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SC Court of Appeals

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

APPEAL FROM ORANGEBURG COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas

The Honorable James B. Jackson, Jr., Master-in-Equity

Case No. 2020-001254

Kacey Green and Charinrath Green, ... Appellants-Respondents,

v.

Mervin Lee Johnson,.....Respondent-Appellant.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Pursuant to Rule 221(a), SCACR, counsel for Respondent-Appellant, hereby petitions for rehearing of this matter following the Court of Appeals' unpublished opinion no. 2024-UP-024, which was filed on January 17, 2024. The grounds for this petition are that the Court overlooked or misapprehended Respondent-Appellant's arguments and thereby failed to conclude: a) that the Court lacked jurisdiction over Appellants-Respondents' notices of appeal; b) that the evidence cited by the Master to alter the excessive default damages award was presented to the court prior to the hearing on Respondent-Appellant's Rule 59(e) motion; c) that the Master did not err in admitting evidence at that hearing; d) that the Master's orders omitted any factual findings to support the excessive punitive damages award; and, e) that the Master correctly held that Appellants' attorney's conduct in negotiating with Respondent's insurer supported setting aside default. Respondent-Appellant craves reference to his Motion to Dismiss, Final Appellate Brief,

Final Return to Appellants-Respondents' Amended Initial Brief, and the Record on Appeal, together with the arguments presented at the October 10, 2023, oral argument, in support of this Petition for Rehearing.

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS NEVER OBTAINED JURISDICTION OVER APPELLANTS' NOTICES OF APPEAL.

The Court of Appeals erred in failing to dismiss Appellants' notices of appeal. Appellants' first notice of appeal was filed after they filed a Rule 59(e) motion, which undeniably stayed the appeal deadline. The Court did not dismiss that notice of appeal and Appellants never withdrew their Rule 59(e) motion. After Master-in-Equity James B. Jackson, Jr. (the "Master") cured this deficiency and ruled on that motion, Appellants did not serve a notice of appeal within the 30-day time limit required by Rule 203(b), SCACR. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals never obtained jurisdiction over Appellants' appeal.

As argued in § II, A of Respondent's Return to Appellants' Final Brief, Appellants' notice of appeal was untimely because Appellants filed a Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend the Amended Order on Damages within ten days of the Master's Amended Damages Order. (R. pp. 162-167). This motion stayed the time to appeal until "receipt of written notice of entry of the order granting or denying such motion." Rule 59(f), SCRCP. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction to hear Appellants' appeal until after the trial court ruled on their Rule 59(e) motion. The relevant procedural timeline is as follows.

Amended Damages Order issued	August 14, 2020
Appellants' Rule 59(e) Motion filed	August 24, 2020
Appellants' Notice of Appeal served	September 14, 2020

Judge Jackson email denying jurisdiction over Appellants' Rule 59 Motion issued	September 18, 2020
Respondent's Notice of Cross-Appeal served	September 25, 2020
Respondent's Motion to Hold Appeals in Abeyance filed	December 9, 2020
Court of Appeals grants Respondent's Motion to Hold Appeals in Abeyance	February 4, 2021
Order (Form 4) Denying Appellants' Rule 59(e) Motion issued	March 8, 2021
Respondent's Notice of Appeal (2nd) served	April 7, 2021
Appellants' Motion for Extension of Time to File Amended Notice of Appeal filed	April 20, 2021
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Appeal filed	May 7, 2021
Court of Appeals Order Denying Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Appeal issued	June 28, 2021

The supreme court has unequivocally stated that an appeal noticed after a timely Rule 59(e) motion should be dismissed without prejudice to allow the trial court to consider the issues raised in such a motion.

> IT IS ORDERED that in the event timely post-trial motions are filed under Rule 59, simultaneously with or subsequent to the filing of a Notice of Appeal, the appellant shall notify the Clerk of this Court in writing. Upon receipt of such notice, the appeal shall be dismissed without prejudice.

Hudson v. Hudson, 290 S.C. 215, 216, 349 S.E.2d 341, 341–42 (1986). The purpose of the rule is so that "all ancillary matters can be timely heard, and appealed, if necessary, in an efficient and wholesale manner." *Holmes v. East Cooper Community Hosp., Inc.*, 408 S.C. 138, 162, 758 S.E.2d 483, 496 (2014).

