

RECEIVED

Oct 10 2025

S.C. SUPREME COURT

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
In the Supreme Court

APPEAL FROM CHARLESTON COUNTY  
Court of Common Pleas  
The Honorable Roger M. Young, Sr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Op. No. 2025-UP-295 (S.C. Ct. App. filed August 13, 2025)  
Appellate Case No. 2022-000346

Reid Fleming, . . . . . Appellant/Petitioner,

v.

The Planet Vape, LLC; SCECIGARETTE, LLC; LG Chem  
Ltd.; John Doe Distributor #1; John Doe Distributor #2; and  
John Doe Distributor #3 . . . . . Defendants,

Of which LG Chem Ltd. is the . . . . . Respondent.

**PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI**

**RICHARDSON THOMAS, LLC**

By: s/Chris Moore  
Chris Moore (SCB: 77934)  
383 W. Cheves St.  
Florence, SC 29501  
T: 803.281.8147  
[chris@richardsonthomas.com](mailto:chris@richardsonthomas.com)

**SMITH & GRIFFITH LLP**

John Griffith (SCB: 6729)  
1102 North Main Street  
Anderson, South Carolina 29621  
T: 864.222.2293  
[john@griffithlawyer.com](mailto:john@griffithlawyer.com)

Florence, South Carolina

*Attorneys for Petitioner Reid Fleming*

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ----- ii

CERTIFICATE BY COUNSEL ----- 1

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ----- 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE----- 1

    Procedural history: ----- 1

    Facts material to consideration of the questions presented: ----- 2

ARGUMENT ----- 6

    I. Fleming did establish a prima facie showing of specific jurisdiction.----- 6

    II. The decision conflicts with Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court,  
        592 U.S. 351 (2021).----- 8

    III. The decision below conflicts with State v. NV Sumatra Tobacco Trading Co., 379 S.C.  
        81, 666 S.E.2d 218 (2008). ----- 11

    IV. Exercise of jurisdiction comports with fairness and South Carolina’s interests.----- 13

CONCLUSION----- 13

**TABLE OF AUTHORITIES**

**FEDERAL CASES**

*Celgard, LLC v. LG Chem, Ltd.*, 3:14-cv-00043, 2015 WL 2412467 (W.D.N.C. May 21, 2015) 9

*Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court*, 592 U.S. 351, 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021)

----- passim

*Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd.*, 79 F.4th 651 (6th Cir. 2023)----- 2, 8

**STATE CASES**

*Cribb v. Spatholt*, 382 S.C. 490, 498–500, 676 S.E.2d 714, 718–19 (Ct. App. 2009) -----6, 14

*Dilworth v. LG Chem, Ltd.*, 355 So. 3d 201 (Miss. 2022)----- 2, 8

*LG Chem Am., Inc. v. Morgan*, 670 S.W.3d 341 (Tex. 2023) ----- 2, 8

*LG Chem, Ltd. v. Lemmerman*, 361 Ga. App. 163, 863 S.E.2d 514 (2021) ----- 3

*Holtzendorff v. Vapor Tek USA, LLC, and LG Chem Ltd.*, 2018-CP-0201518 (May 6, 2020)-----3

*Moore v. Planet Vapor Inc.*, 2018-CP-21-02884 (Florence County) ----- 9

*Roberts v. Planet Vape, LLC, et. al*, 2020-CP-10-00912 (Dec. 17, 2020)-----3

*State v. NV Sumatra Tobacco Trading Co.*, 379 S.C. 81, 666 S.E.2d 218 (2008) -----10, 11, 14

*Thompson v. LG Chem Ltd., et al.*, 2019-CP-44-0054 (Union County)----- 9

*Williamson v. Pirates Cove Vapor Lounge, LLC, et. al*, 2019-CP-07-02270 (June 21, 2021)-----3

**RULES**

Rule 242(b), SCACR ----- passim

## **CERTIFICATE BY COUNSEL**

The undersigned certifies that a petition for rehearing was made and finally ruled on by the Court of Appeals on September 10, 2025.

