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SC Court of Appeals

**THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS**

Appeal from Dorchester County
Court of Common Pleas

Robert Bonds, Circuit Court Judge
R. Markley Dennis Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Case No. 2021-CP-18-01030
Appellate Case No. 2022-001807

Tammy China,
as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Emma Lee James,

Respondent,

v.

Palmetto Hallmark Operating, LLC
d/b/a Hallmark Healthcare Center, and
Elite Patient Care of South Carolina, PC,

Defendants,

Of which Palmetto Hallmark Operating, LLC
d/b/a Hallmark Healthcare Center is

Appellant.

FINAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT

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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

- I. Did the circuit court err in denying the Facility’s¹ motion to compel Plaintiff’s² claims to arbitration?³**
- A. Did the circuit court err in rejecting the Facility’s merger/equitable estoppel argument? More specifically, should the circuit court have found that the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement merged and that, because Ms. James effectively embraced and directly benefitted from the Admission Agreement, she, and, in turn, Plaintiff (her estate), is estopped to deny the enforceability of the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement merged therewith?**
- (1) Did the circuit court misapprehend the nature of the Facility’s merger/equitable estoppel argument?**
- (2) Is the circuit court’s merger analysis erroneous?**
- (a) Is this Court’s merger analysis in *Solesbee v. Fundamental Clinical and Operational Services, LLC*,⁴ erroneous?**
- (3) Is the circuit court’s equitable estoppel analysis erroneous?**
- B. At a minimum, should the circuit court have granted the Facility’s alternative request for permission to conduct limited discovery to address gaps in the evidentiary record bearing on the**

¹ The “Facility” refers to Defendant/Appellant, Palmetto Hallmark Operating, LLC d/b/a Hallmark Healthcare Center. It is a skilled nursing facility.

² “Plaintiff” is Plaintiff/Respondent, Tammy China (“Ms. China”), as personal representative of the Estate of Emma Lee James. “Ms. James” refers to the decedent, Emma Lee James.

³ To be clear, out of an abundance of caution, this issue, and the corresponding argument, covers circuit court error in terms of both the denial of the Facility’s principal motion and the denial of the Facility’s motion to alter, amend, and/or reconsider the denial of its principal motion.

⁴ Op. No. 5963 (S.C. Ct. App. filed January 25, 2023) (Howard Adv. Sh. No. 4 at 21).

Arbitration Agreement’s enforceability under principles relating to the law of agency?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

With the help of her daughter Emma Dunham (“Ms. Dunham”), Ms. James was admitted as a resident of the Facility in August 2018. Ms. Dunham handled the paperwork in conjunction with Ms. James’s admission, and in so doing, she signed an Admission Agreement⁵ and an Arbitration Agreement⁶ on Ms. James’s behalf.

Plaintiff commenced this wrongful death and survival action against the Facility in the Dorchester County Court of Common Pleas on June 9, 2021, based

⁵ (R. pp. 190–201.)

⁶ (R. p. 156.) Without question, the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (the “FAA”), applies to the Arbitration Agreement. For one reason, the Arbitration Agreement expressly states that the FAA applies (R. p. 156), and this must be enforced like any other contract term. *Damico v. Lennar Carolinas, LLC*, 430 S.C. 188, 196, 844 S.E.2d 66, 70 (Ct. App. 2020) (“We first consider whether the FAA applies. We hold it does, for two reasons. First, the [subject contract] provides the parties ‘specifically agree that this transaction involves interstate commerce.’ We must enforce this agreement like any other contract term.”) (citing *Munoz v. Green Tree Fin. Corp.*, 343 S.C. 531, 539, 542 S.E.2d 360, 363–64 (2001) (finding the FAA applied because the parties had agreed that the subject contract involved interstate commerce)). Moreover, and in any event, the FAA applies “to any arbitration agreement regarding a transaction that in fact involves interstate commerce, regardless of whether or not the parties contemplated an interstate transaction.” *Munoz*, 343 S.C. at 538, 542 S.E.2d at 363; *see also Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson*, 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995) (holding that the reach of the FAA extends to the broadest permissible exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause); *id.* at 273–77 (1995) (explaining that unless the parties specifically contract otherwise, the FAA applies whenever an arbitration agreement involves interstate commerce). And our Supreme Court has expressly held that skilled nursing facility admission agreements implicate interstate

on allegedly deficient care/treatment Ms. James received during her residency at the Facility. (R. pp. 22–41.)⁷ The Facility timely answered Plaintiff’s complaint on August 16, 2021, denying the alleged liability, raising a number of affirmative defenses, and expressly reserving its right to compel arbitration. (R. pp. 52–63.)

On January 21, 2022, the Facility moved to compel Plaintiff’s claims against it to arbitration based on the Arbitration Agreement that Ms. Dunham signed on behalf of Ms. James in conjunction with her admission (the “Motion to Compel Arbitration”). (R. pp. 154–213.)⁸

Following a hearing on April 13, 2022, the circuit court, the Honorable R. Markley Dennis Jr. presiding,⁹ denied the Motion to Compel Arbitration by order filed May 4, 2022. (R. pp. 5–15.) Pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCRCF, on May 16,

commerce and, thus, the FAA. *Dean v. Heritage Healthcare of Ridgeway, LLC*, 408 S.C. 371, 381–82, 759 S.E.2d 727, 732–33 (2014).

⁷ As the above caption reflects, Elite Patient Care of South Carolina, PC, is also a defendant in the case, but it is not a party to this appeal.

⁸ Without question, Plaintiff’s claims against the Facility are within the scope of the Arbitration Agreement. (R. p. 156 (“[A]ny controversy or dispute between the parties arising out of or relating to [the] Facility’s Admission Agreement, or breach thereof, or relating in any way to [Ms. James’s] stay at [the] Facility, or to the provisions of care or services to [Ms. James], including but not limited to”).) This plain language clearly embraces the subject matter of Plaintiff’s claims against the Facility, but even if there were “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues[,] [they] should be resolved in favor of arbitration” *Towles v. United HealthCare Corp.*, 338 S.C. 29, 41, 524 S.E.2d 839, 846 (Ct. App. 1999); *see also Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs.*, 346 S.C. 580, 597, 553 S.E.2d 110, 118 (2001) (“[U]nless the court can say with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible to an interpretation that covers the dispute, arbitration should be ordered.”).

2022, the Facility timely moved the circuit court to alter, amend, and/or reconsider its decision. (R. pp. 226–244.)

