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**Jul 30 2025**

**SC Court of Appeals**

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
In The Court of Appeals

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APPEAL FROM OCONEE COUNTY

Court of General Sessions  
The Honorable R. Scott Sprouse, Circuit Court Judge

Appellate Case No. 2022-000567

THE STATE,

Respondent,

v.

MACK ADAMS GAINES,

Appellant.

**BRIEF OF RESPONDENT**

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**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..... ii

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL .....1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.....2

STATEMENT OF FACTS .....3

STANDARD OF REVIEW .....7

ARGUMENT .....8

    The trial court correctly refused to direct a verdict of not guilty of  
    Neglect of a Vulnerable Adult because the State presented evidence  
    Appellant undertook to provide care for his 92-year-old mother after  
    she fell, but failed to provide even minimal assistance, resulting in  
    Victim’s excruciating death.....8

CONCLUSION.....18

## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

### Cases

<u>Doe v. DSS</u> , 407 S.C. 623, 757 S.E.2d 712 (2014) .....	9
<u>Lancaster Cnty. Bar Ass'n v. S.C. Comm'n on Indigent Defense</u> , 380 S.C. 219, 222, 670 S.E.2d 371, 373 (2008) .....	14
<u>Law v. State</u> , 292 S.W.3d 277, 283 (Ark. 2009).....	13
<u>S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Jasper Cnty.</u> , 368 S.C. 388, 398, 629 S.E.2d 624, 629 (2006) .....	14
<u>Sloan v. Hardee</u> , 371 S.C. 495, 498, 640 S.E.2d 457, 459 (2007).....	14
<u>State v. Boyd</u> , 949 N.W.2d 540 (Neb. Ct. App. 2020) .....	10
<u>State v. Fisher</u> , 972 P.2d 90, 97-98 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).....	11
<u>State v. Parris</u> , 363 S.C. 477, 481, 611 S.E.2d 501, 503 (2005).....	7
<u>State v. Pearson</u> , 415 S.C. 463, 474, 783 S.E.2d 802, 808 (2016).....	9
<u>State v. Saintil-Brown</u> , 210 A.3d 213, 221-22 (N.H. 2019) .....	13
<u>Town of Mt. Pleasant v. Roberts</u> , 393 S.C. 332, 342, 713 S.E.2d 278, 283 (2011) .....	14

### Statutes

S.C. Code Ann. § 43-35-10-85 .....	passim
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## STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL

Whether the trial court correctly refused to direct a verdict of not guilty where the State presented evidence Appellant was a “caregiver” and his mother a “vulnerable adult” under S.C. Code §43-35-85.

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In February 2018, the Oconee County Grand Jury indicted Appellant Mack Adams Gaines for Abuse or Neglect of a Vulnerable Adult Resulting in Death, S.C. Code Ann. § 43-35-85(F). On April 18, 2022, Appellant, represented by Fletcher N. Smith, went to trial before the Honorable R. Scott Sprouse. Jason Alderman and Brooke Ennis represented the State. The jury found Appellant guilty, and Judge Sprouse sentenced him to 20 years' incarceration.

Appellant filed a timely appeal, served on April 25, 2022. Counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967), arguing the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Appellant. On January 31, 2025, this Court denied counsel's motion to be relieved pursuant to Anders and asked the parties to brief the issue of "[w]hether the trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict in favor of Gaines when the State failed to demonstrate he was a 'caregiver' as defined by S.C. Code Ann. § 43-53-85(F) (2015) of the Omnibus Adult Protection Act?" S.C. App. Ct. Order, Jan 31, 2025.

## STATEMENT OF FACTS

Appellant lived with his 92-year-old mother, Louise Gaines (Victim), in her home. On Monday, December 18, 2017, Appellant called 911 to report that his mother had fallen and needed help getting up, but was otherwise fine. (R. 56:15-23).