Appellants' Rule 59(e) motion was filed within ten days of the Master's Amended Damages Order and effectively stayed the time to appeal until "receipt of written notice of entry of the order granting or denying such motion." SCRCP, Rule 59(f). Thus, their Notice of Appeal served on September 14th was premature.

Furthermore, as they argued in their Rule 59(e) motion, Appellants were required to raise their objections to the Amended Damages Order to the Master. (R. pp. 162-167). "A party must file such a motion when an issue or argument has been raised, but not ruled on, in order to preserve it for appellate review." *Elam v. South Carolina Dept. of Transp*., 361 S.C. 9, 24, 602 S.E.2d 772, 780 (2004). In their motion to alter or amend, Appellants argue that numerous issues were raised in the hearing, but not ruled on, in the Master's Order. (R. pp. 162-167).

Despite Appellants' argument to the contrary, their Rule 59(e) motion was not a duplicative or successive procedure. In *Coward Hund Const. Co., Inc. v. Ball Corp*., this Court considered "whether [the defendant's] second Rule 59 motion stayed the time for filing its notice of appeal." 336 S.C. 1, 3, 518 S.E.2d 56, 58 (Ct. App. 1999). Under the facts of that case, the Court concluded that the appeal deadline expired 30 days after the denial of the *first* Rule 59 motion. The *Coward* opinion shows that the appropriateness of a Rule 59 motion is determined by the substance of the moving party's challenge. As is true in the instant action, the parties may be required to submit multiple Rule 59 motions to ensure their issues are preserved for appeal.

> [A] second motion for reconsideration is appropriate only if it challenges something that was altered from the original judgment as a result of the initial motion for reconsideration. In such a case, a new judgment has replaced the previous judgment and the party aggrieved by the alteration may move for reconsideration.

Coward, 336 S.C. at 3, 518 S.E.2d at 58. The Master's Amended Damages Order significantly reduced the amount of Appellants' damages award and eliminated their property damages claim. Therefore, according to *Coward*, their Rule 59(e) motion was timely and appropriate. Because they were the losing party in the court's ruling on Respondent's Rule 59(e) motion, Appellants' subsequent motion was mandatory, and not merely successive.

After Appellants served their Notice of Appeal, Respondent sought the trial court's guidance on the status of the outstanding Rule 59(e) motion. (R. pp. 168-170). The Master

erroneously informed Respondent that the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to consider the motion. *Id*. Having relied on the stay imposed by the Rule 59(e) motion, Respondent found himself "between the proverbial rock and a hard place" predicted in *Elam v. South Carolina Dept. of Transp*. 361 S.C. at 25, 602 S.E.2d at 781. Therefore, Respondent on September 25, 2020, served his Notice of Cross-Appeal based on the date of the Master's correspondence. See *Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Fallon Properties South Carolina, LLC*, 422 S.C. 211, 219, 810 S.E.2d 856, 860 (2018) (holding that "an email sent from the court, an attorney of record, or a party that provides written notice of entry of an order or judgment triggers the time for serving a notice of appeal for purposes of Rule 203(b)(1), SCACR").

This jurisdictional defect was properly raised to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals in Respondent's Notice of Cross Appeal filed on October 5, 2020. In that filing, Respondent informed the Court that Appellants filed a timely Rule 59(e) motion, that the Master did not rule on that motion, and that they nevertheless served and filed a notice of appeal. According to *Hudson*, 290 S.C. at 216, 349 S.E.2d at 341–42, it was then incumbent on the Clerk to dismiss Appellants' notice of appeal without prejudice. This did not happen.

After the Clerk failed to dismiss Appellants' notice of appeal, Respondent filed a Motion to Hold Appeals in Abeyance, which this Court granted[1] on February 4, 2021, and returned this action back to the Master for resolution of Appellants' Rule 59(e) motion. The Master then denied Appellants' motion. (Form 4 Order, R. p. 31). Any notice of appeal served prior to the Master's March 8, 2021, order was untimely and outside this Court's jurisdiction.

