

IN THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
COURT OF APPEALS  
FROM LAURENS COUNTY COURT  
OF COMMON PLEAS  
EIGHTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT  
Honorable: EUGENE GRIFFITH JR. Presided.  
2013-CP-30-0243 DAVID V. STATE

LYNN W. LANCASTER

2013 AUG - 9 A 9:11

LAURENS COUNTY  
CLERK OF COURT

Russell Leon DAVID sr. . . . . Appellant

V.S.

STATE OF SOUTH Carolina . . . . . Respondent

NOTICE OF APPEAL  
RULE 203. (A), (ii). RULE 29 (a), SCR, crim P.

Russell Leon DAVID sr. #240689, Will Appeal The Honorable; Judge, Eugene Griffith Jr.  
ON THE 27<sup>TH</sup> day of June Judge Griffith Orderd A Dismissal of Application For  
Post Conviction Relief (P.C.R) Filed MARCH 22, 2013 With Prejudice.,  
Appllant now Serve's THIS NOTICE OF APPEAL.

THIS FINAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL; WAS ORDERD ON The 27<sup>TH</sup> day of June  
and was Served on the 3<sup>RD</sup>, day of JULY 2013 at Laurens County Court of  
Common Pleas. ON The 8<sup>TH</sup> day of JULY 2013 Appllant Recided NOTICE OF Appeal  
ON The 11<sup>TH</sup> day of JULY 2013.

THIS DAY OF AUG. 5<sup>TH</sup>, 2013.

Sincerely,  
*Russell Leon David sr.*  
RUSSELL LEON DAVID sr.  
Pro - Se

THIS NOTICE OF APPEAL come before This court by of AN Application for Post Conviction Relief Filed March 22 2013 The State Fied a Return and a motion For A Conditional Dismissal ORDER. Appellant Argues if Strickland vs Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. Provides The proper frame work For Evaluating a claim that Counsel was Constitutionally ineffective for Failing To File a Notice For direct Appeal When This Appellant Asked For One in 1997 <sup>see</sup> AMENDMENT to P.C.R. #3 on page 2 line 11-17. The Base[s] of Appellant Issue's. Trial Counsel's in the Murder Case was ineffective for failing to Object to The improper Conduct of the Court, When The Judge and, Solicitor did not Object to The plea itself, but The Judge Tried AND Convicted and Sentence Mr. DAVIDSON on the murder Charge ANYWAY it Would or is a little Short of Judicial murder. it cannot boubted and Would be a Gross Violation of The State and Federal due-Proceec of Law and Consti-tution of The State and united States. And We Venture to Think That NO Appellate Court in State or federal Would hesitate to odicide <sup>see</sup> Johnson vs. State, 480 S.E.2d 733 (S.C.) 1997. and in State vs. BUCCUS, 362 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 829 (2001). "This Court is bound by the Court's Factual Findings UNLESS they are Clearly erroneous" <sup>id.</sup> (citing) State vs. Quattlebaum, 338 S.C. 441, 452, 527 S.E.2d 105, 111 (2001). AN Abuse of discretion occur's when The TRIAL COURT'S Ruling is based on an "error" of LAW or When grounded IN Factual Conclusion's, State vs. Tenning's, 394 S.C. 473, 477-78 S.E.2d 91-93 (2011). INdetermining Whether The length of Time for a Post-Conviction Relief Application is Reasonable. For appropriate Constitutional inquiry is Whether The detention lasted longer then was Necessary Given Mr. Davidson's Circum-Stances and its Purpose that Appellant was NOT Allowed his Fair opportunity Required by The Constitution of This State and the united States ~~that~~ He was Allowed a effective not one (1) but Two (2) Counsel's. Appellant Had no assistance For a Collaterally Attacked of his Convictions, ~~First~~ First in State Court then in the First Post-Conviction Relief Application and Now in his First Appeal From His P.C.R. Appellant did not have but a Sixth <sup>th</sup> grad Teaching To do his on litigating and Should be allowed A Bite at the Apple because of his P.C.R. Application was dismissed. 17-27-20A(5) and (6). 17-27-100 and 17-27-60. Appellant has The Right To AN Appellate Counsel's Assistance in Seeking Review of The denial of P.C.R. Rules Civ. Pro. Rule 71:1 (9) under The P.C.R. Rules a Court

