

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE SUPREME COURT

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S.C. SUPREME COURT

On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeals
Appeal from Greenville County
Honorable Alex Kinlaw, Jr., Circuit Court Judge
Appellate Case No. 2023-000601

THE STATE,

Respondent,

vs.

JASON EDWIN STOOTS,

Petitioner.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON CERTIORARI

I.

“Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that the trial judge properly refused to charge the jury with the law on self-defense when there was evidence presented that Petitioner acted in self-defense?”

II.

“Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that the trial judge properly refused to charge the jury with the law on the defense of accident when there was evidence presented that while acting in self-defense, Petitioner accidentally struck his wife causing injury?”

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON CERTIORARI

I.

Did the Court of Appeals correctly conclude the trial judge properly declined to instruct the jury on self-defense when no evidence was presented that Petitioner acted intentionally in self-defense? Furthermore, was Petitioner prejudiced by the absence of the requested self-defense instruction under the circumstances involved?

II.

Did the Court of Appeals correctly conclude the trial court did not err by declining to instruct the jury on accident when the trial court properly instructed the jury it needed to find criminal intent beyond a reasonable doubt in order to be able to convict Petitioner? Furthermore, under the circumstances involved, was Petitioner prejudiced by the absence of the specific requested language on accident?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In October of 2018, Petitioner Jason Edwin Stoots was arrested following an investigation into an incident that led to his estranged wife being transported by ambulance to a hospital emergency room to receive treatment for injuries she had sustained. In January of 2020, the Greenville County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner for first-degree domestic violence. On March 3, 2020, a jury trial was commenced in the Greenville County Court of General Sessions with the Honorable Alex Kinlaw, Jr., circuit court judge, presiding. At the conclusion of the two-day trial, the jury convicted Petitioner of the lesser-included offense of second-degree domestic violence. Following the verdict, the trial judge sentenced Petitioner to a three-year term of imprisonment that was suspended upon the service of an eighteen-month term of probation. Petitioner then timely filed and perfected an appeal.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals—following briefing—issued an unpublished opinion unanimously affirming Petitioner’s conviction. State v. Stoots, Op. No. 2023-UP-051 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Feb. 8, 2023). Thereafter, Petitioner petitioned the Court of Appeals for rehearing, and the petition was denied. Petitioner then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court, and that petition was granted on December 12, 2023.¹

¹ The State acknowledges the deeply-appreciated work of Senior Assistant Attorney General David Spencer, who previously represented the State in Petitioner’s case and prepared the return to the petition for a writ of certiorari. (Return to Cert., pp. 1-18). In its Brief of Respondent, the State has now incorporated a substantial portion of that return.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Petitioner punched his estranged wife, Kimberly Stoots (“Victim”), in the parking lot of a Taco Bell. (R. p. 64). Victim bled profusely as reflected in the photograph introduced during trial. (R. p. 71; p. 248). In that photograph, Victim is seen in a hospital gown with blood on her mouth and chin, and she is holding a thick plastic bag full of her own blood. (R. p. 71; p. 248). Victim’s tooth was displaced as a result of the punch, and it was still displaced by the time of Petitioner’s trial. (R. p. 64; p. 73).

During trial, Victim testified she was married to Petitioner for thirty years and they raised two children together. (R. p. 60). However, they were living separately at the time of the attack. (R. p. 62). Before trial, Petitioner called her and told her the best thing was for her to not show up for trial. (R. pp. 60-61). On October 30, 2018, Petitioner picked her up because they needed groceries for their children, and they went to the drive-thru line at Taco Bell. (R. pp. 62-63). However, Petitioner was already agitated over a bad day at work. (R. p. 62). They got into an argument prompted by a long line at the drive-thru, and that led to Petitioner punching Victim. (R. pp. 62-64). Before he struck her, Victim had not physically touched Petitioner a single time while they were inside the vehicle together. (R. p. 68).

