly prejudicial hearsay that went beyond the scope of time and place, and constituted improper bolstering, when the Prosecutor asked Melinda Lively on redirect examination, “In 1999, had you learned that your daughter, [Victim 2], had been abused *by the Defendant?*” to which the witness replied, Yes, when she was four.” See *State v. Barrett*, 299 S.C. 485, 386 S.E.2d 242 (1989); *Smith v. State*, 386 S.C. 562, 689 S.E.2d 629 (2010); Rule 801(d)(1)(D).
- (29) Trial Counsel failed to move to strike hearsay testimony of a complaining witness (Victim 1) when the witness said, “My mom told me to lie then...,” and Counsel’s hearsay objection was sustained by the Trial Court. See *State v. Bealin*, 201 S.C. 490, 23 S.E.2d 746 (1943).
- (30) Trial Counsel failed to move to strike leading testimony of a complaining witness (Victim 1) when Counsel’s objection to specific and detailed alleged conduct of the Applicant was sustained by the Trial Court. See *State v. Bealin*, 201 S.C. 490, 23 S.E.2d 746 (1943).
- (31) Trial Counsel failed to properly argue and preserve for appellate review Counsel’s objection, when during the testimony of a complaining witness about alleged threats and demands for oral sex, Counsel objected, “Your

honor, I'm having a real hard time hearing her testimony," and the Court ordered her to speak up.

- (32) Trial Counsel provided ineffective assistance by reaffirming the complaining witness's version of events regarding her initial recantation of the allegations by asking her, "[Y]ou're saying it was your mom, Buffy Cartwright that ultimately convinced you to recant?", and Victim 1 responded, "Yes." This highly prejudicial questioning reaffirmed the State's case against Applicant and cannot be deemed a reasonable trial strategy. See U.S. Const. amends. V, VI, XIV.
- (33) Trial Counsel failed to adequately prepare for trial where he attempted to impeach a complaining witness through use of prior testimony at the first trial, yet it appears failed to have a copy of the transcript to use in the present trial, and where the Trial Court ordered Counsel to move on to another line of questioning.
- (34) Trial Counsel failed to object and move to strike the DSS case worker's unfairly prejudicial testimony that DSS only becomes involved in a case "[i]f it meets the legal statute in the State of South Carolina, we take it as a report and go interview family". This improper testimony violates Due Process and lowers the State's burden in the eyes of the jury as it appears to indicate the statutory law for such cases has already been satisfied. See *State v. Ellis*, 345 S.C. 175, 547 S.E.2d 490 (2001); Rules 701 and 702, SCRE.
- (35) Trial Counsel failed to object and move to strike unfairly prejudicial hearsay that went beyond the scope of time and place, and to improperly bolstering and hearsay within hearsay, when the DSS agent testified that she "received a call from her supervisor saying we received a report of sexual abuse concerning [Victim 1] and her step-father Harold Cartwright." See *State v. Barrett*, 299 S.C. 485, 386 S.E.2d 242 (1989); *Smith v. State*, 386 S.C. 562, 689 S.E.2d 629 (2010); Rule 801(d)(1)(D).
- (36) Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review the issue of burden shifting and violation of Due Process when the Trial Court's initial instructions to the jury indicated that Trial Counsel would provide an opening statement and that opening statements were "what lawyers contend the facts will be, the issues will be what they're asking you to look for to keep tuned into *what they intend to prove*, what the case is about." See U.S. Const. amends. V, VI, XIV.
- (37) Trial Counsel provided ineffective assistance by attempting to impeach the testimony of Victim 3's disclosures of abuse, yet Counsel's questions reinforced the State's theory that this witness previously disclosed the abuse to several people. Notably, the State immediately capitalized on Counsel's error on redirect by stating, "Mr. Routzong [Trial Counsel] talked

a whole lot about you telling people about what happened. So lets talk about that.” This unfairly prejudicial line of questioning reaffirmed the State’s case against Applicant and cannot be deemed a reasonable trial strategy. See U.S. Const. amends. V, VI, XIV.

- (38) Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review the admission of Buffy [REDACTED] prior testimony (ex-wife of Applicant, and mother of Victim 1 and Victim 3) where the witness was still alive, purportedly had the same disease, and no foundation was made by the State showing any reasonable efforts to have her present to testify at the second trial. Furthermore, the transcript was not simply published to the jury; rather, it was acted out by a person on the witness stand as Buffy, the prosecutor for direct questions, and Counsel for cross, wherein inflections and mannerisms would likely be as the prosecution saw fit rather than as it actually occurred at the previous trial.
- (39) Trial Counsel failed to object during the “acting-out” of Buffy [REDACTED] prior testimony as unfairly prejudicial hearsay that went beyond the scope of time and place, and to improper bolstering where the Prosecutor asked if she and the police found out that Applicant had been molesting Victim 1, to which she replied in the affirmative. See *State v. Barrett*, 299 S.C. 485, 386 S.E.2d 242 (1989); *Smith v. State*, 386 S.C. 562, 689 S.E.2d 629 (2010); Rule 801(d)(1)(D).
- (40) Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review pursuant to Due Process and *Jackson v. Denno* to the admission of Applicant’s consent to search form (State Exhibit #9), the buccal swab obtained by the State from the search (State Exhibit #10), and the DNA testing derived from the same where no *Denno* hearing was requested or held regarding the voluntariness of the Applicant’s waiver, which if involuntarily made would render the subsequent buccal swab and DNA testing fruits of the poisonous tree. See U.S. Const. amends. IV; V, VI, XIV; *Jackson v. Denno*, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
- (41) Trial Counsel failed to object and move to strike the State’s redirect examination of its DNA expert as it went beyond the scope of cross-examination. Specifically, the State immediately asked whether DNA can be destroyed, what effect washing and drying sheets would have on DNA when Counsel never inquired about the destruction of DNA, and where the State alleged through other witnesses that Applicant sought to destroy his DNA on the sheets by having them laundered.
- (42) Trial Counsel failed to object and move to strike the State’s redirect examination of the jailer who purportedly saw Applicant hanging in his cell as beyond the scope of cross-examination where the State failed to have the witness identify Applicant during direct examination, and where Counsel

asked no questions regarding Applicant's identification on cross-examination, and where on redirect examination, the State immediately asked whether the witness saw the man that was hanging in his cell present in the courtroom.

- (43) Trial Counsel provided ineffective assistance where Applicant stated *in camera* at the end of the State's case that in the first trial, the State proffered evidence and pictures of the sheets that tested for DNA were taken from Victim 3's actual room, yet in this trial, the State elicited testimony based on different pictures that the same sheets were taken from a different bedroom (victim's brother's old bedroom), where Counsel failed to cross-examine the State's witnesses regarding this discrepancy (the location of evidence critical to the State's case, and it is unknown whether Trial Counsel obtained a complete copy of the prior trial transcript before the second trial. However, if true, then failing to examine this area cannot be a valid trial strategy).
- (44) Trial Counsel provided ineffective assistance where Counsel's theory for why Victim 3 lied was that Applicant discovered pornographic pictures of her on the internet and publicly said so, where State witnesses repeatedly indicated Victim 3 was not in any such pictures, and where Counsel failed to proffer any such photographs into evidence to support his theory.
- (45) Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review the Trial Court repeatedly stopping Applicant's testimony before the jury *sua sponte*, admonishing Applicant, and instructing the Prosecutor to object more; thus, usurping the role of the prosecutor and giving the improper appearance of partiality before the jury. Counsel's abandonment of Applicant to the Court's relentless unfairly prejudicial comments and actions cannot be deemed a valid trial strategy. See U.S. Const. amends. V, VI, XIV; Fundamental Due Process (right to be tried before a fair and detached tribunal).
- (46) Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review the Trial Court's closing instruction to the jury as a charge on the facts (as improperly infecting the jury with the Court's opinion on the case): "You've got a version of facts by some witnesses and a complete different version of the facts by other witnesses."
- (47) Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review the Trial Court's closing instructions to the jury that were tantamount to instructions to search for the truth and violative of Due Process: "It is your duty to determine what the true facts are and what the truth is and who is telling the truth..." and "You're to make your decision based solely on what you determine the true facts are in this case." See *State v. Aleksey*, 343 S.C. 20, 538 S.E.2d 248 (2000), *State v. Daniels*, 401 S.C. 251, 737 S.E.2d 473 (2012).

- (48) Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review the Trial Court's jury instruction that, "pursuant to our state law, the testimony of the victim in these cases need not be corroborated." See *State v. Stukes*, 416 S.C. 493, 787 S.E.2d 480 (2016).
- (49) Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review the Prosecutor's improper comments during closing argument. Specifically, the Prosecutor's comments were calculated to arouse the jurors' passions or prejudices and vouched and bolstered the credibility of the State's witnesses. See *State v. Northcutt*, 372 S.C. 207, 222, 641 S.E.2d 873, 881 (2007) (internal citation and quotation omitted); *State v. Rudd*, 355 S.C. 543, 549, 586 S.E.2d 153, 156 (Ct. App. 2003) (citation omitted); See *State v. Copeland*, 321 S.C. 318, 324, 468 S.E.2d 620, 624 (1996) (finding a solicitor's closing argument must be carefully tailored so as not to appeal to the personal biases of the jury); *State v. Shuler*, 344 S.C. 604, 545 S.E.2d 805, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 977, 122 S.Ct. 404 (2001) ("[A] solicitor: cannot vouch for the credibility of a witness by expressing or implying his personal opinion concerning a witness' truthfulness Improper vouching occurs when the prosecution places the government's prestige behind a witness by making explicit personal assurances of a witness' veracity, or where a prosecutor implicitly vouches for a witness' veracity by indicating information not presented to the jury supports the testimony[.]") (citations omitted); *Gilchrist v. State*, 350 S.C. 221, 227, 565 S.E.2d 281, 285 (2002) ("[b]ecause a jury must make its own assessment on the credibility of witnesses, it is inappropriate for the State to assure the jury of a government witness's credibility.") (quotation omitted); *Matthews v. State*, 350 S.C. 272, 565 S.E.2d 766 (2002) (finding trial counsel's decision not to object to prosecutor's improper vouching for the credibility of the State's witnesses because counsel did not want the judge to scold him in front of the jury or give the prosecution more time to make their closing was not valid, even though the record reflected the judge did admonish counsel for wrongfully objecting during the closing and did grant additional time to compensate for the interruption.).
- (50) Trial Counsel failed to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing by not adequately preparing for trial and having an unreasonable trial strategy. See *United States v. Cronin*, 466 U.S. 648 (1984); *Roseboro v. State*, 317 S.C. 292, 294, 454 S.E.2d 312, 313 (1995) (finding "counsel must articulate a valid reason for employing a certain strategy to avoid a finding of ineffectiveness, and where counsel articulates a strategy, it is measured under an objective standard of reasonableness"); *Stacy v. Solem*, 801 F.2d 1048, 1051 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding that "labeling counsel's actions as "trial strategy" does not automatically immunize an attorney's performance from sixth amendment challenges.").
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Furthermore, Applicant also alleged the following acts or omissions of ineffective

assistance of Appellate Counsel:

- (1) Appellate Counsel failed to file a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the United States Supreme Court on the novel issue in South Carolina of whether evidence of an attempted suicide is admissible as evidence of guilt.
- (2) In the event Trial Counsel properly preserved the issue in his pre-trial motions and objections to the Trial Court immediately prior to the witness's testimony, then Appellate Counsel failed to raise and argue the issue of the Trial Court's application of an incorrect legal standard for qualifying the State's expert witness in the field of child sexual abuse dynamics where the court (1) limited Counsel to *voir dire* of the witness regarding "qualifications," (2) qualified the witness as an expert in the given field, and (3) only permitted questioning of the witness about the reliability and validity of field itself after the witness was deemed "expert" by the court and after the State's direct examination—all of which was held in the presence of the jury rather than *in camera*? See Rule 702, SCORE; *State v. Council*, 335 S.C. 1, 515 S.E.2d 508 (1999); *State v. Tapp*, 398 S.C. 376, 728 S.E.2d 468 (2012); *State v. White*, 398 S.C. 376, 728 S.E.2d 468 (2009); and *Watson v. Ford*, 389 S.C. 434, 699 S.E.2d 169 (2010). See also *Staubes v. Folly Beach*, 339 S.C. 406, 529 S.E.2d 543(2000); and *State v. James*, 362 S.C. 557, 608 S.E.2d 455 (Ct. App. 2004).
- (3) In the event Trial Counsel properly preserved the issue in his contemporaneous objection ("leading") to the Trial Court, then Appellate Counsel provided failed to raise and argue the issue of whether the expert witness's testimony went beyond the scope of her expertise. Specifically, the witness's admitted area expertise focused on the perspective of a child experiencing abuse, yet the witness improperly testified as a psychological "profiler" of the accused when the Prosecutor asked whether it was typical for an abuser to have a favorite age to sexually abuse, and the witness answered in the affirmative. See Rules 701and 702, SCORE; *State v. Ellis*, 345 S.C. 175, 547 S.E.2d 490 (2001)
- (4) Appellate Counsel failed to raise and argue Trial Counsel's objection where the Trial Court refused to ask Defense Questions 1 and 3 during *voir dire*, where Question 1: "Have you, any member of your family, or friend been impacted in anyway by Sexual Crime or Sexual Assault or Child Molestation?" and Question 3: "Does any member of the jury panel believe that anyone charged with crimes involving Sexual Molestation of a child is more likely guilty than not?" Notably, the questions sought by Counsel would have elicited the prejudicial bias to disqualify jurors who answer in the affirmative, and thus, depriving Applicant of a fair trial if allowed on the jury panel.
- (5) Appellate Counsel failed to raise and argue Applicant's motion for directed

verdict of acquittal where the motion was timely raised and ruled upon by the Trial Court. See *In re Winship*, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068 (1970); *State v. Brown*, 360 S.C. 581, 602 S.E.2d 392 (2004).

EVIDENTIARY HEARING

At the evidentiary hearing, Applicant testified that his first trial ended in a mistrial due to a hung jury. Applicant also testified that he originally had private counsel during the first trial but that his original lawyer was subsequently relieved as counsel prior to the second trial. Applicant further testified that his second lawyer and lead counsel, Mr. Routzong, did not review all the photographs with him prior to trial.

Applicant testified that he told Mr. Routzong regarding the following character witnesses: Sammy Morton, Uncle Larry Britt, and his ex-bosses. Applicant also testified that he provided a timeline to Mr. Routzong of when he lived in the home. Applicant further testified that he informed Mr. Routzong of [REDACTED] involvement in a drug investigation. Notably, Applicant testified that the testimony related to where critical evidence was collected by police changed from the first trial (in daughter's bedroom) and the second trial (in son's bedroom), and that the identities of the females in the pornographic picture that he found on the internet depicted his daughter and her friends.

Chief Appellate Defender Robert Dudek testified regarding his experience as an appellate defender. Mr. Dudek also testified that the prosecution's use of Applicant's attempted suicide as evidence of guilt was a novel issue in South Carolina. Mr. Dudek further testified that based on his research there was a jurisdictional split. Mr. Dudek maintained that he ultimately decided not to file a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Supreme Court because he did not believe this was a federal issue. As to the remaining issues raised by Applicant regarding ineffective assistance of Appellate Counsel, Mr. Dudek maintained that he only raised meritorious issues that were preserved for appellate review.

Public Defender David Hayes testified that his role as co-counsel was limited to the State's expert witness, Alicia Benedetto. Specifically, Mr. Hayes admitted that he did not request an *in camera* hearing or move to proffer his challenge of the witness's testimony despite that the Trial Court had already qualified the witness as an expert and only permitted questioning of the witness on the reliability and validity of the field itself.

Public Defender Michael Routzong maintained that he met with Applicant for hours and reviewed the discovery with him. Mr. Routzong stated that he does not remember whether he reviewed all the photographs with Applicant or the names of any specific witnesses to interview. Mr. Routzong indicated that he discussed trial strategy with Applicant, including the defense strategy of attacking the credibility of the State's witnesses. Mr. Routzong testified that Applicant embarrassed his daughter by going on the news alleging that she and her friends were posting nude pictures on the internet. Notably, Mr. Routzong testified that he did not remember Applicant's computer being seized.

Mr. Routzong testified that Applicant's first trial was in November of 2012 and the second trial occurred a few months later in 2013. Specifically, he testified that he was appointed on March 5, 2013, and the second trial began on April 15, 2013. Mr. Routzong acknowledged that he did not request documentation regarding the [REDACTED] alleged involvement in an unrelated drug investigation, or whether there were any

possible deals provide by the police or Prosecutor's office. Mr. Routzong further acknowledged that he did not consult with an expert witness regarding any DNA or digital evidence.

Mr. Routzong maintained that he believed Applicant's timeline of when he lived in the home was too remote to use as a defense. Mr. Routzong admitted that he did not have any specific notes regarding when he received the discovery or his review of the discovery with Applicant. Mr. Routzong stated that he did not recall or have any notes regarding potential character witnesses to testify on Applicant's behalf or his discussion explaining to Applicant the risks of testifying at trial.

Mr. Routzong admitted that he did not request or file a supplemental motion for discovery regarding the DNA evidence that was in the State's possession. Mr. Routzong testified that he did not recall when several jurors noted "similar types of behavior" when addressing the judge during *voir dire* and that he did not know bench conferences were not transcribed. Mr. Routzong also admitted that he had no notes regarding juror number 94's conversation with the Trial Court (particularly when he moved to have the juror struck for cause but was forced to use a peremptory strike on the juror). Mr. Routzong further submitted that he did not believe a *Batson* issue was appropriate in this case.

Mr. Routzong explained that he did not move to sequester the witnesses because they had already testified in the first trial (despite his strategy to attack each witness's credibility). Mr. Routzong claimed that he did not believe the indictments were overbroad or vague. Notably, Mr. Routzong testified that he had no strategic reason for not moving for severance of the charges and doesn't remember considering to sever the charges.

Mr. Routzong testified that he did not believe the admission of Applicant's consent

to search form and buccal swab obtain by the State constituted a statement and was therefore not a *Jackson v. Denno* issue. Mr. Routzong did not believe the Trial Court's initial instructions to the jury constituted burden shifting. Mr. Routzong also did not believe that the State's opening statement was prejudicial when the Prosecutor argued that the dates on the indictments were true.

Mr. Routzong admitted that he had not subpoenaed Buffy [REDACTED] prior to his stipulation of reading her prior testimony in the record. Mr. Routzong claimed that he did not believe it was improper bolstering or objectionable for the State to have the victim's mother acknowledge her daughter's prior testimony and then confirm what the daughter said was true. Mr. Routzong also claimed that he had no strategic reason for objecting when the Prosecutor referenced alleged prior abuse. Mr. Routzong stated that he had no strategic reason for not moving to strike an improper hearsay statement and other sustained objections by Trial Counsel.

Mr. Routzong acknowledged that he had never heard of a defense attorney helping recreate the testimony of a state's witness. Mr. Routzong testified that, in hindsight, he would not have participated in the recreated testimony. Mr. Routzong admitted that he had no strategic reason and should have objected to Buff [REDACTED] prior testimony that went beyond the scope of time and place and constituted improper bolstering when the Prosecutor asked if the witness and police found out about Applicant allegedly molesting [REDACTED].

Mr. Routzong noted that he should have conducted a more thorough cross-examination based on the DSS investigation. Mr. Routzong again noted he had no strategic reason for failing to object to hearsay that went beyond the scope of time and place, constituted

improperly bolstering, and hearsay within hearsay regarding the DSS Agent's testimony about receiving a call from her supervisor. Mr. Routzong also maintained that he thought he opened the door when the State's DNA expert went beyond the scope of cross-examination on redirect regarding the potential destruction of DNA evidence caused by washing and drying sheets.

Mr. Routzong stated he thought that he had referenced Applicant's name during cross-examination of the jailer, James Hettich, who conducted an in-court identification of Applicant. Mr. Routzong testified that he does not believe that the pornographic picture Applicant alleged he found on the internet depicting Victim 3 and her friends was relevant or helpful to the defense. Mr. Routzong admitted that Judge Early would make faces and make it seem to the jury as if the lawyer is not prepared but claimed he could not remember the judge's exact demeanor during this trial. Mr. Routzong further testified that he had no strategic reason for not objecting to the Trial Court's instructions to the jury regarding his comments, "It is your duty to determine what the true facts are and what the truth is and who is telling the truth..." and "You're to make your decision based solely on what you determine the true facts are in this case."