Will Appoint AN Attorney to a P.C.R. Applicant if HE/SHE is Indigent and wants to File A Appeal. Rules Civ. Proc. Rule 71.1 (d), (g) Appellant Argues P.C.R. Judge are Required to Advise Pro-se Appellant's of both their Right to Appeal and their Right to Appellate Counsel when Their P.C.R. Application's are Summarily Dismissed, Rules Civ. Proc. Rule 71.1 (d, g). Additionally, the Appellant argues Counsel was ineffective for not Objecting to The Conviction, and Sentencing when Appellant Did not Plead to The Murder IN OPEN COURT This Protection of Law is lacking where a Appellant with funds, appealing as of Right From a Conviction, enjoys Benefit of Counsel, while an indigent Appellant if he Chooses to carry out Such AN Appeal following a Preliminary Appellate Court determination That Appointment of Counsel would be for himself. S.C. Pen. Code §§ 1-23-10-60 and 1-23-310 to 410 - 1-23-500-600. to approach The present Problem in Terms of The Equal Protection Clause as I Submit, but to Substitute Resounding Phrases for analysis. IN The Approach in Griffin vs. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 29, 34-36, 76 S.Ct. 585, 595-97, 100 L.Ed. 891. The majority in Griffin Appeared To Rely, as here on a blend of The Equal Protection and Due-process in Arriving at the Result, SO for as the Result in That case Rested on Due-process Grounds, you can fully accept the authority of Griffin with Mr. David sr. Case To The Murder Conviction see Russell Leon David vs. STATE OF South Carolina 2013-CP-30-0243 Page 2 line's 16-17-18. AND The First is that Mr. David sr. Was Afraid that if he Went to Trial He Might get the "Death Penalty" This was A Real possibility He was Charged with AN OFFENSE Carrying That Penalty. Mr. DAVID sr. Lack of Skill in drafting his allegations it is At least arguable That more than mere Disappointment is Involved. A Flat Misrepresentation by his Two Attorneys Is Asserted. IF The Judge of the P.C.R. Court had held a hearing on These Charges. if This were a Federal Conviction the case would Fall Within the Rule in Machibroda vs. U.S., 1962. 368 U.S. 487, 489, 493, 82 S.Ct. 510. 7 L.Ed. 2d 473 This Court can see we entertain some doubt, as the Trial did. That Mr. David sr. Charges are true But the Murder. The Trial did not and we Do not have the Records of What Took Place at Mr. David sr. Sentencing and in ANY event, it probably would not Fully Answer the Charge which Appears To Allegate Matters Occurring outside the Record. This Court can Conclude That The P.C.R. Judge Should have held A hearing Limited To Those Allegations That Relate The Voluntary Character of Mr. DAVID Plea. see

