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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA COUNTY OF CHARLESTON	IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS IN THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
Jake Antonio Wilson, #303739, Applicant, v. State of South Carolina, Respondent.	Case No.: 2015-CP-10-531 **ORDER OF DISMISSAL**

This matter is before the Court by way of an application for post-conviction relief (PCR) filed by Jake Antonio Wilson (Applicant) on January 27, 2015. Respondent made its return requesting an evidentiary hearing. On April 21, 2023, an evidentiary hearing convened before the Honorable R. Kirk Griffin. Applicant was present and represented by Christopher J. Murphy, Esquire. Assistant Attorney General Danielle Dixon represented Respondent. At the hearing, the Court heard testimony from Applicant and Assistant Public Defender Maybeth Mullaney.[1] Following a thorough review of the transcript and the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, this Court finds Applicant did not meet his burden of proof. Thus, this Court denies relief and dismisses this application with prejudice.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Applicant is presently confined in the Department of Corrections serving a life sentence. In November 2007, the Charleston County Grand Jury indicated Applicant for murder (2007-GS-10-12312) and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent Crime (2007-GS-10-12313). On November 17, 2008, Applicant proceeded to a jury trial before the Honorable Deadra L. Jefferson. Public Defenders Andrew Grime and Marybeth Mullaney represented Applicant,

[1] Lead counsel Andrew Grime passed away before the PCR hearing.

and Assistant Solicitors Julie Cardillo and Nathan Williams prosecuted the case. The jury convicted Applicant as indicted, and Judge Jefferson sentenced him to life for murder and five, concurrent, for the weapons charge.

Applicant filed a notice of appeal, which was perfected by Senior Appellate Defender Joseph Savitz. On appeal, Applicant argued the trial court erred in allowing an officer who initially interrogated Applicant to testify he changed his mind and exercised his right to counsel after waiving his Miranda rights. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the merits. State v. Wilson, Op. No. 2012-UP-99 (filed Feb. 22, 2012). Applicant filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the South Carolina Supreme Court. After granting certiorari, the Court found the trial court erred in allowing the testimony but the error was harmless. The remittitur was sent August 22, 2014.

SUMMARY OF TRIAL TESTIMONY

Applicant's charges arose from the fatal shooting of Latoya Pendergrass (Victim) in her home around 5:00 a.m.; Victim was the mother of Applicant's children. Officer Brian Ambrose responded to the scene and was informed "somebody had been screaming inside the apartment about somebody being dead or hurt." (R. 118). Officer Ambrose entered the residence and, with direction from Applicant, went to an upstairs bedroom. (R. 119-23). At the entrance to the bedroom, Officer Ambrose observed a handgun on the floor, which was later identified as Applicant's .32 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver.[2] (R. 122). Officer Ambrose noticed Victim on the bed with her two young children next to her; she had been shot in the head. (R. 123).

Applicant was taken into custody and transported to the police station. After waiving his Miranda rights, Applicant initially denied shooting Victim and stated he was downstairs when he

[2] Crime scene technician Anita Maestas testified the revolver was approximately three feet from the bed where Victim was found. (R. 242).

heard a gunshot. (R. 446). However, he admitted he and Victim were the only adults in the house and the children were incapable of firing the revolver. (R. 446).

At trial, the State presented the following evidence: (1) the .32 caliber bullet recovered from Victim's head was fired by Applicant's gun (R. 366); (2) according to expert David Black, the gun's two safety mechanisms were working when it was examined (R. 372); (3) according to Black, the weapon required eleven pounds of pressure to depress the trigger depending upon whether the hammer was cocked[3] (R. 373-74); (4) Victim's GSR swab revealed only traces of GSR[4] (R. 651); (5) Victim's wound did not indicate stripling, which indicated she was shot at an intermediate range (R. 518); and (6) Victim was excluded a possible contributor to trace DNA recovered from the revolver, whereas Applicant's DNA was consistent with the DNA profile. (R. 478). Additionally, the couple's oldest child testified Applicant shot Victim. (R. 181-82).

