

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court

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Jun 04 2024

APPEAL FROM ABBEVILLE COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas

S.C. SUPREME COURT

The Honorable B. Alex Hyman, Circuit Court Judge

Case No. 2021-CP-01-00238

Kyron J. L. Bailey, #365251, Petitioner,

v.

State of South Carolina, Respondent.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Applicant, Kyron J. L. Bailey, appeals the order of the Honorable B. Alex Hyman, filed on or about May 29, 2024.



June 4, 2024

ASHLEY A. MCMAHAN, ESQUIRE

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SC Bar No. 71676

ATTORNEY FOR APPLICANT

Opposing Counsel:
T. Cruise Mitchell, Asst. Attorney General
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PO Box 11549
Columbia, SC 29211-1549



ALAN WILSON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

May 24, 2024

The Honorable Shadal Boggs
Abbeville County Clerk of Court
Post Office Box 99
Abbeville, SC 29620-0099


Re: Kyron J.L. Bailey, #365251 v. State of South Carolina
2021-CP-01-00238

Dear Ms. Boggs,

Enclosed please find the original Order of Dismissal signed by the Honorable B. Alex Hyman, in the above-captioned case, for filing in your office. In addition, please forward proof of service and a time stamped copy back to our office for our file.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please let me know.

Sincerely,



Zachary W. Jones
Assistant Attorney General

ZWJ/zew
Enclosure

cc: Ashley A. McMahan, Esquire

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF ABBEVILLE
Filed 5:29 A.D. 2024
at 9:20 o'clock AM
Shadal Boggs
Clerk of Court

possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime (2018-GS-01-00610); strong armed robbery (2018-GS-01-00611); assault and battery, second degree (2018-GS-01-00612); burglary, second degree (2018-GS-01-00639); attempted murder (2018-GS-01-00640); possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime (2018-GS-01-00641); criminal conspiracy (2018-GS-01-00642); and armed robbery (2018-GS-01-00643). Applicant was represented by Scarlet B. Moore, esquire. Senior Assistance Solicitor Micah Black of the Eighth Circuit Solicitor's Office prosecuted the case.

On September 23, 2020, Applicant appeared before the Honorable Eugene C. Griffith, Jr., and, pursuant to negotiations between the State and Applicant, pleaded guilty as indicted to domestic violence, second degree; strong armed robbery; burglary, second degree; attempted murder; and attempted armed robbery. As a result of Applicant's plea, all of Applicant's remaining charges were dismissed. Judge Griffith sentenced Applicant to imprisonment for a term of twenty years for armed robbery and attempted murder; fifteen years for strong armed robbery and burglary, second degree; and two years for domestic violence, second degree; with those sentences to be served concurrently. Applicant did not appeal his conviction or sentence.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Domestic Violence, Second Degree (2018-GS-01-103)

On November 13, 2017, at approximately 5:00am, Kwashante Spencer contacted law enforcement to report a fight between herself and her boyfriend, Applicant. Tr. p. 10-11. Applicant was upset with Ms. Spencer due to another individual messaging Ms. Spencer on Facebook. Tr. p. 11. The altercation became physical and Applicant choked Ms. Spencer in the presence of a child. Tr. p. 11. Applicant was subsequently arrested.

Armed Robbery and Associated Charges (2018-GS-01-609, -610, 0611, -612)

On January 26, 2018, Katori Evans drove his moped back to his house on 111 Meadow Drive in Abbeville, South Carolina. Tr. p. 11. As Mr. Evans walked to the back of his house, he was approached by two individuals, one being Applicant. Tr. p. 11. Applicant, and the other individual spoke with Mr. Evans for a period of time and asked him if he wanted to go hang out with them. Mr. Evans stated "Look, I can't do that. I got to work in the morning. We've got to be at work at 7:00." Tr. p. 11. At that point, Applicant and the other individual surrounded Mr. Evans, the unidentified individual had a gun and pointed it at Mr. Evans, while Applicant went through Mr. Evans' pockets. Tr. p. 11-12. When Mr. Evans attempted to stop Applicant, Mr. Evans was struck over the head with the gun. Tr. p. 12.