### **QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW**

- I. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding Fleming did not establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over LG Chem where LG Chem does not dispute it placed the battery in the stream of commerce and knew its battery was being sold for this purpose?
- II. Whether the Court of Appeals' decision conflicts with *Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court*, 592 U.S. 351 (2021), by requiring a causal link between LG Chem's in-state conduct and the battery at issue?
- III. Whether the Court of Appeals' misapplied this Court's decision in *State v. NV Sumatra Tobacco Trading Co.*, 379 S.C. 81, 666 S.E.2d 218 (2008), by failing to attribute minimum contacts to LG Chem where LG Chem does not dispute significant and regular lithium-ion battery business in South Carolina?
- IV. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in failing to analyze the fairness prong of the due-process test?

### **STATEMENT OF THE CASE**

#### ***Procedural history:***

This appeal arises from a product liability suit that was dismissed by the trial court for want of personal jurisdiction. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision dismissing Mr. Fleming's (Appellant) claims against Respondent LG Chem, Ltd., a South Korean battery manufacturer that is part of the multinational LG conglomerate.

Fleming is a South Carolina resident. (R. p. 17.) He purchased a rechargeable lithium-ion battery he alleged was designed and manufactured by LG. (R. p. 21 ¶ 22.) Fleming purchased the battery in South Carolina. (R. p. 21 ¶ 20.) The battery was purchased for use in Fleming's vaping device. (R. p. 21 ¶ 26.) Fleming alleges LG's battery experienced a failure due its defective nature

and that the failure resulted in an explosion that caused him severe burn injuries. (R. pp. All of Fleming’s contacts with the product – the purchase, use, and failure of the subject battery – occurred in South Carolina.

On April 21, 2021, Fleming filed his complaint against LG, John Doe Distributors #1-3, and retail sellers The Planet Vape, LLC and SC E-Cigarette, LLC. (R. pp. 17–29.) LG moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on July 15, 2021. (R. pp. 30-39, 46-67.) Fleming filed his memorandum in opposition with exhibits on January 10, 2022. (R. pp. 70-386.) The circuit court held a hearing on January 18, 2022. (R. pp. 537-579.) On February 7, 2022, the circuit court granted LG’s motion and dismissed LG for lack of specific jurisdiction. (R. pp.3-13.) The circuit court denied Fleming’s motion to reconsider on February 23, 2022. (R. pp. 14–16.)

Fleming timely appealed the circuit court’s decision on March 21, 2022. (R. p. 1.) On April 19, 2022, Fleming filed a motion to certify the case to the South Carolina Supreme Court because the lower court’s decision was in conflict with numerous other circuit court orders. This Court denied the motion on May 17, 2022.

The parties submitted briefs and the Court of Appeals heard argument June 3, 2025. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court in an unpublished, split decision filed August 13, 2025, from which Judge Hewitt dissented.

***Facts material to consideration of the questions presented:***

LG’s lithium-ion batteries are well-known and popular batteries that are extensively used by the vaping community to power vaping devices, or e-cigarettes. (R. p. 21 ¶ 23.) LG claims it does not intend for consumers to use its lithium-ion batteries with such devices; however, it is well aware its batteries are used for such purpose. *See, e.g., Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd.*, 79 F.4th 651, 670 (6th Cir. 2023); *LG Chem Am., Inc. v. Morgan*, 670 S.W.3d 341, 343–44 (Tex. 2023); *Dilworth*

*v. LG Chem, Ltd.*, 355 So. 3d 201, 210–11 (Miss. 2022); *LG Chem, Ltd. v. Lemmerman*, 361 Ga. App. 163, 863 S.E.2d 514 (2021); *Williamson v. Pirates Cove Vapor Lounge, LLC, et. al*, 2019-CP-07-02270 (June 21, 2021), (R. pp. 256-65); *Holtzendorff v. Vapor Tek USA, LLC, and LG Chem Ltd.*, 2018-CP-0201518 (May 6, 2020), (R. pp. 266-67); *Roberts v. Planet Vape, LLC, et. al*, 2020-CP-10-00912 (Dec. 17, 2020), (R. pp. 268-70).