Prior to ruling on the Facility’s Rule 59(e) motion, however, Judge Dennis retired from the bench and went into the private practice of law. On October 24, 2022, the Honorable Diane Schafer Goodstein, Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes for the First Judicial Circuit (Court of Common Pleas), convened a status conference and advised the parties that, since Judge Dennis was unable to rule on the Facility’s Rule 59(e) motion, the Motion to Compel Arbitration had to be reheard by another circuit judge. (R. pp. 96:21–98:14.)

Following a hearing on November 17, 2022, the circuit court, the Honorable Roberts Bonds now presiding,¹⁰ ruled against the Facility by order filed November 28, 2022, stating:

[The Facility’s] Motion to Reconsider was heard Nov 17, 2022. After hearing arguments of council and reviewing the order of Judge Dennis, this court agrees with Judge Dennis’ findings, conclusions of law and Order and therefore, affirms his ruling. The [Facility’s] motion to Reconsider is respectfully, denied.

(R. pp. 16–18.) Pursuant to Rule 59(e), on December 8, 2022, the Facility timely moved Judge Bonds to alter, amend, and/or reconsider his decision. (R. pp. 245–265.)

⁹ (R. pp. 86–94.)

¹⁰ (R. pp. 95–122.)

Following a hearing on December 19, 2022,¹¹ Judge Bonds issued an order filed December 28, 2022, confirming his denial of the Motion to Compel Arbitration and the Facility's Rule 59(e) motion for the reasons set forth in Judge Dennis's May 4, 2022, order, stating:

This Form 4 shall serve as a supplement to this Court's Order of November 28th, 2022. After hearing arguments of Counsel and reviewing briefs provided to me, the Court respectfully denies [the Facility's] Motion to Compel Arbitration. Furthermore, [the Facility's] Motion to Alter/Amend/Reconsider is respectfully denied. The Court's findings and rationales can be found in Judge Dennis' May 4th, 2022 Order.

(R. pp. 19–21.) Accordingly, while it was Judge Bonds, and not Judge Dennis, who ultimately denied the Motion to Compel Arbitration (and the Facility's corresponding Rule 59(e) motion), for ease of reference, where this brief refers to the circuit court's order denying the Facility's motions, the reference is to the order of May 4, 2022, because it is the order that actually sets forth the court's reasoning.¹²

¹¹ (R. pp. 123–138.)

¹² Out of an abundance of caution, however, the Facility would note that, while it is its understanding that Judge Bonds, not Judge Dennis, ultimately denied the Motion to Compel Arbitration (and the Facility's corresponding Rule 59(e) motion), to the extent that it may be necessary, this appeal includes the Facility's appeal of Judge Dennis's order filed May 4, 2022. (R. p. 268.) And whether that order is viewed as a standalone order of Judge Dennis or as the adopted expression of Judge Bonds's reasoning, the issues/arguments presented in this brief apply with equal force in challenge thereto.

By notice served and filed December 28, 2022, this appeal timely follows.
(R. pp. 266–272.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A circuit court’s determination of whether a claim is subject to arbitration is reviewed de novo on appeal. *Gissel v. Hart*, 382 S.C. 235, 240, 676 S.E.2d 320, 323 (2009). This includes de novo review of the determination of whether an arbitration agreement is enforceable against a nonsignatory. *Wilson v. Willis*, 426 S.C. 326, 334, 827 S.E.2d 167, 172 (2019). “Under de novo review, a circuit court’s factual findings will not be reversed on appeal if any evidence reasonably supports those findings.” *Id.* Issues of law, however, are reviewed without any particular deference to the circuit court. *See, e.g., Duke Energy Corp. v. S.C. Dep’t of Revenue*, 415 S.C. 351, 782 S.E.2d 590 (2016). Even where a ruling is on a matter within circuit court’s discretion, if the ruling is based on a misunderstanding of the law, rather than upon the exercise of discretion, the question presented on appeal is one of law. *See Bain v. Self Mem’l Hosp.*, 281 S.C. 138, 152, 314 S.E.2d 603, 611 (Ct. App. 1984).

ARGUMENT

I. The circuit court erred in denying the Motion to Compel Arbitration.

A. The circuit court erred in rejecting the Facility’s merger/equitable estoppel argument. More specifically, the circuit court should have found that the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement merged and that, because Ms. James effectively embraced and directly benefitted from the Admission Agreement, she, and, in turn, Plaintiff (her estate), is estopped to deny the enforceability of the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement merged therewith.

(1) The circuit court misapprehended the nature of the Facility’s merger/equitable estoppel argument.

As evidenced by the language of its order denying the Motion to Compel Arbitration,¹³ the circuit court failed to appreciate that the Facility’s merger/equitable estoppel argument is a standalone argument that does not depend on any showing of authority (actual or apparent or otherwise) on the part of Ms. Dunham or otherwise on the existence of any valid agreement per se. *Wilson*, 426 S.C. at 338, 827 S.E.2d at 174 (“South Carolina has recognized several theories that could bind nonsignatories to arbitration agreements under general principles of

¹³ (See R. p. 5 (“The basis of [the Facility’s] Motion is that a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement exists between the parties.”); R. p. 6 (“Because [Ms.] Dunham lacked legal authority to enter into legal agreements on behalf of her mother, neither the Arbitration Agreement nor the Admission Agreement can be considered to be valid.”); R. p. 8 (“[T]he Court must determine (1) if the Arbitration Agreement merged with and was a part of the Admission Agreement such that [Ms.] James’ estate would be equitably estopped from denying the Arbitration Agreement’s validity, and (2) if Ms. Dunham had actual or apparent authority to enter the Arbitration Agreement on behalf of [Ms.] James.”).)

contract and agency law, including . . . estoppel.”); *see also Coleman v. Mariner Health Care, Inc.*, 407 S.C. 346, 354–55, 755 S.E.2d 450, 455 (2014) (acknowledging the possibility of enforcing an arbitration agreement against a nonsignatory via merger and equitable estoppel); *id.* (explaining that “Appellants’ equitable estoppel argument,” which “[wa]s premised on [Appellants’] contention that, under state law, the admission agreements and the [arbitration agreements] merged,” as follows: “Appellants contend that even if Sister lacked capacity to execute the [arbitration agreement] . . . , she is nevertheless *equitably estopped to deny the [arbitration agreement’s] enforceability.*”) (emphasis added).

