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SC Court of Appeals

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In the Court of Appeals

APPEAL FROM CHARLESTON COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas

The Honorable Maite Murphy
Circuit Court Judge

Appellate Case No. 2023-000029

Rebecca Turisk,

Appellant,

v.

Dennis K. Schimpf, M.D. and
Sweetgrass Plastic Surgery, LLC,

Respondents.

APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR REHEARING

Pursuant to Rule 221(a), SCACR, Appellant Rebecca Turisk, through her undersigned counsel, hereby petitions this Honorable Court for a rehearing in connection with the unpublished opinion issued in this case (Opinion No. 2025-UP-349), filed October 15, 2025, attached hereto. Appellant respectfully submits that the following points have been overlooked or misapprehended by the Court:

I. The lower court’s Assumption of the Risk Jury Instruction was confusing to the jury, prejudicial to Appellant, and affected the outcome of the trial.

In the present case, this Court correctly held that “the trial court erred in charging the jury as to assumption of risk because it was inapplicable to the facts of this case *and risked confusing the jury.*” (Emphasis added). However, Appellant respectfully submits that this Court erred in holding that “the erroneous instruction was not prejudicial because it did not affect the outcome of

the trial.” A closer review of the record and related case law establishes that the assumption of the risk instruction, particularly when viewed “as a whole in light of the issues and evidence presented at trial,” was indeed confusing and affected the outcome in this trial.

“A jury charge consisting of irrelevant and inapplicable principles may confuse the jury and constitutes reversible error where the jury’s confusion affects the outcome of the trial.” *Berberich v. Jack*, 392 S.C. 278, 285, 709 S.E.2d 607, 611 (2011). “It is reversible error to charge a correct principle of law as governing a case when such principle is inapplicable to the issues on trial.” *Miller v. Schmid Labs., Inc.*, 307 S.C. 140, 142-43, 414 S.E.2d 126, 127 (1992). “In reviewing jury charges for error, we must consider the court’s jury charge as a whole *in light of the evidence and issues presented at trial.*” *State v. Perry*, 440 S.C. 396, 403, 892 S.E.2d 273 (2023) (Emphasis in original).

Here, the jury charge, *when viewed as a whole in light of the evidence and issues presented at trial*, was clearly prejudicial to Appellant. From the outset of trial, Appellant warned that allowing Defendants to center their case on assumption of the risk would mislead the jury. (R. pp. 164:14-169:19). Defendants sought to introduce evidence of Ms. Turisk’s informed consent to support their assumption of the risk theory. (R. pp. 166:1-6). In response, Appellant filed a Motion in Limine arguing that such evidence was irrelevant to a breach of standard of care claim and would mislead the jury to believe that by consenting to the procedure, Ms. Turisk had consented to injuries caused by Defendants’ negligence. (R. pp. 52-55; 164:14-169:19; *see also* Appellant’s Final Brief, pp. 2-5).

In support of her Motion in Limine, Appellant’s counsel cited extensive authority from South Carolina and other states, demonstrating the distinction between informed consent and medical malpractice claims. (R. pp. 52-55; 164:14-169:19; Appellant’s Final Brief, pp. 2-5).

Among these authorities, Ms. Turisk's trial counsel cited the highly instructive case of *Hayes v. Camel*, wherein the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that evidence of a plaintiff's consent "could only serve to confuse the jury because the jury could conclude, contrary to the law and evidence, that consent to the surgery was tantamount to consent to the injury which resulted from that surgery," and that a jury "could conclude that consent amounted to waiver, which is plainly wrong." *Hayes v. Camel*, 283 Conn. 475, 486, 927 A.2d 880, 889 (Conn. 2007).

The trial court initially agreed with Appellant, correctly ruling that assumption of risk was not relevant, nor material, and verbally granted Appellant's motion to exclude such evidence, which, if permitted, would have allowed Defendants to develop their assumption of the risk theory. (Trial Tr. 165:16-22). Despite this ruling, however, Defendants' counsel continued to argue the issue, complaining that assumption of risk was "*a central tenet of our defense in this case.*" (Trial Tr. 166:2-3). Defendants' counsel incorrectly insisted that evidence of informed consent was relevant whenever assumption of risk was pled as an affirmative defense, citing *Faile v. Bycura*, 289 S.C. 398, 346 S.E.2d 528 (1986). (Trial Tr. 165:2-8; 166:2-15).

In response, Ms. Turisk's trial counsel once again noted that the issue of informed consent is irrelevant and would be highly misleading and confusing to a jury, who was likely to interpret it to mean that Ms. Turisk had signed off on any and all possible complications, including any injuries caused by Defendants' negligent acts. (R. p. 166:17 – p. 167:13; p. 168:4-12).

Based on Defendants' misreading of *Faile*, however, the trial court reversed itself, stating "Well, it looks like the Supreme Court has told us differently, so I think since they pled it as an affirmative defense, the jury will be given a jury instruction regarding the two different standards." (Trial Tr. 168:13-19). The court added that the jury would "have the opportunity to make that distinction," abdicating its duty to instruct the jury only on applicable law and requiring the jury

to sort applicable from inapplicable law, which is the trial court's exclusive province and not that of a lay jury. (Id.)

As this Court's opinion acknowledges, "the trial court erred in charging the jury as to assumption of risk because it was inapplicable to the facts of this case and risked confusing the jury." The prejudicial impact of allowing Defendants to introduce informed consent evidence throughout trial to support their inapplicable assumption of risk theory coupled with instructing the jury on that inapplicable doctrine cannot be overstated. "[T]he purpose of jury instructions is to enlighten the jury as to what law is applicable to a certain state of facts in order that a just, fair and proper verdict can be reached." *State v. Peer*, 320 S.C. 546, 554, 466 S.E.2d 375, 380 (Ct. App. 1995). When a trial court instructs a jury on a defendant's "central defense" that has no application in a medical malpractice action, allowing the Defendant to develop that theory throughout trial, the instruction does the opposite. It confuses rather than enlightens. Here, prejudice is not speculative; it is certain and was foreseeable. Indeed, Plaintiff's counsel warned of this very outcome if Defendants were permitted to develop their assumption of the risk theory and the jury was instructed on assumption of the risk.

