

The Supreme Court of South Carolina
DANIEL E. SHEAROUSE, CLERK OF COURT
POST OFFICE BOX 11330
COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 29211

RECEIVED

OCT 24 2013

S.C. SUPREME COURT

October 21, 2013

Dear Honorable CLERK:

Please find enclosed all of the requested legal documentations, requested by this Honorable Court in this legal matter. to be properly file into your Court.

THANKS very much,

~~S. Anthony R. Taylor #197565 OAK-B-4~~

ANTHONY R. TAYLOR #197265 OB 4
Kershaw Correctional Institution
4948 Goldmine Highway
Kershaw, SC 29067-8069

Cefub

Kershaw, SC

2013

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE SUPREME COURT
NOTICE OF INTENT TO APPEAL
FROM Richland County, L. Casey Manning
Chief Administrative Judge Fifth Judicial Circuit

EXPLANATION 2011-CP-40-05965

Anthony R. Taylor #197565 - - - - - Petitioner

v.

Megan Harrigan, Assistant,
Attorney General and
State, - - - - - Respondent(s)

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, certify that I have served the Notice of Intent to Appeal and along the Explanation on Attorney of record, Assistant Attorney General, Megan Harrigan by depositing a copy of same in the United States mail, postage prepaid on this day of October, 24, 2013 addressed to the Assistant Attorney General Megan Harrigan P.O. Box 11549 Columbia, SC 29211-1549 [by mailing original copy of the same to the clerk of court for the S.C. Supreme Court, Daniel E. Shearouse, P.O. Box 11330 Columbia, SC 29211

cc/cls
Megan Harrigan
Assistant Attorney General
Kershaw, SC 2913

S. Anthony R. Taylor #197565 OBY
Anthony R. Taylor #197565 OAF B-4
Kershaw Correctional Institution
4848 Goldmine Highway
Kershaw, SC 29567-8869

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)
COUNTY OF RICHLAND)
Anthony R. Taylor, #197565,)
Applicant,)
v.)
State of South Carolina,)
Respondent.)

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

2011-CP-40-05965

FINAL ORDER

This matter comes before this Court by way of an application for post conviction relief (PCR) filed September 8, 2011. The Respondent made its Return and Motion to Dismiss on September 30, 2011, requesting that the Application be summarily dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations set forth in S.C. Code §17-27-45(a) and as possibly successive in nature. Pursuant to this request, and after reviewing the pleadings in this matter and all of the records attached thereto, the Honorable James R. Barber, III, issued a Condition Order of Dismissal on June 25, 2012, provisionally denying and dismissing this action, while giving the Applicant thirty (30) days from the date of said Order in which to show why the dismissal should not become final.

Copied below is the affidavit of service containing Applicant's signature dated July 20, 2012, confirming service of the Conditional Order upon Applicant at the South Carolina Department of Corrections.

SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

Post Office Box 21787 - Columbia, South Carolina 29221

Pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2), SCRCP, the Director of the South Carolina Department of Corrections has designated Peggy Cawthon (Server) as his duly authorized agent for the purpose of making service of the signed Conditional Order of Dismissal on the below named individual.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA) AFFIDAVIT OF PERSONAL SERVICE
COUNTY OF Lancaster)

On this 20th day of July, 2012, I served the signed Conditional Order of Dismissal on Inmate ANTHONY R. TAYLOR, SCDC Inmate No. 197565, by delivering personally and leaving a copy of the same at Kershaw Correctional Institution, Lancaster, South Carolina. Deponent is not a party to this action.

s/ Peggy Cawthon

SCDC Server

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME

this 20 day of July, 2012

Cathie A. Amos (L.S.)

Notary Public for South Carolina

My Commission Expires: My Commission Expires December 22, 2018

ADMISSION OF SERVICE

Service of a copy of the signed Conditional Order of Dismissal is admitted at the S.C. Department of Corrections, Kershaw Correctional Institution, Kershaw, Lancaster County, South Carolina, this 20th day of July, 2012.

s/ Anthony R. Taylor

Inmate Signature
SCDC No. 197565 2134

Applicant responded to the Conditional Order of Dismissal by two (2) *pro se* documents. The first, dated Friday, June 22, 2012, was a document entitled "Motion for Recusation" in which Applicant set forth the following:

Now comes the above-named (Pro Se), Plaintiff, with this Motion For Recusation, Judge James R. Barber, III, from the above matters. Upon Motion a judge shall Recuse himself if he was the Judge who presided at an subsequent proceeding for which relief was being sought. Furthe it would be in the best interest to all parties that Judge James R. Barber, III, Recuse himself were fear of actual bias, unfairness and prejudice may occur. Plaintiff, request this Court please transferred this above-matter to a different Judge with jurisdiction other than Judge who was instrumental in an subsequent proceeding were relief was being sought. Citing, Floyd-v.-State, 400 S.E.2d 145 (S.C.1991), overruling Henry v.-State, 275 S.C. 148, 268 S.E.2d 41 (1980). Canon 3 (C)(1) of The Code Of Judicial Conduct.