Following the punch, Victim began bleeding, and she described it as like a “waterfall of blood.” (R. p. 64). She asked Petitioner to allow her to call an ambulance and he said no. (R. p. 64). Instead, Petitioner sprayed her in the face with Windex to try and clean the blood off her. (R. pp. 64-65). They drove around to various convenience stores in search of the particular brand of cigarettes he wanted. (R. p. 65). She asked for him to let her out of the car, but he would not let her unless she jumped. (R. pp. 64-65). At some point, blood sprayed on Petitioner

as Victim's spoke—spindrift from Victim's "waterfall." (R. p. 64; p. 67). Petitioner complained she was attacking him with her blood. (R. pp. 65-67).

Eventually, Victim was able to leave the car and go to her uncle's house and then drove herself to her parents' house. (R. pp. 68-70). Upon arriving there, her concerned family members called an ambulance that took her to the hospital due to her condition. (R. pp. 68-70).

Margie Bishop, Victim's mother, testified Victim arrived at their house, bloody, with a swollen nose, lip, and chin. (R. pp. 82-84). Victim's niece, Courtney Bishop, provided similar testimony, noting Victim was scared and upset. (R. pp. 87-90). Courtney noticed Victim was covered with a mixture of wet and dried blood. (R. pp. 87-90).

Dr. Christopher Carey testified he was the second doctor to treat Victim. (R. pp. 49-51). She arrived by ambulance at 12:30 a.m. (R. p. 51). He began his shift the next morning and saw her at approximately 7:00 a.m. (R. p. 50). He testified the records reflected swelling and bruising to Victim's face, a cut to the inner lip, and "one of the upper teeth was displaced posteriorly." (R. p. 51). Her injuries led to a significant amount of bleeding. (R. p. 51).

Initially, medical staff used a powder known as QuikClot, which did not work. (R. pp. 51-52). Her bleeding worsened when she laid back for a CT scan, and they provided a second medication to stop the bleeding. (R. pp. 51-52). Victim received the CT scan because the extent of her injuries raised concerns of possible bleeding inside the brain. (R. p. 52).

Following treatment, Dr. Carey prescribed a narcotic pain medication to Victim. (R. p. 52). On cross-examination, Dr. Carey testified the records indicated past methamphetamine use and a mood disorder. (R. pp. 55-56). However, that information was contained in her medical records and not something he diagnosed that day. (R. pp. 55-58).

Petitioner testified on his own behalf. (R. p. 100). He claimed Victim was the person agitated that day and she had an episode while they were in the drive-thru line at Taco Bell. (R. pp. 106-107). Petitioner testified Victim said a female was tracking his radio signals. (R. pp. 106-107). She started “throwing” her arms and hit Petitioner. (R. pp. 107-108). Petitioner claimed he was trying to hold her wrists to keep from being hit and his hand hit her in the mouth. (R. pp. 107-108). Petitioner claimed he did not intend to hit her and he did not hit her hard. (R. pp. 106-108). He admitted he used Windex and asserted he did so in an effort to help Victim because she was bleeding. (R. pp. 108-109). Petitioner claimed he drove to a store because Victim wanted him to buy her a drink and cigarettes. (R. p. 109). At the store, she yelled out the window that Petitioner was kidnapping her. (R. p. 109). He claimed she then said he was transferring money to the store clerk and she became even more irate. (R. pp. 108-110). According to Petitioner, Victim first asked him to take her to the hospital and then changed her mind and told him to take her to her uncle’s house. (R. p. 110).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In criminal cases, an appellate court sits to review only errors of law, and it is bound by the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006). An appellate court will not reverse the trial court's decision regarding a jury charge absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Mattison, 388 S.C. 469, 479, 697 S.E.2d 578, 583-584 (2010). The appellant's case must have been prejudiced in order to reverse an appellant's verdict on the basis of an erroneous jury charge. State v. Lee-Grigg, 374 S.C. 388, 415, 649 S.E.2d 41, 55 (Ct. App. 2007), aff'd, 387 S.C. 310, 692 S.E.2d 895 (2010); see Brown v. Pearson, 326 S.C. 409, 417, 483 S.E.2d 477, 481 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding "[a]n error not shown to be prejudicial does not constitute grounds for reversal").

