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SC Court of Appeals

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF CHARLESTON

FILED
2025 JAN -9 PM 4:35

State of South Carolina,

JULIE J. ARMSTRONG
CLERK OF COURT

BY 63

v.

Brian Randall Sease,

Defendant.

Presiding Judge:
Solicitor(s):

Defendant's Attorney(s):

Date of Trial:
Court Reporter:

IN THE COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS
FOR THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

Warrant No(s): 2021A1010900442-44
Indictment No(s): 2023-GS-10-04239
2023-GS-10-04241
2023-GS-10-04244

**ORDER ON DEFENSE'S MOTION
FOR A NEW TRIAL OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE RE-SENTENCING**

Hon. Deadra L. Jefferson
Cassity Brewer, Esq.
Hunt Russell, Esq.
Benjamin A. Mack, Esq.
Kaitlyn Watson, Esq.
September 8-15, 2025
Cathy Young (September 8, 2025)
Jamie Bickett (September 9-15, 2025)

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for New Trial, or in the Alternative, Re-sentencing filed on September 25, 2025. The Court received the motion on September 26, 2025. The State's Response was filed October 13, 2025. Defendant's jury trial began September 8, 2025, the jury began deliberations on September 12, 2025, and returned a verdict on September 15, 2025. The Jury deliberated for a total of twelve (12) hours over the course of two (2) days. The jury was polled at the request of the Defense, to which all jurors answered affirmatively, and the verdict was received by the Court. The State was represented by Cassity Brewer, Esq. and Hunt Russell, Esq. of the Solicitor's Office. Defendant Sease was represented by Benjamin A. Mack, Esq. and Kaitlyn Watson, Esq.

Brian Randall Sease was charged with the following offenses: Murder (Indictment No.: 2023-GS-10-04239), Armed Robbery (Indictment No.: 2023-GS-10-04241) and Possession of a

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Weapon During the Commission of a Violent Crime (Indictment No.: 2023-GS-10-04244). These charges were indicted by the Charleston County Grand Jury on September 11, 2023.¹ On September 15, 2025, the jury found Brian Randall Sease ("Defendant") guilty of Voluntary Manslaughter, Armed Robbery, and Possession of a Weapon during the Commission of a Violent Crime. The Court heard extensive argument on sentencing including mitigation. This Court sentenced the Defendant to the South Carolina Department of Corrections for a period of thirty (30) years on Voluntary Manslaughter,² eighteen (18) years on Armed Robbery,³ and five (5) years on Possession of a Weapon during the Commission a Violent Crime⁴ to be served concurrently. The Court gave the Defendant credit for time served pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-40 to be calculated and applied by the State Department of Corrections. At the conclusion of the trial the Court asked for post-trial motions. The State and the Defense indicated they had no motions.

After careful review, the Court finds that Defendant's motion identifies no preserved, prejudicial, or cumulative error warranting a new trial or re-sentencing. This Court acted within its broad discretion, and the defense has not shown an abuse of discretion or that any ruling affected the verdict.⁵

¹ Mr. Sease had been in pretrial detention at the Charleston County Detention Center since October 30, 2021.

² A person convicted of voluntary manslaughter, a violent and most serious offense, can receive between two (2) and thirty (30) years. S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-50.

³ A person convicted of armed robbery, a violent and most serious offense, can receive between ten (10) and thirty (30) years, no part of which may be suspended or probation granted. S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-0330(A).

⁴ A person convicted of possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime can receive a mandatory five (5) years. S.C. Code Ann. § 16-23-0490.

⁵ "A trial judge has the discretion to grant or deny a motion for a new trial, and his decision will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion." *State v. Dean*, 427 S.C. 92, 101, 828 S.E.2d 243, 248 (Ct. App. 2019) (citing *State v. Simmons*, 279 S.C. 165, 166, 303 S.E.2d 857, 858 (1983)).

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MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

"Generally, the grant or refusal of a new trial is within the trial court's discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal without a clear abuse of that discretion." State v. Thompson, 420 S.C. 386, 404, 803 S.E.2d 44, 53 (Cl. App. 2017). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's ruling is based on an error of law, or the ruling is without evidentiary support. State v. Allen, 370 S.C. 88, 94, 634 S.E.2d 653, 656 (2006). "However, when there is competent evidence to sustain the jury's verdict, the judge may not substitute his judgment for that of the jury." Thompson, 420 S.C. at 404, 803 S.E.2d at 53.

The Defendant, by way of this post-trial motion, moves this Court for a new trial, or in the alternative, re-sentencing pursuant to Rule 29, SCRCrimP.⁶ The defense argues that cumulative constitutional error is based on a series of rulings and events that, in combination, deprived Defendant of due process and effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the defense contends: (1) that the Court's delayed consideration of pretrial motions⁷— including a continuance request based on a late-disclosed CPD supplemental report— impaired trial preparation, (2) that repeated,

⁶ Rule 29, SCRCrimP allows post-trial motions, and, in relevant part, states, "Except for motions for new trials based on after-discovered evidence, post-trial motions shall be made within ten (10) days after the imposition of the sentence." Rule 29(a), SCRCrimP.

⁷ The Defense made the following pretrial motions:

- (1) Motion for a Pre-trial Hearing on the Admissibility of Brian Seaso's Statement to Law Enforcement While in Custody. On September 8, 2025, during pretrial the parties advised the Court that the motion was Resolved.
- (2) Motion to Produce Records. On September 8, 2025, during pretrial the parties advised the Court that the motion was Resolved.
- (3) Motion to Suppress or Redact the 911 call, Glock Magazine, and Stanley Coleman's Body Worn Camera Video. On September 9, 2025, after full argument, the 911 call was admitted into evidence as State's Exhibit 25 over Defense's objection. On September 9, 2025, the Glock magazine was admitted into evidence as State's Exhibit 2 without objection. On September 9, 2025, Det. Stanley Coleman's body worn camera video was admitted into evidence as State's Exhibit 28 without objection.

The State made the following pretrial motions:

- (1) Motion to Admit Ballistic Evidence Tested by SLED. On September 9, 2025, the swabs from the gun that SLED tested were admitted into evidence as State's Exhibits 21-24 without objection.
- All pretrial motions were entertained prior to the beginning of trial. There are no Defense pretrial motions the Court failed to entertain or issue a ruling. Any evidentiary matters that were the subject of a pretrial motion or contemporaneous motion were heard in camera, full argument received and a full ruling on the record provided by the Court. The Court defers to the actual portions of the transcript which preserve the parties' objections and the Court's rulings:

sustained objections during the defense's opening remarks improperly constrained presentation and undermined counsel's credibility, (3) that the State was permitted to introduce a purported jail letter on redirect without allowing re-cross, limiting confrontation of new material, (4) that the Court's restrictions on speaking objections and reliance on Rule 18 prevented adequate record-making on complex hearsay issues, (5) that requiring efforts to refresh the cooperating codefendant's recollection outside the jury's presence impaired impeachment, (6) that the court improperly entertained the State's claim that the defense "opened the door" to SLED DNA evidence despite a prior agreement and discouraged creation of a record concerning that issue, (7) that limitations on defense expert testimony regarding ballistics, blood spatter, and reconstruction hindered presentation of the defense theory, and (8) that the Court's remark characterizing counsel's conduct as "nervous," along with frequent interruptions, further prejudiced the defense before the jury.

Trial judges have a wide discretion on courtroom management, decorum, ruling on parties' objections, and limiting witness testimony. See State v. Reyes, 432 S.C. 394, 401, 853 S.E.2d 334, 337 (2020) ("The conduct of a criminal trial is left largely to the sound discretion of the trial judge, who will not be reversed in the absence of a prejudicial abuse of discretion"); State v. Gleaton, 444 S.C. 394, 408, 906 S.E.2d 630, 637 (Ct. App. 2024); State v. Singleton, 438 S.C. 629, 634, 885 S.E.2d 415, 418 (Ct. App. 2023).

Continuance decisions were well within the court's discretion, and the defense acknowledges South Carolina's standard for reversal of continuance denials⁸ and that only extraordinary last-minute disclosures that materially alter the defense can warrant relief. Def. Mot. 5. Here, the supplemental report memorialized a proffer meeting and largely repeated matters

⁸ Reversals of the refusal of a continuance are about as "rare as the proverbial hens' teeth." State v. Williams, 321 S.C. 455, 459, 469 S.E.2d 49, 51 (1996); State v. Lyitchfield, 230 S.C. 405, 409, 95 S.E.2d 857, 859 (1957).

already known in discovery.⁹ The record reflects that the State sent the report the evening before trial and the Court indicated the issue could have been addressed earlier, not that the Court refused to hear motions altogether. The motion was heard, full argument was entertained, and the Court issued its timely ruling on the motion. The defense failed to demonstrate that they were unable to proceed, or specific prejudice resulting from the timing of the disclosure.

The Court properly sustained objections to argumentative or conclusory remarks not framed as expected proof. The Defense concedes the Court instructed counsel to state what "the evidence will show," and counsel complied after several objections, proceeding to deliver the opening. Def. Mot. 7. The Defense cites no exclusion of content, only form, and speculates about perceived credibility effects. Moreover, opening statements are not evidence, and the Court's rulings did not restrict the Defense's theory or anticipated proof. State v. Brown, 277 S.C. 203, 204, 284 S.E.2d 777, 778 (1981) ("An opening statement serves to inform the jury of the general nature of the action and defenses involved in a case so they will be better prepared to understand the evidence presented"); State v. Harris, 275 S.C. 463, 465, 272 S.E.2d 636, 638 (1980) (holding that the scope of the opening statement is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge).

The Court acted within its discretion in managing the scope of redirect and re-cross. Rule 611, SCRE. The extent of redirect examination is subject to the court's discretion. Ward v. Epting, 290 S.C. 547, 559, 351 S.E.2d 867, 874 (Ct. App. 1986) (citing State v. Tyner, 273 S.C. 646, 654, 258 S.E.2d 559, 563 (1979)); See also Rule 611(d), SCRE. Following redirect examination by the State, and the introduction of State's Exhibit 115, the defense sought to re-cross the witness. The Court ruled that re-cross would be permitted absent an objection from the State. The State interposed an objection, and the Court declined to allow re-cross of the witness as no new matter

⁹ The record will reflect that the State provided the Case Supplemental Report to Mr. Mack immediately upon receipt and emailed to Mr. Mack on September 7, 2025, at 5:03 p.m.

was introduced. Moreover, the procedure for questioning a witness is direct, cross, and redirect with the party having the burden of proof concluding the examination of the witness. The defense contends the State raised a new issue during redirect examination and that he was therefore entitled to re-cross. However, whether redirect examination introduces new matter and whether re-cross is warranted are determinations committed to the discretion of the trial court. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gould, 266 S.C. 521, 533, 224 S.E.2d 715, 720 (1976). The State conducted direct exam of the witness, the Defense raised a new issue in its cross examination of the witness and the State conducted redirected to rehabilitate its witness on the issue raised in cross examination. The Court cannot discern an abuse of discretion in declining to allow the Defense re-cross of the witness. It should be noted that the Court would have adhered to the same procedural posture if it was the State instead of the Defense making the same request.

Moreover, the Defense acknowledges no contemporaneous objection was made when the State questioned Derrick Stewart about State's Exhibit 115, which is identified as an undated letter written by Defendant to Stewart. Def. Mot. 9. Additionally, State's Exhibit 115 came into evidence without objection. Issues not contemporaneously objected to are not preserved for review, and the Court finds nothing that would warrant relief despite the lack of preservation. See State v. China; 312 S.C. 335, 342, 440 S.E.2d 382, 386 (Ct. App. 1993).

The Court's management of "speaking objections" did not deprive the defense of a record or fair trial. The Defense cites State v. Washington 424 S.C. 374, 818 S.E.2d 459 (2018) for the proposition that a "no speaking objections" policy can be "problematic," yet Washington was reversed on other grounds and—even by the defense's account—recognized the trial court retains discretion and that the no-speaking-objection policy was not applied to the particular issue raised. Def. Mot. 9-10. Here, the Court consistently enforced orderly proceedings pursuant to Rule 18,

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SCRCrimP¹⁰ and directed counsel to avoid argument after rulings, which is squarely within the Court's authority. See State v. Johnson 439 S.C. 331, 340, 887 S.E.2d 127, 131. Defense's assertion of a "Catch-22" is belied by its failure to identify a specific proffer the Court refused to accept or a ruling where the Court declined to hear precise legal grounds outside the jury's presence. The Court follows the same procedure for all objections and clarifies that procedure for counsel prior to beginning the proceedings. If an objection is made the Court asks counsel for the basis for the objection, Counsel is allowed to state the basis for the objection (i.e. leading, hearsay, relevance), if argument on the motion is necessary for the Court to make an informed ruling the objection is heard *in camera* to allow argument and create a proffer, if further argument is unnecessary the Court rules contemporaneously on the motion. If rulings were made at the bench, as a result of counsel asking to approach the bench,¹¹ the Court ruled summarily in the jury's presence and articulated the ruling in more detail during breaks outside of the jury's presence. The State nor the Defense were precluded from making and articulating contemporaneous objections. However, it appears Mr. Mack misunderstood the procedural boundaries of Rule 18, by continuing to argue after the Court had ruled contemporaneously or continuing to offer argument when the Court had not elicited same. Rule 18(c), SCRCrimP.

The Court properly exercised discretion in requiring any memory refreshment of a cooperating codefendant to occur outside the jury. Rule 612, SCRE expressly vests discretion in the Court to manage writings used to refresh memory. See State v. Hughes, 346 S.C. 339, 552

¹⁰ "Counsel shall not attempt to further argue any matter after he has been heard, and the ruling of the court has been pronounced." Rule 18(a), SCRCrimP. "No argument shall be made on objections to admissibility of evidence or conduct of trial unless specifically requested by the court." Rule 18(b), SCRCrimP. "No attorney shall interrupt another in the course of his argument." Rule 18(c), SCRCrimP.

¹¹ Counsel is well informed, that the Court does not prefer bench conferences for any substantive argument. It is the Court's preference that all motions of that nature be heard *in camera* to ensure a proper record. While the bench has a digital recorder it is not always assured that a clear recording is accomplished. However, when counsel makes a request, these interactions cannot be avoided, and the Court does its best to make sure the entire context of the interaction is memorialized for the record.

S.E.2d 35 (Ct. App. 2001). The defense's own description shows the Court allowed cross-examination to proceed and afforded an opportunity to attempt refreshment. Def. Mot. 16-17. Moreover, the Defense is not accurate in its description of events. A proper motion was raised; the basis of the objection was cited and the Court then determined to hear the objection and testimony in camera to create a proffer if necessary and make an informed ruling on the objection. After the proffer the Court ruled contemporaneously, and the examination of the witness resumed in the presence of the jury.

The Court properly discharged its gatekeeping role¹² regarding Defense's expert witnesses, specifically Dr. Kenny Kinsey. The Defense's expert witnesses included Dr. Kenny Kinsey (Crime Scene Analyst), John Black (Fingerprint Analyst), and Dr. Kyle Shaw (Pathologist). The Defense concedes the Court ultimately allowed all three experts to testify. Def. Mot. 20-21. The qualification of an expert witness and the admissibility of the expert's testimony are matters within the trial court's sound discretion. State v. Prather, 429 S.C. 583, 598, 840 S.E.2d 551, 559 (2020). Here, the Court heard argument, reviewed Dr. Kinsey's *curriculum vitae*, and allowed testimony within the offered qualifications. Any claim of prejudice is further belied as the defense presented its experts, introduced numerous exhibits, and was allowed to argue its theory. The Court allowed expert testimony within each witness' demonstrated expertise consistent with Rule 702, SCR. Id.

The Court's cursory instruction in reference to counsel's "nervous" tapping does not approach the kind of partiality or disparagement that could influence a verdict. Moreover, the record will reflect that counsel was not "tapping" as characterized but was thumping the podium

¹² The South Carolina Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the trial court's "gatekeeping" role regarding the admission of expert testimony. State v. Phillips, 430 S.C. 319, 334, 844 S.E.2d 651, 658 (2020); Graves v. CAS Med. Sys., Inc., 401 S.C. 63, 75, 735 S.E.2d 650, 656 (2012); State v. Council, 335 S.C. 1, 20, 515 S.E.2d 508, 518 (1999).

loudly with his hand while the State was attempting to articulate an objection. Defense counsel's actions which were audible were a loud distraction that was interfering with the court reporter's ability to record the proceedings. A passing instruction by the Court would have been lighthearted in nature and scant in timing to curb the distraction. The defense fails to demonstrate how the Court's instruction would have affected the jury's assessment of the evidence. Viewed in context, the instruction was not one based on the merits, credibility, or evidence.

Based on the foregoing, the Court's rulings fell well within its discretion, and the defense has shown no preserved error, prejudice, or abuse needed for a trial court to grant a new trial. Moreover, there is ample competent evidence to sustain the jury's verdict, and the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the jury.¹³ Accordingly, Defendant's motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 29, SCRCrimP is Denied.

MOTION FOR RE-SENTENCING

"The authority to change a sentence rest solely and exclusively within the discretion of the sentencing judge." State v. Warren, 392 S.C. 235, 237-38, 708 S.E.2d 234, 235 (Cl. App. 2011) (citing State v. Smith, 276 S.C. 494, 498, 280 S.E.2d 200, 202 (1981)). "A judge or other sentencing authority is to be accorded very wide discretion in determining an appropriate sentence and must be permitted to consider any and all information that reasonably might bear on the proper sentence for the particular defendant, given the crime committed." State v. Hicks, 377 S.C. 322, 325, 659 S.E.2d 499, 500 (Cl. App. 2008).

¹³ The jury had the testimony of two (2) eyewitnesses, a cooperating co-defendant establishing the Defendant's involvement in the crime, and a video still of the Defendant fleeing the scene with the purported firearm utilized to kill the deceased victim. It is clear the jury took considerable time in their deliberations to weigh the evidence in their fact-finding province.

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Defendant's motion suggests that Defendant should be given a fifteen (15) year active sentence for voluntary manslaughter and armed robbery, at eighty-five percent. However, the Court finds the Defendant has outlined no sound reason for this Court to alter its sentence.

A person convicted of voluntary manslaughter, a violent and most serious offense, can receive between two (2) and thirty (30) years, S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-50. A person convicted of armed robbery, a violent and most serious offense, can receive between ten (10) and thirty (30) years, no part of which may be suspended or probation granted, S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-0330(A). A person convicted of possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime can receive a mandatory five (5) years, S.C. Code Ann. § 16-23-0490. Defendant was sentenced for a period of thirty (30) years on voluntary manslaughter, eighteen (18) years on armed robbery, and five (5) years on the possession of a weapon during a violent crime, all to be served concurrently. The sentence imposed falls squarely within statutory limits, reflects the seriousness of the offenses, the Defendant's culpability, mitigation presented and the interests of justice. To allow a modification of sentence as proposed by the Defendant would negate the serious nature of the charges for which he was convicted and be contrary to the public interests.

Accordingly, this Court properly sentenced the Defendant on September 15, 2025, and the Court finds no legal or factual basis to disturb its prior ruling.


CONCLUSION

Having fully considered the Defendant's Motion for A New Trial, and, in the Alternative, Re-sentencing and the State's Response thereto, as well as having fully reviewed the record and the various interests balanced by the Court at the time of the ruling, the Defendant's Motion pursuant to Rule 29, SCRCrimP is Denied.¹⁴

¹⁴ This motion is disposed of without the necessity of a hearing and decided on the record and briefs, Rule 29(a), SCRCrimP.

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[Signature]

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 2128
Hon. Deanna L. Jefferson
Presiding Judge
Ninth Judicial Circuit

Charleston, South Carolina
January 9, 2026

FILED

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JULIE J. ARMSTRONG
CLERK OF COURT

BY 

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA) IN THE COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS
COUNTY OF CHARLESTON) FOR THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA) Warrant No(s): 2021A1010200442-0444
) Indictment No(s): 2023-GS-10-04241;
) 2023-GS-10-04239; 2023-GS-10-04244
-~~versus~~-)
BRIAN SEASE,)
Defendant.)

DEFENSE MOTIONS

2025 SEP 19 PM 12:14
CLERK OF COURT
MK

RE: The Discovery and Suppression of the State's Evidence

1. Motion for a Pre-trial Hearing on the Admissibility of Brian Sease's Statement to Law Enforcement while in Custody

The Defense respectfully moves the General Sessions Court to provide Brian Sease with a hearing on the admissibility of his custodial statements to law enforcement about his charges under *Jackson v. Denno*, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) and *State v. Silver*, 314 S.C. 483 (1993).

2. Motion to Produce Records

The Defense respectfully moves the General Sessions Court to Order the State to provide Sease with the following information under Rule 5, South Carolina Rules of Criminal Procedure (SCRCrimP).