LAW

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI. In a PCR action, Applicant bears the burden of proving the allegations in his application by a preponderance of the evidence. *Butler v. State*, 286 S.C. 441, 442, 334 S.E.2d 813, 814 (1985); Rule 71.1(e), SCRPC. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a Petitioner must satisfy the two-prong test set forth in *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishing the

standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims). "First, an [Petitioner] must show that counsel's performance was deficient. Under this prong, [t]he proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." *Cherry v. State*, 300 S.C. 115, 386 S.E.2d 624 (1989) (internal citations omitted). "The second prong of the *Strickland* test requires a showing that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant to the extent that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." *Id.* at 118, 386 S.E.2d at 625 (internal citations omitted). Therefore, a Petitioner must prove that "counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result" when seeking relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel. *Butler v. State*, 286 S.C. 441, 442, 334 S.E.2d 813, 814 (1985) (quoting *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 692).

In a PCR action, "[t]he burden of proof is on the Petitioner to prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence." *Frasier v. State*, 351 S.C. 385, 389, 570 S.E.2d 172, 174 (2002) (citing Rule 71.1(e), SCRCP). Strategic "[d]ecisions made [by counsel] in ignorance of relevant, available information cannot be characterized as strategic." *Weik v. State*, 409 S.C. 214, 236, 761 S.E.2d 757, 768 (2014). "Ordinarily, the existence of 'overwhelming evidence' does not automatically preclude a finding of prejudice." *Smalls v. State*, 422 S.C. 174, 189, 810 S.E.2d 836, 844 (2018). Notably, "for the evidence to be 'overwhelming' such that it categorically precludes a finding of prejudice . . . the evidence must include something conclusive, such as a confession, DNA evidence demonstrating guilt, or a combination of physical and corroborating evidence so strong

that the *Strickland* standard of 'a reasonable probability . . . the factfinder would have had

a reasonable doubt' cannot possibly be met." *Id.* 422 S.C. at 191, 810 S.E.2d at 845.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This Court viewed the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing, observed the witnesses at the hearing, assessed their credibility, and weighed the testimony accordingly based on the evidence and facts of the case. This Court also reviewed the Clerk of Court records regarding the Applicant's convictions and sentences, the trial transcript, the applications for post-conviction relief, and the legal arguments made by the lawyers. Therefore, the relevant findings of fact and conclusions of law are set forth below as required by Section 17-27-80 of the South Carolina Code of Laws. The Court shall address each of these allegations individually.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL

Allegation One: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to conduct a reasonable investigation, develop mitigating evidence, and interview critical witnesses to add to the credibility of the Applicant's case.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to interview critical witnesses who could have added to the credibility of the applicant's case and challenged the credibility of the State's witnesses when it was reasonable and necessary to do so while preparing for trial.

(See *Wiggins v. Smith*, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); *Lounds v. State*, 380 S.C. 454, 670 S.E.2d

646 (2008); *McKnight v. State*, 378 S.C. 33, 46, 661 S.E.2d 354, 360 (2008); *Von Dohlen v. State*, 360 S.C. 598, 607, 602 S.E.2d 738, 743 (2004); *Hicks v. State*, 314 S.C. 280, 443 S.E.2d 907 (1994); *Reeves v. State*, 415 S.C. 366, 782 S.E.2d 747 (Ct. App. 2015).)

The Court finds these allegations to be without merit. The testimony provided to the Court during the extensive hearing included references to potentially mitigating evidence or evidence that could reveal a potential bias of a State's witness. See, e.g., *Martin v. State*, 427 S.C. 450, 455, 832 S.E.2d 277, 279–80 (2019) (holding a PCR applicant who claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call certain witnesses must produce those witnesses or their testimony at the PCR hearing); *Taylor v. State*, 258 S.C. 369, 378, 188 S.E.2d 850, 854 (1972) (holding a PCR applicant's allegation that his trial counsel failed to adequately investigate his case was unsupported where the applicant failed to point out any beneficial evidence which could have been discovered by further investigation).

However this allegation does not explain with particularity what the witnesses may have said to add to the credibility of the Applicant or challenge the credibility of the State's witnesses. Additionally, no such witnesses were presented during the hearing for the Court's consideration. Therefore the Applicant has not presented enough information for the Court to determine that the failure to interview and present such witnesses likely prejudiced the Applicant. Therefore this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Two: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to hire an expert witness to conduct an independent review of the forensic evidence and provide rebuttal testimony.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to hire an expert witness to review the

forensic evidence presented by the State and rebut the State's arguments and evidence, specifically the electronic evidence and DNA evidence. See *McKnight v. State*, 378 S.C. 33, 46, 661 S.E.2d 354, 360 (2008); *Von Dohlen v. State*, 360 S.C. 598, 607, 602 S.E.2d 738, 743 (2004); *Reeves v. State*, 415 S.C. 366, 782 S.E.2d 747 (Ct. App. 2015).

This Court finds these allegations to be without merit. Applicant did not present any expert testimony at the PCR hearing; therefore, any finding of prejudice would be merely speculative. See, e.g., *Dempsey v. State* 363 S.C. 365, 370, 610 S.E.2d 812, 815 (2005) (holding a PCR applicant failed to show prejudice from his Trial Counsel's failure to hire an expert because he failed to have an expert testify at his PCR hearing), abrogated on other grounds by *Smalls v. State*, 422 S.C. 174, 810 S.E.2d 836 (2018). Nor did Applicant make any attempt to show how reviewing SLED's documentation regarding its DNA testing of the bedsheet sample could have led Trial Counsel to discover evidence that would benefit the Applicant's case. See *Taylor*, 258 S.C. at 378, 188 S.E.2d at 854. In fact, Applicant admitted the semen found on the bedsheet was his, explaining that his then-wife had masturbated him on his son's bed. Since Applicant did not dispute the State's identification of the semen as his, Trial Counsel had no reason to hire an expert to rebut the State's DNA analysis. Finally, Applicant has not identified the "electronic evidence seized by the police" that he claims could have been rebutted by an expert witness. As Trial Counsel testified before this Court, the State did not rely on any electronic evidence; the heart of the State's case was the testimony of Applicant's children. Accordingly, the Court finds Trial Counsel was not ineffective as to Allegation two. Therefore, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Three: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to investigate a Victim's potential deal with the State.

The Applicant alleges that trial counsel failed to investigate a Victim's involvement in a drug investigation which could have resulted in a deal from the State and may have prompted a statement implicating the Applicant of sexual abuse.

This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. At the PCR hearing, the Applicant failed to show there was any beneficial evidence that could have been discovered if Trial Counsel had further inquired into the Victim involvement in a drug investigation. See *Taylor*, 258 S.C. at 378, 188 S.E.2d at 854. In addition, Applicant's suggestion that one of the Victims was offered a deal by the State is not supported by any evidence presented at the PCR hearing. This Court will not find prejudice based on mere speculation that a more searching inquiry into the Victim's past would have been beneficial to Applicant's case. See, e.g., *Martin*, 427 S.C. at 455, 832 S.E.2d at 280 (holding an applicant's "mere speculation" as to what a witness's testimony would have been cannot, by itself, support a finding of prejudice). Therefore, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Four: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to investigate the timeline of the allegations.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to investigate and compare the timing of the allegations and the timeline of when the Applicant lived in the home.

At the PCR hearing, Applicant testified that he provided Trial Counsel with a timeline of when he was not living in the home, claiming he occasionally spent a few

7

weeks working in Atlanta. However, Applicant has not adequately explained how any purported periods of absence from the home would have been inconsistent with the victims' disclosures of abuse occurring at uncertain times over many years. Trial Counsel testified he believed the timeline was not an effective alibi defense because the alleged abuse occurred so often over such an extended period that Applicant's occasional absence from the home made no difference. The Applicant to show how this information would have been beneficial and the decision to not present the information does not raise the level of deficient performance and representation by Trial Counsel. Therefore the allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Five: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to review all discovery with the Applicant.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to obtain and review all discovery with him in preparation for trial. Counsel. Applicant claims this was due in part to the amount of time that Counsel had to prepare for the second trial, which was approximately one month. Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to review all the photographs with him prior to trial.

This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. Trial Counsel testified he spent hours going over discovery with Applicant. Without presenting further proof of Trial Counsel's alleged failure to review all the discovery with him, Applicant has failed to overcome the strong presumption that Trial Counsel rendered adequate assistance. See *Butler*, 286 S.C. at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814. In addition, Applicant has not presented any

new evidence or defenses that could have been discovered by Trial Counsel's further

review of the discovery. *Harris v. State*, 377 S.C. 66, 75-76, 659 S.E.2d 140, 145-46 (2008) (citing *Jackson v. State*, 329 S.C. 345, 353-54, 495 S.E.2d 768, 772 (1998)), abrogated on other grounds by *Smalls*, 422 S.C. 174, 810 S.E.2d 836. Furthermore, an Applicant must also show how the new evidence or defenses would have resulted in a different outcome. *Id.* (citing *David v. State*, 326 S.C. 283, 288, 486 S.E.2d 747, 749 (1997); *Skeen v. State*, 325 S.C. 210, 214, 481 S.E.2d 129, 132 (1997)). Mere speculation as to how the alleged lack of preparation prejudiced an Applicant is not sufficient to support a grant of relief. *Id.*, 377 S.C. at 75, 659 S.E.2d at 145 (citing *Glover v. State*, 318 S.C. 496, 498, 458 S.E.2d 538, 540 (1995)). Therefore this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Six: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to cross-examine and impeach witnesses.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to properly cross-examine and impeach the State's witnesses. Specifically, Counsel alleges that Counsel failed to address witnesses' inconsistent testimony from the first trial that ended in a mistrial.

