

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
In the Supreme Court

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Jun 11 2024

S.C. SUPREME COURT

Appeal from Charleston County  
Court of Common Pleas

Honorable Kristi F. Curtis, Circuit Court Judge

Case No.: 2019-CP-10-02706

JALANN WILLIAMS, # 362634 . . . . . Appellant,


v.

THE STATE . . . . . Respondent.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Jalann Williams, #362634, appeals the order dated May 29, 2024, of the Honorable Kristi F. Curtis denying his Post-Conviction Relief application. Appellant received written notice of entry of this order on June 10, 2024.

June 11, 2024

  
Herverly B. O. Young, SC Bar # 7013  
SC Commission on Indigent Defense  
Post Office Box 11433  
Columbia, South Carolina 29211  
(803) 734-1343  
Attorney for Appellant

Other Counsel of Record:

Danielle Dixon  
Assistant Attorney General  
Post Office Box 11549  
Columbia, South Carolina 29211-1549  
(803) 734-3737  
Attorney for Respondent

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA )  
COUNTY OF CHARLESTON )  
JALANN WILLIAMS, )  
 )  
Applicant, )  
v. )  
State of South Carolina, )  
 )  
Respondent. )  
\_\_\_\_\_ )

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS  
FOR THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

Case No.: 2020-CP-10-2706

**ORDER OF DISMISSAL**

This matter is before this Court by way of an application for post-conviction relief (PCR) filed by Jalann Williams (Applicant) on June 23, 2020. On June 23, 2022, an evidentiary hearing convened before the Honorable Kristi Curtis. James K. Falk, Esquire, represented Applicant, and Assistant Attorney General Samantha J. Weidauer represented Respondent. At the hearing Applicant testified on his behalf and called as a witness trial counsel Christopher Murphy, Esquire. Respondent did not call any witnesses. After reviewing the records and evidence, this Court finds Applicant failed to meet his burden and denies and dismisses this application with prejudice.

**FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

Applicant is currently confined in the South Carolina Department of Corrections serving an aggregate thirty-year sentence. In June 2013, the Charleston County Grand Jury indicted Applicant for murder (2013-GS-10-2839), armed robbery, and possession of a weapon during a violent crime (2013-GS-10-2840). On January 5-8, 2015, Applicant proceeded to a jury trial before the Honorable R. Lawton McIntosh. Christopher Murphy, Esquire, represented Applicant. Assistant Solicitors Greg Voigt and David Osborne prosecuted the case. The jury convicted Applicant of murder and the weapon charge but did not reach a verdict on the armed robbery

charge.<sup>1</sup> Judge McIntosh sentenced Applicant to concurrent terms of thirty years for murder and five years for the weapon charge.

Applicant filed a timely notice of appeal. Chief Appellate Defender Robert Dudek filed a brief arguing the trial court erred in refusing to charge self-defense. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the merits. State v. Williams, Op. No. 2017-UP-015 (S.C. Ct. App. filed 1/11/17). Applicant filed a petition for rehearing, which was denied.

Applicant filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the South Carolina Supreme Court, which was granted. Following briefing, the Supreme Court issued a published opinion affirming and finding Applicant was not entitled to the self-defense charge because he was not without fault in bringing on the difficulty. State v. Williams, 427 S.C. 246, 830 S.E.2d 904 (2019). Applicant filed a petition for rehearing, which was denied. The remitter was sent August 15, 2019.

#### SUMMARY OF TRIAL

On January 30, 2013, officers from the North Charleston Police Department responded to a shooting. Upon arrival, officers located Akeem Ladson (“Victim”) slumped over in a Ford Explorer; he was pronounced dead. Applicant’s fingerprint was recovered from the Ford Explorer. Detectives learned a female had provided Applicant and a co-defendant transportation from the crime scene and contacted her. This witness advised officers as to where the men could be found. Applicant, the co-defendant, and a witness were interviewed by law enforcement. Applicant was advised of his rights in writing and signed a waiver of his rights. During the interview, Applicant confessed to shooting Victim twice during a drug deal; the confession was recorded on audio and video.

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<sup>1</sup> Judge McIntosh declared a mistrial on the armed robbery charge.

