

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
In The Supreme Court

**RECEIVED**

**Apr 23 2024**

APPEAL FROM BEAUFORT COUNTY  
Court of Common Pleas

S.C. SUPREME COURT

The Honorable Roger M. Young, Sr., Circuit Court Judge

Case No. 2022-CP-07-00427

Dontarious Jaron Wright, .....Petitioner,

v.

State of South Carolina, .....Respondent.

**NOTICE OF APPEAL**

Petitioner, Dontarious Jaron Wright, appeals the order of the Honorable Roger M. Young, Sr., dated March 25 2024, and filed April 11, 2024. Petitioner received written notice of entry of this order on April 16, 2024.

4/23, 2024



Michael H. Lifsey  
Post Office Box 548  
Chester, South Carolina, 29706  
(803) 899-5040  
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

Opposing Counsel:  
Danielle Dixon  
Assistant Attorney General  
S.C. Attorney General's Office  
PO Box 11549  
Columbia, SC 29211-1549

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA )  
COUNTY OF BEAUFORT )  
Dontarious Jaron Wright, SCDC #343780, )  
Applicant, )  
v. )  
State of South Carolina, )  
Respondent. )

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS  
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

Case No. 2022-CP-07-00427

**ORDER OF DISMISSAL**

2024 APR 11 AM 11:00  
JENNIFER ROSENEAU  
CLERK OF COURT S.C.

This matter is before the court by way of an application for post-conviction relief (PCR) filed by Dontarious Jaron Wright on March 9, 2022. On November 29, 2023, an evidentiary hearing convened before the Honorable Roger M. Young, Sr. Applicant was present and represented by Michael H. Lifsey, Esquire. Assistant Attorney General Danielle Dixon represented Respondent. At the hearing, Applicant testified in his behalf and called as a witness Trasi Campbell, Esquire (trial counsel). Following a thorough review of the records before this Court and the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, this Court finds Applicant did not meet his burden of proof. Thus, this Court denies relief and dismisses this application with prejudice.

**PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

Applicant is presently confined in the South Carolina Department of Corrections serving a cumulative forty-year sentence. In January 2018, the Beaufort County Grand Jury indicted Applicant for murder and possession of a weapon during a violent crime. These charges arose from the fatal shooting of Adrian Lamont Mangio (Victim) on August 22, 2017.

On March 11-13, 2019, Applicant proceeded to a jury trial before the Honorable Perry M. Buckner. Trasi Campbell, Esquire, represented Applicant, and Assistant Solicitors Mary Jones and Kimberly Smith prosecuted the case. The jury convicted Applicant as indicted, and Judge Buckner sentenced him concurrently to forty years for murder and five years for the weapon charge.

Applicant filed a direct appeal, which was perfected by Appellate Defender Susan B. Hackett through the filing of a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). The Court of Appeals dismissed pursuant to Anders, and the remittitur was sent August 5, 2021.<sup>1</sup>

#### SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

Victim was fatally shot in his back. (Tr. 181). At trial, eyewitnesses Frank Young, Jr. and Michael Grant identified Applicant—whom they knew—as the shooter. (Tr. 194, 199-200). Young testified Applicant and Grant were hanging out in Young’s yard when Victim arrived. He stated Applicant shot Victim three times. (Tr. 199-200). Grant similarly testified he was at Young’s house with Applicant when Victim arrived, and Applicant shot three times. (Tr. 218). Erik Black, Applicant’s roommate, testified he saw Applicant running from Young’s<sup>2</sup> house. He further testified Applicant had previously said he was going to shoot Victim. (Tr. 226-28, 231-32). Reeshemah Bryson and Frederika Gray also testified they saw Applicant running that day. (Tr. 242-43, 250-51). Law enforcement found Applicant later that day hiding in a shed and recovered multiple particles of gunshot residue from his hand. (Tr. 261-66, 335-36). Applicant ultimately confessed in a recorded statement but claimed he was acting in self-defense. Applicant moved pretrial for immunity, which was denied. At trial, he proceeded on a theory of self-defense.

#### CURRENT APPLICATION

On March 9, 2022, Applicant timely filed this PCR application alleging:

- a. Ineffective counsel: refused to offer me a plea deal;
- b. Slander: Defamation of character.

The State filed a return requesting an evidentiary hearing and a motion for a more definite statement.

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<sup>1</sup> While Applicant’s direct appeal was pending, he filed a PCR application (2020-CP-7-2000). That action was dismissed without prejudice due to the pending direct appeal.