Attempted Murder and Associated Charges (2018-GS-01-639, -640, -641, -642, -643)

On May 14, 2018, at approximately 11:00am, the victims Angela Donald, and her daughter Khalia Baker were sitting inside their house at 26 Johnson Street when Applicant and two other individuals entered their house, with the intent to steal a gun owned by Ms. Baker. Tr. p. 13. Applicant and one individual had on masks, the other individual did not. Tr. p. 13. Applicant, while wielding a gun, went to Ms. Baker's room, where Ms. Baker was sitting and talking on the phone. Tr. p. 13. Applicant looked for the gun in Ms. Baker's room and then proceeded to the other side of the house where Ms. Donald was located. Tr. p. 14. Ms. Donald attempted to fight Applicant's unarmed accomplices, however once Applicant entered he pointed his handgun at Ms. Donald while the two other individuals secured Ms. Donald's gun. Tr. p. 14. As the two accomplices left the house, they heard six gunshots. Tr. p. 14. Once Applicant ran away, Ms. Donald called 911 and informed them she had been shot multiple times. Tr. p. 14-15. Police showed Ms. Donald a photo lineup which contained one of Applicant's accomplices, Kobi Young, to which Ms. Donald

stated “Oh, my god. That’s him. That’s him. He was there.” Tr. p. 15-16. Based on this information, Abbeville Police interviewed Kobi Young, who initially denied having any involvement in the robbery. Tr. p. 16. Eventually, Mr. Young informed police that he was involved in the robbery and identified Applicant as the individual who show Ms. Donald. Tr. p. 16-17. Applicant was ultimately arrested in June 2018. Tr. p. 17.

CURRENT APPLICATION

Applicant timely commenced this PCR application on November 16, 2020. In his application Applicant alleged he was entitled to relief based on the following grounds:

1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
 - a. Refused to file direct appeal
 - b. Failed to provide Rule 5 discovery materials
 - c. Failed to stay in contact for months

On November 17, 2023, Applicant amended his application to include the following allegations:

1. Ineffective assistance of counsel of Scarlet B. Moore, Esquire
 - a. Failure to adequately engage in plea negotiations with the Solicitor and relay any offers to the Applicant in an appropriate time and manner.
 - b. Failure to adequately prepare the case for trial, thus forcing the Applicant to take a plea deal instead of going to trial like the Applicant had requested since the beginning of her representation.
 - c. Failure to provide the Applicant with a copy of the discovery in his case until after he pleaded guilty.
 - i. Counsel did not explain the charges and possible sentences adequately to the Applicant.

At the hearing, Applicant proceeded only on these claims. Before this Court are the records of the Abbeville County Clerk of Court regarding the underlying convictions, the plea transcript, Applicant’s records from the South Carolina Department of Corrections, and the records of this post-conviction relief action.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, GENERALLY

In a PCR action, Applicant bears the burden of proving the allegations in his application

by a preponderance of the evidence. *Butler v. State*, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985); Rule 71.1(e), SCRCP. Where , the application alleges ineffective assistance of counsel as a ground for relief, Applicant must prove that “counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that [it] cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result.” *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); *Butler*, 286 S.C. at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814.