Dawn King, an EMT, responded to the 911 call and was first on the scene. (R. 64:3-11). King testified at trial that as soon as she entered the home she was “hit immediately with a blast of extreme heat and the smell.” (R. 64:12-16). King further testified that the Victim was located about ten (10) to fifteen (15) feet from the door, lying on her right side and surrounded by trash and newspapers. (R. 64:16-20). King stated Victim was wearing seven shirts and was covered by a heavy jacket when they found her, but underneath the jacket she was bare from the waist down and covered in feces and urine. (R. 65:7-8). King testified that the Victim had dried vomit and saliva on her nose and mouth and was breathing very shallowly. (R. 65:19-66:2). The Victim was completely unresponsive, unable to move, speak, or make any sounds whatsoever. (R. 66:1-68:2). King also testified that the Victim had rhabdomyolysis on the side of her face, which occurs when a person lays in one position for a long period of time, causing their blood to pool and eventually stiffening and distorting the affected area. (R. 68:3-11).

Michael Corbin, the responding paramedic, testified at trial that when they found her Victim had pressure sores—wounds created by sustained contact with a surface for long periods of time—on the right side of her face and thigh, and that her limbs were so stiff “it was almost like they were rigor-ed.” (R. 79:15-80:21). Corbin testified that her skin was “sloughing off” around the pressure sores where the skin had broken down. (R. 80:10-24).

Dr. Kevin Docyk, the Emergency Room doctor who initially treated Victim, testified that when Victim arrived she was “extremely unkempt,” with a notable odor from the feces and urine covering her, and that while she was at times able to open her eyes, she was completely

nonverbal. (R. 89:16-90:3). Dr. Docyk also testified that in Victim's condition and with her having been dressed in seven layers of clothes in an extremely hot room without drinking any water, she likely would have experienced cognitive impairment within 24 hours of her fall. (R. 100:8-20).

Upon admission Dr. Docyk diagnosed Victim with dehydration, elevated troponin, rhabdomyolysis, renal insufficiency, and sepsis, caused by adult neglect. (R. 91:18-20). Dr. Docyk testified that Victim was unable to assist or participate in her own care, as she could not speak and was unable to move her extremities enough to even hold a pen to write, so Victim's next of kin were contacted to make medical decisions for her. (R. 93:7-23, 99:2-24). Dr. Docyk testified that when he spoke with Appellant at the hospital, either Appellant or Appellant's girlfriend told him that Appellant was Victim's primary caregiver, which Dr. Docyk noted in his chart. (R. 97:8-98:24).

Dr. Vijendra Singh, an internal medicine hospitalist who treated Victim, testified that roughly a week after Victim's admission he received reports that Victim's right leg below the knee was cold, blue, and lacked a pulse. (R. 106:4-11). Dr. Singh testified that a vascular surgeon was contacted, but it was determined that Victim was unlikely to survive the surgery necessary to treat the blockage, and that after consulting with the family Victim was moved to a hospice house for the terminally ill to be allowed to die as humanely as possible (R. 106:18-107:7, 109:19-24).

It was eventually determined that Victim had an occluded right femoral common artery—a blockage of one of the major arteries in the leg—which caused the 'death' of her leg and led to her contracting gangrene. (R. 124:7-17). In hospice the infection spread as the Victim's leg became necrotic and began to rapidly decompose, 'seeding' her upper leg and infecting the rest of her

body through the blood stream, eventually killing her kidneys. (R. 131:14-132:12). Victim died of her injuries approximately a month after her fall. (R. 182:11-183:5). Dr. Brett Woodard conducted Victim's autopsy and testified that Victim's death was caused by "the death of the extremity and formation of decubiti allow[ing] germs into the body, and ultimately she developed pneumonia and organ failure." (R. 190:5-7). Dr. Woodward further testified that Victim being left to lie on the floor for multiple days was what "set the cascade in motion that ultimately caused her death." (R. 189:2-3).

Appellant gave a statement to police shortly after his mother was hospitalized. (State's Exhibit 16). The interviewing officer asked Appellant if he was Victim's primary caregiver and whether anyone else took care of her, to which he replied: "Nah, I'm just the only one that's there, yeah, I'm the only son." (07:10-07:18). Appellant also stated during his interview that every Saturday he would go shopping and wash clothes, and that when his mother needed it, he would take her too. (25:59-26:07).