<sup>2</sup> Young went by the name “Mikey.” (Tr. 192).



On November 2, 2022, Applicant filed an amended application alleging counsel was ineffective for the following:

- a. Counsel did not meet with Applicant a sufficient number of times, did not fully explain the strengths and weaknesses of the State' case, and did not explain the elements of the crimes of which he was charged;
- b. Counsel did not object to the Solicitor's repeated references to Applicant as a "coward" despite these characterizations being irrelevant, highly prejudicial, and intended to inflame the passions of the jury against him;
- c. Applicant [sic] did not object when the solicitor repeatedly referenced conversation various witnesses had with her, thereby putting herself in the position of a potential witness in the trial she was prosecuting;
- d. The lack of objection to the Solicitor's actions in making herself a witness as described above served to increase the Solicitor's credibility to the jury when there was no challenge to such by trial counsel;
- e. Counsel advised Applicant not to testify, despite the impossibility of establishing self-defense without Applicant testifying since there were no other witnesses besides himself who could make out a self-defense case;
- f. In advising Applicant not to testify, counsel incorrectly advised him that his prior conviction for assault with intent to kill could be used to impeach him despite its similarity to eh charge of murder that he was facing and the existence of caselaw in South Carolina that states convictions that are too similar to the offense charged cannot be used to impeach a testifying criminal defendant;
- g. Counsel failed to object to the judge's erroneous ruling regarding the use of Applicant's prior conviction for assault with intent to kill to impeach but instead merely acquiesced to the Solicitor's assertion that this offense could be used to impeach despite its obvious similarity to the offense for which Applicant was being tried;
- h. Counsel failed to request a circumstantial evidence charge in conformity with State v. Logan, 405 S.C. 83, 747 S.E.2d 444 (2013).

At the hearing, Applicant proceeded on the allegations in his amended application.



### FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This Court has had the opportunity to review the records before it, including the Beaufort County Clerk of Court records of the underlying conviction; Applicant's records from the Department of Corrections; the records from Applicant's appeal, including the trial transcript; and the records of the current PCR action. This Court also had the opportunity to observe the witnesses presented at the hearing, closely pass upon their credibility, and weigh their testimony. After a careful review based on the Strickland standard set forth below, this Court finds Applicant failed to carry his burden of proof. Below are this Court's findings of facts and conclusions of law as required by section 17-27-80 of the South Carolina Code (2017).

#### **INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL**

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the PCR applicant must prove (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) the applicant sustained prejudice because of counsel's deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 117-18, 386 S.E.2d 624, 625 (1989). "The test for effective assistance of counsel is whether the representation was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Watson v. State, 287 S.C. 356, 357, 338 S.E.2d 636, 637 (1985). To prove prejudice, the applicant must show "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Cherry, 300 S.C. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625.

#### *Failure to meet / advise*

Applicant first contends counsel was ineffective for failing to meet with Applicant a sufficient number of times, failing to fully explain the strengths and weaknesses of the State's case, and failing to explain the elements of the crimes of which he was charged. This Court finds Applicant did not prove this claim.



Critically, Applicant admitted at the PCR hearing that counsel met with him at the detention center two or three times before trial, discussed self-defense, and discussed the State's burden of proving malice as a part of murder. This Court finds counsel's performance at trial was reasonable under prevailing professional norms and not deficient. Likewise, based on Applicant's testimony about his conversations with counsel, this Court finds counsel met with Applicant a sufficient number of times and adequately explained the charges and the strategy of self-defense. Thus, Applicant did not prove deficiency. Likewise, Applicant did not set forth how additional meetings or conversations would have reasonably changed the outcome of trial and thus did not prove prejudice. Thus, this claim is denied.

*Failed to Object - Solicitor's opening statement*

Applicant next avers counsel was ineffective for not objecting to Solicitor's repeated references to Applicant as a "coward" despite these characterizations being irrelevant, highly prejudicial, and intended to inflame the passions of the jury against him. This Court finds Applicant did not prove this claim.

"A solicitor's closing argument must be carefully tailored so as not to appeal to the personal biases of the jury." Vasquez v. State, 388 S.C. 447, 458, 698 S.E.2d 561, 566 (2010). "The State's closing arguments must be confined to evidence in the record and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence." Id. "A solicitor has a right to state his version of the testimony and to comment on the weight to be given such testimony." Id. However, "[s]olicitors are bound to rules of fairness in their closing arguments." Id.