This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. Applicant has not explained what prior inconsistent statements Trial Counsel should have used to impeach the State's witnesses. Without alleging specifically what Trial Counsel should have done to more effectively cross-examine and impeach the State's witnesses, Applicant has failed to overcome the strong presumption of adequate assistance or to prove the result of his trial would likely have been different. See *Butler*, 286 S.C. at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814; *Harrington*, 562 U.S. at 112. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

Allegation Seven: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to adequately interview witnesses and put forth witnesses to testify to the Applicant's character.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to adequately prepare for trial. Specifically, the Applicant alleges that Counsel did not interview witnesses who could have testified regarding Applicant's good character and reputation when it was reasonable and necessary to present this evidence at trial and request a jury instruction on good character and reputation. See *State v. Harrison*, 343 S.C. 165, 539 S.E.2d 71 (Ct. App. 2000); Cf. *Stalk v. State*, 383 S.C. 559, 681 S.E.2d 592 (2009).

This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. Although Applicant named Sammy Morton, Larry Britt, and his ex-bosses as potential character witnesses, he failed to present any of them or offer any of their testimony at the PCR hearing. Failure to present purportedly favorable witnesses or evidence at the evidentiary hearing precludes a finding of prejudice. See, e.g., *Martin*, 427 S.C. at 455, 832 S.E.2d at 279–80; *Taylor*, 258 S.C. at 378, 188 S.E.2d at 854. In addition, Trial Counsel testified he was wary of calling character and reputation witnesses because putting Applicant's character at issue would have opened the door for the State to introduce Applicant's prior convictions. The Court finds Trial Counsel articulated a valid strategic reason for not inquiring further into Applicant's character at trial. See *Underwood*, 309 S.C. at 562, 425 S.E.2d at 22. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Eight: Trial Counsel's alleged erroneous legal advice regarding the Applicant's decision to testify.

Applicant alleges Trial Counsel provided erroneous legal advice regarding Applicant's decision to testify, which was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Specifically, Applicant alleges Counsel failed to explain all the risks involved in testifying as witness.

This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. Trial Counsel admitted he could not recall advising Applicant specifically of the risks involved in testifying; however, he testified that he always explains those risks to his clients, that Applicant would have known about cross-examination after watching the rest of the trial, and that the trial judge always informed defendants of their rights before they testified. In addition, Trial Counsel recalled Applicant wanted to testify, and Trial Counsel believed it would be valuable to have Applicant stand up and tell the jury he was innocent. The Court finds Applicant has not proved Trial Counsel failed to properly advise him concerning testifying in his own defense by a preponderance of the evidence. See *Butler*, 286 S.C. at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814; Rule 71.1(e), *SCRCP*. Furthermore, Applicant has not explained how he was prejudiced; Applicant never claimed that, but for Trial Counsel's alleged failure to properly advise him, he would not have chosen to testify. Therefore, Applicant has failed to show that, but for Trial Counsel's alleged errors, the result of his proceeding likely would have been different. See *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Nine: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to object to jury instructions.

Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review the Trial Court's jury instructions that improperly shifted the burden of proof and misstated the law.

This allegation raises the general issue of purportedly improper jury instructions but lacks any specificity as to what language the Applicant alleges with improper, and thus fails to state what language Trial Counsel failed to object to during trial. Thus the Applicant fails to show deficient performance and prejudice on behalf of Trial Counsel. Therefore this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Ten: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to object to evidence.

Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel's failed to object and preserve for appellate review inadmissible and unduly prejudicial evidence during Applicant's trial. This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. This Allegation does not explain what "inadmissible and unduly prejudicial evidence" Applicant believes Trial Counsel should have objected to. Nor did Applicant clarify this allegation at the evidentiary hearing. To meet his burden, Applicant must assert facts, not mere conclusions. See *Land*, 274 S.C. at 246, 262 S.E.2d at 737. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Eleven: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to object to the State's closing argument.

Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review the State's improper closing argument that was a misstatement of the evidence and unduly prejudicial.

This Allegation fails to specify which comments the Applicant contends were improper and the Applicant did not clarify the allegation during the evidentiary hearing. Since Applicant has failed to identify with particularity the State's remarks to which he claims Trial Counsel should have objected, this Court finds Applicant has failed to meet his burden of proving those allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. See *Land*, 274 S.C. at 246, 262 S.E.2d at 737. Therefore this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Twelve: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to move to quash the indictments.

Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to move to quash the twenty-eight (28) indictments against Applicant as unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. Specifically, where each indictment for the alleged offenses occurred at unspecified times over an entire year, and the combined indictments covered a total period of over eighteen (18) years. See *State v. Baker*, 411 S.C. 583, 769 S.E.2d 860 (2015).

This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. The threshold for an indictment to be valid is not high. *State v. Lewis*, 434 S.C. 158, 173, 863 S.E.2d 1, 9 (2021) (citing *United States v. Bates*, 96 F.3d 964, 970 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Indictments need not exhaustively describe the facts surrounding a crime's commission nor provide lengthy

explanations of the elements of the offense.”). A court must examine the sufficiency of an indictment with a practical eye in view of the surrounding circumstances. *Id.* at 172, 863 S.E.2d at 8. In this case, the indictments each covered one-year time periods and adequately put the Applicant on notice of the charges he was facing and the time period with which the State claimed the incidents took place. See *State v. Tumbleston*, 376 S.C. 90, 101–02, 654 S.E.2d 849, 855 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding indictments that alleged acts of sexual abuse occurring “between 2001 and June 2004” were valid due to the stealth and repetitive nature of the alleged conduct and the fact that the victim was a young child who could not remember exact dates and times).

Applicant argues *State v. Baker*, 411 S.C. 583, 769 S.E.2d 860 (2015) compels a different result. In that case, Baker was initially indicted for committing lewd acts upon a minor during three specific summers; two weeks before trial, however, the State amended the indictments to allege the lewd acts occurred “between June 1, 1998 and September 1, 2004.” *Id.* at 586–87, 769 S.E.2d at 862. The South Carolina Supreme Court held the amended indictments were unconstitutionally overbroad, noting Baker had spent a year preparing an alibi defense and suddenly had only two weeks to prepare a new defense to the greatly expanded period alleged in the new indictments. *Id.* at 590–92, 769 S.E.2d at 864–65. Applicant alleges the Baker holding necessitates finding the indictments in his case unconstitutional.

This Court finds the facts of Baker are significantly different from the facts of this case. Applicant’s indictments have not been amended, and Applicant’s defense was based on attacking the victims’ credibility, not on an alibi. In addition, each of Applicant’s indictments alleged offenses occurring within a one-year period, a much more specific

time frame than the six-year period alleged in each of Baker's indictments. Finally, the Baker Court suggested that the indictments would have been sufficient if limited to just the summer months during those six years—a total of eighteen months per indictment, which would still have been broader than the twelve months alleged in each indictment against Applicant. *Id.* at 592 n.5, 769 S.E.2d at 865 n.5.

Viewing all the circumstances “with a practical eye,” this Court finds the indictments were sufficiently certain and particular to put Applicant on notice of the charges against him and, therefore, were not constitutionally defective. See *Lewis*, 434 S.C. at 172, 863 S.E.2d at 8 (holding the primary purpose of an indictment includes putting the defendant on notice of the elements of the offense and allowing him to decide whether to stand trial or plead guilty). Finally, Trial Counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that he did not move to quash the indictments because he did not view them as objectionable. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Thirteen: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to object to the legal standard used for qualifying the State's expert witness.

Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to object to the Trial Court's application of an incorrect legal standard for qualifying the State's expert witness in the field of child sexual abuse dynamics where the Court (1) limited Counsel to voir dire of the witness regarding “qualifications,” (2) qualified the witness as an expert in the given field, and (3) only permitted questioning of the witness on the reliability and validity of field itself—after the witness was deemed “expert” by the Court and the State's direct examination (all of which was held in the presence of the jury rather than in an in camera hearing). See Rule 702,

SCRE; *State v. Council*, 335 S.C. 1, 515 S.E.2d 508 (1999); *State v. Tapp*, 398 S.C. 376, 728 S.E.2d 468 (2012); *State v. White*, 398 S.C. 376, 728 S.E.2d 468 (2009); and *Watson v. Ford*, 389 S.C. 434, 699 S.E.2d 169 (2010).

The Court finds that Trial Counsel's failure to object to the standard used to qualify the State's expert witness, and the fact that this circumstances described above occurred in the presence of the jury amounted to deficient performance by Trial Counsel.

Allegation Fourteen: Trial Court's alleged failure to object and move to strike part of the testimony of the State's expert witness.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to object and move to strike the expert witness's testimony that went beyond the scope of her expertise. Specifically, the witness's admitted area expertise focused on the perspective of a child experiencing abuse, yet the witness improperly testified as a psychological "profiler" of the accused when the Prosecutor asked whether it was typical for an abuser to have a favorite age to sexually abuse, and the witness answered in the affirmative. See Rules 701 and 702, *SCRE*; *State v. Ellis*, 345 S.C. 175, 547 S.E.2d 490 (2001).

The Court finds that Trial Counsel's failure to object and move to strike the expert witness's testimony amounted to deficient performance by Trial Counsel. Dr. Benedetto's testimony that abusers are often interested in victims of a particular age went beyond the scope of her expertise, which was limited to the perspective of child victims. Although Trial Counsel objected to this line of questioning as "leading," he did not object on the ground that it exceeded the scope of Dr. Benedetto's expertise.

Allegation Fifteen: Trial Court's allegedly erroneous stipulation and failure to object to testimony.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel erroneously stipulated to a witness, Buffy [REDACTED] medical condition of stage 4 cancer before the second trial and failed to object to the admission of her prior testimony from the first trial, where at the time of the second trial the witness was still alive, still in Aiken County (hospice), still had the same cancer as when she testified at the previous trial, and Counsel's stipulation provided the foundation needed by the State to even seek admission of her prior testimony. See Rule 804, SCRE; *Dodd v. Berlinsky*, 344 S.C. 172, 543 S.E.2d 237 (Ct. App. 2001).