In evaluating allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, the reviewing court applies the two-pronged test outlined in *Strickland*. First, Applicant must prove that counsel’s performance was deficient. *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 687; *Cherry v. State*, 300 S.C. 115, 117, 386 S.E.2d 624, 625 (1989). Under this prong, the court measures an attorney’s performance by its “reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117, 386 S.E.2d at 625 (quoting *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 690). The proper measure of performance is whether the attorney provided representation within the range of competence required in criminal cases. *Butler*, 286 S.C. at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814. “Counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” *Id.* (citing *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 690). “When counsel focuses on some issues to the exclusion of others, there is a strong presumption that he [or she] did so for tactical reasons rather than through sheer neglect.” *Yarborough v. Gentry*, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (citing *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 690). The Court, in determining deficiency, must affirmatively entertain the range of possible reasons counsel may have had for proceeding as they did. *Cullen v. Pinholster*, 563 U.S. 170, 196 (2011); *Harrington v. Richter*, 562 U.S. 86, 109–10 (2011). “[E]ven if an omission is inadvertent, relief is not automatic. The Sixth Amendment guarantees reasonable competence, not perfect advocacy judged with the benefit of hindsight.” *Yarborough*, 540 U.S. at 6; *see also Murphy v. Davis*, 901 F.3d 578, 592 (5th Cir. 2018) (“[C]ounsel’s performance need not be optimal to be reasonable.”).

Second, counsel's deficient performance must have prejudiced Applicant such that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117–18, 386 S.E.2d at 625 (quoting *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 694). "This does not require a showing that counsel's actions 'more likely than not altered the outcome,' but the difference between *Strickland*'s prejudice standard and a more-probable-than-not standard is slight and matters 'only in the rarest case.'" *Harrington*, 562 U.S. at 111-12 (quoting *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 697). "The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable." *Id.* at 112.

The standards do not establish mechanical rules; the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged. *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 696. A court need not first determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies; if it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, that course should be followed. *Id.* at 696–97.

In the context of a guilty plea, Applicant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. *Hill v. Lockhart*, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). Because a guilty plea is a solemn, judicial admission of the truth of the charges against an individual, the PCR applicant's right to contest the validity of such a plea is usually, but not invariably, foreclosed. *See Blackledge v. Allison*, 431 U.S. 63, 73–74 (1977) ("Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity. The subsequent presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to summary dismissal, as are contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible."). Statements made during a guilty plea should be considered conclusive, unless an applicant presents

valid reasons why he or she should be allowed to depart from the truth of his statements. *Dalton v. State*, 376 S.C. 130, 137–38, 654 S.E.2d 870, 874 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing *Crawford v. United States*, 519 F.2d 347, 350 (4th Cir. 1975)).

FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This Court has reviewed the testimony presented at the PCR hearing, observed the witnesses, passed upon their credibility, and weighed their testimony accordingly. After hearing the testimony presented and considering the legal arguments by counsel, as well as the record in this action incorporated by way of the State's return, this Court proceeds to the claims raised in the application and finds each to be without merit. Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-80, this Court makes the following findings of facts and conclusions of law based upon all of the probative evidence presented.

Failure to Adequately Consult and Review Discovery with Applicant and Failure to Prepare the Case for Trial¹

Applicant contends Counsel was ineffective for failing to provide Applicant with Rule 5 discovery and failing to stay in contact with him. Applicant further contends Counsel failed to adequately prepare this case for trial. This Court disagrees, and finds Counsel was not ineffective in her consultations with Applicant nor her preparation for trial. This Court finds credible and persuasive the testimony of Counsel, who presented well-recalled testimony of her meetings and discussions with Applicant.

1. PCR Testimony

¹ Allegations 1(b) and (c) of his pro se application and allegations 1(b) and 1(c) of his amended application will be addressed in this section.

Applicant testified Counsel Scarlet Moore was appointed to represent him. Applicant testified Counsel met with for the first time a month after she was appointed. During that first meeting, Applicant explained they discussed setting up a bond hearing. Applicant testified Counsel met with him three times in total. Applicant testified Counsel reviewed discovery with him. Applicant avers he wants a trial because the evidence was insufficient to convict him. Applicant explained he took a plea deal, because Counsel informed him his co-defendant was going to testify against him at trial.