The State theorized Victim's murder was the product of a jealous boyfriend who refused to let her go. (R. 12). The State elicited testimony from Applicant that at the time she was murdered, Victim had a restraining order against him.[5] (R. 587-88). Additionally, the State presented testimony from Victim's sister, Latasha, indicating Applicant was recently "put out" of the house and had threatened to kill Victim in the days leading up to her death. (R. 492-93). The State also introduced evidence that Applicant broke into the house through the upstairs bedroom window. (R. 231-35). Specifically, Officer Kalisha Gill testified a palm print matching Applicant's was found on the outside of the bedroom window. (R. 273).

Applicant proceeded on a defense of accident. He acknowledged Victim had "put him out" but stated he was invited into the residence that night. (R. 553-54). Applicant admitted to

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[3] Applicant testified the hammer was not cocked when the gun was fired. (R. 595).
[4] In addition to the physical evidence presented at trial,
[5] Although the jury was unaware of the reason for the restraining order, the record reveals Petitioner had a history of abusing Victim and an outstanding warrant for Criminal Domestic Violence ("CDV"). (R. 540-41).

recklessly handling the loaded revolver, stating, "I was playing with the gun, waving it around," when "[s]he hit my hand and the gun went off and shot her." (R. 542).

At the close of evidence, Applicant moved for a directed verdict, which was denied. (R. 659-61). Applicant was acquitted of burglary but convicted of murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime. (R. 761). The trial court sentenced him to life.

CURRENT APPLICATION

On January 27, 2015, Applicant timely filed this PCR application alleging he is being held in custody unlawfully for the following reasons:

1. "Denial of Effective Assistance of Trial Counsel"
    a. "failure to conduct adequate form of investigation"

Applicant amended his application to allege ineffective assistance of counsel due to:

1. Failing to meet adequate times;

2. Failing to fulling investigate;

3. Failing to request pursuant to Rule 5, SCRCrimP, copies of case notes and firearm worksheets related to the examination and testing of the firearm alleged to have been the murder weapon;

4. Failing to hire and retain an expert witness to examine a cell phone of the victim's sister;

5. Failing to properly and thoroughly cross-examine the State's witnesses at trial;

6. Failing to contemporaneously object to the State's expert witnesses testimony about the firearms test that violated Rule 5, SCRCrimP;

7. Failing to retain and present expert witness testimony to impeach the State's expert witnesses and further Applicant's defense; and

8. Improperly opening the door to prior bad act evidence that was previously ruled inadmissible by the Court, thereby eviscerating his defense of accident.

At the hearing, Applicant proceeded on the allegations of his original and amended application. Applicant also alleged counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the solicitor's misrepresentation of facts during closing argument; failing to object to the jury charge; failing to have the jury reinstructed when the jury sent a note asking for legal definitions; failing to object when he became aware that population genetics was not performed; and improperly arguing a directed verdict motion. He likewise contended appellate counsel prejudiced him by not raising the directed verdict issue on appeal.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This Court has had the opportunity to review the plea transcript in its entirety and has heard the testimony at the PCR hearing. This Court has further had the opportunity to observe the witnesses presented at the hearing, closely pass upon their credibility, and weigh their testimony.[6] After a careful review based on the Strickland standard set forth below, this Court finds Applicant has failed to carry his burden of proof. Below are this Court's findings of facts and conclusions of law as required by section 17-27-80 of the South Carolina Code (2017).

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Lomax v. State, 379 S.C. 93, 665 S.E.2d 164 (2008). In a PCR action, an applicant bears the burden of proving the allegations in his application. Butler v. State, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985). When the application alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, the applicant must prove "counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that [it] cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result." Strickland, 466 U.S. 668. Butler, 286 S.C.

[6] This Court will reference PCR testimony where relevant below.

at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814.