"On appeal, the appellate court will view the alleged impropriety of the solicitor's argument in the context of the entire record, including whether the trial judge's instructions adequately cured the improper argument and whether there is overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt." Id. "Improper comments do not automatically require reversal if they are not prejudicial to the



defendant, and the appellant has the burden of proving he did not receive a fair trial because of the alleged improper argument.” Id. “The relevant question is whether the solicitor’s comments so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Id.

During opening statement, the solicitor stated:

[W]ithin minutes, Mont has succumbed to his wounds, and he dies on the dirt road on that hot summer afternoon.

So what does the Defendant do? Like the coward that he is, after shooting a man in the back, he runs. He runs, he changes clothes, he gets rid of the gun, and hides. And he remains in hiding for a few hours until the deputies of Beaufort County Sheriff’s Office find him across Highway 17 hiding in a shed. He’s arrested, and he’s taken back to the Sheriff’s office for an interview.

And he does what you would expect any coward to do. He lies. And he lies for roughly the first 30 or 40 minutes of his interview.

(Tr. 166-67).

And one thing that is going to remain the same throughout everything is that the Defendant shot and killed an unarmed man in the back on August 22<sup>nd</sup> of 2017. That coward over there shoots him in the back, runs, changes his clothes, gets rid of the gun, and hides. But he wants you to believe it is self-defense.

(Tr. 169).<sup>3</sup>

At the PCR hearing, Applicant questioned counsel about why she did not object to the foregoing. She explained this was going to be a fact-centric case in terms of whether Applicant acted in self-defense, and she did not believe the solicitor’s description of Applicant as a coward crossed the line. She further averred Applicant’s state of mind was central to self-defense, and “coward” is not an improper term, unlike thug or animal. Trial counsel agreed opening statements are not supposed to be argumentative. However, she elaborated that in considering whether she should object, she evaluates how an objection will be met and the impression it will have on the

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<sup>3</sup> These are the only portions of the transcript Applicant referenced in relation to this argument.



jury. She explained jurors often perceive defense attorneys as trying to be evasive and could view an objection to opening statement negatively, which could harm her client's case. Counsel further averred an objection to the word "coward" would have likely been overruled.

This Court finds counsel articulated a valid reason for not objecting in that she did not believe the "coward" language crossed the line, and because it did not cross the line, an objection could have done more harm than good. Thus, Applicant did not prove deficiency. Likewise, the foregoing did not so infect the trial with unfairness as to violate due process; thus, even if the comments were objectionable (which this court does NOT find), counsel's failure to object did not prejudice Applicant. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986) (finding prosecutor's improper comments—which included statements such as "He shouldn't be out of his cell unless he has a leash on him" and "I wish that I could see him sitting here with no face, blown away by a shotgun"—did not "so infect the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process"). Thus, this claim is denied.

*Failed to Object – Solicitor's questions during trial<sup>4</sup>*

Applicant asserts counsel was ineffective for not objecting when the solicitor repeatedly referenced conversation various witnesses had with her, thereby putting herself in the position of a potential witness in the trial. He further contends the lack of objection to the solicitor's actions in making herself a witness served to increase the solicitor's credibility to the jury when there was no challenge to such by trial counsel. This Court finds Applicant did not prove this claim.

During witness Michael Grant's testimony, the solicitor asked:

- Q. Okay. Do you remember talking to Investigator Duncan?  
A. Yes, ma'am.  
Q. A couple days after the shooting?  
A. Yes, ma'am.  
Q. And you—he asked you about what happened that afternoon?  
A. Yes, ma'ma.

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<sup>4</sup> This section combines allegations (c) and (d) of the amended application.

Q. And you remember talking with me as well?  
A. Yes, ma'am.  
Q. We were actually in the parking lot of the Sheriff's office?  
A. Yes, ma'am.  
Q. And I asked you what happened that afternoon?  
A. Yes, ma'am.  
Q. Okay. And do you remember telling both myself and Investigator Duncan that the—that Derio was talking to Dontarious Wright?  
A. Yeah.  
Q. Did you tell us that?  
A. That he was talking to him? Not at the time, he was just standing there.

(Tr. 214-15).

During witness Erick Black's testimony, the following exchange occurred:

Q. Okay. Do you remember speaking with me about two weeks ago outside of [redacted].  
A. Yes.  
Q. And it was myself and Investigator Hightower?  
A. Yes.  
Q. And do you remember telling us that you saw the Defendant running away from Mikey's house?  
A. Yes.  
....  
Q. In fact, you told Mr. Hightower and myself that you thought it was odd he was running because he had been shot in the leg in the past?  
A. Yeah. Because he—he was shot in the past, but he was normal at that point in time.

