RECEIVED

Jan 18 2024

S.C. SUPREME COURT

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In the Supreme Court

APPEAL FROM YORK COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas

Honorable Heath P. Taylor, Circuit Court Judge

Appellate Case No. 2023-001400

Reginald R. White, Jr. ..... Petitioner,

vs.

The State. ..... Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

C RAUCH WISE
ATTORNEY AT Law
305 Main Street
Greenwood, SC 29646
864-229-5010
SC Bar No. 6188

Attorney for Petitioner

Index

Table of Authorities

Page:

Cases:

Rules:

Other Authorities:

Statement of Issues on Appeal

Question I: Did the Post Conviction Relief Judge err in failing to find trial counsel was not ineffective for his failure to object to the prior drugs crimes which were more prejudicial than probative?

Question II: Did the Post Conviction Relief Judge err in failing to rule counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the hearsay testimony that a neighbor had seen Reginald White's automobile at the residence when whether Mr. White lived at the residence was a contested issue at the trial?

Question III: Did the Post Conviction Relief Judge err in failing to find trial counsel was ineffective for this failure to object to the statement of the trial judge that the jury is to "search for the truth" when such language had been prohibited by the courts of our state before the trial of this case?

Statement of the Case

Procedural History

Reginald Raynard White was arrested on February 26, 2014 and charged with trafficking cocaine between 10 and 28 grams, possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, and possession with intent to distribute Oxycodone. App. 608-623. On May 29, 2014, the York County grand jury indicted him on the charges of trafficking cocaine and possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. App. at 455-460. On August 29, 2014 the State served upon Mr. White a notice to seek life without parole. App. at 448, ll 21-23.

Mr. White proceeded to trial on January 12-14, 2015. The jury convicted Mr. White on January 14, 2015. He was sentenced to life without parole. Mr. White appealed his conviction. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction in an unpublished opinion on October 26, 2016. App. at 495-496.

Mr. White filed his initial Post Conviction Relief Hearing on May 17, 2017. App. at 497. A Motion to Amend the Application was filed on January 23, 2019. A hearing was conducted on this Post Conviction Relief Application on January 30, 2019. App. at 1. Judge Thomas Russo issued an order on June 20, 2019 denying Mr. White relief. App. at 515-534. No Appeal was filed from this order.

Mr. White filed his second Post Conviction Relief application on November 1, 2019 in which he sought relief on numerous grounds. App. at 535-709. Mr. White filed an Amended Post Conviction Relief Application of August 20, 2020. App. at 710-717. His sole relief requested in the Amended Post Conviction Relief application was to be ale to appeal the initial denial of his Post Conviction Relief applicant and to be permitted to file a Rule 59 motion to alter or amend the order denying him relief. A hearing was held on this Post Conviction Relief petition on August 14, 2023.

Judge Heath Taylor, on August 31, 2023 issued an order granting Mr. White the right to file an appeal from the previous order denying him relief. Mr. White filed his Notice of Appeal on September 6, 2023.

Factual History

On February 26, 2014, at approximately 11 AM Officer Carson Neely took a statement from a complaining witness concerning a claim by her that Reginald Raynard White raped her on February 24, 2014, when she and her boyfriend went to a trailer on Silver Creek Road in Clover, SC. Her boyfriend was an acquaintance of Mr. White. When they arrived at the trailer they met Mr. White and another individual who lived across the street from the trailer. After the other individual left at about 8 PM, she, her boyfriend and Mr. White used crack cocaine. After using the crack cocaine, she went to the bathroom. She claimed Mr. White followed her and raped her in the bedroom. App. at 661- 664.

Based upon this information, a search warrant was obtained for the residence on Silver Creek Road. The search warrant was issued shortly before 2:30 PM on February 26, 2014. App. at 579-589. The search of the Silver Creek Road property occurred on February 26, 2014. App. at 587. Based upon the papers found at the residence, the officer were able to determine the man the complaining witness had referred to as "Reggie" was Reginald Raynard White. App. at 588. During the search on February 26, 2014, the officer also found the drugs in question. They were found in the air conditioning vent in the master bedroom. App. at 198, ll 23-25.