- Reports on meetings between law enforcement and the testifying co-defendant, Derrick Stewart, after his proffer on February 21, 2025.
- Reports by law enforcement about their search for images of the alleged murder weapons on Derrick Stewart and Antonio Green's phones.

3. Motion to Suppress Videos from Antonio Green's Phone Taken While the Camera was Hidden under His Clothes

The Defense respectfully moves the General Sessions Court to suppress as evidence videos from ~~Atlanta Green~~ phone taken while the camera was hidden under his clothes based on the State's inability to properly authenticate them under Rule, 901, South Carolina Rules of Evidence. In the alternative, the Defense respectfully moves the Court to order the State to redact the portions of the videos that include statements by Sease's convicted co-defendant, ~~Atlanta Green~~, under the Confrontation Clauses of the United States and South Carolina Constitutions, if the State does not intend to call Green as a witness at Sease's trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI; S.C. Const. Art. I, Sec.14.

4. Motion to Suppress or Redact the 911 call, Glock magazine, and Stanley Coleman's Body Worn Camera Video

The Defense respectfully moves the General Sessions Court to suppress or redact as evidence under Rule 402 and 403, SCRE, the 911 call, Glock magazine, and Stanley Coleman's body worn camera video for being irrelevant and substantially more prejudicial than probative.

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Benjamin A. Mack

Benjamin A. Mack
Senior Assistant Public Defender
For the Ninth Judicial Circuit

September 8, 2025
Charleston, South Carolina

2025 SEP 19 PM 12:49
CLERK OF COURT
FILE

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA) IN THE COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS
COUNTY OF CHARLESTON) FOR THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

) Warrant No(s): 2021A1010900442-0444
) Indictment No(s): 2023-GS-10-04241;
) 2023-GS-10-04239; 2023-GS-10-04244

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)

-versus-

DEFENSE MOTION

BRIAN SEASE,

Defendant.

2025 SEP 19 PM 12:49
CLERK OF COURT
BY _____

RE: Pre-Trial Voir Dire

Pursuant to S.C. Code § 14-7-1020, the Defense, represented by Benjamin A. Mack, on behalf of Brian Sease, respectfully requests the following of the General Sessions Court: (1) That prior to *voir dire* the entire jury panel swear to tell the truth; (2) that the following questions be asked of the individual members of the jury panel; (3) that each juror be asked to stand and identify themselves by name and juror number, prior to answering the following questions; and (4) that any inquiry about the specifics of responses given by jurors be conducted on the record, at the bench, and outside the presence of the entire jury panel.

Questions for the Jury Panel

1. Are you or any members of your immediate family or personal friends employed by the Charleston County Solicitor's Office or another county Solicitor's Office in South Carolina?
2. Are you or any members of your immediate family or personal friends employed by the Charleston Police Department, or another law enforcement agency?
3. Are you or any members of your immediate family or personal friends employed by the Medical University of South Carolina?

4. Do you belong to or contribute to any of the following groups or their partners and affiliates:
 - a) Citizens Against Violent Crime (CAVE)
 - b) Citizens Advocating Decency and Return to Ethics (CADRE)
5. Have you or any members of your immediate family or personal friends previously been the victim of a violent crime, including but limited to armed robbery or murder?
6. Have you previously served on a jury, either for a criminal or civil matter?
7. Have you seen or heard any publicity, whether through news publications, social media, or blogs, regarding Brian Sease's case?
8. Would you believe the witness testimony of a police officer over that of others simply because the witness is employed as a police officer?
9. Would you assume that a person is guilty if they did not testify on their own behalf?
10. Do you have any connection through friends or family to the State's witnesses?
11. Do you have any connection through friends or family to the Defense's witnesses?
12. Do you have any connection through friends or family to the alleged victim, ~~James Carroll~~
~~James Carroll~~?
13. Do you have any connection through friends or family to Brian Sease's co-defendant,
~~James Carroll~~?
14. Do you have any connection through friends or family to Brian Sease's co-defendant,
~~James Carroll~~?
15. Do you have any connection through friends or family to Brian Sease?
16. Have you already formed an opinion about Brian Sease's case?
17. Are you aware of any reason whatsoever why you could not be fair and impartial to Brian Sease's case?

18. Do you believe that the State of South Carolina does not have the burden of proof in a criminal case and that Brian Sease must prove his innocence?

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Benjamin A. Mack

Benjamin A. Mack
Senior Assistant Public Defender
For the Ninth Judicial Circuit

September 8, 2025
Charleston, South Carolina

2025 SEP 19 PM 12:49
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
BY MK

Benjamin A. Mack

From: Benjamin A. Mack
Sent: Friday, September 05, 2025 12:12 PM
To: Jefferson, Deadra L. Secretary (Chanda C. Sheppard)
Cc: Cassity A. Brewer; Kaitlyn M. Watson; Hunt Russell
Subject: RE: Charleston GS Term Week of September8, 2025
Attachments: Sease, Brian - Pre-Trial Motions.pdf; Sease Brian - Witness List - For Filing.pdf; Sease Brian - Motion for Voir Dire.pdf

Thanks, Chanda! See attached. These documents will be filed on behalf of Brian Sease when the case is called on Monday.

FYI. Kaitlyn Watson from the PD's office will be sitting second chair with me. Please copy her on any future correspondences.

Sincerely,

Ben



Benjamin A. Mack
Senior Assistant Public Defender
Charleston County Public Defender's Office
101 Meeting Street, 5th Floor
Charleston, SC 29401
(843) 958-1884

2025 SEP 19 PM 12:51
BENJAMIN A. MACK
MK

From: Jefferson, Deadra L. Secretary (Chanda C. Sheppard) <DJeffersonSC@sccourts.org>
Sent: Wednesday, September 03, 2025 11:08 AM
To: Cassity A. Brewer <BrewerC@SCSolicitor9.org>; Benjamin A. Mack <BMack@charlestoncounty.org>; Sara Bozarth <BozarthS@SCSolicitor9.org>; Mary Ford <MFord@charlestoncounty.org>; Hunt Russell <RussellH@SCSolicitor9.org>; Ted Smith <WTSmith@charlestoncounty.org>; Jewell Gearding <GeardingJ@SCSolicitor9.org>; culver@kiddlaw.com; Amy Harrell <harrella@scsolicitor9.org>; office@parhamlawllc.com
Cc: James M. Milone <JMilone@charlestoncounty.org>; Cherae M. Gray <CMGray@charlestoncounty.org>
Subject: Charleston GS Term Week of September8, 2025

CAUTION: This email originated outside of Charleston County. Do not click links or open attachments from unknown senders or suspicious emails. If you are not sure, please contact IT helpdesk.

Your case appears on the Charleston County General Sessions roster for the week of September 8, 2025, with Judge Jefferson presiding. If you are prepared to go forward, please provide your Pretrial brief, Witness list, Voir dire and any outstanding motions to the following email: djeffersonsc@sccourts.org by 12:00 PM on Friday, September 5, 2025.

If your case is pleading, in providing your plea paperwork, please include all sentencing sheets, each charge's indictment or waiver, and any additional documentation you wish to include (such as orders to be signed, victim or witness statements, letters from any third parties, etc.) by 12:00PM on Friday, September 5, 2025. Pleas will be heard Monday morning after jury qualification.

If you are seeking a continuance of your case, please send a copy of your filed motion to ryoungsc@sccourts.org. Thank you.

Chanda Sheppard-Burnell
Administrative Assistant to the Honorable Deadra L. Jefferson
Charleston County Judicial Center
100 Broad Street
Charleston, SC 29401
Phone: (843) 958-5147
Fax: (843) 958-5148

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2025 SEP 19 PM 12:51  
OK  
MK

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA ) IN THE COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS  
COUNTY OF CHARLESTON ) FOR THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

) Warrant No(s): 2021A1010900442-0444  
) Indictment No(s): 2023-GS-10-04241;  
) 2023-GS-10-04239; 2023-GS-10-04244  
)

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA )

-versus-

BRIAN SEASE,

Defendant.

DEFENSE WITNESS LIST

2023 SEP 19 PM 12:49  
CLERK OF COURT  
KWA

The Defense may call the following individuals associated with Brian Sease's pending charges in Charleston County as witnesses during his trial or for any of his pre-trial matters.

**I. Law Enforcement**

1. Tanya M. Duby-Gritzuk, CPD  
*Case Manager*
2. Eric Tuttle, CPD  
*Case Manager*
3. Edward Gilliard, CPD  
*R/O on Stand-by*
4. Robert Feeters, CPD  
*R/O Second on Scene; Commanding Officer*
5. Coleman Stanley, CPD  
*R/O First on Scene*
6. Jeffrey Thom, CPD  
*R/O Third on Scene*
7. Mathew R. Stubbs, CPD  
*Search Warrant Acquisition*
8. Peter Hall, CPD  
*R/O K9 Unit*

9. Latisha Harris, CPD  
*I/O; Surveillance Review; Line-up Review for AJ Green*
10. Derrick Kenwright, CPD  
*R/O Coroner Contact*
11. Tyler Kittrell, CPD  
*R/O K9 Unit*
12. Tracey Andres, CPD  
*CSI Detective*
13. Christopher Malinowski, CPD  
*I/O Witness Interview*
14. Ashleigh Wojslawowicz, CPD  
*CSI Detective*
15. Raymond Odell, CPD  
*I/O Witness Interview*
16. Michael Bruce, CPD  
*Arrest of Brian Sease*
17. Anthony Powell, CPD  
*Arrest of Derrick Stewart*
18. Odies Jenkins, CPD  
*SW Execution; Address Unknown*
19. Katrina Billie, CPD  
*SW Acquisition for Derrick Stewart's DNA; Arrest Warrant Acquisition for AJ Green*
20. Paul Kelly, CPD  
*Fingerprints for AJ Green's Car*
21. Justin Schmidt, CPD  
*SW Execution of Derrick Stewart's Home*
22. Daniel Malone, CPD  
*I/O Interview of Brian Sease and Derrick Stewart*
23. William Crocket, CPD  
*I/O Interview Derrick Stewart*

24. Jeffrey Miller, CPD  
*CSI Detective; DNA Swab for 40 cal. and Car*
25. Luke Spratt, CPD  
*CSI Detective; Pics of Victim at MUSC; Took possession of Victim's Belongings;  
IBIS Report*
26. Brian Argo, CPD  
*Gun Forensics*
27. Jonah Delucia, CPD  
*SW Acquisition for 714 Bantry Circle*
28. Cory Broadwater, CPD  
*Arrest Warrant Service on AJ Green*
29. William Jerry Roberts, CPD  
*Phone Forensics*
30. Maria Heffron, CPD  
*Phone Forensics*
31. Nova Grilli, CPD  
*Fingerprint Forensics*
32. Sarah Gladwell, CPD  
*Fingerprint Forensics*
33. Michael Galka, CPD  
*SW Execution on Brian Sease*
34. Holly Bennett, CPD  
*CPD Lab; Chain witness for jacket*
35. Jerome Desheers, CPD  
*Phone Location*
36. Sarah Lusk, SLED  
*DNA Analyst*
37. James Green, SLED  
*Firearms Analyst*

## **II. Medical**

38. Madeline Kahle, EMS  
*Technician*

39. Wesley Lyles, EMS  
*Technician*

40. Nicholas Batalis, MUSC  
*Pathologist*

41. Edward D. Norcross, MUSC  
*Medical Doctor*

42. Demi Garvin, NMS Lab  
*Toxicologist*

**III. Ninth Circuit Solicitor's Office**

43. Joshua Pierce, Investigator

44. Eric Jourdan, Investigator

**IV. Eye-Witnesses**

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**V. Defense Experts**

52. John Ackerman  
*Phone Forensics*

53. Kenny Kinsey  
*Crime Scene Reconstruction*

54. John Black

*Fingerprints Forensics*

55. David Collins  
*Firearms Forensics*

**VI. Defense Team**

56. Dale Wilson  
*Investigator, Charleston County PD's Office*

57. Andrew Proctor  
*Paralegal, Charleston County PD's Office*

Respectfully Submitted,

*Benjamin A. Mack*

Benjamin A. Mack

Attorney for Brian Sease

Charleston, South Carolina  
September 8, 2025

2025 SEP 19 PM 12:50  
CLERK OF COURT  
COURT CLERK  
MK

FILED

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS

2025 OCT -3 PM 2:54

COUNTY OF CHARLESTON

NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

JULIE J. ARMSTRONG  
CLERK OF COURT

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S  
MOTION

vs.

BRIAN RANDELL SEASE,

DEFENDANT.

Arrest Warrants #2021A1010900442;  
2021A1010900443; 2021A1010900444

Indictment #2023-GS-10-04239; 2023-GS-10-04241;  
2023-GS-10-04244

TO: The Honorable Deadra Jefferson  
Presiding Judge, Ninth Judicial Circuit

The State requests Defendant's Motion for "A New Trial or in the Alternative Re-Sentencing" be denied without a hearing pursuant to Rule 29, SCRCrimP ("[Post-trial] motions may, in the discretion of the court, be determined on briefs filed by the parties without oral argument.").

It is well-settled law that trial judges have wide discretion on how to run their courtroom, rule on parties' objections, and limit witness testimony. ("The conduct of a criminal trial is largely entrusted to the sound discretion of the presiding judge", *State v. Gleaton*, 906 S.E.2d 630; 444 S.C. 394 (2024); "the conduct of a criminal trial and the reception or exclusion of evidence are matters left largely to the sound discretion of the court", *State v. Groome*, 262 S.E.2d 31; 274 S.C. 189 (1980). Throughout this trial, the Court properly exercised that discretion to ensure the jury heard a fair and accurate recitation of the evidence pursuant to the rules dictated by the South Carolina Supreme Court. Defense's Motion is nothing more than a twenty-three-page soliloquy of defense counsel's personal grievances against the judge masquerading as legal argument. None of the issues raised would have changed the outcome of

the trial and verdict. At best, Defense points out issues that would be considered harmless error by an appellate court.

Additionally, the Court's sentence is appropriate under the facts of this case. A motion to "re-sentence" is not intended as an automatic "do-over" for a valid sentencing hearing. It is instead, in the interests of the sentencing judge having all the relevant facts and circumstances to best effectuate justice, an opportunity for counsel to come back and raise facts or issues that were not previously addressed. If that were not the case, every criminal sentencing, be it following a plea or trial, would always have to be done twice. In short, the sentencing court would repeatedly find itself in the position of being asked "to do over what it thought it had already done correctly", *State v. Higgenbottom*, 344 S.C. 11, 17, 542 S.E.2d 718, 721 (2001) (quoting *Colten v. Kentucky*, 407 U.S. 104, 117 (1972)).

In the alternative, the State requests an extension to file a merits response to the motion until a transcript of the trial can be completed and provided to both the Defendant and the State.

The Defendant requested a transcript of this trial on September 23, 2025, as indicated in Exhibit 3 of Defendant's motion. Court Reporter Jamie Bickett indicated the transcript would take 60 days to produce.

The State respectfully asks for this motion to be held in abeyance to assure both parties receive the transcript and can review it and to issue a scheduling order for any merits response that would be warranted.<sup>1</sup>


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<sup>1</sup> As it is unclear why the transcript is necessary at this time, and in an abundance of caution to prevent surprise and/or unnecessary delay, the State would respectfully advise that it intends to object to amendments, modifications, or additions that would offend the jurisdictional limitations attached to a timely filed post-trial motion. See *State v. Warren*, 708 S.E.2d 234, 238, 392 S.C. 235 (2011).

Accordingly, the State requests the Court deny Defendant's motion, or, in the alternative, grant an extension until a transcript of the trial is produced and the State has sufficient time to conduct a review.

FILED  
2025 OCT -3 PM 2:54  
JULIE J. ARMSTRONG  
CLERK OF COURT  
BY mk

Respectfully submitted,



Cassidy Brewer  
Assistant Solicitor  
Ninth Judicial Circuit

October 3, 2025  
Charleston, South Carolina

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
COUNTY OF CHARLESTON

SENTENCE ORDER

IN THE COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS

STATE vs.

Brian Randall Sease

AKA: Brian Sease, Brian

Randall Sease

RACE: B

SEX: M

DOB: [REDACTED]

SSN: [REDACTED]

) INDICTMENT/CASE#: 2023-GS-10-04239

) AWW#: 2021A1010900442

) Date of Offense: 10/30/2021

) S.C. Code§: 16-03-0010

) CDR Code #: 0115

) Range of Offense: Murder (Death, Life, or NLT 30 years to life)

In disposition of the above indictment comes now the Defendant who was CONVICTED OF ☒ or ☐ PLEADS

Range of Offense Pled: (2 years-30 years)

TO: Manslaughter/Voluntary Manslaughter  
In violation of § 16-03-0050 of the S.C. Code of Laws, bearing CDR Code # 0217

☐ NON-VIOLENT ☒ VIOLENT ☐ SERIOUS ☒ MOST SERIOUS ☐ MANDATORY GPS ☐ § 17-25-45  
(CBC w/minor 1<sup>st</sup> or CBC w/minor 3<sup>rd</sup>)

The charge is: ☐ As Indicted ☒ Lesser Included Offense

☐ Defendant Waives Presentment to Grand Jury

The plea is: ☐ w/o Rec/Negotiations ☐ Negotiated

☐ Recommendation

/s/ Cassidy A. Brewer 101679

/s/ Benjamin A. Mack 102068

Solicitor

SC Bar #

Attorney for Defendant

SC Bar #

The Defendant is committed to the ☒ SCDC ☐ County Detention Center ☐ Home Incarceration Program  
for a determinate term of 30 days/months/years/Time Served ☐ YOANTE        years and/or shall pay a fine  
of \$       ; provided that upon the service of        days/months/years/Time Served and or payment  
of \$        plus costs and assessments as applicable; balance is suspended with probation for        months/years  
and subject to SCDPPPS standard conditions of probation, which are incorporated by reference.

The sentence shall run ☒ CONCURRENT or ☐ CONSECUTIVE to sentence on: 2023-GS-10-4241; 4244

☒ The Defendant is to be given credit for time served pursuant to S.C. Code § 24-13-40 to be calculated and applied by SCDC  
       days/months ☐ To include time spent on monitored house arrest prior to trial and sentencing

SPECIAL CONDITIONS:

☐ PTUP

☐ No Contact with Victim

☐ Domestic Violence Intervention Program

☐ Hold for Inpatient Treatment

☐ Sex Offender Registry pursuant to S.C. Code § 23-3-430

☐ SAC/MHC if necessary

☐ Central Registry of Child Abuse and Neglect pursuant to S.C. Code § 17-25-135

☐ Other:       

☐ RESTITUTION See Separate Order (20% per S.C. Code §24-21-490(B))

§14-1-206 (Assessments 107.5%)

§14-1-211 (A)(1) Conv. Surcharge)

§14-1-211 (A)(2)(DUI Surcharge)

§56-5-1905 (DUI Assessment)

§56-1-286 (DUI Breath Test)

§14-1-212 (Law Enforcement Funding)

§14-1-213 (Drug Court Surcharge)

§34-11-70(b)and(c), and 34-11-90(c)and(d) (Admin Fraud Check Court Costs)

§50-21-114 (BUI Breath Test Fee)

§56-5-2942(J) (Vehicle Assessment)

3% to County (if paid in installments)

☐ Appointed PD or appointed other counsel, Proviso requires \$600 to be paid to Clerk during  
probation and shall be collected before any other fees

☐ §17-3-45(B) Unpaid Application Fee to be paid to the Public Defender Fund

|             |                  |
|-------------|------------------|
| Restitution | \$               |
| FINE:       | \$               |
|             | \$               |
|             | \$               |
| \$100       | \$ <u>100.00</u> |
| \$100       | \$               |
| \$12        | \$               |
| \$25        | \$               |
| \$25        | \$ <u>25.00</u>  |
| \$150       | \$               |
| \$41        | \$               |
| \$60        | \$               |
| \$40/ea     | \$               |
| TBD         | \$ <u>3.75</u>   |
| \$500       | \$               |
| \$40        | \$               |
| TOTAL       | \$ <u>128.75</u> |

/s/ Cheralee  
Clerk of Court/Deputy Clerk

/s/ Jamie Backett  
Court Reporter

2128  
Judge Code

Sept. 15, 2025  
Sentence Date

[Signature]  
Presiding Judge

SCCA217B  
01/27/2025

CAB/0384259  
WITNESSES

Charleston City Police Department

*Mark R. / Mark R. R. R.*

AGENCY CASE NUMBER

2021-16480

ARREST WARRANT NUMBER

2021A1010900442

DATE OF ARREST

11/04/2021

ACTION OF GRAND JURY

**TRUE BILL**

*W. Woodward*  
Foreperson of Grand Jury

SEP 11 2023  
Date:

VERDICT

*Guilty - voluntary  
manslaughter*

*Judith S.*  
Foreperson of Jury  
9/15/25  
Date:

DOCKET NO. 2023-GS-10-04239

The State of South Carolina  
County of Charleston

COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS  
SEPTEMBER TERM 2023

THE STATE

VS.