(Tr. 227-29).

Q. Okay. And you remember talking to myself and watching a video of yourself when you are speaking with the police about this, correct?  
A. Yes.  
Q. And amounting to that video, you remember telling the police, who just got there, 'He said, if he keeps running his mouth, then next time I see him, I'm going to shoot him'?  
A. Yeah. That was when we were in the car.

(Tr. 233).

During witness Andrew White's testimony, the following exchange occurred:



Q. Okay. Do you remember speaking with myself and Investigator Hightower a few weeks back at your home? This man right here?

A. Uh-huh. (Indicating affirmatively.)

Q. And also Ms. Smith.

A. Uh-huh. (Indicating affirmatively).

Q. We came to your home and spoke with you?

A. Uh-huh. (Indicating affirmatively).

Q. And we asked you about what happened that afternoon?

A. Uh-huh. (Indicating affirmatively).

Q. And you told us that while you were cutting the grass, two kids came running through your yard?

A. Well, I don't know if I said "running," but I know they were coming through my yard.

(Tr. 240).

Finally, during witness Fredericka Gray's testimony, the following occurred:

Q. Do you remember meeting with myself and Investigator Hightower downstairs a week or so ago?

A. Yeah.

Q. And you told us [Applicant] appeared 'panicked.'

A. Yeah.

(Tr. 251-52).

At the PCR hearing, Applicant testified the solicitor kept making it seem like she was a witness at the scene, but trial counsel did not object. When questioned about the foregoing, trial counsel testified she may have objected if the solicitor had just referenced herself alone, but in each of the situations she referenced law enforcement being involved in the conversation. Counsel further testified she did not view the foregoing as vouching.

This Court finds counsel articulated a valid reason for not objecting to the foregoing in that each reference involved a conversation with law enforcement, and the questioning did not constitute improper vouching. See State v. Shuler, 344 S.C. 604, 630, 545 S.E.2d 805, 818 (2001) ("Improper vouching occurs when the prosecution places the government's prestige behind a witness by making explicit personal assurances of a witness' veracity, or where a prosecutor implicitly vouches for a witness' veracity by indicating information not presented to the jury

supports the testimony.”); contra State v. Kelly, 343 S.C. 350, 368, 540 S.E.2d 851, 860 (2001), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 534 U.S. 246 (2002) (finding questions “What did I tell you that I absolutely required regarding your testimony to this jury today?”, “Did I tell you to tell the truth to this jury?”, and “What did I tell you regarding your testimony to this jury today? The only thing the State wanted from your testimony was what?” constituted improper vouching because the jury could have perceived that the solicitor believed the witness was telling the truth).

This Court further finds Applicant failed to set forth a valid, legal objection counsel should have made to this questioning and thus did not prove deficiency. Likewise, this Court finds it is not reasonably likely an objection to the foregoing would have changed the outcome of trial; thus, Applicant did not prove prejudice, and this claim is denied.

*Advice regarding Applicant testifying<sup>5</sup>*

Applicant asserts counsel was ineffective for advising him not to testify, despite the impossibility of establishing self-defense without Applicant testifying since there were no other witnesses besides himself who could make out a self-defense case. He further contends counsel incorrectly advised him that his prior conviction for assault with intent to kill (AWIK) could be used to impeach him despite its similarity to the charge of murder, and counsel failed to object to the judge’s erroneous ruling regarding the use of Applicant’s prior AWIK conviction. This Court finds Applicant did not prove this claim.

At the PCR hearing, Applicant testified he wanted to testify, but counsel advised him not to because he had a prior AWIK conviction. Applicant testified counsel did not explain that she could have argued the AWIK charge was not admissible for impeachment, and he did not to testify due to the AWIK charge. On cross-examination, he acknowledged he had prior convictions for strong armed robbery (2016) and petite larceny (2012), and counsel advised him those convictions

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<sup>5</sup> This section addresses allegations (e), (f), and (g) of the amended application.



would come out if he testified.

Counsel testified she was able to establish the elements for self-defense charge through Applicant's statement, and she did not believe Applicant would add anything by testifying. She further explained she had concerns that he would undermine his case by testifying. Ultimately, however, counsel explained it was Applicant's decision whether to testify.

