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S.C. SUPREME COURT

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE SUPREME COURT
APPEAL FROM Beaufort COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas
The Honorable Kristi F. Curtis, PCR Action Judge
2019-CP-07-00369

TERRANCE SEABROOK, #184020,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

Respondent.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Terrance Seabrook appeals the denial of his post-conviction relief application. The post-conviction relief action was heard and denied by the Honorable Kristi F. Curtis, circuit court judge, on July 21, 2022, and was denied by written order issued filed on May 28, 2024. Applicant received notice of the judgement on May 30, 2024.

/s Chelsey F. Marto
Chelsey F. Marto, Esquire
Attorney for the Applicant
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA COUNTY OF BEAUFORT	)	IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
Terrance L. Seabrook, #184020, Applicant, v. State of South Carolina, Respondent.	)	Case No.: 2019-CP-07-00369 **ORDER OF DISMISSAL**

This matter is before the Court by way of an application for post-conviction relief (PCR) filed by Terrance L. Seabrook (Applicant) on February 15, 2019. On July 21, 2022, an evidentiary hearing convened before the Honorable Kristi F. Curtis. Applicant was present and represented by James K. Falk, Esquire. Assistant Attorney General Lauren Mims represented Respondent. At the hearing, Applicant testified on his behalf and called as witnesses Appellate Defender Lara M. Caudy and trial counsel Larry W. Weidner, Esquire. Following a thorough review of the records before this Court and the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, this Court finds Applicant did not meet his burden of proof. Thus, this Court denies relief and dismisses this application with prejudice.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Applicant is presently confined in the South Carolina Department of Corrections serving a life sentence. In December 2010, the Beaufort County Grand Jury indicted Applicant for kidnapping (2010-GS-07-2320) and armed robbery (2010-GS-07-2321). On March 19-21, 2012, Applicant proceeded to a jury trial before the Honorable Carmen T. Mullen.[1] Larry W. Weidner, II, represented Applicant, and Assistant Solicitor James M. Bannon prosecuted the case. The jury

[1] Applicant's case was initially called to trial on February 27, 2012, before the Honorable Roger M. Young, Sr., but that trial was continued at Applicant's request.

acquitted Applicant of kidnapping but found Applicant guilty of armed robbery. On March 31, 2012, Judge Mullen sentenced Applicant to life without parole for armed robbery.

Applicant filed a timely notice of appeal, which was perfected by Appellate Defender Lara M. Caudy (App. Case No. 2012-212388). On June 11, 2014, following a motion by Applicant, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the circuit court to reconstruct the record. On April 15, 2015, a reconstruction hearing was held before Judge Mullen. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Mullen found the record had been sufficiently reconstructed for meaningful appellate review.[2] Thereafter, Appellate Defender Caudy file an Anders[3] brief. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal pursuant to Anders, and the remittitur was sent February 16, 2018.[4]

SUMMARY OF TRIAL TESTIMONY

At trial, the State presented evidence that Applicant robbed an Exxon gas station while armed with a handgun on October 4. 2010. Shatike J. Shabazz, a/k/a Walter Jenkins, testified he drove Applicant to an Exxon gas station on October 4, 2010, in a blue Ford explorer that belonged to Staff Sergeant Shawn Boyd. Shabazz recalled Applicant was wearing a blue and white striped shirt. He testified he left the gas station and went to his mother's house but returned later that day. After Shabazz could not find Applicant, he left again and did not return. Shabazz stated he did not see Applicant the rest of that night. (R. 106-111).

Sean Kirkpatrick (Victim), a clerk at the gas station, testified Applicant was one of his regular customers whom he knew as "Terrance." Victim testified he was taking a smoke break when he was approached by an individual wearing a mask and holding a gun. The individual

[2] Applicant appealed that order, and on appeal the Court affirmed the circuit court's finding that the record had been sufficiently reconstructed. State v. Seabrook, Op. No. 2017-UP-164 (Ct. App. filed Apr. 19, 2017).
[3] 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
[4] While his direct appeal was pending, Applicant filed a PCR application that was dismissed without prejudice due to the pending direct appeal. 2014-CP-7-562.

pointed the gun at Victim's head, forced him inside, and ordered him to open the cash register. Victim testified the individual emptied the drawer and forced Victim to lie on the ground. After the individual left, Victim locked the door and called 911. Victim described the perpetrator as an "African-American male, about 5–4 to 5–8" with a slender build, weighing "between 120 and 160 pounds." He stated the man wore gloves and a *Scream* Halloween mask. (R. 74-76, 85).