The assumption of risk instruction did not merely risk confusing the jury about whether Dr. Schimpf breached the standard of care; it infected their analysis of causation itself. By presenting informed consent evidence alongside an assumption of risk instruction, and by developing this theory throughout trial, Defendants led the jury to believe that Ms. Turisk's acknowledgment of generalized surgical risks severed the causal link between Dr. Schimpf's breach and her injuries.

This erroneous instruction was confusing to the jury, prejudicial to Appellant, and affected the outcome in this case. As this Court acknowledged in its Opinion, "Dr. Schimpf breached a duty

of care he owed Turisk by selecting a contraindicated technique.” Yet despite every expert testifying that Dr. Schimpf disrupted the blood flow *during surgery* using this contraindicated technique—and that this disruption caused Ms. Turisk’s necrosis and infection—the jury found no causation.¹ (See Appellant’s Final Brief, at pp. 6-9, 23).

This inconsistent verdict demonstrates precisely the type of confusion that *Hayes v. Camel* predicted, and counsel for Ms. Turisk warned against from the outset of trial, allowing the jury to conclude that “consent to the surgery was tantamount to consent to the injury which resulted from that surgery,” that “consent amounted to waiver.” 927 A.2d 880 (Conn. 2007). Viewed “as a whole *in light of the evidence and issues presented at trial*,” the instruction that this Court recognized “risked confusing the jury” did exactly that—with prejudicial effect that confused the jury and affected the outcome of the trial. Accordingly, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court grant rehearing, find the assumption of risk instruction was prejudicial error, and remand this case for a new trial on the merits.

II. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that “By reaching proximate cause, the jury rejected the theory that Turisk assumed the risk of her injuries.”

Respectfully, this reasoning is circular. Here, the Court points to the verdict itself to conclude that the verdict was not affected by the trial court’s erroneous instruction. But a jury can find breach while still believing the plaintiff “assumed” the risk of complications, with that belief

¹ Defendants’ own medical experts attributed the complications which Ms. Turisk suffered (i.e., necrosis and infection) to Dr. Schimpf’s performance of the surgical procedure. Specifically, all of the experts acknowledged that Dr. Schimpf had disrupted the blood supply to Ms. Turisk’s breasts *during* the course of surgery using what the jury deemed a contraindicated technique, which deviated from the standard of care, and that it was the disruption of blood supply during surgery which caused the necrosis and infection. (Trial Tr., R. p. 371:1-19; pp. 568:1—570:7, citing Lefkowitz Depo. Tr., R. p. 854:18-24 and p. 855:3-6; Trial Tr., R. p. 553:7-12; p. 507:9-16; p. 516:15-25; p. 357:5-15; and p. 574:22-25).

improperly severing the causal analysis. As our Supreme Court noted in *Berberich v. Jack*, “A jury charge consisting of irrelevant and inapplicable principles may confuse the jury.” 392 S.C. 278, 285, 709 S.E.2d 607, 611 (2011). That’s precisely what happened here, and what Appellants trial counsel foresaw happening before the trial even started, and is further reinforced by courts across this country, which acknowledge that, within the context of medical malpractice actions like the present case, issues of informed consent “could only serve to confuse the jury because the jury could conclude, contrary to the law and the evidence, that consent to the surgery was tantamount to consent to the injury which resulted from that surgery.” *Hayes v. Camel*, 927 A.2d 880, 283 Conn. 475 (Conn. 2007).

As described above, the trial court’s erroneous and inapplicable assumption of risk instruction infected the jury’s analysis as to assumption of the risk. This is particularly evident where every expert, including Defendants’ plastic surgery expert, Dr. Lefkowitz, and Defendants’ infectious disease expert, Dr. Joseph, testified that Dr. Schimpf disrupted blood flow *during* surgery using what the jury found to be a contraindicated technique that deviated from the standard of care, and that this disruption caused the necrosis and infection.

Dr. Hultman testified “when you remove blood supply to the breast, that’s when you get fat necrosis.” (Trial Tr. 371:16-17). Dr. Lefkowitz acknowledged blood flow “was disrupted *during the surgery*.” (Trial Tr. 570:7). Indeed, as this Court’s Opinion acknowledges, “Dr Lefkowitz [Defendants’ Expert] conceded there was some disruption to the blood flow *during surgery* because fat necrosis *would not have occurred* absent some disruption.” (Emphasis added). Dr. Joseph admitted, “You can’t cure something that doesn’t have a blood flow, and the only way this was cured was by surgery, by removing it.” (Trial Tr. 514:22-25). Even Dr. Schimpf

acknowledged that without blood flow to the nipple, infection was inevitable. (Trial Tr. 457:20-23). (See Appellant’s Final Brief, pp. 6 -10 and15).

III. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Trial Court’s denial of Appellant’s Post-Trial Motions Based on its finding that “the evidence presented to the jury was susceptible to more than one inference.”

A. The Court’s Opinion Misstates the Record.

This Court’s Opinion states there was “conflicting evidence as to causation.” Respectfully, this misstates the record. The experts disagreed about whether the inferior pedicle technique was appropriate (breach), not about what caused the injuries (causation).

There was never any doubt at trial that Defendants caused Plaintiffs’ injuries. As noted in herein and in Appellant’s Final Briefs, Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ experts agreed that it was Dr. Schimpf who disrupted the blood supply to Plaintiff’s breasts *during surgery* and that it was this disruption in blood supply that *caused* the necrosis and infection. As this Court’s Opinion acknowledges, “Dr. Lefkowitz [Defendants’ Expert] conceded there was some disruption to the blood flow *during surgery* because fat necrosis *would not have occurred* absent some disruption.” (Emphasis added). It is also undisputed that neither Plaintiff, nor her caretakers, nor her subsequent physicians did anything to cause and/or contribute to Ms. Turisk’s injuries, and that the multiple post-operative procedures she has been forced to undergo as a result of these injuries, including debridements and mastectomies, were all medically necessary. (Trial Tr., R. p. 357:2-20; p. 566:17-19; pp. 520:22 – 521:3; pp. 471:25 – 472:2.; p. 573:4-17).

“Proximate cause is the efficient or direct cause; the thing that brings about the complained of injuries.” *McKnight v. S.C. Dept. of Corrections*, 385 S.C. 380, 386, 684 S.E.2d 566, 569 (Ct. App. 2009). In the present case, there was no controversy as to whether Dr. Schimpf caused Plaintiff’s injuries, but, rather, as to whether he deviated from the standard of care in doing so.