BRIAN RANDELL SEASE  
B/M DOB: [REDACTED]

Indictment for

MURDER

SC Code: § 16-03-0010  
CDR Code: 0116

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
COUNTY OF CHARLESTON


INDICTMENT

At a Court of General Sessions, convened September 2023, the Grand Jurors of Charleston County present upon their oath:

Murder

That in Charleston County, South Carolina on or about October 30, 2021, the defendant, Brian Randell Sease with malice aforethought did kill and murder Travis Terrell Green Jr. by means of gunshot, and Travis Terrell Green Jr. did die in Charleston County as a proximate result thereof on or about October 30, 2021 in violation of §16-3-10 of the South Carolina Code of Laws (1976) as amended.

Against the peace and dignity of the State, and contrary to the statute in such case made and provided.

  
CASSIDY A. BREWER  
ASSISTANT SOLICITOR

IN THE COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS  
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

### VERDICT FORM

BRIAN RANDELL SEASE,

**Defendant.**

**We, the jury, by unanimous consent find the Defendant:**

OR AS TO THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE.

OR

**Please sign and date**

Foreperson

September 15, 2025

CAB/0384259  
WITNESSES

Charleston City Police Department

AGENCY CASE NUMBER

2021-16480

ARREST WARRANT NUMBER

2021A1010900442

DATE OF ARREST

11/04/2021

ACTION OF GRAND JURY  
**TRUE BILL**

*W. Woodland*  
Foreperson of Grand Jury

SEP 11 2023

Date:

VERDICT

Foreperson of Petit Jury

Date:

DOCKET NO. 2023-GS-10-04239

The State of South Carolina  
County of Charleston

COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS  
SEPTEMBER TERM 2023

THE STATE

VS.

BRIAN RANDELL SEASE  
B/M [REDACTED]

Indictment for

MURDER

SC Code: § 16-03-0010  
CDR Code: 0116

**FILED**

9/20/2023 11:19:00 AM  
JULIE J. ARMSTRONG  
CLERK OF COURT

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
COUNTY OF CHARLESTON


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Against the peace and dignity of the State, and contrary to the statute in such case made and provided.

  
CASSITY A. BREWER  
ASSISTANT SOLICITOR

**ARREST WARRANT**

**2021A1010900442**

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

☒ County/ ☐ Municipality of

Charleston

THE STATE  
against

**Brian Randall Sense**

Address: [REDACTED]

Phone: [REDACTED] SSN: [REDACTED]

Sex: M Race: R Height: 5 6 Weight: 185

DL State: SC DL #: [REDACTED]

DOB: [REDACTED] Agency ORI #: SC0100100

Prosecuting Agency: Charleston City Police Department

Prosecuting Officer: William T Crockett - S00451

Offense: Murder / Murder

(License Code 0116  
Code/Ordinance Sec 16-03-0010)

This warrant is **CERTIFIED FOR SERVICE** in the

☐ County/ ☐ Municipality of

is to be arrested and brought before me to be dealt with according to the law

(L.S.)

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

**RETURN**

A copy of this arrest warrant was delivered to defendant Brian Randall Sense on 11/11/2021

[Signature]

**RETURN WARRANT TO:**

General Sessions  
Charleston County Judicial Center  
100 Broad Street, Suite 106  
Charleston, SC 29401

ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

☒ County/ ☐ Municipality of

Charleston

Personally appeared before me the affiant William T Crockett being duly sworn deposes and says that defendant Brian Randall Sense did within this county and state on or about 10/30/2021 violate the criminal laws of the State of South Carolina (or ordinance of ☒ County/ ☐ Municipality of Charleston) in the following particular:

**DESCRIPTION OF OFFENSE: Murder / Murder**

I further state that there is probable cause to believe that the defendant named above did commit the crime set forth and that probable cause is based on the following facts:

See Attached Affidavit

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

☒ County/ ☐ Municipality of

Charleston

Signature of Affiant: [Signature]

Affiant's Address: 180 Lockwood Blvd.  
Charleston, SC 29403-

Affiant's Telephone: \_\_\_\_\_

**ARREST WARRANT**

**TO ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER OF THIS STATE OR MUNICIPALITY OR ANY CONSTABLE OF THIS COUNTY:**

It appearing from the above affidavit that there are reasonable grounds to believe that

on or about 10/30/2021 defendant Brian Randall Sense did violate the criminal laws of the State of South Carolina (or ordinance of Charleston) as set forth below:

☒ County/ ☐ Municipality of

**DESCRIPTION OF OFFENSE: Murder / Murder**

Having found probable cause and the above affiant having sworn before me, you are empowered and directed to arrest the said defendant and bring him or her before me forthwith to be dealt with according to law. A copy of this Arrest Warrant shall be delivered to the defendant at the time of its execution, or as soon thereafter as is practicable.

Sworn to and subscribed before me on 11/11/2021

[Signature] (L.S.)

Judge's Address: 1720 Saint Rittenberg Blvd, Unit 11  
Charleston, SC 29417-

Judge's Telephone: (843)-76-6-65 x 31

Issuing Court: ☒ Magistrate ☐ Municipal ☐ Circuit

ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL

Form Approved by  
SC A-0000000000  
April 15, 2005  
SCCA 111

NOV 1 16:55  
OFFICER INITIALS: [Signature]  
REC'D INITIALS: [Signature]

BAIL set by

Judge \_\_\_\_\_  
on \_\_\_\_\_  
Type and Amount \_\_\_\_\_  
Name of Surety \_\_\_\_\_

PRELIMINARY HEARING held by

Judge \_\_\_\_\_  
on \_\_\_\_\_  
Defendant Attorney \_\_\_\_\_  
Disposition \_\_\_\_\_

DISPOSITION before

Judge \_\_\_\_\_  
on \_\_\_\_\_  
by \_\_\_\_\_  
(indicate jury trial, bench trial, plea, not guilty, etc.)  
Disposition \_\_\_\_\_  
Sentence \_\_\_\_\_

JURORS

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

WITNESSES

Name \_\_\_\_\_  
Address \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone \_\_\_\_\_

Name \_\_\_\_\_  
Address \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone \_\_\_\_\_

Name \_\_\_\_\_  
Address \_\_\_\_\_  
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Telephone \_\_\_\_\_

Name \_\_\_\_\_  
Address \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone \_\_\_\_\_

CODEFENDANTS

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_



FILED  
2021 NOV -9 AM 11:52  
JULIE A. ARMSTRONG  
CLERK OF COURT  
BY \_\_\_\_\_

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COUNTY OF CHARLESTON

Charleston Police Department

AFFIDAVIT

Personally appear before me, a magistrate of this county one, Det. W. Crockett who first being duly sworn deposed and says that, Brian Randall Sease did within this county and state on the 30 October 2021 violate the criminal laws of the State of South Carolina in the following particular:

DESCRIPTION OF OFFENSE

Murder  
§S.C. Code of Law 16-3-10

NOV 1 16:58  
OFFICER INITIALS *WTC*  
NOTIC INITIALS

The affiant states there is probable cause to believe that the defendant named did commit the crime set forth and that such probable cause is based on the following facts:

That on October 30 2021 at approximately 1437 hours, while at [REDACTED] (Pinecrest Apartment) which is in the County and City of Charleston, S.C., the above named defendant, Brian Randall Sease, did knowingly, willingly, and unlawfully violate SC State Statute 16-3-10 (Murder) in the following particulars:

On Saturday, October 30, 2021 at around 1437 hours, CPD Officers responded to 1750 Raoul Wallenberg Blvd. (Pinecrest Apartments), Charleston, SC in reference to a shooting that just occurred. Upon arrival Officers located the victim, [REDACTED] in the driver seat of his 2004 Black Jaguar (SC Tag: 9424PD) suffering from multiple gunshot wounds. The victim was transported by Charleston County EMS to MUSC where he was pronounced deceased. This incident is subsequently being investigated as a homicide.

The apartment complex office, which is located across from the incident location, was equipped with surveillance footage capturing the parking lot. This footage revealed two black males walking across the parking lot at around 1424 hours. One black male is wearing a light colored jacket and black pants, while the second suspect is wearing all black. Both parties walk toward the incident location. The victim's vehicle arrives in the complex at around 1434 hours and goes out of camera view. At approximately 1435 hours, a black male wearing all black runs past the office toward 1800 Ashley West Apartments, and is carrying what appears to be a backpack. A few seconds later a black male wearing a blue denim jacket and black pants and appears to be carrying a handgun. These suspects appear to be the same individuals captured walking toward the incident location 10 minutes before the murder. Based on this security camera footage, Detectives believe that the suspects fled the area headed west through the yards toward William Kennerty Drive. Detectives subsequently conducted a video canvass of the surrounding area obtaining video footage from 1800 William Kennerty Drive (1800 Ashley West Apartments).

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME

THIS 1<sup>st</sup> DAY OF November 2021

*William L. Steinberg* (L.S.)  
SIGNATURE OF JUDGE

COMPLAINT # 21-16480

WARRANT # 2021A1010900442

INVESTIGATING OFFICER: Det. W. Crockett

*[Signature]*  
AFFIANT  
180 Lockwood Blvd.  
Charleston, SC 29403  
843-577-7434

CPD Form 01

## Charleston Police Department

NOV 1 16:59  
OFFICER INITIALS  
HEIC INITIALS

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COUNTY OF CHARLESTON

ORIGINAL  
CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE

AFFIDAVIT

During the investigation, CPD Detectives interviewed the victim's family who indicated that the victim was in a monetary dispute with his cousin (later identified as [REDACTED]) over a matter of 75 dollars. Family stated that the matter was over the mis-handling of narcotics belonging to the Defendant and that the Defendant replied to a Facebook post on October 26<sup>th</sup>, 2021 that stated, "Niggas will owe you money and move like y'all beefing. Bro just pay me" by posting, "Sushi bitch ass." It should be known that the victim's nickname is "Sushi." Family understood this to be a threat toward the victim over the aforementioned debt.

Detectives located Green's driver's license information via the South Carolina DMV website and observed that he bears similar physical characteristics as the suspect wearing the light-colored jacket in the security camera footage. A further query of the South Carolina DMV system indicated that Green is the registered owner of a 2009 Nissan Altima with a South Carolina license plate [REDACTED]. The Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) system captured this vehicle entering the West Ashley area at 04:12 hours on the morning of October 30<sup>th</sup>, 2021. ALPR photographs reveal that this vehicle is dark grey in color and has rain guards installed over both front and rear side windows.

During a review of the security footage obtained from 1800 William Kennerty Drive, Detectives observed a dark grey Nissan Altima with rain guards turn onto William Kennerty Drive and head toward the incident location at 13:51 hours, approximately 9 minutes before the suspects are observed on the Pinecrest Apartment security cameras. The same Nissan Altima is then observed heading the opposite direction on William Kennerty Drive, away from the incident location, at 14:38 hours, approximately 1 minute after the first 911 call was received.

On 10/31/2021, Antonio Green Jr met with Detectives at CPD Headquarters. During a post Miranda statement, Green advised that on 10/30/2021 he was with Brian Sease (the Defendant) and another male (co-defendant) in West Ashley who arranged to meet the victim to purchase marijuana. The co-defendant already contacted the victim and arranged to meet at the [REDACTED] Apartment. Green advised he and the co-defendant met the defendant at his house. Green then drove the co-defendants to the neighborhood behind the Pinecrest Apartments and parked his vehicle. They all exited the vehicle and walked to the apartments to wait for the victim. They were hanging out by the stairs when the co-defendant received a message from the victim that he was arriving.

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME


THIS 1<sup>st</sup> DAY OF November 2021

SIGNATURE OF JUDGE

COMPLAINT # 21-16480

WARRANT # 2021A1010900442

INVESTIGATING OFFICER: Det. W. Crockett

  
AFFIANT  
180 Lockwood Blvd.  
Charleston, SC 29403  
843-577-7434

CPD Form OT3

ORIGINAL

## Charleston Police Department

NOV 1 15:59  
OFFICER INITIALS *W*

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

JDC INITIALS

COUNTY OF CHARLESTON

AFFIDAVIT

CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE

Due to the victim and Green having a dispute over the victim owing him money, he knew that the victim would not speak to the co-defendants if the victim saw him. When the victim arrived, Green started to walk behind the building but observed the co-defendant enter the front seat of the victim's vehicle while the Defendant entered the rear passenger seat behind the victim. Within seconds of Green walking behind the building, he heard one gunshot followed by another (2) gunshots. Green immediately fled behind the building toward the entrance, crossed the parking lot and fled toward the vehicle. When he arrived at his vehicle, the co-defendant was already waiting for him in the vehicle. When Green and the co-defendant arrived back at the Defendant's residence, Green confronted them about what happened. At that time, the Defendant informed Green that when they were trying to purchase marijuana from the victim, he tried to increase the price. The victim went to reach for "something," and the Defendant subsequently shot him. After shooting the victim, they took a bag containing marijuana from the vehicle and fled the scene.


During the interview, Green advised that earlier in the week, the co-defendant spoke to him about wanting to rob the victim.

Green provided Detectives with the Defendant's name. Detectives requested a SLED generated six-photo lineup which was presented to Green. Green positively identified the Defendant in the six-photo lineup as the individual that conducted the robbery and shot the victim.

Based on the surveillance footage obtained from the Pinecrest Apartments, the footage obtained from ~~1800~~ ~~Wet~~ ~~the~~ statements provided by the victim's family members, the statement provided by the defendant, Antonio Green Jr, that he drove the Defendant to meet the victim, at which time the victim was murdered by the Defendant and Green positively identifying the Defendant via a six photo lineup, this affiant believes probable cause is established to charge the defendant, Brian Sease, with a violation of South Carolina Statute 16-3-10 Murder, for killing the victim, Travis Terrell Green Jr, with malice aforethought.

The above is true and believable based on the statements of Antonio Green, the video surveillance, the positive identification of the defendant, and the investigation conducted by Detectives with the Charleston Police Department.

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME

THIS 1<sup>st</sup> DAY OF November 2021

  
AFFIANT


  
SIGNATURE OF JUDGE (L.S.)

COMPLAINT # 21-16480

WARRANT # 2021 A1010900442

INVESTIGATING OFFICER: Det. W. Crockett

CPD Form 013

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
COUNTY OF CHARLESTON

SENTENCE ORDER

IN THE COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS

STATE vs.

Brian Randall Sease

AKA: Brian Sease, Brian

Randall Sease

RACE: B

SEX: M

SSN: [REDACTED]

DOB: [REDACTED]

) INDICTMENT/CASE#: 2023-GS-10-04244  
) AWW#: 2021A1010900444  
) Date of Offense: 10/30/2021  
) S.C. Code§: 16-23-0490  
) CDR Code #: 0549

) Range of Offense: Possession Of A Weapon During The Commission Of A Violent Crime (5 Years)

In disposition of the above indictment comes now the Defendant who was CONVICTED OF ☐ or ☐ PLEADS  
TO: Possession Of A Weapon During The Commission Of A Violent Crime  
In violation of § 16-23-0490 of the S.C. Code of Laws, bearing CDR Code # 0549

Range of Offense Pled: (5 Years)

☐ NON-VIOLENT ☐ VIOLENT ☐ SERIOUS ☐ MOST SERIOUS ☐ MANDATORY GPS (CSC winner 1<sup>st</sup> or CSC winner 3<sup>rd</sup>) ☐ § 17-26-45

The charge is: ☐ As Indicted ☐ Lesser Included Offense ☐ Defendant Waives Presentment to Grand Jury  
The plea is: ☐ w/o Rec/Negotiations ☐ Negotiated ☐ Recommendation

/s/ Cassidy A. Brewer 101679 /s/ Benjamin A. Mack 102068  
Solicitor SC Bar # Attorney for Defendant SC Bar #

The Defendant is committed to the ☒ SCDC ☐ County Detention Center ☐ Home Incarceration Program  
for a determinate term of 5 days/months/years/Time Served ☐ YOANTE \_\_\_\_\_ years and/or shall pay a fine  
of \$ \_\_\_\_\_; provided that upon the service of \_\_\_\_\_ days/months/years/Time Served and or payment  
of \$ \_\_\_\_\_ plus costs and assessments as applicable\*; balance is suspended with probation for \_\_\_\_\_ months/years  
and subject to SCDCPPPS standard conditions of probation, which are incorporated by reference.

The sentence shall run ☒ CONCURRENT or ☐ CONSECUTIVE to sentence on: 2023-GS-10-4239; 4241  
☒ The Defendant is to be given credit for time served pursuant to S.C. Code § 24-13-40 to be calculated and applied by SCDC  
\_\_\_\_\_ days/months ☐ To include time spent on monitored house arrest prior to trial and sentencing

SPECIAL CONDITIONS:

- ☐ PTUP \_\_\_\_\_  
☐ No Contact with Victim ☐ Domestic Violence Intervention Program ☐ Hold for Inpatient Treatment  
☐ Sex Offender Registry pursuant to S.C. Code § 23-3-430 ☐ SAC/MHC if necessary  
☐ Central Registry of Child Abuse and Neglect pursuant to S.C. Code § 17-26-136  
☐ Other: \_\_\_\_\_

☐ RESTITUTION See Separate Order (20% per S.C. Code §24-21-490(B))

- §14-1-206 (Assessments 107.5%)  
§14-1-211 (A)(1) Conv. Surcharge  
§14-1-211 (A)(2) (DUI Surcharge)  
§56-5-1996 (DUI Assessment)  
§58-1-286 (DUI Breath Test)  
§14-1-212 (Law Enforcement Funding)  
§14-1-213 (Drug Court Surcharge)  
§34-11-70(b) and (c), and 34-11-90(c) and (d) (Admin Fraud Check Court Costs)  
§50-21-114 (BUI Breath Test Fee)  
§56-5-2842(J) (Vehicle Assessment)  
3% to County (if paid in installments)  
☐ Appointed PD or appointed other counsel. Proviso requires \$500 to be paid to Clerk during probation and shall be collected before any other fees  
☐ §17-3-45(B) Unpaid Application Fee to be paid to the Public Defender Fund

|             |                  |
|-------------|------------------|
| Restitution | \$               |
| FINE:       | \$               |
|             | \$               |
| \$100       | \$ <u>110.00</u> |
| \$100       | \$               |
| \$12        | \$               |
| \$25        | \$               |
| \$25        | \$ <u>25.00</u>  |
| \$150       | \$               |
| \$41        | \$               |
| \$50        | \$               |
| \$40/ea     | \$               |
| 180         | \$ <u>3.75</u>   |
| \$500       | \$               |
| \$40        | \$               |
| TOTAL       | \$ <u>128.75</u> |

/s/ Chenagerey  
Clerk of Court/Deputy Clerk

DRP 2128  
Court Reporter Judge Code

Sept. 15, 2025  
Sentence Date

Al. [Signature]  
Presiding Judge

SCCA217B  
01/27/2025

CAB/0384259  
WITNESSES

Charleston City Police Department

*Mark A. / Mark A. Williams*

AGENCY CASE NUMBER

2021-16480

ARREST WARRANT NUMBER

2021A1010900444

DATE OF ARREST

11/04/2021

ACTION OF GRAND JURY

**TRUE BILL**

*Mark A. Williams*  
Foreperson of Grand Jury

SEP 11 2023

Date:

VERDICT

*Guilty*

*Indy A. /*  
Foreperson of Petit Jury

9/15/25  
Date:

DOCKET NO. 2023-GS-10-04244

The State of South Carolina  
County of Charleston

COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS  
SEPTEMBER TERM 2023

THE STATE

VS.

BRIAN RANDELL SEASE  
B/M DOB: [REDACTED]

Indictment for

POSSESSION OF A WEAPON DURING  
THE COMMISSION OF A VIOLENT  
CRIME

SC Code: § 16-23-0490  
CDR Code: 0549

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
COUNTY OF CHARLESTON


INDICTMENT

At a Court of General Sessions, convened September 2023, the Grand Jurors of Charleston County present upon their oath:

Possession Of A Weapon During The Commission Of A Violent Crime

That in Charleston County, South Carolina, on or about October 30, 2021, the Defendant, Brian Randell Sease, did possess a firearm or did visibly display what appeared to be a firearm or did visibly display a knife during the commission of or attempted commission of a violent crime, to wit: Murder; in violation of Section 16-23-490, Code of Laws of South Carolina, (1976, as amended).

Against the peace and dignity of the State, and contrary to the statute in such case made and provided.