[1] The Court amended this order on March 4, 2021, to clarify that Appellants' appeal and Respondent's cross-appeal would both be held in abeyance pending the Master-in-Equity's consideration of the pending motion.

On April 7, 2021, within 30 days of the Master's order denying Appellants' Rule 59(e) motion, Respondent served a new Notice of Appeal. Appellants, however, did not timely appeal from that Order. Instead, they filed on April 20, 2021, an "Amended Notice of Appeal" and simultaneously filed a motion for an extension of time to file the amended notice of appeal. Appellants never served this amended notice of appeal prior to the date of filing.

> Rule 203(b), SCACR, requires a party to serve his notice of appeal within thirty days after receiving written notice of the entry of a final order or judgment, and failure to do so divests this court of subject matter jurisdiction and results in dismissal of the appeal.

Canal Ins. Co. v. Caldwell, 338 S.C. 1, 4, 524 S.E.2d 416, 418 (Ct. App. 1999). Appellants cannot demonstrate that either of their notices of appeal complied with this blackletter standard. Nor can Appellants seek a remedy for their untimely notice of appeal.

> The requirement of service of the notice of appeal is jurisdictional, i.e., if a party misses the deadline, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal and has no authority or discretion to 'rescue' the delinquent party by extending or ignoring the deadline for service of the notice.

Elam, 361 S.C. at 14–15, 602 S.E.2d at 775 (quoting *Mears v. Mears*, 287 S.C. 168, 337 S.E.2d 206 (1985)).

This issue was also raised in Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, filed on May 7, 2021. Also on May 7th, Respondent wrote the Clerk of the Court of Appeals to explain that the notice of appeal filed on April 16, 2021, was a new appeal from the Master's March 8, 2021, order. Respondent requested a new appeal number and submitted a check for the filing fee.

Instead, by order dated June 28, 2021, the Court dismissed Respondent's motion to dismiss without explanation. On that same date, the Clerk issued a letter informing the parties that:

> The Court has received multiple notices of appeal from appellant/respondents and respondent/appellant in this matter. These appeals will be consolidated for consideration by the Court under the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules

(SCACR), and we anticipate receiving one record on appeal. **The times for perfecting an appeal will run from the service of the last notice of appeal**.

Nondispositive Order, dated June 28, 2021 (emphasis supplied). Not only was this instruction contrary to the Rules of Appellate Procedure, but Appellants never served a notice of appeal from the Master's order denying Appellants' Rule 59(e) motion. Nor did the Court grant Appellants' request for an extension or address their failure to timely notice their appeal. For these reasons, the Court should reconsider its failure to hold that Appellants never perfected their appeal.

II. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION REDUCING THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT AWARD WAS BASED ON EVIDENCE TIMELY PRESENTED.

The Court of Appeals erred in determining that the Master improperly relied on evidence submitted at the hearing on Respondent's Rule 59(e) motion. Even if the Master should not have considered specific evidence presented at that hearing, that does not impair the Master's decision to reduce the damages award for two reasons. First, the grossly disproportionate damages award was apparent from evidence previously presented at the default damages hearing, in Respondent's Rule 60 motion to set aside default judgment, in the Affidavits of Nikole Shields and Breeann Richardson, and in the hearing on Respondent's Rule 60 motion. Secondly, the evidence presented at the Rule 59(e) hearing was relevant only to Respondent's effort to set aside default to allow Respondent to appear and defend the action on its merits. In other words, the trial court's discretion to reduce the patently disproportionate damages award was independent of the decision to deny Respondent's effort to set aside default judgment.

The evidence Respondent presented to support his Rule 59(e) motion included correspondence between Appellants' counsel and Respondents' insurer, a picture from the accident scene, and documentation of Appellants' property subrogation claim for repairs to their vehicle. (R. pp. 133-151). However, the Master's decision to reduce the damages award did not depend

upon this evidence. The only evidence cited by the Master as justification for reducing the damages award was the "uncontested medical bills of $12,826.00; and the additional evidence presented at the hearing,[2] …." (R. P. 30).

