

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In the Supreme Court

RECEIVED

Nov 25 2024

S.C. SUPREME COURT

Appeal from Berkeley County Court of Common Pleas
The Honorable Michael G. Nettles, Circuit Court Judge

Lower Case No. 2020800504

Telly McClam, #00232709.....Petitioner,

v.

The State of South Carolina.....Respondent

NOTICE OF APPEAL

The Applicant-Petitioner, Telly McClam, hereby appeals the Order Denying Applicant's Posting Hearing Motion pursuant to Rule 59, issued by the Honorable Michael G. Nettles. Undersigned received notice of the judgment on November 20, 2024. This judgment was issued in response to Applicant's timely filed post-hearing motion to alter or amend the Order of Dismissal pursuant to Rule 59, SCRPC. Copies of the Order Denying Applicant's Post-Hearing Motion and Order of Dismissal are attached to this notice.

This Notice has also been forwarded to the Clerk of Court for Berkeley County and the Appellate Division of SCCID. Undersigned has filed this Notice of Appeal on Petitioner's behalf but has not been retained to perfect Petitioner's PCR appeal. Undersigned has advised Petitioner of his need to retain other counsel or SCCID and that Undersigned will withdraw as counsel on this appeal at the appropriate time.

Respectfully submitted,

William G. Yarborough, III

Lauren Carole Hobbis

By: s/ Lauren C. Hobbis, #103190

William G. Yarborough III, Attorney at Law, LLC

308 West Stone Avenue

Greenville, South Carolina 29609

(864) 331-1612

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)
)
 COUNTY OF BERKELEY)
)
 Telly McClam, # 00232709,)
)
 Applicant,)
 v.)
)
 State of South Carolina,)
)
 Respondent.)
 _____)

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
 NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

Case No. 2020CP800504


**ORDER DENYING APPLICANT'S
 POST-HEARING MOTION TO ALTER
 OR AMEND THE JUDGMENT OR
 GRANT RELIEF THEREFROM**

This matter came before the Court by way Applicant's post-hearing Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment or Grant Relief Therefrom pursuant to Rules 52(b), 59, and 60, SCRPC. This Court had issued a written Order of Dismissal on October 14, 2024 following two evidentiary PCR hearings held on March 10, 2022 and September 9, 2024.

Having reviewed the Applicant's Post-Hearing Motion, in conjunction with the PCR pleadings, transcripts, and the trial court record, this Court finds that the Order of Dismissal made sufficient findings of facts and conclusions of law specific to the allegations raised in the PCR application, as required by S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-80 and Rule 52(a), SCRPC. This Court also finds that no fact, ground, or legal issue requires reconsideration or vacating of the Order of Dismissal. In light of the foregoing findings, the Applicant's Motion is denied.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Applicant's Post-Hearing Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment or Grant Relief therefrom is DENIED.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED this 20 day of Nov, 2024.



 The Honorable Judge Michael G. Nettles
 Presiding Judge, Ninth Judicial Circuit

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)
 COUNTY OF BERKELEY)
 Telly Darnell McClam, #232709,)
 Applicant,)
 v.)
 State of South Carolina,)
 Respondent.)

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
 NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

Case No.: 2020-CP-08-00504

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

LEAH GUERRY DUPRE
 CLERK OF COURT
 BERKELEY COUNTY, SC
 2024 OCT 14 PM 4:43
 FILED

This matter is before the Court by way of an application for post-conviction relief (PCR) filed by Telly Darnell McClam (Applicant) on February 20, 2020. Respondent made its return requesting an evidentiary hearing. On March 10, 2022, a Web-Ex hearing convened before the Honorable R. Markley Dennis, Jr. However, Judge Dennis retired before any final order was entered. Thereafter, the Honorable Jennifer B. McCoy, acting as Chief Administrative Judge for the Ninth Judicial Circuit, ordered the matter be set for a new hearing. On September 9, 2024, a hearing convened before the Honorable Michael G. Nettles. Applicant was present and represented by William G. Yarborough, Esquire. Assistant Attorney General Danielle Dixon represented Respondent. At the hearing, the parties agreed the transcript of the first PCR hearing would be made part of the record. Additionally, Applicant testified on his behalf, and Respondent called as a witness trial counsel David Schwecke. After reviewing the records before this Court and the testimony presented at the hearing, this Court finds Applicant did not meet his burden of proof. Thus, this Court denies relief and dismisses this application with prejudice.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Applicant is presently confined in the Department of Corrections serving a life sentence. In May and June of 2014, the Berkeley County Grand Jury indicted Applicant for two counts of

first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC) (2014-GS-08-839, -840), two counts of kidnapping (-653, -654), first-degree burglary (-655), possession of a weapon during a violent crime (-658), and unlawful possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a violent offense (-659). These charges arose from the kidnapping and rape of Applicant's ex-girlfriend's and her seventeen-year-old daughter (Minor Victim). After family members contacted police about the suspected kidnapping, an Amber alert was issued. Law enforcement located the vehicle Applicant was driving, and a car chase ensued. The victims were subsequently rescued from Applicant's vehicle; Applicant fled and was later apprehended by a K-9 unit.

On February 29-March 3, 2016, Applicant proceeded to a jury trial before the Honorable Deadra Jefferson. Public Defenders David Schwacke and Deborah Littlejohn represented Applicant. Assistant Solicitors Anne Williams and Daniel Poulos prosecuted the case. The jury convicted Applicant as indicted, and Judge Jefferson sentenced him to concurrent terms of life for CSC, kidnapping, and first-degree burglary; and five years for each weapon charge.

Applicant filed a direct appeal, which was perfected by William G. Yarborough, III (2016-000793). On appeal, Applicant argued the trial court erred in (1) denying his motion for a directed verdict, (2) finding the mandatory life sentence under section 17-25-45 of the South Carolina Code did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, and (3) finding the mandatory life sentence did not violate separation of powers. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the merits. State v. McClam, 2019-UP-088 (filed Feb. 20, 2019). The remittitur was sent March 13, 2019.

CURRENT APPLICATION

On February 20, 2020, Applicant filed this PCR application alleging counsel was ineffective in:

- a. Failing to object to prejudicial hearsay testimony;

- b. Failing to move to exclude various prejudicial evidence relating to either irrelevant or prior bad acts;
- c. Failing to present mitigating evidence at sentencing.

On March 9, 2022, Applicant served on Respondent a Motion to Amend Application for Post-Conviction Relief, raising the following grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel:

- I. Counsel failed to object to prejudicial hearsay testimony by Karlayne Dufault;
- II. Counsel failed to object or move to exclude prior bad act evidence by witness Deandrene McHoney;
- III. Counsel failed to object to testimony by expert witness Alyssa Rheingold;
- IV. Counsel failed to present mitigation evidence at sentencing;
- V. Counsel failed to inform Applicant or sufficiently advise him about a prior plea offer.

At the PCR hearing, Applicant proceeded on the allegations of his amended application. Applicant further alleged counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the State's notice of its intent to seek life without parole (LWOP).

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This Court has had the opportunity to review the records before it, including the Berkeley County Clerk of Court records of the convictions, Applicant's records from the South Carolina Department of Corrections, the trial transcript, the records of Applicant's direct appeal; and the records of this PCR application (including the transcript of the March 10, 2022 PCR hearing). This Court has further had the opportunity to observe the witnesses presented at the PCR hearing,

closely pass upon their credibility, and weigh their testimony accordingly.¹ After a careful review based on the Strickland standard set forth below, this Court finds Applicant has failed to carry his burden of proof. Below are this Court's findings of facts and conclusions of law as required by section 17-27-80 of the South Carolina Code (2017).

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In a PCR action, an applicant bears the burden of proving the allegations. Butler v. State, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985). In evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, courts apply the two-pronged test outlined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668. First, an applicant must prove counsel's performance was deficient. Id.; Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 117, 386 S.E.2d 624, 625 (1989). Under this prong, courts measure an attorney's performance by its "reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Cherry, 300 S.C. at 117, 386 S.E.2d at 625. "Counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment," and an applicant must overcome this presumption to receive relief. Id.; Cherry, 300 S.C. at 118, 386 S.E.2d at 625. Second, a PCR applicant must prove the deficiency prejudiced him such that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Cherry, 300 S.C. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625.

LWOP Notice

Applicant first contends counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the life without parole (LWOP) sentence on the basis he did not receive written notice of the State's intent to seek LWOP ten days prior to trial, in contravention of section 17-25-45(H) of the South Carolina Code. This

¹ This Court will reference PCR testimony where relevant below.

contention lacks merit.

A solicitor must provide at least ten days' notice prior to trial if he or she intends to seek a life sentence under section 17-25-45. S.C. Code Ann. § 17-25-45(H). The purpose of this statutory notice provision is to ensure "a defendant and his counsel have actual notice the State is seeking a sentence under the recidivist statute." James v. State, 372 S.C. 287, 294–95, 641 S.E.2d 899, 903 (2007). The requirements of this statute are satisfied as long as the defendant and his counsel possess actual notice of the State's intention at least ten days prior to trial. Id. "[U]nder such notice statutes, the law only requires actual notice." State v. Washington, 338 S.C. 392, 398, 526 S.E.2d 709, 712 (2000).

Here, the State filed notice of its intent to seek LWOP on December 29, 2015. On January 5, 2016, David Schwacke, acting as counsel for Applicant, signed an acknowledgement of service of the State's notice of intent to seek LWOP. Applicant's trial began on February 29, 2016—more than ten days after Schwacke signed the acknowledgment form. At the PCR hearing, Schwacke explained he signed the form on Applicant's behalf. Schwacke further credibly testified he advised Applicant of the State's intent to seek LWOP. This Court finds, based on the foregoing, that Applicant had actual notice of the State's intent to seek LWOP in advance of trial. Under James, this was sufficient notice of the State's intent to seek LWOP, and the fact that Applicant himself did not sign the acknowledgement form does not provide a basis for granting PCR. See James, 327 S.C. At 287, 641 S.E.2d 899 (reversing Court of Appeals' finding that counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the State's failure to provide the applicant himself written notice of its intent to seek LWOP when section 17-25-45(H) requires only actual notice of the State's intent to seek

LWOP, which the applicant received).² Further, like the applicant in James, this issue was raised on the record at trial prior to the swearing of the jury. (Tr. 44-45, 63-64). Under James, Applicant cannot show prejudice from counsel's failure to object. See id. (finding applicant could not demonstrate prejudice from counsel's failure to assert the applicant himself did not receive written notice of the State's intent to seek LWOP when the issue regarding LWOP notice first arose prior to the swearing of the jury). Ultimately James is controlling, and Applicant's contention that the LWOP notice was insufficient does not set forth a basis for granting PCR.

To the extent Applicant avers he did not have notice of LWOP in time to accept or reject an offer of fifteen to twenty-five years, this Court finds Applicant did not prove counsel was ineffective in this regard. Initially, this Court finds NOT credible Applicant's testimony that he did not learn about the LWOP notice until 2021, and he did not learn about the plea offer until the end of trial. This Court finds credible counsel's testimony that he explained the offer (which was conveyed in June 2014) to Applicant, and he explained LWOP to Applicant. Before trial, the solicitor noted Applicant had previously rejected the offer. (Tr. 44). Prior to sentencing, the trial court noted the State's prior offer and the fact the State subsequently served the LWOP notice. The State filed its LWOP notice in December 2015, and nothing indicates counsel failed to adequately explain the plea offer or the LWOP notice to Applicant. Applicant thus did not prove deficiency or prejudice, and this claim is denied.

Failed to object – Hearsay

Applicant next contends counsel was ineffective for not objecting to hearsay. Specifically,

² In James, the South Carolina Supreme Court reiterated its holding in State v. Washington, 338 S.C. 392, 526 S.E.2d 709 (2000) that "Under such notice statutes [such as section 17-25-45], the law only requires actual notice." James, 372 S.C. at 294-95, 641 S.E.2d at 903.

he contends counsel should have objected to hearsay testimony by SANE³ Nurse Karlayne Dufault that a condom was not used and the sexual assault occurred on the hood of a car. This court finds Applicant did not prove this ground.

At trial, Dufault testified Minor Victim told her she was “assaulted in Pineville, down a dirt road, on the top of a car.” This Court finds this testimony was not objectionable because it was limited to the time and place of the alleged assault. See Rule 801(d)(1)(D) (providing a prior statement by a witness is not hearsay if “[t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is . . . consistent with the declarant’s testimony in a criminal sexual conduct case . . . where the declarant is the alleged victim and the statement is limited to the time and place of the incident”). Counsel thus was not deficient for not objecting.

Later, during Dufault’s direct examination, the following exchange occurred:

Q. And would the presence of a condom be important?

A. Yes.

Q. Why?

A. Well, first, if a condom was used, we would want to try to gather that as evidence; and then secondly, it may help us decide on what—what tests to run and what—what medications to administer.

Q. And in this case, was a condom used?

A. No, ma’am.

Q. And would it be important to know where you had to swab on the body to collect evidence?

A. Yes.

³ Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner.

Q. And would it be important to know if there was licking or kissing on the neck or sucking, like what we call a hickey?

A. Yes.

Q. And in this case, did any of that occur?

A. No, ma'am.

(Tr. 361-62). At the PCR hearing, trial counsel testified he did not object to this testimony because he believed it was covered by the medical exemption to hearsay. This Court agrees and finds counsel articulated a valid reason for not objecting. See Rule 803(4) (providing “[s]tatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment” are not excluded by the hearsay rule). Applicant thus did not prove deficiency.

Finally, even if an objection would have excluded this testimony (which this Court does NOT find), it is not reasonably probable the outcome would be different had this testimony been excluded. The State presented overwhelming evidence of Applicant’s guilt, which included the testimony and identification of Applicant by both victims (who knew Applicant as the boyfriend of Minor Victim’s mother); Applicant’s DNA recovered from Minor Victim’s rape kit; testimony that the victims’ family members contacted law enforcement after receiving suspicious text messages from the victims, which resulted in an Amber alert, a high-speed car chase, and Applicant’s subsequent apprehension by a K-9 unit; evidence that law enforcement noticed a forced entry to the home from which Minor Victim stated she was apprehended; and Applicant’s fingerprint on duct tape recovered from a cabin where the victims stated he restrained them with duct tape. Ultimately, based on the foregoing, it is not reasonably probable the outcome would be

different had Nurse Dufault's foregoing testimony been excluded. This claim is thus denied.

Failed to Object - Prior Bad Act Evidence

Applicant next contends counsel was ineffective for not objecting to prior bad act testimony by victim Deandre McHoney that (1) Applicant had "physically harmed" her in the past; (2) Applicant had been abusive to her in the months prior to the alleged offenses; (3) Applicant had physically hurt her before; and (4) she knew what Applicant was capable of, in reference to his violence. This Court finds Applicant did not prove this ground.

At trial, McHoney (Minor Victim's mother) testified she had been in a relationship with Applicant and broke up with him about a week before the kidnapping. (Tr. 218-19). She explained Applicant had tried to contact her after the break-up, but she did not take his calls or respond to his texts. (Tr. 220). During direct examination, the following exchange occurred:

Q. And what was the thing that made you go with the defendant that day?

Mr. Schwacke: Your Honor, may we approach?

The Court: You may.

(Bench conference.)

Mr. Schwacke: She's pitting for information.

The Court: If she said, what made you go with him that day, it's res gestae. That's a continuum of events. She's entitled to say why she went with him. As long as it's not a reference to something that happened in the past.

Ms. Williams: I've warned them not to say anything about the two prior —

The Court: I need to be sure.

Ms. Williams: I'll do a hearing even when it's not necessary, I promise you. Like yesterday—

The Court: Uh-huh. I need to be sure. I mean, you can't control her. What do you anticipate her response to be?

Ms. Williams: That she got a call from her daughter and—

The Court: That's res gestae.

(End of bench conference.)

The Court: Overruled, you may proceed.

By Ms. Williams:

Q. So at some point you got in a car with Telly McClam that day?

A. I did.

Q. And up until that point, you just testified that you didn't want anything to do with him, you were ignoring the calls?

A. Right.

Q. What made you get in the car?

A. Because he had my daughter.

Q. Without going into any specifics, why did that alarm you?

A. Because he physically harmed me before, so I was scared for her.

(Tr. 221-22, emphasis added). At the PCR hearing, counsel testified the State filed a pretrial motion to include prior bad act evidence under Rule 404(b), SCRE. He testified he objected to the State's line of questioning here, but the Court overruled his objection. The trial transcript shows counsel did in fact object to this testimony, and Applicant did not prove deficiency in this regard.

In addition to the foregoing, Applicant avers counsel should have objected to the following during McHoney's direct examination:

Now, during the course of your relationship with Mr. McClam, there

were times even close to this event where you—how did you feel about him?

A. I started to hate him.

Q. But did you always hate him?

A. I didn't always hate him. The last few months in the relationship, things just totally turned around. **He started being abusive and talking to me all sorts of ways.**

Q. **Without going into those details**, were there times when you expressed different emotions to him, even when things were going wrong? Did you sometimes let him know a different type of emotion? Did you sometimes tell him that you didn't hate him—

A. Yes, ma'am.

Q. —even when things were bad?

A. Yes.

In fact, even after he was arrested, didn't you sometimes tell him you loved him?

A. Yes.

(Tr. 234, emphasis added).

Q. Okay. And you didn't run away?

A. No, ma'am.

Q. Did you tell the sister that you were being held against your will?

A. No, ma'am.

....

Q. And why?

A. **Why didn't I run?**

Q. Yes.

A. Because I knew what he was capable of.

(Tr. 236).

Q. After that, did you feel like you could leave the car when you first got in with [Minor Victim]?

A. No, ma'am.

Q. Why was that?

A. He hurt me physically before.

Q. What else did he have with him?

A. The gun and the knife.

(Tr. 249).

Trial counsel testified he did not object to McHoney's testimony that Applicant "started being abusive" because the solicitor cut her off and reigned in the testimony. He stated he did not object to McHoney's statement that she didn't run because she "knew what he was capable of" because this was part of the res gestae of the crime, which the Court had ruled admissible. Finally, counsel stated he did not object to McHoney's testimony that Applicant had hurt her physically before because it explained why she did not leave the car. This Court finds counsel articulated valid reasons for not objecting to the foregoing testimony and thus was not deficient.

Finally, Applicant did not prove prejudice from counsel's failure to object. Initially, this Court finds it unlikely the testimony would have been excluded based on the Court's prior ruling that testimony about why McHoney behaved a certain way was part of the res gestae of the crime. Further, and critically, due to the overwhelming evidence presented by the State, it is not reasonably probable the outcome would be different this "bad act" testimony been excluded. As set forth above, the State's evidence included the testimony and identification of Applicant by both

victims (who knew Applicant as the boyfriend of Minor Victim's mother); Applicant's DNA recovered from Minor Victim's rape kit; testimony that the victims' family members contacted law enforcement after receiving suspicious text messages from the victims, which resulted in an Amber alert, a high-speed car chase, and Applicant's subsequent apprehension by a K-9 unit; evidence that law enforcement noticed a forced entry to the home from which Minor Victim stated she was apprehended; and Applicant's fingerprint on duct tape recovered from a cabin where the victims stated he restrained them with duct tape. This claim is thus denied.⁴

Failed to Object - Expert Testimony

Applicant asserts counsel was ineffective for not objecting to expert witness Alyssa Rheingold's responses to hypothetical questions, which improperly bolstered Minor Victim's testimony. Applicant did not prove this ground.

At trial, Rheingold was qualified as an expert in impact trauma, and she testified generally to victims' behavioral responses to trauma, such as fight, flight, or freeze reaction and emotional numbing. She further testified sexual assault victims often don't immediately disclose sexual assault, especially when they know the perpetrator. Finally, she opined fear of the person can prevent a person from running away. (Tr. 513-23). On cross-examination, she clarified she did not meet any of the victims in this case. She further clarified victims display a wide range of responses to trauma, and she cannot predict how an individual would react to trauma. (Tr. 527).

Initially, expert testimony regarding behavioral characteristics of sex abuse victims is generally admissible, and Applicant did not set forth a valid legal objection that would have

⁴ At the PCR hearing, Applicant also asserted counsel should have objected when Emma Ruth Cooper (Applicant's aunt) testified Applicant started visiting her "when he got out of prison." (Tr. 558). This Court finds, due to the overwhelming evidence presented by the State, that it is not reasonably probable the outcome would have been different had counsel objected to this passing statement.

reasonably excluded this testimony. See State v. Jones, 423 S.C. 631, 636, 817 S.E.2d 268, 271 (2018) (“[T]he law in South Carolina is settled: behavioral characteristics of sex abuse victims is an area of specialized knowledge where expert testimony may be utilized.”). Further, Applicant did not set forth any improper comment by Rheingold on the victims’ credibility or any hypothetical scenarios that contained facts similar to the case on trial. Thus, Applicant did not prove deficiency or prejudice in this regard. Finally, due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt presented by the State (as recounted above), it is not reasonable probable the outcome would have been different had counsel successfully excluded this testimony. This claim is thus denied.

Mitigation

Applicant asserts counsel was ineffective for not offering further mitigation at sentencing, such as Applicant’s history of mental illness, learning disability, and troubled/abuse childhood and upbringing. This lacks merit. Here, Applicant was properly served with the States’ notice of intent to seek LWOP. In light of that, counsel’s mitigation was reasonable under prevailing professional norms and not deficient. Further, due to the LWOP notice, Applicant cannot prove prejudice from this claim. In other words, there is no reasonable probability that additional mitigation would have led to a lighter sentence when the Court was bound by the LWOP notice. This claim is thus denied.

Plea offer

Finally, Applicant contends counsel was ineffective for not adequately advising him about a prior plea offer of fifteen to twenty-five years or ensuring Applicant understood the implications of rejecting the offer relative to the strength of the State’s evidence. Applicant did not prove this ground. At the hearing, Applicant testified he did not learn about this offer until *after* trial. This Court finds Applicant’s testimony here NOT credible. This Court finds credible counsel’s testimony that he conveyed and discussed this offer with Applicant prior to trial. Counsel’s

testimony that Applicant was aware of this offer is corroborated by the trial transcript, wherein the solicitor indicated *prior to trial* that Applicant had previously turned down this offer. (Tr. 44). Applicant did not set forth what advice counsel provided related to the offer that was deficient and thus did not meet his burden of proving deficiency or prejudice. Thus, this claim is denied.


CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, this Court concludes Applicant has not established any constitutional violations that would require this Court to grant relief. Thus, this application is denied and dismissed with prejudice. Should Applicant wish to appeal, he must file and serve a notice of appeal within thirty days of receipt by counsel of written notice of entry of judgment. See Rule 203, SCACR. Applicant has the right to an appellate counsel’s assistance in seeking review of the denial of PCR. Austin v. State, 305 S.C. 453, 409 S.E.2d 395 (1991). If Applicant wishes to seek appellate review, PCR counsel must serve and file a notice of appeal on applicant’s behalf. Rule 71.1(g), SCRCP. Attention is directed to Rule 243, SCACR, for appellate procedures.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. This application for PCR is denied and dismissed with prejudice; and
2. Applicant shall be remanded to and remain in the custody of the State.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 1 day of Oct, 2024.


MICHAEL G. NETTLES
Presiding Judge
Ninth Judicial Circuit

Houner, South Carolina



ALAN WILSON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

October 10, 2024

2024 OCT 14 PM 4:43
LEAH GUERRY DUPREE
CLERK OF COURT
BERKELEY COUNTY, SC

FILED


The Honorable Leah Guerry Dupree
Clerk of Court - Berkeley County
Post Office Box 219
Moncks Corner, South Carolina 29461-0219

Re: Telly Darnell McClam, #232709 v. State of South Carolina
Case No.: 2020-CP-08-00504

Dear Ms. Dupree:

Enclosed please find the original Order of Dismissal signed by the Honorable Michael G. Nettles, in the above-captioned case, for filing in your office. In addition, please forward a time-stamped copy back to our office for our file.

Sincerely,


Danielle Dixon
Assistant Attorney General

DD/vh

cc: William G. Yarborough, III, Esquire