  
CASSITY A. BREWER  
ASSISTANT SOLICITOR

) IN THE COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS  
) FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

### VERDICT FORM

BRIAN RANDALL SEASE,

**Defendant.**

**We, the jury, by unanimous consent find the Defendant:**

☒ Guilty of Possession of a Weapon During the Commission of a Violent Crime

**Not Guilty**

Please sign and date

Please sign and date

Judy A. [Signature]  
Foreperson

September 15, 2025

**ARREST WARRANT**

**2021A1010900444**

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

☒ County/ ☐ Municipality of

Charleston

THE STATE  
against

Brian Randall Sene

Address: [REDACTED]

Phone: [REDACTED] BSN [REDACTED]

Sex: M Race: B Height: 5 6 Weight: 185

DL State: SC DL #: [REDACTED]

DOB: [REDACTED] Agency Off # SC0100100

Prosecuting Agency: Charleston City Police Department

Prosecuting Officer: William T. Crockett - S00451

Offense: Weapons / Poss. weapon during violent crime, if not also sentenced to life without parole or death

Offense Code: 0549

Code/Ordinance Sec: 16-23-0490

The warrant is CERTIFIED FOR SERVICE in the

☐ County/ ☐ Municipality of

is to be arrested and brought before me to be dealt with according to the law.

(L.S.)

Signature of Judge \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

**RETURN**

A copy of this arrest warrant was delivered to defendant Brian Randall Sene on 11/3/2021

[Signature]  
Signature of Constable/Prosecuting Officer

**RETURN WARRANT TO:**

General Sessions  
Charleston County Judicial Center  
100 Broad Street, Suite 106  
Charleston, SC 29401

**ORIGINAL**

**STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA**

☒ County/ ☐ Municipality of

Charleston

**AFFIDAVIT**

Personally appeared before me the affiant William T. Crockett with

being duly sworn deposes and says that defendant Brian Randall Sene violate the criminal laws of the

did within this county and state on or about 10/30/2021

State of South Carolina for ordinance of ☒ County/ ☐ Municipality of Charleston

in the following particulars:

**DESCRIPTION OF OFFENSE:** Weapons / Poss. weapon during violent crime, if not also sentenced to life without parole or death

I further state that there is probable cause to believe that the defendant named above did commit the crime set forth and that probable cause is based on the following facts:

See Attached Affidavit

NOV 1 17 2021  
OFFICER INITIALS [Signature]  
REC INITIALS [Signature]

Signature of Affiant [Signature]

**STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA**

☒ County/ ☐ Municipality of

Charleston

Affiant's Address: 180 Lockwood Blvd.  
Charleston, SC 29403

Affiant's Telephone: \_\_\_\_\_

**ARREST WARRANT**

**TO ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER OF THIS STATE OR MUNICIPALITY OR ANY CONSTABLE OF THIS COUNTY:**

It appearing from the above affidavit that there are reasonable grounds to believe that

on or about 10/30/2021 defendant Brian Randall Sene

did violate the criminal laws of the State of South Carolina for ordinance of \_\_\_\_\_ ) as set forth below

☒ County/ ☐ Municipality of Charleston

**DESCRIPTION OF OFFENSE:** Weapons / Poss. weapon during violent crime, if not also sentenced to life without parole or death

Having found probable cause and the above affiant having sworn before me, you are empowered and directed to arrest the said defendant and bring him or her before me forthwith to be dealt with according to law. A copy of this Arrest Warrant shall be delivered to the defendant at the time of its arrest, or as soon thereafter as is practicable.

Sworn to and subscribed before me

on 11/1/2021

[Signature]  
Signature of Issuing Judge  
Ellen Saffir Steinberg  
Judge Code 7280

Judge's Address: 1720 Sam Rittenberg Blvd, Unit 11  
Charleston, SC 29417

Judge's Telephone: (843)-76-665 x 31

Issuing Court: ☒ Magistrate ☐ Municipal ☐ Circuit

**ORIGINAL**      **ORIGINAL**      **ORIGINAL**

**BAIL set by**

**WITNESSES**



Judge \_\_\_\_\_  
 on \_\_\_\_\_  
 Type and Amount \_\_\_\_\_  
 Name of Surety \_\_\_\_\_

Name \_\_\_\_\_  
 Address \_\_\_\_\_  
 Telephone \_\_\_\_\_

**PRELIMINARY HEARING held by**

Judge \_\_\_\_\_  
 on \_\_\_\_\_  
 Defendant Attorney \_\_\_\_\_  
 Decision \_\_\_\_\_

Name \_\_\_\_\_  
 Address \_\_\_\_\_  
 Telephone \_\_\_\_\_

**DISPOSITION before**

Judge \_\_\_\_\_  
 on \_\_\_\_\_  
 by \_\_\_\_\_  
 (indicate jury trial, bench trial, plea, not. pros., etc.)

Name \_\_\_\_\_  
 Address \_\_\_\_\_  
 Telephone \_\_\_\_\_

Disposition \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sentence \_\_\_\_\_

Name \_\_\_\_\_  
 Address \_\_\_\_\_  
 Telephone \_\_\_\_\_

**JURORS**

\_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

Name \_\_\_\_\_  
 Address \_\_\_\_\_  
 Telephone \_\_\_\_\_  
 Name \_\_\_\_\_  
 Address \_\_\_\_\_  
 Telephone \_\_\_\_\_

**CODEFENDANTS**

\_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

FILED  
 2021 NOV -9 AM 11:52  
 JULIE J. ARMSTRONG  
 CLERK OF COURT  
 BY \_\_\_\_\_

# Charleston Police Department

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COUNTY OF CHARLESTON

AFFIDAVIT

Personally appear before me, a magistrate of this county one, Det. W. Crockett who first being duly sworn deposed and says that, Brian Randell Sease did within this county and state on the 30 October 2021 violate the criminal laws of the State of South Carolina in the following particular:

## DESCRIPTION OF OFFENSE

Possession of a Weapon during the Commission of a Violent Crime  
§S.C. Code of Law 16-23-490

NEW 1.7.2022

OFFICER INITIALS

MCIS INITIALS

The affiant states there is probable cause to believe that the defendant named did commit the crime set forth and that such probable cause is based on the following facts:

That on October 30 2021 at approximately 1437 hours, while at [REDACTED] (Pinecrest Apartment) which is in the County and City of Charleston, S.C., the above named defendant, Brian Randell Sease, did knowingly, willingly, and unlawfully violate SC State Statute 16-23-490 (Possession of a Weapon during the Commission of a Violent Crime) in the following particulars:

On Saturday, October 30, 2021 at around 1437 hours, CPD Officers responded to 17 [REDACTED] (Pinecrest Apartments), Charleston, SC in reference to a shooting that just occurred. Upon arrival Officers located the victim, [REDACTED] in the driver seat of his 2004 [REDACTED] suffering from multiple gunshot wounds. The victim was transported by Charleston County EMS to MUSC where he was pronounced deceased. This incident is subsequently being investigated as a homicide.

The apartment complex office, which is located across from the incident location, was equipped with surveillance footage capturing the parking lot. This footage revealed two black males walking across the parking lot at around 1424 hours. One black male is wearing a light colored jacket and black pants, while the second suspect is wearing all black. Both parties walk toward the incident location. The victim's vehicle arrives in the complex at around 1434 hours and goes out of camera view. At approximately 1435 hours, a black male wearing all black runs past the office toward [REDACTED], and is carrying what appears to be a backpack. A few seconds later a black male wearing a blue denim jacket and black pants and appears to be carrying a handgun. These suspects appear to be the same individuals captured walking toward the incident location 10 minutes before the murder. Based on this security camera footage, Detectives believe that the suspects fled the area headed west through the yards toward William Kennerly Drive. Detectives subsequently conducted a video canvass of the surrounding area obtaining video footage from 1800 William Kennerly Drive (1800 Ashley West Apartments).

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME

THIS 1<sup>st</sup> DAY OF November 2021

SIGNATURE OF JUDGE

COMPLAINT # 21-16480

WARRANT # 2021 A1010900444

INVESTIGATING OFFICER: Det. W. Crockett

AFFIANT

180 Lockwood Blvd.  
Charleston, SC 29403  
843-577-7434

CPD Form OT3

# Charleston Police Department

NOV 1 17 02  
OFFICER INITIALS *W*  
NCIC INITIALS  
AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COUNTY OF CHARLESTON

CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE

During the investigation, CPD Detectives interviewed the victim's family who indicated that the victim was in a monetary dispute with his cousin (later identified as ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~) over a matter of 75 dollars. Family stated that the matter was over the mis-handling of narcotics belonging to the Defendant and that the Defendant replied to a Facebook post on October 26<sup>th</sup>, 2021 that stated, "Niggas will owe you money and move like y'all beefing. Bro just pay me" by posting, "Sushi bitch ass." It should be known that the victim's nickname is "Sushi." Family understood this to be a threat toward the victim over the aforementioned debt.

Detectives located Green's driver's license information via the South Carolina DMV website and observed that he bears similar physical characteristics as the suspect wearing the light-colored jacket in the security camera footage. A further query of the South Carolina DMV system indicated that Green is the registered owner of a ~~2007 Nissan Altima~~ with a South Carolina ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~. The Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) system captured this vehicle entering the West Ashley area at 04:12 hours on the morning of October 30<sup>th</sup>, 2021. ALPR photographs reveal that this vehicle is dark grey in color and has rain guards installed over both front and rear side windows.

During a review of the security footage obtained from ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~, Detectives observed a dark grey Nissan Altima with rain guards turn onto William Kennerty Drive and head toward the incident location at 13:51 hours, approximately 9 minutes before the suspects are observed on the Pinecrest Apartment security cameras. The same Nissan Altima is then observed heading the opposite direction on William Kennerty Drive, away from the incident location, at 14:38 hours, approximately 1 minute after the first 911 call was received.

On 10/31/2021, Antonio Green Jr met with Detectives at CPD Headquarters. During a post Miranda statement, Green advised that on 10/30/2021 he was with Brian Sease (the Defendant) and another male (co-defendant) in West Ashley who arranged to meet the victim to purchase marijuana. The co-defendant already contacted the victim and arranged to meet at the Pinecrest Apartments. Green advised he and the co-defendant met the defendant at his house. Green then drove the co-defendants to the neighborhood behind the Pinecrest Apartments and parked his vehicle. They all exited the vehicle and walked to the apartments to wait for the victim. They were hanging out by the stairs when the co-defendant received a message from the victim that he was arriving.

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME


THIS 1<sup>st</sup> DAY OF November 2021

SIGNATURE OF JUDGE

COMPLAINT # 21-16480

WARRANT # 2021A1010900444

INVESTIGATING OFFICER: Det. W. Crockett



AFFIANT  
180 Lockwood Blvd.  
Charleston, SC 29403  
843-577-7434

CPD Form OT3

# Charleston Police Department

NOV 1 17 32

OFFICER INITIALS

N.E.I.C. INITIALS

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COUNTY OF CHARLESTON

CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE

Due to the victim and Green having a dispute over the victim owing him money, he knew that the victim would not speak to the co-defendants if the victim saw him. When the victim arrived, Green started to walk behind the building but observed the co-defendant enter the front seat of the victim's vehicle while the Defendant entered the rear passenger seat behind the victim. Within seconds of Green walking behind the building, he heard one gunshot followed by another (2) gunshots. Green immediately fled behind the building toward the entrance, crossed the parking lot and fled toward the vehicle. When he arrived at his vehicle, the co-defendant was already waiting for him in the vehicle. When Green and the co-defendant arrived back at the Defendant's residence, Green confronted them about what happened. At that time, the Defendant informed Green that when they were trying to purchase marijuana from the victim, he tried to increase the price. The victim went to reach for "something," and the Defendant subsequently shot him. After shooting the victim, they took a bag containing marijuana from the vehicle and fled the scene. During the interview, Green advised that earlier in the week, the co-defendant spoke to him about wanting to rob the victim.

Green provided Detectives with the Defendant's name. Detectives requested a SLED generated six-photo lineup which was presented to Green. Green positively identified the Defendant in the six-photo lineup as the individual that conducted the robbery and shot the victim.

Based on the surveillance footage obtained from the Pinecrest Apartments, the footage obtained from ~~West Apartments~~, the statements provided by the victim's family members, the statement provided by the defendant, Antonio Green Jr, that he drove the Defendant to meet the victim, at which time the victim was murdered by the Defendant and Green positively identifying the Defendant via a six photo lineup, this affiant believes probable cause is established to charge the defendant, Brian Sease, with a violation of South Carolina Statute 16-3-10 Murder, for killing the victim, Travis Terrell Green Jr, with malice aforethought. Per South Carolina Statute 16-1-60, Murder is defined as a violent crime therefore, probable cause exists to charge the defendant with a violation of South Carolina Statute 16-23-490, Possession of a Weapon during the Commission of a Violent Crime.

The above is true and believable based on the statements of Antonio Green, the video surveillance, the positive identification of the defendant, and the investigation conducted by Detectives with the Charleston Police Department.

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME

THIS 1<sup>st</sup> DAY OF November 2021

Ellen L. Steinberg (L.S.)  
SIGNATURE OF JUDGE

COMPLAINT # 21-16480

WARRANT # 2021 A1010900444

INVESTIGATING OFFICER: Det. W. Crockett

[Signature]  
AFFIANT

CPD Form OT3

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
COUNTY OF CHARLESTON

SENTENCE ORDER

IN THE COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS

STATE vs.

Brian Randall Sease

AKA: Brian Sease, Brian

Randall Sease

RACE: B

SEX: M

DOB: [REDACTED]

SSN: [REDACTED]

) INDICTMENT/CASE#: 2023-GS-10-04241

) AWH#: 2021A1010900443

) Date of Offense: 10/30/2021

) S.C. Code§: 16-11-0330(A)

) CDR Code #: 0139

) Range of Offense: Armed Robbery (10-30 years)

In disposition of the above indictment comes now the Defendant who was CONVICTED OF ☐ or ☐ PLEADS

Range of Offense Pled: (10-30 years)

In violation of § 16-11-0330(A) of the S.C. Code of Laws, bearing CDR Code # 0139

☐ NON-VIOLENT

☐ VIOLENT

☐ SERIOUS

☐ MOST SERIOUS

☐ MANDATORY GPS

(CSC winner 1<sup>st</sup> or CSC winner 3<sup>rd</sup>)

☐ § 17-25-45

The charge is: ☐ As indicted

☐ Lesser Included Offense

☐ Defendant Waives Presentment to Grand Jury

The plea is: ☐ w/o Rec/Negotiations ☐ Negotiated

☐ Recommendation

/s/ Casely A. Brewer 101679

/s/ Benjamin A. Mack 102068

Solicitor

SC Bar #

Attorney for Defendant

SC Bar #

The Defendant is committed to the ☒ SCDC ☐ County Detention Center ☐ Home Incarceration Program  
for a determinate term of 18 days/months/years/Time Served ☐ YOANTE        years and/or shall pay a fine  
of \$       ; provided that upon the service of        days/months/years/Time Served and or payment  
of \$        plus costs and assessments as applicable<sup>a</sup>; balance is suspended with probation for        months/years  
and subject to SCDPPPS standard conditions of probation, which are incorporated by reference.

The sentence shall run ☒ CONCURRENT or ☐ CONSECUTIVE to sentence on: 2023-GS-10-4239; 4244

☒ The Defendant is to be given credit for time served pursuant to S.C. Code § 24-13-40 to be calculated and applied by SCDC  
       days/months ☐ To include time spent on monitored house arrest prior to trial and sentencing

SPECIAL CONDITIONS:

☐ PTUP

☐ No Contact with Victim

☐ Domestic Violence Intervention Program

☐ Hold for Inpatient Treatment

☐ Sex Offender Registry pursuant to S.C. Code § 23-3-430

☐ SAC/MHC if necessary

☐ Central Registry of Child Abuse and Neglect pursuant to S.C. Code § 17-25-135

☐ Other:       

☐ RESTITUTION See Separate Order (20% per S.C. Code §24-21-490(B))

§14-1-208 (Assessments 107.5%)

§14-1-211 (A)(1) Conv. Surcharge)

§14-1-211 (A)(2)(DUI Surcharge)

§56-5-1996 (DUI Assessment)

§56-1-286 (DUI Breath Test)

§14-1-212 (Law Enforcement Funding)

§14-1-213 (Drug Court Surcharge)

§34-11-70(b)and(c), and 34-11-90(c)and(d) (Admin Fraud Check Court Costs)

§50-21-114 (BUI Breath Test Fee)

§56-5-2942(J) (Vehicle Assessment)

3% to County (if paid in installments)

☐ Appointed PD or appointed other counsel. Proviso requires \$500 to be paid to Clerk during probation and shall be collected before any other fees

☐ §17-3-45(B) Unpaid Application Fee to be paid to the Public Defender Fund

|             |         |               |
|-------------|---------|---------------|
| Restitution | \$      | <u>      </u> |
| FINE:       | \$      | <u>      </u> |
|             | \$      | <u>      </u> |
|             | \$      | <u>100.00</u> |
|             | \$      | <u>100</u>    |
|             | \$12    | <u>      </u> |
|             | \$25    | <u>      </u> |
|             | \$25    | <u>25.00</u>  |
|             | \$150   | <u>      </u> |
|             | \$41    | <u>      </u> |
|             | \$50    | <u>      </u> |
|             | \$40/ea | <u>      </u> |
|             | TBD     | <u>375</u>    |
|             | \$500   | <u>      </u> |
|             | \$40    | <u>      </u> |
| TOTAL       | \$      | <u>128.75</u> |

/s/ [Signature]  
Clerk of Court/Deputy Clerk

Jamie Bickett 2128  
Court Reporter Judge Code

Sept. 15, 2025  
Sentence Date

[Signature]  
Presiding Judge

SCCA217B  
01/27/2025

CAB/0384259  
WITNESSES

Charleston City Police Department

*Ned M. / Mont Miller*

AGENCY CASE NUMBER

2021-16480

ARREST WARRANT NUMBER

2021A1010900443

DATE OF ARREST

11/04/2021

ACTION OF GRAND JURY

**TRUE BILL**

*W. E. W. W. W.*  
Foreperson of Grand Jury

SEP 11 2023  
Date:

VERDICT

*Guilt - armed  
Robbery*

*Judith R. S.*  
Foreperson of Petit Jury

9/15/25  
Date:

DOCKET NO. 2023-GS-10-04241

The State of South Carolina  
County of Charleston

COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS  
SEPTEMBER TERM 2023

THE STATE

VS.

BRIAN RANDELL SEASE  
B/M DOB: [REDACTED]

Indictment for

ARMED ROBBERY

SC Code: § 16-11-0330(A)  
CDR Code: 0139

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
COUNTY OF CHARLESTON


INDICTMENT

At a Court of General Sessions, convened September 2023, the Grand Jurors of Charleston County present upon their oath:

Armed Robbery

That on or about October 30, 2021, in Charleston County, South Carolina, the Defendant, Brian Randell Sease, by use of force, threats or intimidation and while armed with a deadly weapon, or while alleging, either by action or words, he was armed while using a representation of a deadly weapon or any object which a person present during the commission of the robbery reasonably believed to be a deadly weapon, did take and carry away goods and/or monies from the person or immediate presence of Travis Terrell Green Jr. with the intent to permanently deprive the victim of possession thereof, in violation of §16-11-330(A) of the South Carolina Code of Laws (1976) as amended.

Against the peace and dignity of the State, and contrary to the statute in such case made and provided,

  
CASSITY A. BREWER  
ASSISTANT SOLICITOR

IN THE COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS  
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

### VERDICT FORM

BRIAN RANDELL SEASE,

**Defendant.**

**We, the jury, by unanimous consent find the Defendant:**

OR

**Please sign and date**

Foreperson

September 15, 2025

CAB/0384259  
WITNESSES

Charleston City Police Department

*Neil / Mark Miller*

AGENCY CASE NUMBER

2021-16480

ARREST WARRANT NUMBER

2021A1010900443

DATE OF ARREST

11/04/2021

ACTION OF GRAND JURY

**TRUE BILL**

*M. E. Woodward*  
Foreperson of Grand Jury

SEP 11 2023  
Date

VERDICT

Foreperson of Petit Jury

Date

DOCKET NO. 2023-GS-10-04241

The State of South Carolina

County of Charleston

COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS

SEPTEMBER TERM 2023

THE STATE

VS.

BRIAN RANDELL SEASE  
B/M DOB: [REDACTED]

Indictment for

ARMED ROBBERY

SC Code: § 16-11-0330(A)  
CDR Code: 0139

**FILED**

9/20/2023 11:19:00 AM  
JULIE J. ARMSTRONG  
CLERK OF COURT

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
COUNTY OF CHARLESTON


INDICTMENT

At a Court of General Sessions, convened September 2023, the Grand Jurors of Charleston County present upon their oath:

Armed Robbery

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Against the peace and dignity of the State, and contrary to the statute in such case made and provided.