In evaluating allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, the reviewing court applies the two-pronged test outlined in Strickland, 466 U.S. 668. First, an applicant must prove counsel's performance was deficient. Id.; Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 117, 386 S.E.2d 624, 625 (1989). Under this prong, courts measure an attorney's performance by its "reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Cherry, 300 S.C. at 117, 386 S.E.2d at 625 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). The proper measure of performance is whether an attorney provided representation within the range of competence required in criminal cases. Butler, 286 S.C. at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814. "Counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). The applicant must overcome this presumption to receive relief. Cherry, 300 S.C. at 118, 386 S.E.2d at 625. Second, a PCR applicant must prove that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the applicant such that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Cherry, 300 S.C. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625.

Failed to Investigate[7]

Applicant first alleges counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate. More specifically, he asserts counsel failed to interview key witnesses, including Victim's sister, about an alleged Rule 404(b), SCRE, prior bad act. This Court finds Applicant did not prove this claim.

At the PCR hearing, Applicant testified he discussed with counsel the witnesses he wanted called on his behalf. He testified he wanted Grimes to speak with his friend Bubba, who was not present the night of the shooting. Applicant also averred counsel should have collected Latoya

[7] This section combines allegation one of the original application and allegation two of the amended application.

Pendergrass' phone records. However, Applicant did not call Bubba (or any other lay witness) or introduce Pendergrass's phone records (or any other evidence) at the PCR hearing.

Critically, Applicant did not present any testimony (through, for example, calling Bubba or another lay witness) or any other evidence that counsel may have uncovered upon a further investigation. Thus, Applicant did not prove prejudice. See Glover v. State, 318 S.C. 496, 498-99, 458 S.E.2d 538, 540 (1995) (providing a PCR applicant must produce witnesses at the PCR hearing or otherwise admit their testimony in accordance with the rule of evidence to establish prejudice from counsel's failure to call those witnesses at trial).

Further, Applicant did not prove deficiency. This Court finds credible Mullaney's PCR testimony that Grimes was a very dedicated public defender, and based on their conversations, she believed Grimes did a lot of work preparing for this trial. This Court further finds counsel's failure to speak to Victim's sister was reasonable under professional norms—especially when the sister testified for the State that Applicant had threatened to kill Victim after she "put out" Applicant. Based on the foregoing, Applicant did not prove deficiency or prejudice, and this claim is denied.

Failed to adequately meet with Applicant[8]

Applicant next contends counsel was ineffective for failing to meet with Applicant in an amount of overall time required to thoroughly prepare for and defend his case. This Court finds Applicant did not prove this ground.

At the PCR hearing, Applicant testified Grimes visited him approximately three to four times at the detention center for about twenty minutes each visit. He stated they discussed the facts of the case, including the defense of accident. Applicant also testified Grimes reviewed discovery with him. Mullaney testified this case was primarily Grime's case, and she joined

[8] This section addresses allegation one of the amended application.

Grimes about a week or two before trial to sit as second chair. She stated Grimes was a very dedicated public defender. Based upon their conversations, Mullaney believed Grimes had done a lot of work and investigation on the case. Mullaney recalled that Grimes met with Applicant at jail before Applicant testified to prepare his testimony. She testified they learned about the sister's expected testimony at trial and were able to procure the sister's phone records during trial.

This Court finds Mullaney's foregoing testimony credible. This Court further finds that based on the foregoing, counsel adequately met with Applicant and was not deficient in this regard. Finally, Applicant has not shown by a reasonable likelihood the outcome would have been different had counsel spent more time meeting with Applicant. Thus, Applicant did not prove deficiency or prejudice, and this claim is denied.

Rule 5 – firearm examination[9]

Applicant contends counsel was ineffective for failing to request copies of case notes and firearm worksheets related to firearm examination and testing. Specifically, he contends counsel should have requested reports about the testing of the trigger pull that were not disclosed prior to trial. Applicant further contends counsel failed to contemporaneously object to Black's testimony about the firearms test that violated Rule 5. This Court finds Applicant did not prove counsel was ineffective in this regard.