ZAFFARANO VS. UNITED STATE, 9<sup>th</sup> Cir., 1962 306 F.2d 707; *ibid.*, 9 Cir. F.2d 114. The mainstay of A Plea of Guilty to Murder with Recommendation of mercy the Plea would Result in a mandatory life Sentence. But Mr. DAVID sr. Thought The Evidence was better he would have TAKE The hold Case to The Jury not Just the Murder. AND He KNEW that if he was Found Guilty he would get the death Sentence and The Recommendation of mercy would be out The Door. Mr. DAVID sr. in his Original Plea on the Stand was He would Plead To all Other Charge's in the Indictment but the murder Charge. Mr. DAVID sr. would have Withdrew his Original Plea and Plead not Guilty To The hold Thing in the Indictment on March 26<sup>th</sup> 1997 if Not For his Counsel Being ineffective To That Failure to Consider That Mr. DAVID sr. would want to Appeal The Claim, will Result in a Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice where Appellant Claiming ineffect Assistance of Counsel see Mc Coy vs. State, (Opinion 27214, Fed. 2013) The S.C. Supreme Court Reversed and Remanded For hearing The dismissal of The petitioner's P.C.R. Application. IN Appellant's P.C.R. Amendment #3 line 17-32 and Page 3 and on page 4 line 1-31 and Page 5 line 1-12. Mr. DAVID sr. knew He was not Guilty on the murder but he was Sentence to life + 65 years imprisonment That's Just as bad as The death Sentence itself NO ONE mentioned to him that the murder was not going to be Taking out of The Plea and he was going to be tried For the murder Along with Rest of his Charges. When the Judge Sentenced Mr. DAVID sr. To Life + 65 imprisonment He Raises Several questions about Pleas. He does not urge The practice in itself. because it is unconstitutional He does Claim the Plea is in Voluntary For The murder and That his Arraignment was Constitutionally defective. A Conviction based on such a Plea is open to Collateral Attack. see Walker vs. Johnson, 312 U.S. 275, 615 S. Ct. 574, 85 L. Ed 830; Waley vs. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 62 S. Ct. 964, 86 L. Ed. 1302. Shelton vs. US, 26, 78 S. Ct. 563, 2 L. Ed. 2d. 579, Reversing 5 Cir., 246 F.2d 571. "The Voluntariness of Mr. DAVID sr. Plea Does depend upon Whether he was The Victim of a Fake Judgement even if fulfilled in dce The plea and deprive it of The "Character" of A Voluntary Act Whether Mr. DAVID sr. Plea was Voluntary Raises issues of Fact upon which the State Court differed. Mr DAVID sr. Contends he was denied Due-process of Law because Court at TRIAL Level did not Advise Him of The Consequences of his plea.

"A Plea of Guilty differs in purpose and effect from a mere Admission or an extrajudicial Confession; It is itself a Conviction, like a Verdict of a Jury, it is Conclusive. more is not Required; The Court Has Nothing to do but give Judgement and Sentence, Out of Just Consideration For Persons Accused of Crime, Court are Careful That A Plea of guilty Shall not be accepted unless Made Voluntarily After proper Advice and With Full understanding of The Consequences. No Particular Form of Ritual is Required, But it must Appear That A defendant Understand or Understood The Consequences of his plea. The defect in Mr. David sr. arraignment lies in the fact That no one - Court or Counsel - ascertained That David sr. Understood The Consequences of his plea. Nevertheless, if Mr. David sr. in fact understood The error was harmless, Gundlach v. U.S. 262 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied 360 U.S. 904, 79 S. Ct. 1288, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1255 (1959). The State, however, has The burden of proving HARMLESS error of Muich vs. U.S. 337 F.2d 356, 360 (9th Cir. 1964). The Result does not depend upon this Prisoner's Subjective testimony alone. The issue is one of Fact, which must be Resolved by an examination of "Reasonable inferences to be drawn from all The Surrounding Facts AND Circumstances. Under Familiar Principles of due-process, a Guilty Plea Cannot be accepted unless the defendant understand its Consequences. When Mr. DAVID sr. side He was to Plead to The Charge's of Conspiracy, Lynching, Strong Armed Robbery, Kidnapping, Grand Larceny of A Motor Vehicle. He side in open court he was not going to Plea To The Murder Charge. That When the Murder Charge and Counsel Preudice Mr. David sr. The Court made no effort to Ascertain What Mr. DAVID sr. Understood. Either Through it's own efforts or Through Counsel, AND the State has Failed to Show This error was harmless. Mr. David sr. When His Two Counsel's did not Object to the Conviction or Sentencing. Rule 52.(b). Plain error merely Restate's existing Law and was Intended to afford a means For the promot Redress of Miscarriages of Justice. The Fed. Rule cri. Proc. Rule 52.(b). 18 U.S.C. A Power Granted by the plain error Rule is to be used Sparingly Solely in those Circumstances in Which a Miscarriages of Justice would Otherwise Result From This error.