  
CASSITY A. BREWER  
ASSISTANT SOLICITOR

**ARREST WARRANT**

**2021A1010900443**

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

☒ County/ ☐ Municipality of  
Charleston

THE STATE  
against

Brian Randall Sense

Address [REDACTED]

Phone [REDACTED] SSN [REDACTED]  
Sex M Race B Height 5 6 Weight 185  
DL State SC DL # [REDACTED]  
DOB [REDACTED] Agency ORI # SC0100100  
Prosecuting Agency Charleston City Police Department  
Prosecuting Officer William T. Cruikett - S00451  
Offense Robbery / Armed Robbery, robbery while armed or allegedly armed with a deadly weapon  
Offense Code 0139  
Code/Ordinance Sec 16-11-0330(A)

This warrant is **CERTIFIED FOR SERVICE** in the  
☐ County/ ☐ Municipality of \_\_\_\_\_

is in be arrested and brought before me to be dealt with according to the law. The accused

(L.B.)

Signature of Judge \_\_\_\_\_  
Date \_\_\_\_\_

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA )  
☒ County/ ☐ Municipality of )  
Charleston )

**AFFIDAVIT**

Personally appeared before me the affiant William T. Cruikett who being duly sworn deposes and says that defendant Brian Randall Sense did within this county and state on or about 10/30/2021 violate the criminal laws of the State of South Carolina for ordinance of ☒ County/ ☐ Municipality of Charleston in the following particulars

DESCRIPTION OF OFFENSE: Robbery / Armed Robbery, robbery while armed or allegedly armed with a deadly weapon

I further state that there is probable cause to believe that the defendant named above did commit the crime set forth and that probable cause is based on the following facts:

See Attached Affidavit

NOV 1 17 2021  
OFFICER INITIALS [Signature]  
NCIC INITIALS [Signature]

Signature of Affiant [Signature]

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA )  
☒ County/ ☐ Municipality of )  
Charleston )

Affiant's Address 180 Lockwood Blvd.  
Charleston, SC 29403

Affiant's Telephone \_\_\_\_\_

**RETURN**

A copy of this arrest warrant was delivered to defendant Brian Randall Sense on 11/3/2021

[Signature]  
By \_\_\_\_\_  
Judge of Criminal Justice Court

RETURN WARRANT TO:  
General Sessions  
Charleston County Judicial Center  
100 Broad Street, Suite 106  
Charleston, SC 29401

**ORIGINAL**      **ORIGINAL**

**ARREST WARRANT**

TO ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER OF THIS STATE OR MUNICIPALITY OR ANY CONSTABLE OF THIS COUNTY:

It appearing from the above affidavit that there are reasonable grounds to believe that on or about 10/30/2021 defendant Brian Randall Sense did violate the criminal laws of the State of South Carolina for ordinance of ☒ County/ ☐ Municipality of Charleston as set forth below

DESCRIPTION OF OFFENSE: Robbery / Armed Robbery, robbery while armed or allegedly armed with a deadly weapon

Having found probable cause and the above affiant having sworn before me, you are empowered and directed to arrest the said defendant and bring him or her before me forthwith to be dealt with according to law. A copy of this Arrest Warrant shall be delivered to the defendant at the time of its execution, or as soon thereafter as is practicable

Sworn to and subscribed before me on 11/1/2021

[Signature] Judge  
Ellen Soffer Steinhilber  
Judge Code 7280

Judge's Address 1720 Sam Rittenberg Blvd, Unit 11  
Charleston, SC 29417

Judge's Telephone (843)-766-65 x 31

Issuing Court: ☒ Magistrate ☐ Municipal ☐ Circuit

**ORIGINAL**      **ORIGINAL**      **ORIGINAL**      **ORIGINAL**

# Warrant set by

# WITNESSES

Judge \_\_\_\_\_  
on \_\_\_\_\_  
Type and Amount \_\_\_\_\_  
Name of Society \_\_\_\_\_

Name \_\_\_\_\_  
Address \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone \_\_\_\_\_  
Name \_\_\_\_\_  
Address \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone \_\_\_\_\_

## PRELIMINARY HEARING held by

Judge \_\_\_\_\_  
on \_\_\_\_\_  
Defendant/Alibi \_\_\_\_\_  
Decision \_\_\_\_\_

Name \_\_\_\_\_  
Address \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone \_\_\_\_\_  
Name \_\_\_\_\_  
Address \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone \_\_\_\_\_

## DISPOSITION before

Judge \_\_\_\_\_  
on \_\_\_\_\_  
by \_\_\_\_\_  
(indicate jury trial, bench trial, plea, not pros, etc)  
Disposition \_\_\_\_\_  
Sentence \_\_\_\_\_

Name \_\_\_\_\_  
Address \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone \_\_\_\_\_  
Name \_\_\_\_\_  
Address \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone \_\_\_\_\_

## JURORS

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Name \_\_\_\_\_  
Address \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone \_\_\_\_\_  
Name \_\_\_\_\_  
Address \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone \_\_\_\_\_

## CODEFENDANTS

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_



FILED  
2021 NOV -9 AM 11:52  
JULIE J. ARMSTRONG  
CLERK OF COURT  
BY \_\_\_\_\_

Charleston Police Department

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COUNTY OF CHARLESTON

ORIGINAL

AFFIDAVIT

Personally appear before me, a magistrate of this county one, Det. W. Crockett who first being duly sworn deposed and says that, Brian Randell Sease did within this county and state on the 30 October 2021 violate the criminal laws of the State of South Carolina in the following particular:

DESCRIPTION OF OFFENSE

Armed Robbery  
§S.C. Code of Law 16-11-330

NOV 1 17 2021  
OFFICER INITIALS *W*  
NCIC INITIALS *C*

The affiant states there is probable cause to believe that the defendant named did commit the crime set forth and that such probable cause is based on the following facts:

That on October 30 2021 at approximately 1437 hours, while at 1 ~~1800 Ashley West Apartments~~ (Pinecrest Apartment) which is in the County and City of Charleston, S.C., the above named defendant, Brian Randell Sease, did knowingly, willingly, and unlawfully violate SC State Statute 16-11-330 (Armed Robbery) in the following particulars:

On Saturday, October 30, 2021 at around 1437 hours, CPD Officers responded to ~~1800 Ashley West Apartments~~ (Pinecrest Apartments), Charleston, SC in reference to a shooting that just occurred. Upon arrival Officers located the victim, Travis Terrell Green, Jr in the driver seat of his ~~2014 Ford Focus~~ suffering from multiple gunshot wounds. The victim was transported by Charleston County EMS to MUSC where he was pronounced deceased. This incident is subsequently being investigated as a homicide.

The apartment complex office, which is located across from the incident location, was equipped with surveillance footage capturing the parking lot. This footage revealed two black males walking across the parking lot at around 1424 hours. One black male is wearing a light colored jacket and black pants, while the second suspect is wearing all black. Both parties walk toward the incident location. The victim's vehicle arrives in the complex at around 1434 hours and goes out of camera view. At approximately 1435 hours, a black male wearing all black runs past the office toward 1800 Ashley West Apartments, and is carrying what appears to be a backpack. A few seconds later a black male wearing a blue denim jacket and black pants and appears to be carrying a handgun. These suspects appear to be the same individuals captured walking toward the incident location 10 minutes before the murder. Based on this security camera footage, Detectives believe that the suspects fled the area headed west through the yards toward ~~William Kennerty Drive~~. Detectives subsequently conducted a video canvass of the surrounding area obtaining video footage from 1800 William Kennerty Drive (1800 Ashley West Apartments).

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME

THIS 1<sup>st</sup> DAY OF November 2021

*Ellen A. Steenberg* (L.S.)  
SIGNATURE OF JUDGE

COMPLAINT # 21-16480

WARRANT # 2021A1010900443

INVESTIGATING OFFICER: Det. W. Crockett

*[Signature]*  
AFFIANT  
180 Lockwood Blvd.  
Charleston, SC 29403  
843-577-7434

CPD Form OT3

NOV 1 17 2021

## Charleston Police Department

OFFICER INITIALS 

NOTE INITIALS

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA


COUNTY OF CHARLESTON



AFFIDAVIT

CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE

During the investigation, CPD Detectives interviewed the victim's family who indicated that the victim was in a monetary dispute with his cousin  (Jr) over a matter of 75 dollars. Family stated that the matter was over the mis-handling of narcotics belonging to the Defendant and that the Defendant replied to a Facebook post on October 26<sup>th</sup>, 2021 that stated, "Niggas will owe you money and move like y'all beefing. Bro just pay me" by posting, "Sushi bitch ass." It should be known that the victim's nickname is "Sushi." Family understood this to be a threat toward the victim over the aforementioned debt.


Detectives located Green's driver's license information via the South Carolina DMV website and observed that he bears similar physical characteristics as the suspect wearing the light-colored jacket in the security camera footage. A further query of the South Carolina DMV system indicated that Green is the registered owner of a  Altima with a South Carolina license . The Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) system captured this vehicle entering the West Ashley area at 04:12 hours on the morning of October 30<sup>th</sup>, 2021. ALPR photographs reveal that this vehicle is dark grey in color and has rain guards installed over both front and rear side windows.

During a review of the security footage obtained from  Detectives observed a dark grey Nissan Altima with rain guards turn onto William Kennerty Drive and head toward the incident location at 13:51 hours, approximately 9 minutes before the suspects are observed on the Pinecrest Apartment security cameras. The same Nissan Altima is then observed heading the opposite direction on William Kennerty Drive, away from the incident location, at 14:38 hours, approximately 1 minute after the first 911 call was received.

On 10/31/2021, Antonio Green Jr met with Detectives at CPD Headquarters. During a post Miranda statement, Green advised that on 10/30/2021 he was with Brian Sease (the Defendant) and another male (co-defendant) in West Ashley who arranged to meet the victim to purchase marijuana. The co-defendant already contacted the victim and arranged to meet at the Pinecrest Apartments. Green advised he and the co-defendant met the defendant at his house. Green then drove the co-defendants to the neighborhood behind the Pinecrest Apartments and parked his vehicle. They all exited the vehicle and walked to the apartments to wait for the victim. They were hanging out by the stairs when the co-defendant received a message from the victim that he was arriving.

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME

THIS 1<sup>st</sup> DAY OF November 2021

AFFIANT


180 Lockwood Blvd.  
Charleston, SC 29403  
843-577-7434

SIGNATURE OF JUDGE

COMPLAINT # 21-16480

WARRANT # 2021A1010900443

INVESTIGATING OFFICER: Det. W. Crockett

 (L.S.)

CPD Form OT3

## Charleston Police Department

NOV 1 17:01  
OFFICER INITIALS *W*  
HCIC INITIALS

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

 ORIGINAL

COUNTY OF CHARLESTON

AFFIDAVIT

CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE

Due to the victim and Green having a dispute over the victim owing him money, he knew that the victim would not speak to the co-defendants if the victim saw him. When the victim arrived, Green started to walk behind the building but observed the co-defendant enter the front seat of the victim's vehicle while the Defendant entered the rear passenger seat behind the victim. Within seconds of Green walking behind the building, he heard one gunshot followed by another (2) gunshots. Green immediately fled behind the building toward the entrance, crossed the parking lot and fled toward the vehicle. When he arrived at his vehicle, the co-defendant was already waiting for him in the vehicle. When Green and the co-defendant arrived back at the Defendant's residence, Green confronted them about what happened. At that time, the Defendant informed Green that when they were trying to purchase marijuana from the victim, he tried to increase the price. The victim went to reach for "something," and the Defendant subsequently shot him. After shooting the victim, they took a bag containing marijuana from the vehicle and fled the scene.

During the interview, Green advised that earlier in the week, the co-defendant spoke to him about wanting to rob the victim.

Green provided Detectives with the Defendant's name. Detectives requested a SLED generated six-photo lineup which was presented to Green. Green positively identified the Defendant in the six-photo lineup as the individual that conducted the robbery and shot the victim.

Based on the surveillance footage obtained from the Pinecrest Apartments, the footage obtained from ~~West Apartments~~, the statements provided by the victim's family members, the statement provided by the defendant, ~~that he drove the Defendant to meet the victim, at which time the victim was murdered by the Defendant and Green positively identifying the Defendant via a six photo lineup, this affiant believes probable cause is established to charge the defendant, Brian Sease, with a violation of South Carolina Statute 16-11-330 Armed Robbery, for robbing the victim, Travis Terrell Green Jr, while armed with a deadly weapon.~~

The above is true and believable based on the statements of Antonio Green, the video surveillance, the positive identification of the defendant, and the investigation conducted by Detectives with the Charleston Police Department.

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME

THIS 1<sup>st</sup> DAY OF November 2021

*Ellen L. Steinberg* (L.S.)  
SIGNATURE OF JUDGE

COMPLAINT # 21-16480

WARRANT # 2021 A 1010400443

INVESTIGATING OFFICER: Det. W. Crockett

*[Signature]*  
AFFIANT

CPD Form OT3

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA ) IN THE COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS  
COUNTY OF CHARLESTON ) FOR THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

) Warrant No(s): 2021A1010900442-0444

) Indictment No(s): 2023-GS-10-04241;  
) 2023-GS-10-04239; 2023-GS-10-04244

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA )

-versus-

**DEFENSE MOTION**

BRIAN SEASE,

Defendant.

**RE: A New Trial or in the Alternative Re-Sentencing**

Brian Sease respectfully moves the General Sessions Court for a new trial or in the alternative re-sentencing under Rule 29 of the South Carolina Rules of Criminal Procedure (SCRCrimP) based on the violation of his constitutional rights at his trial in Charleston during the week of September 8, 2025. The United States Constitution states that "no one shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend V. This protection has been applied to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Const. amend XIV, and South Carolina has a similar provision in its constitution. S.C. Const. art. I, §. 3. In addition, the United States Constitution guarantees the right of a defendant at trial to "effective assistance of counsel." U.S. Const. amend VI. This right has been similarly applied to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend VI XIV, and it is rooted in *Gideon v. Wainwright* and its progeny. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

In South Carolina, "post-trial motions shall be made within ten (10) days after the imposition of a sentence." Rule 29, SCRCrimP. The South Carolina Court of Appeals in *State v. Thompson* stated that "[g]enerally, the grant or refusal of a new trial is within the trial [court]'s discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal without a clear abuse of that discretion." 420 S.C. 386, 404 (2017)(quoting *State v. Garrett*, 350 S.C. 613, 619 (Ct. App. 2002)).<sup>1</sup> In addition, it said, "The cumulative error doctrine provides relief to a party when a combination of errors, insignificant by themselves, has the effect of preventing the party from receiving a fair trial, and the cumulative effect of the errors affects the outcome of the trial." *Id.* (quoting *State v. Beekman*, 405 S.C. 225, 237 (Ct. App. 2013), *aff'd*, 415 S.C. 632 (2016)).<sup>2</sup> Moreover, it stated "An appellant must demonstrate more than error in order to qualify for reversal pursuant to the cumulative error doctrine; rather, he must show the errors adversely affected his right to a fair trial to qualify for reversal on this ground." *Id.*

Accordingly, Sease is entitled to a new trial or in the alternative re-sentencing because under the cumulative error doctrine his rights to due process and effective assistance of counsel were violated as follows: (1) pre-trial motions by the Defense were not heard by the Court; (2) the State repeatedly and improperly objected eight or nine times during the Defense's opening statement on the facts of the case, and the Court sustained the objections; (3) the State admitted substantially prejudicial evidence that it agreed was irrelevant and lacked proper foundation on re-direct exam, and the Defense was unconstitutionally prevented from re-cross examining the

---

<sup>1</sup> "An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the trial court either lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of law." *State v. Tennant*, 383 S.C. 245, 254 (2009). "To warrant reversal based on the admission or exclusion of evidence, the complaining party must prove both the error of the ruling and the resulting prejudice. To prove prejudice, the complaining party must show there is a reasonable probability that the jury's verdict was influenced by the challenged evidence or lack thereof."

<sup>2</sup> The Defense acknowledges the significance and importance of Rule 18, SCRCrimP, preventing further argument on any matter after a ruling has been pronounced by the Court. It is merely making the following post-trial arguments to demonstrate how this Court's ruling cumulatively affected Sease's rights in an adverse manner for this Court's reconsideration and appellate review.

witness on the matter; (4) the Defense was not allowed to properly provide grounds for its objections or respond to the State's objections, thereby preventing their ability to make a record on complex hearsay issues before the Court; (5) the Defense was not allowed to refresh the recollection of the testifying codefendant in front of the jury; (6) the Defense was not allowed to make a record on the State's assertion that the Defense opened the door to the admission as evidence of a DNA report by SLED; (7) limitations were improperly placed on the Defense's expert witnesses both *sua sponte* and based on the State's objection; and (8) A slight remark during defense counsel's cross-examination, likely with harmless intent, by the Court and frequent interruptions prevented the Defense from zealously advocating for their client and potentially affected the jury's view of them.

#### CASE PROCEDURE

On October 31, 2021, Brian Sease was arrested for murder, armed robbery and possession of a weapon during a violent crime with his codefendants ~~A. Green and B. Green~~. Sease admittedly is pictured on a security camera leaving the scene of the incident with the murder weapon, and at trial, his attorneys asserted that he was likely guilty of accessory after the fact but not his pending violent charges. The angle of the camera that pictured Sease does not show him walking toward the scene with the murder weapon, and it does not show Sease at the scene with the murder weapon. It only shows him running from the scene with the murder weapon, thereby supporting the Defense' theory that he could have picked-up the murder weapon after his codefendant dropped it while exiting the victim's car after the shooting. This theory is supported by recorded, post-Miranda statements by Sease to the police in which he states that: (1) he was only at the incident location to buy weed, and (2) he picked up the gun of his codefendant, Green, who dropped it when he was exiting the victim's car. It is also supported

by the multiple pictures of Sease's codefendants with the gun found on their phones taken weeks to months before the incident, and a conversation on Facebook Messenger between them about Sease's other codefendant, Stewart, wanting to purchase the gun.

Before Sease's trial, Stewart pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and proffered a recorded statement to the State. This likely occurred before the State reviewed the pictures on Stewart's phone of him holding the murder weapon, since the prosecution never asked him about it at the recorded proffer meeting. Stewart made the recorded statement for the State with his attorney present and while sentencing was in deferment by this Court with Judge Deadra Jefferson presiding over the plea hearing and the deferred sentencing. Also, before Sease's trial, Sease's other codefendant, Green, was convicted at trial of murder, armed robbery, and possession of a weapon during a violent crime. Judge Donald B. Hocker presided of the trial and sentenced Green to thirty-three years.

On September 8, 2025, the State called Sease's case to trial with Judge Jefferson presiding. At trial, the Defense introduced numerous exhibits as evidence and called three experts as witnesses in the fields of crime scene analysis, pathology, and fingerprints. Sease did not testify, and the Court presented his case to the jury for deliberation on September 12, 2025, with a charge on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included of murder. After deliberating for over twelve hours over the course of two days spanning over a weekend, on September 15, 2025, the jury convicted Sease of voluntary manslaughter, armed robbery, and possession of a weapon during a violent crime. Sease was sentenced to a concurrent thirty years on voluntary manslaughter, eighteen years on armed robbery, and five years on the weapon conviction. This motion is being made within ten days of Sease's convictions, pursuant to Rule 29, SCRCrimP, and it places his appeal on hold while awaiting a ruling from this Court. The motion was drafted

without a transcript of the trial given the quick turnaround required for post-trial motions under Rule 29. As such, the Defense respectfully requests the right to correct any errors in its arguments or presentation of the record upon receipt of the transcript with a follow-up motion, and it apologizes in advance to the Court for any discrepancies in its recollection of the record verses the actual record.

## ARGUMENT

### 1. Pre-Trial Motions Not Heard by the Court

Sease's right to due process and effective assistance of counsel were violated at trial because this Court did not address his pre-trial motions before picking a jury in his case, including a motion to continue his case under Rule 5, SCRCrimP, due to discovery delays. Review of caselaw in South Carolina shows "that reversals of refusal of continuances are about as rare as the proverbial hens' teeth." *State v. Lylichfield*, 230 S.C. 405, 409 (1957). However, in *State v. Tanner*, the South Carolina Supreme Court overturned an appellant's conviction when a trial court improperly denied the appellant's continuance motion, having received "blood, skin, and hair samples" taken from the incident location, held in police custody, and provided to the appellant ten minutes before pre-trial hearings. 299 S.C. 459, 463 (1989). Specifically, the Court said, "Discovering who the samples belonged to and the samples' exact location in the car may [] have aided Tanner's accident reconstruction expert in arriving at his opinion about who was driving." *Id.* It also said, "The eve of trial production of these samples warranted the granting of a continuance so that the defendant could adequately ascertain the samples' full evidentiary value." *Id.*

Here, the discovery violation at issue was an incident report generated by Sergeant Detective Eric Tuttle of the Charleston Police Department (CPD) about an unrecorded meeting conducted by him and prosecutors for the State with their cooperating codefendant, Stewart, and

his attorney about the incident. The State provided the report to the Defense for Sease the day before trial on Sunday, September 7, 2025, at 5:03 PM,<sup>3</sup> thereby preventing Sease from ever being able to review it with his attorneys until after picking a jury for his trial. Upon information and belief, the State never provided the report, which introduced new facts into Sease's case, to counsel for Sease's codefendant, Green, before his conviction at trial, and the report was never raised as an issue at Green's trial, which was witnessed by Sease's attorneys.