The second response was a *pro se* document dated July 6, 2012, entitled "Applicant Reply Motion in Opposition to Respondent Conditional Order of Dismissal". In it, Applicant set forth the following objections, generally:¹

.....

In this post-conviction action Applicant in good faith belief that the current PCR action is "nonfrivolous" and proper for this Court to consider, where Applicant is challenging the legality of his Sentences as being "unauthorize, illegal, and unconstitutional" under law, and falls within the Discovery Rule pursuant to § 17-27-45(C), as this ground has not previously presented or heard. Applicant cites cases law and statute to support this ground and rights to proceed. See. Coats v. State, 575 S.E.2d.557 (S.C.2003); Tilloy v.State, 511 S.E.2d. 689 (S.C.1999), and S.C.Code § 17-27-45(C) (Supp.2001).

¹ This is not an exhaustive list of the objections set forth in the *pro se* filing. This Court took the entirety of the filing, including the numerous case law citations and legal arguments, into consideration in making the current determination.

The Applicant contends that he was greatly persuaded by the legal influence of sentencing judge legal authority, counsels, and South Carolina Department of Corrections(SCDC), classification employee's at his year/annual review that his Sentences was legal and correct and ends 2023, maxs-out date.

The sentencing court, SCDC, and Attorney General's Office, still holds that same opinion that the cumulative punishment of thirty(30) years for, a class C, felony is correct and proper under law for the crimes committed.

In this case Applicant contends that he actually discovered this Sentences error in 2010, he immediately after actual discovery filed this current application with the one year period of limitation proscribed under statute asserting that his Sentences exceeded the maximum allowed under law, and a Conflict of Interest on unprofessional conduct of counsels.

In this case Applicant contends specific material fact that his thirty(30) years cumulative consecutive punishment of imprisonment term is "unauthorize, illegal, and unconstitutional under both South Carolina Law and Federal Law.

In this case Applicant were sentenced to twenty(20)years for Possession with Intent to Distribute Marijuana third Offense, ten(10)years for Distribution of Marijuana third offense, sentences run consecutively, pursuant to S.C.Code ANN. § 44-53-370(b)(2), a class C, felony a maximum punishment of imprisonment term of twenty(20)years. There is no logical reason to believe that Applicant would knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently would agree to waived this ground. Under commentary in S.C.Rules of Court, knowingly- is, defined as having actual knowledge of the fact in question; voluntarily- is, defined as given freely and without compulsion; Intelligently- is, defined to understand.

Here Applicant contends that this is a very complicated issue that has cause serious conflicts and confusion throughout our justice system between well train legal minds of both lawyers and judges of this great art. Train professional minds has labor over this issue and their dissented opinions is legal proof as to the complication that this particular issue has created when it came to the opinion and legal reasoning for correct interpretation of statutory provision of S.C.Code of Law Ann. § 44-53-370(b)(2)(3rd, offense), a class C, felony.

Here Applicant contends a sentence is invalid as a matter of law when its terms or not authorize by the statute or when the sentencing court considers inappropriate factors, or if the sentences were improperly ordered to run consecutively instead of concurrently. Now Applicant cites case law to support.

In this case at bar Applicant has demonstrated and pointed to specific material facts that this Court must consider and recognize the complication and stress applicant has suffer under this "unauthorize, illegal, and unconstitutional thrity(30)years sentences thats greater than the sentence specified in the applicable guideline range. Applicant contends this ground could not have been raised in original application due to it complication nature under actual discovery, lack of knowledge, and the great persuade legal authority of sentencing court, and the material fact at every yearly annual review by (SCDC) classification personnels, he is told that his sentences is proper and correct. U.S.C.Const. Amend.6, code 1976 § 17-27-45(a,c).

