THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The South Carolina Supreme Court

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S.C. SUPREME COURT

Appeal from Greenville County
Greenville County Court of Common Pleas
Hon. Judge J. Derham Cole, Circuit Court Judge, Presiding

2021-CP-23-05253

Corina Veronica Castro.....Petitioner,

Versus

State of South Carolina .....Respondent.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Corina Veronica Castro APPEALS the order entered in the above titled Post-Conviction Relief matter, which was signed on January 22, 2024, clocked with the Greenville County Clerk of Court on January 31, 2024, and is attached to this Notice of Appeal. The Petitioner received written notice of the entry of the Order and Judgment in this matter on January 31, 2024.

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March 1, 2024.
Greenville, S.C.

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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA	)	IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
	)	THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
COUNTY OF GREENVILLE	)	
Corina Veronica Castro, #384806,	)	Case No.: 2021-CP-23-05253
	)	
Applicant,	)	
v.	)	
	)	ORDER OF DISMISSAL
State of South Carolina,	)	
	)	
Respondent.	)	

This matter comes before the Court by way of an application for post-conviction relief filed by Applicant Corina Veronica Castro on October 29, 2021. An evidentiary hearing was held July 25-26, 2023, in the Greenville County Courthouse. Applicant was present and represented by counsel, Scarlett B. Moore, Esq. Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Melody J. Brown represented Respondent, the State. At the close of the hearing, the undersigned took the matter under advisement. By a conditional Form 4 order issued on July 28, 2023, and filed August 8, 2023, this Court indicated it would deny relief and directed Respondent's counsel to prepare and submit a proposed order. [1] After consideration of the testimony received, and after reviewing and considering the record, arguments presented by counsel, and the controlling case law, this Court finds that Applicant has failed to carry her burden of proof. Consequently, this Court DENIES relief for the specific reasons set out in this order.

General Procedural History

Applicant is presently confined in the South Carolina Department of Corrections in Leath

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[1] The proposed order was circulated among counsel prior to this Court's acceptance. *See Fishburne v. State*, 427 S.C. 505, 516, 832 S.E.2d 584, 589 (2019) (providing a "proposed order should be transmitted to opposing counsel" for review and that counsel "should … alert preparing counsel and the PCR court as to any deficiencies in the proposed order.").

Correctional Institution pursuant to orders of commitment of the Greenville County Clerk of Court. A Greenville County Grand Jury indicted Applicant in July 2020 for murder (2020-GS-23-003486); two counts of attempted murder (2020-GS-23-003482 and 003483); two counts of conspiracy (2020-GS-23-003487 and 003481); and, three counts of possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime (2020-GS-23-003486, 003482 and 003483). Kraig Alan Pringle Esq., represented Applicant on the charges.

On March 10, 2021, Applicant appeared before the Honorable Letitia H. Verdin and pleaded guilty to murder (2020-GS-23-003486), and two counts of attempted murder (2020-GS-23-03482 and 003483). During the plea, the State offered the following factual basis for the crimes:

> On 3/13/19 in Greenville County Jacori Ashley, age 21, and Kalo McCullough, age 27, drove up to the Dollar General off Locust Hill Road in Travelers Rest. Jacori was driving and Kalo was the passenger.
>
> Jacori had been contacted by the co-defendant, Adam Byrum, and requested a ride. Jacori worked with Byrum and this co-defendant's, [Applicant's] mother, at a place called RimTyme. Jacori had given rides to Byrum in the past.
>
> This night Jacori asked his friend, Kalo, to ride with him. They arrived at the Dollar General and waited for Byrum and Castro to arrive. They noticed two individuals wearing hoodies walking up to the car. They knew it was Byrum and Castro as they were on the phone talking with them.
>
> When they got next to the car, Byrum stated something to Jacori, immediately pulled a gun and started shooting into the vehicle. Jacori was hit with one round that went through his mouth and nasal area as well as his shoulders. Kalo was hit with a round that went through his lung and shattered a vertebra leaving him permanently paralyzed from the chest area down. Jacori was able to speed off from the site and amazingly drive to St. Francis Hospital in downtown Greenville.
>
> The guns used to shoot the victims was or were a .380 caliber. Four shell casings found were identified by ballistics tests as having been fired from one of the .380 handguns, which were found later belonging to the defendants. Both victims have given statements that both [Applicant] and co-defendant were the individuals there that night and that Byrum was the person that shot them.