Counsel testified she was appointed due to conflicts between Applicant and the circuit public defender's office. Counsel testified she met with Applicant in person five times and multiple times over the phone. Counsel testified she spent hours reviewing discovery and the Rule 5 materials with Applicant at the detention center. Counsel noted she had a phone call with Applicant where they discussed Applicant's thoughts regarding the discovery. Thereafter, Counsel explained she gave Applicant another copy of the discovery. Counsel testified she thoroughly reviewed discovery with Applicant, including all electronic evidence and co-defendant's statements. Counsel testified the State's evidence against Applicant was strong and she believed a plea was in his best interest. However, Counsel explained she never pressures her clients into pleading guilty; if Applicant wanted a trial, they would have gone to trial. Counsel testified she would have requested a continuance if she felt she needed additional time to prepare for trial. Counsel testified it was Applicant's own decision to plead guilty and he signed an advisement of rights form acknowledging as much.

On cross examination, Counsel reiterated she reviewed discovery with Applicant. Counsel explained the strategy at trial would have been to argue against co-defendant's credibility and possibly present testimony of an alibi witness. Counsel testified Applicant filed a complaint against

her with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel. Following this, Counsel asked Applicant if he still wanted her to represent him and he said yes. Counsel explained the complaint was dismissed without a hearing. Counsel testified Applicant never moved to relieve her.

2. Discussion

This Court finds Counsel was not ineffective in consulting or reviewing discovery with Applicant. At the time of his plea, Applicant asserted that he had enough time to speak with Counsel, that Counsel discussed all aspects of the plea with him, and that he was satisfied with the advice he received from Counsel. Tr. pp. 22–23.

Because a guilty plea is a solemn, judicial admission of the truth of the charges against an individual . . . , a criminal inmate’s right to contest the validity of such a plea is usually, but not invariably, foreclosed.” *Dalton v. State*, 376 S.C. 130, 137, 654 S.E.2d 870, 874 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing *Blackledge v. Allison*, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977); see also *Jamison v. State*, 410 S.C. 456, 469–71, 765 S.E.2d 123, 129–30 (2014)). Admissions made during a guilty plea should be considered conclusive unless an applicant presents valid reasons why he should be allowed to depart from the truth of his statements. *Id.* at 137–38, 654 S.E.2d at 874; see also *Blackledge*, 431 U.S. at 73–74 (pointing out that representations made by a defendant, his lawyer, and the prosecutor at a guilty plea hearing, as well as any findings made by the judge accepting the plea, constitute a “formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings”).

Applicant suggests a failure to adequately meet with him prior to the plea. Additionally, Applicant contends Counsel failed to review discovery and adequately prepare for trial. This Court finds Counsel’s credible testimony, and the record of Applicant’s guilty plea, refutes these allegations. There is no established “minimum number of meetings between counsel and client prior to trial necessary to prepare an attorney to provide effective assistance of counsel.” *United*

States v. Olson, 846 F.2d 1103, 1108 (7th Cir.1988) (there is no constitutional minimum number of meetings between attorney and client and observes that an experienced attorney may get more out of a single meeting than a neophyte); *Moody v. Polk*, 408 F.3d 141, 148 (4th Cir. 2005); *Campbell v. Polk*, 447 F.3d 270, 279, n.2 (4th Cir. 2006) (“we cannot conclude that the fact that Campbell's counsel only met with him five times before trial made them ineffective.”). “[B]revity of consultation time between a defendant and his counsel, alone, ‘cannot support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.’” *Davis v. State*, 44 So. 3d 1118, 1130 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009) (quoting *Murray v. Maggio*, 736 F.2d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 1984)); *White v. Godinez*, 301 F.3d 796, 800 (7th Cir. 2002) (“A brief consultation does not by itself establish that counsel's performance was inadequate.”); *Chavez v. Pulley*, 623 F. Supp. 672, 685 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (“brevity of consultation time between a defendant and his counsel alone cannot support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,” especially where the defendant “fails to allege what purpose further consultation with his attorney would have served and fails to demonstrate how further consultation with his attorney would have produced a different result”). Counsel testified she met with Applicant five times in person and several times over the phone. Counsel was clear she thoroughly reviewed all discovery and the Rule 5 materials with Applicant. Applicant even admitted the same at the evidentiary hearing. Thus, this Court finds Counsel was not deficient in consulting or reviewing discovery with Applicant prior to his plea.