The Sixth Amendment embodies a Realistic Recognition of The Obvious truth That The Average defendant does not have The Professional Legal Skill to protect himself When brought before a Tribunal With Power to Take his life or liberty, Where in the prosecution is presented By experienced and learned Counsel. That Which is Simple, Orderly and Necessary to The lawyer, to The untrained Laymen may appear intricate. Complex and mysterious, it is True The accused's Case was Tried before The Case of Similar Cases Were decided, but The Same Constitutional Right existed Then, and while Retractive Correction Should be made only in Cases Where great Wrongs Have been Done, I Think This is Such a Case. [He] Committed a Crime For Which punishment is decreed in The Law, Society is entitled to That to That Protection, but this now 53 years of Age now has Given The Best Years of his life in payment of his debt to Society, "must He [Give 13 more years] of an Already broken Life and 65 Year's Would Border on cruel and unusual Punishment, and Certainly The Appellant of due-process and equal protection of The Law. The United States Supreme Court's decisions establish that a State Criminal trial, a proceeding initiated and Conducted by The State itself, is an action of the State Within The Meaning of U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. A defendant who must Face Felony Charges in State Court Without The experienced and learned in Capital Case Assistance of Counsel Guaranteed by U.S. Const. Amend. VI. has been denied due process of LAW, unless a defendant charged with a serious offense has Counsel able to invoke The procedural and substantive safeguards that distinguish The American System of Justice, a serious Risk of injustice infects the trial itself. When a State Obtains a Criminal Conviction Through such a TRIAL, it is The State That unconstitutionally deprives The defendant of his liberty. Mr. DAVID sr. raise Claims of ineffective assistance of Trial Counsel's only Where, under State Law, ineffective-assistance-of-Trial-Counsel's not ONE but TWO Counsel's in this were Ineffective given That The precise question here is Whether ineffective assistance in an initial-review collateral proceeding

A Procedural default will not bar a federal Court from hearing those claims state court should resolve the question left open in Russell Leon DAVID sr. #240689 vs. State of South Carolina 2013-CP-30-0243. Application and Amendments to his claim #11 Three 3 times all 68 pages. Mr. DAVID sr. is doing his best to let the court know about what this ineffective assistance of Counsel's never gave the assistance necessary to establish a cause for a appeal from his trial court sentencing "The Attorney's is the prisoner's agent" and "The principal bears the risk of" his agent negligent conduct. no other court has addressed the claim and defendants "are generally ill equipped to represent themselves" where they have no brief from counsel and no court opinion addressing their claim. Without adequate representation in an initial appeal request form defendant a prisoner's inability to present an ineffective-assistance claim is of particular concern because the right to effective trial counsel is a bedrock principle in this nation's justice system. Mr. DAVID sr. has demonstrated that the two underlying ineffective-assistance claims. DAVID sr. claimed his TRIAL Counsel's had been ineffective for failing to challenge the prosecution's doings with Mr. DAVID sr. Pleaded to the murder when he did not plead to it at all. With this Mr. DAVID sr. Ask the court of appeals to look at his cry for a fundamental fairness at his issues. because a bad lawyer or bad lawyering and how it can cast someone their life. March 25 2009 in Davie v. State. Counsel has constitutionally-imposed duty to consult with defendant about appeal when there is reason to think either (1) that rational defendant would want to appeal. or (2) that this practical defendant reasonably demonstrate to counsel that he was interested in either actually or constructively. Is presumably prejudicial of counsel's alleged failure to file notice of appeal, depriving defendant of appellate proceeding altogether, was presumably prejudicial all in light of the (6) Sixth U.S.C.A. Const. Amend: 6. six.

1. Strickland vs. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. provides the proper framework for evaluation a claim that Counsel was Constitutionally ineffective for failing to file a notice of Appeal Under Strickland, a defendant must show that Counsel's Representation "fell below an objective standard of Reasonableness," *id.*, at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, and (2) that Counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. *id.*, at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Pp. 1034-1040.