Conceptually, the Facility’s merger/equitable estoppel argument is *not* an argument *for the enforceability* of the Admission Agreement/Arbitration Agreement *but rather* an argument *for Ms. James, and, in turn, Plaintiff (her estate), to be estopped to deny the enforceability* of the Admission Agreement/Arbitration Agreement. In short, the idea is that the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement merged, and Ms. James having effectively embraced and directly benefitted from the Admission Agreement, her estate is now estopped to deny the enforceability not only of the Admission Agreement but also the Arbitration Agreement merged therewith. And by its very nature, i.e., because the Facility’s argument in favor of direct benefits estoppel is based on the direct benefits Ms. James received under the Admission Agreement

(with which the Arbitration merged), this argument applies with equal force to estop Plaintiff, i.e., Ms. James’s estate, from denying the enforceability of the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement merged therewith.

Accordingly, as to the Facility’s merger/equitable estoppel argument, any contrary analysis regarding the Admission Agreement/Arbitration Agreement’s supposed lack of validity—e.g., that Ms. Dunham lacked authority to sign the Admission Agreement/Arbitration Agreement on behalf of Ms. James under the law of agency¹⁴ and/or under the South Carolina Adult Health Care Consent Act, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 44-66-10 to -80 (the “AHCCA”),¹⁵ and/or because Ms. Dunham lacked power of attorney over Ms. James¹⁶—is beside the point and unavailing to refute the Facility’s merger/equitable estoppel argument, which, again, turns not on the question of whether the Arbitration Agreement is enforceable per se but whether Ms. James, and, in turn, Plaintiff (her estate), is estopped to deny its enforceability.

¹⁴ (See R. pp. 10–11 (regarding principles of agency).)

¹⁵ (See R. pp. 6, 8 (regarding the AHCCA).)

¹⁶ (See R. pp. 6–7, 10–11 (regarding power of attorney).)

(2) The circuit court's merger analysis is erroneous.

In *Coleman*, even though our Supreme Court found against merger on the particular *facts* of the case, it nonetheless confirmed the validity of the general proposition of *law* on which the *Coleman* appellants based their merger/equitable estoppel argument:

Appellants contend that even if Sister lacked capacity to execute the [arbitration agreement] under the [Adult Health Care Consent] Act, she is nevertheless equitably estopped to deny the [arbitration agreement's] enforceability. The circuit court held there was no estoppel here, and we agree.

Appellants' equitable estoppel argument is premised on their contention that, under state law, the admission agreements and the [arbitration agreements] merged. In South Carolina,

The general rule is that, in the absence of anything indicating a contrary intention, where instruments are executed at the same time, by the same parties, for the same purpose, and in the course of the same transaction, the courts will consider and construe the documents together. The theory is that the instruments are effectively one instrument or contract.

Klutts Resort Realty, Inc. v. Down'Round Dev. Corp., 268 S.C. 80, 88, 232 S.E.2d 20, 24 (1977).

Here, *the documents were executed at the same time, by the same parties, for the same purposes, and in the course of the same transaction. Unless there is a contrary intention, appellants are correct that there was a merger.*

407 S.C. at 354–355, 755 S.E.2d at 455 (emphasis added).

Here, the circuit court erred in rejecting the Facility’s merger argument, failing to recognize material differences between the facts and arguments involved in the instant case and those that controlled (or were simply not addressed in) *Coleman* and its progeny *Thompson v. Pruitt Corp.*, 416 S.C. 43, 784 S.E.2d 679 (Ct. App. 2016), and *Hodge v. UniHealth Post-Acute Care of Bamberg, LLC*, 422 S.C. 544, 813 S.E.2d 292 (Ct. App. 2018).

The circuit court wrongfully concluded that the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement are separate contacts that do not merge. (R. pp. 8–10.) The merger question examines whether, “where instruments are executed at the same time, by the same parties, for the same purpose, and in the course of the same transaction,”¹⁷ as undoubtedly the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement were here,¹⁸ there is evidence to upset the *presumption in favor of merger*, i.e., the presumption that the instruments were intended to be construed

¹⁷ *Coleman*, 407 S.C. at 355, 755 S.E.2d at 455.

¹⁸ To be clear, *Coleman* unequivocally answers the question of whether the instant Admission Agreement and Arbitration Agreement were executed at the same time, by the same parties, for the same purposes, and in the course of the same transaction: they were. As the *Coleman* Court expressly observed regarding the admission and arbitration agreements before it (which in *this* respect—but not in respect of the material facts bearing on the question of whether the presumption of merger is rebutted—are no different from the instant agreements), “the documents *were* executed at *the same time, by the same parties, for the same*

together as effectively one contract. This is a question of intention. *Id.* at 355, 755 S.E.2d at 455 (“in the absence of anything indicating a contrary *intention* . . .”) (emphasis added). And “in attempting to ascertain th[e] [parties’] intention,” our courts “endeavor to determine the situation of the parties, as well as their purposes, at the time the contract was entered into.” *Klutts*, 268 S.C. at 89, 232 S.E.2d at 25.

It must be remembered that, where, as here, the instruments in question were executed at the same time, by the same parties, for the same purpose, and in the course of the same transaction, merger is *presumed*. For the merger presumption to mean anything in practice it cannot be upset based on mere conjecture, but only by actual evidence that—notwithstanding the concurrence of all the particular circumstances necessary for the presumption to even arise in the first place (same time, parties, purpose, and transaction)—can nonetheless support a reasonable, non-speculative inference that the parties’ intention was contrary to merger. *Cf. The Huffines Co., LLC v. Lockhart*, 365 S.C. 178, 188, 617 S.E.2d 125, 130 (Ct. App. 2005) (“[V]erdicts may not be permitted to rest upon surmise, conjecture, or speculation.”). No such inference can be drawn here. Indeed, under the circumstances, the idea that there would have been an intention contrary to merger does not make sense.

purposes, and in the course of the same transaction.” 407 S.C. at 355, 755 S.E.2d at 455 (emphasis added).