Applicant further fails to specify what Counsel did not disclose to him from materials provided in discovery, or what, if anything, could have been achieved had Counsel spent more time with him in consultation regarding the contents of his discovery. *See Smith v. State*, 404 S.C. 493, 500–01, 745 S.E.2d 378, 382 (Ct. App. 2012) (noting that an applicant must present evidence to show how additional time spent in consultation regarding discovery would have resulted in a different

outcome; mere speculation as to how the alleged lack of preparation prejudiced an applicant is not sufficient to support a grant of relief). Thus, Applicant has failed to meet his burden establishing prejudice as to this allegation.

Applicant alleges Counsel failed to prepare the case for trial, thus forcing Applicant to take a plea deal instead of going to trial like the Applicant had requested since the beginning of her representation. Applicant presented no testimony at the evidentiary hearing supporting this allegation. This Court finds Counsel's credible testimony demonstrates her adequate preparedness for trial. Counsel was clear that Applicant's decision to plead guilty was his alone and had Applicant insisted on going to trial then she would have been prepared to go to trial. As mentioned above, Applicant's own admissions at the guilty plea hearing further refute this allegation.

Moreover, Applicant has failed to present evidence or testimony as to how further preparation would have resulted in Applicant proceeding to trial. In order to prevail upon a claim that counsel did not adequately prepare or investigate a case, an applicant must present evidence of what counsel could have discovered or what other defenses applicant could have requested counsel develop and present had counsel been more prepared. *Harris v. State*, 377 S.C. 66, 75-76, 659 S.E.2d 140, 145-46 (2008) (citing *Jackson v. State*, 329 S.C. 345, 353-54, 495 S.E.2d 768, 772 (1998)). Furthermore, an applicant must also present evidence to show how the discoverable matters or defenses would have resulted in a different outcome. *Id.* (citing *Davis v. State*, 326 S.C. 283, 288, 486 S.E.2d 747, 749 (1997); *Skeen v. State*, 325 S.C. 210, 214, 481 S.E.2d 129, 132 (1997)). Mere speculation as to how the alleged lack of preparation prejudiced an applicant is not sufficient to support a grant of relief. Thus, Applicant has failed to prove he suffered prejudice as to this allegation.

Applicant also alleges Counsel did not explain the charges and possible sentences to

Applicant. However, Applicant has failed to present any testimony or evidence supporting this allegation. Thus, he has failed to meet his burden establishing ineffective assistance of counsel as to this allegation. Nevertheless, the record from Applicant's guilty plea refutes this allegation. The plea court engaged in a thorough colloquy with Applicant regarding the charges and negotiated sentencing ranges and Applicant affirmed he understood. Tr. pp. 19–23.

Accordingly, Applicant's claims that Counsel failed to adequately consult and review discovery and failed to prepare for trial are **DENIED**.

Failure to Engage in Plea Negotiations

Applicant alleges Counsel failed to adequately engage in plea negotiations and relay any offers to Applicant in an appropriate time or manner. This Court disagrees and finds Counsel was not ineffective in this regard.

1. PCR Testimony

Applicant presented no testimony as to this allegation. Counsel testified she engaged in plea negotiations with the Solicitor and was able to negotiate a plea offer of a 10–20 year sentencing range.