This Court finds these allegations to be without merit. The second trial was conducted approximately six months after the first trial, during which time [REDACTED] stage 4 lung cancer appears to have advanced to the point that she was taken off all treatments but palliative care and pain management. It is not likely the trial court would have ordered [REDACTED] to appear in that condition, even if Trial Counsel had not stipulated that she was medically unavailable. See Rule 804(a)(4), SCRE. In addition, Trial Counsel testified he thought [REDACTED] illness would make her a very sympathetic witness for the State. Because Trial Counsel articulated a valid strategic reason for not seeking [REDACTED] presence this Court finds Applicant has not proved Trial Counsel ineffective as to this allegation. See *Underwood*, 309 S.C. at 562, 425 S.E.2d at 22; *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625. Therefore this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Sixteen: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to hire a DNA expert.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to investigate and obtain all the necessary documentation from SLED regarding its policies, procedures, qualifications, laboratory bench notes, and overall testing of the purported semen stain from a fitted bedsheet for review by an independent DNA expert, and in cross-examination; failed to hire an expert in DNA analysis to independently review the documentation; and failed to demand independent testing by his DNA expert of clippings from the fitted bedsheet with the purported semen stain. See *McKnight v. State*, 378 S.C. 33, 661 S.E.2d 354 (2008), *Lounds v. State*, 380 S.C. 454, 460, 670 S.C. 646, 649 (2008); *Sneed v. Smith*, 670 F.2d 1348, 1353 (4th Cir. 1982) ("To meet this standard, an attorney must at a minimum, 'conduct appropriate investigations, both factual and legal, to determine if matters of defense can be developed, and to allow himself enough time for reflection and preparation for trial.'") (quoting *Coles v. Peyton*, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir. 1968)).

This Court finds these allegations to be without merit. Applicant did not present any expert testimony at the PCR hearing; therefore, any finding of prejudice would be merely speculative. See, e.g., *Dempsey v. State* 363 S.C. 365, 370, 610 S.E.2d 812, 815 (2005) (holding a PCR applicant failed to show prejudice from his Trial Counsel's failure to hire an expert because he failed to have an expert testify at his PCR hearing), abrogated on other grounds by *Smalls v. State*, 422 S.C. 174, 810 S.E.2d 836 (2018). Nor did Applicant make any attempt to show how reviewing SLED's documentation regarding its DNA testing of the bedsheet sample could have led Trial Counsel to discover evidence that would benefit his case. See *Taylor*, 258 S.C. at 378, 188 S.E.2d at 854.

Thus, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Seventeen: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to request further voir dire of a specific potential juror.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to move for the Trial Court to conduct follow-up voir dire questioning of a potential juror who indicated he knew one of the investigating officers but was not asked how he knew the officer, whether he could determine the facts fairly to the Applicant, and the potential juror's number.

This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. At the PCR hearing, Trial Counsel was questioned about a juror who knew a member of the public defender's office, but no evidence was presented that the juror knew one of the investigating officers. Trial Counsel testified he had no worries about that juror's impartiality because the juror stated in the transcript that he could be fair and impartial. In addition, Trial Counsel believed it might be beneficial to have a juror who knew someone in the public defender's office, which was a valid strategic reason for failing to object to the juror. See *Underwood*, 309 S.C. at 562, 425 S.E.2d at 22. The Court finds Applicant has not met his burden to show that Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to move for additional voir dire of that juror. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Eighteen: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to make a Batson motion.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to move to quash the jury panel pursuant to *Batson* where the State utilized its statutory strikes to strike two white females from the petit jury, yet where the State sat eleven white jurors, six of whom were female. See *U.S. Const. amends. V, VI, XIV*; *State v. Adams*, 322 S.C. 114, 470 S.E.2d 366 (1996); *State v. Schuler*, 344 S.C. 604, 545 S.E.2d 805 (2001); *State v. Rogers*, 405 S.C. 520, 748

S.E.2d 247 (Ct. App. 2013).

This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. *Batson* held that the purposeful exclusion of jurors on racial grounds violates a defendant's right to equal protection and that a "pattern" of peremptory strikes against potential jurors of the defendant's race "might give rise to an inference of discrimination." *Batson*, 476 U.S. at 96–97. In this case, however, Applicant admits that, despite striking two white jurors, the State ultimately sat eleven white jurors. This is unlike *Batson*, in which the prosecutor struck all jurors of the defendant's race from the venire. *Id.* at 83. The Court finds the composition of the jury in this case is not consistent with a discriminatory pattern of striking jurors of Applicant's race. Trial Counsel had no reason to infer, from only two strikes out of numerous white jurors, that the State was employing its peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Nineteen: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to sequester witnesses.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to move to sequester any of the witnesses for trial where the State repeatedly referred to prior witness testimony when questioning later witnesses. See Rule 615, *SCRE*.

All the witnesses had participated in the prior trial but counsel could not tell the Court if the witnesses had the opportunity to hear each other's testimony during the first trial. Trial Counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that, because the witnesses were already familiar with the testimony from the previous trial, he believed sequestration would have achieved nothing. However, the Court believes that Trial Counsel was deficient in

failing to sequester the witnesses during the second trial. Although these witnesses had testified in the first trial, sequestration during the second trial would have ensured that the witnesses did not have the ability to hear other witnesses, especially, in a trial where the Defense's strategy was to attack the credibility of the State's witnesses.

Allegation Twenty: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to object during voir dire and move for further voir dire.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel by failed to object requesting a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. See *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; S.C. Const. art. I, §§ 3 and 14; S.C. Code § 17-27-20(A)(1), (4), and (6).

object and move for individual voir dire when the Trial Court indicated to Counsel during the voir dire process that several jurors approached him regarding "similar types of behavior." Notably, Trial Counsel failed to preserve for appellate review the issue and any resulting prejudice because none of those conversations between the Trial Court and jurors was placed on the record, and none of those juror's numbers were placed on the record with whom the judge spoke. See *U.S. Const. amends. V, VI, XIV*.

Trial Counsel stated during the PCR hearing that having unrecorded conversations during voir dire was not his general practice and he would have asked for the conversations to be on the record if he had been made aware. The Court believes it is the clear responsibility of Trial Counsel to ensure that all aspects of the trial on record for appellate review and it would be obvious if these portions of the trial went undocumented by the court reporter. The Court believes that Trial Counsel was deficient for failing to

ensure that conversations regarding juror fairness and impartiality were on the record to preserve the issue for appellate review.

Allegation Twenty One: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to preserve a juror's conversation with the Court.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to properly argue and preserve for appellate review that juror number 94's conversation with the Trial Court be placed on the record where, during jury selection, juror number 94 was called up and stated that she had a relative that was a victim "as the court knows." Notably, Counsel sought for this juror to be stricken for cause, which the Court denied, resulting in Counsel being forced to use a strike on this juror. See *U.S. Const. amends.* V, VI, XIV.

Trial Counsel admitted juror number 94 was struck using a peremptory challenge after the trial court denied the motion to strike her for cause. Trial Counsel testified he did not use up all of his peremptory strikes, because only nine jurors were struck in total, and he had ten strikes. However, Trial Counsel was deficient for failing to have these conversations on record, especially when Counsel moved to have a juror stricken for cause and had to strategically use one of his preemptory strikes on this juror.

Allegation Twenty Two: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to sever the Applicant charges.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to move to sever Applicant's charges where the three (3) primary complaining witnesses alleged conduct over three (3) distinct and large periods of time, did not arise out of a single chain of circumstances,

and are not proved by the same evidence. See *State v. Middleton*, 288 S.C. 21, 339 S.E.2d 692 (1986); *State v. Smith*, 322 S.C. 107, 470 S.E.2d 364 (1996).

The Court finds that Trial Counsel was deficient for failing to sever the charges. The Applicant's charges involved three separate victims over an extended period of time. Although at the evidentiary hearing, Trial Counsel testified that he was afraid multiple trials could result in a longer total term of imprisonment, the State's case was strengthened with the amount of victims presented to the jury at one time, especially when the credibility of the victims was a central issue of the Defense's case. The charges did not arise out of a single chain of circumstances and were not proved by the same evidence, however the State's case was potentially improperly bolstered by the testimony of these Victims together coupled with the State's expert witness commenting that the offenders typically seek out victims in a particular age range.

Allegation Twenty Three: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to object to the Court's preliminary instructions to the jury.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review the Trial Court's initial instructions to the jury that were tantamount to instructions to search for the truth, violative of Due Process, and burden shifting. Specifically, the Trial Court told the jury prior to opening statements, "you twelve collectively act as one, decide what the true facts are...", and "you will be in a position then to render a true and just verdict, an verdict that speaks the truth of the case", and "It's your civic responsibility to pay close attention and decide whose telling the truth." See *State v. Aleksey*, 343 S.C. 20, 538 S.E.2d 248 (2000), *State v. Daniels*, 401 S.C. 251, 737 S.E.2d 473 (2012).

Trial Counsel was deficient for failing to object to this language regarding “true” and “just” verdicts. At the time of this trial the South Carolina Supreme Court issued clear language in *Daniels*, that any reference to the word “true” must be removed from the Court’s comments to the jury.

Allegation Twenty Four: Trial Counsel’s alleged failure to object to the State’s opening statement.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review the State’s improper opening statement when it invited the jury to utilize the unconstitutionally overbroad and vague indictments in its deliberations by saying, “These are the dates when all this is said and done”, and “It’s important to see how we grouped these indictments together.”

, this Court finds there were no grounds for Trial Counsel to object to the State’s reference to the indictments during its opening statement. The indictments each alleged the offenses occurred within a one-year period, dated based on the age of the victims; the State simply mentioned that fact in its opening statement to explain why the indictments were dated in that manner. Applicant has not explained how he was prejudiced by the State’s brief and innocuous reference to the dates on the indictments. Even if the State’s explanation of the indictments’ dates was somehow improper, any error would have been cured when the trial court correctly charged the jury that the indictments were not evidence and that nothing should be inferred from the mere fact Applicant was indicted. See, e.g., *State v. Brown* 274 S.C. 48, 51, 260 S.E.2d 719, 721 (1979) (holding a trial court’s “unfortunate” reference to the grand jury’s returning a true

bill was cured by the court's subsequent instruction that the grand jury proceedings were irrelevant and the State had the burden to prove the defendant guilty). The Court finds Applicant has failed to prove Trial Counsel's assistance was ineffective. Therefore this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Twenty Five: Trial Counsel's alleged improper argument during opening statements.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel improperly argued in his opening statement that "[i]f they're telling the truth, [the Applicant] can't be innocent..." and where the State used that same quote against the defense in its close, saying, "As Mr. Routzong [Trial Counsel] said in his opening statement, if you believe the victims, the Applicant's guilty," and where use of such a statement could not be considered a reasonable trial strategy.