Instead, the trial transcript from the July 13, 2020, hearing makes clear that the Master simply regretted the excessive damages award. At the hearing, the Master concluded that "I think the damages that I previously awarded are too high. And so I'm going to reduce those damages, okay. I don't know how much." (R. pp. 93-94). Referencing the default damages hearing, the Master offered that "when there's nobody here defending it, you know, and the Court only hears one set of argument on the damages … it's just kind of hard." *Id*.

What is not hard is concluding that the evidence presented to the Master prior to the Rule 59(e) hearing was sufficient to support his decision that the original award was excessive. Appellants testified and presented record evidence at the May 22, 2019, default damages hearing. Counsel for Appellants entered medical bills totaling $12,826.00 and suggested that "anywhere from 100 to 150 times medical expenses" was appropriate for an actual damages award. (R. pp. 53-54). Mr. Green testified that repairs to Appellants' car was "$3,000.00 or something." (R. p. 49). When Appellant attempted to sell the vehicle, he showed prospective buyers photos of damage caused by the collision and told them "See, look, it -- it didn't look bad." (R. p. 51). Appellants offered a video of the relatively minor accident, which the Master viewed during the hearing. (R. pp. 24 & 44-45). Accordingly, the Master's decision to reduce the damages award was based on evidence presented well before the July 2020, hearing and not on newly admitted evidence.

[2] It is not clear from the order which of the three hearings the Master is referring to regarding the "additional evidence" he relied upon.

Instead, a close review of the Amended Damages Order shows that the evidence offered with Respondent's Rule 59(e) motion was considered by the Master in setting aside the $10,000.00 property damage award and in finding that the case of *McClurg v. Deaton*, 380 S.C. 563, 671 S.E.2d 87 (Ct. App. 2008), *aff'd*, 395 S.C. 85, 716 S.E.2d 887 (2011), supported finding that Respondent had a meritorious defense under Rule 60(b). As to the single photograph of the accident scene, this evidence was merely duplicative of the video of the accident that the Master viewed at the default damages hearing. (R. pp. 24 & 44-45). Therefore, admitting this evidence was at worst harmless error. The impact of this evidence, whatever it may be, was not necessarily tied to the Master's decision, which was well within a trial court's discretion, to reduce an excessive damages award.

III. THE MASTER DID NOT ERR IN ACCEPTING EVIDENCE AT THE HEARING ON RESPONDENT'S RULE 59(E) MOTION.

A. The Court Erred Because the Record Does Not Definitively Establish What Evidence was Presented Prior to the Hearing on Respondent's Rule 59(e) Motion.

As a preliminary matter, the record does not conclusively establish that the evidence offered by Respondent at the July 13, 2020, hearing was not previously brought to the Master's attention. This is because there was no court reporter present at, and no recording was made of, the October 21, 2019, hearing on Respondent's Rule 60(b) motion. At the Rule 59(e) hearing, counsel for Appellants informed the Master that the arguments presented that day were "basically all the same arguments [the Master] heard after this motion to dismiss." (R. p. 79). Accordingly, the record casts doubt on the grounds relied on by the Court to vacate the Amended Damages Order.

B. Evidence Presented Respondent's Rule 59(e) Motion was Properly Before the Master Because Respondent Could Not Have Offered the Evidence Prior to Default Judgment.

It is well established that "[a] party cannot use Rule 59(e) to present to the court an issue the party **could have raised prior to judgment** but did not." *Hickman v. Hickman*, 301 S.C. 455, 456, 392 S.E.2d 481, 482 (Ct. App. 1990). The Court overlooked the issue of whether Respondent, in the context of a Rule 59(e) motion challenging the court's refusal to set aside default judgment, could have raised **any** issue "prior to judgment." The fact is that Respondent was not represented in this action prior to the Master entering judgment by default.