Applicant initially proceeded on a theory of manslaughter. (R. 19-21). Applicant testified in his defense and acknowledged being the shooter. However, he claimed Victim had sold him bad drugs, they got into an altercation, Victim began choking him, and he shot Victim twice in response. (R. 228-48). Applicant testified that he panicked and hid the gun. (R. 248-49). At the conclusion of trial Applicant request a charge on self-defense, which the Court declined. (R. 290-92, 295-96). Although the Court was willing to charge voluntary manslaughter, Applicant relayed that he did not want the Court to charge the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. (R. 298). The Court stated, "Your attorney advises me that you do not wish for me to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter." Applicant replied, "Yes, sir." The Court then advised him of the sentencing range for both murder and voluntary manslaughter and asked whether trial counsel had explained the difference; Applicant replied, "Yes, sir." The Court then asked if Applicant was freely and voluntarily asking it not to charge voluntary manslaughter; Applicant replied, "Yes, sir." (R. 300-01). The Court did not charge voluntary manslaughter, and the jury convicted Applicant of murder.

#### CURRENT APPLICATION

On June 23, 2020, Applicant filed a PCR application raising various grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. On March 22, 2022, Applicant filed an amended PCR application alleging the following:

Ineffective assistance of counsel:

1. Counsel failed to object to hearsay by Taylor McLean (112 ln. 4-8), Charles Benton (122 ln. 20-25), Lauren Thrower (145 ln 8-18), and Matt Hughes (194 ln. 25 through 195 ln. 1);
2. Counsel failed to request a Jackson v. Denno hearing;

3. Counsel failed to object to the solicitor's leading questions (pg. 205 ln. 14-19; pg. 276 ln. 2 through 278 ln. 17);

4. Counsel failed to object to portions of the State's closing argument that contained personal attacks against Applicant. On page 392, the solicitor implied that Applicant was being disingenuous with the jury because he cut off his dreads. On page 395, the solicitor accused Applicant of being a bad father;

5. Counsel failed to object to the Court's response to the jury's question regarding the lesser-included offense.

At the hearing, Applicant proceeded on the grounds presented in his amended application. He also proceeded on one ground from his original application—that counsel was ineffective for not requesting a charge on criminal intent. This Court will address these six grounds below. This Court further finds Applicant did not present evidence or testimony to support any other ground.

#### **FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW**

This Court has had the opportunity to review the records before it, including the Charleston County Clerk of Court records of the underlying convictions, Applicant's records from the South Carolina Department of Corrections, the trial transcript, Applicant's appellate records, and the records from this PCR action. This Court has further had the opportunity to observe the witnesses presented at the hearing, closely pass upon their credibility, and weigh their testimony accordingly. After a careful review based on the Strickland standard set forth below, this Court finds Applicant has failed to carry his burden of proof. Below are this Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by section 17-27-80 of the South Carolina Code (2017).

#### ***Ineffective Assistance of Counsel***

In a PCR action, an applicant bears the burden of proving the allegations in his application. Butler v. State, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985). When the application alleges ineffective

assistance of counsel, the applicant must prove “counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that [it] cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

In evaluating allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, the reviewing court applies the two-pronged test outlined in Strickland, 466 U.S. 668. First, an applicant must prove counsel’s performance was deficient. Id.; Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 117, 386 S.E.2d 624, 625 (1989). Under this prong, courts measure an attorney’s performance by its “reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Cherry, 300 S.C. at 117, 386 S.E.2d at 625 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). The proper measure of performance is whether an attorney provided representation within the range of competence required in criminal cases. Butler, 286 S.C. at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814. “Counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). The applicant must overcome this presumption to receive relief. Cherry, 300 S.C. at 118, 386 S.E.2d at 625. Second, a PCR applicant must prove that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the applicant such that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Cherry, 300 S.C. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625.

***Failed to object to hearsay – Taylor McLean***

Applicant first contends counsel was ineffective for failing to object to hearsay during Taylor McLean’s testimony. This Court finds Applicant did not prove counsel was ineffective in this regard.

At trial, Taylor McLean testified that Applicant was her ex-boyfriend and the father of her two children. (R. 61-62). She stated Robert Mitchell and “Lauren” picked Applicant up from her

home sometime on January 30, 2013, and later returned when the sun was setting. (R. 62-64). She stated Applicant asked her to drive them to Mitchell's house. (R. 65). Thereafter, the following exchanged occurred:

Q: Did Mitch and Lauren talk in the backseat?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What did they say?