ARGUMENT

I.

Because no evidence was presented that Petitioner acted intentionally in self-defense, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded the trial court properly declined to instruct the jury on self-defense. Furthermore, Petitioner was not prejudiced by the absence of the requested self-defense instruction, especially since he did not arm himself in self-defense.

Petitioner claims he was entitled to a jury instruction for self-defense despite insisting at trial that he hit Victim by accident. No evidence supports a self-defense instruction because self-defense is an intentional act and Petitioner did not testify he struck Victim intentionally. Petitioner attempts to circumvent this deficiency by arguing he held Victim's hands or arms in self-defense. Petitioner was not charged with holding her arms or hands—Petitioner was charged and convicted for punching Victim in the mouth so hard that she dislocated a tooth and bled profusely.

In its unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals correctly found Petitioner did not present any evidence that he struck Victim intentionally in self-defense. As additional sustaining grounds, the Court of Appeals found that Petitioner did not meet the four elements of self-defense and further, used excessive force. State v. Stoots, 2023-UP-051 (S.C. Ct. App. filed February 8, 2023). The Court of Appeals correctly determined the trial court did not err.

Petitioner testifies it was an accident

Petitioner testified he picked up his wife and she was “upset, angry, just agitated, said she [did not have] anything to eat or drink or food for several days, and I said I would take her and get whatever she needed.” (R. p. 106). They went to Taco Bell. (R. p. 106). There, Victim “was just talking random -- a lot of random things. She was upset.” (R. p. 106). Victim said there was a female that Petitioner did not see who was tracking his radio signals from an infusion

pump that was medically inserted in Petitioner for his past injuries. (R. p. 106). Petitioner said Victim had a history of saying these kind of these things. (R. p. 107). Petitioner answered affirmatively when asked if Victim attacked him. (R. p. 107). He then testified:

She just got irate and upset about the person that was tracking the radio signals. I have a vision problem. I couldn't see from a distance, just maybe 100 yards. And she was just upset, throwing arms. And she hit me, and I just grabbed both her arms, so, you know, it was like push and pull.

And then the next thing I know, it was just -- I felt my hand -- the back side of my hand hit her right there.

(R. pp. 107-108). Petitioner said he did not mean to hit Victim in the mouth. (R. p. 108).

Defense counsel asked if Petitioner struck “her hard in the mouth[,]” and Petitioner answered, “No. I mean, I was just holding her wrist and all that and it was going back and forth. It was accidental.” (R. p. 108). He immediately added, “*There was no intent whatsoever.*” (R. p. 108) (emphasis added).

On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked if Petitioner was scared Victim would hurt him and he answered, “No, because when she has these episodes-- I’ve been trying for years to help her.” (R. p. 112).

When asked by the prosecutor if Victim attacked him, Petitioner answered, “She started throwing her arms around me and started hitting me.” (R. p. 114). He claimed he had scratches on his neck from the incident. (R. p. 114). Cross-examination led to the prosecutor asking, “Did she want to be hit in the mouth?” and Petitioner answered, “I did not do that.” (R. p. 119).

During redirect, Petitioner confirmed he did not want to hurt Victim at the Taco Bell drive-thru. (R. p. 122).

Requested instruction

Petitioner requested the following instruction:

A person is entitled to defend against reasonably anticipated unlawful bodily harm even though it would not be serious, but in defending, he must respond proportionally.

A person is not entitled to self-defense unless the person was without fault in bringing on the difficulty.

(R. p. 251).

A judge should decline a self-defense instruction if unsupported by evidence at trial

“A jury charge on self-defense is not required unless it is supported by the evidence.”