During trial, David Black, an expert in firearms examinations, testified the .32 Smith & Wesson long-caliber revolver (State's Exhibit 60) fired the recovered cartridge (State's Exhibit 65). (Tr. 574-75). Black testified he examined the revolver and determined "the safeties were functioning properly." (Tr. 576). As part of his testing, he ensured that when the hammer was cocked, he "couldn't bump it or strike it to make it go off. That didn't happen." (Tr. 581). He

[9] This section combines allegations three and six of the amended application.

tested the hammer block—"a mechanism inside the revolver that prevents the hammer from striking the firing pin unless the trigger is pulled"—and concluded it functioned properly. (Tr. 582). Additionally, he tested the rebound slide—which is "designed to prevent accidental discharges"—by "cock[ing] the revolver" and striking it with a rubber mallet "to see if it would fire without me touching the trigger and it did not." (Tr. 582). Black clarified the hammer block and the rebound slide were safety features designed to prevent accidental discharge, and they both functioned properly. (Tr. 582). Finally, he tested the trigger pull and concluded it was approximately eleven pounds, the equivalent of holding a gallon-and-a-half of milk with one finger. (Tr. 584). On cross-examination, Black acknowledged the testing of the trigger-pull and the safety features was not included in the two-page report that had been produced to the defense, but he had worksheets about those tests that were available for examination. (Tr. 585-89).

After Black's testimony, Grimes moved to strike the testimony or alternately for a mistrial based on an alleged Rule 5 violation. (Tr. 596). The solicitor stated he did not have the worksheets in his possession, and counsel only requested specific reports of GSR and DNA testing. (Tr. 596-602). Ultimately the Court denied the mistrial motion and the motion to strike Black's testimony, concluding that was an extreme remedy. (Tr. 606). However, the Court ordered the State to produce the worksheets and made Black available for additional cross-examination after counsel had an opportunity to review the report. (Tr. 606-07). Counsel, however, did not recall Black.

At the PCR hearing, Applicant maintained the gun discharged when Victim hit his hand and the shooting was accidental. He averred counsel did not request the evidence about the trigger pull prior to trial or adequately cross-examine the State's witnesses. Mullaney testified Grimes requested a copy of the firearms exam before trial, including all notes, as part of the boiler-plate discovery request. However, she stated he did not specifically request a trigger pull test, and they

did not know a trigger pull test had been conducted until Black testified. Mullaney stated Grimes did not make a contemporaneous objection to the trigger pull evidence, but he cross-examined Black about the test not being disclosed. She averred that if they had known about the trigger pull test, they would have hired an expert to review the notes.

This Court finds counsel's performance reasonable under prevailing professional norms and not deficient. Here, counsel would not have known the trigger pull test was conducted because, based on Black's testimony, the SLED report did not contain that information. Although Grimes did not immediately object, this Court finds his performance was reasonable under prevailing professional norms. When confronted with this new information, Grimes moved to strike the testimony or alternately for a mistrial—both of which were denied by the trial court as an extreme remedy. Based on the foregoing, counsel was not deficient.

Further, and critically, Applicant did not prove prejudice. More specifically, he did not show how requesting and receiving this information prior to trial would have changed the outcome. Although Mullaney stated they would have hired an expert to review the notes, Applicant did not call any expert at trial or otherwise show how hiring an expert would have changed the outcome—leaving this Court to speculate as to whether an expert would have aided his case at all. Finally, due to the fact the trial court found granting a mistrial or striking Black's testimony would be an extreme remedy, this Court finds it is not reasonably likely the outcome would have been different had counsel contemporaneously objected. Applicant did not meet his burden of proving deficiency or prejudice, and this claim is denied.

Expert Witnesses[10]

Applicant contends counsel was ineffective for failing to hire and retain an expert witness

[10] This section addresses allegations four and seven of the amended application.

to examine Victim's sister's cell phone. He likewise contends counsel was ineffective for failing to retain and present expert witness testimony to impeach the State's expert witnesses and further Applicant's theory of the case. This Court finds Applicant did not prove counsel was ineffective in this regard.