(A) Courts must "judge the Reasonableness of Counsel's Conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of Counsel's Conduct," 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A lawyer who disregards a defendant's specific instructions to file a notice of Appeal acts in a professionally unreasonable manner; see Rodriguez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327, 89 S.Ct. 1715, 23 L.Ed.2d 340, while a defendant who explicitly tells his attorney not to file an appeal plainly cannot later complain that, by following those instructions, his Counsel performed deficiently; see Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987. The Ninth Circuit adopted a bright-line rule for cases where the defendant has not clearly conveyed his wishes ~~ONE WAY OR THE OTHER~~ in its view, failing to file a notice of Appeal without the defendant's consent is per se rule as inconsistent with Strickland's circumstance-specific Reasonableness Requirement. The question whether Counsel has performed deficiently in such cases is best answered by first asking whether Counsel in fact consulted with <sup>1471</sup> the defendant about and Appeal. By "consult," the Court means advising the defendant about an appeal's advantages and disadvantages of taking an Appeal and making a reasonable effort to discover the defendant's wishes. (b) Second part of the Strickland Test requires the defendant to show prejudice from Counsel's deficient performance. Where an ineffective assistance of Counsel claim involves Counsel's performance during the course of a legal proceeding, the Court normally applies a strong presumption of reliability to the prosecution

of Reliability to The proceeding, Requiring a defendant to overcome that proceeding, requiring demonstrating that Attorney error actually had an adverse effect on the defense. The complete denial of counsel during a critical stage of a Judicial Proceeding, however Mandates a Presumption of PreJudice because "The adversary process itself" has been rendered "presumptively unreliable" United States v. Cronin, 466 U.S. 648, 659, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657. The even more serious denial of the entire Judicial Proceeding also demands a presumption of PreJudice because no presumption of Reliability can be accorded to Judicial proceeding that never took place. If Respondent Claims that his Counsel's deficient performance led to The forfeiture of his Appeal, if that is so, PreJudice must be presumed. It's clear that Mr. DAVID Sr. had little or no understanding of what the process was, what the appeal process was, or what Appeal meant at that stage of the game. The Supreme Court have long held that a lawyer who disregards specific instructions from the defendant to file a Notice of Appeal acts in a manner that is professionally unreasonable. See Rodriguez v. U.S. 395 U.S. 327, 89 S. Ct. 1715, 23 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1969). cf. Peguero v. U.S., 526 U.S. 23, 28, 119 S. Ct. 961, 143 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1999). ("When Counsel fails to file a Requested appeal, a defendant is entitled to [a New] Appeal without showing that his appeal would likely have had merit"). This is so because a defendant who instructs Counsel to initiate an appeal reasonably relies upon Counsel to file the necessary Notice. Counsel's failure to do so cannot be considered a strategic decision; filing a notice of Appeal is a purely ministerial task, and the failure to file reflects inattention to the defendant's wishes. The Courts of Appeals for the First and Ninth Circuits have answered that question with a bright-line rule: Counsel must file a notice of Appeal unless the defendant specifically instructs them otherwise; failing to do so is Per Se deficient.

7.)

IN Title 17- Criminal Procedures CHAPTER 27. OF THE UNIFORM POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT. SECTION 17-27-20 (a) (4) (b) Reads as, (a) Any person who has been convicted of or sentenced for a crime and who claims: (4), that there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice;

If South Carolina Law is going to put forth such a law must be responsible for the ones who impose it. (6) The conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error heretofore available under and common law, statutory or other writ, motion petition, proceeding or remedy; may institute, without paying a filing fee, a proceeding under this chapter to secure relief. of his Equal Protection Clause and Due Process of Law of law in every step, The ERRONEOUS error of the COURT ITSELF conduct in was when the Judge, Solicitor did not object or stop the pleading itself because the defendant SAID in open court on the stand with not 13 but 16 sixteen JURY. The Court erred in accepting his plea to the court charging him with murder this activity in violation of due process of Law and Constitution of the State and United States AND they venture to think that know Appeal Court in State or Federal would hesitate so to decide. as State vs. Quattlebaum, 338 S.C. 441, 52, 527 S. E. 2d

105, 111 (2001) AN Abuse of discretion occurs when the Trial Court Ruling and denial of his Fundamental Justice This miscarriage of Justice in this case of Mr. David sr. is the result from an familiar principle of due-process, a guilty plea cannot be accepted unless the defendant understand its consequences of the plead and conviction. From and result of this miscarriage of Justice and the Abuse of due process of Law and erroneous error of the proceeding itself is

As in The Sixth Amendment embodies a Realistic Recognition of  
The Obvious Truth That The Average defendant does not have  
The Professional Legal Skill to protect him Self When  
brought before a Tribunal with Power to Take his life  
and Liberty, Where in the Prosecution is presented by  
Experienced And Learned Counsel.  
That Wich is Simple, Orderly and Necessary to The Lawyers [s]  
to The untrained LAYMEN May appear intricate.  
8). Mr. DAVID sr. Ask's This Court of Appeals to Look  
At all Constitution and Law of This State and United  
State's and Grant A evidentiary hereing.