Trial Counsel was deficient for the comments made to the jury and could not articulate any strategy for these comments.

Allegation Twenty Six: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to object and strike victim impact testimony.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to object and move to strike under Rules 401 and 403, SCRE, when the State delved unopposed into victim impact on direct examination of the complaining witness (Victim), "Now, sitting here today, telling these events to these 13 strangers, how are you doing?" to which the witness responded, "I would rather be at home with my children, but it's something that needs to be done; I'm glad I finally get to tell what happened." See *State v. Livingston*, 327 S.C. 17, 488 S.E.2d

313 (1997).

This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. Applicant cites *State v. Livingston*, 327 S.C. 17, 488 S.E.2d 313 (1997), in support of his position. In that case, which involved a DUI car crash resulting in death, the prosecution introduced “poignant” testimony that the crash victim was recently married and photographs depicting the victim and her husband. *Id.* at 19, 488 S.E.2d at 314. The Supreme Court held the evidence was irrelevant, highly inflammatory, and likely affected the outcome of the trial because the other evidence of guilt was inconclusive. *Id.* at 20, 488 S.E.2d at 314. In this case, however, the State’s brief inquiry into how the Victim was doing, though irrelevant, was not, by itself, likely to arouse the sympathy or prejudice of the jury. Furthermore, the Victim’s response to the State’s question—that she “would rather be home with [her] children, but it’s something that needs to be done”—was not “highly inflammatory” victim impact evidence like the evidence at issue in *Livingston*. This Court finds Applicant was not prejudiced by the State’s brief inquiry or the Victim’s response. See *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Twenty Seven: Trial Counsel’s alleged failure to objection to bolstering.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review the Prosecutor’s improper bolstering when Melinda Lively (mother of Victim) answered in the affirmative to the State’s question, “Did you just hear [the other Victim] testify?” and later indicated that she did not contact police because of threats from the Applicant “as [the other Victim] stated.”

This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. Improper bolstering occurs when a witness conveys to the jury that the witness believes the victim. See, e.g., *Briggs v. State*, 421 S.C. 316, 324, 806 S.E.2d 713, 717 (2017). Here, however, Lively never claimed to believe the Victim; she merely corroborated the Victim's account of Applicant's threatening behavior. There was, therefore, no ground for Trial Counsel to object to improper bolstering. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Twenty Eight: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to object to hearsay and bolstering.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review unfairly prejudicial hearsay that went beyond the scope of time and place, and constituted improper bolstering, when the Prosecutor asked Melinda Lively on redirect examination, "In 1999, had you learned that your daughter, had been abused by the Defendant?" to which the witness replied, Yes, when she was four." See *State v. Barrett*, 299 S.C. 485, 386 S.E.2d 242 (1989); *Smith v. State*, 386 S.C. 562, 689 S.E.2d 629 (2010); Rule 801(d)(1)(D).

This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. All Lively said was that (1) the Victim did disclose she had been abused by Applicant, and (2) the Victim's alleged the abuse occurred when she was four. The Victim's age when the abuse occurred is clearly relevant to the "time of the assault" and is, therefore, within the scope of time and place. In addition, Rule 801(d)(1)(B), SCRE, allows the admission of prior consistent statements by a testifying declarant when the declarant is charged with fabricating her testimony; in the trial in this case, Applicant accused the Victim of fabricating abuse allegations against

him in 2011 because she bore a grudge. Therefore, the evidence of the Victim's prior statement would have been admissible even if Trial Counsel had successfully argued it went beyond the time and place of the assault, so Applicant was not prejudiced by Trial Counsel's failure to make that objection. See *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Twenty Nine: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to strike hearsay testimony.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to move to strike hearsay testimony of a complaining witness (Victim) when the witness said, "My mom told me to lie then....," and Counsel's hearsay objection was sustained by the Trial Court. See *State v. Bealin*, 201 S.C. 490, 23 S.E.2d 746 (1943).

Trial Counsel's failure to move to strike hearsay after an objection was sustained is not deficient performance. Although Counsel did not articulate a strategy for not striking this testimony, there are many reasons Counsel may choose to not do so. Even if this failure was deficient performance, it would not rise to the level of prejudicing the Applicant. Therefore this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Thirty: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to strike testimony following an objection.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to move to strike leading testimony of a complaining witness (Victim) when Counsel's objection to specific and detailed alleged conduct of the Applicant was sustained by the Trial Court. See *State v. Bealin*, 201 S.C. 490, 23 S.E.2d 746 (1943).

Again, Trial Counsel's failure to move to strike testimony after an objection was sustained is not deficient performance. Although Counsel did not articulate a strategy for not striking this testimony, there are many reasons Counsel may choose to not do so. Even if this failure was deficient performance, it would not rise to the level of prejudicing the Applicant as the State continued to ask questions about the same subject matter without leading. Therefore this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Thirty One: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to preserve an issue for appellate review.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to properly argue and preserve for appellate review Counsel's objection, when during the testimony of a complaining witness about alleged threats and demands for oral sex, Counsel objected, "Your honor, I'm having a real hard time hearing her testimony," and the Court ordered her to speak up.

There is no indication that Trial Counsel's ability to effectively represent Applicant was compromised by this minor inconvenience. The Court finds Applicant has not met his burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Trial Counsel was ineffective as to this allegation. See *Butler*, 286 S.C. at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814; Rule 71.1(e), *SCRCP*. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Thirty Two: Trial Counsel's alleged ineffective assistance regarding recanting statements.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel provided ineffective assistance by reaffirming the complaining witness's version of events regarding her initial recantation of

the allegations by asking her, “[Y]ou’re saying it was your mom, Buffy Cartwright that ultimately convinced you to recant?”, and the Victim responded, “Yes.” Applicant alleges that this highly prejudicial questioning reaffirmed the State’s case against Applicant and cannot be deemed a reasonable trial strategy. See *U.S. Const. amends. V, VI, XIV*.

This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. This Victim had already testified that she originally recanted because her mother told her to, so allowing her to “reaffirm” that claim was not likely to be prejudicial to Applicant. Trial Counsel’s question followed a series of questions suggesting that the Victim had already denied the abuse occurred in private conversations with her mother, which (if believed by the jury) would have rebutted the State’s theory that her mother’s request for her to recant was made in bad faith. Therefore, asking the Victim about the circumstances of her recantation was not an unreasonable trial strategy. This Court will not nitpick whether Trial Counsel employed the perfect phrasing in pursuing this strategy; the Sixth Amendment does not require perfect advocacy as judged with the benefit of hindsight. See *Yarborough*, 540 U.S. at 6. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Thirty Three: Trial Counsel’s alleged failure to acquire a transcript of the Applicant’s first trial.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to move to sequester the witnesses, which was prejudicial because the State repeatedly referred to prior witness testimony when questioning later witnesses. This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. It appears that Trial Counsel had a transcript of the previous trial and a specific failure to impeach could not be articulated to this Court.

This Court finds Applicant has failed to prove his counsel was deficient or that the result of his trial would likely have been different if the witnesses had been sequestered. See Underwood, 309 S.C. at 562, 425 S.E.2d at 22; Cherry, 300 S.C. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Thirty Four: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to object to the DSS case worker's allegedly prejudicial testimony.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to object and move to strike the DSS case worker's unfairly prejudicial testimony that DSS only becomes involved in a case "[i]f it meets the legal statute in the State of South Carolina, we take it as a report and go interview family". The Applicant alleges that this improper testimony violates Due Process and lowers the State's burden in the eyes of the jury as it appears to indicate the statutory law for such cases has already been satisfied. See *State v. Ellis*, 345 S.C. 175, 547 S.E.2d 490 (2001); Rules 701 and 702, *SCRE*.

At the evidentiary hearing, Trial Counsel admitted the possibility that the jury may have inferred DSS made a determination of guilt, although DSS does not need to meet any burden of proof to start an investigation. He maintained he found nothing objectionable in Price's phrasing because there are not many ways to say what Price was trying to say. However, the Court disagrees and finds that Trial Counsel was deficient for failing to object these comments as they amounted to a comment on a legal issue and was prejudicial to the Applicant because it lowers the State's burden in the eyes of the jury.

Allegation Thirty Five: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to object to the DSS case worker's testimony as hearsay and bolstering.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to object and move to strike unfairly prejudicial hearsay that went beyond the scope of time and place, and to improperly bolstering and hearsay within hearsay, when the DSS agent testified that she "received a call from her supervisor saying we received a report of sexual abuse concerning [Victim] and her step-father Harold Cartwright." See *State v. Barrett*, 299 S.C. 485, 386 S.E.2d 242 (1989); *Smith v. State*, 386 S.C. 562, 689 S.E.2d 629 (2010); Rule 801(d)(1)(D).

This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. Bolstering requires a witness to convey that she believes the victim; merely announcing that the Victim made a report does not imply that Price believed the report. See, e.g., *Briggs*, 421 S.C. at 324, 806 S.E.2d at 717. In addition, prior consistent statements of a testifying declarant may be admitted, notwithstanding the rule against hearsay, to rebut the charge that the declarant fabricated her testimony. Rule 801(d)(1)(B), *SCRE*. The Court, therefore, finds Trial Counsel had no grounds to object to this statement by Price. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Thirty Six: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to object to the Court's preliminary instructions to the jury.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review the issue of burden shifting and violation of Due Process when the Trial Court's initial instructions to the jury indicated that Trial Counsel would provide an opening statement and that opening statements were "what lawyers contend the facts will be, the

issues will be what they're asking you to look for to keep tuned into what they intend to prove, what the case is about." See *U.S. Const. amends. V, VI, XIV*.

The Court finds it unlikely that the jury might have misinterpreted this isolated phrase to mean Applicant had some obligation to prove his innocence, the trial court's jury instructions, considered as a whole, were free from error and cured any conceivable prejudice. See *Id.* at 26–27, 538 S.E.2d at 251. Consequently, Trial Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to this language. Therefore this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Thirty Seven: Trial Counsel's allegedly ineffective impeach of a witness.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel provided ineffective assistance by attempting to impeach the testimony of one of the Victim's disclosures of abuse, yet Counsel's questions reinforced the State's theory that this witness previously disclosed the abuse to several people. Notably, the State immediately capitalized on Counsel's error on redirect by stating, "Mr. Routzong [Trial Counsel] talked a whole lot about you telling people about what happened. So lets talk about that." This unfairly prejudicial line of questioning reaffirmed the State's case against Applicant and cannot be deemed a reasonable trial strategy. See *U.S. Const. amends. V, VI, XIV*.

This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. Trial Counsel was attempting to show inconsistencies between the stories the Victim told various people about Applicant's abuse. In order to pursue that reasonable impeachment strategy, Trial Counsel necessarily had to question the Victim about the multiple reports she made to different people. The Court finds Trial Counsel's questioning of the Victim was part of a

valid trial strategy, even though, with the benefit of hindsight, it may seem imperfect. See *Yarborough*, 540 U.S. at 6; *Underwood*, 309 S.C. at 562, 425 S.E.2d at 22. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Thirty Eight: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to review and object to the admission of prior testimony.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review the admission of Buffy [REDACTED] prior testimony (ex-wife of Applicant, and mother of two Victims) where the witness was still alive, purportedly had the same disease, and no foundation was made by the State showing any reasonable efforts to have her present to testify at the second trial. Furthermore, the Applicant alleges the transcript was not simply published to the jury; rather, it was acted out by a person on the witness stand as Buffy, the prosecutor for direct questions, and Counsel for cross, wherein inflections and mannerisms would likely be as the prosecution saw fit rather than as it actually occurred at the previous trial.

Applicant, however, has not identified which inflections or mannerisms the solicitor is alleged to have improperly adopted. In addition, the solicitor only "acted out" her own role; Trial Counsel portrayed Applicant's defense counsel in the first trial, and [REDACTED] was played by Ms. Emma Dicks. The solicitor, therefore, could not have inserted improper inflections and mannerisms into their performances, which greatly limits the scope of potential prejudice.

Trial Counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that he had the same ability to alter mannerisms. He also testified he could not remember the solicitor making any

exaggerated or excessive mannerisms. This Court finds Applicant has not met his burden to prove that the “acting out” of [REDACTED] testimony was harmful to his case. See *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625.

Allegation Thirty Nine: Trial Counsel’s alleged failure to object to prior testimony on the grounds of presentation, hearsay, and bolstering.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to object during the “acting-out” of Buffy [REDACTED] prior testimony as unfairly prejudicial hearsay that went beyond the scope of time and place, and to improper bolstering where the Prosecutor asked if she and the police found out that Applicant had been molesting the Victim, to which she replied in the affirmative. See *State v. Barrett*, 299 S.C. 485, 386 S.E.2d 242 (1989); *Smith v. State*, 386 S.C. 562, 689 S.E.2d 629 (2010); Rule 801(d)(1)(D).

At the evidentiary hearing, Trial Counsel testified he believed it would be futile to object to portions of [REDACTED] testimony, because it was admitted and presented to the jury as a whole; he also believed the trial judge would not agree to strike the whole thing, because [REDACTED] unavailability made the prior trial transcript admissible. This Court finds Trial Counsel was not ineffective because he articulated a valid strategic reason why he did not object to the question. See *Underwood*, 309 S.C. at 562, 425 S.E.2d at 22.

Allegation Forty: Trial Counsel’s alleged failure to object.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to request a *Jackson v. Denno*, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), hearing to challenge the voluntariness of his consent to the buccal swab that was later used to match his DNA to that of the semen on the bedsheet. This Court finds

this allegation to be without merit. As discussed above, Applicant admitted the semen was his; he simply denied that it was related to any criminal activity. Therefore, even if all the DNA evidence was excluded, the semen would still have been identified as his. This Court finds Applicant has not proved that, but for the alleged error of Trial Counsel, the result of Applicant's trial would have been different. See *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Forty One: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to object and strike the State's redirect examination of the State's DNA expert.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to object and move to strike the State's redirect examination of its DNA expert as it went beyond the scope of cross-examination. Specifically, the State immediately asked whether DNA can be destroyed, what effect washing and drying sheets would have on DNA when Counsel never inquired about the destruction of DNA, and where the State alleged through other witnesses that Applicant sought to destroy his DNA on the sheets by having them laundered.

On cross-examination, Trial Counsel asked Gallman whether she detected a mixture of DNA on the bedsheet, and Gallman testified she only found Applicant's DNA. At the PCR hearing, Trial Counsel testified he was attempting to show Applicant's DNA from the bedsheet was not mixed with one of the Victim's DNA, which might have cast doubt on the State's theory that the semen was from Applicant's abuse of the Victim. Trial Counsel believed the State brought up whether laundering the sheets could destroy DNA in order to explain why the Victim's DNA was not found on them. Trial Counsel perceived that line of redirect questioning as a permissible response to the line of questioning he

pursued on cross-examination, which is why he did not object. The Court finds Applicant has failed to prove Trial Counsel's decision not to object to the State's line of questioning fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. See *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 687–88. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Forty Two: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to object to the State's redirect examination of the Corrections Officer.

The Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel failed to object and move to strike the State's redirect examination of the jailer who purportedly saw Applicant hanging in his cell as beyond the scope of cross-examination where the State failed to have the witness identify Applicant during direct examination, and where Counsel asked no questions regarding Applicant's identification on cross-examination, and where on redirect examination, the State immediately asked whether the witness saw the man that was hanging in his cell present in the courtroom.

This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. There was patently no prejudice from Hettich's identification of Applicant as the hanged man on redirect examination because he had already testified on direct examination that he saw "Inmate Cartwright" hanging by a sheet tied around his neck. Applicant has failed to prove any prejudice. See *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Forty Three: Trial Counsel's alleged ineffective assistance for failing to inquire about a discrepancy between the first trial and the second trial.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel provided ineffective assistance where Applicant stated in camera at the end of the State's case that in the first trial, the State proffered evidence and pictures of the sheets that tested for DNA were taken from one of the Victim's actual room, yet in this trial, the State elicited testimony based on different pictures that the same sheets were taken from a different bedroom (victim's brother's old bedroom), where Counsel failed to cross-examine the State's witnesses regarding this discrepancy (the location of evidence critical to the State's case, and it is unknown whether Trial Counsel obtained a complete copy of the prior trial transcript before the second trial. However, if true, then failing to examine this area cannot be a valid trial strategy). The Court finds that the Trial Counsel was deficient for failing to inquire about this discrepancy.

Allegation Forty Four: Trial Counsel's alleged ineffective assistance regarding an impeachment strategy.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel provided ineffective assistance where Counsel's theory for why one of the Victims lied was that Applicant discovered pornographic pictures of her on the internet and publicly said so, where State witnesses repeatedly indicated the Victim was not in any such pictures, and where Counsel failed to proffer any such photographs into evidence to support his theory.

Trial Counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that he—like everyone else who testified having seen the photographs, except Applicant—did not believe the model in the

photographs was the Victim. In addition, during his closing argument, Trial Counsel argued that this Victim was motivated to retaliate against Applicant for falsely accusing her of posing for pornographic images. Therefore, proving the person in the photographs was actually the Victim was not necessary to Applicant's defense. Therefore, this Court finds Applicant has failed to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, either Trial Counsel's deficiency or any resulting prejudice from the alleged error. See *Butler*, 286 S.C. at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814; *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625; Rule 71.1(e), *SCRCP*. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Forty Five: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to object to the Court stopping the Applicant's testimony.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review the Trial Court repeatedly stopping Applicant's testimony before the jury suasponete, admonishing Applicant, and instructing the Prosecutor to object more; thus, usurping the role of the prosecutor and giving the improper appearance partiality before the jury. Counsel's abandonment of Applicant to the Court's relentless unfairly prejudicial comments and actions cannot be deemed a valid trial strategy. See *U.S. Const. amends. V, VI, XIV*; Fundamental Due Process (right to be tried before a fair and detached tribunal

Trial Counsel was deficient for failing to object the Court's comments and the only reason articulated to the Court to explain this deficiency was Counsel's perception that if he objected he would fall out of favor with the trial judge. This fear of objecting to avoid what Counsel deemed as upsetting the trial judge was referenced multiple times in the PCR hearing and is not an objectively reasonable strategic choice to explain Counsel's

failure to object on behalf of his client.

Allegation Forty Six: Trial Counsel's alleged to object to the Court's closing instructions.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review the Trial Court's closing instruction to the jury as a charge on the facts (as improperly infecting the jury with the Court's opinion on the case): "You've got a version of facts by some witnesses and a complete different version of the facts by other witnesses."

To the extent this isolated statement could be interpreted as an improper comment on the facts, this Court finds Applicant has shown no prejudice. In Applicant's testimony and in Trial Counsel's closing argument, the defense expressly claimed the complaining witnesses' accusations of sexual abuse were untrue; in fact, that claim was the heart of Applicant's defense. Trial Counsel had no reason to object to the trial court's express affirmance of a point that was necessary to his own client's theory of the case. In addition, there is no way any juror could have failed to notice that some witnesses gave a "different version of the facts" than others. Therefore, the trial court's statement was so obviously true that, even if Trial Counsel had made an objection on that ground, it could not possibly have changed the result of the proceeding. *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625. Thus this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Forty Seven: Trial Counsel's alleged to object to the Court's closing instructions.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review the Trial Court's closing instructions to the jury that were tantamount to instructions to search for the truth and violative of Due Process: "It is your duty to determine what the true facts are and what the truth is and who is telling the truth...", and "You're to make your decision based solely on what you determine the true facts are in this case." See *State v. Aleksey*, 343 S.C. 20, 538 S.E.2d 248 (2000), *State v. Daniels*, 401 S.C. 251, 737 S.E.2d 473 (2012). The Court followed the language that was provided at the time and cannot be expected to predict all possible changes in the law. Therefore the Court denies and dismisses the allegation with prejudice.

Allegation Forty Eight: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to objection to a jury instruction.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review the Trial Court's jury instruction that, "pursuant to our state law, the testimony of the victim in these cases need not be corroborated." See *State v. Stukes*, 416 S.C. 493, 787 S.E.2d 480 (2016). Trial Counsel was deficient for failing to object to these comments made during jury instructions as a misstatement of the law.