This Court finds counsel articulated a valid reason for advising Applicant not to testify and was not deficient in this regard. Specifically, counsel credibly testified she was able to use Applicant's statement to law enforcement to support a self-defense charge, and she was afraid Applicant would undermine his defense if he testified. Additionally, Applicant was advised on the record of his right to testify, and ultimately it was his decision to not testify. (Tr. 401-03).

This Court further finds that because Applicant was not planning to testify, counsel's decision to not challenge the admissibility of the 2010 AWIK charge for impeachment was reasonable under prevailing professional norms and not deficient. This Court notes Applicant had two other impeachable convictions and finds it is not reasonably likely his decision to not testify hinged solely on his belief that the 2010 AWIK charge would be admissible. (Tr. 402). Finally, and critically, Applicant did not offer any testimony at the PCR hearing as to what he would have testified to at trial and thus did not show a reasonable likelihood the outcome would have been different had he testified. Thus, he did not prove deficiency or prejudice, and this claim is denied.

Logan charge

Finally, Applicant contends counsel was ineffective for failing to request a circumstantial evidence charge in conformity with State v. Logan, 405 S.C. 83, 747 S.E.2d 444 (2013). This Court finds Applicant did not prove this claim.

"Unlike direct evidence, evaluation of circumstantial evidence requires jurors to find that the proponent of the evidence has connected collateral facts in order to prove the proposition

A handwritten signature or set of initials, possibly 'Ru', written in black ink.

propounded—a process not required when evaluating direct evidence.” State v. Logan, 405 S.C. 83, 97, 747 S.E.2d 444, 451 (2013). “Analysis of circumstantial evidence is plainly a more intellectual process.” Id. at 97-98, 747 S.E.2d at 451.

[T]rial courts should provide the following language as a circumstantial evidence charge, in addition to a proper reasonable doubt instruction, when so requested by a defendant:

There are two types of evidence which are generally presented during a trial—direct evidence and circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence directly proves the existence of a fact and does not require deduction. Circumstantial evidence is proof of a chain of facts and circumstances indicating the existence of a fact.

Crimes may be proven by circumstantial evidence. The law makes no distinction between the weight or value to be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence, however, to the extent the State relies on circumstantial evidence, all of the circumstances must be consistent with each other, and when taken together, point conclusively to the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. If these circumstances merely portray the defendant's behavior as suspicious, the proof has failed.

The State has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden rests with the State regardless of whether the State relies on direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or some combination of the two.

Id. at 99, 747 S.E.2d at 452.

At the PCR hearing, counsel explained the State had direct evidence against Applicant, and this was not purely a circumstantial case; thus, she did not see a reason to request the Logan charge. This Court agrees. Specifically, at trial, Young and Grant identified Applicant as the shooter. (Tr. 194, 199-200). Further, and critically, Applicant admitted to being the shooter but proceeded on self-defense. This case was not purely circumstantial, and counsel's failure to request the Logan charge was reasonable under prevailing professional norms and not deficient. Likewise, and for the same reason, it is not reasonably likely the outcome would have been different had counsel requested and the court charged the Logan circumstantial charge. Thus, Applicant did not prove



deficiency or prejudice, and this claim is denied.

CONCLUSION


Based on the foregoing, this Court concludes Applicant has not established any constitutional violations that would require this Court to grant relief. Thus, this application is denied and dismissed with prejudice.


Should Applicant wish to secure appellate review, he must file and serve a notice of appeal within thirty days of receipt by counsel of written notice of entry of judgment. See Rule 203, SCACR. Applicant has the right to an appellate counsel's assistance in seeking review of the denial of PCR. *Austin v. State*, 305 S.C. 453, 409 S.E.2d 395 (1991). If Applicant wishes to seek appellate review, PCR counsel must serve and file a notice of appeal on applicant's behalf. Rule 71.1(g), SCRPC. Attention is directed to Rule 243, SCACR, for appropriate procedures for appeal.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. This application for PCR is denied and dismissed with prejudice; and
2. Applicant shall be remanded to and remain in the custody of the State.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 3/25 day of March, 2023/2024

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
ROGER M. YOUNG, SR.  
Presiding Judge  
Fourteenth Judicial Circuit

  
\_\_\_\_\_, South Carolina

**FORM 4**

**STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
COUNTY OF BEAUFORT  
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS**

**JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE  
CASE NUMBER 2022CP0700427**

Dontarious Wright		South Carolina State Of	
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<b>PLAINTIFF(S)</b>	<b>DEFENDANT(S)</b>
<b>Submitted by:</b>	<b>Attorney for:</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Plaintiff <input type="checkbox"/> Defendant <input type="checkbox"/> Self-Represented Litigant