Appellant claimed that on Friday, December 15, he came home after work to find Victim had fallen and was lying on the floor, unable to get up by herself. (State's Exhibit 16, 23:46-57). Appellant stated that he tried to help Victim up, but she refused his help because she was in pain. (State's Ex. 16, 24:24-30). Appellant stated that he offered Victim food and water Friday night, but she refused. (State's Ex. 16, 24:56-58). Appellant stated that Saturday Victim was still lying on the ground when he left to do shopping and laundry, so he brought back food for Victim, which she again refused. (State's Ex. 16, 25:45-26:07).

Appellant stated that Victim told him she was cold, so he turned on the heaters for her. (State's Ex. 16, 27:58-28:05). Appellant stated that he again offered Victim food and water on Sunday, but she refused. (State's Ex. 16, 13:17-13:21). Appellant stated that until Monday

Victim was responsive, and he had multiple conversations with her where she complained about the pain she was in. (State's Ex. 16, 27:40-28:05). Appellant at one point stated that by Monday his mother was no longer able to talk to him, though he contradicted himself on this point throughout. (17:35-17:50). Regardless, Appellant stated that he decided after work that day that "it's not up to [her] now, it's up to me." (17:10-17:50).

At trial David McMahan testified that once Appellant had given him his written statement he said to Appellant, "We can't get past the fact that you left her on the floor for four days. You know what that is, don't you?" to which Appellant answered "Neglect." (R. 174:2-9). Appellant did not testify at trial.

At the close of the State's case in chief, Appellant moved for a directed verdict, arguing that Victim was not a vulnerable adult, that Appellant was not a caregiver, and that Appellant had not acted willfully. (R. 194:9-199:14). The State argued that it presented evidence that Victim was a vulnerable adult in the form of facts and testimony that she could not get up or provide for herself after her fall, and that evidence of Appellant's status as a caregiver was presented through Appellant's own description of the acts of care he undertook for his mother after her fall. (R. 199:25-200:10). The State further argued that the facts in evidence created at least a factual dispute for the jury to resolve. (R. 200:21-200:15). After hearing arguments from both parties, the court denied Appellant's motion, stating that when reviewing a motion for a directed verdict the court's concern was the existence of evidence, not its weight, and that the State had produced evidence of each element of its case. (R. 201:14-203:12).

## STANDARD OF REVIEW

A defendant is entitled to a directed verdict when the State fails to produce evidence of the offense charged. State v. Parris, 363 S.C. 477, 481, 611 S.E.2d 501, 503 (2005). In ruling on a motion for directed verdict, the trial judge is concerned with the existence of the evidence, not with its weight. Id. at 481, 611 S.E.2d at 502–03. The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Id. at 481, 611 S.E.2d at 503. If there is any direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, the Court must find the case was properly submitted to the jury. Id. The appellate court reviews the trial court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion, and must affirm if the ruling is supported by the record. Id.

## ARGUMENT

**The trial court correctly refused to direct a verdict of not guilty because the State presented evidence Appellant undertook to provide care for his 92-year-old mother after she fell, but failed to provide even minimal assistance, resulting in Victim's excruciating death.**

The trial court correctly refused to direct a verdict of not guilty for Neglect of a Vulnerable Adult. Appellant lived with his 92-year-old mother in her home. Even if Appellant did not meet the statutory definition of a "caregiver" before his mother's fall, he assumed that role when he undertook to provide care for her after she fell and was unable to help herself. Appellant admitted he offered his mother food, water, and blankets after her fall. However, he failed to take the simplest and most important action to save his mother's life—call for an ambulance. As a result of Appellant's neglect, his mother died an agonizing death. This Court should affirm.