After midnight on the day of the search, the officer arrested Mr. White at a residence on Hudson Street in York. App. at 103, l 20 to 104, l 1. Mr. White was subsequently interrogated by Officer McGarity. The officer testified he asked Mr. White what drugs would be found in the Silver Creek Road residence. The officer's testimony was Mr. White said "The crack, cocaine and

Oxycodone." App. at 107, l 22; 189, ll 19-20. Officer McGarity was the officer who found the illegal drugs in the initial search of the residence. App. at 182, l 13 to 183, l 9.

In the search of the house, in addition to the drugs, the officer found two bank statements in the name of Reginald White. These appear to be cash withdrawal documents from a bank ATM machine. They were dated February 3, 2024. App. at 203, ll 1-13. They also found a pill bottle with Mr. White's name on it. The date of the pill bottle is not known as the bottle was not taken and photographs of the bottle were taken. App. at 248, l 3-25.

At the trial, Mr. White had three witnesses testify for him, Their testimony was Mr. White did not reside at the Silver Creek road residence. The witnesses were his sister, his grandmother and the mother of his children, who was renting the residence on Silver Pond Road. The testimony also established that Mr. White's vehicle and driver's license did not list Silver Pond Road as his residence.

Standard of Review

"We review questions of law de novo, *181 with no deference to trial courts." *Smalls v. State*, 422 S.C. 174, 180–81, 810 S.E.2d 836, 839 (2018). "While we defer to the PCR court's credibility findings as to witnesses who testified before the PCR court, we do not defer to the PCR court's credibility findings as to witnesses who did not testify before the PCR court." *Thompson v. State*, 423 S.C. 235, 247, 814 S.E.2d 487, 493 (2018). As the Post Conviction Relief Judge ruled the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence, this ruling is not a credibility issue. It is a ruling as a matter of law and should be reviewed de novo. This standard should apply to all three issues.

Argument

Question I

Did the Post Conviction Relief Judge err in failing to find trial counsel was not ineffective for his failure to object to the prior drugs crimes which were more prejudicial than probative?

Reginald White was charged and convicted of trafficking in cocaine and possession with intend to distribute crack cocaine. App. at 455-460. The facts giving rise to these charges arose from a report by a woman that Reginald White had on February 24, 2014, committed a sexual assault on her.[1] When the investigating officers questioned Mr. White about the incident, he admitted that he had had sexual relations with the woman, but stated that the sexual relations was consensual. Mr. Williams had told the officers that he had given the woman and her boyfriend crack cocaine. After giving them crack cocaine, he engaged in consensual sex with the woman. After that, both people left. App. at 131, l 3 to 132, l 8.

---

[1] This case was dismissed on March 19, 2015. The allegations against Mr. White are found in the Appendix at 661-664. A reading of the allegations makes this a suspicious case.

At the pre-trial motion hearing, counsel for Mr. Williams objected to the introduction of the proposed testimony based upon *State v. Lyle,* 125 S.C. 406, 118 S.E. 803 (1923). Upon hearing the objection, the trial judge said, "The question is whether or not it would qualify as Lyle evidence and whether it appears to be part of a common plan, scheme, course of conduct. We will weigh all those things." App. at 138, l 24 to 139, l 2. Trial counsel then set forth his basis for the objection of the other bad acts. He advised the court the only contested issue was whether the crack cocaine was in fact Mr. White's. App. at 141 ll 10-12. Trial counsel argued, "That makes whatever value this is on intent is far outweighed by the prejudice to my client . . . ." App. at 141, ll 7-9. Further, trial counsel advised the court, "I am certainly not going to argue personal use." App. at 140, l 24. The sole defense established at trial was the drugs found in the residence belonging to Jessica Collins, his girlfriend at the time, were not his. The trial judge ruled that based upon the representations and testimony at the pre-trial hearing, he would admit the testimony as to other drugs transactions as other bad acts. App. at 149, ll 6-9. The trial judge admitted the other bad act on the issue of intent. Based upon the admission of trial counsel that he was not going to argue personal use, the probative value of the statement by Mr. White that he gave two small pieces of crack cocaine to two individuals was marginal at best. Had a proper objection been made an appellate court could have ruled upon the issue of whether the probative value outweighed the prejudice.