Investigator Michael James Pierce testified Sergeant Boyd's vehicle matched the description of a vehicle used in an armed robbery. Agent Pierce further testified he took pictures of two individuals driving that vehicle, and he identified one of the individuals as Applicant. (R. 140-41, 144). Investigator Chapman testified he interviewed Applicant twice after Applicant was in custody, and Applicant changed his story multiple times during the interviews. (R. 179-80).

CURRENT APPLICATION

On February 15, 2019, Applicant filed this current PCR application alleging:

1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
    a. "the counsel didn't give a time objection"
2. "Violation of my 14th, 6th, and 5th [Amendment]"
    a. "and the [all] of my rights of due [process]"
3. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

On November 20, 2019, Applicant filed an amendment to his application alleging:

1. "Counsel failed to investigate the olloqotion in the case or the evidence and discovery and furthermore; failed to attend scheduled preliminary hearing set forth by Hon. Carmen T. Mullen. The dates of December 3, 2010 and this new date set by Mr. Mullens was 10, 2010. This was a violation of Applicant's due process rights of the 6th and 14th Amendment."

At the evidentiary hearing, Applicant relayed he was proceeding on the following claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel:

1. Counsel failed to request a jury charge advising the jury to take precautions when hearing a voluntary confession;

2. Counsel failed to request the Logan[5] circumstantial evidence charge;
3. Counsel failed to object to the solicitor's statements in closing argument pitting Shabazz's testimony against Applicant's statements;
4. Counsel failed to object pursuant to State v. Smith[6] when the jury asked a question regarding the elements of armed robbery and the court recharged the jury on armed robbery.
5. Counsel failed to impeach Shabazz with prior convictions.[7]

Additionally, Applicant alleged appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising an issue related to the trial court overruling counsel's hearsay objection to Applicant's statements.

FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This Court has had the opportunity to review the records before it, including the Beaufort County Clerk of Court records of the underlying convictions, Applicant's records from the South Carolina Department of Corrections, Applicant's appellate records, and the records of Applicant's past and current PCR actions. This Court has further had the opportunity to observe the witnesses presented at the evidentiary hearing, closely pass upon their credibility, and weigh their testimony accordingly. After a careful review based on the Strickland standard set forth below, this Court finds Applicant has failed to carry his burden of proof. Below are this Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by section 17-27-80 of the South Carolina Code.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In a PCR action, the applicant bears the burden of proving the allegations in his application. Butler v. State, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985). When the application alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, the applicant must prove "counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that [it] cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result." Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Butler, 286 S.C. at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814.

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[5] 405 S.C. 83, 747 S.E.2d 444 (2013).
[6] 304 S.C. 129, 403 S.E.2d 162 (Ct. App. 1991).
[7] This issue was raised in the middle of the evidentiary hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, this Court agreed to leave the record open until July 29, 2022, to provide Applicant time to investigate Shabazz's criminal history. On July 29, 2022, Respondent notified this Court and PCR counsel with information regarding Shabazz's criminal record.

In evaluating allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, the reviewing court applies the two-pronged test outlined in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. First, an applicant must prove counsel's performance was deficient. Id.; Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 117, 386 S.E.2d 624, 625 (1989). Under this prong, courts measure an attorney's performance by its "reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Cherry, 300 S.C. at 117, 386 S.E.2d at 625 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). "Counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Butler, 286 S.C. at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). The applicant must overcome this presumption to receive relief. Cherry, 300 S.C. at 118, 386 S.E.2d at 625. Second, a PCR applicant must prove that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the applicant such that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Cherry, 300 S.C. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625.