A: Lauren was talking about throwing away phones and Mitch was—I can't remember what he said but he was just talking.

Q: Talking about getting rid of cell phones?

A: Well, Lauren was. Mitch was kind of looking around everywhere because there were sirens.

(Tr. 112). At the PCR hearing, counsel testified he did not object to this testimony due to trial strategy. Specifically, he stated his initial strategy was to argue manslaughter, but they changed their strategy to self-defense midtrial—which he regretted. He stated that because Applicant did not deny being the shooter, he did not consider McLean's testimony harmful. He explained, “[A]fter shooting someone it's reasonable to want to try and hide evidence or get scared or do things that are foolish. I wanted to focus solely on those 10 to 15 seconds when [Applicant] was in the car [with the victim].” (PCR 18). Counsel further explained he did not typically object to things *only* because they were objectionable because jurors get annoyed with it. Here, he was not concerned with the testimony because it was outside the critical timeframe, and he did not want the jury to believe he was trying to hide something.

This Court finds counsel's testimony on this issue credible. This Court further finds counsel articulated a valid strategy in not objecting to the foregoing in that he did not believe it

was harmful to his initial strategy of manslaughter, and he did not want the jury to believe he was hiding something. See Smith v. State, 386 S.C. 562, 689 S.E.2d 629 (2010) (providing that when counsel articulates a valid reason for employing a certain strategy, such conduct will not be deemed ineffective assistance of counsel). Counsel has been engaged in the practice of criminal law in this State for twenty-five years and has significant experience trying cases before juries and evaluating trial tactics and strategy. This Court agrees with counsel's assessment that the foregoing was not harmful to his initial manslaughter defense and finds Applicant failed to establish deficiency.

Moreover, Applicant did not prove prejudice. Notably, the foregoing hearsay—"Lauren was talking about throwing away phones and Mitch was—I can't remember what he said but he was just talking"—in and of itself did not implicate Applicant as the shooter. More critically, Applicant himself admitted to being the shooter as part of his initial strategy of voluntary manslaughter. (R. 19-21). In fact, Applicant admitted on the stand to panicking and hiding the gun. (R. 248-49). In light of the foregoing, it is not reasonably likely the outcome would have been different had counsel objected and had the foregoing hearsay testimony excluded. Thus, Applicant failed to prove deficiency and prejudice, and this claim is denied.

***Failed to object to hearsay – Charles Benton***

Applicant next asserts counsel was ineffective for failing to object to hearsay testimony of Detective Charles Benton. Applicant did not prove counsel was ineffective in this regard.

During trial, Detective Benson testified that as part of his investigation, he went to an address associated with Applicant and spoke to McLean. He testified, "She advised us initially that she had not seen [Applicant] since 2 p.m. the previous day, which would have been the day of the homicide.

She said that she had dropped him off at 2 p.m. at the Piggly Wiggly . . . . As we were preparing to leave that residence, a neighbor informed us that they had seen Mr. Williams . . . .” (Tr. 122).

Counsel testified he did not object to this testimony due to trial strategy. He indicated that with Applicant headed off to rob a drug dealer, “the fact that somebody was incorrect about where he was or what he was doing isn’t surprising.” Counsel further testified there was not a need to object as “[a]gain, it is information that really doesn’t help or hurt us.”

This Court finds Counsel’s testimony on this issue credible. This Court further finds counsel articulated a valid strategy in that the foregoing testimony did not really help or hurt their case—especially where Applicant acknowledged being the shooter. Thus, Applicant did not prove deficiency. Likewise, it is not reasonably likely the outcome would be different had counsel objected to and had the foregoing hearsay excluded because it was not material to Applicant’s guilt or innocence. Thus, Applicant did not establish any resulting prejudice, and this claim is denied.

***Failed to object to hearsay – Lauren Thrower***

Applicant next asserts counsel was ineffective for failing to object to hearsay testimony of Lauren Thrower. Applicant did not prove counsel was ineffective in this regard.