Fleming alleges he purchased LG’s rechargeable lithium-ion batteries from retail stores The Planet Vape, LLC and SC E-Cigarette, LLC in Charleston, South Carolina for use in his vaping device. (R. p. 21 ¶ 20.) On May 24, 2018, one of the LG batteries exploded in his pants pocket, causing severe burns requiring hospitalization, and resulting in permanent physical and mental damage. (R. p. 22 ¶¶ 31–35.) Fleming alleges the batteries were a particular sized lithium-ion battery – size 18650 – and that it was designed, manufactured, and distributed by LG. (R. pp. 21 ¶ 22.)

LG is a battery making subsidiary of the LG Corporation or LG Group, a South Korean multinational conglomerate parent. (R. pp.75-76.) LG itself has (or had) U.S. subsidiaries, including LG Chem America, Inc., which conducts “sales and trading” and is authorized to do business in South Carolina. (R. pp. 97–99, 244.) Fleming alleged that LG transacts business in South Carolina, including shipping lithium-ion batteries through the Port of Charleston and to South Carolina businesses with the expectation that these products be sold in South Carolina. (R. pp. 18–19 ¶¶ 9-10, 184–242, 243, 292–386.) In response to LG’s motion challenging jurisdiction, Fleming supplied the circuit court with shipping records evidencing large shipments by LG of “lithium-ion” batteries to South Carolina entities. (R. pp. 184–242, 243, 292–386). LG does not dispute that it serves a market for lithium-ion batteries here or that it shipped 18650 lithium-ion batteries here. Instead, LG is careful to say only that it did not place 18650 rechargeable lithium-

ion batteries into the stream of commerce “for use as standalone, replaceable batteries.” *See e.g.* (R. pp. 30-31, 37-38, 46-48, 53, 57, 60-63, 64, 396-98, 410-11, 415-16, 436-41, 443-44 446-47, 456-57).

Fleming alleged a number of jurisdictional facts related to LG’s purposeful availment of South Carolina law related not only to its sale / distribution of lithium-ion battery products here. (R. pp. 18–19 ¶¶ 9-10.) Importantly, LG by and large does not dispute these allegations. Anticipating, LG’s argument, Fleming also alleged that “LG has known since 2016 that individuals use LG’s lithium ion battery products to power devices such as flashlights and personal vaporizing devices” and that “[a]rmed with that awareness, LG has done virtually nothing to prevent its lithium ion battery products from being sold individually throughout the U.S. and, specifically, in South Carolina.” (R. p.19 ¶ 10(d)). Fleming also alleged a specific negligence action against LG for its breach of its duty to monitor its supply chain and to protect consumers from what it claims is an authorized misuse of its lithium-ion battery products. (R. pp. 24-28 ¶¶ 49-61.)

When Fleming filed his complaint, South Carolina circuit courts had already denied LG’s motions to dismiss for personal jurisdiction in five other similar lithium-ion battery explosion cases. (R. pp. 19-20 ¶ 11.) Fleming submitted these opinions from South Carolina circuit courts in LG lithium-ion battery cases where LG lost motions to dismiss for lack of specific jurisdiction. *See e.g., Williamson v. Pirates Cove Vapor Lounge, LLC, et. al*, 2019-CP-07-02270 (June 21, 2021), (R. pp. 256-65); *Holtzendorff v. Vapor Tek USA, LLC, and LG Chem Ltd.*, 2018-CP-0201518 (May 6, 2020), (R. pp. 266-67); *Roberts v. Planet Vape, LLC, et. al*, 2020-CP-10-00912 (Dec. 17, 2020), (R. pp. 268-70).