Unlike the arbitration agreement at issue in *Coleman*—and, for that matter, the arbitration agreements at issue in *Coleman*'s progeny *Thompson* and *Hodge*, all of which cases involved arbitration agreements that contained a provision allowing them to be disclaimed or revoked within 30 days of signing while the corresponding admission agreements did not—the instant Arbitration Agreement has no disclaimer/revocation provision. (R. p. 156.) Moreover, while the instant Admission Agreement does contain an “Entire Agreement” clause, it does not reference the Arbitration Agreement as a separate contract. (R. p. 201.) Indeed, directly contradicting the idea of “separatedness” (in the parlance of the *Coleman* Court¹⁹), the “Entire Agreement” clause in the instant Admission Agreement expressly states that “other Admissions materials” are part of the Admission Agreement, thereby expressly contemplating the lack of its own supposed “separatedness.” (R. p. 201.) Without question, the Arbitration Agreement is among these other materials. *See Stott v. White Oak Manor, Inc.*, 426 S.C. 568, 571–72, 828 S.E.2d 82, 84 (Ct. App. 2019) (“The same day as Decedent’s admission to White Oak, Stott, acting as Decedent’s authorized representative, signed White Oak’s admission documentation—including the Arbitration

¹⁹ 407 S.C. at 356, 755 S.E.2d at 455 (explaining how, in *Coleman*—unlike the instant case—the “Entire Agreement” clause expressly referred to a separate arbitration agreement and, thus, “recognize[d] the ‘*separatedness*’ of the [arbitration agreement] and the admission agreement, not a merger of the two contracts.”) (emphasis added).

Agreement.”) (emphasis added) (internal footnote omitted); *Hodge*, 422 S.C. at 550, 813 S.E.2d at 295 (“Her husband . . . executed various documents *related to her admission*, including an *Arbitration Agreement* and an *Admission Agreement.*”) (emphasis added)). The circuit court’s conclusory finding that there is ambiguity in this regard²⁰ is unsupported and erroneous.

To be sure, the Arbitration Agreement was optional, i.e., agreeing to arbitration was not required as a precondition of Ms. James’s residency at the Facility. But all this means is that the Arbitration Agreement did not have to be executed at all. It does not mean that the Arbitration Agreement did not become part of the admissions materials once it was in fact executed. Indeed, the fact that the Arbitration Agreement was not required for admission underscores its *connectedness* to the Admission Agreement. The two go together hand in glove. Without the hand (the Admission Agreement), there is no reason for the glove (the Arbitration Agreement).

Moreover, while it is true that the Arbitration Agreement is not necessary to the Admission Agreement, the converse is not true: The Admission Agreement *is* necessary to the Arbitration Agreement. That is, the Admission Agreement *could* have stood on its own, i.e., without the Arbitration Agreement ever having been

²⁰ (R. pp. 8–9 (“While the Admission Agreement purports to incorporate admissions materials into itself by reference herein’, when viewed alongside the

executed, in which case no question of merger would have even arisen to begin with—but that is not what happened. The Arbitration Agreement was in fact executed, and it was executed under the particular circumstances that give rise to the presumption of merger—same time, parties, purpose, and transaction—but unlike the Admission Agreement, which is capable of making sense either standing alone or together with the Arbitration Agreement, *the Arbitration Agreement only makes sense together with the Admission Agreement*, which is its (the Arbitration Agreement’s) sole reason for being. (R. p. 156 (providing for arbitration of “any controversy or dispute between the parties arising out of or relating to [the] Facility’s Admission Agreement, or breach thereof, or relating in any way to [Ms. James’s] stay at [the] Facility, or to the provisions of care or services to [Ms. James]”); R. p. 156 (“This [Arbitration] Agreement shall remain in effect for all care rendered at [the] Facility”).)

Even though the Arbitration Agreement was not a *condition* of admission, it was agreed to in *conjunction* with admission; whereupon, it was intended to be considered and construed together with the Admission Agreement, such that the two were effectively one instrument governing various interrelated aspects of Ms. James’s relationship with the Facility, the Admission Agreement setting forth the terms of her admission, the Arbitration Agreement providing for arbitration of

other details of the agreements, it creates at best an ambiguity as to merger when

disputes arising out of her admission. (*Compare* R. pp. 190–201 (setting forth the terms of Ms. James’s admission to the Facility) *with* R. p. 156 (providing for arbitration of disputes arising out of Ms. James’s admission in the Facility).)

Also absent here is the type of discrepancy the *Hodge* Court pointed out with respect to the respective provisions of the admission and arbitration agreements before it as to the governing law. 422 S.C. at 562, 813 S.E.2d at 302. (*Compare* R. p. 199 (“This Agreement will be governed by and construed in accordance with applicable Federal regulations and those laws of the State in which Facility is located.”) *with* R. p. 156 (providing that, “because the services and reimbursement thereof effect a transaction involving interstate commerce, the enforcement of this Arbitration Agreement . . . shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Action,” but also providing that arbitration shall be “as provided by the South Carolina Alternate Dispute Resolution/Mediation Rules”).) Essentially, both instruments provide that South Carolina law applies except where displaced by federal law. This provides no reasonable inference of an intent contrary to merger.

Similarly, and contrary to the view expressed by the circuit court,²¹ the survival of the Arbitration Agreement is no evidence of “separatedness.” Again,

taken in context of the totality of the circumstances . . .”).)

²¹ (R. p. 8 (“Further, the Arbitration Agreement by its very language distinguishes between itself and the Admission Agreement, stating that the Arbitration Agreement will survive any ‘breach of this Agreement or the Admission Agreement.’”).)

the only reason for the Arbitration Agreement is the Admission Agreement, as the point of the Arbitration Agreement is to cover disputes relating to/arising out of the Admission Agreement. So yes, the Arbitration Agreement would remain in effect after termination of the Admission Agreement, but all this means is that any claims relating to/arising out of the Admission Agreement would still have to be arbitrated even if they are not asserted until after termination of the Admission Agreement. In other words, the Arbitration Agreement is still connected to the Admission Agreement even after the termination of the Admission Agreement. This is simply how arbitration agreements work. *See Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips*, 39 F. Supp. 2d 582, 612–13 (D.S.C. 1998) (“Under South Carolina arbitration law, the duty to arbitrate under an arbitration clause in a contract survives termination of the contract.”).

The fact that the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement have their own titles, are separately paginated, and are separately signed provides no reasonable inference of an intention contrary to merger. Respectfully, to point to such things, as the circuit court does,²² is really to do no more than to point out that the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement are separate instruments, a fact which does not actually suggest anything probative about whether they are intended to be construed together. Indeed, the question of merger will not arise in

²² (R. p. 8.)

the first place unless there are multiple instruments involved. Obviously, it cannot be the case that the mere existence of the necessary factual predicate for the question of merger to arise, i.e., separate instruments, shows an intention contrary to merger. The very nature of *merger* is to *merge* separate documents.

