

which Appellant was on trial. Appellant had been charged in the 2007 burglary, but that case against him had been dismissed by the state. Owen, his codefendant on the 2015 charges, had also been charged and convicted of the 2007 burglary.

The state contended the defense opened the door to recalling Owen to testify about the 2007 burglary, due to questions asked by Appellant's defense counsel of the officer that investigated the 2015 incident. The trial court allowed the recall testimony. On appeal, Appellant argued multiple grounds for finding the court's ruling was reversible error. The Court of Appeals affirmed the admission of the testimony.

Appellant asks the Court to rehear its decision due to certain principles and authorities it overlooked or misapprehended.

Appellant submits the Court misapprehended that *State v. Stroman*, 281 S.C. 508, 513, 316 S.E.2d 395, 399 (1984), allows admission of the Owen recall testimony under the door-opening doctrine. In this case, questions were asked by trial counsel, but those questions did not elicit from the witness the information counsel was seeking – that Owen had previously implicated Appellant in another crime for which Owen faced charges. The Court found *Stroman* allowed admission of Owen's recall testimony, upon a finding that counsel's **questioning** opened the door, rather than requiring that the questioning had to result in the **introduction of evidence** before the door is deemed to have been opened for testimony rebutting that **evidence**. The Court's reliance on *Stroman* is misplaced. Although *Stroman* stated counsel's having "initiated the questioning" had opened the door to further evidence on the subject, that reference was in the context of its earlier recital of the facts – that counsel asked the witness if he had ever broken into other homes for money **and the witness answered that he had**. See *Stroman*, 281 S.C. at 512-13, 316