LG argued to the circuit court that Fleming is required to show LG imported and sold a size 18650 lithium-ion battery for sale to a consumer. (R. p.549, line 8-p.550, line 9.) Fleming

responded that LG’s position improperly injects intended-use arguments and distribution-chain control into the jurisdictional analysis where it does not belong. *See* (R. p.566, line 8-p.567, line 17.) In addition, Fleming argued that drawing an artificial distinction between 18650 sized lithium-ion batteries and other different sized lithium-ion batteries “would be like ... drawing a distinction between light cigarettes and ultra light cigarettes.” (R. p. 568, lines 7-11.) Fleming’s point was straightforward: LG serves the South Carolina market for lithium-ion batteries; Fleming bought an LG battery here; and it exploded causing him permanent injuries. (R. pp. 568–70.) Fleming supplied evidence that LG made over fifty shipments of lithium-ion batteries into South Carolina and that while those records lack size specificity, they clearly show shipments by LG to South Carolina of “LITHIUM ION BATTERY.” (R. pp. 184–242, 243, 292–386.)

In the unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals panel affirmed, holding Fleming “did not plead any jurisdictional facts specific to the particular product at issue here— a 18650 lithium-ion cell that was re-sold as a standalone consumer battery,” and that he “did not plead any facts showing a connection between his claims and any action of [LG] directed to South Carolina.” (Op. at pp.2–3.). It further concluded that, even considering the parties’ affidavits and Fleming’s “voluminous exhibits,” “[n]one of the facts” supported jurisdiction, including an asserted lack of evidence “reflecting shipment of 18650 lithium-ion cells to anyone in South Carolina, let alone anyone engaged in the consumer vaping industry.” (Op. at pp.2–3.) The majority accepted LG’s argument that the shipments of other lithium-ion batteries were “unrelated business” and found Fleming could not establish minimum contacts. (Op. at pp.5–6.) This was error on its face given the facts are to be weighed in the light most favorable to Fleming at this stage.

Judge Hewitt dissented concluding the complaint “sufficiently alleges facts that support specific personal jurisdiction.” (Op. at p.7.) Importantly, the dissent notes that LG “has not denied

that it placed this battery in the stream of commerce, that it regularly does business in South Carolina, or even that it distributes this type of battery with the reasonable expectation that the batteries will be used in this way in South Carolina.” *Id.*

## **ARGUMENT**

LG does not deny that it placed this battery in the stream of commerce, that it regularly does business in South Carolina, or that it distributed this type of battery with the knowledge that the batteries were being used in the way Fleming alleged in South Carolina. Despite LG’s substantial contacts here, the Court of Appeals’ effectively shields LG from suits by South Carolina citizens harmed by LG’s products, compelling our citizens to go to South Korea to seek recourse. In doing so, the Court of Appeals adopts the causation analysis rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court*, 592 U.S. 351 (2021). The Court of Appeals’ decision requires a consumer plaintiff to show that the manufacturer brought the battery here for a discrete consumer use. That is far too narrow an inquiry, particularly where, as here, LG benefits from distributing the same product in South Carolina just for a different market.

The Court should grant the petition because substantial constitutional issues are involved, the decision of the Court of Appeals is in conflict with both *Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court*, 592 U.S. 351 (2021) and this Court’s decision in *State v. NV Sumatra Tobacco Trading Co.*, 379 S.C. 81, 666 S.E.2d 218 (2008), and there is a dissent in the decision of the Court of Appeals. *See* Rule 242(b), SCACR.

### **I. Fleming did establish a prima facie showing of specific jurisdiction.**

As observed by the Judge Hewitt:

The complaint alleges that LG Chem's pervasive activities in the lithium-ion battery industry are such that it should reasonably anticipate being sued in this sort of case in South Carolina. As I read the filings, LG Chem has not denied that it placed this battery in the stream of commerce, that it regularly does business in South Carolina, or even that it distributes this type of battery with the reasonable expectation that the batteries will be used in this way in South Carolina.

(Op. p. 7).

The Court of Appeals nevertheless affirmed dismissal of Fleming's complaint at the pleading stage by holding that Fleming "did not plead any jurisdictional facts specific to the particular product at issue here—a 18650 lithium[-]ion cell that was re-sold as a standalone consumer battery," and that he "did not plead any facts showing a connection between his claims and any action of [LG] directed to South Carolina." (Op. pp. 2–3.) The majority also declared that "even when looking at the evidence submitted by the parties, including LG's affidavits and Appellant's affidavit and 'voluminous exhibits,' '[n]one of the facts'" supported jurisdiction, citing an asserted lack of evidence "reflecting shipment of 18650 lithium[-]ion cells to anyone in South Carolina, let alone anyone engaged in the consumer vaping industry." (Op. p. 3.)