At the trial, the officer testified as to the other two alleged drug sales without any objection from defense counsel. App. at 244, ll 20 to 245 l 5. Mr. White appealed his case raising this issue. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction on October 26, 2016. As to the issue of the other bad acts, the Court stated, "Because a ruling in an *in limine* motion is not final, the losing party must renew his objection at trial when the evidence is presented in order to preserve the issue for appeal." App. at 496.

The trial counsel erred in failing to object to the introduction of the other bad act of giving away a small amount of crack cocaine. At the post conviction relief hearing trial counsel admitted he failed to make a proper objection. App. at 17, ll 11-19. Trial counsel committed error. The only question to decide is whether the Mr. White was prejudiced. As the Court of Appeals declined to rule on the issue as it was not preserved, this Court should presume Mr. White was prejudiced.

This Court has held that when intent is conceded by the defendant, evidence of intent is not admissible. This Court said:

> Appellant does not contend to the contrary, but does contend that criminal intent or guilty knowledge was not such a disputed and issuable fact in the case at bar as would authorize the admission of this evidence merely to establish such fact. When this class of evidence was offered by the state the defendant through his counsel caused to be spread upon the record an admission to the effect that his defense was an alibi, and that for the purposes of the trial the criminal intent or guilty knowledge of the person who uttered the forged check, as charged. would be freely and fully conceded." *State v. Lyle*, 125 S.C. 406, 118 S.E. 803, 810 (1923).

The same rule is applicable here. Mr. White, through his counsel, admitted intent was not an issue. His trial counsel "caused to be spread upon the record an admission" that he was not going to argue simple possession. His sole argument was that the drugs were not his client's. The State was put on notice that they could argue the inference from the amount without fear of any contrary argument by the defendant. The State did not need the other unduly prejudicial evidence to obtain its conviction, if they proved the crack cocaine belonged to Mr. White. The state elected to engage in the proverbial "gilding of the lily."[2] And as applied to the law of this case, the evidence is the

---

[2] The exact quote is:
"To gild refined gold, to paint the lily,
To throw a perfume on the violet,
To smooth the ice, or add another hue
Unto the rainbow, or with taper-light
To seek the beauteous eye of heaven to garnish,
Is wasteful and ridiculous excess."
Shakespeare, King John, Act II

excess that ruins the case by permitting the jury to decided the case on an improper basis. Without the other bad act, the trial is fair as to this issue. The "gilding of the lily" made the trial unfair. The fact Mr. White may have given crack cocaine to two other individuals does not mean he knew the drugs were in the air conditioning vent in the home he sometimes occupied. The other bad act permitted the jury to decide the case on an improper basis. "Unfair prejudice means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, such as an emotional one." *State v. Saltz*, 346 S.C. 114, 127, 551 S.E.2d 240, 247 (2001). As noted above, the giving of crack cocaine was only marginally relevant to the issue of an intent to distribute. If the State had testimony that Mr. White had been found in possession of crack cocaine the day before the raid, such testimony would not have been admissible. The possession of crack cocaine the day before would be another bad act used by the state to support the claim that Mr. White knew the drugs were in the home. The use of the other bad act for that purpose would not make it admissible. In the present case, the other bad act serves two purposes. One is to prove Mr. White had an intent to distribute the crack cocaine. The other would be to prove he knew the crack cocaine was in the house because he gave some away in the house. The second purpose is an improper purpose. The second purpose makes the evidence more prejudicial than probative.

The trial judge abused his discretion in this case in admitting the other bad act evidence. The Court has held, "An abuse of discretion arises from an error of law or a factual conclusion that is without evidentiary support." *State v. Irick*, 344 S.C. 460, 464, 545 S.E.2d 282, 284 (2001). As defense counsel stated on the record he was not disputing the intent part of possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, the trial court had no factual basis to conclude the giving away of the crack cocaine was probative. At the very least, the trial judge erred in failing to consider that defense counsel's statement greatly lessened the need for the State to use the other bad act to prove intent.

Furthermore, the trial judge erred in failing to weigh the prejudice to Mr. White on the trafficking charge by admitting the giving away of the crack cocaine.[3] The giving away of two small amounts of crack cocaine is not admissible had the trafficking charge been tried alone. This Court has said, "As we have stressed on more than one occasion, the Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one." *State v. Mitchell*, 330 S.C. 189, 199, 498 S.E.2d 642, 647–48 (1998)(internal citations omitted). When a defendant charged with trafficking drugs has to dispute a giving away of drugs or the possession of drugs on another occasion, the trial is not fair. The Court of Appeals has said, "The inference that the State clearly wanted jurors to draw was that because some of the text messages indicated Appellant was dealing drugs earlier—sometimes weeks before the incident at issue—then he must have owned the drugs found on January 25, 2017." *State v. Ostrowski*, 435 S.C. 364, 392–93, 867 S.E.2d 269, 283–84 (Ct. App. 2021). In this case the State wanted the jury to draw the inference that because Mr. White gave away a small amount of crack cocaine a day before the raid, he knew the trafficking amount of drugs were in the house. This is not permissible. Had the state wanted to give Mr. White a truly fair trial, they would have either tried him twice on two separate charges or not buttressed their trafficking case by seeking to admit the giving away of a small amount of crack cocaine. Had an objection been raised by trial counsel, there is a reasonable probability that this case would have been reversed on appeal.

Question II

Did the Post Conviction Relief Judge err in failing to rule counsel was ineffective for

---

[3] There will virtually always be prejudice to a defendant when the state has two charges one of which would make the other bad act admissible and one of which would not make it admissible. The State should not be permitted two combine two charges for the purpose of admitting prejudicial evidence as to one when the evidence would not otherwise be admissible. The fact that the State proved Mr. White gave away a small amount of crack cocaine would be prejudicial to the trafficking cocaine charge.

not objecting to the hearsay testimony that a neighbor had seen Reginald White's automobile at the residence when whether Mr. White lived at the residence was a contested issue at the trial?

During the testimony of Officer Walter Beck, trial counsel was cross-examining the officer about who rented the trailer. He was asked:

> Q. (By Mr. Mckinnon) Did Mr. White rent the trailer?
> A. (By Mr. Beck) Who rented the trailer?
> Q. Yeah, that's what I am asking.
> A. I have no clue who rented the trailer.
> Q. You didn't bother to investigate that?
> A. Because that does not matter.
> Q. Oh, it doesn't matter who rents the trailer
> Does it matter who rents the trailer?
> A. No, not at all.
> App. at 246, l 24 to 247, l 7.

The obvious importance of this line of questioning is that if the officer does not know who rented the trailer, he can provide little testimony about who has dominion and control over the trailer. The cross continued with testimony from the officer saying Mr. White had some clothes at the trailer as well as mail and a pill bottle. App. at 224, ll 15-22. The officer then improperly stated, with no objection, "[W]e had no reason to doubt that he was not living there." App. at 247, ll 19-20. On further cross the officer admitted he did not know what the date on the pill bottle was. At this point trial counsel asked a very specific question:

> Q. (By Mr. McKinnon) Okay. But let me - - so you are - - the evidence that you say that Mr. White lived there is a pill bottle and some couple piece of paper with bank information on it and some men's clothes? Is that your evidence?
> A. (By Mr. Beck) We have other information other information also that he was living there. Other people had told us that he was living there.
> App. at 249, ll 3-8.

The question called for a simple "yes" or 'no" answer. The officer elected to provide hearsay testimony as to other information he had beyond the limited facts in the question. What other people

told Officer Beck was hearsay under Rule 801(c). The out of court statement was admitted for the truth of the matter asserted. When the hearsay testimony was given, trial counsel did not object, ask for a curative instruction or a mistrial. While the state did have a neighbor testify that Mr. White lived at the trailer, her credibility was seriously questioned when she stated:

> Q. (By Mr. McKinnon) So the reason that you think he [Reginald White] lived there was there was a silver car there"
> A. (By Ms. Kinley) Yes sir.
> App. at 274, ll 23-25

The testimony at the trial established that Mr. White drove a green Honda. The State never sought to establish whether Kimberly Ann Kinley was the "other people" to whom officer Beck made reference. This testimony was inadmissible. Trial counsel should have made an objection. Error by trial counsel has been established. The question is has Mr. White been prejudiced.