Here Applicant contends that he could not raised this ground of conflict of interest due to unprofessional conduct of counsels in the original application nor could he have known or foreseen the procedural irregularities that occurred throughout that PCR process that deprived him of due process. Here Applicant were unfamiliar with the complication of ploading and rules, and unaware of all the possible sets of facts which could result in granting relief in a post-conviction. Our Supreme Court has explicitly stated that procedures rules and court rules like statute must be followed when unambiguous language is clear. In this case the language of Rule 59(E,F,), are clear and unambiguous and state officials were obligated to obey that rule but instead violated it with procedural strategic decision to disregard and move forward against that motion depriving applicant of a fundamental right .

Here Applicant contends that the Conflict of Interest of Unprofessional Conduct occur the moment when PCR counsel refrained from acting in the best interest of applicant when she did nothing to try and correct state officials misconduct of action by proceeding forward against a timely motion in violation of the fundamental substantial rights to a fair one complete bite at the apple, but The Applicant was never noticefy of a 30 days notice by court-appointed counsel or from the Court to give him an fair opportunity to deny or appeal, regardless of the letters he had the right to change his mind, but he was deprived of the right causing great harm by depriving him of a fundamant right of appeal, resulting great hana and benefited state officials in the procedural irregularities by proceeding forward intorduceing "sham documents" upon the Court. Where record

After conducting a thorough review of the entirety of the record and all relevant documents, this Court finds Applicant has failed to establish any sufficient reason why the current action should not be summarily dismissed with prejudice as set forth in the Conditional Order. Specifically, the allegation set forth regarding the validity and legality of the marijuana

conviction/sentence was previously raised by Applicant in his prior collateral challenges, including his 2004 PCR action (2004-CP-40-03255) and 2009 Petition for Writ of Mandamus (2009-CP-40-04880). Therefore, as set forth in this Court's Conditional Order, these allegations are successive in nature and barred by the doctrine of *res judicata*.

Additionally, Applicant alleges he was denied the right to appeal the denial of his previous PCR action due to the improper conduct of his then appointed attorney, Tara Shurling, Esquire. Shurling represented Applicant on his 1998 PCR application before the Honorable Costa M. Pleicones (1998-CP-40-4140). Since the denial of that application on February 28, 2000, Applicant has filed at least three (3) additional post-conviction relief applications through which such an allegation could/should have been raised prior to this action (2000-CP-40-2484; 2004-CP-40-0682; 2004-CP-40-3255). Therefore, such an allegation regarding his right to appeal the denial of the 1998 PCR action is successive as well. See e.g. Graham v. State, 378 S.C. 1, 661 S.E.2d 337 (where issue of belated appeal could've been raised through previous action, raising in a subsequent action is successive).


Upon review of the *entirety* of Applicant's *pro se* filings, this Court finds no sufficient reason has been set forth to justify withholding summary dismissal of this action. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in the Conditional Order, this action must be summarily dismissed.

This Court hereby advises Applicant that he must file and serve a Notice of Appeal within thirty (30) days of the service of this Order to secure appellate review. See Rule 203, SCACR. Applicant's attention is directed to Rule 243, SCACR, for the procedures following the filing and service of the notice of appeal.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. That, for the reasons set forth in the Court's Conditional Order of Dismissal as well as herein, the application for PCR must be denied and dismissed *with prejudice*; and
2. Applicant must be remanded to the custody of Respondent.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED this 14 day of September, 2013.


The Honorable L. Casey Manning
Chief Administrative Judge
Fifth Judicial Circuit

Columbia, South Carolina.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF RICHLAND
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

CASE NUMBER: 2011CP4005965

Anthony Robert #97565 0B17 Taylor

State of South Carolina

PLAINTIFF(S)

DEFENDANT(S)

Submitted by: _____

Attorney for : Plaintiff Defendant or Self-Represented Litigant

DISPOSITION TYPE (CHECK ONE)

- JURY VERDICT.** This action came before the court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and a verdict rendered.
- DECISION BY THE COURT.** This action came to trial or hearing before the court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision rendered.
- ACTION DISMISSED (CHECK REASON):** Rule 12(b), SCRPC; Rule 41(a), SCRPC (Pl. No. suit); Rule 43(k), SCRPC (Settled); Other _____
- ACTION STRICKEN (CHECK REASON):** Rule 40(j), SCRPC; Bankruptcy; Binding arbitration, subject to right to restore to confirm, vacate or modify arbitration award; Other _____
- DISPOSITION OF APPEAL TO THE CIRCUIT COURT (CHECK APPLICABLE BOX):** Affirmed; Reversed; Remanded; Other _____

RICHLAND COUNTY
FILED
2012 JUN 25 AM 9:38
JEANETTE W. McBRIDE
C.P. & S.S.