The State presented evidence reasonably tending to establish every element of S.C. Code Ann. § 43-35-85(F), which provides: "A person who knowingly and willfully abuses or neglects a vulnerable adult resulting in death is guilty of a felony. . . ." Neglect is defined as:

[T]he failure or omission of a caregiver to provide the care, goods, or services necessary to maintain the health or safety of a vulnerable adult including, but not limited to, food, clothing, medicine, shelter, supervision, and medical services and the failure or omission has caused, or presents a substantial risk of causing, physical or mental injury to the vulnerable adult. . . . Neglect includes the inability of a vulnerable adult, in the absence of a caretaker, to provide for his or her own health or safety which produces or could reasonably be expected to produce serious physical or psychological harm or substantial risk of death.

S.C. Code § 43-35-10. A vulnerable adult is defined as:

[A] person eighteen years of age or older who has a physical or mental condition which substantially impairs the person from adequately providing for his or her own care or protection. This includes a person who is impaired in the ability to adequately provide for the person's own care or protection because of the

infirmities of aging including, but not limited to, organic brain damage, advanced age, and physical, mental, or emotional dysfunction.

Id. A caregiver is defined as “a person who provides care to a vulnerable adult, with or without compensation, on a temporary or permanent or full or part-time basis and includes, but is not limited to, a relative, household member. . . .” Id.

Thus, to survive a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, specifically on the issue of whether Appellant was a caregiver, the State was required to present some evidence tending to prove that: (1) Victim was a vulnerable adult, and (2) Appellant provided care to Victim on at least a temporary basis. The evidence was sufficient to survive a motion for directed verdict if any rational juror could have found Appellant guilty. State v. Pearson, 415 S.C. 463, 474, 783 S.E.2d 802, 808 (2016).

**Victim was a vulnerable adult.**

Appellant relies on Doe v. DSS, 407 S.C. 623, 757 S.E.2d 712 (2014), to argue that the Victim was not a vulnerable adult. However, Doe is easily distinguishable. In Doe, the question on appeal was whether the DSS was able to categorize an 86-year-old woman as a vulnerable adult at substantial risk of neglect on the basis of age alone for the purpose of removing her from her home and putting her in protective custody. Id. at 627-29, 757 S.E.2d at 714-15. In Doe, the elderly woman had no physical or mental impairments, but lived in squalid conditions. The court held that under the clear and convincing evidence standard in her case, her age alone was insufficient evidence of vulnerability to allow the family court to grant DSS protective custody of her. Id. at 637-39, 757 S.E.2d at 719-20.

By contrast, the evidence presented in this case was more than sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that Victim could not provide for her own care or protection after her fall. The physical condition in which she was found – unresponsive, covered in urine, feces,

and dried vomit – is by itself enough evidence to allow a jury to infer that Victim was incapable of caring for herself for at least several days. Further, proof of her incapacitation was demonstrated by Appellant’s own statements in his police interview, where he detailed that his mother was unable to get up by herself or with help because she was in pain; his mother was unable to get food or water for herself on Friday, Saturday, Sunday, and Monday; and that his mother was unable to turn up the thermostat when she was cold, so he had to do it. Appellant also stated at one point that after Sunday his mother was no longer able to speak, though he contradicts himself on this point throughout.

Further, evidence of Victim’s vulnerability was demonstrated by testimony from the medical personnel who attended to her. Dr. Docyk testified that the victim was “extremely unkempt” with a notable odor and was unable to participate in or assist with her own care. Even after receiving IV fluid and medical attention at the hospital, Victim was still too weak to speak or even move her extremities.

While there is no South Carolina case law directly on point, an analogous case from Nebraska provides strong support that the State’s evidence supported a finding of guilt. In State v. Boyd, 949 N.W.2d 540 (Neb. Ct. App. 2020), the defendant’s otherwise healthy and mentally able 89-year-old mother fell, and the defendant allowed her to lay on the floor for several days before calling 911. Id. at 877. When emergency services arrived, the elderly victim was alert and aware enough to try and refuse care, but the responding paramedic noted that the victim was covered in urine and fecal matter, seemed generally disoriented, and that her skin was stuck to the carpet. Id. The Nebraska statute at issue provided: “[a] person commits knowing and intentional abuse, neglect, or exploitation of a vulnerable adult or senior adult if he or she through a knowing and intentional act causes or permits a vulnerable adult or senior adult to be .