The jury unanimously found that he did. This Court’s very Opinion holds, that insofar as the breach of the standard of care is concerned, “the intention of the jury’s verdict was clear,” stating, “Dr. Schimpf breached a duty of care he owed Turisk by selecting a contraindicated technique.” It was error for the lower court to find that Plaintiff “did not prove her damages were proximately caused by Defendants’ breach,” when all of the evidence, including all the expert testimony in this case, establishes otherwise. (Order, at R. p. 5).

“Ordinarily proximate cause is a question for the jury, but when the evidence is susceptible to only one inference, it becomes a matter of law for the court.” *McKnight*, 385 S.C. at 387, 684 S.E.2d at 569; *Oliver v. S.C. Dept. of Highways & Public Transp.*, 309 S.C. 313, 317, 422 S.E.2d 128, 131 (1992); see also *Tuten v. Joel*, 410 S.C. 104, 116, 763 S.E.2d 54, 61 (Ct. App. 2014). Here, there could only be one inference from the evidence: Dr. Schimpf disrupted blood flow *during* surgery using what the jury found to be a contraindicated technique that deviated from the standard of care, and that this disruption caused the necrosis and infection. That is what the experts for both Plaintiff and Defendants testified to at trial.

It was error for the lower court to find that Plaintiff “did not prove her damages were proximately caused by Defendants’ breach,” when all of the evidence, including all the expert testimony in this case, establishes otherwise. (Order, at R. p. 5).

B. The Court of Appeals’ Opinion improperly heightened Appellant’s burden of proof.

This Court stated that “because the alleged breach was the selection of a contraindicated technique, Turisk had to prove that using an inferior pedicle elevated the risk of blood flow disruption so much that this outcome was foreseeable.” This misstates the applicable standard.

Proximate cause requires proof of: (1) causation in fact—the injury would not have occurred “but for” the defendant’s negligence; and (2) legal cause—foreseeability. *Oliver v. S.C.*

Dept. of Highways, 309 S.C. 313, 316, 422 S.E.2d 128, 130-31 (1992). Causation in fact is proven by establishing the injury would not have occurred “but for” the defendant’s negligence. *Id.* Legal cause is proven by establishing foreseeability, which is determined by looking to the natural and probable consequences of the complained-of act. *Vinson v. Hartley*, 324 S.C. 389, 400, 477 S.E.2d 715, 721 (Ct. App. 1996).

The law does not require proving the risk was “elevated [...] so much” compared to other techniques. It requires only that the harm be a natural and probable consequence of the breach itself. Here, both elements were established: (1) But for Dr. Schimpf’s disruption of blood supply during surgery, Ms. Turisk would not have suffered necrosis and infection; and (2) necrosis and infection were the natural and probable consequences of blood flow disruption, as every expert testified. Dr. Hultman testified, “when you remove blood supply to the breast, that’s when you get fat necrosis, or breast-tissue necrosis.” (Trial Tr. 371:16-17). Dr. Joseph confirmed, “You can’t cure something that doesn’t have a blood flow.” (Trial Tr. 514:22-25).

When a technique is contraindicated specifically because it risks blood flow disruption through scar tissue, and that exact risk materializes during employment of that contraindicated technique, which the jury deemed was a deviation of the standard of care, both causation and foreseeability are established as a matter of law.

C. The Court of Appeals’ Opinion mischaracterizes mitigation testimony as alternative causation.

This Court’s opinion points to Dr. Lefkowitz’s testimony about cutting a larger pedicle as creating a factual dispute. But this testimony addressed mitigation attempts, not alternative causation. As set forth above, Dr. Lefkowitz still admitted blood flow was disrupted *during the surgery* and that fat necrosis would not have occurred absent some disruption. He further conceded this was an “unfortunate complication *from this procedure.*” (Trial Tr. 553:7-12).

Attempted mitigation that fails is not an alternative inference. It is confirmation of causation. The Court cannot transform testimony defending the theoretical adequacy of a technique into evidence disputing actual causation. No expert—including Dr. Lefkowitz when confronted with his prior testimony—disputed that the surgery disrupted blood flow and caused the necrosis.

It was error for this Court to hold that “the evidence presented to the jury was susceptible to more than one inference.” When every expert—including Defendants’ own—testified that blood flow was disrupted during surgery using what the jury found to be a contraindicated technique, and that this disruption caused the necrosis, the evidence is susceptible to only one inference. As this Court’s Opinion acknowledges, “Dr. Lefkowitz [Defendants’ expert] conceded there was some disruption to the blood flow during surgery because fat necrosis would not have occurred absent some disruption.” (Emphasis added).

Because the evidence was susceptible to only one inference, it was error for the lower court to deny Appellant’s post-trial motions and error for this Court to affirm that denial. The verdict as to proximate cause is contrary to the weight of the evidence. Accordingly, Appellant respectfully request that this Court grant her petition for rehearing, reverse its decision, and remand this case for a new trial on the merits.

IV. The Court of Appeals’ Opinion incorrectly makes a credibility determination stating, “There was credible evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that the blood flow disruption was not caused by Dr. Schimpf’s use of an inferior pedicle.”

This violates the very standard the Court itself articulated in its Opinion. The Court correctly cited *RFT Mgmt. Co. v. Tinsley & Adams L.L.P.*, stating: “In deciding such motions, neither the trial court nor the appellate court has the authority to decide credibility issues or to resolve conflicts in the testimony or the evidence.” 399 S.C. 322, 332, 732 S.E.2d 166, 171 (2012) Yet immediately after citing this prohibition, the Court proceeded to find there was “credible”

evidence to support a conclusion that the blood flow disruption was not caused by Dr. Schimpf's use of an inferior pedicle. This is the exact credibility determination *RFT Mgmt. Co.* forbids.

Moreover, the Court mischaracterizes Dr. Lefkowitz's testimony by conflating two distinct subjects. The Court states: "On the other hand, Dr. Lefkowitz testified that even if 'not a drop of blood got through the scar,' Dr. Schimpf mitigated any increased risk of blood flow disruption by cutting a larger-than-standard pedicle. Thus, there was credible evidence to support the jury's conclusion that the blood flow disruption was not caused by Dr. Schimpf's use of an inferior pedicle."

