

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

COUNTY OF CHESTER

CIVIL ACTION NO: 2018-CP-12-00117

Heidi Gersten, Ivanka Ayoub, Daniel
Hubbard,

Plaintiff,

**ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS KEVIN
CARTER'S AND RICHARD DAVIS'
MOTION TO DISMISS**

vs.

Kevin Carter, Richard Davis, Joseph
Tribovich, Nationwide Insurance Company,
Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile
Club, John Ammendola, Trustguard Insurance
Company, SC Department of Public Safety,
Chevrolet, GMC, Unknown John Does,

Defendants.

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SC Court of Appeals

This matter comes before the Court upon Defendants Kevin Carter's and Richard Davis' Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike or, in the Alternative, Motion to Sever. The Court held a hearing on this Motion and a number of other motions on September 5, 2018. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants Carter's and Davis' Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This action arises out of an automobile collision that took place on March 19, 2015 between a vehicle operated by Heidi Gersten and allegedly owned by Ivanka Ayoub and a vehicle operated and owned by Kevin Carter. Plaintiff Gersten originally filed a property damage arbitration claim on February 21, 2018 (hereinafter "Arbitration Action"). The claim named Kevin Carter, Richard Davis, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, Interinsurance of the Automobile Club, and Trustguard Insurance as defendants.

Gersten then created a "First Amended Claim for Property Damage Verified" (hereinafter "Amended Arbitration Complaint") on or about March 2, 2018, however, she did not file the Amended Arbitration Complaint at that time. The Amended Arbitration Complaint added Gersten's mother, Ivanka Ayoub, as a claimant and added Joseph Tirbovich and John Ammendola as additional defendants. Gersten and Ayoub never obtained an Amended Summons listing Ayoub as a claimant, and the Amended Arbitration Complaint was not filed until March 27, 2018.

On March 16, 2018, Gersten, Ayoub, and Daniel Hubbard filed the above-captioned case in Circuit Court purporting to seek recovery for injuries arising out of the same collision. In addition to the defendants named in the Amended Arbitration Complaint, the Plaintiffs named the South Carolina Department of Public Safety, Blackwell (*sic*), Chevrolet, GMC, and unknown John Doe defendants.

Kevin Carter, Richard Davis, and the other Defendants who have allegedly been served in the case filed motions to dismiss both cases.¹ Interinsurance Exchange sought to dismiss the Arbitration Action, in part, on the grounds that the arbitration panel lacked jurisdiction over some of the claims asserted in the Arbitration Action. On April 26, 2018, Judge Gibbons, acting as the Chief Administrative Judge for Chester County Circuit Court, entered an Order finding the claims asserted in the Arbitration Action were outside the scope of arbitration. Therefore, he transferred the Arbitration Action to the Common Pleas docket and consolidated the case with the Circuit Court action. (April 26, 2018 Form 4 Order). Because the cases have been consolidated, this Order will address the allegations set forth in the Circuit Court Complaint. However, the Court

¹ The Court has no record of Blackwell, GMC, Chevrolet or any John Doe defendants being served. Furthermore, John Ammendola and Joseph Tirbovich deny that they have been served.

has reviewed all three Complaints, and the Court's ruling would be the same regardless of which pleading(s) were in effect.

This case was set for a hearing on the various pending motions for September 5, 2018. The case was also placed on the non-jury roster for a merits hearing for the same week. Plaintiff Heidi Gersten filed a motion for continuance. At the hearing, the defendants all consented to continuing the merits hearing of the case, but they requested that the motions be heard. Gersten consented to the Court proceeding with hearing the various motions.

LAW

Carter and Davis' Motion to Dismiss seeks the following relief:

- a) Dismissal of all claims asserted against Richard Davis;
- b) Dismissal of Daniel Hubbard's claims;
- c) Dismissal of Ivanka Ayoub's claims; and
- d) Dismissal of all causes of action asserted by Heidi Gersten with the exception of the negligence cause of action.²

The Court will address each item in turn.