State v. Wigington, 375 S.C. 25, 31, 649 S.E.2d 185, 188 (Ct. App. 2007). Petitioner’s testimony lacks any evidence of an intentional act. “If the harm was caused by accident, the defendant is not criminally responsible because of the absence of criminal intent. It is precisely the lack of intent that separates accident from self-defense, for self-defense ‘admits an intentional killing, and sets up as justification a necessity to kill in order to save the accused from death or serious bodily harm, whereas a defense of homicide by accident denies that the killing was intentional.’ ” State v. Owens, 427 S.C. 325, 330, 831 S.E.2d 126, 128 (Ct. App. 2019) (quoting State v. McDaniel, 68 S.C. 304, 317, 47 S.E. 384, 389 (1904)), aff’d, 433 S.C. 482, 860 S.E.2d 357 (2021). Although a murder case, Owens conveys the requirement of intent for self-defense regardless of the resulting injury. Absent in this case is any evidence that Petitioner intentionally punched Victim in self-defense. Therefore, a self-defense instruction was not warranted.

Petitioner cites to cases where some evidence is provided that a defendant armed themselves in self-defense and then accidentally caused harm with the weapon. State v. White, 425 S.C. 304, 311, 821 S.E.2d 523, 527 (Ct. App. 2018); State v. Williams, 400 S.C. 308, 314, 733 S.E.2d 605, 608-609 (Ct. App. 2012); see State v. Burriss, 334 S.C. 256, 262, 513 S.E.2d 104, 108 (1999) (finding a person may be acting lawfully, even if he is in unlawful possession of a weapon, if the person is entitled to arm themselves in self-defense, and therefore is entitled to

an instruction on accident if the weapon discharges accidentally). In the instant case, Petitioner did not arm himself and there was no dispute as to whether he could lawfully restrain his wife from hitting him. Petitioner was not charged with trying to hold her hands, he was charged for the punch that dislocated a tooth and left Victim holding a bag of her own blood. Petitioner denied striking her hard, even accidentally. (R. p. 108). Note Petitioner was not charged with kidnapping. The only controversy was whether Petitioner intentionally punched Victim, as testified to by Victim, or whether it was an accident, as testified to by Petitioner. Therefore, the evidence did not support self-defense nor was a self-defense instruction necessary to the determination of whether Petitioner had the criminal intent to cause the harm.

Petitioner failed to show evidence of all four elements of self-defense. In order for a defendant to be entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense, evidence of the following four elements must be presented:

(1) The defendant must be without fault in bringing on the difficulty; (2) the defendant must have been in actual imminent danger of losing his life or sustaining serious bodily injury, or he must have actually believed he was in imminent danger of losing his life or sustaining serious bodily injury; (3) if his defense is based upon his belief of imminent danger, defendant must show that a reasonably prudent person of ordinary firmness and courage would have entertained the belief that he was actually in imminent danger and that the circumstances were such as would warrant a person of ordinary prudence, firmness, and courage to strike the fatal blow in order to save himself from serious bodily harm or the loss of his life; and (4) the defendant had no other probable means of avoiding the danger.

State v. Day, 341 S.C. 410, 416, 535 S.E.2d 431, 434 (2000). Wholly absent is any evidence Petitioner believed he was in imminent danger of losing his life or sustaining serious bodily injury. Cf. State v. Bruno, 322 S.C. 534, 536-537, 473 S.E.2d 450, 452 (1996) (“Since Bruno

presented no evidence that he believed he was in imminent danger of losing his life or sustaining serious bodily injury, he fails the second element of self-defense.”).

Petitioner argues he is allowed to act in self-defense when threatened by even non-serious injury. Case law on this point is less developed in South Carolina. In City of Gaffney v. Putnam, 197 S.C. 237, 15 S.E.2d 130 (1941), the defendant espoused his religious sect at a street corner and seemingly denounced all other sects. A bypassing pedestrian took offense, and attacked the defendant, “administer[ing] a severe beating to the defendant.” Id. at 237, 15 S.E.2d at 131. The Supreme Court found the evidence did not support a verdict for a city ordinance akin to breach of the peace, noting as follows: “One acting in self-defense to repel an unlawful attack is not guilty of assault; he may repel force with force and continue his self defense as long as the danger apparently continues.” Id.