The Court treats this testimony as addressing causation, but Dr. Lefkowitz was testifying about something entirely different: whether the inferior pedicle technique was **theoretically contraindicated** (a breach question). He testified that "even if you took that worst-case assumption" that "not a drop of blood got through the scar," the pedicle design was theoretically adequate. (R. 394:25-395:12). This was his defense of why selecting the technique met the standard of care—not testimony about what actually caused Ms. Turisk's injuries. The jury disagreed with him.

When Dr. Lefkowitz was forced to address what **actually happened** (causation), and confronted with his earlier deposition testimony, he was forced to concede that blood flow **was** "disrupted during the surgery" and that fat necrosis would not have occurred absent some disruption. (Full exchange and impeachment at Trial Tr., R. pp. 568:1-570:7, citing Lefkowitz Depo. Tr., R. p. 854:18-24, and p. 855:3-6; Appellants Final Brief, pp. 6-10). He further acknowledged this was an "unfortunate complication *from this procedure.*" (Trial Tr. 553:7-12). As noted in this Court's Opinion, "Dr. Lefkowitz [Defendants' expert] conceded there was some

disruption to the blood flow *during surgery* because fat necrosis *would not have occurred* absent some disruption.” (Emphasis added).

These are not conflicting statements requiring reconciliation. They address different questions:

1. **Breach question:** Was selecting the inferior pedicle technique theoretically defensible? (Dr. Lefkowitz testified, yes, because, in his opinion, the pedicle was designed to be large enough.)
2. **Causation question:** Did the surgery disrupt blood flow causing necrosis? (Dr. Lefkowitz testified blood flow was disrupted during surgery and necrosis wouldn’t have occurred without it.)

As noted above, the Court cannot transform testimony defending the theoretical adequacy of a technique into evidence disputing actual causation. No expert—including Dr. Lefkowitz when confronted with his prior testimony—disputed that the surgery disrupted blood flow and caused the necrosis. Respectfully, the Court’s characterization of this selected testimony as creating a causation dispute constitutes both an improper credibility determination and a misstatement of the record. Because the Court made an improper credibility determination and treated theoretical breach testimony as creating a causation dispute, it should reverse and remand for a new trial.

V. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that “the trial court did not err in denying Turisk’s post-trial motion because evidence supports the jury’s finding that to the extent Dr. Schimpf breached the standard of care in his treatment of Turisk, the breach did not cause Turisk’s injuries.”

For the reasons set forth in Sections III and IV above, this holding is wholly unsupported by the evidence and controlled by an error of law. When every expert—including Defendants’ own—testified that blood flow was disrupted *during surgery* using what the jury found to be a contraindicated technique, and that this disruption *caused the necrosis*, the evidence establishes

causation as a matter of law. *McKnight v. S.C. Dept. of Corrections*, 385 S.C. 380, 387, 684 S.E.2d 566, 569 (Ct. App. 2009).

VI. The Court of Appeals erred in holding “the trial court did not err in finding that the jury’s verdict was consistent because the intention of the jury’s verdict was clear—Dr. Schimpf breached the duty of care he owed Turisk by selecting a contraindicated technique, but the breach did not cause the damages suffered.”

This holding overlooks the internal contradiction in the verdict. As this Court recognized, the inferior pedicle technique was contraindicated because it “failed to account for existing scar tissue below each nipple, which limited blood flow to the nipple-areolar complex.” The technique was contraindicated precisely because it posed unacceptable risks of blood flow disruption.

The verdict requires accepting two irreconcilable propositions: (1) Dr. Schimpf was wrong to select a technique because it risked blood flow disruption through scar tissue, and (2) when blood flow disruption occurred through scar tissue during use of that technique, it was unrelated to his selection. If the technique selection didn’t matter—if any technique would have caused the same problem—then selecting the inferior pedicle would not constitute a breach. Conversely, if selecting it was a breach because of its specific risks, then those risks materializing establishes causation.

“[W]hen a verdict is so confused that the jury’s intent is unclear, the safest and best course is to order a new trial.” *Johnson v. Parker*, 279 S.C. 132, 135, 303 S.E.2d 95, 97 (1983). Here, the verdict’s internal contradiction—finding breach for selecting a risky technique while finding that risk’s materialization unrelated—demonstrates the confusion created by the erroneous assumption of risk instruction.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, as well as those reasons stated in Appellant’s Final Brief and at oral argument, Appellant respectfully requests that this Honorable Court grant her petition, reverse

the trial court, and remand this case for a new trial on the merits. It was error for the trial court to charge the jury as to assumption of the risk. The charge was prejudicial to Appellant, confusing to the jury, and affected the outcome of the trial. It was also error for the trial court to deny Appellant's post-trial motion for a new trial, or in the alternative for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, where the verdict as to proximate cause was contrary to the weight of the evidence at trial, indicating that the jury was confused.

[Signatures on following page]

Respectfully submitted,

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October 30, 2025
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**THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(D)(2), SCACR.**

**THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals**

Rebecca Turisk, Appellant,

v.

Dennis K. Schimpf, M.D. and Sweetgrass Plastic
Surgery, LLC, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000029

Appeal from Charleston County
Maite Murphy, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-349
Heard April 10, 2025 – Filed October 15, 2025

AFFIRMED

Mark C. Tanenbaum and Whitney Allison Smith Rogers,
both of Mark C. Tanenbaum, PA, of Mt. Pleasant;
Elizabeth Middleton Burke, Misty Black O'Neal, and
Theodore Augustus Constantine Hargrove, II, all of
Rogers, Patrick, Westbrook & Brickman, LLC, of Mount
Pleasant; Jesse Sanchez, of The Law Office of Jesse
Sanchez, LLC, of Mount Pleasant; and William Tyler
Robinson, of Ty Robinson Law Firm, LLC, of Charleston,
all for Appellant.