Failure to request charge on voluntary confession

Applicant contends trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury charge advising the jury to take precautions when hearing a voluntary confession. This Court finds counsel articulated a valid strategic reason for not requesting this charge and thus was not ineffective. See Brown v. State, 375 S.C. 464, 481, 652 S.E.2d 765, 774 (Ct. App. 2007) ("[W]here counsel articulates a valid reason for employing a certain strategy, such conduct will not be deemed ineffective assistance of counsel." (alteration in original)). At the PCR hearing, counsel testified Applicant repeatedly denied to police that he committed the robbery. Counsel stated he attempted to have Applicant's statements excluded, but once the court determined they were admissible, counsel believed his best strategy was to elicit testimony from law enforcement that Applicant never admitted to committing the armed robbery. Trial counsel further explained he did not want

the jury charged on the meaning of a voluntary confession when his primary argument was that Applicant did *not* confess. This Court finds counsel's testimony credible. This Court further finds counsel articulated a valid, strategic reason for not requesting this charge and thus was not deficient. Likewise, this Court finds it is not reasonably likely the outcome would be different had counsel requested and the Court provided this charge. Applicant has thus failed to prove deficiency or prejudice, and this claim is denied.

Failure to request Logan charge

Applicant next contends counsel was ineffective for not requesting the circumstantial evidence charge articulated in State v. Logan, 405 S.C. 83, 747 S.E.2d 444 (2013). This Court finds Applicant has failed to meet his burden of proof in this regard. Critically, counsel testified he would have preferred a Logan charge but did not request it because Applicant's trial occurred before Logan was decided. Applicant's case was tried in March 2012, whereas Logan was not decided until August 14, 2013. Because Logan had not been decided at the time of Applicant's trial, counsel cannot be ineffective for not requesting the charge. See Frierson v. State, 417 S.C. 287, 299, 789 S.E.2d 762, 768 (Ct. App. 2016), aff'd as modified, 423 S.C. 257, 815 S.E.2d 433 (2018) ("Our courts have "never required an attorney to be clairvoyant or anticipate changes in the law which were not in existence at the time of trial."). Thus, this claim is denied.

Failure to object to closing argument

Applicant contends counsel was ineffective for not objecting to pitting in the State's closing argument. Specifically, Applicant contends counsel failed to object when the solicitor attempted to pit Shabazz's testimony against the statements Applicant made to police. In support, Applicant pointed to the following portion of the State's closing argument:

> Out of all this stuff, you need to ask yourselves what makes the most sense. Out of the different versions of events that you've heard,

> which is the one you can believe?
>
> If you believe Mr. Shabazz's testimony, which was consistent from now back to when he first talked with the police back in 2010, or—I don't know—the five different stories that Mr. Seabrook has, some of which conflict from minute to minute, and with the same people that he's talking to.
>
> Who seems more credible? I have tried to let you visualize what happened that evening from the evidence we have. Now, the description that we get from the Clerk is that there was a skinny black male, around five foot seven.
>
> That represents many possibilities, millions if not billions of possibilities. Could be any skinny black male who is roughly five foot seven. It puts Mr. Seabrook right there.
>
> Now, Mr. Shabazz identifies Mr. Seabrook as the person who gets out of his car. Okay? So we'll mark that as being Mr. Seabrook.
>
> And you can see on the video this person is wearing a blue shirt, dark pants and white shoes. Again, anyone can be that skinny black male, wearing a blue, white piped shirt, dress pants, white shoes.

(R. 247).

This Court finds Applicant has failed to show counsel was ineffective in this regard. This Court agrees with counsel's assessment that the foregoing argument was a proper argument that commented on Shabazz's credibility. Cf. State v. Busse, 439 S.C. 104, 111, 886 S.E.2d 208, 212 (2023) ("[A] prosecutor is expected to comment on the credibility of the witnesses when making a closing argument. Far from improper, . . . doing so is one of the fundamental responsibilities of a lawyer."); id. (finding the State's argument regarding "the importance of facts in evidence to the *jury's* determination of the victim's credibility" was not improper argument). Additionally, counsel explained he rebutted the solicitor's closing argument by attacking Shabazz's credibility in closing. This Court finds counsel's performance was reasonable under prevailing professional norms and not deficient. Applicant has not set forth any objectionable, improper comments by the solicitor and has not met his burden of proving deficiency or prejudice. Thus, this claim is denied.

Failed to object to recharge on armed robbery

Applicant contends counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the trial court recharged the jury on armed robbery. This Court finds Applicant has failed to show counsel was ineffective in this regard.