And—besides the fact that there is indeed no ambiguity in regard to the merger of the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement—to fall back on the idea that any ambiguity in this regard must be construed against the Facility as the drafter makes no sense in this context. Merger is *presumed* upon the occurrence of a particular set of circumstances, those being, as stated in the above-quoted passage from *Coleman*, where, as here, the instruments are executed at the same time, by the same parties, for the same purpose, and in the course of the same transaction. When all these align—same time, same parties, same purpose, same transaction—our courts will consider and construe the documents together *unless* there is evidence of a contrary intention. The plain language of the rule endorsed in *Coleman* is to the effect that to upset the merger presumption requires evidence “indicating [(i.e., affirmatively showing)] a contrary intention.” 407 S.C. at 355, 755 S.E.2d at 455. To allow the merger presumption to be upset based on evidence that is merely ambiguous—i.e., that does not even go so far as to clearly indicate a contrary intention, but at most might (or might not) reflect a contrary intention—is to allow the exception to devour the rule.

Respectfully, the circuit court's finding against merger relies on improper speculation, not evidence from which a reliable conclusion can reasonably be drawn regarding intent. It must be remembered that the presumption of merger arises from the concurrence of the four elements of time, parties, purpose, and transaction. *Coleman*, 407 S.C. at 354–55, 755 S.E.2d at 455. This is why for the merger presumption to mean anything in practice it cannot be upset based on mere conjecture, but only on actual evidence that—notwithstanding the concurrence of all the particular circumstances necessary for the presumption to even arise in the first place (same time, parties, purpose, and transaction)—can nonetheless support a reasonable, non-speculative inference that the parties' intention was contrary to merger. *Cf. Huffines*, 365 S.C. at 188, 617 S.E.2d at 130 (“[V]erdicts may not be permitted to rest upon surmise, conjecture, or speculation.”). The merger presumption is “earned,” so to speak, by the fact that for it even to arise in the first place there must be, as there is here, a concurrence of particular circumstances (same time, parties, purpose, and transaction). It is the very rarity of this concurrence that both safeguards against the overzealous application of the merger doctrine and justifies ascribing to it (the concurrence) the presumptive intent of merger.

The circuit court should have found that the Arbitration Agreement merged with the Admission Agreement. The instruments were executed at the same time,

by the same parties, for the same purposes, and in the course of the same transaction, the whole of which related to Ms. James's admission to the Facility and would not have been done at all but for her admission to the Facility.

(a) Most respectfully, this Court's merger analysis in *Solesbee* is erroneous.

During the pendency of this appeal, this Court decided *Solesbee, supra*, wherein it affirmed the circuit court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration in the face of a merger/equitable estoppel argument substantially the same as at present. Indeed, the Arbitration Agreement and Admission Agreement in issue in the instant case are the same form documents as in *Solesbee*.

In affirming the circuit court's denial of the motion to compel arbitration in *Solesbee*, this Court likened that case to *Coleman* and *Hodge* and found that the circuit court had correctly determined that there was no merger of the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement and, in turn, had properly denied the Facility's equitable estoppel argument. *Solesbee, supra* ("Thus, like the *Coleman* and *Hodge* courts, we find there was no merger in this case and [the Facility's] equitable estoppel argument was properly denied.")²³ Most respectfully, this

²³ To be clear, the Court's decision in *Solesbee* turned on its affirmance of the circuit court's ruling against *merger* of the Arbitration Agreement and the Admission Agreement. Consequently, the *Solesbee* Court did not address the substance of the *equitable estoppel* prong of the merger/estoppel argument.

Court’s decision in *Solesbee* is erroneous, and it should not control the disposition of this appeal.²⁴

First, the *Solesbee* Court erroneously found against merger on the basis that “the Admission Agreement provides it is governed by South Carolina law, and the Arbitration Agreement provides it is governed by federal law.” But it is not true that “the Admission Agreement provides it is governed by South Carolina law, and the Arbitration Agreement provides it is governed by federal law.”

Regarding governing law, what the Admission Agreement actually states is this: “This Agreement will be governed by and construed in accordance with applicable Federal regulations and those laws of the State in which the Facility is located.” (R. p. 199.) And what the Arbitration Agreement actually states is this:

The parties acknowledge and agree that, because the services and reimbursement thereof effects a transaction that involves interstate commerce, the enforcement of this Arbitration Agreement is not subject to the South Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act and shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (Title 9 of the United States Code), notwithstanding any contrary provision of this Agreement or contrary state law.

(R. p. 156.)

As explained above, the FAA applies whenever an arbitration agreement involves interstate commerce—and this is so even where an arbitration clause is

²⁴ In this regard, the Facility would also note that it is still possible that the Supreme Court might review *Solesbee* via a writ of certiorari.

included in a single instrument that is otherwise governed by South Carolina law. *Allied-Bruce*, 513 U.S. at 273–77. Moreover, even under the FAA, the general state law of contracts continues to apply. *Allied-Bruce*, 513 U.S. at 281 (“States may regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general contract law principles and they may invalidate an arbitration clause ‘upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’ What States may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause. The Act makes *any* such state policy unlawful, for that kind of policy would place arbitration clauses on an unequal ‘footing,’ directly contrary to the Act’s language and Congress’ intent.”) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Further still, the Arbitration Agreement expressly calls for the arbitration proceedings to be conducted pursuant to the South Carolina ADR Rules. (R. p. 156.)

Again, essentially, the provisions of the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement regarding governing law are to the effect that South Carolina law applies except where displaced by federal law, and they do not support any reasonable inference of any intent contrary to merger.

Second, the *Solesbee* Court erroneously found against merger on the basis that “[t]he Arbitration Agreement recognized the two documents were separate, stating the Arbitration Agreement ‘shall survive any termination or breach of this

Agreement or the Admission Agreement.”” This provides no reasonable inference of an intent contrary to merger here. Unlike in *Coleman* and *Hodge*, the supposed textual recognition of the Admission Agreement as being separate from the Arbitration Agreement is not included in any “Entire Agreement” provision. Rather, the “Entire Agreement” provision of the Admission Agreement expressly states, “other Admissions materials . . . are made a part of this Agreement by reference.” (R. p. 201.) And as in the instant case, the Arbitration Agreement that was signed in conjunction with the admission is clearly among these “other Admissions materials.” Moreover, that the Arbitration Agreement “shall survive any termination or breach of this Agreement or the Admission Agreement” just means that any claims relating to/arising out of the Admission Agreement would still have to be arbitrated even if they are not asserted until after termination of the Admission Agreement. In other words, the Arbitration Agreement is still connected to the Admission Agreement even after the termination of the Admission Agreement. Again, this is simply how arbitration agreements work—and would be so even were the agreement to arbitrate in the form of a clause included within a single instrument. *See Phillips*, 39 F. Supp. 2d at 612–13 (“Under South Carolina arbitration law, the duty to arbitrate under an arbitration clause in a contract survives termination of the contract.”).