## CONCLUSION A PRAUER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Appellant Respectfully Prays That This Appeal AND This Court Enter Judgment;

1. GRANTING Appellant; hey A declaraiton that The acts, acts and Omissions described herein Violate his Rights under the Constitution and Law of The United States and State of South Carolina, and

2. GRANTING Appellant Judgment AS;

Individual is entitled to Rulings on the base ~~is of~~ an error of law or, When grounded in Factual Conclusions, State vs. Jennings, 394 S.C. 473, 477-78, 716 S.E.2d 91, 93 (2011). IN determining Whether The length OF time For a Post Conviction Relief Application is Reasonable For appropriate Constitutional inquiry is Whether the detention lasted longer Than was Necessary given His Circumstances.

3. GRANTING; Appellant Right to AN Appellate Counsel Assitance in Seeking Review of the denial of P.C.R. in litght of Rule 71.1(g) and 71.1(d.g).

4. GRANTING Appellants Right to his Equal Protection Clause; and

■ Due process of law IN EVERY Step in This Appeal.

5. GRANTING A Hearing; ON The ALL ISSUES Raised in His P.C.R. Application.

6. TO Reversal and Remande For A Hearing.

Today's hearing in this Court provides a mode For The Redeemable of denial's of Due Process of Law. Vindication of Due Process of Law is Precisely its Historic. A variant of This Argument is That if the State Court declines to entertain because of A Procedurat default, is a Miscarriage of Justice Then The Prisoner Custady is Actually due To The default and The Miscarriage of Justice. Rether Than to The Underlying Constitutional Infringement.

Russell Leon DAVID

# CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I CERTIFY That on 08/5/2013, I served A Copy of This APPEAL NOTICE ON All parties Addressed as Shown. TO Mis LYNN W. LANCASTER at LAURENS COUNTY COURT With The Electronic Case Filing System To The Court of APPEAL, Judge Eugene Griffith Jr. and Assis. Attorney General J. Rutledge Johnson and a Certify Copy back Applicant For His File's

Russell Leon David Sr.  
Russell Leon DAVID Sr. #240689  
Pro Se Attorney

RLD file prose

LYNN W. LANCASTER

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LAURENS COUNTY  
CLERK OF COURT

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AUG 12 2013

SC COURT OF APPEALS

LAURENS COUNTY  
CLERK OF COURT

RUSSELL LEON DAVID Sr.  
PRO SE / ATTORNEY

2013 AUG - 9 A 9:11

August 5<sup>TH</sup>, 2013

LYNN W. LANCASTER

THE Honorable Lynn W. Lancaster  
Clerk of Court, Laurens County  
Post Office Box 287  
LAURENS, South Carolina.  
29010

RE: Russell Leon DAVID Sr. #240689 2013-CP-  
30-0243, State of South Carolina  
NOTICE OF APPEAL  
A Rule 203(A)(ii) Rule 290(a) S.C.R. Crim. P.

DEAR Ms. LANCASTER;

Enclosed please find AN Original NOTICE OF Appeal. IN Connection with The Above Referenced Case. Please MAKE (2) Two Copies of The Original and Return a Copy to The Addressees below. AND (1) one Copy To my This Adresse Here is For Myself.

**RECEIVED**

AUG 12 2013

SC Court of Appeals

South Carolina Court of Appeals / Assistant Attorney General  
J. Rutledge Johnson

Russell Leon DAVID Sr. #240689

Russell Leon David Sr.  
Russell Leon DAVID Sr. #240689  
Lee. Corr. Inst.  
990 Wisacky Highway  
Bishopville, SC, 29010

cc:  
RLD. File;

S.C.A., AA.G. RLD. For Copies