On March 17, 2019, four days later, Your Honor, deputies arrived at [and address on] Locust Hill Road in Travelers Rest and found a Ford F-150 partially in the roadway and partially in the entrance to a business. Inside the vehicle a deceased white male sitting in the driver's seat was found slumped over the center console with blood on the left and right sides of his head. It was determined that he had been shot in the head. Bullet holes were found on the car. And two .380 caliber shell casings were also found. The male was later determined as Jamie Dale Smith, age 32.

A handwritten note on a paper towel found at Smith's home was later given to investigators that stated 864 721 7109 Smokey G, Locust Hill Road, TR 29690, called 30 min, m-i-n, b I arrive. Smokey G was later identified as Adam Byrum. And the phone number was run and found to belong to Adam Byrum as well.

An attempt to arrest the defendants was carried out a day later on 3/18/19 a short distance from where these two incidents had occurred. Officers had to use a K-9 due to Byrum running to avoid apprehension.

When arrested Byrum was found in possession of [1.41] grams of methamphetamines and admitted that he had just shot meth. Both Byrum and [Applicant] are members of the Gangster Disciple Gang, which is part of the larger Folk Nation Gang.

Two females at the site of the arrest stated that Byrum was acting crazy last night and that [Applicant] had been vomiting when they got back. Byrum's sister was one of those girls and had stated that when Adam got home I took the guns from him because he was acting crazy.

[Applicant] gave a statement in these matters stating that she and Adam had planned to rob Jacori and that Kalo was an unintentional victim as they did not know he was going to be there. She stated that they each had .380 caliber handguns, walked up to the car and Byrum fired multiple rounds into the vehicle. She also stated that they knew Smith as well.

As in the case before, they went to meet Smith both armed with the .380 handguns with the plan to kill and rob him. She stated that it had been her decision to handle Smith, meaning to kill him. Several other motives have been mentioned as to why these particular individuals were chosen such as robbing the targets of drugs, and killing them to believing that Jamie Smith was a snitch to Jacori Ashley flirting with [Applicant].

(Return Attachment, Tr. 10-13). The State further handed up several pages of recovered communications between Applicant and others which supported that Applicant was a member of

the referenced gang. (Return Attachment, Tr. 13). Applicant pled guilty without contesting or qualifying any of the factual summary presented. (*See* Return Attachment, Tr. 14). The State underscored that Applicant not only had a part in the planning of the crimes, she "did give the order to kill Smith." (Return Attachment, Tr. 14).

The State also acknowledged that as a result of the plea, the State would dismiss the three charges for possession of a weapon during commission of a violent crime, and two conspiracy charges. (Return Attachment, Tr. 13).

Plea counsel acknowledged the tragic impact of the crimes, but indicated Applicant was young, only twenty-three, and had no prior record. Counsel observed the crimes appeared to "make no sense," but noted a societal "fascination ... with gang culture, hip hop culture ... the allure of video games, the movies, the music, the social media." (Return Attachment, Tr. 20-21). He asserted that Applicant "became involved with the co-defendant and this whole lifestyle." (Return Attachment, Tr. 22). He underscored her admissions, acceptance of responsibility, and "that she was completely willing and prepared to go forward and testify against her co-defendant, who ... was the shooter." (Return Attachment, Tr. 22). Plea counsel asserted Applicant "had somewhat of an awakening to this process. Believe it or not, I think there was almost like an ignorance of the severity" of her acts, "or almost a lack of appreciation for it." (Return Attachment, Tr. 23). He again underscored the "allure of the gangs" that "pull these people in" and that such a process continues to occur. (Return Attachment, Tr. 23). Applicant then addressed the plea court directly:

> I stand here today to give my apology to the victims and the people it affected. I'm not expecting your forgiveness. I just want you to know I'm sincerely sorry.
>
> I am nothing like I used to be at that time. I was under the influence of drugs and not in my right mind. I want it known that if

> I could do it over, I would change everything. Once again, I want you to know how truly sorry I am for the actions and those that I've hurt.

(Return Attachment, Tr. 24).

However, the State pointed out:

> ... I know she has said that she's changed and that that's not who she is anymore, but yet she stands before you today wearing her orange jumpsuit, her jail issued slippers with the six point Folk Nation stars drawn on the slippers. And I know they don't hand them out that way, but that's what she's wearing today. And she's got the Folk Nation sign on her slippers. I don't know how much she's changed.

(Return Attachment, Tr. 25).

Judge Verdin noted the crimes "couldn't be more heinous... It just could not be more heinous." (Return Attachment, Tr. 27). Judge Verdin, nonetheless, considered the mitigation presented and particularly that she was not the shooter; that she had no prior record; and that she was willing to cooperate with the State. (Return Attachment, Tr. 27). The judge sentenced Applicant thirty years imprisonment on each count of attempted murder, and forty-three years, concurrent, for murder. (Return Attachment, Tr. 28). Applicant did not appeal.

Post Conviction Relief Allegations

Applicant makes the following allegations:

1. Ineffective assistance of counsel: Attorney told me my plea deal would be for less time;

2. Under the influence of drugs when statement was made: I was high on meth when I made my statement;

3. Officer made multiple mistakes: Officer called me "Smith" and said a shooting happened on 3-13-19.

(Application at 3).

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

In addition to carefully considering the record and the arguments presented by counsel, this Court has also had the opportunity to consider the testimony presented at the PCR evidentiary hearings and has weighed the testimony accordingly. Set forth below are the relevant findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by S.C. Code Ann. §17-27-80 (2003).

Ineffective Assistance Claims

For claims that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, this Court is guided by the familiar test: To show a violation of the Sixth Amendment, an applicant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and but for counsel's error, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. *Strickland v. Washington,* 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); *Simpson v. Moore,* 367 S.C. 587, 595–96, 627 S.E.2d 701, 706 (2006). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome" of the trial. *Strickland,* at 694. It is presumed that counsel made all decisions in exercise of reasonable judgment. *Strickland,* at 689. It is an applicant's burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, an entitlement to relief. Rule 71.1 (e), SCRCP. *See also Speaks v. State*, 377 S.C. 396, 399, 660 S.E.2d 512, 514 (2008) ("the burden of proof is on the applicant to prove the allegations in his application"). For a guilty plea, the analysis varies slightly as the issue is, at bottom, the voluntariness of the plea.

"Where, as here, a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea process and enters [the] plea upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice 'was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.' " *Hill v. Lockhart*, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (quoting *McMann v. Richardson*, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). Indeed, "[a] defendant who enters a plea on the advice of counsel may only attack the voluntary

and intelligent character of the plea by showing that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the defendant would not have pled guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial." *Kolle v. State*, 386 S.C. 578, 588, 690 S.E.2d 73, 78 (2010) (quoting *Rolen v. State*, 384 S.C. 409, 413, 683 S.E.2d 471, 474 (2009)); *Burket v. Angelone*, 208 F.3d 172, 189 (4th Cir. 2000) (same). This is the *Strickland* test as applied in the guilty plea context. *See also Taylor v. State*, 404 S.C. 350, 360, 745 S.E.2d 97, 102 (2013) ("In the context of a guilty plea, the deficiency prong inquiry turns on whether the plea was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered.").

Notably, statements made during a guilty plea should be considered true: "... accuracy and truth of an accused's statements at ... his guilty plea ... are 'conclusively' established by that proceeding unless and until he makes some reasonable allegation why this should not be so." *Crawford v. United States*, 519 F.2d 347, 350 (4th Cir. 1975), *overruled on other grounds by United States v. Whitley*, 759 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1985); *Dalton v. State*, 376 S.C. 130, 137–38, 654 S.E.2d 870, 874 (Ct. App. 2007) (same).

The record here supports that the plea was a voluntary choice among alternatives as guided by counsel against which Applicant had no complaints at the time of the plea. (*See* Return Attachment, Tr. 6). Applicant's testimony at the PCR hearing that counsel misinformed her of the negotiated sentence, and that counsel failed to challenge the voluntariness of her statement though he was aware that she was intoxicated at the time, are against the weight of the contemporaneous record and plea counsel's credible testimony. This Court find Applicant's testimony on these points is simply not in the least credible. Further, this Court finds that Applicant's claims that she was intoxicated on methamphetamine when she gave a statement to law enforcement officers, and that a law enforcement officer made mistakes as to Applicant's name and the date of one of the

crimes, may not be heard on the merits as her knowing and voluntary plea acts as a waiver and bar to all non-jurisdictional errors and complaints.

Allegation Counsel Advised Applicant Plea Agreement was for Less Time

Applicant testified at the hearing that counsel advised her she would receive less time. Counsel testified at the hearing that was not the case. Considering the contemporaneous record of the plea, with the specifics of the negotiations set out and uncontested before Judge Verdin, this Court credits plea counsel's testimony. Further, Applicant's testimony was not credible in many respects.

The "prejudice prong ordinarily requires more than simply a defendant's assertion that but for counsel's deficient performance he would not have pled but would have gone to trial." *Stalk v. State*, 383 S.C. 559, 563, 681 S.E.2d 592, 595 (2009). Notably, the Supreme Court has instructed: "Courts should not upset a plea solely because of *post hoc* assertions from a defendant about how he would have pleaded but for his attorney's deficiencies. Judges should instead look to contemporaneous evidence to substantiate a defendant's expressed preferences." *Lee v. United States,* 582 U.S. 357, 369 (2017). Our Supreme Court has similarly found that "*Hill* makes clear that th[e] prejudice prong ordinarily requires more than simply a defendant's assertion that but for counsel's deficient performance he would not have pled but would have gone to trial." *Stalk*, at 563, 681 S.E.2d at 595; *see also Taylor v. State,* 404 S.C. 350, 362, 745 S.E.2d 97, 103 (2013) ("Despite Petitioner's assertions to the contrary, there is probative evidence in the Record before us that he would not have chosen to proceed to trial"); *Goins v. State*, 397 S.C. 568, 575, 726 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2012) ("Although Goins testified at the PCR hearing that he accepted the plea because of the erroneous advice on the suppression of the evidence, his testimony specifically was found not to be credible. We therefore find evidence to support the PCR court's finding that Goins failed

to prove he was prejudiced by counsel's ineffective assistance because he has not demonstrated he would have gone to trial absent the erroneous advice.").

"To find a guilty plea is voluntarily and knowingly entered into, the record must establish the defendant had a full understanding of the consequences of his plea and the charges against him." *Dalton v. State*, 376 S.C. 130, 138, 654 S.E.2d 870, 874 (Ct. App. 2007). "A defendant's knowing and voluntary waiver of the constitutional rights which accompany a guilty plea may be accomplished by colloquy between the Court and the defendant, between the Court and defendant's counsel, or both." *Id.*, (quoting *Pittman v. State*, 337 S.C. 597, 600, 524 S.E.2d 623, 625 (1999)). "In determining guilty plea issues, it is proper to consider the guilty plea transcript as well as evidence at the PCR hearing." *Suber v. State*, 371 S.C. 554, 558, 640 S.E.2d 884, 886 (2007).

Here, the terms of the agreement were fully set out on the record, including that the State would dismiss the three charges for possession of a weapon during commission of a violent crime, and two conspiracy charges. (Return Attachment, Tr. 13). After the judge's detailed explanation, Applicant responded to Judge Verdin that she understood that she faced up to thirty years for attempted murder, and thirty to life for murder, and even further, that the sentences were to be served day for day, not subject to early release credits or parole. (Return Attachment, Tr. 5). Applicant also responded to Judge Verdin that no one had made any promises to her for the guilty plea. (Return Attachment, Tr. 6). Applicant further assured Judge Verdin that she was "clear headed," taking her appropriate medication, and was "not under the influence of anything." (Return Attachment, Tr. 7-8). Applicant's PCR testimony that she was promised a lesser sentence than received is plainly not credible. The evidence shows Applicant's only expectation was the dismissal of charges, which is not contested. Counsel was not ineffective in any way regarding

the terms of the agreement. Simply, Applicant "received the benefit of the agreement for which [s]he bargained and cannot now complain." *Rollison v. State*, 346 S.C. 506, 511–12, 552 S.E.2d 290, 293 (2001).

To the extent that Applicant's testimony could be construed as her expectation or hope of a lesser sentence, that neither shows any deficiency in plea counsel's representation nor the possibility of an involuntary plea. *Wolfe v. State*, 326 S.C. 158, 485 S.E.2d 367 (1997) (fact that defendant "hoped" and "expected" to get reduced sentence does not render plea invalid); *Harres v. Leeke*, 282 S.C. 131, 318 S.E.2d 360 (1984) (fact that defendant "thought" judge would give lighter sentence not a basis for relief). At any rate, the detailed information conveyed by Judge Verdin should have cured any misunderstanding Applicant may have held on her own. In fact, had counsel made an error in advice, which this Court finds he did not, any such error would have been cured by Judge Verdin's express and clear explanation. *Moorehead v. State*, 329 S.C. 329, 333, 496 S.E.2d 415, 416 (1998) ("When considering an allegation on PCR that a guilty plea was based on inaccurate advice of counsel, the transcript of the guilty plea hearing will be considered to determine whether any possible error by counsel was cured by the information conveyed at the plea hearing."). Applicant has failed in her burden of proof.

State's Motion to Dismiss

In its Return, the State moved to dismiss two of Applicant's claims as a matter of law, specifically, Applicant's claim that she was intoxicated on methamphetamine when she gave her statement to law enforcement, and that the office made certain mistakes during the investigation. (Return at 4-5). The State asserted that Applicant entered a voluntary plea, and a voluntary plea acts as a waiver of non-jurisdictional claims or alleged constitutional violations. (Return at 4-5). This Court agrees.

"Few principles of South Carolina criminal law are as ingrained as the notion that a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent guilty plea 'constitutes a waiver of nonjurisdictional defects and claims of violations of constitutional rights.'" *State v. Sims*, 423 S.C. 397, 400, 814 S.E.2d 632, 633 (2018) (quoting *State v. Rice*, 401 S.C. 330, 331-32, 737 S.E.2d 485, 485 (2013)). "[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the plea . . . ." *Rice*, at 332, 737 S.E.2d at 486 (brackets in original) (quoting *Tollett v. Henderson*, 411 U.S. 258 (1973)).

"It is beyond dispute that a guilty plea must be both knowing and voluntary." *Parke v. Raley*, 506 U.S. 20, 29 (1992). It is also clear the record should reflect that voluntary choice. *Boykin v. Alabama*, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) ("a guilty plea should only be accepted where the record evidences 'an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary.'"). That record is established "by colloquy between the court and defendant, between the court and defendant's counsel, or both." *Roddy v. State*, 339 S.C. 29, 34, 528 S.E.2d 418, 421 (2000) (citing *State v. Ray*, 310 S.C. 431, 437, 427 S.E.2d 171, 174 (1993)).

Applicant affirmed under oath to Judge Verdin that she understood her trial rights and that she would be waiving those rights in pleading guilty. (Return Attachment, Tr. 6.) The judge advised of the potential sentences for the crimes. (Return Attachment, Tr. 5). Judge Verdin also inquired if Applicant was satisfied with counsel, and Applicant indicated she was. (Return Attachment, Tr. 6). The judge also ensured that Applicant was not coerced, or promised anything, or under the influence of anything when making the critical decision to plead guilty, and that she

understood the process of the plea and the questions being posed to her, "what[was] happening" at the plea. (Return Attachment, Tr. 6-8). After listening to the solicitor's recitation of facts, Applicant affirmed that she wished to plead guilty. (Return Attachment, Tr. 10-14). Further, Applicant admitted guilt and remorse for her crime. (Return Attachment, Tr. 24). The record supports a voluntary plea. Consequently, Applicant cannot challenge the veracity of the statements she made to law enforcement and the conduct of their investigation after admitting guilt by nature of the guilty plea. *Sims, supra.*