Specifically, Stewart denied being involved in a gang during the unrecorded meeting as reported by Detective Tuttle – a statement contradicted by evidence on his phone where he is pictured multiple times flashing gang-related hand signs and displaying bandannas in gang-related colors with guns and fat stacks of money.<sup>4</sup> If the Defense had been granted a continuance, it would have investigated Stewart's gang involvement for impeachment purposes by calling witnesses, like Green, to contradict his claims, who is on record stating to police that Stewart frequently robs people. Defense counsel would have also been better prepared for the introduction of the gang-related pictures on Stewart's phone as relevant evidence during his testimony or that of Detective Tuttle. The State's assertion was that Stewart conspired with Sease and Green to rob the victim, despite them having no other evidence of Sease's involvement in a gang or in Stewart and Green's conspiracy apart from the claims of Stewart.<sup>5</sup> The trial judge addressed the matter as a side bar after conducting *voir dire* and picking a jury for Sease's trial,

---

<sup>3</sup> Exhibit 1, p. 1

<sup>4</sup> These pictures and videos were presented to the Court in color as Defense Exhibits 66-96 in addition to 103, to which the State objected as admissible as evidence. The Court sustained the State's objection based on a lack of relevancy apart from Defense Exhibits 81 and 103, which were published before the jury, since Stewart is pictured holding the murder weapon in Defense Exhibit 81 and 103.

<sup>5</sup> See *State v. Robinson*, 438 S.V. 421, 435 (2023) ("The proponent of prior bad act evidence must demonstrate it has a legitimate purpose, 'i.e., the evidence does something more than prove a person has propensity to commit crimes'"); *Johnson v. State*, 433 S.C. 550 (2021) ("The evidence of Johnson's leadership of Sumter 135 Piru and his ordering of the random hit was probative—if not essential—to establish the reason why Brandon killed Victim and that he did so intentionally and maliciously").

and she essentially stated that the Defense was not entitled to a hearing on the matter before conducting *voir dire* and picking a jury because they were late to court.<sup>6</sup> To that effect, the trial judge stated that the continuance matter could have been addressed at an earlier time.

## **2. State's Objections during Opening Statement**

Sease's rights to due process and effective assistance of counsel were violated at trial because the State objected eight or nine times during the Defense opening statement -- all of which were sustained by the Court. This Court's rulings on the objections were that the Defense could only assert in opening essentially what the evidence would show or prove. The State and Court seemed concerned with the fact that the Defense was not saying in opening the phrases, "the evidence will show" or "the State may prove" before making every point to the jury about their case. However, the Defense's statements in their opening were no less rooted in fact, and the State's objections did not provide any evidence to the contrary, especially when defense counsel started saying the requested words after the third or fourth objection. The Defense's claims were supported by eye-witness statements to police, videos from body worn cameras, CSI pictures, phone records, security camera videos, expert opinions of the discovery, and the recorded statements of witnesses who were under subpoena by the Defense. In other words, the Defense intended to prove the assertions made in its opening, if the State did not establish them in their case-in-chief. As such, the State made baseless objections unmoored to any rule. By

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<sup>6</sup> Defense counsel was late because the pants Sease's family provided to him to wear during his trial did not fit him to the point where he could not close his zipper. Sease had gained a significant amount of pre-trial weight in jail, and as a result, he was uncertain of the new size of his waistline when asked by the defense counsel in preparation for trial. This meant that after qualifying the jury venire but before picking a jury panel at around 11:00AM on the first day of trial, defense counsel had to find a suitable pair of pants for Sease, which proved to be difficult given defense counsel's inability to measure Sease's waistline, the renovations taking place at the public defender's office in Charleston, and the need for the Sheriff's deputies, charged with maintaining safety in the courtroom, to search and inspect any new clothing provided to Sease by defense counsel. In other words, the Sheriff (understandably so) prevented Sease from simply changing clothes in the courtroom, and he had to do so in the lock-up station beneath the courthouse.

granting these objections, the Court both erred on the law and may have conveyed to the jury that defense counsel's factual assertions were somehow inherently less trustworthy than those that the State made during their opening statements.<sup>7</sup>

**3. The State's Admission of Evidence on Re-Direct despite a Pre-trial Agreement and the Defense's Unconstitutional Inability to Re-Cross on the Matter**

Sease's right to due process and effective assistance of counsel were violated at trial because of this Court's unconstitutional policy on re-cross examination of a witness under the Confrontation Clause of the 6<sup>th</sup> Amendment. The rules on cross-examination in South Carolina grant broad authority to the trial court in terms of discretion for allowing cross examination. Rule 611, SCRE. That authority coupled with the stipulation of the parties to the case to suppress evidence, however, created a problem in Sease's case when on re-direct the State admitted as evidence State's Exhibit 115, which is an undated letter supposedly written by Sease to the cooperating codefendant, Stewart. This evidentiary admission violated Sease's right to confront the State's witness when Sease was denied the ability to re-cross examine the witness about it.<sup>8</sup> The letter was supposedly written by Sease to Stewart when they were in jail before Stewart posted bond and started cooperating with the State. Stewart's attorney supposedly turned over the letter to the State at some point during the investigation of the case, and the Defense did

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<sup>7</sup> This same issue similarly affected the Defense's closing and created the potential for Sease's conviction at trial to be overturned at a post-conviction relief hearing. As stated during Sease's sentencing, the Defense failed to address why the charge of accessory after the fact would not be on the jury's verdict form during closing after raising it in opening, for fear that the Court would sustain an objection from the State, for uncertain reasons, as it did during the Defense's opening statement, thereby further undermining the Defense's credibility with the jury.

<sup>8</sup> See *United States v. Riggi*, 951 F.2d 1368, 1375 (3d Cir. 1991) ("When material new matters are brought out on redirect examination, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment mandates that the opposing party be given the right of recross-examination on those new matters"); See also *Thurman v. State*, 211 Md. App. 455, 472 (2013) ("It is well settled that if a new subject is raised in redirect examination, the district court must allow the new matter to be subject to recross-examination") (citing *O'Brien v. Dubois*, 145 F.3d 16, 26-27 (1st Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds, *McCambridge v. Hall*, 303 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2002); *United States v. Vasquez*, 82 F.3d 574, 576 (2d Cir. 1996); *United States v. Ross*, 33 F.3d 1507, 1518 (11th Cir. 1994); *United States v. Baker*, 10 F.3d 1374, 1404 (9th Cir. 1993), overruled on other grounds, *United States v. Nordby*, 225 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2000)).

not explore the evidentiary relevancy or foundation of the letter because the State said that they would not admit it as evidence at trial, acknowledging its evidentiary problems. This letter was admitted as evidence by the State on redirect of a witness called by the State under their assertion that the Defense opened the door for its admission during cross-examination. The State did not request a bench conference before questioning their witness about it, and defense counsel failed to make a contemporaneous objection having been caught off-guard by the evidentiary admission. The problem could not be cured with re-cross examination of the witness because the Court said that the State had to consent to re-cross. To which, the State said they did not consent. Thus, the Defense was unconstitutionally prevented by the Court and State from exploring the relevancy and foundation of the letter through the State's witness under the Confrontation Clause, even though the State raised the letter as a new matter before the jury on re-direct exam.<sup>9</sup>

#### **4. The Prevention of Making a Record on Complex Hearsay Issues**

Sease's rights to due process and effective assistance of counsel were violated at trial because the Defense was prevented from making a record on complex hearsay issues before the Court. At the root of the matter is the Court's policy against "speaking objections." In *State v. Washington*, the South Carolina Court of Appeals said, "We acknowledge, and find problematic, that the trial court did, throughout the trial, indicate it would not allow 'speaking objections' and numerous bench conferences were held off the record. However, it does not appear the trial court implemented its 'no speaking objections' rule concerning this particular matter." 424 S.C. 374 (2018). This case was overturned for reasons unrelated to "speaking objections." But this Court should no less be concerned about the opinion's view of "speaking objections" because, unlike in *Washington*, this Court's policy on speaking objections had a direct impact on the Defense's

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<sup>9</sup> *Id.*

ability to address complex hearsay objections made by the State during the testimony of the lead detectives involved in Sease's case while the Defense was cross-examining them.

The trial judge's policy on speaking objections prevented the defense counsel from arguing how various non-hearsay rules apply to the testimony that they were trying to elicit from the lead detectives and that contradicted the State's theory of the case and the claims of their cooperating, testifying codefendant. Then, when defense counsel attempted to make a record on the matter after the jury was removed from the courtroom, the trial judge blocked Sease's attorneys by citing Rule 18, SCRE, which prevents counsel from arguing with the Court after it has already ruled on the matter. Essentially, the Court placed the Defense in a *Catch-22* situation. They could not put on the record their concerns about the State's interpretation of suspect evidentiary standards like "investigative hearsay" and "self-serving hearsay" in front of the jury while cross-examining the State's witnesses nor could they outside the presence of the jury upon completion of cross-examination.

These evidentiary standards are called into question by the unique posture and facts of Sease's case because his codefendants both gave post-Miranda statements to police, the State opted to sever their trials without a motion from the defense, and one of Sease's codefendants had already been convicted at trial with the other codefendant having testified at his trial under oath and subject to cross-examination. If allowed to make a record on these hearsay issues being applied to Sease's case, the Defense would have asserted the following under the law.

**A. The Defense's Argument on Investigative Hearsay, if Allowed to Make a Record**

This Court improperly ruled based on its interpretation of investigative hearsay that the Defense for Sease could not elicit testimony on cross-examination from the State's witness, Sergeant Detective Tuttle, about Stewart's contradicting statements to him. Stewart made the

statements at issue to Detective Tuttle at an unrecorded meeting with prosecutors present. Also, the statements were detailed in a report created by Detective Tuttle and provided to Defense the night before trial,<sup>10</sup> and they contradicted the statements made by Stewart during his recorded post-Miranda interrogation by law enforcement the day after incident, at the recorded proffer meeting, and during his testimony at the trial of Sease's other codefendant, Green. Similarly, this Court improperly ruled based on its interpretation of investigative hearsay that defense counsel for Sease could not elicit testimony on cross-examination from the State's witness, Case Agent Detective Tanya Duby-Gritzuk, about her contradicting theories of the case as portrayed in her agency's arrest warrant affidavit and search warrants that she drafted and sent to Facebook, Inc. for access to the defendants' electronic records. These warrants created by Detective Duby were based on the statements of Green during his recorded post-Miranda interrogation by law enforcement the day after the incident, and like the statements Stewart made to Detective Tuttle, they are admissible as non-hearsay evidence or in the alternative hearsay evidence falling under the exceptions for statements against interest and statements by a party opponent, regardless of whether they were gathered during a police investigation.

The rules of evidence state that "hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at a trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Rule 801(c), SCRE. A statement is not hearsay if it is a prior statement by a witness,<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Exhibit 1

<sup>11</sup> A prior statement by a witness is when "[t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony, or (B) consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive; provided, however, the statement must have been made before the alleged fabrication, or before the alleged improper influence or motive arose, or (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person, or (D) consistent with the declarant's testimony in a criminal sexual conduct case or attempted criminal sexual conduct case where the declarant is the alleged victim and the statement is limited to the time and place of the incident." Rule 801, SCRE(d)(1).

or an admission by a party-opponent.<sup>12</sup> Here, Stewart and Green's statements to Detectives Tuttle and Duby are admissions by a party-opponent and prior statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy. They implicated Sease and themselves in a plan to rob the victim that resulted in a murder. In other words, they were either "inconsistent with the declarant's testimony, or consistent with the declarant's testimony and [] offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. . . made before the alleged fabrication or [] improper influence of motive arose." Rule 801(d)(1), SCRE. Plus, they were made "by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." Rule 801(d)(2)(E).

Arguably, the pre-trial statements made by Green and Stewart were hearsay and elicited simply because of Detective Tuttle's and Duby's investigation into Sease's case. In *State v. King*, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a police officer's testimony should not have been admitted by the trial court under Rule 801(d)(1) and 801(d)(2)(E), SCRE, because it was inadmissible hearsay "*offered by the State to explain [the officer]'s investigation.*" 422 S.C. 47 (2017) [emphasis added].<sup>13</sup> At trial, in *King*, the State elicited testimony from the police officer about the number of gunshots heard by the neighbors who lived by the incident location. The Defense objected to the testimony, and the trial judge admitted it as evidence over the Defense's objection. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court agreed with the South Carolina Court of Appeals that the testimony elicited from the police officer *by the state* was hearsay because "it

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<sup>12</sup> An admission by a party-opponent is when "[t]he statement is offered against a party and is (A) the party's own statement in either an individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." Rule 801, SCRE(d)(2).

<sup>13</sup> See also *Moore v. Commonwealth*, 2025 Ky. Unpub. LEXIS 37, \*11, 2025 LX 109026 (Court outlines the problems with investigative hearsay when offered by the State, but the Court ultimately determines that its use was harmless error due to the weight of the evidence against the appellant and the defense strategy).

was based exclusively on what the witnesses told her during the neighborhood canvas and was offered to prove that King fired more than one gunshot." *Id.* at 66. Specifically, the South Carolina Supreme Court said, "[E]ven with this straightforward analysis, we believe it is necessary to *caution prosecutors* against using 'investigative information' as it appears this is an attempt to circumvent the rules against hearsay." *Id.* [emphasis added].

Here, the statements by Sease's codefendants offered through Detectives Tuttle and Duby do not meet the exclusionary requirements of investigative hearsay delineated in *King*, even if this Court had determined they were *not* non-hearsay under Rules 801(1) and (2), because they were not offered by the prosecution. In other words, *King* places a limit on the State's ability to elicit investigative hearsay through their witnesses. It does not limit the Defense's ability to elicit investigative hearsay through the State's witnesses on cross-examination. This is probably because the State can cure any issues with the truthfulness of the investigative hearsay statement elicited from their witness on re-direct by placing their own spin on it. For instance, defense counsel was trying to offer as evidence statements by his codefendant, Stewart, at an unrecorded meeting through Detective Tuttle. These statements were that Stewart was never in possession of the murder weapon and that Stewart denied being in a gang.<sup>14</sup> On re-direct, the State could have cured any concern about the truthfulness, or lack thereof, regarding the statement by simply asking Detective Tuttle whether he believed Stewart at the time, and Detective Tuttle could have responded accordingly, placing whatever spin he wanted on the proof, saying something like: No, I didn't believe him at the time, which is the reason why I conducted another meeting and confronted him about his truthfulness. The State could similarly do the same with the statements made by codefendant Green and elicited by the Defense through Detective Duby as the State's

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<sup>14</sup> Exhibit 1, p.3, para.2 & p.5, para.2-3.

witness, only this might have been more difficult for the State to spin because Detective Duby put Green's statements in a search warrant as a basis for acquiring permission to the defendants' phones from a General Sessions Court judge with a search warrant.

**B. The Defense's Argument on Self-Serving Hearsay, if Allowed to Make a Record**

This Court improperly ruled based on its interpretation of self-serving hearsay that the Defense for Sease could not elicit testimony on cross-examination from the State's witness, Detective Duby, that Sease had indicated he was simply at the incident location to buy weed and not to commit an armed robbery resulting in a murder. As stated previously, non-hearsay is an admission by a party-opponent where the statement is offered against a party and is the party's own statement in either an individual or a representative capacity. Rule 801(d)(2)(A), SCRE. Also, an exception to the hearsay rule is a then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. Rule 803(3), SCRE. This is "a statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health)." *Id.*

Here, defense counsel for Sease was trying to elicit Sease's statement from Detective Duby on cross-examination that he was at the incident location to buy weed as non-hearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(A), SCRE. In other words, Detective Duby, as the State's witness, would have been offering the statement against Sease, who is a party-opponent, since it incriminates Sease as the purchaser of an illegal substance. Also, even if this Court finds this incriminating statement does not meet the requirements of non-hearsay, since buying weed is not as serious of a crime as murder and Sease potentially has a reason to lie about implicating himself in a murder, it falls under an exception to the hearsay rule mentioned in Rule 803(3), SCRE, because it clearly explains Sease's motive for being at the incident location.

Arguably, Sease's statement meets the requirements of self-serving hearsay as explained in *State v. Cheeseboro* by the South Carolina Supreme Court. 346 S.C. 526 (2001). In *Cheeseboro*, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's ruling to exclude a letter written by the defendant and offered by the Defense at trial as evidence. The letter is clearly exculpatory, instead of inculpatory like Sease's statement. The opinion states:

Appellant's exculpatory letter contains inadmissible hearsay since it is offered for the truth of the matter asserted, i.e. that appellant did not commit the cab driver murder which linked him to the barbershop murder. See Rule 801(c) and 802, SCRE. Further, it falls under no exception to the hearsay rule. Moreover, given that it was written while appellant was awaiting trial on this matter, its trustworthiness is highly suspect.

*Cheeseboro*, 346 S.C. at 552

As such, *Cheeseboro* does not fully apply to Sease's case because the letter did not include an inculpatory statement, like Sease's statement about being at the incident location simply to buy weed, and it did not speak to the appellant's alleged reason for being at the incident location. It only removed him from the incident location at-issue in the case. Also, the Supreme Court fails to analyze the statement under the then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition exception delineated in Rule 803(3), SCRE,<sup>15</sup> and it acknowledges the importance of the timing of the statement, which adds validity to Sease's statement, since it was made to Detective Duby the day after his arrest during a police interrogation in a room with a recording device, not in some document drafted outside the presence of law enforcement.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>15</sup> In *State v. Tennant*, the South Carolina Court of Appeals addressed the application of Rule 803(3), SCRE, to self-serving hearsay in the form of a suicide note drafted by the appellant months after the incident at issue before the trial court. 383 S.C. 245, 257 (2009). The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's ruling to exclude the note under Rule 803(3) due to its lack of timeliness in relation to the incident. *Id.* Again, this reason for exclusion does not apply to Sease's case because the statement he made was the day after the incident during a police interrogation.

<sup>16</sup> Detective Duby's colleague, Detective Daniel Malone, feigned like he was turning off the recording device at CPD during the interrogation before Sease repeated the statement, thereby reducing its self-serving nature for preparation of trial, since Sease likely believed that his statements were being made in secret to law enforcement to avoid him being labeled as a snitch by his codefendants, unlike the letters in *Cheeseboro* and *Tennant*. This fact is not in the record at trial. However, it is shown in Sease's recorded statement to police, and it would have been

### 5. The Prevention of Recollection Refreshment in front of the Jury

Sease's rights to due process and effective assistance of counsel were violated at trial because this Court would not let defense counsel refresh the recollection of the testifying codefendant in front of the jury, thereby impeding his ability to effectively impeach him. The rules in South Carolina on impeachment are as follows: "The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling the witness," Rule 608, SCRE, and "[b]ias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by evidence otherwise adduced." Rule 609, SCRE. Additionally, the rules in South Carolina on refreshing a witness's recollection are as follows:

If a witness uses a writing to refresh memory for the purpose of testifying, either – (1) while testifying, or (2) before testifying, if the court in its discretion determines it is necessary in the interest of justice, an adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at the hearing, to inspect it, to cross-examine the witness thereon, and to introduce in evidence those portions which relate to the testimony of the witness. Rule 612, SCRE.

In examining a witness concerning a prior statement made by the witness, whether written or not, the statement need not be shown nor its contents disclosed to the witness at that time, but on request the same shall be shown or disclosed to opposing counsel. Rule 613(a), SCRE.

Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is advised of the substance of the statement, the time and place it was allegedly made, and the person to whom it was made, and is given the opportunity to explain or deny the statement. If a witness does not admit that he has made the prior inconsistent statement, extrinsic evidence of such statement is admissible. However, if a witness admits making the prior statement, extrinsic evidence that the prior statement was made is inadmissible. This provision does not apply to admissions of a party-opponent as defined in Rule 801(d)(2). Rule 613(b), SCRE.