During deliberations, the jury asked the Court for "the lawful definition of armed robbery." (R. 277). The Court recharged the jury on armed robbery as follows:

> The Defendant is charged with armed robbery. In order to prove this offense the State must first prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant took personal property from the person or presence of another person.
>
> Property is in the presence of a person when it is within the person's reach, inspection, observation or control, so that the person could, if not overcome with violence or prevented by fear, keep possession of the property.
>
> The State must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant cared the property away, intending to permanently deprive the owner of it, and to keep the property from the Defendant's own use.
>
> The slightest removal of the property or the complete possession of the property even for an instant by a Defendant is sufficient to show a taking and carrying away of the property.
>
> The taking and carrying away of the property must have been done with violence or by putting the owner of the property in fear.
>
> Finally, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was armed with a deadly weapon during the robbery.

(R. 277-78). At the PCR hearing, counsel relayed he did not believe the judge erred in recharging the jury on armed robbery when the jury asked for the definition.

This Court agrees there was no basis for counsel to object when the judge, in response to the jury's question, recharged armed robbery. Critically, the judge's recharge on armed robbery answered the question asked and was not misleading. Contra State v. Smith, 304 S.C. 129, 131,

403 S.E.2d 162, 163 (Ct. App. 1991) ("The error of the trial judge is manifest and twofold. In the first place, he did not answer the question asked. Moreover, his response was misleading. The examples he gave may very well have caused the jury to think that sufficient provocation could only arise out of an assault on the defendant himself. This is not the law."). Here, the jury asked for the definition of armed robbery, and the judge recharged the jury on armed robbery. This Court agrees with trial counsel's assessment that there was no basis to object to this recharge. Thus, Applicant did not prove deficiency or prejudice, and this claim is denied.

Trial Counsel Failed to Impeach Shabazz's Credibility Under Rule 609, SCRE

Finally, Applicant contends counsel was ineffective for not impeaching Shabazz with prior criminal convictions. Specifically, at the PCR hearing, Applicant averred Shabazz was on federal probation for a counterfeiting conviction, which he told his initial attorney (Trasi Campbell). This Court finds Applicant has failed to show counsel was ineffective in this regard.

At the PCR hearing, counsel agreed prior convictions were fertile ground for impeachment, but he explained "that does not necessarily mean that I would go there if I had a better horse to ride." Although he did not recall the details of Shabazz's prior convictions (if any), he averred the State would have provided him a copy of Shabazz's NCIC report. He explained his strategy for cross-examining Shabazz as follows:

> [L]et's assume for the moment there was something out there. If it was attenuated and I had—like in this case, I mean, they had charged him—they had given him immunity on the eve of trial to say one thing and one thing only, that [Applicant] got out of his truck that day.
>
> Everything else, this guy was all over the page about. What was he wearing? Who he was with. He even said at one point that the guy that got out of the truck didn't look like [Applicant] Seabrook because he was bigger. Like this guy was all over the page.
>
> So where I was headed—I remember that much. Where I was

> headed, you're essentially getting out of getting charged to say one thing, and that is [Applicant] got out of there. And everything else you told the jury—and it was all over the page, right?
>
> I mean, it was at one point, I remember—I had him pinned into a corner, and I said, essentially. I'm sure it's in the record. But I said essentially that your ground of immunity hinges upon one thing and one thing only, and that is putting [Applicant] as getting out of your truck. He said something like, *Well, when you put it that way.*
>
> I said, *I am putting it that way to you. That's exactly what you're here to do, right? Like, your whole immunity hinges on that.* I remember that moment actually, surprisingly.
>
> Because he said, *Well, when you put it that way.* I was like, *I'm putting it that way. That's exactly what you're doing.*
>
> Blasting that, I don't think that—I'd have to be in the moment, but I'm not sure I would want him to get that shotgun blast at this guy, and then say, *Oh, by the way, you were convicted 12 years ago,* or something. I think it would lose steam.
>
> So it would depend—I guess my answer to your question is, it would depend on how I felt the evidence and how that trial was going and were I could make my best punches and get the jury to remember it.