NOTE: ATTORNEYS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR NOTIFYING LOWER COURT, TRIBUNAL, OR ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OF THE CIRCUIT COURT RULING IN THIS APPEAL.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: See attached order (formal order to follow) Statement of Judgment by the Court:

ORDER INFORMATION

This order ends does not end the case.

Additional Information for the Clerk : _____

INFORMATION FOR THE PUBLIC INDEX

Complete this section below when the judgment affects title to real or personal property or if any amount should be enrolled. If there is no judgment information, indicate "N/A" in one of the boxes below.

Judgment in Favor of (List name(s) below)	Judgment Against (List name(s) below)	Judgment Amount To be Enrolled
		\$
		\$
		\$

If applicable, describe the property, including tax map information and address, referenced in the order: _____

The judgment information above has been provided by the submitting party. Disputes concerning the amounts contained in this form may be addressed by way of motion pursuant to the SC Rules of Civil Procedure. Amounts to be computed such as interest or additional taxable costs not available at the time the form and final order are submitted to the judge may be provided to the clerk. Note: Title abstractors and researchers should refer to the official court order for judgment details.

Circuit Court Judge _____ Judge Code _____ Date _____

For Clerk of Court Office Use Only

This judgment was entered on the _____ day of _____, 20____ and a copy mailed first class or placed in the appropriate attorney's box on this 25 June 2012 to attorneys of record or to parties (when appearing pro se) as follows:

Anthony Robert #97565 0B17
Taylor

Brian T. Petrano

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE PLAINTIFF(S)

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE DEFENDANT(S)

Court Reporter _____

Clerk of Court _____

Jeanette W. McBride

of Appeals denied Applicant's *pro se* petition for rehearing on May 21, 1998, and issued the remittitur on June 30, 1998.

Applicant subsequently filed his first post-conviction relief application on November 12, 1998 (98-CP-40-4140). The Honorable Costa M. Pleicones held an evidentiary hearing on the first application on May 31, 1998, at which Applicant was present and with counsel, Tara D. Shurling, Esquire. By formal order dated February 28, 2000, Judge Pleicones denied the application with prejudice.

Applicant filed a second application for PCR on June 26, 2000 (00-CP-40-2484). Respondent filed its Return on or about July 26, 2000. On September 27, 2001, an evidentiary hearing was held before the Honorable James R. Barber, III, at which Applicant was present with counsel, Robert A. Muckenfuss, Esquire. By order dated December 13, 2001, Judge Barber denied and dismissed the Petitioner's application. A Notice of Appeal was filed and a Johnson Petition for Writ of Certiorari submitted to the South Carolina Supreme Court on Applicant's behalf. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted Appellate counsel's request to be relieved and denied Certiorari on November 7, 2002.

On information and belief, it appears Applicant has also had a Federal Habeas Petition filed but no further information in the action is known.¹

Another Federal Habeas Petition was filed February 15, 2003 (6:15-257-20AK). Federal Magistrate issued its Report and Recommendation on June 23, 2003, after which the action was summarily dismissed by order dated July 22, 2003.

Applicant filed a third PCR application on or about February 12, 2004 (04-CP-40-0682). Respondent filed a Return and Motion to Dismiss on or about November 4, 2004, and a Conditional Order of Dismissal was signed/entered by the Court on December 3, 2004

¹ Federal Habeas filed 7/5/2001 (0:01-22456-2280)

provisionally granting Respondent's request for summary dismissal. The Honorable J. Earnest Kinard, Jr., issued an Order of Dismissal on or about February 10, 2005. Applicant's subsequent appeal was denied by the the South Carolina Supreme Court and the case was remitted on May 24, 2007.

Applicant filed a fourth application for post-conviction relief on July 2, 2004 (04-CP-40-3255). The state filed its Return and Motion to Dismiss on September 12, 2005. The Honorable J. Earnest Kinard, Jr., issued a Conditional Order of Dismissal on September 16, 2005, provisionally dismissing the action. The Final Order of Dismissal was signed on March 16, 2006, summarily dismissing the action with prejudice. Applicant appealed the decision and the South Carolina Supreme Court requested an explanation of why the lower court's assertion was improper pursuant to Rule 227(c) SCACR. On June 7, 2006, the Supreme Court issued an Order dismissing the appeal finding that Applicant's explanation pursuant to Rule 227(c) had failed to show an arguable basis for asserting that the determination by the lower court was improper.