At trial, Thrower testified she was with Applicant and Robert Mitchell the day of the shooting. She stated Mitchell spoke to Victim that morning and arranged to purchase marijuana from him. She and Mitchell walked to Applicant’s home, and the three of them walked to a park to wait for Victim. (R. 85-89). According to Thrower, Applicant and Mitchell discussed “jacking” Victim. (R. 89). She recalled Applicant and Mitchell got into the car with Victim; thereafter she looked up and saw them running. Thrower stated she did not hear any gunshots and although she could see Victim’s car, she could not see Applicant or Mitchell inside the car. (R. 90-91). She stated they went back to her

apartment to divide the marijuana. The following exchange then occurred:

Q. Do you know where the marijuana came from?

A. I'm assuming—I know it came from [Victim] because that's who they were getting it from.

Q. Did Mitch or the defendant have marijuana prior to meeting with [Victim]?

A. No, sir.

Q. I kind of breezed over it pretty quickly. You got to your apartment by [McLean]. [McLean] drove all three of you there?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. After they split the marijuana and had the conversation, what happened then?

A. [Applicant] ended up leaving maybe 45 minutes to an hour later. And [McLean] came back and got him and took him to wherever he was at.

(R. 94; Tr. 145).<sup>2</sup>

No testimony was presented on this allegation at the hearing; thus, this Court granted Respondent's motion for a directed verdict. See Butler v. State, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985) (holding a PCR applicant bears the burden of proving his allegations).<sup>3</sup> Thus, this claim is dismissed with prejudice.

***Failed to object to hearsay - Matt Hughes***

Applicant next asserts counsel was ineffective for failing to object to hearsay testimony of

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<sup>2</sup> This is the portion of the transcript referenced in Applicant's amended application.

<sup>3</sup> Alternately, this Court finds the foregoing does not contain objectionable hearsay, and Applicant did not prove counsel was deficient for not objecting. Likewise, the foregoing was not material to Applicant's guilt or innocence—especially when Applicant admitted as part of his trial strategy that he was purchasing marijuana from Victim when the shooting occurred. Because it is not reasonably likely the outcome would have been different had counsel objected, Applicant failed to prove deficiency or prejudice, and this claim is denied.

Sergeant Matt Hughes. At trial, Sergeant Hughes testified about his investigation. During his testimony, the State asked, “Now you said you had the occasion to speak to the Defendant?” Sergeant Hughes replied, “I did.” (R. 1432-43; Tr. 194-95).<sup>4</sup>

No testimony was presented on this allegation at the hearing; thus, this Court granted Respondent’s motion for a directed verdict. See Butler v. State, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985) (holding a PCR applicant bears the burden of proving his allegations).<sup>5</sup> Thus, this claim is dismissed with prejudice.

***Failed to request a Jackson v. Denno hearing***

Applicant contends counsel was ineffective for failing to request a Jackson v. Denno hearing. At the PCR hearing, counsel testified he did not request a Denno hearing because “we admitted to shooting him.” He further stated “Our whole point was yeah, we shot him. There wasn’t any question about who pulled the trigger, who had the gun. And so I wouldn’t have done a Jackson v. Denno hearing.”

This Court finds counsel’s foregoing testimony credible, and counsel articulated a valid reason for not requesting a Denno hearing. Specifically, Applicant never denied shooting Victim but rather initially proceeded on a theory of voluntary manslaughter.<sup>6</sup> Counsel credibly testified he discussed the strategy with Applicant, and counsel articulated valid reasons for the strategy. Thus, Applicant did not prove deficiency.

Likewise, it is not reasonably likely Applicant would have been successful in having the

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4 This is the portion of the transcript Applicant cites to in his amended application.

5 Alternately, this Court finds the foregoing does not contain objectionable hearsay, and Applicant did not prove counsel was deficient for not objecting on that basis. Likewise, it is not reasonably likely the outcome would have been different had counsel objected based on hearsay, and Applicant failed to prove resulting prejudice.

6 Notably, it was ultimately Applicant’s decision for the Court to not charge voluntary manslaughter.

statement suppressed. Specifically, Sergeant Hughes and Detective Jerome Desheers both testified Applicant was advised of his Miranda rights, and the State entered a Miranda advice of rights form signed by Applicant. (R. 143, 167). Applicant did not put forth any evidence suggesting his statement was not knowing or voluntary and thus did not show any likelihood of success at a Denno hearing. Applicant thus failed to show any resulting prejudice, and this claim is denied.