A. All Causes of Action as to Defendant Richard Davis.

The Complaint only references Richard Davis in one paragraph, stating "The Defendants Kevin Carter and Richard Davis reside in Iredell County, North Carolina." (Compl. ¶ 2). The Complaint does not allege Richard Davis was involved in the automobile collision. Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, a Complaint should be dismissed if it fails "to state facts sufficient to

² Carter and Davis also sought dismissal of the co-defendants. However, the co-defendants each moved on their own behalf for dismissal. Those motions were also heard at the September 5, 2018 hearing, and the Court will grant each of those motions in separate orders.

constitute a cause of action.” Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP. The Complaint alleges no factual allegations against Defendant Richard Davis.³

Moreover, Richard Davis is a citizen and resident of the State of North Carolina. The Complaint does not allege any actions that Richard Davis took in this State. Therefore, this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Richard Davis pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2), SCRCP. For both of these reasons, the claims against Richard Davis are dismissed.

B. Daniel Hubbard’s claims.

Kevin Carter and Richard Davis moved to dismiss Daniel Hubbard’s claims on the ground that South Carolina does not recognize a cause of action for loss of a sibling’s consortium. However, Daniel Hubbard did not appear for the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss. Therefore, his claims are dismissed for failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 41(b), SCRCP.⁴

C. Ivanka Ayoub’s claims.

Plaintiff Ayoub appears to have asserted a property damage claim in the Amended Arbitration Complaint and a cause of action for loss of consortium in the Circuit Court Complaint. Ayoub is Gersten’s mother. The Circuit Court Complaint does not allege Ayoub was personally

³ The Arbitration Action Complaint alleges Davis co-owned the vehicle operated by Carter. Even if that were true, co-ownership of a vehicle does not support a cause of action. *See Fletcher v. Anderson*, 27 Kan. App. 2d 276, 3 P. 3d 558, 567-68 (2000) (because “no action for negligent entrustment can occur where the person entrusting the vehicle lacked a superior or exclusive right of control over the vehicle,” a nonowner is not liable for returning car to owner); *McGlothlin v. Municipality of Anchorage*, 991 P.2d 1273, 1280 (Alaska 1999) (“doctrine of negligent entrustment requires that the defendant have a greater right of possession or control of the chattel than the person to whom he entrusts it”); *De Blanc ex rel. De Blanc v. Jensen*, 59 S.W.3d 373 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (“In order for the [Defendant] to be liable under a theory of negligent entrustment, we would have to conclude that it is negligent for a nonowner to return control of a vehicle to its owner. We decline to so hold.”).

⁴ Even if Hubbard had appeared at the hearing, his claim would nonetheless fail for the reasons set out in Part C. below.

involved in the accident, but it does allege she “suffered, among other things, loss of consortium.” (Compl. ¶ 103).

Our Supreme Court has refused to recognize a cause of action in tort for filial loss of consortium. *See Doe v. Greenville County School Dist.*, 375 S.C. 63, 70, 651 S.E.2d 305, 308 (2007) (“Accordingly, in the absence of some action from the legislature, this Court has no authority upon which it could rely in finding that South Carolina law recognizes claims for loss of filial consortium.”).⁵ While South Carolina does recognize loss of spousal consortium, that cause of action was expressly recognized by the South Carolina General Assembly. *See* S.C. Code Ann. § 15-75-20. Our Supreme Court has held the absence of a similar statutory cause of action for filial loss of consortium indicates the General Assembly did not intend to recognize such causes of action. *See Greenville County School Dist.*, 375 S.C. at 69, 651 S.E.2d at 308.

Because South Carolina does not recognize claims for loss of filial consortium, the causes of action asserted by Ayoub in the Circuit Court Complaint must be dismissed.

Carter and Davis also seek to dismiss the property damage claim asserted by Ayoub in the Arbitration Action on Rule 12(b)(8) grounds. Because the Arbitration Action has been consolidated with the Circuit Court action, the Court finds that motion is now moot. At the hearing, Carter and Davis also raised the statute of limitations as an additional ground for dismissal of the property damage claim. The Court finds that a ruling on the statute of limitations issue is premature at this time, but Defendant Carter may file a separate motion on that issue in the future.