Applicant filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and a Writ of Mandamus on February 21, 2007, demanding a hearing and that his sentence be corrected. A Conditional Order of Dismissal was issued by this Court on July 3, 2007, and a final order was entered on September 2, 2010 (2007-CP-40-01139).

Applicant subsequently filed another Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus on July 9, 2009 (2009-CP-40-4880). Respondent made its Return and Motion to Dismiss on September 17, 2009. The Honorable Alison Renee Lee signed an Order of Dismissal on September 1, 2010, and the Order was served on Applicant September 8, 2010.

Applicant filed current application for post-conviction relief on September 8, 2011 (2011-CP-40-5965). In it, the Applicant alleges that he is being held in custody unlawfully for the following reasons:

1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel during sentencing

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

In making its decision, the Court had before it the available records of the Richland County Clerk of Court regarding the subject convictions, and/or the Applicant's records from the South Carolina Department of Corrections, the Applicant's application, the *Respondent's Return and Motion to Dismiss*, and the relevant documents from Applicant's prior PCR actions.

TIMELINESS – S.C. Code §17-27-45(a)

This Court agrees that this Application for Post-Conviction Relief must be summarily dismissed for failure to comply with the filing procedures of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act. S.C. Code Ann. §17-27-10 to -160.

S.C. Code Ann. §17-27-45(a) reads as follows:

An application for relief filed pursuant to this chapter must be filed within one year after the entry of a judgment of conviction or within one year after the sending of the remittitur to the lower court from an appeal or the filing of the final decision upon an appeal, whichever is later.

The South Carolina Supreme Court has held that the statute of limitations shall apply to all applications filed after July 1, 1996. Peloquin v. State, 321 S.C. 468, 469 S.E.2d 606 (1996). For the purposes of this Order, the Applicant's conviction/sentence was "finalized" on the date of his conviction, which was June 19, 1996. Adding one (1) year per S.C. Code § 17-27-45(a) and one (1) day per Rule 6(a), SCRPC means that this PCR application had to be filed by June

20, 1997. **This Application was filed on September 8, 2011 which was 5559 days beyond the time that the statutory filing period had expired.**

A motion for summary judgment may properly be used to raise the defense of statute of limitations. McDonnell v. Consolidated School District of Aiken, 315 S.C. 487, 445 S.E.2d 638 (1994). In addition, S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-70(c) (1985) authorizes the Court to “grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of [an] application when it appears from the pleadings ... that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Therefore, this Court shall summarily dismiss the application for post conviction relief for failure to file within the time mandated by the Post Conviction Procedure Act.

SUCCESSIVE-S.C. Code § Ann. 17-27-90

This Court further finds the current PCR application is successive. Successive applications for post-conviction relief are disfavored. Land v. State, 274 S.C. 243, 262 S.E.2d 735 (1980). S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-90 (1985) states:

All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this chapter must be raised in his original, supplemental or amended application. Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence, or in any other proceeding the applicant has taken to secure relief, may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which, for sufficient reason, was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental or amended application.

Under this statute, successive post-conviction relief applications are forbidden unless an applicant can point to a "sufficient reason" why new grounds for relief were not raised or were not properly raised in previous applications. Aice v. State, 305 S.C. 448, 409 S.E.2d 392 (1991). Any new ground raised in a subsequent application is limited to those grounds that “could not have been raised . . . in the previous application.” Id., 305 S.C. at 450, 409 S.E.2d at 394. If the

Applicant could have raised these allegations in a previous application, then the Applicant may not raise those grounds in successive applications. Id. The Applicant bears the burden of showing that the allegations could not have been raised previously. Land, 274 S.C. 243, 262 S.E.2d 735 (1980).

The Applicant could have raised the new grounds for relief in his prior post-conviction relief application. The Applicant has failed to present any reasons why he could not have raised the current allegations in his previous post-conviction relief applications. Once a PCR applicant obtains a complete adjudication on the merits of his original application, including an appeal, he may not make successive applications based on ineffective assistance of prior PCR counsel. (Aice v. State, 409 S.E.2d 392 (1991). Even a belated direct appeal claim is subject to limitations. Graham v. State, 378 S.C. 1, 661 S.E.2d 337 (2008)(Petitioner was barred from raising in successive post-conviction relief (PCR) application claim that he was denied the right to direct appeal due to the ineffective assistance of counsel, where claim could have been raised in first PCR application).