***Failed to object to leading***

Applicant next asserts that Counsel was ineffective for failing to object to leading. Specifically, he contends counsel should have objected to the following during Sergeant Hughes' direct examination:

Q. So is it accurate to say through your investigation, through the witness testimony, through the evidence that you believe the defendant, Mitchell and Lauren went through this hole in the fence and came back after the shooting through this hole in the fence—

A: —yes, sir.

(R. 153; Tr. 205). He further contends counsel should have objected to leading during the following redirect examination of Robert Mitchell:

Q. You knew it was a very good possibility didn't you?

A. Yeah.

Q. And you knew he brought a gun that would let him do it right?

A. Right.

Q. And you knew that after he did it you'd still had the money and the weed right?

A. Right.

Q. So you come out ahead right?

A. Right.

Q. Jalann gets some weed and he comes out ahead right?

A. Right.

Q. The only person who doesn't come out ahead is [Victim] right?

A. Right.

Q. And you knew that going to meet [Victim] because y'all talked about it right?

A. Right.  
Q. I mean very clearly you knew exactly what he meant to do right?  
A. Right.  
Q. And you were okay with it.  
A. Right.  
Q. Okay. And this wasn't a fight. This was [Victim] trying to protect himself from that gun [indicates] isn't it?  
A. I mean like I told you they was struggling over the gun. I seen the dude come across the seat. I don't know when the gun was pulled or nothing.  
Q. Where was [Victim] going to run? He wasn't going anywhere was he?  
A. No.  
Q. You keep the money?  
A. I gave him his money back.  
Q. Right. You kept what you came with?  
A. Right.  
Q. And you got the weed?  
A. Right.  
Q. And that was your plan the whole time, yes?  
A. Right.  
Q. And that was his plan the whole time, yes?  
The Court Reporter: Is that yes?  
A. Yes, sir, yes ma'am.

(R. 224-25; Tr. 276-77).<sup>7</sup>

Applicant did not present any testimony or further argument on this issue at the PCR hearing, and this Court granted Respondent's motion for a directed verdict.<sup>8</sup> Thus, this claim is dismissed with prejudice.

***Failed to object to the State's closing argument***

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<sup>7</sup> Although the amended application references testimony through page 278 of the transcript, this is the end of Mitchells' testimony.

<sup>8</sup> Alternately, this Court finds counsel articulated a valid reason in that he explained he does not object to everything during trial because jurors get annoyed with excessive objections. This Court finds counsel was not deficient for failing to object. This Court further finds it is not reasonably likely the outcome would have been different had counsel objected based on leading. Sergeant Hughes' testimony above—pointing to a hole in a fence that he believed Applicant, Mitchell, and Lauren went through—was cumulative to other testimony and not material to Applicant's guilt or innocence, especially here where Applicant acknowledged being in the car with Victim and being the shooter. Although some of Mithcell's foregoing testimony was material to Applicant's guilt, it was cumulative to his direct testimony that Applicant had a gun and planned to rob Victim. (R. 198-203). Thus, it is not reasonably likely the outcome would have been different had counsel based on leading, Applicant failed to prove deficiency or prejudice, and this claim is denied.

Applicant contends counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the following statements in the State's closing argument:

And then what does Jalann, what does the kid with the dreads, the kid with dreads for some reason decided to change his haircut for you, the kid with dreads in the backseat says give it up.

(R. 390).<sup>9</sup>

Well on this day the only time those kids got to really see their parents that we have evidence of, evidence, testimony is when they drive dad away when he murdered somebody. When he puts them in the car seat and has Taylor McLean drive him and get him out of there and she starts to freak out because she knows something has gone wrong and she hears the sirens.

(R. 395). Applicant specifically contends counsel should have objected because the foregoing implied he was being disingenuous with the jury because he cut off his dreads and accused him of being a bad father. This Court finds Applicant did not prove counsel was ineffective in this regard.

“To find whether the assistant solicitor's comments in closing argument violated the defendant's due process rights, we must determine whether the comments were improper, and if so, whether the improper argument so unfairly prejudiced the defendant as to deny him a fair trial.” Fortune v. State, 428 S.C. 545, 549, 837 S.E.2d 37, 39 (2019). In determining whether an improper comment prejudiced a defendant, “[t]he relevant question is whether the prosecutors' comments so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986).