Critically, Applicant did not present any expert testimony at the PCR hearing—leaving this Court to speculate about whether any expert testimony would have in fact furthered his defense. Thus, Applicant did not meet his burden of proving prejudice. See Glover, 318 S.C. at 498-99, 458 S.E.2d at 540 (providing a PCR applicant must produce witnesses at the PCR hearing or otherwise admit their testimony in accordance with the rule of evidence to establish prejudice from counsel's failure to call those witnesses at trial). Likewise, this Court finds Applicant did not prove counsel was deficient. Counsel utilized two experts as part of Applicant's defense, and this Court finds counsel's defense of Applicant reasonable under prevailing professional norms and not deficient. Applicant did not prove deficiency or prejudice, and this claim is denied.

Failed to cross-examine State's witnesses[11]

Applicant asserts counsel was ineffective for failing to properly and thoroughly cross-examine the State's witnesses at trial. This Court finds Applicant did not prove counsel was ineffective in this regard. At the PCR hearing, Applicant generally averred counsel did not effectively cross-examine the State's witnesses, but he did not set forth *which* witnesses should have been further cross-examined or the manner in which counsel should have further cross-examined them. Thus, Applicant failed to meet his burden of proving deficiency or prejudice. Likewise, a review of the transcript indicates counsel's cross-examination of the State's witnesses was reasonable under prevailing professional norms and not deficient. Applicant has

[11] This section addresses allegation five of the amended application.

not proved deficiency or prejudice, and this claim is denied.

Opening the Door – Prior Bad Act Evidence[12]

Applicant avers counsel was ineffective by opening the door to his prior bad acts that were ruled inadmissible by the Court, thereby eviscerating his defense of accident. This Court finds Applicant did not prove counsel was ineffective in this regard.

Initially, this Court finds counsel was deficient by opening the door to prior bad act evidence the court had ruled inadmissible. Throughout trial, counsel kept out the 404 evidence of prior bad acts. Just before Applicant took the stand, the trial judge ruled that evidence of Applicant's prior drug convictions would not be admissible. After the court ruled, counsel proceeded to question Application about his prior drug convictions during direct examination. This Court finds counsel's performance in this regard was deficient.

However, Applicant failed to show this deficiency prejudiced him under the second prong of Strickland. To satisfy the prejudice prong, an applicant must demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. Ard v. Catoe, 372 S.C. 318, 331, 642 S.E.2d 590, 596 (2007) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). As the Supreme Court of the United States explained in Strickland, "the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt." 466 U.S. at 695. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of trial." Rutland v. State, 415 S.C. 570, 577, 785 S.E.2d 350, 353 (2016) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

Although Applicant testified that he believed he had been prejudiced, his belief is not proof that trial counsel's performance deprived Applicant of a fair trial or that the outcome of trial would

[12] This section addresses allegation eight of the amended application.

have been different. Ultimately, this case hinged on whether the shooting was accidental (as Applicant claimed). However, the State presented overwhelming evidence to show the shooting was *not* accidental—including expert testimony that the gun did not malfunction when tested, expert testimony that Victim's DNA was excluded from the gun, and evidence that Victim had recently broken up with Applicant. Thus, it is not reasonably likely evidence of Applicant's prior drug convictions changed the outcome, and this claim is denied.

Additional allegations raised at hearing

Applicant raised several additional allegations at the PCR hearing. This Court finds Applicant did not meet his burden of proving any of these claims.

First, Applicant alleged counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the solicitor's misrepresentation of facts during closing argument. Specifically, he averred counsel should have objected when the State argued Victim's DNA "could be excluded as a contributor to the gun." (Tr. 1025). However, the State's argument was supported by Dr. Bogan's testimony that he "excluded [Victim] as a contributor of DNA to the handgun," and Applicant has not set forth a valid, legal objection to this argument. (Tr. 706). Thus, he did not prove deficiency or prejudice.