The evidence as to Mr. White living in the trailer at 809 Silver Creek Road was seriously contested. Jessica Collins, the mother of Mr. White's children, testified Mr. White was not living in the trailer with her. He would come watch the children while she was at work. App. at 365, l 23 to 366, l 11. His South Carolina driver's license contained a different address in York, SC. The address of Ms. Collins was in Clover, SC. App. at 365, ll 10-16. Brenda Lee, Mr. White's grandmother, testified he lived with his sister. App. at 353, l 12 to 354 l 14. Tralicia White, his sister, testified Mr. White lived with her on East Jefferson Street in York, SC. App. at 355, l 16 to 359, l 12. No evidence identified Mr. White as being the owner of the drugs found in the air conditioning vent. Ms. Collins also identified Forest Peeples as living with her.[4] She further stated that Mr. Peeples is a known drug dealer. App. at 368, ll 12-16.

This Court has over turned convictions in a Post Conviction Relief hearing based upon

---

[4] The correct spelling of the name appears to be "Peoples," based upon an examination of the York County records.

improper hearsay testimony. As this Court has said, "As a whole, the properly admitted evidence of Petitioner's guilt was not strong enough to overcome trial counsel's failure to object to the inadmissible hearsay testimony of Ms. Elfering and Dr. Benedetto." *Thompson v. State*, 423 S.C. 235, 249, 814 S.E.2d 487, 494 (2018). *See, also, Watson v. State*, 370 S.C. 68, 72, 634 S.E.2d 642, 644 (2006), abrogated on other grounds by *Smalls v. State*, 422 S.C. 174, 810 S.E.2d 836 (2018)("This Court has held that the failure to object to improper hearsay testimony in a criminal sexual conduct case because the testimony is merely cumulative to the victim's testimony is not a reasonable strategy where the evidence is not overwhelming or the improper testimony bolsters the victim's testimony.") The same is applicable here. On the issue of whether Mr. White lived at the address where the drugs were found, properly admitted evidence is not strong enough to overcome the prejudice of the hearsay testimony.

"Counsel must articulate a valid reason for employing a certain strategy to avoid a finding of ineffectiveness." *Ingle v. State*, 348 S.C. 467, 470, 560 S.E.2d 401, 402 (2002). In this case, no valid reason was given for not objecting to the hearsay testimony. At the Post Conviction Relief hearing, trial counsel admitted the statement was hearsay. His explanation to not objecting was that it was in response to his own question. App. at 22, ll 1-24. His explanation was not part of any trial strategy. His opinion was the statement was not harmful to his case. As he stated, "I mean a single sentence that unstated people other people said he lived there I didn't think was damaging at all." App. at 23, ll 9-11. A belief that the inadmissible evidence is not harmful is hardly a trial strategy. Trial counsel failed to appreciate that the hearsay statement undermined all the other favorable testimony he had brought out on cross-examination and undermined every defense witness he presented on the issue of where Mr. White lived. The jury easily could have elected to believe the hearsay statement of Officer Beck as oosed to the relatives of Mr. White. A court can only presume

the jury heard and considered any of the testimony given in the trial. "Moreover, jurors are presumed to follow the law as instructed to them." *State v. Grovenstein,* 335 S.C. 347, 353, 517 S.E.2d 216, 219 (1999). A presumption that a jury heard the testimony is equally compelling. This Court should hold trial counsel was ineffective and Mr. White was prejudiced by his ineffectiveness.

Question III

Did the Post Conviction Relief Judge err in failing to find trial counsel was ineffective for this failure to object to the statement of the trial judge that the jury is to "search for the truth" when such language had been prohibited by the courts of our state before the trial of this case?

In the opening charge to the jury, the trial court made the following two statements to the jury:

> What you are engaged in here is a search for the truth. App. at 160 ll 11-12.
>
> I hope that you understand that searching for the truth or trying to do justice is sometimes a slow process. App. at 160 ll 17-18