Perhaps then, under Putnam, Petitioner could lawfully repel any attack on him if necessary. Nonetheless, Petitioner did not testify he punched Victim out of necessity to repel her attack. He testified the back of his hand hit her *accidentally*. Putnam does not call for the trial court to circumvent the requirement of an intentional act to support a jury instruction and there is no evidence that Petitioner punched Victim intentionally in self-defense.

Further, the law of self-defense is based on the simple concepts of necessity, reasonableness, and proportionality. If there is reasonable means to avoid the danger rather than engage in violence, the necessity to resort to force does not exist, and therefore, neither should self-defense. See State v. Beckham, 24 S.C. 283, 285 (1886) (noting “[a]ll the authorities agree that the right of self-defence rests upon necessity . . .”).

This is demonstrated in a North Carolina case in which, according to the defendant, a “bad woman” threw stones at him and hit him with a stick, so he dismounted his horse and struck

her with a stick. State v. Gibson, 32 N.C. 214 (N.C. 1849). The North Carolina Supreme Court noted that “the law does not justify any assault by way of retaliation or revenge for a previous one by the prosecutrix, but only in the defendant’s own defence. . . . [I]n cases of battery merely, the party, who strikes another, must be guilty, unless he be justified in committing it, as an act of self-defence; . . .” Id. at 215. The North Carolina Supreme Court found evidence supported the jury’s verdict because “the prosecutrix was a woman and several yards from the defendant, then on horseback on the opposite side of the fence, he could not have believed himself in further danger from her, and therefore that his alighting from his horse and going the several yards to her and striking her with a stick on the head, was not in defence of himself, but an act of unmanly aggression on her.” Id. at 216.

Necessity and proportionality remain the essential components of self-defense, even with the use of non-lethal force to repel a slighter attack. This was the repeated theme in Golden v. State, 1 S.C. 292 (1870), which cited Gibson favorably and analyzed the defendant police officer’s use of force against a drunken wagon driver. Following its discussion of several cases, including Gibson, the Supreme Court announced: “*Conclusion.* – Enough has now been said to show conclusively that the rule of law prevailing, both in England, in the various States of the Union, and particularly in South Carolina, limits the force which may be justified to the actual necessities of the immediate case.” Golden, at 4.

Duty to retreat

The question of the duty to retreat in this case is simply academic because there was no evidence Petitioner intended to act in self-defense—Victim testified she was struck without provocation and Petitioner claims she was struck by accident.

However, self-defense is a rule of necessity and the ability to retreat renders use of force unnecessary. Therefore, the rule in Golden and its recognition of Putnam's holding shows the common law of South Carolina requires that even the use of non-lethal force as a resort is lawful only when retreat is not a viable option. The common duty to retreat originates in English common law as a policy that preservation of life and aversion to violence was paramount. See J. Dave Williamson, Untying the Hands of Prosecutors in "Stand Your Ground" States: Rethinking the Jury Charge on Reasonableness for Altercations Occurring Outside One's Home, 6 J. Marshall L.J. 243, 248-249 (Fall 2012). However, American judges and scholars in the nineteenth century rejected the English rule on the reasoning that a "true man" without fault should not be obliged to flee from an assailant. See id. Of course, South Carolina never adopted this now-archaic rationale and retained the duty to retreat or otherwise avoid the danger. See State v. Jackson, 384 S.C. 29, 37, 681 S.E.2d 17, 21 (Ct. App. 2009) ("Unless the incident occurred in the accused's home or business or on the curtilage thereof, the accused generally has a duty to retreat.").

The Alaska Supreme Court in Miller v. State, 462 P.2d 421, 426 (Alaska 1969), held it would not continue to recognize the common law right to resist an unlawful arrest and articulated a policy argument applicable to the issue in instant case, opining, "The control of man's destructive and aggressive impulses is one of the great unsolved problems of our society. Our rules of law should discourage the unnecessary use of physical force between man and man."

