

**STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW COURT**

Robert Spigner, #65500,)
)
 Appellant,)
)
 v.)
)
 South Carolina Department of Probation,)
 Parole and Pardon Services,)
)
 Respondent.)
 _____)

Docket No. 23-ALJ-15-0022-AP

FINAL ORDER

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SC Court of Appeals

This matter is before the South Carolina Administrative Law Court (ALC or Court) pursuant to an appeal filed on July 21, 2023, by Robert Spigner (Appellant), an inmate in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC). On June 21, 2023, the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services (Department or Respondent) notified the Appellant of the South Carolina Parole Board's (Board) unanimous decision to deny the Appellant parole. The Appellant challenges the Board's denial of parole on the basis that the criteria that was in effect at the time of his parole violation in 1971 controls his parole and that the Board's use of incorrect criteria renders him ineligible to be a part of the parole program. After careful consideration of the parties' briefs, the Department's determination is affirmed.

BACKGROUND

On September 8, 1971, the Appellant was sentenced to life in prison for murder, with the possibility of parole after service of ten (10) years. In 1981 upon his initial appearance, the Appellant was granted parole. However, in September of 2000, the Appellant's parole was revoked for absconding supervision, admitting to the use of cocaine and crack cocaine, failure to maintain employment and testing positive for marijuana. Since the Appellant's parole revocation, the Appellant has been before the Parole Board ten (10) times each resulting in the denial of parole. At the Appellant's most recent appearance on June 21, 2023, the Board unanimously denied the Appellant parole due to the nature and seriousness of the current offense, use of deadly weapons in this or previous offense and for the Appellant's failure to successfully complete a community supervision program. On July 21, 2023, the Appellant filed an appeal with the court.

The State of South Carolina
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Administrative Law Court

ISSUE ON APPEAL

Whether the Parole Board not using the parole criteria in effect in 1971, renders the Appellant ineligible for parole?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court's jurisdiction to review this matter is derived from the South Carolina Supreme Court decisions in *Al-Shabazz* and *Furtick*. See *Al-Shabazz v. State*, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000) (establishing an administrative review process for inmate appeals); see also *Furtick v. S.C. Dep't of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs.*, 352 S.C. 594, 576 S.E.2d 146 (2003) (incorporating final decisions of the Department into that review process). As explained by the *Al-Shabazz* Court, "procedural due process is guaranteed when an inmate is deprived of an interest encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property." *Wicker v. S.C. Dep't of Corrs.*, 360 S.C. 421, 424, 602 S.E.2d 56, 58 (2004) (citation omitted).

Since parole is a privilege, not a right, the routine denial of parole does not constitute such a liberty interest. See *Cooper v. S.C. Dep't of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs.*, 377 S.C. 489, 495-96, 661 S.E.2d 106, 109-10 (2008) (citation omitted). If, however, the Board "deviates from or renders its decision without consideration of the appropriate [statutory] criteria, . . . it essentially abrogates an inmate's right to parole eligibility and, thus, infringes on a state-created liberty interest." *Id.* at 499, 661 S.E.2d at 111. Thus, this court may review decisions from the Department for violations of statutory procedure or procedural due process only but may not review the Board's substantive decision to deny an appellant parole.

In reviewing such matters, the court sits in its appellate capacity. See *id.* at 497, 661 S.E.2d at 110 (citation omitted); *Al-Shabazz*, 338 S.C. at 377, 527 S.E.2d at 754 (citation omitted). Under the Administrative Procedures Act, the court's review in appellate matters is confined to the record. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(4). The court may modify or reverse the decision of the agency when substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(5). Substantial rights of the appellant are prejudiced when the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) affected by other error of law; (e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. *Id.*

DISCUSSION

As stated *supra*, parole is not a right, but a privilege. *State v. Dingle*, 376 S.C. 643, 649, 659 S.E.2d 101, 104 (2008) (citing *Sullivan v. S.C. Dep't of Corrs.*, 355 S.C. 437, 443, 586 S.E.2d 124, 127 n.4 (2003)). The discretion to grant parole lies solely with the Board. *Id.* at 649, 659 S.E.2d at 104-05 (citing *State v. McKay*, 300 S.C. 113, 115, 386 S.E.2d 623, 623-24 (1989)). If, in denying parole, the Board follows proper procedure, then its decision will constitute a routine denial of parole and summary dismissal of the case would be appropriate. *See Cooper*, 377 S.C. at 500, 661 S.E.2d at 112; *see also Compton v. S.C. Dep't of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs.*, 385 S.C. 476, 479, 685 S.E.2d 175, 177 (2009). The proper procedure for the Board to follow includes considering the factors outlined in Section 24-21-640 of the South Carolina Code, as well as those listed in the Department's parole form. *Cooper*, 377 S.C. at 500, 661 S.E.2d at 112; *Compton*, 385 S.C. at 479, 685 S.E.2d at 177; *see also* S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-640 (Supp. 2019) (setting forth the statutory factors warranting parole). Additionally, the Board must utilize an actuarial risk and needs assessment tool, known as COMPAS, in making its parole determinations. *See* S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-10(F) (Supp. 2019).

If the Board fails to follow proper procedure, giving due consideration to the specified factors, an appellant is denied his liberty interest in parole eligibility. *Cooper*, 377 S.C. at 499, 661 S.E.2d at 111. If, however, the Board adheres to procedure and considers all the requisite factors, the appellant's liberty interest is protected, and the Board has the discretion to deny parole based on any of the factors found in Section 24-21-640 or its own criteria. *See id.* at 499, 661 S.E.2d at 111-12. Here, the Board's order plainly reflects that it considered all the appropriate factors – including those set forth in Section 24-21-640, the Department's own criteria for parole consideration, and an actuarial risk and needs assessment – before making its decision to deny the Appellant parole. Thus, as a routine denial of parole, the court's ability to further review this matter is limited:


[T]he [] Board may avoid [reversal of its parole determinations] if it clearly states in its order denying parole that it considered the factors outlined in [S]ection 24-21-640 and the fifteen factors published in its parole form. If the Board complies with this procedure, the decision will constitute a routine denial of parole and the ALC would have limited authority to review the decision to determine whether the Board followed proper procedure. Under that scenario, the ALC can summarily dismiss the inmate's appeal.

Cooper, 377 S.C. at 500, 661 S.E.2d at 112; *see Compton*, 385 S.C. at 479, 685 S.E.2d at 177. Consequently, because the record reflects that the Board routinely denied the Appellant parole after complying with the necessary procedure, the court may not interfere with the Department's determination.

ORDER

THEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the Department's decision is hereby **AFFIRMED**.


AND IT IS SO ORDERED.


S. Phillip Lenski
Administrative Law Judge

January 3, 2024
Columbia, South Carolina

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that the undersigned has this date served this order in the above entitled action upon all parties to this cause by depositing a copy hereof, in the United States Mail, postage paid, or in the interagency Mail Service addressed to the party(ies) or their attorney(s).

This 3 day of January 2024

Judicial Law Clerk