Todd W. Smyth and Allie Aleece Maples, both of Smyth Whitley, LLC, of Charleston, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: In this medical malpractice action, Appellant Rebecca Turisk assigns error to the trial court charging the jury on assumption of risk. Turisk also appeals the trial court's denial of her motion for a new trial or in the alternative, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) because (1) the verdict as to proximate cause was contrary to the weight of the evidence, (2) Turisk's criticism of Respondent Dr. Dennis K. Schimpf's postoperative care did not amount to a second distinct theory of liability, and (3) the jury's verdict was inconsistent and demonstrates the jury was confused. We affirm.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Turisk commenced the underlying medical malpractice action against Respondents,¹ alleging Dr. Schimpf selected a contraindicated surgical technique for her breast reduction and implant removal surgery, which resulted in necrosis, infection, and ultimately a double mastectomy and reconstructive surgeries. Specifically, Turisk alleged the technique Dr. Schimpf used was contraindicated for her surgery because it failed to account for existing scar tissue below each nipple, which limited blood flow to the nipple-areolar complex (NAC).

On November 1, 2016, Dr. Schimpf performed an implant removal, breast reduction, and breast lift on Turisk using the "inferior pedicle" technique.² In the first three weeks following surgery, Turisk testified she experienced fevers, noticed drainage and odor from her breasts, and that her incision opened. The patient notes from those weeks provided that Turisk's right NAC was very bruised and that an eschar (hardened dead tissue over a deep wound) had formed, but there was no discharge, warmth, or redness. Eventually, Turisk went to the emergency room when the incision opened on her right breast. Turisk received IV antibiotics and was sent home to follow-up at Sweetgrass. The patient note from the following day

¹ Sweetgrass Plastic Surgery, LLC, and Dennis K. Schimpf, MD are Respondents. Dr. Schimpf owns Sweetgrass Plastic Surgery, and Turisk was seen and treated by Dr. Schimpf and other Sweetgrass Plastic Surgery employees.

² During the breast reduction surgery, most of the tissue surrounding the NAC is removed. The surgeon leaves a strip of tissue, the "pedicle", to maintain blood supply to the NAC. An inferior pedicle goes downward from the NAC to the bottom of the breast.

indicated that the right incision had closed, and Dr. Schimpf "prophylactically" prescribed a round of antibiotics. Dr. Schimpf debrided³ the tissue on the right NAC and noted an odor coming from the surrounding underlying tissue, "which was open and draining," but he did not notice any internal spread of infection. Dr. Schimpf prescribed a solution to control odor and "clean up" the region.

On December 3, Turisk entered inpatient care at the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) and remained there for five days. Turisk had developed an infection, fat necrosis,⁴ and an open wound on her right NAC. Unfortunately, the breast tissue could not be saved, resulting in Turisk having to undergo a double mastectomy and five reconstructive surgeries.

Turisk brought the underlying action against Respondents. Turisk's expert witness, Dr. Charles Hultman, testified he believed Dr. Schimpf breached the standard of care by using a contraindicated surgical technique. In his opinion, the inferior pedicle technique compromised blood supply to the NAC and part of the breast because the tissue preserved to maintain blood flow—the pedicle—directed blood through Turisk's existing scars and blood could not pass through scar tissue. Dr. Hultman opined the inferior pedicle technique would be "extremely rare" in cases involving scar tissue like Turisk's because it would be "a dangerous operation . . . that would have a high chance of failure." Dr. Hultman described other techniques that could have "greatly improve[d] the safety of the operation and [ensured] success." However, Dr. Hultman acknowledged on cross-examination that "a patient can experience fat necrosis and nipple loss even when the surgeon has done everything according to the standard of care" and that necrosis can occur regardless of where the incisions were made. Finally, Dr. Hultman testified that he did not believe any of Turisk's actions caused or accelerated the infection.

Dr. Schimpf then offered Dr. Todd Lefkowitz as an expert in plastic surgery. Dr. Lefkowitz testified that, in his opinion, Turisk's scars did not render the inferior pedicle technique a contraindicated choice because blood could flow through the scars. Dr. Lefkowitz further testified that Dr. Schimpf cut a larger pedicle than is standard to accommodate for the scar tissue and to ensure sufficient blood flow to the NAC. Dr. Lefkowitz conceded there was some disruption to the blood flow during surgery because fat necrosis would not have occurred absent some disruption;

³ Debridement cleans the area of nonviable tissue to allow a wound to heal.

⁴ Fat necrosis occurs when inadequate blood flow into or return from fatty tissue causes the tissue to die and release oil that metabolizes into a caustic alcohol, which can damage surrounding tissue.

however, he did not believe the use of the inferior pedicle technique as opposed to another technique caused the disruption. Dr. Lefkowitz further testified that known risks and complications of this surgery include loss of the NAC, infection, and the need for further, more complex surgery. Lastly, Dr. Lefkowitz agreed with other witnesses that Turisk did nothing to cause the infection or necrosis. All the experts testified to a reasonable degree of medical certainty.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Respondents, finding that Turisk proved by the preponderance of the evidence that Respondents deviated from the standard of care but failed to prove this deviation from the standard of care proximately caused Turisk's injuries. Turisk filed a post-trial motion for a new trial as to proximate cause and damages, or in the alternative, either a JNOV or a new trial absolute. The trial court denied the motion. This appeal followed.

LAW/ANALYSIS

I. Assumption of Risk Jury Instructions

Turisk argues the trial court erred in charging the jury on assumption of risk because a patient cannot assume the risk that a physician will deviate from the standard of care, and because assumption of risk goes to duty and there was no question a duty existed as a matter of law. Turisk further argues the charge was prejudicial because it confused the jury. We hold the charge was erroneous but not prejudicial.

"A jury charge consisting of irrelevant and inapplicable principles may confuse the jury and constitutes reversible error where the jury[']s confusion affects the outcome of the trial." *Cole v. Raut*, 378 S.C. 398, 404, 663 S.E.2d 30, 33 (2008). "An appellate court will not reverse the trial court's decision regarding jury instructions unless the trial court committed an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's ruling is based on an error of law or is not supported by the evidence." *Id.* (citation omitted). "An erroneous jury instruction . . . is not grounds for reversal unless the appellant can show prejudice from the erroneous instruction." *Id.* at 405, 663 S.E.2d at 33.

"Primary implied assumption of risk arises when the plaintiff impliedly assumes those risks that are *inherent* in a particular activity." *Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Prop. Regime*, 333 S.C. 71, 81, 508 S.E.2d 565, 570 (1998). "Primary implied assumption of risk is not a true affirmative defense[] but instead goes to the initial determination of whether the defendant's legal duty

encompasses the risk encountered by the plaintiff." *Id.*; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496A cmt. (c)(2) (1965) (stating that under implied assumption of risk, "the legal result is that the defendant is relieved of his duty to the plaintiff").