2. Discussion

This Court finds Counsel adequately engaged in plea negotiations with the Solicitor. Applicant pleaded guilty pursuant to a negotiated sentencing range of 10 – 20 years. On his original indictments, Applicant's potential sentence was *significantly* greater than the 20-year active sentence he ultimately received after pleading guilty. This plea agreement clearly would not have been possible without Counsel's active and competent engagement in plea negotiations with the Solicitor. Therefore, this Court finds Counsel was not deficient in her negotiations with the Solicitor.

Additionally, Applicant has failed to present any evidence or testimony that Counsel failed to communicate a more favorable plea offer to him, or that a more favorable plea offer would have been made had Counsel more adequately engaged in the negotiations. Thus, he has failed to prove prejudice as to this allegation.

Accordingly, this allegation is **DENIED**.

Counsel Refused to File a Direct Appeal

Applicant contends Counsel was ineffective for refusing to file a direct appeal. This Court disagrees, and finds Applicant has not met his burden entitling him to a belated direct appeal. This Court finds credible and persuasive the testimony of Counsel, who presented well-recalled testimony of her meetings and discussions with Applicant.

1. PCR Testimony

Applicant presented no testimony as to this allegation. Counsel testified Applicant signed an advisement of rights form which discussed his right to an appeal. Counsel testified Applicant never asked her to file a direct appeal.

2. Discussion

Counsel has a constitutionally imposed duty to consult with a defendant about an appeal only when there is reason to think (1) that a rational defendant would want to appeal, or (2) that this particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing. *Roe v. Flores-Ortega*, 528 U.S. 470, 471 (2000). These elements are much harder to establish when a conviction follows a guilty plea, because a plea both reduces the scope of appealable issues and indicates that the defendant sought an end to judicial proceedings. *Id.* In addition, to prove prejudice, an applicant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would have timely appealed but for counsel's deficiency. *Id.* Evidence that there were nonfrivolous grounds for

appeal or that the defendant promptly expressed a desire to appeal is highly relevant to this determination. *Id.* at 472.

Here, this Court finds Counsel had no duty under *Roe* to file a direct appeal on Applicant's behalf. Although Applicant was facing multiple charges for serious crimes, Counsel was able to negotiate a very favorable plea deal for a sentencing range of 10 to 20 years. Applicant was facing substantially more time on his original charges. This Court finds no rational defendant would want to appeal such a favorable outcome. Furthermore, Applicant has presented no evidence or testimony there were any nonfrivolous grounds for appeal or that he express to Counsel any desire to appeal.

Accordingly, this allegation is **DENIED**.

[SIGNATURE PAGE FOLLOWS]

CONCLUSION


Based on the foregoing, this Court finds and concludes Applicant has not established any constitutional violations or deprivations that would require this Court to grant his application for post-conviction relief. This Court finds Counsel was not deficient in any manner, nor was Applicant prejudiced by Counsel's representation. This Court finds Applicant freely, knowingly, and voluntarily pleaded guilty. Therefore, this Court denies relief on all allegations and dismisses this PCR action with prejudice.

Applicant must file and serve a notice of appeal within thirty days from PCR counsel's receipt of written notice of entry of judgment to secure the appropriate appellate review pursuant to Rule 203, SCACR. Applicant has a right to appellate counsel's assistance in seeking review of the denial of PCR. *Austin v. State*, 305 S.C. 453, 409 S.E.2d 395 (1991). Rule 71.1(g), SCRCP, provides that if Applicant wishes to seek appellate review, PCR counsel must serve and file a notice of appeal on Applicant's behalf. Applicant is directed to Rule 243, SCACR, for appropriate procedures for appeal.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. The application for post-conviction relief be denied and dismissed with prejudice; and
2. Applicant be remanded to the custody of the State.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED this 21 day of May, 2024.



THE HONORABLE B. ALEX HYMAN
Presiding Judge
Eighth Judicial Circuit

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF ABBEVILLE
Filed 5/29 A.D. 2024
at 6:30 o'clock A.M.
Shanda Brooks
Clerk of Court

Conway, South Carolina