Second, Applicant generally alleged counsel should have objected to the jury charge. Applicant, however, did not set forth *what* charge should have been objected to and thus did not meet his burden of proving deficiency or prejudice in this regard. Third, Applicant averred counsel was ineffective by failing to have the jury reinstructed when the jury sent a note asking for the legal definitions of "murder, Guilty of possession of firearm, Burglary."[13] (Tr. 1077). This allegation lacks merit. The jury asked to be presented the legal definition of the charges; it was

[13] During deliberations, the jury sent a note asking for the legal definitions of "murder, guilt of possession of firearm, burglary." The Court relayed it would respond, "[O]ur procedures do not allow for a copy of the jury charges slash instructions to be given to you. If there is a specific instruction that you would like given again or the entire instruction, lease advise us and I will accommodate your request." (Tr. 1077).

told it could not have a paper copy of the charges, but if it wished to be reinstructed on the law, to send a note. Counsel's failure to object was not deficient performance. Further, Applicant did not set forth a valid, legal objection and thus did not establish deficiency or prejudice.

Fourth, Applicant averred counsel was ineffective for failing to object when he became aware that population genetics was not performed.[14] Initially, nothing suggests counsel was unaware that population genetics was not performed by SLED, especially when counsel hired a population genetics expert to challenge the State's evidence. Applicant did not set forth a valid, legal basis to object and thus did not prove deficiency or prejudice in this regard.

Finally, Applicant averred counsel was ineffective by improperly arguing a challenge to a motion for a directed verdict, and appellate counsel prejudiced Applicant by failing to raise the directed verdict issue on appeal. This claim patently lacks merit, especially here where Applicant himself testified he was holding the gun when the fatal shot was fired. Thus, this claim is denied.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, this Court concludes Applicant has not established any constitutional violations that would require this Court to grant relief. Thus, this application is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Should Applicant wish to secure appellate review, he must file and serve a notice of appeal within thirty days of receipt by counsel of written notice of entry of judgment. See Rule 203, SCACR. Applicant has the right to an appellate counsel's assistance in seeking review of the denial of PCR. Austin v. State, 305 S.C. 453, 409 S.E.2d 395 (1991). If Applicant wishes to seek

[14] Counsel called Dr. Ronald Ostrowski, an expert in population molecular genetics, to challenge the State expert's conclusion that Victim's touch DNA was excluded from the gun. (Tr. 924-36). During cross-examination, Ostrowski testified, "My first concern was SLED is supposed to do population genetics, in fact they're required to do population genetics and it surprised me that it was not here. That was one of the things that was discussed." (Tr. 943).

appellate review, PCR counsel must serve and file a notice of appeal on applicant's behalf. Rule 71.1(g), SCRCP. Attention is directed to Rule 243, SCACR, for appropriate procedures for appeal.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. This application for PCR is denied and dismissed with prejudice; and

2. Applicant shall be remanded to and remain in the custody of the State.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 7th day of March, 2023.

R. KIRK GRIFFIN
Presiding Judge
Ninth Judicial Circuit

Greenville, South Carolina

State of South Carolina
The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit

R. Kirk Griffin
Judge

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March 7, 2024

Honorable Julie J. Armstrong
Charleston County Clerk of Court
100 Broad Street, Suite 106
Charleston, South Carolina 29401-2210

RE: Jake Antonio Wilson, #303739 v State of South Carolina (2015-CP-10-531)

Dear Ms. Armstrong:

I am enclosing an Order of Dismissal in the above matter.

Please file the order and send certified copies to all attorneys of record.

If you have any questions, please let me know.

Yours very sincerely,

R. Kirk Griffin

RKG, djf

Enclosures

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF CHARLESTON
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

Jake Antonio Wilson, #303739, Applicant,

v.

State of South Carolina, Respondent.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a filed copy of the Order of Dismissal has been served upon the applicant by mailing one copy in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:

Rep. Christopher John Murphy
Murphy Crantford Meehan
Attorneys at Law, LLC.
136 West Richardson Avenue
Summerville, SC 29483

This 18th day of March, 2024.

Vickie Hall
Vickie Hall, Legal Assistant
for Respondent

SWORN to before me this 18th day of March, 2024.

Notary Public for South Carolina
My Commission Expires: 3/29/2032

JORDAN BAIRD HICKMAN
NOTARY PUBLIC
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES
03/29/2032
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA