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S.C. SUPREME COURT

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE SUPREME COURT

Certiorari to the Court of Appeals
Appeal from Chesterfield County
Honorable Michael G. Nettles, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 2025-UP-024 (S.C. Ct. App. Filed January 29, 2025)

Lower Court Case No. 2021-GS-13-00461

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

RESPONDENT

V.

ANDRE JUNIOR COVINGTON,

RESPONDENT

APPELLATE CASE NO. 2022-000831

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

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CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

Counsel for Petitioner certifies that the petition for rehearing was made and finally ruled on by the Court of Appeals on April 2, 2025.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Did the Court of Appeals err under Rules 403 and 404, SCRE, by affirming the admission of evidence Petitioner offered to make unrelated witnesses "disappear" after the alleged crime when he was on trial for the murder of a man who disappeared?

2. Did the Court of Appeals err by finding Petitioner's motion for a directed verdict was properly denied despite the lack of evidence of violence, meaning the state failed to prove the criminal act of another caused the death of Terris Parsons?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In April of 2021, the Chesterfield County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Andre Junior Covington, for murder, indictment #2021-GS-13-0461. (R. p. 601). On April 4, 2022, Appellant proceeded to jury trial before the Honorable Michael G. Nettles. Kyle Hobbs represented Appellant at trial. Kernard Redmond prosecuted the case. The jury found Appellant guilty. Judge Nettles sentenced Appellant to forty-five (45) years in prison. A timely notice of intent to appeal was served on June 10, 2022.

Kathrine Hudgins and Jordan Wayburn represented Petitioner on appeal. W. Joseph Maye represented the state. The Court of Appeals (Williams, C.J.; McDonald, Turner, JJ.) affirmed in an unpublished opinion. *State v. Covington*, Op. No. 2025-UP-024 (S.C. Ct. App. Filed Jan. 29, 2025). Petitioner filed a petitioner for rehearing on February 13, 2025, which the Court of Appeals denied on April 2, 2025.

This petition for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Appeals decision follows.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In June of 2019, Terris Parsons disappeared. Parsons has not been seen or heard from since, and a body was never found. Parsons's girlfriend, Latoya Broadie, told police that Parsons went out to buy cigarettes at 9:45 PM on June 2, 2019, and never returned. (R. p. 110, line 9 – p. 111, lines 1-15). Parsons was driving a champagne colored 2010 Buick Lacrosse. (R. p. 157, lines 18-21). Broadie was able to access Parsons's phone records, and the next morning she called one of the numbers displayed from the night before. (R. p. 116, line 5 – p. 117, 118, lines 1-25). The police determined that Appellant was the last person to talk with Parsons and decided to interview Appellant. (R. p. 153, lines 16-21; State's Ex. #80, Interview #1). Appellant denied seeing Parsons on the evening of June 2, 2019. (State's Ex. #80, Interview #1). Video surveillance showed Parsons's car going to Appellant's house on Chapman Street and then both Parsons's car and Appellant's blue Mustang leaving the Chapman Street house in Cheraw. (R. p. 158, line 21 – p. 159, lines 1-22). The police re-interviewed Appellant and his then girlfriend, Lillie Moore, and they were both subsequently charged with obstruction of justice. (R. p. 163, lines 1-23; State's Ex. #80, Interview #2).

The police also received information that Parsons's car may have been seen at an abandoned car wash in Morven. (R. p. 156, lines 9-19). A detective testified Parsons's phone may have been in Morven. (R. p. 228, lines 8-19). The police were unable to locate Parson or his car in Morven. (R. p. 156, lines 23-25). The police interviewed Robert Wilson who admitted that on June 2, 2019, he dropped his son off at the son's home in Morven. (R. p. 510, lines 2-10). Wilson admitted that while he was in Morven he called Parsons at about 9:57 PM. (R. p. 510, lines 10-12). Wilson admitted that he deleted text messages from June 2, 2019. (R. p. 510, lines 7-8).

On June 25, 2019, Moore led police to a cream-colored car at an abandoned house in Florence. (R. p. 167, line 1 – p. 168, lines 1-25). The car was registered to Parsons. (R. p. 426, lines 1-5). According to Moore, on June 2, 2019, Appellant asked her to follow him on Highway 52 to Morven, as he drove the cream car and she followed in Appellant's blue Mustang. (See State's Ex. #81 – video deposition of Lillie Moore and Bruce Romero).[1] Moore denied seeing Parsons that night. According to Moore, she brought Appellant back home to Cheraw in the blue Mustang. Moore claimed that the next morning Appellant received a phone call from a young lady and Appellant stated, "He never showed up." (See State's Ex. #81). According to Moore, on the evening of June 3, 2019, she and Appellant went back to a car wash in Morven, North Carolina to move the cream car. (See State's Ex. #81). Moore stated that this time she drove Appellant's Lexus. (See State's Ex. #81). According to Moore, she followed Appellant to Florence where Appellant parked the cream car behind a house. (See State's Ex. #81). Moore stated that she drove Appellant back to Cheraw in the Lexus. (See State's Ex. #81).

On November 26, 2019, Appellant was charged with kidnapping. (R. p. 446, line 25 – p. 447, lines 1-12). At this time Appellant was detained at the Marlboro County Detention Center. (R. p. 437, lines 2-9). On March 18, 2020, Captain Wayne Jordan interviewed Bruce Romero, who was also detained at the Marlboro County Detention Center. (R. p. 438, line 17 – p. 439, lines 1-18). Romero gave Captain Jordan a letter he claimed was from Appellant. (R. p. 439, lines 19-23). A video deposition of Romero was played at trial. (R. p. 461, line 11 -p. 462, lines 1-12). The video deposition is included in State's Exhibit #81 with Lillie Moore's video deposition. While

[1] Instead of requiring the State to meet its burden of proof and require witnesses Lillie Moore and Bruce Romero to appear at trial, defense counsel agreed to the video depositions of these two witnesses on February 9, 2022, prior to trial. (R. p. 210, line 16 – p. 211, 212, lines 1-25). This matter will need to be addressed on PCR, if necessary.

trial counsel did not object to the procedure and use of the video deposition, counsel did object to the content of the Romero deposition and reference to the letter based on Rule 404(b) and 403, SCRE. (R. pp. 71-83).

The judge overruled the objection and found allowed a redacted version to be published to the jury. (R. p. 210, line 1 – p. 211, lines 1-11). In ruling the letter was admissible the trial judge stated:

> With regard to the letter, I am gonna allow the redacted – we've had discussions in chambers about that and we're gonna allow the redacted version of it to be published before the jury. And the reason for that is I specifically find that the prejudicial value does not over – override the probative value with regard to this particular piece of evidence. And when you look at all of the evidence, and the fact that there was a warrant and the letter, it's probative with regard to identity and that the reason why I'm admitting it.

(R. p. 210, lines 1-10). Counsel renewed the objection when the Romero video deposition was played for the jury and before the letter was published. (R. p. 461, line 25 – p. 462, lines 1-2). The prosecutor read to the jury the content of a redacted letter Romero claimed was given to him by Appellant. (R. p. 462, line 18 – p. 463, lines 1-4). At the close of the State's case counsel renewed the objection to the content of the Romero deposition and the letter. (R. p. 488, lines 8-11). The objections were again overruled. (R. p. 490, lines 4-7).

Based on his video deposition, Romero became a jailhouse snitch. Romero met Appellant while they were both at the Marlboro County Detention Center. (See State's Ex. #81). Romero claimed that while they were in jail Appellant gave him a copy of his kidnapping arrest warrant and a letter. (See State's Ex. #81). In the video deposition Romero stated that he believed the letter could help him with the serious charges he was facing. (See State's Ex. #81). At trial the prosecutor read the purported letter to the jury:

> First, let me tell you how I can help you in a major way. If they don't have any witnesses they don't have a case. You follow me. I

> can make that happen. Trust me. That can be done while you're out on bond for the State bonds for the State charge, which, you know, the charge will get dismissed because there is no one to take the stand against you. Are you still with me.
>
> Once again, I'm telling you that if I get out, there will be nobody to take the stand. I can make witnesses disappear. They wouldn't have a case because they have to be able to take the stand. Trust me. I want this paper back.

(R. p. 462, line 18 – p. 463, lines 1-4). Romero claimed on the video deposition that Appellant wanted Romero to give him one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) so he could hire a lawyer and get a bond. (See State's Ex. #81).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether the trial court erred in the admission of evidence is reviewed to determine if the trial court acted within its discretion. *State v. Swafford*, 375 S.C. 637, 640, 654 S.E.2d 297, 299 (Ct. App. 2007) ("The admission or exclusion of evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose decision will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion." (quoting *State v. Saltz*, 346 S.C. 114, 121, 551 S.E.2d 240, 244 (2001))).

"A case should be submitted to the jury when the evidence is circumstantial 'if there is any substantial evidence which reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the accused or from which his guilt may be fairly and logically deduced.'" *State v. Bostick*, 392 S.C. 134, 139, 708 S.E.2d 774, 776 (2011) (quoting *State v. Mitchell*, 341 S.C. 406, 409, 535 S.E.2d 126, 127 (2000)). "When reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, this Court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the state." *State v. Cherry*, 361 S.C. 588, 593, 606 S.E.2d 475, 478 (2004) (citing *State v. Burdette*, 335 S.C. 34, 46, 515 S.E.2d 525, 531 (1999)). "If there is any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, an appellate court must find the case was properly submitted to the jury." *Id.* (citations omitted). *Cherry*, 361 S.C. at 593-94, 606 S.E.2d at 478. Whether there exists "any evidence" sufficient to reach the jury is a question of law reviewed de novo. *Cf. State v. Williams*, 427 S.C. 246, 249, 830 S.E.2d 904, 906 (2019) ("Whether there is any evidence to support [a jury charge] is a question of law.").

WHY CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED

On the first issue, certiorari should be granted because the trial court and Court of Appeals (1) incorrectly concluded there is a "clearly perceived" connection between a kidnapping warrant and this alleged murder, and (2) entirely disregarded the substantial danger of unfair prejudice that the jury would not accept the unreasonable inference suggested by the state yet nonetheless be presented with propensity evidence that petitioner offered to make people disappear in a murder case about a man who went missing.

As to the second issue, certiorari should be granted because the Court of Appeals opinion is in clear contrast to all of this Court's prior precedent requiring the state to prove some violent, criminal act caused the death before the trial court should deny a motion for a directed verdict. In every other "no body" murder case properly presented to the jury there has been clear evidence of violence thereby satisfying the second element of the corpus delicti. *See State v. Owens*, 293 S.C. 161, 164, 359 S.E.2d 275, 276 (1987) (human blood stains); *State v. Weston*, 367 S.C. 279, 295, 625 S.E.2d 641, 649 (2006) (blood stains in the defendant's car); *State v. Lynch*, 412 S.C. 156, 168, 771 S.E.2d 346, 352 (Ct. App. 2015) (blood found all over the apartment defendant shared with victims).

ARGUMENT

I. The Court of Appeals erred under Rules 403 and 404, SCRE, by affirming the admission evidence Petitioner offered to make unrelated witnesses "disappear" after the alleged crime when he was on trial for the murder of a man who disappeared.

a. Rule 404(b)

Rule 404(b) of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence provides,

> Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible to show motive, identity, the existence of a common scheme or plan, the absence of mistake or accident, or intent.

Petitioner's purported claim that he could make a witness disappear in order to convince Romero to give him money is evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts pursuant to the rule. It was therefore admissible only to show motive, identity, the existence of a common scheme or plan, the absence of mistake or accident, or intent, and then only if it meets the clear and convincing standard required by *State v. Smith*, 300 S.C. 216, 387 S.E.2d 245 (1989). Because the evidence cannot do either of these, particularly considering Romero's express recognition of bias (believing the letter could help him), the evidence should have been excluded.

In *State v. Perry*, 430 S.C. 24, 842 S.E.2d 654 (2020), this Court confirmed the logical connection test for the admission of evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b), SCRE, established in *State v. Lyle*, 125 S.C. 406, 118 S.E. 803 (1923). In *Perry* the Court wrote:

> Historically, to justify a finding that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is offered for a legitimate purpose, and thus should not be excluded pursuant to Rule 404(b), South Carolina courts have required a logical relevancy or connection between the other crime and some disputed fact or element of the crime charged. *See, e.g.*, *Gaines*, 380 S.C. at 29, 667 S.E.2d at 731 ("To be admissible, the bad act must logically relate to the crime with which the defendant has been charged."); *State v. Brooks*, 341 S.C. 57, 61, 533 S.E.2d 325, 327-28 (2000) ("If the court does not clearly perceive the connection between the extraneous criminal transaction and the

> crime charged, that is, its logical relevancy, the accused should be given the benefit of the doubt, and the evidence should be rejected." (quoting *Lyle*, 125 S.C. at 417, 118 S.E. at 807)).

430 S.C. at 31, 842 S.E.2d at 658.

The trial court and Court of Appeals erred in finding the letter was probative of identity. Evidence Petitioner later tried to con Romero into giving him money by claiming he could make a witness disappear has no logical relevance or connection to some disputed fact or element in the murder of Parsons. There is no allegation Parsons was murdered to prevent him from testifying against someone in a trial. This evidence is entirely disconnected from the alleged murder. It is unlike the evidence of other forgeries in *Lyle* that were logically relevant to the forgery with which he was charged because that evidence placed the defendant near the scene of the crime and defeated his alibi defense. The Romero evidence fails to show motive, identity, the existence of a common scheme or plan, the absence of mistake or accident, or intent. The State failed to demonstrate that the Romero evidence served some purpose other than using Petitioner's character to show his propensity to commit the crime charged. All it did was show Petitioner had a kidnapping warrant and offered to make entirely unrelated people disappear. There is no connection demonstrated even in the Court of Appeals' explanation,

> Romero testified Covington passed him the arrest warrant, which charged Covington with kidnapping Victim, along with the letter. The warrant stated Covington was the last person to be with Victim on the night of his disappearance. Further, the letter stated Covington could make people 'disappear.'

Covington, Op. No. 2025-UP-024, at 4.

The Court of Appeals overlooked the following language from *Perry* quoting *State v. Brooks*, 341 S.C. 57, 61, 533 S.E.2d 325, 327-28 (2000), and in turn quoting *Lyle*: "If the court does not clearly perceive the connection between the extraneous criminal transaction and the crime charged, that is, its logical relevancy, the accused should be given the benefit of the doubt, and the

evidence should be rejected." 430 S.C. at 31, 842 S.E.2d at 658. There is no "clearly perceived" logical connection between the letter to Romero purporting the ability to make a witness disappear and the murder of Parsons. Respectfully, the attempt to establish the required logical connection by linking the offer letter to the alleged murder through an arrest warrant for kidnapping is a step too far for purposes of admission pursuant to 404(b). In particular, it goes too far because the purported connected is the bare allegation in a warrant for a different crime. The connection here is not clearly perceived and requires an inference that the letter is something more than an attempt to con Romero. If that theory represents *some* logical connection, it is an unreasonable one and therefore does not satisfy Rule 404. *See State v. Wallace*, 440 S.C. 537, 543, 892 S.E.2d 310, 313 (2023) ("[A]n . . . 'unreasonable' ruling clearly is outside of a court's discretion . . . ."). Petitioner should have been given the benefit of the doubt and the testimony and letter excluded.

b. Rule 403

The key part of this analysis that both the trial court and Court of Appeals missed is that the trial court admitted evidence on three separate points: Romero's description of the exchange, the contents of the arrest warrant, and the contents of the letter. It is the contents of the letter to which Petitioner most strenuously objects, and it must be considered separately from the exchange and warrant. Even if the evidence was admissible under the threshold inquiry of Rule 404, the evidence should still have been barred by Rule 403. *See State v. Clasby*, 385 S.C. 148, 155-56, 682 S.E.2d 892, 896 (2009) (citation omitted) ("Even if prior bad act evidence is clear and convincing and falls within an exception, it must be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant."). The Court of Appeals appeared to believe that because there was "an allowable inference" that "Covington impliedly identified himself as Victim's killer" all danger of the improper propensity evidence was outweighed, even

though the likelihood of that permissible inference was so small. *Covington*, Op. No. 2025-UP-024, at 4.

Although through a string of inferences the jury might conclude Petitioner admitted to making Parsons disappear, the probative force of that conclusion is diminished by its unlikelihood and does not outweigh the severe prejudice from the letter. *See* Rule 403, SCRE ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . ."). This is because of the tenuous link between that direct evidence of another crime or wrong and the purported non-propensity purpose of the letter in conjunction with the warrant. The joint letter-and-warrant evidence might serve a legitimate purpose only under narrow circumstances: if the jury infers Petitioner's alleged conduct constituted an admission to making Parsons disappear. That inference depends on the jury (1) believing Romero's testimony despite his admitted lack of credibility, (2) believing Petitioner was admitting to the acts described in the kidnapping warrant rather than using a tool at his disposal to manipulate Romero, and (3) concluding that if Petitioner admitted to kidnapping Parsons he therefore also murdered him. That is a weak train of logic and severely diminishes the probative value of the evidence. *See* 16 Corpus Juris, *Criminal Law* § 1165, at 601 (1918) (explaining evidence of other crimes is admissible in a homicide case when "the two offenses are so inseparably connected that proof of one necessarily involves proving the other").

More importantly for Rule 403 purposes, the trial court entirely failed to consider the prejudicial effect of the letter and its "inherent tendency" to lead the jury to the spurious assumption that because Petitioner offered to make someone disappear at another point in time, he in fact made Parsons disappear here. *Perry*, 430 S.C. at 30, 842 S.E.2d at 657. The jury was allowed to hear Petitioner—on some other occasion *after the alleged crime*—offered to make witnesses disappear:

"If they don't have any witnesses they don't have a case. You follow me. I can make that happen. Trust me." That evidence has absolutely nothing to do with the disappearance of Parsons. Nonetheless, given the marked similarity to the crime charged, "Its effect is to predispose the mind of the juror to believe the prisoner guilty." *Perry*, 430 S.C. at 30, 842 S.E.2d at 657 (quoting *State v. Lyle*, 125 S.C. 406, 416, 118 S.E. 803, 807 (1923)). That "inevitable tendency" is why the evidence should have been excluded where the alleged confession is not to the crime for which Petitioner was on trial. *Perry*, 430 S.C. at 30, 842 S.E.2d at 657 (quoting *Lyle*, 125 S.C. at 417, 118 S.E. at 807); *Lyle*, 125 S.C. 406, 118 S.E. at 809 (quoting *Shaffner v. Commonwealth.*, 72 Pa. 60, 65 (1872)) (explaining the rule exists in part because it is "unjust to the prisoner to compel him to acquit himself of two offenses instead of one"). To the extent the letter had any legitimate purpose at all, it was clearly outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice when inevitably inferred his purported offer to make other people disappear is evidence he in fact made Parsons disappear.

The prejudicial effect of the letter was substantial for two reasons. First is the inevitable and improper power of propensity evidence. Informing the jury Petitioner offered to make unrelated people disappear in a disappearance case is extremely and unfairly prejudicial. Critically, that prejudicial effect exists *even if the jury does not make the purportedly legitimate inferences*. Even if the jury concluded Petitioner was merely blustering to Romero in waving around his kidnapping warrant, it still heard he offered to commit "another crime equally heinous" which "prompts to a ready acceptance of and belief in the prosecution's theory that he is guilty." *Perry*, 430 S.C. at 30, 842 S.E.2d at 657 (quoting *Lyle*, 125 S.C. at 416, 118 S.E. at 807). This is critical. Evidence is admissible under Rule 404 on the theory that it serves "dual purposes"—the legitimate logical connection and the illegitimate propensity tendency—and the proper benefits outweigh the improper harms. *Perry*, 430 S.C. at 31, 842 S.E.2d at 657. But here there was a very

substantial risk the jury would perceive no legitimate benefit even while the improper harm remained, and thus the trial court exceeded its discretion and committed an error of law.

Second, had the jury believed Petitioner actually admitted to kidnapping Parsons, the evidence that he can make witnesses disappear—implicitly permanently—is still improper propensity evidence that would illegitimately encourage and allow the jury to leap from kidnapping to murder without connection to the crime charged. Therefore, regardless of what the jury thought of the state's purported connection, Petitioner was always going to be saddled with a jury tainted by propensity evidence and allowed to infer his other, unrelated wrong meant he is guilty of the murder of Parsons. That is why the trial court erred as a matter of law under Rule 403—because the jury was presented with propensity evidence even if it disregarded the purported legitimate purpose *and* because that propensity function impermissibly and inherently allowed the jury to conclude he committed murder based on an admission of only an offer of an unrelated crime.

II. The Court of Appeals erred by finding Petitioner's motion for a directed verdict was properly denied despite the lack of evidence of violence, meaning the state failed to prove the criminal act of another caused the death of Terris Parsons.

"The corpus delicti, in a case of murder, consists of two elements,—the death of a human being, and the criminal act of another in causing that death." *State v. Martin*, 47 S.C. 67, 25 S.E. 113, 115 (1896). It is this second part—"the criminal act of another"—that was entirely missing from the state's case. In every other "no body" murder case properly submitted to the jury there has been clear evidence of violence thereby satisfying the second element of the corpus delicti. *See State v. Owens*, 293 S.C. 161, 164, 359 S.E.2d 275, 276 (1987) (human blood stains); *State v. Weston*, 367 S.C. 279, 295, 625 S.E.2d 641, 649 (2006) (blood stains in the defendant's car); *State v. Lynch*, 412 S.C. 156, 168, 771 S.E.2d 346, 352 (Ct. App. 2015) (blood found all over the

apartment defendant shared with victims). This case is different. Despite law enforcement officers searching Petitioner's cars, Parsons's car, and Petitioner's house and yard, they found no physical evidence Parson was ever even there, let alone murdered. There were no fingerprints, no DNA, no blood, and no indications of violence anywhere related to Petitioner. That cannot be "substantial circumstantial evidence" that Petitioner committed murder. *See State v. Arnold*, 361 S.C. 386, 389, 605 S.E.2d 529, 531 (2004) (citations omitted) ("The trial court has a duty to submit the case to the jury where the evidence is circumstantial if there is substantial circumstantial evidence which reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the accused or from which his guilt may be fairly and logically deduced."). The "criminal act" element is central to the requirement that the state prove malice—yet here, there is no evidence of a disagreement or anger between Petitioner and Parsons and no evidence of a murder weapon.

In its opinion the Court of Appeals found the following evidence was sufficient to reach the jury: "(1) Victim drove to Covington's house; (2) Victim's last known location was Covington's house; (3) Covington denied seeing Victim that night, yet hid Victim's car; and (4) Victim has never been seen or heard from again." *Covington*, Op. No. 2025-UP-024, at 4.

That is not substantial circumstantial evidence sufficient to reach the jury on a charge of murder. It is, at most, evidence of different crimes. Petitioner does not contend the evidence presented was insufficient to reach the jury on a charge for grand larceny or possessing a stolen vehicle. But those are not the charges he faced. While it is suspicious that Petitioner drove Parsons's car to another location, that is evidence of car theft, not murder. Nor is lying to police evidence *of a killing*. That detail is the key. Petitioner's conduct might reasonably rouse suspicion he is guilty of something, but it is too distant and removed from the specific crime of murder. If Parsons was in fact killed, there is not substantial evidence linking Petitioner to that killing.

The state chose to take Petitioner to trial for *murder*, the highest crime punishable by law. That was its mistake, as the evidence presented raised no more than the specter of suspicion Petitioner is guilty of murder. The courts should not bail the state out of its decision to overcharge Petitioner without sufficient evidence.

CONCLUSION

Based on the above argument, this Court should grant the petition for writ of certiorari to allow further briefing on the issues.

Respectfully Submitted,

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Jordan M. Wayburn
Appellate Defender

ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER

This 24th day of April, 2025.