Because this is an action to set aside default judgment, the evidentiary standards are governed first by Rule 60. The Court agreed with Appellants that the evidence presented with Respondent's Rule 59(e) motion was not "newly discovered evidence" citing the standard of Rule 60(b)(2). Respondent, however, relied on Rule 60(b)(3), to which courts apply a more lenient standard than to Rule 60(b)(2). *Schultz v. Butcher*, 24 F.3d 626, 631 (4th Cir. 1994). Moreover, Rule 60(b)(2), which was never relied on by Respondent, has limited application when the movant proffers evidence to meet the evidentiary burden to justify setting aside default judgment. Instead, relief from default under Rule 60 depends on factors including "the reasons for the failure to act promptly … the existence of a meritorious defense, and the prejudice to the other parties." *Mictronics, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue*, 345 S.C. 506, 510–11, 548 S.E.2d 223, 226 (Ct. App. 2001). It goes without saying that meeting this burden requires evidence and that such evidence was **not** presented prior to default judgment. Our courts do not hold that a party seeking relief from default judgment is constrained to offer only evidence that was offered prior to the entry of judgment. Ergo, our rules permit such a party to offer evidence even though it theoretically could have been raised prior to judgment but was not.

The issue remains whether this permissive approach to the admissibility of evidence includes evidence offered in a party's Rule 59(e) motion. If our courts had previously held that a party in default cannot present evidence with a Rule 59(e) motion that the party did not offer with its Rule 60(b) motion, then the Master clearly erred in admitting the evidence offered by Respondent here. But that is not the rule set forth by our courts. Because Respondent could not have offered this evidence prior to judgment, the Court erred by vacating the Master's Amended Damages Order based on evidence offered at the Rule 59(e) hearing.

C. The Court Erroneously Concluded that Appellants Preserved Objections to the Admission of Evidence at the Hearing on Respondent's Rule 59(e) Motion.

The Court overlooked[3] Appellants' Rule 59(e) motion when it held that Appellants preserved, via their unsolicited proposed order, their objections to the admission of evidence at the July 13, 2020, hearing. In fact, Appellants did not raise in their Rule 59(e) motion the issue of whether evidence could properly be introduced in support of a motion to reconsider. (R. pp. 162-164). As argued above, Appellants were obligated to submit a Rule 59(e) motion to challenge the Master's Amended Damages Order. The Court's citation to *Eades v. Palmetto Cardiovascular & Thoracic, PA*, 422 S.C. 196, 810 S.E.2d 848 (2018), demonstrates its error in crediting Appellant's proposed order for the purpose of issue preservation. In *Eades*, the court noted that issue preservation requires "the issue must have been timely raised by the appellant with sufficient specificity and ruled upon by the [circuit] court." *Id*., 422 S.C. at 201 n.3, 810 S.E.2d at 850 n.3. A trial court is under no obligation to read, much less rule upon, a proposed order. Although the transcript shows that at the hearing Appellants objected to admission of the evidence, the Amended Damages Order does not address their objections. (R. pp. 19-30). Thus, Appellant was required to

[3] This is also significant because it demonstrates that the Court overlooked the effect of Respondents' Rule 59(e) motion on their untimely notice of appeal.

raise this issue in a timely Rule 59(e) motion. While their motion was timely filed within ten days of the Amended Damages Order, it omitted any objection to the timing of evidence offered with Respondent's Rule 59(e) motion. In light of Appellants' failure to properly preserve this issue in their motion for reconsideration, the Court should not rescue their appeal with reference to the proposed order.

IV. THE COURT OVERLOOKED THE MASTER'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE ANY FACTUAL FINDINGS SUPPORTING THE EXCESSIVE PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARD.

The Master's June 5, 2019, Damages Order awarded punitive damages of $750,000.00. (R. pp. 2-12). The Amended Damages Order reduced this amount to $50,000.00. (R. p. 30). However, neither order contains any factual findings justifying an exemplary damages award. Although the trial court is not required to "make findings of fact for each factor to uphold a punitive damage award," the Master's orders failed to provide the slightest justification for the Appellants' exorbitant award. *Welch v. Epstein*, 342 S.C. 279, 306, 536 S.E.2d 408, 422 (Ct. App. 2000). Upon review of a punitive damages award, the trial judge's factual findings specific to that award must be reasonably supported by the evidence in the record. *Austin v. Specialty Transp. Services, Inc.*, 358 S.C. 298, 314, 594 S.E.2d 867, 875 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing *Carjow, LLC v. Simmons*, 349 S.C. 514, 563 S.E.2d 359 (Ct. App. 2002)). However, neither the Master's June 5, 2019, order, nor his August 14, 2020, amended order, contain a single factual finding that Respondent's conduct was willful, wanton, or in reckless disregard of Appellants' rights. *Taylor v. Medenica*, 324 S.C. 200, 479 S.E.2d 35 (1996).