In its primary sense, implied assumption of risk focuses not on the plaintiff[']s conduct in assuming the risk, but on the *defendant's general duty of care* Clearly, primary implied assumption of risk is but another way of stating the conclusion that a plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case [of negligence] by failing to establish that a duty exists.

Davenport, 333 S.C. at 81, 508 S.E.2d at 570 (emphasis added) (quoting *Perez v. McConkey*, 872 S.W.2d 897, 902 (Tenn. 1994)). Primary assumption of risk is "really a principle of no duty, or no negligence, and so denies the existence of any underlying cause of action." W. Page Keeton et al., *Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts* § 68, at 496–97 (5th ed. 1984). In essence, defendants do not owe plaintiffs a duty of due care regarding common and known inherent risks—the classic example being that a baseball stadium owes no duty to plaintiffs injured by flying baseballs. Cf. *Hurst v. E. Coast Hockey League, Inc.*, 371 S.C. 33, 38, 637 S.E.2d 560, 562–63 (2006) ("Under the doctrine of implied primary assumption of risk, Respondents' duty of care did not encompass the risk involved. The risk of a hockey spectator being struck by a flying puck is inherent to the game of hockey and is also a common, expected, and frequent risk of hockey."); *Cole v. Boy Scouts of Am.*, 397 S.C. 247, 253, 725 S.E.2d 476, 479 (2011) ("Where a person chooses to participate in a contact sport, whatever the level of play, he assumes the risks inherent in that sport.").

Before surgery, Turisk signed a consent form acknowledging that "[a]lternative methods and therapies, their benefits, material risks and disadvantages" had been explained to her; she understood and accepted that the most likely risks and complications included infection and nipple/skin loss, among others; and she had been informed of the possible need for additional procedures postoperatively.

The trial court instructed the jury on the elements of assumption of risk and explained that:

In this case, [Respondents] contend[] that [primary] implied assumption of the risk applies. Primary implied assumption of risk arises when the plaintiff impliedly

assumes those risks that are inherent in a particular activity.

Primary implied assumption of the risk is not a trial affirmative defense, but instead goes to the initial determination of whether the defendant's legal duty encompasses the risk encountered by the plaintiff. In other words, it is simply a part of the initial negligence analysis.

In addition to its assumption of risk instruction, the trial court instructed the jury that: "despite [informed consent to a medical procedure], the defendant remains under a duty to comply with and meet the standard of care in choosing a surgical technique and performing that technique."

We hold the trial court erred in charging the jury as to assumption of risk because it was inapplicable to the facts of this case and risked confusing the jury. *Cole v. Raut*, 378 S.C. 398, 404, 663 S.E.2d 30, 33 (2008) ("A jury charge consisting of irrelevant and inapplicable principles may confuse the jury and constitutes reversible error where the jury[']s confusion affects the outcome of the trial."). Surgery is an inherently risky endeavor, and we recognize that patients may assume some risk when they agree to undergo surgery. In fact, our precedent does evidence that patients assume the risk of their chosen method of treatment—i.e., by electing to undergo surgery as opposed to another form of treatment. *See Faile v. Bycura*, 289 S.C. 398, 399, 346 S.E.2d 528, 529–30 (1986) ("When a patient seeks treatment by a particular type of practitioner, he may be held to have assumed the risk of the *method* of treatment of the particular school of thought chosen." (emphasis added)). However, the existence of a surgery's known inherent risks does not alter the physician's duty to exercise reasonable care, and the exercise of reasonable care includes selecting an appropriate surgical technique. *See Hoeffner v. The Citadel*, 311 S.C. 361, 368, 429 S.E.2d 190, 194 (1993) ("Reasonable care, in the context of professional negligence, requires the exercise of that degree of skill and care which is ordinarily employed by members of the profession under similar conditions and in like surrounding circumstances."); *Cole v. Raut*, 378 S.C. 398, 405, 663 S.E.2d 30, 33 (2008) (holding that though a patient consented to a vaginal birth after caesarian section procedure, the patient "did not simultaneously assume the risk of any danger specifically associated with a delayed C-section delivery").

Turisk claimed Dr. Schimpf violated the standard of care by selecting a contraindicated technique, a risk she neither consented to nor understood and appreciated. Turisk at no point consented to the risks associated with negligent

surgery. Keeton et al., *supra* § 68, at 485 ("It is not true that in any case where the plaintiff voluntarily encounters a known danger he necessarily consents to any future negligence of the defendant."). There is no testimony or indication that Turisk was aware of the different techniques Dr. Schimpf could have used to perform her surgery, nor is there any evidence that she consented to a particular technique. Moreover, even if she had consented to Dr. Schimpf's use of the inferior pedicle technique, there is no evidence that she fully understood and appreciated the risks of this technique compared to any other. See *Faile*, 289 S.C. at 399, 346 S.E.2d at 529 ("In order for the doctrine of assumption of the risk to apply, the injured party must have freely and voluntarily exposed himself to a known danger which he *understood and appreciated.*" (emphasis added))⁵; Keeton et al., *supra* § 68, at 487 ("[The plaintiff] must not only know of the facts which create the danger, but he must comprehend and appreciate the nature of the danger he confronts."). Turisk's decision to undergo surgery and consent to the inherent risks did not relieve Dr. Schimpf of his duty to select an appropriate technique and perform the surgery with due care. Thus, primary implied assumption of risk did not apply in this case and the trial court erred in charging the jury as to assumption of risk.