Notably, though, Applicant did not even present any credible evidence that could have given any support to her assertions had the claims been allowed. First, as indicated, Applicant accepted responsibility at the plea. The fact of admission of guilt in open court weighs heavily in finding no basis to reverse. *See State v. Wiley,* 387 S.C. 490, 497, 692 S.E.2d 560, 564 (Ct. App. 2010). *See also State v. Sroka,* 267 S.C. 664, 665, 230 S.E.2d 816, 817 (1976) ("We affirm because the guilt of the appellant is conclusively shown by the record and any alleged error could not have been prejudicial. Any doubt about the correctness of this conclusion is eliminated by the admission of appellant in open court ..."). Second, as counsel credibly testified at the PCR hearing, there was nothing in the recorded statement or any of his communications with his client to support that she was under the influence of drugs at the time she gave the statement.[2] Third, Applicant admitted at the PCR hearing that she also signed and/or initialed documents confirming the voluntariness of the statement, and also gave consent for a DNA sample and a search (which she did not contest). Fourth, Applicant admitted during cross-examination at the PCR hearing that she had made a

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[2] The basis for suppression of an involuntary confession is tied to a showing of coercive police activity. *See Colorado v. Connelly,* 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986). "A defendant's mental condition in and of itself does not render a statement involuntary in violation of due process." *State v. Hill,* 361 S.C. 297, 306, 604 S.E.2d 696, 701 (2004). There is no allegation of coercive police activity.

remarkably similar suggestion of being under the influence of drugs during the crime(s) in hopes of lessening assessment of culpability, but then also stated that she was taking responsibility. And, again in the same vein of hoping to lessen her sentence, at the plea, suggested some type of change in herself, but could identify no change that actually occurred – in fact, she admitted at the PCR hearing that she had incidents of violence while in custody and still embraced gang affiliation. Applicant's testimony appears subject to change or simply formed for the situation at hand, and is, at any rate, not in the least credible. And fifth, part of the case for requesting less than a life sentence was based on the fact Applicant had confessed and cooperated with the State. Applicant's attempt to attack the statement collaterally after having expressly relied upon the statement for benefit is clearly suspect. Applicant's late assertion of an involuntary statement due to drug use is not credible. Further, as noted above, had the voluntariness of the statement been suspicious in the least, the admission of guilt at the plea and the express remorse, together, confirm it was not untrue or false in any way. Again, if the claim could be heard, there is no credible evidence that could conceivably warrant any relief.

Finally, Applicant's second allegation regarding an incorrect reference to her as "Smith," if true, is of no moment. Clearly, Applicant was the individual being questioned, and, as noted, one of her victims was named Smith. Again, this Court finds Applicant's testimony on these points is simply not credible, but even so, it does not support that any relief is due.

But to be clear, this Court finds that Applicant has failed to show counsel was ineffective in his advice concerning sentencing and the plea may not be set aside. Further, the record demonstrates a knowing and voluntary plea entered with the assistance of counsel. Consequently, Applicant may not now challenge the statement as her ability to do so was waived by entry of the knowing and voluntary plea. *Sims, supra.*

CONCLUSION

For the above stated reasons, this Court finds that Applicant failed to carry her burden of proof. Therefore, this application for post-conviction relief must be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. Applicant's application for post-conviction relief is denied and dismissed with prejudice; and

2. Applicant is remanded to the custody of Respondent for completion of her sentence.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED this 22nd **day of** January **, 2024.**

J. DERHAM COLE
Presiding Judge

Spartanburg, South Carolina.

Copy mailed to
Attorney general / Scarlett Moore
on 1 / 31 / 2024.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this date, March 1, 2024, I served a copy of the **Notice of Appeal** on opposing counsel to her address, and by affixing proper postage and putting into the U.S. Mail.

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

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