While historically, the majority of other jurisdictions have found no duty to retreat before using non-deadly force, a notable exception exists. Massachusetts courts find the use of deadly or nondeadly force is impermissible in self-defense where retreat is practical. Commonwealth v. Tirado, 842 N.E.2d 980, 985 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006). Accordingly, retreat is predicate to the use

of deadly or *nondeadly* force in self-defense. See Commonwealth v. Bastarache, 414 N.E.2d 984, 996 n. 15 (Mass. 1980). The holding of one case from Massachusetts resonates to the instant case: “While the defendant may have had an equal right to remain on the public street, the measure of a duty to retreat is not equality of right to remain in the face of an unreasonable demand, but the ability to retreat.” Commonwealth v. Toon, 773 N.E.2d 993, 1004 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002).

Petitioner’s analogy to Section 16-11-440(C) of the South Carolina Code of Laws fails because the legislature could easily have authorized the use of non-lethal force without a duty to retreat in response to an assault without the risk of serious bodily injury and failed to do so. See German Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Charleston, 352 S.C. 600, 576 S.E.2d 150 (2003) (recognizing the existence of the statutory construction doctrine of “*expressio unius est exclusio alterius*”).

Further, Petitioner was not prejudiced by the lack of a self-defense instruction. As will be discussed in the second issue, the trial court instructed the jury on criminal intent and the need for the jury to find it beyond a reasonable doubt. If the jury believed Petitioner’s version of events or had a reasonable doubt about Victim’s version of events, it would have acquitted Petitioner because it would have found that the State failed to prove Petitioner acted with criminal intent. Therefore, any error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Mitchell, 286 S.C. 572, 573, 336 S.E.2d 150, 151 (1985) (holding whether an error is harmless depends on the circumstances of the case, but it is harmless where it could not reasonably have changed the outcome of the trial).

II.

Because the trial court properly instructed the jury it needed to find criminal intent beyond a reasonable doubt in order to be able to convict Petitioner, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded the trial court did not err by declining to instruct the jury on accident. Furthermore, under the circumstances involved, Petitioner was not prejudiced by the absence of the specific requested language on accident.

The trial judge is required to charge only the current and correct law of South Carolina. State v. Zeigler, 364 S.C. 94, 106, 610 S.E.2d 859, 865 (Ct. App. 2005). The law to be charged must be determined from the evidence presented at trial. State v. Knoten, 347 S.C. 296, 302, 555 S.E.2d 391, 394 (2001). Further, the substance of the law must be charged to the jury, not any particular verbiage. State v. Adkins, 353 S.C. 312, 318-319, 577 S.E.2d 460, 464 (Ct. App. 2003). A judge's charge to a jury is sufficient if, as a whole, it is substantially correct and covers the law applicable to the case. State v. Burton, 302 S.C. 494, 498, 397 S.E.2d 90, 92 (1990).

Further, it is a "general rule that a trial judge should refrain from all comment which tends to indicate to the jury his opinion on the credibility of the witnesses, the weight of the evidence, or the guilt of the accused." State v. Jackson, 297 S.C. 523, 526, 377 S.E.2d 570, 572 (1989); see also S.C. Const. art. V, § 21 ("Judges shall not charge juries in respect to matters of fact, but shall declare the law."). Trial judges should refrain from providing requested instructions that may constitute "an improper court-sponsored emphasis of a fact in evidence[.]" State v. Burdette, 427 S.C. 490, 503, 832 S.E.2d 575, 582 (2019).

The defense of accident is generally discussed in the context of homicide cases. "A homicide will be excusable on the ground of accident when (1) the killing was unintentional, (2) the defendant was acting lawfully, and (3) due care was exercised in the handling of the weapon." State v. Chapman, 336 S.C. 149, 153, 519 S.E.2d 100, 102 (1999). Significantly, "[i]f the harm was caused by accident, the defendant is not criminally responsible *because of the*

absence of criminal intent.” Owens, 427 S.C at 330, 831 S.E.2d at 128 (emphasis added and citation and internal quotations omitted).

In State v. Owens, 433 S.C. 482, 483, 860 S.E.2d 357, 358 (2021), this Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’s holding but refrained from reviewing the propriety of its suggested accident charge. Yet, this Court tellingly observed, “[A]ny plea of accident in a murder case does not change the State’s burden of proof as to its case in chief. To prove murder, as we have held many times, the State must prove a voluntary and intentional act with malice.” Id. at 483-484, 860 S.E.2d at 358. What this Court’s dicta suggests is that at least in most cases, a defendant’s claim of accident does not need any special instruction where the jury instruction adequately conveys the requirement of criminal intent.