. . [n]eglected[.]” In her appeal, the defendant raised an almost identical argument as Appellant does in this case, arguing the victim was not a vulnerable adult, and therefore the defendant was not a caregiver under the statute. Id. at 884-83.

The Nebraska Court of Appeals held that under a very similar definition of “vulnerable adult,” the defendant’s acknowledgment that her 89-year-old mother had been on the floor for days, would not get up, and had not eaten—combined with the responding paramedic’s testimony that the victim had soiled herself and appeared unable to care for herself—was sufficient evidence of substantial incapability to provide self-care, and that the victim was therefore a vulnerable adult under the state statute.<sup>1</sup> Id. at 549-50.

In this case, the State presented evidence to support a finding that Victim was a vulnerable adult. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, Appellant’s claim that Victim was fully independent before the fall does not negate the evidence of her vulnerability afterwards. See State v. Fisher, 972 P.2d 90, 97-98 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (holding that an otherwise healthy and able-bodied child became “disabled” under a neglect statute once he developed a debilitating ulcer preventing him from providing his own food, clothing, and shelter). Section 43-35-10(11) does not require that Victim was incompetent or an invalid prior to her fall—it only requires that at some point she became incapable of providing for her own care and protection.

To this point, the State presented overwhelming evidence of Victim’s complete inability to protect or care for herself after her fall. Appellant repeatedly stated throughout his interview that his mother was unable to get up, and Victim was found covered in her own urine and feces, a

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<sup>1</sup> Under Nebraska law, a “vulnerable adult” is “any person eighteen years of age or older who has a substantial mental or functional impairment or for whom a guardian or conservator has been appointed under the Nebraska Probate Code.” (emphasis added).

state that no person of sound mind and adequate physical abilities would subject themselves to. Victim had pressure sores on her sides and face, indicating she was unable to move enough to even roll over and ease the pressure on those wounds. Victim's limbs were so stiff when she was found that the paramedic described her state as "rigor-ed," like a dead body. Victim had not had food or water for at least four days when she was found and was severely dehydrated, to the point of kidney failure. Victim was also completely unresponsive when she was found and remained in an addled state of mind until her death. Additionally, by Applicant's own admission Victim repeatedly told him that she was in pain, so there is no contesting that Victim was actively suffering for the four days she lay on the floor.

A mentally well and physically able person does not lay on the floor and subject themselves to the excruciating pain of slowly dehydrating to death as their limbs become so stiff they can't move them, while pressure sores open on their body and their skin begins to "slough off," all while urinating and defecating on themselves. This is not equivalent to a terminally ill cancer patient choosing to die at home, as Appellant argued at trial. This was a woman who could have easily avoided a horrible death from gangrene by *getting up off the floor*. There was a simple, fast, and easy solution to the source of Victim's pain, and Victim's alleged refusal and/or inability to do so was evidence reasonably tending to show that she was impaired in her ability to adequately provide for her own care and protection.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the State was not required to prove that Victim was a vulnerable adult prior to her fall, even though a rational juror could have found that to be true based on her "advanced age." Appellant's statements that Victim was unable to get up combined with Victim's physical condition when she was found was more than sufficient to allow a jury to reasonably conclude that after her fall Victim was physically

impaired and unable to care for herself. The State's evidence well exceeded the standard of "any evidence," and the Victim's status was therefore a jury question. Accordingly, the court did not err in finding that the State had presented evidence reasonably tending to prove that Victim was a vulnerable adult under Section 43-35-10(11).

### **Appellant was Victim's Caregiver**

The evidence supported a finding that Appellant was his mother's caregiver even before she fell. Though Appellant characterizes his living situation with his mother as a "roommate" relationship, a rational trier of fact could conclude Appellant was "providing care" to his 92-year-old mother, who was a "vulnerable adult" due to her "advanced age."