However, though the trial court erred in charging the jury on assumption of risk, we hold the erroneous instruction was not prejudicial because it did not affect

⁵ *Faile* and *Cole v. Raut* were decided under a prior framework when assumption of risk was an affirmative defense. Following the adoption of comparative negligence, see generally, *Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co.*, 303 S.C. 243, 399 S.E.2d 783 (1991); our supreme court had to reconcile the assumption of risk doctrine with comparative negligence. *Davenport*, 333 S.C. at 77, 508 S.E.2d at 568. ("*Nelson* made clear that a plaintiff's contributory negligence would no longer bar recovery unless such negligence exceeded that of the defendant. Not so clear was what would become of the defense of assumption of risk."). The court held express assumption of risk and primary implied assumption of risk are compatible with comparative negligence because they go to whether the defendant has a legal duty to the plaintiff. *Id.* at 79–82, 508 S.E.2d at 569–71. However, the court held secondary implied assumption of risk—which "arises when the plaintiff knowingly encounter[ed] a risk created by the defendant's negligence"—is *not* compatible with comparative negligence because it is "an absolute bar to recovery" and "may involve either reasonable or unreasonable conduct on the part of the plaintiff." *Id.* at 82, 87, 508 S.E.2d at 571, 573. Thus, because secondary assumption of risk may "require a plaintiff, who is fifty-percent or less at fault, to bear all of the costs of the injury," the court held it was "contrary to the premise of our comparative fault system." *Id.* at 86, 508 S.E.2d at 573.

the outcome of the trial. *See Cole v. Raut*, 378 S.C. 398, 405, 663 S.E.2d 30, 33 (2008) ("An erroneous jury instruction, however, is not grounds for reversal unless the appellant can show prejudice from the erroneous instruction."). The jury ultimately found that Dr. Schimpf's actions, although a deviation from the standard of care, did not proximately cause Turisk's injuries. Even without the assumption of risk instruction, the outcome would not change because, as the circuit court instructed the jury, assumption of risk contemplates whether a defendant's duty encompasses a particular risk. Inherent to the jury's finding that Dr. Schimpf breached the standard of care is a finding that Dr. Schimpf was *not* relieved of his duty of care to Turisk with regard to selecting a surgical technique and providing adequate postoperative care. *See Cole v. S.C. Elec. & Gas, Inc.*, 362 S.C. 445, 453, 608 S.E.2d 859, 863 (2005) ("Primary implied assumption of the risk arises when the plaintiff impliedly assumes risks inherent in a particular activity. It is not a true affirmative defense but is another way of stating there is no duty to the plaintiff." (citation omitted)). The jury may only reach proximate cause once the existence of a duty, the standard of care, and a breach of that standard have already been established. By reaching proximate cause, the jury rejected the theory that Turisk assumed the risk of her injuries. As discussed herein, the jury—within its purview and consistent with the evidence presented—did not find that the breach of the standard of care proximately caused the unfortunate injury in this case.

Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in charging the jury on assumption of risk but the error did not prejudice Turisk.

II. Post-trial Motion

Turisk asserts the trial court erred in denying her post-trial motion for a new trial or JNOV because all experts agreed that but for a disruption of blood supply to the NAC, Turisk would not have suffered her injuries, and all experts agreed that necrosis and infection were the natural and probable consequences of a disruption of blood supply. Turisk contends the evidence was susceptible to only one inference—a disruption to the NAC's blood supply resulted from the inferior pedicle technique that caused infection and necrosis. Turisk also argues that the jury's findings were inconsistent and demonstrated that the jury was confused because (1) the verdict was wholly unsupported by the evidence and (2) the assumption of risk charge was improper. Turisk notes the trial court compounded the error by relying on the assumption of risk doctrine in its order. We disagree.

"When reviewing the trial court's ruling on a motion for a directed verdict or a JNOV, this [c]ourt must apply the same standard as the trial court by viewing the

evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." *RFT Mgmt. Co. v. Tinsley & Adams L.L.P.*, 399 S.C. 322, 331–32, 732 S.E.2d 166, 171 (2012). "The trial court must deny a motion for a directed verdict or JNOV if the evidence yields more than one reasonable inference or its inference is in doubt." *Id.* at 332, 732 S.E.2d at 171. "Moreover, '[a] motion for JNOV may be granted only if no reasonable jury could have reached the challenged verdict.'" *Id.* (alteration in original) (quoting *Gastineau v. Murphy*, 331 S.C. 565, 568, 503 S.E.2d 712, 713 (1998)). "An appellate court will reverse the trial court's ruling only if no evidence supports the ruling below." *Id.* "In deciding such motions, neither the trial court nor the appellate court has the authority to decide credibility issues or to resolve conflicts in the testimony or the evidence." *Id.*

"Whether to grant a new trial is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge, and this decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is unsupported by the evidence or is controlled by an error of law." *Austin v. Stokes-Craven Holding Corp.*, 387 S.C. 22, 49, 691 S.E.2d 135, 149 (2010). "Verdicts which are irreconcilably inconsistent should not stand, and a new trial should be granted, because the parties and the judge 'should not be required to guess as to what a jury sought to render.'" *Id.* (quoting *Prego v. Hobart*, 287 S.C. 116, 118, 336 S.E.2d 725, 726 (Ct. App. 1985)). "However, '[i]t is the duty of the court to sustain verdicts when a logical reason for reconciling them can be found.'" *Id.* at 49–50, 691 S.E.2d at 149 (alteration in original) (quoting *Rhodes v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc.*, 249 S.C. 526, 530, 155 S.E.2d 308, 310 (1967)).

To succeed in a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff must establish (1) there was a doctor-patient relationship between the parties; (2) the health professional deviated from "generally accepted standards, practices, and procedures;" and (3) the deviation was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. *Brouwer v. Sisters of Charity Providence Hosps.*, 409 S.C. 514, 521, 763 S.E.2d 200, 203 (2014).

"Proximate cause requires proof of both causation in fact and legal cause." *Hurd v. Williamsburg County*, 353 S.C. 596, 611, 579 S.E.2d 136, 144 (Ct. App. 2003), *aff'd*, 363 S.C. 421, 611 S.E.2d 488 (2005). "Causation in fact is proved by establishing the plaintiff's injury would not have occurred 'but for' the defendant's negligence." *Id.* "Legal cause, in contrast to the 'but for' nature of causation in fact, is proved by establishing foreseeability. *Id.* "The standard by which foreseeability is determined is that of looking to the natural and probable consequences of the complained of act." *Id.* at 612, 579 S.E.2d at 144. "[I]f the accident would have happened as a natural and probable consequence, even in the absence of the alleged

breach, then a plaintiff has failed to demonstrate proximate cause." *Id.* "When one relies solely upon the opinion of medical experts to establish a causal connection between the alleged negligence and the injury, the experts must, with reasonable certainty, state that in their professional opinion, the injuries complained of most probably resulted from the defendant's negligence." *Turner v. Med. Univ. of S.C.*, 430 S.C. 569, 586–87, 846 S.E.2d 1, 10 (Ct. App. 2020) (quoting *McKaughan v. Upstate Lung & Critical Care Specialists, P.C.*, 421 S.C. 185, 190, 805 S.E.2d 212, 214 (Ct. App. 2017)).