Third, the *Solesbee* Court erroneously found against merger on the basis that “[t]he Arbitration Agreement is silent as to whether it could be revoked, but the Admission Agreement provides, ‘Resident and/or his/her legal representative may terminate this Agreement at any time, upon written notice to Facility.’” This provides no reasonable inference of an intent contrary to merger. The absence of a “revocation” provision is one way in which the Arbitration Agreement is materially different from those at issue in *Coleman* and *Hodge*, and, for that matter, *Thompson*. Moreover, the *Solesbee* Court drew a false equivalency between the concept of “revocation” and that of “termination.” A “revocation” is an annulment (i.e., to make something a nullity),²⁵ whereas “termination” is to put or bring something to an end. *Id.* at p. 1482. And, again, that the Arbitration Agreement survives the termination of the Admission Agreement is simply how arbitration agreements work—and would be so even were the agreement to arbitrate in the form of a clause included within a single instrument. *See Phillips*, 39 F. Supp. at 612–13.

Fourth, the *Solesbee* Court erroneously found against merger on the basis that “the Admission Agreement and Arbitration Agreement were separately paginated and had their own signature pages.” This provides no reasonable inference of an intent contrary to merger. Again, the fact that the Admission

²⁵ *Black’s Law Dictionary* p. 1321 revocation (7th ed. 1999); *id.* at 89

Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement have their own titles, are separately paginated, and are separately signed provides no reasonable inference of an intent contrary to merger. Respectfully, to point to such things is really to do no more than to point out that the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement are separate instruments, a fact which does not actually suggest anything probative about whether they were intended to be construed together. Indeed, the question of merger will not arise in the first place unless there are multiple instruments involved. Obviously, it cannot be the case that the mere existence of the necessary factual predicate for the question of merger to arise, i.e., separate instruments, shows an intention contrary to merger. Again, the very nature of *merger* is to *merge* multiple things together as one.

Finally, the *Solesbee* Court erroneously found against the Facility on merger on the basis that Arbitration Agreement was voluntary. This provides no reasonable inference of an intent contrary to merger. Again, to be sure, the Arbitration Agreement was optional, i.e., agreeing to arbitration was not required to gain admission to the Facility. But all this means is that it did not have to be agreed to for the resident to be admitted, i.e., the Arbitration Agreement did not have to be executed at all. It does not mean that the Arbitration Agreement did not become a part of the admissions materials once it was signed. Indeed, the fact that

annulment (“The act of nullifying or making void.”).

the Arbitration Agreement was not required for admission underscores its *connectedness* to the Admission Agreement. Again, the two go together hand in glove. Without the hand (the Admission Agreement), there is no reason for the glove (the Arbitration Agreement).

To say that the Arbitration Agreement was not required for admission, which it was not, is not to say that it was not intended to be part of the admissions materials in the event it was agreed to, which it was, by Mr. Dover on Ms. Solesbee's behalf in *Solesbee* and by Ms. Dunham on Ms. James's behalf in the instant case. While it is true that the Arbitration Agreement is not necessary to the Admission Agreement, the converse is not true: the Admission Agreement *is* necessary to the Arbitration Agreement. That is, the Admission Agreement *could* have stood on its own, i.e., without the Arbitration Agreement ever having been executed, in which case no question of merger would have even arisen to begin with—but that is not what happened. The Arbitration Agreement was in fact executed, and it was executed under the particular circumstances that give rise to the presumption of merger—same time, parties, purpose, and transaction—but unlike the Admission Agreement, which is capable of making sense either standing alone or together with the Arbitration Agreement, *the Arbitration Agreement only makes sense together with the Admission Agreement*, which is its (the Arbitration Agreement's) sole reason for being. (See R. p. 156 (providing for arbitration of

“any controversy or dispute between the parties arising out of or relating to Facility’s Admission Agreement, or breach thereof, or relating in any way to Resident’s stay at Facility, or to the provisions of care or services to Resident”); R. p. 156 (“This [Arbitration] Agreement shall remain in effect for all care rendered at Facility”).)

Again, even though the Arbitration Agreement was not a *condition* of admission, it was agreed to in *conjunction* with admission, whereupon, it was intended to be considered and construed together with the Admission Agreement, such that the two were effectively one instrument governing various interrelated aspects of the resident’s relationship with the Facility: the Admission Agreement setting forth the terms of the admission, the Arbitration Agreement providing for arbitration of disputes arising out of the admission. (*Compare* R. p. 190–201 (setting forth the terms of the admission) *with* R. p. 156 (providing for arbitration of disputes arising out of the admission).)

(3) The circuit court’s equitable estoppel analysis is erroneous.

The circuit court’s view of equitable estoppel misapprehends our Supreme Court’s decision in *Wilson*, 426 S.C. at 338, 827 S.E.2d at 174 (observing that South Carolina has recognized a number of theories that could bind nonsignatories to arbitration agreements, including estoppel). The *Wilson* Court favorably discussed the framework of the direct benefits test—which test the Court of Appeals had applied in the decision then before the *Wilson* Court on writ of certiorari, which followed the Court of Appeals’ earlier decision in *Pearson v. Hilton Head Hospital*, 400 S.C. 281, 733 S.E.2d 597 (Ct. App. 2012), and under which the Facility contends Ms. James, and, in turn, Plaintiff (her estate), is estopped from refusing to comply with the Arbitration Agreement here, where Ms. James received direct benefits (in the form of her admission and care/treatment at the Facility) from the Admission Agreement with which the Arbitration Agreement was merged. *Wilson*, 426 S.C. at 340–345, 827 S.E.2d at 175–177; *see also id.* at 340, 827 S.E.2d at 175 n.6 (while expressing no opinion on the petitioner’s alternative argument based on the application of the state’s “traditional” six-factor test for estoppel, which the *Wilson* Court found unpreserved for review, observing nonetheless that that test, i.e., “[t]he traditional test referenced by [the] [p]etitioners,” “has been analyzed most-often in *non*-arbitration cases”) (emphasis added). In other words, *Wilson* supports the use of the direct benefits test to

answer the question of equitable estoppel in an arbitration case like this, without any resort to another test for equitable estoppel, such as that addressed in the *Kelly* and *Strickland* cases cited by the circuit court. (R. p. 9 (“Further, the Estate of Emma James cannot be equitably estopped from denying enforcement of the Arbitration Agreement. ‘Equitable estoppel is a contract defense and the party asserting this defense bears the burden of proving all of its elements.’ *Kelly v. Logan, Jolley & Smith*, 383 S.C. 626, 638, 682 S.E.2d 1, 7 (Ct. App. 2009). Equitable estoppel requires proof that the party to be estopped acted in a way amounting to a false representation. *Strickland v. Strickland*, 375 S.C. 76, 84, 650 S.E.2d 465, 470 (2007). Palmetto Hallmark cannot meet its burden to establish this element.”).)²⁶