RES JUDICATA

Finally, doctrine of *res judicata* bars the Applicant from bringing the current claims. *Res judicata* prohibits subsequent actions by the same parties on the same issues. Bell v. Bennett, 307 S.C. 286, 414 S.E.2d 786 (Ct. App. 1992). A final judgment on the merits in a prior action bars subsequent consideration of those issues in a new action. Foran v. USAA Casualty Ins. Co., 311 S.C. 189, 427 S.E.2d 918 (Ct. App. 1993). *Res judicata* also bars any issues that could have been raised in the former action. Id.


The Applicant had a full opportunity to litigate all allegations regarding ineffective assistance of counsel in [both] the state [and federal] court[s]. The Petitioner continues to raise

the same meritless claims by repeated collateral attacks on his convictions. The other grounds present allegations that could have been raised in those prior proceedings. The public interest in finality of judgments requires that litigation must eventually come to an end. Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, the Court should summarily dismiss these claims as barred by *res judicata*.

Based upon its review of the pleadings in this matter, this Court does not see the need to appoint counsel to represent the Applicant and expresses its intent to summarily dismiss this matter unless Applicant advises this Court with specific reasons, factual or legal, why it should not dismiss the matter in its entirety. Applicant is granted thirty (30) days from the date of service of this Order upon him to show why this Order should not become final. The Applicant shall file any reasons he may have with the Richland County Clerk of Court and shall serve opposing counsel at the following address:

Assistant Attorney General
Robert D. Corney
Office of the Attorney General
P.O. Box 11549
Columbia, SC 29211

AND IT IS SO ORDERED this 21 day of June, 2012.


The Honorable James R. Barber, III
Administrative Judge
Fifth Judicial Circuit

Columbia, South Carolina

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COUNTY OF RICHLAND

Anthony R. Taylor
 Plaintiff

State Of South Carolina
 Defendant.

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

CASE NO.
2011-CP-400-5965

MOTION AND ORDER INFORMATION
FORM AND COVER SHEET

Plaintiff's Attorney:
Anthony R. Taylor, Bar No.
Address:
KERSHAW CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION
4848 Gold Mine Highway
Kershaw, SC, 29067-8069
phone: fax:
e-mail: other:

Defendant's Attorney:
Robert D. Corney, Bar No.
Address:
Post Office Box 11549
Columbia, South Carolina 29211
phone: 803-734-3737 fax: 803-734-5178
e-mail: rcorney@scag.gov other:

RICHLAND COUNTY
FILED
2012 JUN 25 AM 9:34
JEANETTE W. McBRIDE
C.C.P. & C.S.

- MOTION HEARING REQUESTED (attach written motion and complete SECTIONS II and III)
- FORM MOTION, NO HEARING REQUESTED (complete SECTIONS II and III)
- PROPOSED ORDER/CONSENT ORDER (complete SECTIONS II and III)


SECTION I: Hearing Information

Nature of Motion:
Estimated Time Needed: Court Reporter Needed: YES / NO

SECTION II: Motion/Order Type

- Written motion attached
- Form Motion/Order

I hereby move for relief or action by the court as set forth in the attached proposed order.


Signature of Attorney for Plaintiff / Defendant

June 20, 2012
Date submitted

SECTION III: Motion Fee

- PAID - AMOUNT:
- EXEMPT: Rule to Show Cause in Child or Spousal Support
(check reason) Domestic Abuse or Abuse and Neglect
 Indigent Status State Agency v. Indigent Party
 Sexually Violent Predator Act Post-Conviction Relief
 Motion for Stay in Bankruptcy
 Motion for Publication Motion for Execution (Rule 69, SCRPC)
 Proposed order submitted at request of the court; or,
reduced to writing from motion made in open court per judge's instructions
Name of Court Reporter:
 Other:

JUDGE'S SECTION

- Motion Fee to be paid upon filing of the attached order.
- Other:

JUDGE

CODE: Date:

CLERK'S VERIFICATION

Date Filed:

Collected by: _____

MOTION FEE COLLECTED: _____

ANTHONY R. TAYLOR #197565 OAK-B-4
Kershaw Correctional Institution
4848 Goldmine Highway
Kershaw, SC 29067-8069

The Supreme Court of South Carolina
DANIEL E. SHEAROUSE, CLERK OF COURT
POST OFFICE BOX 11330
COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 29211

RECEIVED

OCT 20 2013

KCI
BUSINESS OFFICE