But surely Appellant became a "caregiver" when he undertook to provide assistance after her incapacitating fall. Despite the fact that Appellant did next to nothing to help his mother, his actions show he undertook to "provide care" after the fall. This "care" fell far short of what any son should provide to his helpless elderly mother, but it nonetheless was sufficient for Appellant, a household member, to meet the broad statutory definition of a caregiver: "a person who provides care to a vulnerable adult, with or without compensation, on a temporary or permanent or full or part-time basis and includes, but is not limited to, a relative, household member. . . ." S.C. Code Ann. § 43-35-10. See State v. Saintil-Brown, 210 A.3d 213, 221-22 (N.H. 2019) (holding that defendant met the "provided care" element of a caregiver under state statute when she undertook to buy and prepare food for the victim, who could not do so independently, and tried to help the victim up off the floor when she fell); Law v. State, 292 S.W.3d 277, 283 (Ark. 2009) (holding that a defendant providing begrudging and belated assistance to victim was evidence to support trial court's finding that he voluntarily acted as a caregiver, even when defendant claimed he was not a caregiver).

“The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Sloan v. Hardee, 371 S.C. 495, 498, 640 S.E.2d 457, 459 (2007). “When a statute's terms are clear and unambiguous on their face, there is no room for statutory construction and a court must apply the statute according to its literal meaning.” Id. When interpreting a statute, “[w]ords must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute's operation.” Id. at 499, 640 S.E.2d at 459. Furthermore, “the statute must be read as a whole and sections which are a part of the same general statutory law must be construed together and each one given effect.” S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Jasper Cnty., 368 S.C. 388, 398, 629 S.E.2d 624, 629 (2006).

“If the statute is ambiguous ... courts must construe the terms of the statute.” Town of Mt. Pleasant v. Roberts, 393 S.C. 332, 342, 713 S.E.2d 278, 283 (2011) (citation omitted). The statutory language must be construed in light of the intended purpose of the statute. Id. Courts must not construe a statute in a way which leads to an absurd result or renders it meaningless. See Lancaster Cnty. Bar Ass'n v. S.C. Comm'n on Indigent Defense, 380 S.C. 219, 222, 670 S.E.2d 371, 373 (2008) (“In construing a statute, this Court will reject an interpretation when such an interpretation leads to an absurd result that could not have been intended by the legislature.”).

At trial, the State presented direct evidence in the form of a video of Appellant's police interview. During the interview, investigator David McMahan asked Appellant if he was Victim's primary caregiver or if someone else took care of her, to which Appellant replied, “Nah, I'm just the only one that's there, yeah, I'm the only son.” Further direct evidence was presented when Dr. Docyk testified about his note in Victim's chart that Appellant was her primary caregiver. Dr. Docyk emphasized that the only reason he would have written that was if Appellant or

Appellant's girlfriend told him, as per procedure. However, under the relevant statute Appellant's status as a caregiver is not dependent upon direct evidence of his self-identification as such – it is dependent upon whether he committed acts that show he was “providing care.”

Section 43-35-10(2) defines a caregiver as someone who “provides care to a vulnerable adult, with or without compensation, on a temporary or permanent or full or part-time basis and includes, but is not limited to, a relative, household member. . . .” The preamble to the Act further clarifies the legislative intent behind the act, stating: “the General Assembly finds it necessary (1) to provide a system of adult protection in South Carolina; . . . (5) to uniformly define abuse, neglect, and exploitation for vulnerable adults in all settings. . . .”

The plain language of the statute and stated legislative directives show that in crafting the statute, the South Carolina legislature intended to protect victims beyond the traditional invalid-caregiver scenarios and intentionally crafted a statute broad enough to account for situations like Appellant's. The legislature made a point to highlight that caregivers could be compensated or un-compensated, could provide care on a “temporary or permanent or full or part-time basis,” and could be relatives or household members. S.C. Code Ann. § 43-35-10(2). The broad language of the Act demonstrates the legislature's prioritization of the safety and wellbeing of vulnerable adults in South Carolina, and by broadly constructing the statutes the legislature intentionally established a duty for anyone who provided “care” for those with “a physical or mental condition which substantially impairs the person from adequately providing for his or her own care of protection.”