Moreover, the circuit court incorrectly interpreted *Wilson* as follows:

As the Supreme Court explained in *Wilson*, to successfully assert direct benefits estoppel, the arbitration agreement must be a clause within the larger admissions agreement, and the plaintiff must be seeking to assert causes of action that arise from and are created by the contract. Here, as explained above and below, the Admission Agreement and optional Arbitration Agreement are separate documents that did not merge. Second, Plaintiff does not assert breach of contract, or a violation of contractual duties, and instead has brought

²⁶ To be clear, neither *Kelly* nor *Strickland* was an arbitration case, and both cases relied on the traditional six-factor test for estoppel, *Kelly*, 383 S.C. at 638, 682 S.E.2d at 7, *Strickland*, 375 S.C. at 84–85, 650 S.E.2d at 470, not the direct benefits test.

his lawsuit under a negligence theory arising from common law duties.

(R. p. 10.)

What *Wilson* actually explains is that the key to determining when direct benefits estoppel may be applied is not whether the claims at issue rely on contract terms to impose liability but whether benefits to the nonsignatory are direct or indirect. *Wilson*, 426 S.C. at 340–41, 827 S.E.2d at 175 (“Under direct benefits estoppel, [a] nonsignatory is estopped from refusing to comply with an arbitration clause when it receives a direct benefit from a contract containing an arbitration clause. In the arbitration context, the doctrine recognizes that a party may be estopped from asserting that the lack of his signature on a written contract precludes enforcement of the contract’s arbitration clause when he has consistently maintained that other provisions of the same contract should be enforced to benefit him. Stated another way, [u]nder the direct benefits theory of estoppel, a nonsignatory may be compelled to arbitrate where the nonsignatory knowingly exploits the benefits of an agreement containing an arbitration clause, and receives benefits flowing directly from the agreement”) (internal citations/quotations and emphasis therein omitted); *id.* at 343, 827 S.E.2d at 176 (“It is important to distinguish direct benefits from indirect benefits because when the benefits to a nonsignatory are merely indirect, arbitration cannot be compelled. A benefit is direct if it flows directly from the agreement. In contrast, any benefit derived from

an agreement is indirect where the nonsignatory exploits the contractual relationship of the parties, but does not exploit (and thereby assume) the agreement itself.”) (internal citations omitted). Direct benefits estoppel simply recognizes, and remedies, the patent inequity that would result if a party were able to enjoy direct benefits under an agreement containing an arbitration clause (which is the case here because the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement merge) while at the same time denying that the arbitration clause is enforceable.

Here, Ms. James was a direct beneficiary. To deny her receipt of such benefits is illogical and objectively unreasonable, as it would require wholly discrediting the entirety of her residency: every night’s stay, every meal, every amenity/service provided, every instance of care/treatment, essentially every moment at the Facility—even Plaintiff’s complaint does not go nearly so far as that. (*See R. pp. 23–37.*)

Properly viewing the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement as merged, Ms. James received the benefit of her admission to the Facility, including, without limitation, the room, board, care, and treatment she received therein. Respectfully, the circuit court should have found that the Arbitration Agreement merged with the Admission Agreement and that Ms. James, and, in turn, Plaintiff (her estate), is estopped to deny the Admission Agreement/Arbitration Agreement’s enforceability, Ms. James having effectively

embraced the contract with the Facility for the purpose of her admission and receipt of the benefits thereof.²⁷

B. At a minimum, the circuit court should have granted the Facility’s alternative request for permission to conduct limited discovery to address gaps in the evidentiary record bearing on the Arbitration Agreement’s enforceability under principles relating to the law of agency.

The circuit court incorrectly ruled—in conclusory fashion, without citing any legal or factual support—that “the only relevant and necessary evidence for the Court to make its determination is already available for the Court’s review. Any further discovery with the goal of revisiting the arbitrability of this case would only serve to protract this litigation, waste judicial resources, and increase costs for both parties unnecessarily.” (R. p. 11.)

At a minimum, the circuit court should have allowed the Facility to engage in some appropriately limited discovery to investigate fairly the Arbitration Agreement’s enforceability under principles relating to the law of agency.^{28 29 30}

²⁷ To be clear, although the dispute here is about the Arbitration Agreement, as opposed to the Admission Agreement, to the extent there were any question about the enforceability of the Admission Agreement, the Facility’s equitable estoppel argument applies with equal force to the Admission Agreement.

²⁸ A true agency relationship may be established by evidence of actual or apparent authority. *R & G Const., Inc. v. Lowcountry Reg’l Transp. Auth.*, 343 S.C. 424, 432, 540 S.E.2d 113, 117 (Ct. App. 2000). “Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control.” *Froneberger v. Smith*, 406 S.C. 37, 49, 748 S.E.2d 625, 631 (Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 (2006)). “An

This would entail, at the least, allowing the Facility to depose Ms. Dunham and to follow up on any pertinent evidentiary leads revealed by her deposition. Otherwise, the Facility is in a Catch-22: vulnerable on the one hand to the argument that it has not presented sufficient evidence to prove the Arbitration Agreement is enforceable based on Ms. Dunham’s agency (or related principles,

agreement may result in the creation of an agency relationship although the parties did not call it an agency and did not intend the consequences of the relationship to follow. Agency may be proved by circumstantial evidence showing a course of dealing between the two parties.” *Peoples Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Myrtle Beach Golf & Yacht Club*, 310 S.C. 132, 145–46, 425 S.E.2d 764, 773 (Ct. App. 1992). The doctrine of apparent authority provides that a principal may be bound by the acts of its agent when the principal has placed the agent in a position such that third parties are reasonably led to believe the agent has certain authority and they in turn deal with the agent in reliance on this manifestation. *Eadie v. H.A. Sack Co.*, 322 S.C. 164, 171, 470 S.E.2d 397, 401 (Ct. App. 1996).