Here, the trial court did not err in denying the post-trial motion because the evidence presented to the jury was susceptible to more than one inference. *See RFT Mgmt. Co.*, 399 S.C. at 332, 732 S.E.2d at 171 ("An appellate court will reverse the trial court's ruling only if no evidence supports the ruling below. In deciding such motions, neither the trial court nor the appellate court has the authority to decide credibility issues or to resolve conflicts in the testimony or the evidence." (citation omitted)). All the experts agreed that fat necrosis was caused by inadequate blood flow into the NAC, which can occur as a natural consequence of this surgery regardless of the technique used. But to satisfy the element of causation, Turisk was required to prove that Dr. Schimpf's *breach* caused the blood flow disruption that resulted in fat necrosis. Because the alleged breach was the selection of a contraindicated technique, Turisk had to prove that using an inferior pedicle elevated the risk of blood flow disruption so much that this outcome was foreseeable. *Hurd*, 353 S.C. at 611, 579 S.E.2d at 144 ("Proximate cause requires proof of both causation in fact and legal cause.").

The jury was presented with conflicting evidence as to causation. Dr. Hultman testified it would be "extremely rare" to use the inferior pedicle technique on a patient like Turisk because of "the knowledge ahead of time that there were serious risks to the nipple and to the breast tissues." On the other hand, Dr. Lefkowitz testified that even if "not a drop of blood got through the scar," Dr. Schimpf mitigated any increased risk of blood flow disruption by cutting a larger-than-standard pedicle. Thus, there was credible evidence to support the jury's conclusion that the blood flow disruption was not caused by Dr. Schimpf's use of an inferior pedicle. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Turisk's post-trial motion because evidence supports the jury's finding that, to the extent Dr. Schimpf breached the standard of care in his treatment of Turisk, the breach did not cause Turisk's injuries. *Curcio v. Caterpillar, Inc.*, 355 S.C. 316, 320, 585 S.E.2d 272, 274 (2003) ("In considering a JNOV, the trial judge is concerned with the existence of evidence, not its weight. When considering a JNOV, 'neither [an appellate] court, nor the trial court has authority to decide credibility issues or to resolve conflicts in

the testimony or the evidence." (alteration in original) (quoting *Reiland v. Southland Equip. Serv., Inc.*, 330 S.C. 617, 500 S.E.2d 145 (Ct. App. 1998)); *Geiger v. Checker Cab Co.*, 229 S.C. 39, 43, 91 S.E.2d 552, 554 (1956) ("The credibility of witnesses is peculiarly within the province of the jury.").

Further, the trial court did not err in finding that the jury's verdict was consistent because the intention of the jury's verdict was clear—Dr. Schimpf breached a duty of care he owed Turisk by selecting a contraindicated technique, but this breach did not cause the damages she suffered. *Daves v. Cleary*, 355 S.C. 216, 234, 584 S.E.2d 423, 432 (Ct. App. 2003) ("A jury's verdict should be affirmed if it is possible to do so and carry into effect the jury's clear intention."); *Austin*, 387 S.C. at 49, 691 S.E.2d at 149 ("Verdicts which are irreconcilably inconsistent should not stand, and a new trial should be granted, because the parties and the judge 'should not be required to guess as to what a jury sought to render.'" (quoting *Prego*, 287 S.C. at 118, 336 S.E.2d at 726)); *id.* at 49–50, 691 S.E.2d at 149 ("However, '[i]t is the duty of the court to sustain verdicts when a logical reason for reconciling them can be found.'" (alteration in original) (quoting *Rhodes*, 249 S.C. at 530, 155 S.E.2d at 310)); *see Vinson v. Hartley*, 324 S.C. 389, 411–12, 477 S.E.2d 715, 726–27 (Ct. App. 1996) (upholding a jury verdict finding the defendant did not proximately cause the plaintiff's injuries despite the defendant conceding she had breached her duty of care to the plaintiff).

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of Turisk's post-trial motion.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we hold the trial court erred in charging the jury on assumption of risk but the error did not prejudice Turisk, and we affirm the trial court's denial of Turisk's post-trial motion.

WILLIAMS, C.J., and GEATHERS and TURNER, JJ., concur.

RECEIVED

Oct 30 2025

SC Court of Appeals

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In the Court of Appeals

APPEAL FROM CHARLESTON COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas

The Honorable Maite Murphy
Circuit Court Judge

Appellate Case No. 2023-000029

Rebecca Turisk,

Appellant,

v.

Dennis K. Schimpf, M.D. and
Sweetgrass Plastic Surgery, LLC,

Respondents.

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, certify that, contemporaneous with filing, I have served *Appellant's Petition for Rehearing* on Respondents Dennis K. Schimpf, M.D. and Sweetgrass Plastic Surgery, LLC by email on October 30, 2025, addressed to their attorneys of record at the following AIS-designated email addresses:

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October 30, 2025



October 30, 2025

VIA FIRST CLASS MAIL AND EMAIL (ctappfilings@sccourts.org)

The Honorable Jenny Abbott Kitchings
Clerk, South Carolina Court of Appeals
1220 Senate Street
Columbia, SC 29201

RE: Rebecca Turisk, Appellant v. Dennis K. Schimpf, M.D. and
Sweetgrass Plastic Surgery, LLC, Respondents,
Appellate Case No. 2023-000029

Dear Ms. Kitchings:

Enclosed herewith, please find the following for filing with the Court:

1. Appellant Rebecca Turisk's *Petition for Rehearing*.
2. A copy of *Opinion No. 2025-UP-349*, filed on October 15, 2025 from which this *Petition for Rehearing* is made.
3. The corresponding *Proof of Service* evidencing service on all counsel of record via electronic mail.

A law firm check for the fifty dollar (\$50.00) filing fee has been placed in today's outgoing mail.

Thank you for your assistance with this matter. Should you have any questions or wish to discuss the filing, please do not hesitate to contact me directly.

Sincerely,

s/Jesse Sanchez

Jesse Sanchez (SC Bar 101906)

Enclosures (as stated)

Letter to J. Kitchings
Re: Turisk Petition for Rehearing
October 30, 2025
Page 2

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