⁵ *See also Taylor v. Medenica*, 324 S.C. 200, 479 S.E.2d 35 (1996) (declining to recognize loss of filial consortium claim of child relating to injury to parent); *Kirkland v. Sam's East, Inc.*, 411 F. Supp. 2d 639, 641 (D.S.C. 2005) (“South Carolina does not recognize a cause of action for filial loss of consortium”).

D. All Other Causes of Action asserted by Gersten with the Exception of Negligence.

The Complaint lists eighteen separate causes of action. With the exception of the negligence claim, these causes of action merely allege the legal elements of various other causes of action, and several of these causes of action fail to even allege the basic legal elements. Rule 8(a) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure states that a pleading setting forth a cause of action "shall contain . . . a short and plain statement of the facts showing the pleader is entitled to relief." Rule 8(a), SCRPC. In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court's analysis is limited solely to the Complaint itself, and no other documents may be considered. *See Woodell by Allen v. Marion School Dist. One*, 307 S.C. 297, 298, 414 S.E.2d 794, 794 (Ct. App. 1992). Moreover, a "trial court must dismiss a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, if the pleadings, when taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, fail to allege sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action." *Trancik v. USAA Ins. Co.*, 354 S.C. 549, 552, 581 S.E.2d 858, 860 (Ct. App. 2003).

Plaintiff must allege facts supporting each element of the causes of action asserted in the Complaint. She has failed to do so. Defendant Carter concedes the Complaint alleges sufficient facts to create a cause of action for negligence between Plaintiff Heidi Gersten and Defendant Kevin Carter. However, the Complaint alleges no facts that would support the other causes of action enumerated in the Complaint. Therefore, all causes of action with the exception of Gersten's negligence claim will be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

E. Carter and Davis' other motions.

Carter and Davis also moved to dismiss the claims asserted against the various co-defendants or, in the alternative, to sever the causes asserted against those defendants. As noted above, the Court is granting the motions to dismiss the co-defendants via separate orders.

Therefore, Carter and Davis' motion to dismiss the co-defendants or, in the alternative, to sever is denied as moot.

In addition to moving to dismiss various claims asserted in the Complaint, Carter and Davis also moved to strike a number of paragraphs in the Complaints. Shortly before the hearing on the Defendants' various motions, Gersten apparently served an Amended Complaint on some of the defendants in the Circuit Court action. Counsel for Carter agreed at the hearing on this Motion that the Motion to Strike would need to be addressed after the Amended Complaint has been filed. Therefore, Carter's Motion to Strike is denied without prejudice and with leave to refile.

CONCLUSION

For the above-stated reasons, the Court finds Defendants Kevin Carter's and Richard Davis' Motions should be granted in part and denied in part. It is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that:

- 1) All causes of action asserted against Richard Davis are dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), SCRPC.
- 2) The causes of action asserted by Daniel Hubbard are dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b), SCRPC for failure to prosecute.
- 3) Ivanka Ayoub's loss of consortium claim is dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), SCRPC because South Carolina does not recognize a claim for filial loss of consortium.
- 4) All of the remaining causes of action against Kevin Carter with the exception of Heidi Gersten's negligence cause of action for personal injuries and property damage and Ivanka Ayoub's negligence cause of action for property damage are dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), SCRPC.
- 5) Carter's Motion to Dismiss the property damage claim by Ivanka Ayoub is denied, but Carter may file a separate motion based on his statute of limitations argument at a later time.
- 6) Carter's Motion to Sever is denied as moot.
- 7) Carter's Motion to Strike is denied without prejudice and with leave to refile in light of the recently-served Amended Complaint.

8) Carter's and Davis' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(8) is denied as moot.
It is so **ORDERED**.

John C. Hayes, III
Circuit Court Judge



Chester Common Pleas

Case Caption: Heidi Gersten , plaintiff, et al VS Kevin Carter , defendant, et al
Case Number: 2018CP1200117
Type: Order/Other

So Ordered

s/John C. Hayes III 2049

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