**DISPOSITION TYPE (CHECK ONE)**

- JURY VERDICT.** This action came before the court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and a verdict rendered.
- DECISION BY THE COURT.** This action came to a hearing before the court. The issues have been heard and a decision rendered.  See Page 2 for additional information.
- ACTION DISMISSED (CHECK REASON):**  Rule 12(b), SCRPC;  Rule 41(a), SCRPC (Vol. Nonsuit);  
 Rule 43(k), SCRPC (Settled);  Other: \_\_\_\_\_
- ACTION STRICKEN (CHECK REASON):**  Rule 40(j) SCRPC;  Bankruptcy;  
 Binding arbitration, subject to right to restore to confirm, vacate or modify arbitration award;  Other: \_\_\_\_\_
- STAYED DUE TO BANKRUPTCY**
- DISPOSITION OF APPEAL TO THE CIRCUIT COURT (CHECK APPLICABLE BOX):**  
 Affirmed;  Reversed;  Remanded;  Other:

NOTE: ATTORNEYS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR NOTIFYING LOWER COURT, TRIBUNAL, OR ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OF THE CIRCUIT COURT RULING IN THIS APPEAL.

**IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:**  See attached order  Statement of Judgment by the Court:

**ORDER INFORMATION**

**Order of Dismissal**

**This order**  ends  does not end the case.

Additional Information for the Clerk: \_\_\_\_\_

**INFORMATION FOR THE JUDGMENT INDEX**

Complete this section below when the judgment affects title to real or personal property or if any amount should be enrolled. If there is no judgment information, indicate "N/A" in one of the boxes below.

Judgment in Favor of (List name(s) below)	Judgment Against (List name(s) below)	Judgment Amount To be Enrolled (List amount(s) below)

If applicable, describe the property, including tax map information and address, referenced in the order:

The judgment information above has been provided by the submitting party. Disputes concerning the amounts contained in this form may be addressed by way of motion pursuant to the SC Rules of Civil Procedure. Amounts to be computed such as interest or additional taxable costs not available at the time the form and final order are submitted to the judge may be provided to the clerk.

**Note: Title abstractors and researchers should refer to the official court order for judgment details.**

**E-Filing Note: In E-Filing counties, the Court will electronically sign this form using a separate electronic signature page.**

s/ R. M. Young, Sr  
Circuit Court Judge

2134  
Judge Code

3/25/2024  
Date

**For Clerk of Court Office Use Only**

This judgment was entered on **April 11, 2024**, and a copy mailed first class or placed in the appropriate attorney's box on **April 12, 2024**, to attorneys of record or to parties (when appearing pro se) as follows:

**Dontarious Wright** #343780 Evans Correctional Institution  
610 Hwy 9 West Bennettsville, SC 29512  
**Michael H. Lifsey** PO Box 548 Chester, SC 29706

**Danielle Dixon** PO Box 11549 Columbia, SC 29211

\_\_\_\_\_  
**ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE PLAINTIFF(S)**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE DEFENDANT(S)**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**Court Reporter**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**Jerri Ann Roseneau - Clerk of Court**

**Court Reporter:**

**E-Filing Note: In E-Filing counties, the date of Entry of Judgment is the same date as reflected on the Electronic File Stamp and the clerk's entering of the date of judgment above is not required in those counties. The clerk will mail a copy of the judgement to parties who are not E-Filers or who are appearing pro se. See Rule 77(d), SCRCP.**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING DECISION BY THE COURT AS REFERENCED ON PAGE 1.**

This action came to trial or hearing before the court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision rendered.

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_



2024 APR 11 AM 11:00  
JERRI ANN ROSENEAU  
CLERK OF COURT  
BEAUFORT COUNTY, S.C.

ALAN WILSON  
ATTORNEY GENERAL

April 9, 2024

The Honorable Jerri Ann Roseneau  
Clerk of Court – Beaufort County  
Post Office Box 1128  
Beaufort, South Carolina 29901-1128

**Re: Dontarious Jaron Wright, #343780 v. State of South Carolina**  
**Case No.: 2022-CP-07-00427**

Dear Ms. Roseneau:

Enclosed please find the original Order of Dismissal signed by the Honorable Roger M. Young, Sr., in the above-captioned case, for filing in your office. Please forward a time-stamped copy back to our office for our file.

Sincerely,

Danielle Dixon  
Assistant Attorney General

DD/vh

cc: Michael H. Lifsey, Esquire