This Court finds credible counsel's foregoing testimony regarding his strategy for cross-examining Shabazz. This Court further finds counsel's strategy and cross-examination of Shabazz was reasonable under prevailing professional norms and not deficient. Counsel recalled receiving Shabazz's criminal history but did not remember what the record contained or if Shabazz was on probation. Counsel further testified that even if he was aware of Shabazz's past criminal convictions, he may not have used it if it caused his cross-examination to "lose steam." Ultimately counsel's strategy of impeaching Shabazz based on his receipt of immunity from the State was reasonable under prevailing professional norms and not deficient. Likewise, this Court has examined counsel's cross-examination of Shabazz and finds it reasonable under prevailing professional norms and not deficient. (R. 117-23, 129-31). Critically, counsel elicited testimony

from Shabazz that the person in the video with the gun did not look like Applicant (R. 121-23); and "If I thought that was [Applicant], I would say that was [Applicant]" (R. 131). Counsel also elicited testimony from Shabazz insinuating his immunity rested on him testifying that Applicant was the person he dropped off at the gas station. (R. 131). Ultimately counsel effectively cross-examined Shabazz and was not deficient. Finally, although this Court held the record open for additional evidence, Applicant never provided a record of Shabazz's federal conviction and subsequent release from incarceration.[8] Thus, Applicant failed to meet his burden of proving prejudice, and this claim is denied.

Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Applicant contends his statements to police that were introduced at trial constituted hearsay, and appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising this issue on appeal. This Court finds Applicant did not prove this ground.

"A defendant is constitutionally entitled to the effective assistance of appellate counsel." Southerland v. State, 337 S.C. 610, 615, 524 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1999). However, "appellate counsel is not required to raise every nonfrivolous issue that is presented by the record." Thrift v. State, 302 S.C. 535, 539, 397 S.E.2d 523, 526 (1990). The "goal of vigorous and effective advocacy" would not be served if judges "second-guess reasonable professional judgments and impose on appointed counsel a duty to raise every 'colorable' claim suggested by a client." Jones, 463 U.S. at 754.

At the reconstruction hearing during Applicant's direct appeal, trial counsel testified the

[8] Respondent relayed via email that Shabazz had a prior federal conviction for manufacturing / passing counterfeit currency; he was arrested August 23, 2000, pled guilty September 19, 2001, was sentenced to sixty months' jail time, and was placed on supervised release on April 7, 2005. This Court finds, based on counsel's cross-examination of Shabazz, that it is not reasonably likely the outcome would have been different had counsel further elicited information about this prior conviction.

trial court held a Jackson v. Denno hearing, and he argued against the admissibility of Applicant's statements to police based on relevance, unfair prejudice, hearsay, and coerciveness. (R. 351-64). Specific to the hearsay objection, counsel averred Applicant's statements to police were not confessions and thus could not come in as an exception to hearsay under Rule 801(d)(2). (R. 359-63). At the PCR hearing, appellate counsel testified she did not raise this issue because she did not believe it had merit. She averred that providing "inconsistent statements as to where you were and what you were doing would certainly be a statement against interest." Counsel further testified she believed the issue was adequately preserved.

This Court agrees with appellate counsel's assessment that this argument did not have merit. Specifically, this Court finds Applicant's custodial statements were not hearsay. See Rule 801(d)(2) (providing a statement is not hearsay if it "is offered against a party and is (A) the party's own statement in either an individual or a representative capacity . . . ."). Applicant has not set forth any legal argument or caselaw to support his contention that this statement was hearsay, and this Court is not aware of any. Thus, Applicant has not met his burden of proving deficiency or prejudice, and this claim is denied.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, this Court finds and concludes that Applicant has not established any constitutional violations or deprivations that would require this Court to grant his application. Therefore, this PCR application must be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

This Court notifies Applicant that he must file and serve a notice of appeal within thirty days of receipt by counsel of the judgement entry's written notice to secure appropriate appellate review. See Rule 203, SCAR. Pursuant to Austin v. State, 305 S.C. 453, 409 S.E.2d 395 (1991), an Applicant has the right to appellate counsel's assistance in seeking review of the denial of PCR.

Rule 71.1 (g). SCRCP provides that if Applicant wishes to seek appellate review, PCR counsel must serve and file a notice of appeal on Applicant's behalf. Your attention is directed to South Carolina Appellate Court Rule 243 for appropriate appellate procedures.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. The PCR application be denied and dismissed with prejudice; and
2. Applicant be remanded to custody of Respondent.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED this 17th day of May, 2023.