Although the panel acknowledged the rule that "[o]n a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, factual disputes arising by affidavit will be resolved in favor of the non-moving party," it ignored Fleming's allegations regarding LG's negligence in failing to ensure these batteries were not put to this allegedly unauthorized use here. (Op. pp. 2-3) Fleming's allegations that the Court had specific jurisdiction over LG coupled with supported jurisdictional facts showing LG's purposeful South Carolina contacts and a nexus to his claims—including South Carolina purchase and injury, LG's regular lithium-ion battery commerce in South Carolina, and LG's knowledge of consumer use in vaping devices—when taken as true with any factual disputes resolved in Fleming's favor, make out a prima facie showing of specific jurisdiction. . (R. pp. 17–29.)

The Court of Appeals panel misapplied the specific jurisdiction prongs by requiring Fleming to make a showing that LG purposefully sold and distributed these 18650 batteries *as standalone consumer products*. (Op. pp. 2-5.) That is not what is required to determine whether the circuit court’s exercise of specific jurisdiction is proper, and underscores why this Court’s review is needed.

As noted by Judge Hewitt, there have been a number of courts faced with this same issue. *See, e.g., Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd.*, 79 F.4th 651, 670 (6th Cir. 2023); *LG Chem Am., Inc. v. Morgan*, 670 S.W.3d 341, 343–44 (Tex. 2023); *Dilworth v. LG Chem, Ltd.*, 355 So. 3d 201, 210–11 (Miss. 2022); *LG Chem, Ltd. v. Lemmerman*, 361 Ga. App. 163, 863 S.E.2d 514 (2021); *see also Ethridge v. Samsung SDI Co., Ltd.*, 137 F.4th 309, 319 (5th Cir. 2025). While some courts have come to a different conclusion, those exercising jurisdiction on similar facts are comfortable in doing so because the manufacturers are taking advantage of the state’s business markets. That is sufficient for the companies to anticipate suit in the forum state for a consumer’s unintended use of the products. South Carolina has a strong interest in providing a forum for its injured citizens. Here, Fleming sufficiently set forth a prima facie showing of the Court’s personal jurisdiction over LG.

**II. The decision conflicts with *Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court*, 592 U.S. 351 (2021).**

In *Ford*, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a “causation-only approach” to the requirement of a relationship between a defendant’s forum activities and the plaintiff’s suit. *See Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court*, 592 U.S. 351, 361-62 (2021) (“None of our precedents has suggested that only a strict causal relationship between the defendant's in-state activity and the litigation will do.”). Despite this rejection, the Court of Appeals engaged in the same rejected analysis, requiring Fleming to show that LG directed batteries to South Carolina for

a discrete purpose – for sale to consumers as a standalone battery for vaping devices. By framing the issue so narrowly, the Court of Appeals’ ruling means South Carolina courts could only exercise personal jurisdiction over LG for an injured South Carolina-consumer’s claim where the injury is from one of LG’s products that LG intended for the consumer market, even if LG distributes the same product within the forum state for a different market. *Ford* asks whether the defendant “systematically served a market” in the forum—not whether the defendant blessed the end use. *See Ford Motor Co.*, 592 U.S. at 365-366.

Here, there was significant evidence of LG’s South Carolina market activities. As pointed out by the dissent, LG did not deny that it placed lithium-ion batteries into the stream of commerce within South Carolina, that it transacted substantial lithium-ion battery related business within South Carolina, or that it distributed the exact type of battery at issue within South Carolina. *See* (Op. p.6.) Nor did LG deny knowledge that its batteries were being used here in this way. LG denies only that it distributed these batteries in South Carolina *for a particular market or use*, as a standalone or individual battery. (R. pp. 37-38). But this is of no moment for purposes of the jurisdictional analysis. “[W]hen a corporation has continuously and deliberately exploited [a State’s] market, it must reasonably anticipate being haled into [that State’s] court[s] to defend actions based on products causing injury there.” *Ford Motor Co.*, 592 U.S. at 364, 141 S. Ct. at 1027 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