Even Appellants agree that the Master failed to set forth mandatory findings to justify the punitive damages award. As Appellants argued in their August 24, 2020, Rule 59(e) motion, the Amended Damages Order "contains an award for punitive damages and hereby seeks clarification

on the findings of fact which support the award." (R. pp. 162-167). Appellants never raised their concerns with the Master's punitive damages award in the June 5, 2019, Damages Order.

V. THE COURT OVERLOOKED RECORD EVIDENCE DISTINGUISHING RESPONDENT'S APPEAL FROM *MCCLURG V. DEATON.*

The Court further overlooked the distinctions between Respondent's effort to avoid default judgment and the defendant in *McClurg v. Deaton*, 380 S.C. 563, 671 S.E.2d 87 (Ct. App. 2008), aff'd, 395 S.C. 85, 716 S.E.2d 887 (2011). The Court erroneously anchored its critique of the Master's application of *McClurg* on the distinction that the McClurg's attorney promised the insurer he would send you a courtesy copy of the pleadings. That there is no evidence that Appellants' counsel promised to send a copy of any pleading to Ms. Shields merely points out a distinction without a difference. However, the *McClurg* case doesn't turn on the existence of a promise reduced to writing or even a verbal promise. Instead, it was that the insurer had a reasonable expectation it would be notified of any lawsuit arising from the employee's accident based on the attorney's conduct in negotiating the claim.

Moreover, the Court overlooked the significance of issue preservation in distinguishing this action from *McClurg.* This Court found in *McClurg* that "New Prime never even raised the issue of a meritorious defense before the trial court." 380 S.C. 563, 575, 671 S.E.2d 87, 94. This finding was central to this Court's rejection of that defendant's argument that the plaintiff's attorney's misrepresentations entitled him to an order setting aside default judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3).

Furthermore, the Court's conclusion that Respondent failed to show that the insurer was taken by surprise when Appellants filed their suit solely against the insured driver without informing the insurer misapprehends the record evidence in the affidavit of Nikole Shields. (R. pp.

110-112). While the word "surprise" is absent from the affidavit, the clear import of her testimony was that despite her communications with Appellants' counsel, she was never informed that suit was filed naming the driver alone.

For these reasons, the Court should grant Respondent-Appellant's Petition, rehear these appeals, withdraw its order of January 17, 2024, and issue an order accounting for the arguments heretofore overlooked.

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APPEAL FROM ORANGEBURG COUNTY
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The Honorable James B. Jackson, Jr., Master-in-Equity

Case No. 2020-001254

Kacey Green and Charinrath Green, ... Appellants-Respondents,

v.

Mervin Lee Johnson, ...Respondent-Appellant.

PROOF OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 1st day of February, 2024, he has served counsel for Respondents with a copy of the **PETITION FOR REHEARING** together with all enclosures in this matter by electronically mailing copies of the same to the following addresses:

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February 1, 2024

VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL ONLY *ctappfilings@sccourts.org*
The Honorable Jenny Abbott Kitchings
Clerk, South Carolina Court of Appeals
1220 Senate Street
Columbia, SC 29201

RE: *Kacey Green v. Mervin Lee Johnson*
App. Case No. 2020-001254
Our File No. 15580

Dear Ms. Kitchings:

Please find enclosed for filing in the above case, the following:

(1) Respondent-Appellant's Petition for Rehearing

(2) Proof of Service of the same.

In accordance with the provisions of Rule 240(d) our law firm placed a check in the mail to you today for the $50.00 filing fee.

Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions or concerns. Otherwise, please file the copies of the Petion for Rehearing, Proof of Service, and return to me the clocked copies via electronic mail.

By copy of this letter and the attached enclosures, I am hereby serving by email other counsel of record with the enclosed filings.

Sincerely,

s/Todd R. Flippin

Todd R. Flippin

cc: David R. Williams, Esq. (Via E-Mail Only - david@williamsattys.com)
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