²⁹ “When a principal, by any such acts or conduct, has knowingly caused or permitted another to appear to be his agent, either generally or for a particular purpose, he will be estopped to deny such agency to the injury of third persons who have in good faith and in the exercise of reasonable prudence dealt with the agent on the faith of such appearances.” *R & G Const.*, 343 S.C. at 433, 540 S.E.2d at 118 (Ct. App. 2000).

³⁰ Moreover, authority can be supplied to an agent retroactively by express or implied ratification. *See Brazell Bros. Contractors v. Hill*, 245 S. C. 69, 74, 138 S.E.2d 835, 837 (1964) (“Ratification, as the term implies, is the adoption by one person of an act done or bargain made for him by another under such circumstances that he would not have been bound but for his subsequent assent.”). “Ratification, as it relates to the law of agency, may be defined as the express or implied adoption and confirmation by one person of an act or contract performed or entered into on his behalf by another who at the time assumed to act as his agent.” *Fuller v. E. Fire & Cas. Ins. Co.*, 240 S. C. 75, 89, 124 S.E.2d 602, 608 (1962). It is not necessary for a principal to be present at the time of the commission of his agent’s act in order for him to ratify that act. *See State v. Waldrop*, 73 S.C. 60, 52 S.E. 793, 795 (1905) (“The presiding judge ruled that he

such as agency by estoppel or ratification), which is a fact-intensive question, while at the same time vulnerable on the other hand to the argument that it waived its arbitration rights by making use of the tools of litigation (i.e., discovery) to prove them.

It must be remembered that the Arbitration Agreement is valid on its face, bearing, as it does, Ms. Dunham's express representation of authority to bind Ms. James. (R. p. 156 ("By . . . her signature below, the executing party [(i.e., Ms. Dunham)] represents that . . . she has the authority to sign on [Ms. James's] behalf so as to bind [Ms. James] as well as [herself].").)³¹ It cannot be the case that the proponent of arbitration (who, it must be remembered, may well be attempting to vindicate a valid right to arbitrate that the arbitration opponent has wrongfully denied) has the burden to establish that right in a fact-based judicial proceeding in which it is disallowed use of the fact-finding tools (discovery procedures) available in other judicial proceedings.

could ratify the act of the agent, whether he was present or not, and in this we see no error.").

³¹ The Facility would note here that, having signed the Arbitration Agreement, Ms. Dunham "is presumed to have, read, understood, and assented to its terms." *Gibson v. Epting*, 426 S.C. 346, 352, 827 S.E.2d 178, 181 (Ct. App. 2019) ("[O]ne who has signed a contract is presumed to have read, understood, and assented to its terms."); see also *Adams v. G.J. Creel & Sons, Inc.*, 320 S.C. 274, 277, 465 S.E.2d 84, 86 (1995) (South Carolina law implies a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract).

Obviously, if this were an action to determine the validity of a contract other than an arbitration agreement there would be no question about the Facility's ability to conduct discovery relevant to the facts/circumstances bearing on the contract's validity. To force the Facility into a situation where it cannot conduct relevant discovery to vindicate its arbitration rights without risking a waiver of those rights by the very act of attempting to vindicate them is not only patently unjust but also a violation of the FAA's requirement that arbitration agreements must be placed on equal footing with other contracts. *See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion*, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (Under the FAA, "courts *must* place arbitration agreements on *equal footing with other contracts*"); *Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. P'ship v. Clark*, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1423 (2017) (While a court may invalidate an arbitration agreement based on "generally applicable contract defenses," it may not do so based on legal rules that "apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.") (citing *Concepcion*, 563 U.S. at 339); *Allied-Bruce*, 513 U.S. at 281 ("States may regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general contract law principles and they may invalidate an arbitration clause 'upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.' What States may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause. The Act

makes *any* such state policy unlawful, for that kind of policy would place arbitration clauses on an unequal ‘footing,’ directly contrary to the Act’s language and Congress’ intent.”) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted)).

Principles relating to the law of agency may potentially provide an additional, independent basis on which to grant the Motion to Compel Arbitration. Their application is fact dependent, and in no reasonable way can it be said “that the only relevant and necessary evidence for the Court to make its determination [thereon] is already available for the Court’s review” such that “further discovery with the goal of revisiting the arbitrability of this case would only serve to protract this litigation, waste judicial resources, and increase costs for both parties unnecessarily.” The allowance of discovery into Ms. James and Ms. Dunham’s course of dealing and the potential creation of an agency relationship between them (or other potential bases for enforcement of the Arbitration Agreement under related principles) is only reasonable.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Appellant asks this Honorable Court to reverse the circuit court’s denial of the Motion to Compel Arbitration and to stay this lawsuit in favor of arbitration between Plaintiff and the Facility (or to remand this matter to the circuit court with instructions that it stay the lawsuit in favor of arbitration between Plaintiff and the Facility) or, alternatively, to reverse the circuit

court's denial of the Motion to Compel Arbitration and remand this matter to the circuit court for the additional discovery requested by the Facility to be conducted; for additional briefing to be submitted to the circuit court in light of such discovery; and, with the benefit of the same, for the circuit court to hear and decide the Motion to Compel Arbitration anew.

Respectfully submitted,
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October 3, 2023

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SC Court of Appeals

**THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS**

Appeal from Dorchester County
Court of Common Pleas

Robert Bonds, Circuit Court Judge
R. Markley Dennis Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Case No. 2021-CP-18-01030
Appellate Case No. 2022-001807

Tammy China,
as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Emma Lee James,

Respondent,

v.

Palmetto Hallmark Operating, LLC
d/b/a Hallmark Healthcare Center, and
Elite Patient Care of South Carolina, PC,

Defendants,

Of which Palmetto Hallmark Operating, LLC
d/b/a Hallmark Healthcare Center is

Appellant.

APPELLANT'S CERTIFICATION FOR FINAL BRIEF

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I, Russell G. Hines, do hereby certify that the **Final Brief of Appellant** complies with Rule 211(b), SCACR. Additionally, the undersigned hereby certifies that this filing complies with the Supreme Court's order of April 15, 2014.

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