Here, this Court told the Defense while they were cross-examining the cooperating codefendant, Derrick Stewart, that they had to refresh Stewart's memory outside the presence of

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addressed by defense counsel, if Sease had been allowed a pre-trial hearing on the admissibility of his post-Miranda statement to law enforcement.

the jury when he testified that he did not remember saying "I done fucked-up my life" during a recorded statement to police after his arrest when the police officers questioning him had left the interrogation room. Stewart's statement clearly speaks to his motive to lie and to bias against Sease.

This Court's policy on only allowing the Defense to refresh a witness's recollection outside the presence of the jury clearly contradicts the rules of evidence, especially since Stewart is a party-opponent and the entire transcript from his statement to police is arguably admissible as extrinsic evidence under Rule 613(b), SCRE. Put simply, the jury should be allowed to watch the witness deny being able to refresh their recollection with a transcript or after watching a video recording of their statement with headphones at the witness stand before the impeachment process takes place. Otherwise, it looks like the Defense is the source of the delay in the trial, rather than the witness, who is failing to remember statements they made to law enforcement, post-Miranda, that makes them look like a liar or a conspiring codefendant.<sup>17</sup>

**6. The Prevention of Making a Record on the State's Assertion that the Defense Opened the Door on DNA Evidence**

Sease's rights to due process and effective assistance of counsel were violated by this Court at trial because this Court asserted that the Defense "opened the door" for the State to introduce the DNA evidence related to a gun found at the scene of the crime, simply by saying that the gun likely belonged to the victim. The foundation of "opening the door" on evidence is found in the rule of completeness, which primarily applies to writings and recorded statements,

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<sup>17</sup> The Court's policy on refreshing recollection forced the Defense to move on with their cross-examination, which ended around 1:30PM before the jury broke for lunch on Thursday, making any attempt to refresh Stewart's recollection after the jury had been excused for lunch contextually less impactful and strategically risky. If Stewart could not refresh his recollection with a transcript or video recording of his statement to police, then the jury would have had to return to the courtroom before being provided their lunch or after simply to watch the video recording without context or the ability to watch Stewart deny on the record his recollection being refreshed for the purpose of impeachment.

not necessarily non-fungible evidence. Rule 106, SCRE. The rule of completeness states that "[w]hen a writing, or recorded statement, or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it." *Id.*

Here, the State and Defense had struck a deal about the DNA evidence involved in Sease's case. During an email status conference with Administrative Judge Roger Young, the Defense agreed to withdraw their motion for a trial continuance due to their DNA expert's lack of availability when the State agreed to not introduce the portion of SLED's DNA report about Sease's DNA being on the magazine of the handgun found at the scene of the crime.<sup>18</sup> In opening, the Defense said nothing about DNA evidence. It merely said the gun likely belonged to the victim.<sup>19</sup> Responding officers found the gun underneath a phone charger on the part of the front passenger seat closest to the center console and the victim, who was found dead from gunshot wounds in the driver seat.

This Court entertained the State's claim that the Defense opened the door for the State to introduce the DNA evidence, even though it was not interested in reviewing or making as a Court's exhibit a printed copy of the email status conference between the State, the Defense, and Judge Young. Also, this Court failed to state for the record its ruling about the rule of completeness and how the Defense opened the door to the DNA evidence, when the Defense never mentioned DNA in their opening. If the Defense had said in opening that Sease's DNA was not on the gun found in the victim's car, or that no DNA was found on the gun, or that the DNA of Sease's codefendant was not entirely excluded by SLED as being found on the trigger of

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<sup>18</sup> Exhibit 2

<sup>19</sup> This is a plausible statement considering Sease likely started sweating when shots were fired in the victim's car, and he admittedly was clamoring to exit the back seat of the victim's car over the front passenger seat where the gun was located after shots were fired due to the victim having activated the car's child locks for the back seat of his car.

the gun, then the Defense admittedly would have opened the door for the State to admit the DNA report on the gun from SLED as evidence. However, the Defense simply stated, based on the factual location of the gun, that it likely belonged to the victim. This alone does not open the door for the DNA report on the gun to be introduced as evidence under the rule of completeness, especially since the victim was a drug dealer and the gun was left at the murder scene where first responders found the victim's body. Simply put, an agreement not to make DNA on a gun an issue at trial does not mean that the parties must pretend the gun does not exist or that the parties cannot still speculate who possessed the gun without mentioning DNA.

The presence of DNA does not fully establish possession of a gun. It only establishes contact by touch or bodily fluid and does not rule out contact by a party simply because DNA is not found on it. Ultimately, the Defense was forced to strike another deal with the State based on this Court's encouragement, since this Court was suggesting that it would allow the State to introduce SLED's DNA report on the gun under the rule of completeness and since the Defense's DNA expert was unavailable to testify during the trial. This deal likely hindered the Defense in convincing the jury that the gun was not Sease's since it prevented the Defense from arguing in closing, without mentioning DNA, that the gun could have belonged to the victim even though his DNA was not on it.<sup>20</sup>

## **7. Limitations Placed on the Defense's Expert Witnesses**

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<sup>20</sup> The trial court's misinterpretation of the rule of completeness thereby hindered the Defense's ability to prepare for other aspects of the trial the night before the SLED agent testified about DNA found on other objects at the scene and before the parties to the case struck the second DNA deal the day of the SLED agent's testimony, because the night before the SLED agent testified about DNA, defense counsel had to prepare a cross-examination of the SLED agent on the DNA. These extensive preparations were done knowing that the Defense would not have the assistance of their DNA expert's testimony on SLED's (mis)interpretation and analysis of the DNA collected from the gun. If the Defense's DNA expert had testified at trial, he would have stated that Sease's DNA had been excluded by SLED's analysis as being on the gun's trigger. However, his DNA was likely on the magazine, and since only one swab was used for the magazine, the DNA could have been collected from the portion of the magazine that protrudes from the gun's handle and is exposed to the elements – a pertinent fact considering the gun was in Sease's flight path from the victim's car on the victim's front passenger seat.

Sease's rights to due process and effective assistance of counsel were violated at trial because this Court asserted that the Defense's experts were not qualified to testify without proffering their testimony about their qualifications.<sup>21</sup> In addition, this Court *sua sponte* limited, without a legal basis, the extent to which the Defense's crime scene analyst could testify to ballistics, blood spatter, and reconstruction. The rules state that "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. Rule 702, SCORE. Furthermore, Appellate Courts in South Carolina have stated the following about the admission of expert testimony during the qualification process: "The qualification of an expert witness and the admissibility of the expert's testimony are matters within the trial court's sound discretion." *State v. Tennant*, 383 S.C. 245, 255, (2009) (quoting *State v. White*, 372 S.C. 364, 373, 642 S.E.2d 607, 611 (Ct. App. 2007)). "Before expert testimony is admitted, the trial court must determine if the evidence is relevant, reliable, and helpful to the jury." *Id.* (quoting *White*, 372 S.C. at 374). "If the evidence is reliable, and relevant, the trial [court] should determine if the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by its prejudicial effect." *Id.*<sup>22</sup>

Here, the Defense wanted to call Crime Scene Analyst Dr. Kenny Kinsey, Fingerprints Analyst John Black, and Pathologist Dr. Kyle Shaw as witnesses during the presentation of Sease's case-in-chief. The State objected to the witnesses being called without proffering their

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<sup>21</sup> See also *Pascual v. Dozier*, 771 So. 2d 552, 554 (2000) ("The right to call witnesses is one of the most important due process rights of a party[.] Accordingly, the exclusion of the testimony of expert witnesses must be carefully considered and sparingly done. Furthermore, a trial court should exercise caution when the witness sought to be excluded is a party's only witness or one of the party's most important witnesses because if the witness is stricken, that party will be left unable to present evidence to support his or her theory of the case").

<sup>22</sup> See *United States v. Wan Chyu Liu*, 716 F.3d 159, 168 (2013) ("A lack of personal experience—the district court's concern here—should not ordinarily disqualify an expert, so long as the expert is qualified based on some other factor provided by Rule 702: 'knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education'" (Citing Fed. R. Evid. 702).

testimony on their expertise for reasons unclear to the Defense other than they did not have direct access to the crime scene, the victim's body, or the original lifted fingerprints from the scene. The Court seriously considered the State's objection without proffering testimony from the witnesses about their expertise for roughly an hour after dismissing the jury for the day on Thursday evening before the Defense presented their case-in-chief on Friday morning.<sup>23</sup> Ultimately, the Court allowed the Defense's experts to testify. However, it prevented Dr. Kinsey from forming an opinion about his review of the crime scene images, body camera videos of first responders, shell casing location, projectile location, firearm statistics, and outside research of what might have happened at the crime scene. More specifically, the Court prevented Dr. Kinsey from testifying to ballistics because its scientific nature. Plus, for the same reason, this Court stated *sua sponte* and off the record during a bench conference after Dr. Kinsey had been qualified as an expert in crime scene analysis that he could not testify about his interpretation of the blood spatter involved in the case.<sup>24</sup> Neither of these conclusions referred to any caselaw, including *State v. Tennant*, 383 S.C. 245, 255 (2009), which allows for the exclusion of expert testimony based on relevancy – a non-issue in Sease's case since he was charged with armed robbery, murder, and unlawful possession of a firearm.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> This consideration was based on the *curriculum vitae* of the experts and not their proffered testimony. The Court was unwilling to proffer testimony from Dr. Kenny Kinsey, who was the focal point of the Court's concern and who was present in the courtroom on Thursday evening prepared to testify for the Defense, having driven from Lexington to Charleston for his testimony that evening at the Court's request.

<sup>24</sup> See *Taylor v. Illinois*, 484 U.S. 400, 408-09 (1988) ("The right to offer the testimony of witnesses . . . is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of due process of law.") See also, *Rock v. Arkansas*, 483 U.S. 44, 54-55 (1987).

<sup>25</sup> This of course hindered the Defense's ability to assert with proper foundation to the jury in closing that Sease and his codefendants were all in the victim's car when shots were fired by at least two different caliber guns – a possibility that contradicted the claims of his cooperating codefendant, Derrick Stewart, who consistently maintained post-police interrogation, during his recorded proffer statement, and during trial that only Sease was in the car when shots were fired by the guns after initially stating to police upon his arrest during his interrogation that everyone was in the car before the shooting.

## 8. A Slight Remark before the Jury and Frequent Interruptions

Sease's rights to due process and effective assistance of counsel were violated at trial because of the trial judge's slight remark, likely with harmless intent, about his "nervous"-ness before the jury and its frequent interruptions of Defense counsel. In *United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co.*, the Federal Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit said "Due to the very nature of the court as an institution, it must and does have an inherent power to impose order, respect, decorum, silence, and compliance with lawful mandates." 11 F.3d 450, 461 (4th Cir. 1993).<sup>26</sup> Here, this Court frequently interrupted counsel for the defense, which prevented them from effectively making a record for appellate purposes. Furthermore, this Court undermined defense counsel for Sease in front of the jury by stating that his tapping of the podium with his fingers was "a nervous tick" as he was contemplating on cross-examination of a witness how to address the Court's ruling on investigative and self-serving hearsay.<sup>27</sup>

## CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Sease is entitled to a new trial, or in the alternative re-sentencing, and as suggested during sentencing at trial, a 15-year active sentence is appropriate for him on voluntary manslaughter and armed robbery at eighty-five percent, since Sease admitted to being guilty of accessory after the fact in the Defense's opening statement, and accessory after the fact

<sup>26</sup> See *State v. Pace*, 316 S.C. 71, 74 (1994) (Comments by a trial judge about an attorneys age, gender, or competence are improper and constitute reversible error upon a showing of prejudice to defendant). See also, *State v. Brisdon*, 323 S.C. 324, 331 (1996) ("Trial judge must refrain from any comment which tends to indicate their opinion as to the weight or sufficiency of the evidence, credibility of witnesses, the guilty of an accused, or any fact in controversy"); *State v. Kennedy*, 272 S.C. 231, 250 (1978) (Basic to the defendant's absolute right to a fair and impartial trial is "the requirement of neutrality on the part of the trial judge, and it is imperative that he exercise a high degree of restraint, caution, and circumspection in making remarks or comments in the presence of the jury"); *State v. Campbell*, 297 S.C. 24, 26 (1988) ("In the course of the trial of a criminal case, a trial judge must refrain from all comment which tends to indicate his opinion as to the weight or sufficiency of evidence, the credibility of witnesses, the guilt of the accused, as to the controverted facts"); *Crenshaw v. Southern Railway Company*, 214 S.C. 533, 560 (1949) ("It has long been recognized that even a slight remark, apparently innocent in its language, may, when uttered by the court, have a decided weight in shaping the opinion of the jury").

<sup>27</sup> *Id.*

upon a conviction carries fifteen years at sixty-five percent at most. The percentage difference arguably makes up for any detailed discrepancy or misinterpretation in the record by the Defense of this Court's efforts and intent due to not having a trial transcript of the proceeding before a post-trial motion was due to the court within ten days of Sease's conviction.<sup>28</sup> It also considers the fact that representatives of the victim at sentencing said that they did not know whether Sease was involved in the conspiracy to rob the victim, even after having sat through two different trials on the matter — one for Sease and another for his codefendant, Green, who the State concedes was the owner or initial possessor of the murder weapon pictured in Sease's hand when leaving the scene.

Respectfully Submitted,

*Ben Mack*

Benjamin A. Mack  
Senior Assistant Public Defender  
In Defense of Brian Sease

2023 SEP 25 PM 4:09  
JULIE J. ARMSTRONG  
CLERK OF COURT  
H

FILED

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<sup>28</sup> Exhibit 3

~

***State of South Carolina v. Brian Sease***

2021A1010200442-0444

2023-GS-10-04241; 2023-GS-10-04239; 2023-GS-10-04244

Motion for New Trial or Re-Sentencing

**Exhibit 1**

~

**Benjamin A. Mack**

**Subject:**

FW: supplement

**Attachments:**

SUPPLEMENTS\_[EDIT]01142025\_14\_53\_47.PDF

---

**From:** Cassity A. Brewer <[REDACTED]>  
**Sent:** Sunday, September 07, 2025 5:03 PM  
**To:** Benjamin A. Mack <BMack@charlestoncounty.org>  
**Subject:** supplement



**Cassity A. Brewer**  
**Assistant Solicitor**

~~101 Meeting Street, Suite 1000~~  
~~Charleston, SC 29401~~

~~Office: [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]~~  
~~e: [REDACTED] | web: www.scsolicitor9.org~~

# CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT

Printed: 01/14/2025 14:53

OCA: 2116480

Charleston Police Department

Case Status: **CLEARED**

Case Mng Status: **CLEARED BY ARREST**

Occurred: 10/30/2021

Offense: **MURDER / NON-NEGLIGENT MANSLAUGHTER**

Investigator: **TUTTLE, E. M. (1604)**

Date / Time: 01/14/2025 12:44:26, Tuesday

Supervisor: **MELLETT, M. (1805)**

Supervisor Review Date / Time: 01/14/2025 12:58:10, Tuesday

Contact: **Stewart, Derrick Samuel**

Reference: **Supplemental Report**

OCA: 21-16480

Incident: **Murder (firearm)**

Incident Location: **1300 Forest Hill Road, Charleston, SC 29405**

Incident Date & Time: **Saturday, October 30, 2021 around 14:30 hours**

**-Wednesday, December 4, 2024-**

Around 13:00 hours, Derrick Stewart (offender) and his attorney (Michael Loignon) met with ASOLs Brewer and Kozik and me, Detective Sergeant Eric Tuttle, at the solicitor's office for a Proffer. 9th Circuit Inv. E. Jourdan was present as well.

The proffer agreement was previously signed and ASOLs reminded Derrick of the agreement prior to beginning. We sat together at a conference table, and I introduced myself to Derrick and then gathered some basic contact information. Below is a summary of what Derrick provided during the meeting. It was agreed between he, his attorney, the ASOLs, and I that we would be meeting at least one to two more times in the coming months after this meeting.

Derrick Stewart Jr. (b/m; 10-22-2004) © 843-530-7263; Address - recently moved to Johns Island and didn't know address; Emergency Contact: Derrick Stewarts Sr (father) © 843-925-5396; currently unemployed - last worked at Volvo Warehouse via a Temp agency, does not own a vehicle but borrows his father's vehicle. Moniker: Lil D/Derrick

We then discussed his relationship with all subjects involved.

## VICTIM

**-Travis Green Jr. (AKA Travis)-**

- " Known the victim for several months.
- " Met three or four times and corresponded via phone (text and Facebook Messenger).
- " Purchased small amounts of marijuana from the victim for personal use "1/8th" (around 3.5 grams) or so.
- " Aware that the victim sold marijuana, "Lean" (codeine), pills (Oxycontin), and edibles.
- " Met the victim through co-defendant Antonio Green.
- " He did not know Travis to be affiliated with any criminal gangs.

## DEFENDANTS/OFFENDERS

Investigator Signature

Supervisor Signature

# CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT

Printed: 01/14/2025 14:53

OCA: 2116480

Charleston Police Department

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Case Status: **CLEARED**

Case Mng Status: **CLEARED BY ARREST**

Occurred: 10/30/2021

Offense: **MURDER / NON-NEGLIGENT MANSLAUGHTER**

Investigator: **TUTTLE, E. M. (1604)**

Date / Time: 01/14/2025 12:44:26, Tuesday

Supervisor: **MELLETTTE, M. (1805)**

Supervisor Review Date / Time: 01/14/2025 12:58:10, Tuesday

Contact: ~~Stephen Derrick-Samuel~~  
78 Ashely Middle School Rd,  
Charleston 29405-5300

Reference: Supplemental Report

-Antonio Green Jr (AJ)-

Derrick met AJ while he was in 8th Grade at West Ashely Middle School, which was around four to five years prior to the murder. AJ and Derrick both resided in Ashley Oaks apartment complex through his cousin, Terrell Taylor. He and AJ were present during a double murder that occurred in Ashley Oaks (reference CPD OCA: 18-10496).

Derrick & AJ never got into any trouble together, prior to this incident. They would drink and smoke marijuana together. He didn't know AJ to be employed. AJ drove his mother's vehicle (suspect vehicle). He knew him to possess firearms, including a black handgun. Derrick said he never used, borrowed, or touched one of AJ's firearms. He did not know AJ to be affiliated with any criminal gangs.

AJ had a paramour but Derrick couldn't recall her name.

-Brian Sease (Block) -

Derrick has known Block, via AJ, for about three to four years. He also previously resided in Ashley Oaks but moved to Dogwood Rd with his girlfriend (unknown name) prior to the incident. Block was employed but he didn't know where.

He knew Block to smoke marijuana and he may serve (sell) small personal amounts to others. He had never seen Block with a firearm prior to the murder. He didn't know Block to be affiliated with any criminal gangs. Other folks that they would associate with were Jordan, Quell, and TJ.

He observed Block with a 9mm silver-in-color handgun waistband.

-INCIDENT-

Derrick knew that the victim owed AJ money and that it was public knowledge. I presented him with a screenshot of the Facebook post and Derrick concurred that it was referencing that Travis owed AJ money. Derrick didn't know how much money was owed by Travis to AJ. This vendetta occurred a few days, maybe a week or so, prior to the murder. Derrick, who had been calm and reserved, did have a physiological reaction and began to sweat at this point.

Derrick remembers the time around the incident well, because it was near his birthday (October 22). The morning of the incident, Travis reached out to Derrick asking if he had any connections that would want to purchase marijuana. Derrick sent out numerous messages, likely by Facebook Messenger, to folks.

Investigator Signature

Supervisor Signature

Supplements (Edit)

(3)

# CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT

Printed: 01/14/2025 14:53

OCA: 2116480

Charleston Police Department

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: **CLEARED** Case Mng Status: **CLEARED BY ARREST** Occurred: **10/30/2021**  
Offense: **MURDER / NON-NEGLIGENT MANSLAUGHTER**

Investigator: **TUTTLE, E. M. (1604)** Date / Time: **01/14/2025 12:44:26, Tuesday**

Supervisor: **MELLETTE, M. (1805)** Supervisor Review Date / Time: **01/14/2025 12:58:10, Tuesday**

Contact: **Stewart, Derrick Samuel** Reference: **Supplemental Report**

**99-A74 Ashley Hall Plantation Rd,  
Charleston, SC 29303**

Block was the first and only person to respond to the message. He wanted to purchase a "QP" or "4 zips." (IRT to marijuana sales - these slang terms commonly mean: quarter pound & zip = ounce and Derrick said a common price is between \$400 and \$500). Block had never purchased any narcotics prior to this transaction. AJ arranged it with the victim.

AJ picked up Derrick and then they drove to Block's house, making no stops along the way. While there, AJ told them that "I aint gonna lie, if he don't pay me, I'm gonna rob him (victim - Travis - also could have said lick which means to rob)!" AJ offered no details as to how he was going to rob the victim. They then drove (AJ driver, Derrick front passenger, Block rear seat) to William Kennerty and parked in an Apartment complex. Derrick wasn't positive, but believed they parked next to a trashcan in an apartment complex that sat near William Kennerty Rd/Boone Hall Apartments.