For sure, intent is a necessary element of any criminal assault, including domestic violence. See Mellen v. Lane, 377 S.C. 261, 277, 659 S.E.2d 236, 245 (Ct. App. 2008) (“There is a well- recognized distinction between criminal assault and a civil action for an assault and battery. In civil actions, the intent, while pertinent and relevant, is not an essential element.”).

In the instant case, Petitioner requested the following instruction:

As with nearly every crime, the State must prove criminal intent beyond a reasonable doubt. In order to prevail, the State must prove not only that the Defendant cause[d] some level of injury to a household member but also that he intentionally did so. As such, accidental injuries do not give rise to criminal convictions.

The defense of accident has three elements. First, the harm must be unintentional. Second, the Defendant must have been acting lawfully at the time of the incident. And third, that the injury was not the result of negligence.

(R. pp. 250-251).

The trial court declined to provide Petitioner's requested instruction to the jury.

However, the trial court did instruct the jury on the necessity of proving criminal intent, as follows:

Now, in order to establish criminal liability in a case, a criminal case, the State must prove criminal intent. And criminal intent is a matter that must be determined by you from the facts as you heard the facts. There is no way to prove criminal intent in a mathematical certainty, so the law says that criminal intent may be inferred from the circumstances. It is not necessary to establish intent by direct evidence. Intent may be established by circumstantial evidence taken into account the circumstances that are at issue. Criminal intent is a mental state of conscious wrongdoing. It is up to you to determine what the defendant intended to do based on the circumstances shown to have existed.

(R. p. 226). This followed the trial court's instruction on reasonable doubt, including the admonishment: "[A]s to any issue of fact that is essential to a finding of guilt [if] you have a reasonable doubt as to how that issue should be resolved, then it is your duty to resolve it in the defendant's favor." (R. pp. 225-226).

Therefore, the trial court instructed the jury the essence of the first paragraph of Petitioner's requested instruction, conveying that the harm must have been intentional—"conscious wrongdoing"—and the jury needed to find intent beyond a reasonable doubt. See Burton, 302 S.C. at 92, 397 S.E.2d at 496 (recognizing a judge's charge to a jury is sufficient if, as a whole, it is substantially correct and covers the law applicable to the case). The second paragraph of Petitioner's requested instruction merely places two limitations on that defense: that the defendant must have been acting lawfully and must not have been acting negligently. Petitioner was not and could not have been prejudiced by the lack of an instruction that provided two ways for the jury to disqualify his defense.

Further, the second sentence of the requested jury instruction makes a misstatement of law. It claims that the prosecution must show not only that the defendant caused “some level” of injury to the household member “but also that he intentionally did so.” However, it is inaccurate to say that the State is required to prove the defendant intended the specific injury that resulted. “There can be no doubt of the general rule of law that a person engaged in the commission of an unlawful act is legally responsible for all the consequences which naturally or necessarily flow from it[.]” State v. Williams, 189 S.C. 19, ___, 199 S.E. 906, 908 (1938); see State v. McCall, 304 S.C. 465, 470, 405 S.E.2d 414, 416 (Ct. App. 1991) (“McCall’s argument that he did not intend to kill Stroud is untenable in view of the well-established law that a person is responsible for the results of his intentional and criminal acts.”), overruled on other grounds by Brightman v. State, 336 S.C. 348, 520 S.E.2d 614 (1999). The operative question is whether Petitioner intended the act, not whether he intended the specific result. The requested instruction fails to adequately state this.

Therefore, the trial court’s instruction fully covered the applicable law in this case since an instruction on criminal intent was provided, and Petitioner was not prejudiced by the absence of his requested instruction since the jury was advised that it needed to find criminal intent beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, just as the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, Petitioner’s conviction should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION


For all the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment and conviction of the trial court should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

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