Kristi F. Curtis

HON. KRISTI F. CURTIS
Presiding Judge
Fourteenth Judicial Circuit

Sumter, South Carolina.

FORM 4

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF BEAUFORT
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
CASE NUMBER 2019CP0700369

Terrance L Seabrook		**South Carolina State Of**	
PLAINTIFF(S)		**DEFENDANT(S)**	
Submitted by:		**Attorney for:** ☐ Plaintiff ☐ Defendant ☐ Self-Represented Litigant	

DISPOSITION TYPE (CHECK ONE)

☐ **JURY VERDICT.** This action came before the court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and a verdict rendered.

☒ **DECISION BY THE COURT.** This action came to trial or hearing before the court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision rendered. ☐ See Page 2 for additional information.

☐ **ACTION DISMISSED (*CHECK REASON*):** ☐ Rule 12(b), SCRCP; ☐ Rule 41(a), SCRCP (Vol. Nonsuit); ☐ Rule 43(k), SCRCP (Settled); ☐ Other: _____

☐ **ACTION STRICKEN (*CHECK REASON*):** ☐ Rule 40(j) SCRCP; ☐ Bankruptcy; ☐ Binding arbitration, subject to right to restore to confirm, vacate or modify arbitration award; ☐ Other: _____

☐ **STAYED DUE TO BANKRUPTCY**

☐ **DISPOSITION OF APPEAL TO THE CIRCUIT COURT (CHECK APPLICABLE BOX):**
☐ Affirmed; ☐ Reversed; ☐ Remanded; ☐ Other: _____

NOTE: ATTORNEYS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR NOTIFYING LOWER COURT, TRIBUNAL, OR ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OF THE CIRCUIT COURT RULING IN THIS APPEAL.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: ☒ **See attached order** ☐ Statement of Judgment by the Court:

ORDER INFORMATION

Order of Dismissal

This order ☒ ends ☐ does not end the case.
Additional Information for the Clerk: _____

INFORMATION FOR THE JUDGMENT INDEX

Complete this section below when the judgment affects title to real or personal property or if any amount should be enrolled. If there is no judgment information, indicate "N/A" in one of the boxes below.

Judgment in Favor of (List name(s) below)	Judgment Against (List name(s) below)	Judgment Amount To be Enrolled (List amount(s) below)

If applicable, describe the property, including tax map information and address, referenced in the order:

The judgment information above has been provided by the submitting party. Disputes concerning the amounts contained in this form may be addressed by way of motion pursuant to the SC Rules of Civil Procedure. Amounts to be computed such as interest or additional taxable costs not available at the time the form and final order are submitted to the judge may be provided to the clerk.
Note: Title abstractors and researchers should refer to the official court order for judgment details.
E-Filing Note: In E-Filing counties, the Court will electronically sign this form using a separate electronic signature page.

s/ K. F. Curtis	2762	5/17/2023
Circuit Court Judge	**Judge Code**	**Date**

For Clerk of Court Office Use Only

This judgment was entered on **May 28, 2024**, and a copy mailed first class or placed in the appropriate attorney's box on **May 28, 2024**, to attorneys of record or to parties (when appearing pro se) as follows:

Terrance L Seabrook #184020 Perry Corr. Inst. Q3-B-102
430 Oaklawn Road Pelzer, SC 29669
Chelsey Faith Marto PO Box 8795 Columbia, SC 29201

Danielle Dixon PO Box 11549 Columbia, SC 29211

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE PLAINTIFF(S)

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE DEFENDANT(S)

Court Reporter

Jerri Ann Roseneau - Clerk of Court

Court Reporter:

E-Filing Note: In E-Filing counties, the date of Entry of Judgment is the same date as reflected on the Electronic File Stamp and the clerk's entering of the date of judgment above is not required in those counties. The clerk will mail a copy of the judgement to parties who are not E-Filers or who are appearing pro se. See Rule 77(d), SCRCP.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING DECISION BY THE COURT AS REFERENCED ON PAGE 1.

This action came to trial or hearing before the court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision rendered.