The Court of Appeals accepted LG’s argument that Fleming is required to show that LG specifically targeted the consumer market for standalone 18650 batteries in South Carolina. But that is the same causation analysis rejected by *Ford*, spurning the argument that a plaintiff must prove its claim “came about because of the defendant’s in-state conduct.” *Id.* at 362, 141 S.Ct. at 1026. The majority focuses almost exclusively on what it describes as a lack of evidence that

Respondent “served a consumer standalone market” for lithium-ion batteries, with little consideration to Respondent’s substantial in-state contacts involving lithium-ion battery sales and shipments. (Op. p. 4) The Court of Appeals dismisses LG’s substantial lithium-ion battery contacts as “unrelated business activities,” ignoring the fact that LG does not deny it distributed 18650 lithium-ion batteries here for other purposes. In doing so, the Court of Appeals erroneously resolved factual disputes in favor of LG, rather than Fleming as the nonmoving party.

The majority also appears to place import on its observation that it “was third-parties that supplied [Appellant] with the batteries at issue.” (Op. at 4.) However, the same was true in *Ford* – both vehicles were brought into Montana and Minnesota by third parties. *See Ford Motor Co.*, 592 U.S. at 366, 141 S.Ct. at 1029. But that did not prevent the exercise of personal jurisdiction in *Ford*. Nor does it in South Carolina. *See NV Sumatra Tobacco Trading, Co.*, 379 S.C. at 90, 666 S.E.2d at 223 (finding minimum contacts existed “[r]egardless of how the [product] arrived in South Carolina” due to forum contacts sufficient enough that defendant could reasonably anticipate suit in South Carolina). The *Ford* court found jurisdiction was appropriate based on Ford’s “systematically servi[ng] a market” for its products in those states. *Ford Motor Co.*, 592 U.S. at 365, 141 S.Ct. at 1028. Here, Respondent does not deny systematically serving a market in South Carolina for lithium-ion battery products. And, importantly, Respondent does not deny serving a market here for its 18650 lithium-ion batteries. It only denies serving a standalone consumer battery market.

The majority overlooks these important distinctions, views them in the light most favorable to Respondent, and fails to analyze whether Respondent’s substantial contacts in South Carolina “are related enough to the plaintiff’s suit.” *Id.* at 371, 141 S.Ct. at 1031. The relatedness test only requires that the “relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation” is close enough

to support jurisdiction. *Id.* at 371, 141 S.Ct. at 1032. The majority frames the issue far too narrowly focusing only on whether Respondent served a standalone market rather than whether it served a larger market to such an extent that it is not unfair to subject Respondent to suit here. In doing so the majority ignores other factors that “may be relevant in assessing the link between the defendant’s contact and the plaintiff’s suit.” *Id.* at 371, 141 S.Ct. at 1031. Here those factors can include the plaintiff’s residence, where he purchased/used the product, where he was hurt, and the uncontroverted allegations that Respondent knew of this particular unauthorized use of its product in South Carolina and did nothing within its South Carolina supply chain to preclude unauthorized resale to the standalone market. *See id.* at 371, 141 S.Ct. at 1032. (observing that a plaintiff’s place of injury and purchase are relevant to the relatedness inquiry).

The majority did not discuss the reasoning of those decisions or explain why South Carolina should reject the widely adopted view that purposeful forum contacts tied to the distribution of lithium-ion batteries—including but not limited to, sending shipments of batteries through the Port of Charleston—is enough to establish specific jurisdiction, even where the manufacturer denies authorizing or selling these 18650 batteries for use as standalone consumer products.