At the PCR hearing, counsel testified he did not have any sense that the statements inflamed the jury. Counsel testified “Again, I don't think that had anything to do with the case. I don't think

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<sup>9</sup> Although Applicant cites to 392 in his amended application, that page does not discuss Applicant's haircut or children. This Court finds the reference to 392 is a scrivener's error.

there was any type of inflaming or angering the jury. ... And I like the State saying stuff like that because it shows they are reaching. They're not focusing on the facts. They're focusing on stuff that has nothing to do with the case."

This Court finds counsel's testimony credible, and counsel articulated a valid reason for not objecting in that he did not believe the statements were inflammatory. This Court further finds the foregoing statements were reasonable inferences from the evidence and not objectionable, and Applicant thus failed to prove deficiency. Applicant did not prove resulting prejudice by showing it was reasonably likely the outcome would have been different had counsel objected. See Darden, 477 U.S. 168 (finding prosecutor's improper comments—which included statements such as "He shouldn't be out of his cell unless he has a leash on him" and "I wish that I could see him sitting here with no face, blown away by a shotgun"—did not "so infect the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process"). Thus, this claim is denied.

***Failed to object to the Court's response to the jury question***

Applicant alleges that Counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the Court's response following a jury question. During deliberations, the jury sent the following question (among others) to the presiding judge: "Are there any lesser included offenses charged?". In response, the judge stated, "I'm going to tell them that none of the charges that I have given them are lesser included of one another." Counsel replied, "That's correct." The Court then made the charge without objection.

At the PCR hearing, counsel indicated he had valid strategic reasons for going "all or nothing," and he felt good about the "all or nothing" strategy at the close of the State's case. He stated he had adequate time to discuss the strategy with Applicant and "he liked what I was saying." Applicant agreed the "all or nothing" strategy was discussed with him. For these reasons, Applicant did not

request a lesser-included offense.<sup>10</sup> Thus, counsel found the judge's statement that "none of the charges that I have given them are lesser included of one another" was accurate and did not object.

This Court finds Counsel articulated strategic reason for not objecting. Further, this Court finds that due to Applicant's decision to waive the lesser-included offense, there was nothing objectionable in the court's response to the jury. Applicant has not shown deficiency or resulting prejudice, and this claim is denied.

***Failed to object to recharge***

Applicant contends counsel was ineffective for not charging criminal intent during the jury recharge. This Court finds Applicant did not prove counsel was ineffective in this regard.

At the PCR hearing, Applicant stated, "I believe that you have to charge criminal intent in a criminal case because in any crime not charging the jury criminal intent is like giving them the whole thing that you don't understand what you're doing." Trial counsel testified he didn't object because he felt the intent charge "dealt with that [it] said he had to have malice aforethought and the intent, the depraved heart language."

Initially, this Court notes the trial court *did* charge the jury on criminal intent. (R. 447-48). Although the Court did not specifically recharge criminal intent, the recharge was responsive to the question asked by the jury, and it charged the jury on malice as a necessary element of murder. (R. 366). This Court finds Applicant did not prove deficiency or prejudice, and this claim is denied.

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<sup>10</sup> Applicant waived a charge on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter on the record. (R. 300-01).

CONCLUSION


Based on the foregoing, this Court finds Applicant has not established any constitutional violations or deprivations that would require this Court to grant relief. Thus, this application is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Should Applicant wish to secure appellate review, he must file and serve a notice of appeal within thirty days of receipt by counsel of written notice of entry of judgment. See Rule 203, SCACR. Applicant has the right to an appellate counsel's assistance in seeking review of the denial of PCR. Austin v. State, 305 S.C. 453, 409 S.E.2d 395 (1991). If Applicant wishes to seek appellate review, PCR counsel must serve and file a notice of appeal on applicant's behalf. Rule 71.1(g), SCRPC. Attention is directed to Rule 243, SCACR, for appropriate procedures for appeal.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. This application for PCR is denied and dismissed with prejudice; and
2. Applicant shall be remanded to and remain in the custody of the State.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 29 day of May, 2024.

  
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KRISTI F. CURTIS  
Presiding Judge  
Ninth Judicial Circuit

Sunder, South Carolina