Block and Derrick went to Tia's (unknown last name and couldn't provide more) apartment while AJ walked to the area of the incident location to meet with another female (unknown - b/f, skinny).

Block and Derrick didn't find who they were looking for, so they walked to the incident location and observed AJ on some steps with the above female. The female left. The victim sent a message that he was on his way to complete the deal.

The victim parked in a spot near the steps and AJ along with Derrick approached the front passenger side while Block entered the back seat of the vehicle. AJ and Derrick stood at the open passenger door while the victim showed Block his black bookbag that contained a variety of illicit drugs, including "lean" (common street slang for codeine, Sprite, and Jolly Ranchers) and various pills.

AJ and Block had handguns, Derrick did not. The victim quoted a price while Block began counting money but said he didn't have enough money. The victim may have changed the price from what he initially quoted.

AJ then brandished a handgun from his waistband and demanded the victim's bag. He then instructed Derrick to take the bag. Derrick grabbed the book bag and began to run. He heard two gunshots, a short pause and maybe three more shots as he was running away. It is unclear if he observed this, but the child locks were engaged in the rear seats and Block had to exit over the center console (this was previously known and documented in the incident report).

Derrick dropped the bag along the pathway back to the vehicle. He went to pick it up when he observed Block running with a gun in his hand. AJ followed shortly after as they made it back to the car and began to drive away.

Block told them "I kill him," and AJ said he didn't have to do that. They drove back to Block's house where they

Investigator Signature

Supervisor Signature

Supplements (Edit)

4

# CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT

Printed: 01/14/2025 14:53

Charleston Police Department

OCA: 2116480

ALL INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: **CLEARED**

Case Mag Status: **CLEARED BY ARREST**

Occurred: 10/30/2021

Offense: **MURDER / NON-NEGLIGENT MANSLAUGHTER**

Investigator: **TUTTLE, E. M. (1604)**

Date / Time: 01/14/2025 12:44:26, Tuesday

Supervisor: **MELLETTE, M. (1805)**

Supervisor Review Date / Time: 01/14/2025 12:58:10, Tuesday

Contact: **Stewart, Derrick Samuel**  
78-A74 Ashley Hall Plantation Rd,  
Charleston 843-530-7263

Reference: **Supplemental Report**

began to split the proceeds of the robbery. They then went their separate ways. Block asked AJ for a ride but he denied him. Derrick was then picked up by ~~Zion Williams (born 01/10/1997)~~ and took his portion (2 zips) with him.

## Post Incident

- Derrick said that AJ set the incident in motion.
- Derrick knew about the audio recording and believed AJ was trying to protect himself
- Derrick denied being affiliated with any criminal gangs
- He described Zion Williams as a close friend but also denied any knowledge that Zion was involved in any criminal gang/activity despite extensive law enforcement documentation to the contrary. Zion was murdered in January 2022.

This was a summary only of Derrick's account.

Nothing further.

Investigator Signature

Supervisor Signature

Supplements [Edit]

5

~

***State of South Carolina v. Brian Sease***

2021A1010200442-0444

2023-GS-10-04241; 2023-GS-10-04239; 2023-GS-10-04244

Motion for New Trial or Re-Sentencing

**Exhibit 2**

~

**Benjamin A. Mack**

**Subject:**

FW: Aug. 18th Trial Dockets - State v. Brian Sease

---

**From:** Cassity A. Brewer <[BrewerC@SCSolicitor9.org](mailto:BrewerC@SCSolicitor9.org)>

**Sent:** Thursday, July 10, 2025 10:27 AM

**To:** Benjamin A. Mack <[BMack@charlestoncounty.org](mailto:BMack@charlestoncounty.org)>; Young, Roger Law Clerk (M. Eliza Joye) <[ryounglc@sccourts.org](mailto:ryounglc@sccourts.org)>; Young, Roger Secretary (Robyn R. Hills) <[ryoungsc@sccourts.org](mailto:ryoungsc@sccourts.org)>

**Cc:** Hunt Russell <[RussellH@SCSolicitor9.org](mailto:RussellH@SCSolicitor9.org)>

**Subject:** RE: Aug. 18th Trial Dockets - State v. Brian Sease

Eliza,

The State has complied with all of Mr. Mack's specific discovery requests. The State does not intend to introduce the DNA into evidence for which Mr. Mack has hired an expert. Therefore, there should be no issue.

Please let us know if there needs to be a formal hearing on this or if a filed motion is necessary.

Thank you,

Cassity



**Cassity A. Brewer**  
Assistant Solicitor

101 Meeting Street, Suite 400  
Charleston, SC 29401

o: 843-958-1963 | f: 843-958-1905

e: [brewerc@scsolicitor9.org](mailto:brewerc@scsolicitor9.org) | web: [www.scsolicitor9.org](http://www.scsolicitor9.org)

---

**From:** Benjamin A. Mack <[BMack@charlestoncounty.org](mailto:BMack@charlestoncounty.org)>

**Sent:** Thursday, July 10, 2025 10:19 AM

**To:** Young, Roger Law Clerk (M. Eliza Joye) <[ryounglc@sccourts.org](mailto:ryounglc@sccourts.org)>; Young, Roger Secretary (Robyn R. Hills) <[ryoungsc@sccourts.org](mailto:ryoungsc@sccourts.org)>

**Cc:** Cassity A. Brewer <[BrewerC@SCSolicitor9.org](mailto:BrewerC@SCSolicitor9.org)>

**Subject:** FW: Aug. 18th Trial Dockets - State v. Brian Sease

Hello Eliza,

Please inform Judge Young that Brian Sease respectfully objects to the State's placement of his case on the trial docket for August 18, 2025. His objection falls under the SC Supreme Court's most recent docketing order, and it is being made within the seven days required by the order for an objection.

The objection is based on discovery delays and expert availability for testimony related to firearms and DNA. Efforts to resolve these matters with the State have been unsuccessful. Also, a formal motion for a continuance will be filed with the clerk, if necessary, when the Defense firms-up the availability of his experts and coordinates their schedules with the State's witnesses.

As a reminder, Sease's case has been on the trial docket previously in December 2024 and June 2025. It was not reached on the docket in December 2024, and Judge Young granted a continuance based on the Defense's motion in June 2025, due to discovery delays and expert availability.

Sincerely,

Ben



**Benjamin A. Mack**  
Senior Assistant Public Defender  
Charleston County Public Defender's Office  
101 Meeting Street, 5th Floor  
Charleston, SC 29401  
(843) 958-1884

---

From: Megan S. Ehrlich <[MEhrlich@charlestoncounty.org](mailto:MEhrlich@charlestoncounty.org)>  
Sent: Thursday, July 03, 2025 4:20 PM  
To: Public Defenders All <[PublicDefenders-All@charlestoncounty.org](mailto:PublicDefenders-All@charlestoncounty.org)>  
Subject: FW: Aug. 18th Trial Dockets


See attached. If you have objections to your cases being scheduled, make sure those are communicated in compliance with the Docket Management Order.

---

From: April Campbell <[campbella@scsolicitor9.org](mailto:campbella@scsolicitor9.org)>  
Sent: Thursday, July 3, 2025 4:00 PM  
To: Peter McCoy <[peter@mccovlawgrp.com](mailto:peter@mccovlawgrp.com)>; Steve Davis <[scdavis@homesc.com](mailto:scdavis@homesc.com)>; Rachael C. Arora <[RARora@charlestoncounty.org](mailto:RARora@charlestoncounty.org)>; Jason King <[JKing@charlestoncounty.org](mailto:JKing@charlestoncounty.org)>; Helen R. Dovell <[HDovell@charlestoncounty.org](mailto:HDovell@charlestoncounty.org)>; Sherman M Brown <[SMBrown3@charlestoncounty.org](mailto:SMBrown3@charlestoncounty.org)>; Steve Schmutz <[steve@schmutzlaw.com](mailto:steve@schmutzlaw.com)>; Scott Bischoff <[scott@adamsblischoff.com](mailto:scott@adamsblischoff.com)>; Durham Hill <[HillD@SCSolicitor9.org](mailto:HillD@SCSolicitor9.org)>; Tiffany Izer <[tizerT@SCSolicitor9.org](mailto:tizerT@SCSolicitor9.org)>; Catherine Fries <[FriesC@SCSolicitor9.org](mailto:FriesC@SCSolicitor9.org)>; Sara E. Malone <[MaloneS@SCSolicitor9.org](mailto:MaloneS@SCSolicitor9.org)>; Ashleigh Brown <[BrownA1@scsolicitor9.org](mailto:BrownA1@scsolicitor9.org)>; Ted Corvey <[ted@corveylawfirm.com](mailto:ted@corveylawfirm.com)>; Ashley Cornwell <[acornwell@cornwellfirm.com](mailto:acornwell@cornwellfirm.com)>; Mary Ford <[MFord@charlestoncounty.org](mailto:MFord@charlestoncounty.org)>; Jaree <[jaree@lahensleylawoffice.com](mailto:jaree@lahensleylawoffice.com)>; barrandbarr@ftc-l.net; Grant Smaldone <[grant@gbslawfirm.com](mailto:grant@gbslawfirm.com)>; Jeff Weathers <[jeff@weathersfirm.com](mailto:jeff@weathersfirm.com)>; Hunt Russell <[RussellH@SCSolicitor9.org](mailto:RussellH@SCSolicitor9.org)>; Jewell Gearding <[GeardingJ@SCSolicitor9.org](mailto:GeardingJ@SCSolicitor9.org)>; Sara Bozarth <[BozarthS@SCSolicitor9.org](mailto:BozarthS@SCSolicitor9.org)>; A. Elliott Barrow III <[BarrowA@scsolicitor9.org](mailto:BarrowA@scsolicitor9.org)>; Patrick s. Goodwyn <[PGoodwyn@charlestoncounty.org](mailto:PGoodwyn@charlestoncounty.org)>; Christopher G. Hamilton <[CHamilton@charlestoncounty.org](mailto:CHamilton@charlestoncounty.org)>; Benjamin A. Mack <[BMack@charlestoncounty.org](mailto:BMack@charlestoncounty.org)>; Melissa Gay <[mgaylaw@yahoo.com](mailto:mgaylaw@yahoo.com)>; Sterling Chillico <[schillico@chillico.law](mailto:schillico@chillico.law)>; Rodney D. Davis <[RDavis@charlestoncounty.org](mailto:RDavis@charlestoncounty.org)>; John J. Kozelski <[JKozelski@charlestoncounty.org](mailto:JKozelski@charlestoncounty.org)>; Ted Smith <[WTSmith@charlestoncounty.org](mailto:WTSmith@charlestoncounty.org)>; Kelsey Davis <[DavisK@scsolicitor9.org](mailto:DavisK@scsolicitor9.org)>; Tyra Roberts <[RobertsT@scsolicitor9.org](mailto:RobertsT@scsolicitor9.org)>; Cassity A. Brewer <[BrewerC@SCSolicitor9.org](mailto:BrewerC@SCSolicitor9.org)>; Lemuel C. Zeigler <[ZeiglerL@SCSolicitor9.org](mailto:ZeiglerL@SCSolicitor9.org)>; Jordan A. Norvell <[NorvellJ@scsolicitor9.org](mailto:NorvellJ@scsolicitor9.org)>  
Cc: Adam Miles <[BMiles@charlestoncounty.org](mailto:BMiles@charlestoncounty.org)>; Cameron J. Blazer <[CBlazer@charlestoncounty.org](mailto:CBlazer@charlestoncounty.org)>; Megan S. Ehrlich <[MEhrlich@charlestoncounty.org](mailto:MEhrlich@charlestoncounty.org)>; Jennifer Shealy <[shealyj@scsolicitor9.org](mailto:shealyj@scsolicitor9.org)>; Timothy Finch <[FinchT@SCSolicitor9.org](mailto:FinchT@SCSolicitor9.org)>; Stephanie Linder <[linders@scsolicitor9.org](mailto:linders@scsolicitor9.org)>; Lauren M. Frierson <[FriersonL@SCSolicitor9.org](mailto:FriersonL@SCSolicitor9.org)>; Young, Roger Law Clerk (Daniel Rinaldo) <[ryounglc@sccourts.org](mailto:ryounglc@sccourts.org)>

Judge Young <[ryoung1@sccourts.org](mailto:ryoung1@sccourts.org)>; Young, Roger Secretary (Robyn R. Hills) <[ryoungsc@sccourts.org](mailto:ryoungsc@sccourts.org)>; Josh Cheney <[JCheney@charlestoncounty.org](mailto:JCheney@charlestoncounty.org)>; David Burnsed <[dburnsed@charlestoncounty.org](mailto:dburnsed@charlestoncounty.org)>; Ashley Kay <[KayA@SCSolicitor9.org](mailto:KayA@SCSolicitor9.org)>; James M. Milone <[JMilone@charlestoncounty.org](mailto:JMilone@charlestoncounty.org)>; Cherae M. Gray <[CMGray@charlestoncounty.org](mailto:CMGray@charlestoncounty.org)>  
**Subject:** Aug. 18th Trial Dockets

Please see the attached Trial Dockets for the week of Aug. 18<sup>th</sup>.



**April Campbell**  
Prosecution Coordinator

101 Meeting Street, Suite 400

Charleston, SC 29401

o: 843-958-1923 | f: 843-985-1905

e: [campbella@scsolicitor9.org](mailto:campbella@scsolicitor9.org) | web: [www.scsolicitor9.org](http://www.scsolicitor9.org)

~

***State of South Carolina v. Brian Sease***

2021A1010200442-0444

2023-GS-10-04241; 2023-GS-10-04239; 2023-GS-10-04244

Motion for New Trial or Re-Sentencing

**Exhibit 3**

~

**Benjamin A. Mack**

---

**From:** Bickett, Jamie <jbickett@sccourts.org>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, September 23, 2025 9:04 AM  
**To:** Benjamin A. Mack; Andrew Jennings Proctor  
**Subject:** Re: UPDATED: Transcript Request for Docket Number 2021A1010900442

**CAUTION: This email originated outside of Charleston County. Do not click links or open attachments from unknown senders or suspicious emails. If you are not sure, please contact IT Helpdesk.**

Let me know when the funding is approved and I'll add it to my list.

Thanks.

Jamie Bickett  
Official Court Reporter

This message is intended exclusively for the individual or entity to which it is addressed. This communication may contain information that is privileged, confidential or otherwise exempt from disclosure. If you are not the named addressee, you are not authorized to read, print, retain, copy or disseminate this message. If you have received this message in error, please contact me immediately and delete all copies of this message.

---

**From:** Benjamin A. Mack <BMack@charlestoncounty.org>  
**Sent:** Monday, September 22, 2025 11:17:16 AM  
**To:** Andrew Jennings Proctor <AJProctor@charlestoncounty.org>  
**Cc:** Bickett, Jamie <jbickett@sccourts.org>  
**Subject:** RE: UPDATED: Transcript Request for Docket Number 2021A1010900442

**\*\*\* EXTERNAL EMAIL \*\*\*** This email originated from outside the organization. Please exercise caution before clicking any links or opening attachments. **\*\*\***

Thanks, Jamie! You are correct. We need the transcript from the verdict and sentencing from 9/15, as well.

Andrew -- Will you please draft a funding order for 5k for the transcription?

Sincerely,

Ben



**Benjamin A. Mack**  
Senior Assistant Public Defender  
Charleston County Public Defender's Office  
101 Meeting Street, 5th Floor  
Charleston, SC 29401  
(843) 958-1884

---

From: Andrew Jennings Proctor <[ajproctor@charlestoncounty.org](mailto:ajproctor@charlestoncounty.org)>  
Sent: Monday, September 22, 2025 9:32 AM  
To: Benjamin A. Mack <[BMack@charlestoncounty.org](mailto:BMack@charlestoncounty.org)>  
Subject: FW: UPDATED: Transcript Request for Docket Number 2021A1010900442

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From: Bickett, Jamie <[jbickett@charlestoncounty.org](mailto:jbickett@charlestoncounty.org)>  
Sent: Monday, September 22, 2025 9:30 AM  
To: Andrew Jennings Proctor <[AJProctor@charlestoncounty.org](mailto:AJProctor@charlestoncounty.org)>  
Subject: Re: UPDATED: Transcript Request for Docket Number 2021A1010900442

**CAUTION: This email originated outside of Charleston County. Do not click links or open attachments from unknown senders or suspicious emails. If you are not sure, please contact IT Helpdesk.**

Good morning, Andrew.

I received your request for a quote for Brian Sease's trial. I noticed you only put 09/09-09/12 on your request in the portal. However, the verdict and sentencing were on 09/15, so I've given you an estimate for both ways.

Doing only 09/09-09/12, I estimate the cost for regular 60-day delivery will be about \$4,020.

To do through 09/15, I estimate the cost also for regular 60-day delivery will be about \$4,300.

Please let me know if/how you would like to proceed.

Thank you.

Jamie Bickett  
Official Court Reporter

This message is intended exclusively for the individual or entity to which it is addressed. This communication may contain information that is privileged, confidential or otherwise exempt from disclosure. If you are not the named addressee, you are not authorized to read, print, retain, copy or disseminate this message. If you have received this message in error, please contact me immediately and delete all copies of this message.

From: Andrew Jennings Proctor <AJProctor@charlestoncounty.org>  
Sent: Monday, September 22, 2025 9:23 AM  
To: Transcripts <transcripts@sccourts.org>; Bickett, Jamie <jbickett@sccourts.org>  
Cc: Benjamin A. Mack <BMack@charlestoncounty.org>  
Subject: RE: UPDATED: Transcript Request for Docket Number 2021A1010900442

**\*\*\* EXTERNAL EMAIL: This email originated from outside the organization. Please exercise caution before clicking any links or opening attachments. \*\*\***

Hello,

We are looking for a quote so we can get a funding order.

Thanks,  
Andrew Proctor  
Paralegal  
Charleston County Public Defender's Office  
101 Meeting Street, 5<sup>th</sup> Floor  
Charleston, SC 29401  
843-958-1893

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From: Transcripts@sccourts.org <Transcripts@sccourts.org>  
Sent: Monday, September 22, 2025 9:22 AM  
To: Andrew Jennings Proctor <AJProctor@charlestoncounty.org>; transcripts@sccourts.org  
Subject: UPDATED: Transcript Request for Docket Number 2021A1010900442

**CAUTION: This email originated outside of Charleston County. Do not click links or open attachments from unknown senders or suspicious emails. If you are not sure, please contact IT helpdesk.**

Greetings,

You are receiving this notice for the summarized Transcript Request shown below because it has been Accepted by Court Reporter: Bickett, Jamie (jbickett@sccourts.org)

Should you have questions or need further assistance, please contact us at [transcripts@sccourts.org](mailto:transcripts@sccourts.org).

Regards,

Court Administration

Summarized Transcript Request ID(s): 1813256967\_2

## Requester Information:

**Name:** Andrew Proctor  
**Entity:** *Not entered*  
**Phone Number:** (843) 958-1850  
**Email:** [ajproctor@charlestoncounty.org](mailto:ajproctor@charlestoncounty.org)  
**Address:** 101 Meeting Street , 5th Floor Charleston, SC 29401  
**Is the requester a party on the case?** No  
**Does the requester represent a party?** Yes Brian Sease

## Transcript Information:

**Docket Number:** 2021A1010900442  
**Court Type:** Circuit  
**County:** Charleston  
**Case Caption:** The State of South Carolina vs Sease, Brian Randell  
**Appeal Pending?** No  
**Death Penalty?** No  
**Start Date of Proceeding:** 9/9/2025  
**End Date of Proceeding:** 9/12/2025  
**Presiding Judge:** Jefferson, Deadra L.  
**Court reporter daily assignments:**  
09/09/2025: Bickett, Jamie  
09/10/2025: Bickett, Jamie  
09/11/2025: Bickett, Jamie  
09/12/2025: Bickett, Jamie  
**Opposing Counsel and/or other parties Information:**  
(Attorney) Grant Bradley Smaldone  
(Defendant) Brian Randell Sease  
(Solicitor) Cassity Brewer  
(email): [brewero@scsolicitor9.org](mailto:brewero@scsolicitor9.org)  
(Defense Attorney) Benjamin Mack  
(email): [bmack@charlestoncounty.org](mailto:bmack@charlestoncounty.org)  
**Next hearing date:** *Date not entered*  
**Portion of proceeding to be transcribed:** Entire Hearing

## Delivery Information:

**Delivery Timeframe:** Quote  
**Delivery Method:** PDF/Email  
**Delivery Timeframe:** Court Appointed Counsel  
**Appeals Attorney:** Benjamin Mack  
**Email:** [bmack@charlestoncounty.org](mailto:bmack@charlestoncounty.org)

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