**III. The decision below conflicts with *State v. NV Sumatra Tobacco Trading Co.*, 379 S.C. 81, 666 S.E.2d 218 (2008).**

The Court of Appeals’ decision conflicts with this Court’s decision in *State v. NV Sumatra Tobacco Trading Co.*, 379 S.C. 81, 666 S.E.2d 218 (2008). The panel affirmed dismissal because LG “did not design, manufacture, distribute, advertise, or sell the 18650 Batteries as standalone, replaceable batteries for consumer use” and because the import evidence “only shows unrelated business activities,” concluding that “any intermediary action that allowed for the 18650 Batteries

to end up in South Carolina ... was not on behalf of or authorized by LG.” (Op. at pp. 5–6.) That reasoning cannot be squared with *Sumatra*.

Respectfully, it was error for the Court of Appeals to conclude that a foreign manufacturer’s authorization of use of a product is the touchstone of a specific jurisdictional analysis. It is not. In *State v. NV Sumatra Tobacco Trading Co.*, the foreign manufacturer of cigarettes argued it sold abroad to an “independent reseller” and did not itself distribute cigarettes into the United States. 379 S.C. 81, 86, 666 S.E.2d 218, 220 (2008). This Court in *Sumatra* nevertheless affirmed specific jurisdiction, holding that minimum contacts existed “as a whole and, via the stream of commerce theory,” because Sumatra manufactured for the U.S. market and its brand was in fact sold in South Carolina. *Id.* at 90, 666 S.E.2d at 222-223.

The constitutional inquiry from *Sumatra* turns on whether the “defendant’s [own] conduct and connection with the forum state are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there” – not whether the defendant directly authorized the last step in the distribution chain. *See id.* at 89-90, 666 S.E.2d at 222. The record here was sufficient to satisfy *Sumatra*: LG manufactured lithium-ion cells (including 18650 batteries) for the U.S. market and, specifically South Carolina, distributed them through its own distribution chain, and repeatedly shipped “LITHIUM ION BATTERY” products through the Port of Charleston with the with the expectation they are sold in South Carolina. (R. pp. 184–243, 292–386; see R. p. 243). The panel’s rule—that no specific jurisdiction lies absent proof LG authorized “standalone” consumer sales of these lithium ion batteries—raises the intended use defense on the merits to jurisdictional prerequisites that *Sumatra* does not impose. Whether retail sellers or consumers used these batteries outside LG’s preferred use is not what *Sumatra* asks; the question is whether LG’s own conduct purposefully targeted the forum. It did.

**IV. Exercise of jurisdiction comports with fairness and South Carolina’s interests.**

For the reasons discussed *supra*, Fleming has satisfied the power prong of the specific jurisdiction analysis. While both the circuit court and the Court of Appeals’ declined to address the fairness prong of the due process analysis, it is easily met here.

Under the fairness prong, the court must consider the following factors: (1) the duration of the defendant's activity in this State; (2) the character and circumstances of its acts; (3) the inconvenience to the parties; and (4) the State's interest in exercising jurisdiction. *Cribb v. Spatholt*, 382 S.C. 490, 500, 676 S.E.2d 714, 719 (Ct. App. 2009). LG does not dispute its activity in South Carolina. It has litigated and defended similar claims here a number of times, and its subsidiary was authorized to transact business here. It would not be inconvenient to LG to participate in this litigation in South Carolina. Last, given the extensive injury to Fleming, a South Carolina resident, South Carolina has a substantial interest in exercising jurisdiction over a claim involving its citizen, for a product sold, used, and doing harm in our State.

**CONCLUSION**

For these reasons, Petitioner Fleming respectfully requests this Court issue a writ of certiorari to review the final decision of the Court of Appeals.

Most respectfully,

**RICHARDSON THOMAS, LLC**

By: *s/Chris Moore*  
Chris Moore (SCB: 77934)  
383 W. Cheves Street  
Florence, SC 29501  
T: 803.281.8147  
[chris@richardsonthomas.com](mailto:chris@richardsonthomas.com)

**SMITH & GRIFFITH LLP**

John Griffith (SCB: 6729)  
1102 North Main Street  
Anderson, South Carolina 29621  
T: 864.222.2293  
[john@griffithlawyer.com](mailto:john@griffithlawyer.com)

Florence, South Carolina

*Attorneys for Petitioner Reid Fleming*