Allegation Forty Nine: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to object to comments made in the State's closing argument.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to object and preserve for appellate review the Prosecutor's improper comments during closing argument. Specifically, the Applicant alleges that the Prosecutor's comments were calculated to arouse the jurors' passions or prejudices and vouched and bolstered the credibility of the State's witnesses. See *State v. Northcutt*, 372 S.C. 207, 222, 641 S.E.2d 873, 881 (2007) (internal citation and quotation omitted); *State v. Rudd*, 355 S.C. 543, 549, 586 S.E.2d 153, 156 (Ct. App. 2003) (citation omitted); See *State v. Copeland*, 321 S.C. 318, 324, 468 S.E.2d 620, 624 (1996) (finding a solicitor's closing argument must be carefully tailored so as not to appeal to the personal biases of the jury); *State v. Shuler*, 344 S.C. 604, 545 S.E.2d 805, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 977, 122 S.Ct. 404 (2001) ("[A] solicitor: cannot vouch for the credibility of a witness by expressing or implying his personal opinion concerning a witness' truthfulness Improper vouching occurs when the prosecution places the government's prestige behind a witness by making explicit personal assurances of a witness' veracity, or where a prosecutor implicitly vouches for a witness' veracity by indicating information not presented to the jury supports the testimony[.]") (citations omitted); *Gilchrist v. State*, 350 S.C. 221, 227, 565 S.E.2d 281, 285 (2002) ("[b]ecause a jury must make its own assessment on the credibility of witnesses, it is inappropriate for the State to assure the jury of a government witness's credibility.").

The Court finds this allegation without merit, as the Applicant failure to specify which comments the Applicant contends were improper and the Applicant did not clarify during the evidentiary hearing. Since Applicant has failed to identify with particularity the

State's remarks to which he claims Trial Counsel should have objected, this Court finds Applicant has failed to meet his burden of proving those allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. See *Land*, 274 S.C. at 246, 262 S.E.2d at 737. Therefore this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Fifty: Trial Counsel's alleged failure to prepare for trial and present a reasonable trial strategy.

The Applicant alleges Trial Counsel failed to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing by not adequately preparing for trial and having an unreasonable trial strategy. See *United States v. Cronin*, 466 U.S. 648 (1984); *Roseboro v. State*, 317 S.C. 292, 294, 454 S.E.2d 312, 313 (1995) (finding "counsel must articulate a valid reason for employing a certain strategy to avoid a finding of ineffectiveness, and where counsel articulates a strategy, it is measured under an objective standard of reasonableness"); *Stacy v. Solem*, 801 F.2d 1048, 1051 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding that "labeling counsel's actions as "trial strategy" does not automatically immunize an attorney's performance from sixth amendment challenges.").

The Applicant does not explain with particularity what aspects of Trial Counsel's preparation or strategy were inadequate or unreasonable; rather, Applicant cites *United States v. Cronin*, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), and claims Trial Counsel "failed to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing." This bare conclusion, devoid of supporting facts, is insufficient to merit a determination by this Court. See *Land v. State*, 274 S.C. 243, 246, 262 S.E.2d 735, 737 (1980) (holding a PCR applicant must assert facts, as contrasted with conclusions, to meet the burden imposed upon him). Therefore this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE COUNSEL

In analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, courts must apply the *Strickland* test just as they would when analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. *Bennet v. State*, 383 S.C. 303, 309, 680 S.E.2d 273, 276 (2009). Therefore, a PCR applicant alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must prove counsel's performance was deficient and the applicant was prejudiced thereby. *Id.*

Allegation One: Appellate Counsel's alleged failure to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.

Applicant alleges Appellate Counsel should have filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court on the issue of whether evidence of attempted suicide is admissible as evidence of guilt in South Carolina. This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. First of all, there is no right to discretionary review by the United States Supreme Court. See *Douglas v. State*, 369 S.C. 213, 216, 631 S.E.2d 542, 543–44 (2006) ("We find that the decision whether to pursue certiorari is a matter left solely to the appellant's attorney's professional discretion.") Cf. *Jones v. Barnes*, 463 U.S. 745 (1983) (Appellate counsel must be allowed to exercise reasonable professional judgment in determining which non-frivolous issues to raise on direct appeal). In addition, the admissibility of evidence in a state criminal trial is not generally an issue of federal law, unless it implicates constitutional concerns. Applicant has not explained any basis for seeking review of his direct appeal by the United States Supreme Court on what is facially an issue of state law. Therefore, Applicant has not met his burden of showing

Appellate Counsel was deficient for failing to request such review, or that he likely would have obtained review had he requested it. See *id.*; Rule 71.1(e), SCRCP. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Two: Appellate Counsel's alleged failure to raise issues related to Dr. Benedetto's qualification as an expert in child sexual abuse dynamics.

Applicant alleges Appellate Counsel should have raised the issues of Dr. Benedetto's qualification as an expert as set forth above. However, Appellant Counsel had a limited record due to the limitation on Trial Counsel's questions of Dr. Benedetto as an expert. Further, the Applicant failed to provide the Court with evidence to show that the outcome of the appeal would have been different, nor has the Applicant supplied any additional evidence regarding this allegation. This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. Applicant has failed to prove that Appellate Counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue on appeal. See *Bennet*, 383 S.C. at 309, 680 S.E.2d at 276. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Three: Appellate Counsel's alleged failure to raise issue of Dr. Benedetto's testimony that abusers typically seek victims of a particular age

Applicant alleges Appellate Counsel should have raised the issue of Dr. Benedetto's testimony that abusers typically seek victims within a certain age range as going beyond the scope of her expertise. This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. Much like the allegation listed above, the Applicant has failed to provide the Court with evidence to support a finding of deficiency. Therefore, the Court finds no deficiency

in failing to raise it on appeal. See *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625; *Bennet*, 383 S.C. at 309, 680 S.E.2d at 276. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Four: Appellate Counsel's alleged failure to raise issue of Trial Counsel's objection to the trial court's refusal to question jurors about sexual molestation

Applicant alleges Appellate Counsel should have challenged the trial court's refusal to ask Defense Questions 1 and 3 during *voir dire*, where Question 1 ("Have you, any member of your family, or friend been impacted in any way by Sexual Crime or Sexual Assault or Child Molestation?" and Question 3 ("Does any member of the jury panel believe that anyone charged with crimes involving Sexual Molestation of a child is more likely guilty than not?") would have elicited potential bias among the jurors. This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. Appellate Counsel testified he raised four issues on appeal; counsel is not required to raise every non-frivolous issue on appeal but may select among them to maximize the likelihood of a favorable outcome. See *Bennet*, 383 S.C. at 309, 680 S.E.2d at 276. The Court finds Appellate Counsel attempted to raise those issues he believed were most likely to obtain a favorable result. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation Five: Appellate Counsel's alleged failure to raise issue of Applicant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal.

This Court finds this allegation to be without merit. On appeal from the denial of a directed verdict, the appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the State; if there is any evidence from which the defendant's guilt can be fairly and logically deduced, the jury verdict will not be disturbed. See *State v. Brown*, 360 S.C. 581, 586, 602 S.E.2d 392, 395 (2004). Here, there was substantial evidence of Applicant's guilt: the three victims' detailed testimony. It would likely have been fruitless for Appellate Counsel to challenge the sufficiency of the State's evidence on appeal, and he was not ineffective for declining to try. See *Bennet*, 383 S.C. at 309, 680 S.E.2d at 276. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

CONCLUSION

The Applicant has submitted an extensive list of alleged errors on behalf of Trial Counsel and Appellate Counsel. The Court finds that Trial Counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel based on cumulative error and the prejudice suffered from the individual allegations that were found by this Court. *State v. Johnson*, 334 S.C. 78, 93, 512 S.E.2d 795, 803 (1999); See *Tennant v. Marion Health Care Foundation*, 194 W.Va. 97, 459 S.E.2d 374 (1995) (cumulative error doctrine provides relief to a party when a combination of errors that are insignificant by themselves have the effect of preventing a party from receiving a fair trial and it requires the cumulative effect of the errors to affect the outcome of the trial). Here, the Applicant has suffered prejudice warranting a new trial based on cumulative trial error. The Court has identified eleven (11) errors that

individually and cumulatively create prejudice against the Applicant. "As we have stressed on more than one occasion, the Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one." *State v. Mitchell*, 330 S.C. 189, 199–200, 498 S.E.2d 642, 647–48 (1998) (quoting *Delaware v. Van Arsdall*, 475 U.S. at 681, 106 S.Ct. at 1436, 89 L.Ed.2d at 684). These errors have created a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional error, the result would have been different.


In determining whether the Applicant has proven prejudice, the PCR court should consider the specific impact counsel's error had on the outcome of the trial. See *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 695-96, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698-99 (explaining that the court must analyze how individual errors of counsel affect the important factual findings in a particular case). In addition, the PCR court should consider the strength of the State's case in light of all the evidence presented to the jury. See generally *Jones v. State*, 332 S.C. 329, 333, 504 S.E.2d 822, 824 (1998). The Applicants first trial ending in a mistrial and the analysis of the evidence presented to this Court over the multi-day PCR hearing supports the Court's finding of prejudice.

Based on all the foregoing reasons, this Court finds and concludes that Applicant has established constitutional violations and deprivations that would require post-conviction relief. This Court finds that Trial Counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. See *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 687-88. This Court also finds that Trial Counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Petitioner because it "so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result." *Butler*, 286 S.C. at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814 (quoting *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 642). The Court has concluded

that Trial Counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel because "there is a reasonable probability that but for [trial] counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 118, 386 S.E.2d at 625 (internal citations omitted); See *U.S. Const. amends.* VI, XIV; S.C. Const. art. I, §§ 3 and 14; S.C. Code § 17-27-20(A)(1), (4), and (6). Therefore this PCR application must be granted and Applicant shall receive a new trial.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Applicant's application for Post-Conviction Relief is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED!



The Honorable Robert J. Bonds
Presiding Judge

July 14, 2022

Walterboro, South Carolina