Applying the statute to Appellant's case, the court did not err in finding that the State provided evidence in support of every element of Section 43-35-10(2). The Act defines a caregiver as a person who “provides care to a vulnerable adult,” and while it does not provide a

precise definition of “care,” the definition of neglect provided under the same section of the Act criminalizes “the omission of a caregiver to provide the care, goods, or services necessary to maintain the health or safety of a vulnerable adult including, but not limited to, food, clothing, medicine, shelter, supervision, and medical services. . . .” S.C. Code Ann. § 43-35-10(6). Considering that the legislature expressly criminalized such omissions by caregivers, it is reasonable to assume that the term “care” in the definition of a caregiver then encompasses any acts which a caregiver would be negligent for failing to provide, like providing food, water, and medical services.

Recognizing that “care” encompasses acts like providing food, water, and medical assistance, Appellant’s statements that he offered his mother food and water, turned up the heat for her, and eventually called 911 are all evidence that he provided his mother with “care.” A caregiver may be compensated or uncompensated, so Appellant not receiving payment for his acts does not prevent him from being a caregiver. A caregiver can provide care on a temporary, permanent, full-time, or part-time basis, and Appellant’s statements that he adjusted the heat and offered food, water, and medical assistance over the four-day period his mother was on the floor constitutes a temporary or part-time basis. Finally, the statute specifically notes that caregivers can be relatives and household members (who presumably may already do some acts of care for one another under normal circumstances) so Appellant and Victim’s familial relationship also does not prevent him from being a caregiver. Therefore, the trial court did not err in finding that the State presented evidence reasonably tending to prove every element of Section 43-35-10(2).

The statute criminalizing neglect of a vulnerable adult did not provide any onerous obligations on Appellant. It simply required that he call for an ambulance when his mother became incapacitated rather than letting her die on the floor. The law did not require Appellant

to have acted as a caregiver prior to Victim's fall, nor does it require Victim to have been an invalid prior to her fall. All the law requires for Appellant to be culpable is that at some point Victim became unable to physically care for herself, and that during that time Appellant provided or attempted to provide some level of "care." Once those elements were met, the law placed a duty upon Appellant, the only person able to protect Victim's health and safety in that situation, to do what Victim was physically incapable of doing. Ultimately, whether Appellant was a caregiver was a question for the jury. But the State presented evidence to support that finding, and as such the trial court did not err in refusing to direct a verdict of not guilty.

**CONCLUSION**

For all the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the judgment and conviction of the lower court be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

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July 30, 2025

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**Jul 30 2025**

**SC Court of Appeals**

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
In The Court of Appeals

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APPEAL FROM OCONEE COUNTY

Court of General Sessions  
The Honorable R. Scott Sprouse, Circuit Court Judge

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Appellate Case No. 2022-000567

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THE STATE,

Respondent,

v.

MACK ADAMS GAINES,

Appellant.

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**PROOF OF SERVICE**

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I, Susan Spencer, certify that I have served the within Brief of Respondent on Katherine Hudgins, Esquire, counsel of record for the Appellant, by electronic mail to the address listed for counsel in AIS.

I further certify that all parties required by Rule to be served have been served.

This 30th day of July, 2025.



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## Susan Spencer

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**From:** Susan Spencer  
**Sent:** Wednesday, July 30, 2025 12:03 PM  
**To:** Hudgins, Kathrine  
**Cc:** Josh Edwards; Stock, Chris  
**Subject:** The State v. Mack Adams Gaines (2022-000567)  
**Attachments:** GAINES Mack - Brief of Respondent.pdf

Good afternoon Ms. Hudgins,

Attached please find the Brief of Respondent in The State v. Mack Adams Gaines (2022-000567). This Brief will be filed today with the Court of Appeals via the AIS OneDrive system. If you will, please confirm receipt.

Thank you.

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