No objection was taken to these two comments. At the Post Conviction Relief hearing, trial counsel stated that he would have objected to the statements at the time of the hearing based upon a more recent case. App. at 43 ll 16-25.The trial counsel was apparently referring to *State v. Beaty*, 423 S.C. 26, 813 S.E.2d 502 (2018). In that case, this Court stated, "Although there was error here, our review of the entirety of the judge's opening comments and the entire trial record convinces us that Appellant has not shown prejudice from this error sufficient to warrant reversal." *Id.* at 34, 813 S.E.2d at 506. What the Post Conviction Relief Judge failed to note is that this court had since 2000 called into question the validity of the truth searching charge. As this Court said, "While we have urged trial courts to avoid using any 'seek' language when charging jurors on either reasonable doubt

or circumstantial evidence, the 'seek' language here did not appear in either the reasonable doubt or circumstantial evidence charges, but in the instructions on juror credibility." *State v. Aleksey*, 343 S.C. 20, 27, 538 S.E.2d 248, 251–52 (2000)(internal citations omitted). Some 12 years later this Court stated, "Appellant also now argues the trial judge erred in charging the jury that their verdict would represent the 'truth and justice for all parties.'" *State v. Daniels*, 401 S.C. 251, 255, 737 S.E.2d 473, 475 (2012). Thus, prior to the trial of this case, this Court had twice admonished trial courts to refrain from using any truth seeking or searching language in their jury charges. A reasonablely competent criminal defense lawyer should have been aware of these two cases. "Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." *Att'y Grievance Comm'n of Maryland v. Costanzo*, 432 Md. 233, 239, 68 A.3d 808, 811 (2013).

As noted above, the jury can be presumed to have followed the instructions of the trial judge. Thus, this Court has to assume that the jury did as they were instructed, not once but twice, and searched for the truth as to who owned the drugs. When this improper instruction is coupled with the inadmissible hearsay statement that the neighbors said Mr. White was living in the trailer, they could easily have concluded Mr. White owning the drugs was the truth they were required to find This is not the law in South Carolina or any other state. If a jury is unable to determine what the truth is, they are to acquit. The pressure should not be put on a jury to determine what the actual truth is. The jury was never told if they did not know what the truth was, they should find Mr. White not guilty.

At the Post Conviction Relief hearing the issue of the improper charge to the jury on inferring dominion and control over the drugs based upon dominion and control over the premises was not raised. At the trial, the judge instructed the jury, "The defendant's knowledge and possession may

be inferred when a substance is found on the property that's under a defendant's control." App. at 440, ll 7-9. The assistant solicitor echoed this charge in his closing argument. He stated in defining constructive possession, "When a person has what lawyers and judges refer to as dominion and control, or the right to exercise dominion and control, the ability, the access, over either the object, i.e. the drugs, or the premises upon which the object is located' the Silver Creek residence in this case." App. at 405, l 25 to 406, l 5.[5] This charge by the judge was rejected by this court in *State v. Stewart*, 433 S.C. 382, 392, 858 S.E.2d 808, 813 (2021). In *Stewart*, this Court held, "The improper explanation of the inference of knowledge and possession permitted the jury to find Stewart guilty of simple possession and trafficking without the State proving knowledge and intent, a scenario not permitted under the legal principle of possession as we explained it in *Ellis*, *Brown*, *Lane*, and *Hudson*." The fact that *Stewart* was decided after this case was tried, does not prevent this Court from evaluating the prejudice from the "search for the truth" charge by also looking at the improper inference charge. This Court has said several times, "Jury instructions must be considered as a whole and if as a whole, they are free from error, any isolated portions which might be misleading do not constitute reversible error." *State v. Sims*, 304 S.C. 409, 422, 405 S.E.2d 377, 384 (1991). Likewise, if as a whole they are unduly prejudicial, the conviction should be reversed. Taken as a whole, the jury was instructed that they could infer the truth of the case is Mr. White possessed the drugs. Such a conclusion is not legally correct.

This Court has on at least three occasions admonished trial judges not to use any truth seeking language in their jury charges. Notwithstanding this admonishment, judge have continued

---

[5]As argued by the solicitor and charged by the judge, the jury was told they can convict Mr. White by his simply being in possession of the trailer without any knowledge that the drugs were present. Such a charge completely eliminates any mens rea requirement on the part of the defendant.

to use such language. This Court should grant the Petition for Writ of Certiorari on this issue and reverse the conviction of Mr. White. Only when the admonishment has an impact can this Court expect the practice to completely stop.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant this Petition for Writ of Certiorari, reverse the ruling of the Post Conviction Relief judge and remand the case to the Court of General Sessions for the County of York for a new trial.

January 18, 2024

C. Rauch Wise
305 Main Street
Greenwood, SC 29646
(864) 229-5010
rauchwise@gmail.com
S. C. Bar № 6188

Attorney for Reginald Raynard White