

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In the Court of Appeals

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SC Court of Appeals

Appeal from the Administrative Law Court
Administrative Law Judge Crystal M. Rookard

ALC Case No. 23-ALJ-04-0553-AP
Appellate Case No. 2024-002004


BERNARD JACKSON, #210745,

APPELLANT,

v.

SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

RESPONDENT.



APPELLANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF AND MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
RELIEF:

CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONALITY OF S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-3-430 (D)
AS AMENDED MAY 21, 2024, ON GROUNDS OF FEDERAL SUPREMACY CLAUSE
PREEMPTION AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL RETROACTIVE DEPRIVATION

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Torrence v. SCDC, 433 S.C. 533, 861 S.E.2d 36 (2021)

United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006)

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INTRODUCTION

Appellant Bernard Jackson submits this Supplemental Brief to present this Court with the full constitutional dimension of the challenge to the May 21, 2024 amendment to S.C. Code Ann. § 24-3-430(D). That amendment changed the wage standard applicable to inmates employed in South Carolina's Prison Industries program from a prevailing wage – wages "not less than those paid for work of similar nature in the locality" – to a federal minimum wage floor.

The amendment was not enacted in a vacuum. It was enacted directly in response to the wave of prevailing wage claims by incarcerated workers following *Torrence v. SCDC*, 433 S.C. 533, 861 S.E.2d 36 (2021), in which the South Carolina Court of Appeals upheld the prevailing wage requirement. The legislature, acting on behalf of SCDC, amended the statute to retroactively reduce the wage obligation that courts had just confirmed.

But there is a constitutional barrier the General Assembly cannot cross: the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. South Carolina's Prison Industries program is not merely a state program. It is a federally certified Prison Industries Enhancement Certification Program (PIECP) participant. Federal law – specifically 18 U.S.C. § 1761(c) and the Bureau of Justice Assistance's promulgated guidelines – makes the prevailing wage a mandatory condition of federal

certification. South Carolina cannot, by state legislation, override a federal mandate that is the very condition upon which it holds its federal certification and upon which SCDC depends to sell prisoner-made goods in interstate commerce.

The question is not whether South Carolina has the power to set wage rates for state programs. It does. The question is whether South Carolina can set wage rates for a federally certified program that are below what federal law requires as a condition of that certification. It cannot. The Supremacy Clause forbids it.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

WHETHER the May 21, 2024 amendment to S.C. Code Ann. § 24-3-430(D), which reduced the applicable wage standard for SCDC's Prison Industries program from a prevailing wage to a federal minimum wage floor, is preempted by and in conflict with federal law – specifically 18 U.S.C. § 1761(c) and the Bureau of Justice Assistance's PIECP certification requirements – under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, Article VI, clause 2, and is therefore void and unenforceable as applied to SCDC's federally certified PIECP program.

ARGUMENT

I. THE FEDERAL PIECP STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK MANDATES PREVAILING WAGES AS A CONDITION OF CERTIFICATION.

Understanding why the 2024 amendment is preempted requires a clear grasp of the federal PIECP structure, because the preemption is not incidental – it flows from the very terms upon which South Carolina obtained and retains its federal certification.

A. The Historical Foundation: The Ashurst-Sumners Act and the PIECP Exception.

The federal Ashurst-Sumners Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1761, generally prohibits the transportation of prisoner-made goods in interstate commerce. This prohibition exists to protect free-market workers from competition with prison labor operating outside normal wage and labor conditions. Congress recognized, however, that under carefully controlled conditions – specifically, conditions that ensure prisoner workers are paid prevailing wages and do not displace free workers – limited prison industry activity in interstate commerce could be permitted.

The PIECP was created by Congress through the Justice Assistance Act of 1984 precisely to create this controlled exception. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1761(c), the prohibition on transporting prisoner-made goods in interstate commerce does not apply to goods produced by inmates in PIECP-certified programs.

The certification is the key - and the price of the certification is compliance with specific federal conditions, including the prevailing wage mandate.

B. The Federal Certification Conditions Are Mandatory, Not Discretionary.

The Bureau of Justice Assistance, which administers the PIECP program, promulgated comprehensive guidelines at 64 Fed. Reg. No. 66 (April 7, 1999). These guidelines are not suggestions. They are the federal government's statement of what conditions must be satisfied for a state Department of Corrections to obtain and retain PIECP certification. The guidelines state:

"To become eligible for BJA certification, an applicant department of corrections must comply with specified statutory requirements. It must pay participating prisoners wages not less than that paid for work of a similar nature in the locality in which work was performed; and that the qualifying applicant must ensure that paid PIECP inmate employment will not result in the displacement of employed workers."

The guidelines further provide that once certified:

"If all eligibility requirements are met and an applicant acquires BJA certification, the agency is thereafter authorized to operate irrespective of Federal prohibition on the market of State prisoner-made goods. Noncompliance with the statutory eligibility requirements could expose an industry to criminal prosecution under the Ashurst-Sumners Act." Title 18 U.S.C. § 1761(c).

The structure is clear: prevailing wage compliance is an eligibility requirement for certification; loss of certification means loss of the interstate commerce exception; and operating without that exception exposes SCDC to criminal prosecution. The wage mandate is not peripheral - it is the core of the federal-state bargain.

C. South Carolina Affirmatively Accepted These Conditions.

South Carolina did not stumble into the PIECP program accidentally. In 1984, South Carolina became a PIECP certificate holder under the Justice Assistance Act of 1984. In 1987, the S.C. General Assembly enacted Act No. 177, § 2, codified as S.C. Code Ann. § 24-3-315, authorizing SCDC's participation in the federal PIECP program and explicitly conditioning that participation on compliance with the federal wage standards - specifically, that "the rates of pay and other conditions of employment are not less than those paid and provided for work of

similar nature in the locality in which the work was performed." In 1995, Act No. 7, Part 2, § 43, further codified these requirements as § 24-3-430 of the S.C. Code of Laws.

By enacting § 24-3-315, South Carolina's legislature affirmatively agreed, as a matter of state law, to the federal prevailing wage conditions. The 2024 amendment to § 24-3-430(D) does not merely change a wage floor - it attempts to unilaterally withdraw South Carolina's acceptance of the federal conditions upon which its PIECP certification rests. It cannot do so without consequence, because federal law - not state law - defines the conditions of certification.

II. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE REQUIRES FEDERAL PREVAILING WAGE STANDARDS TO GOVERN SCDC'S PIECP OPERATIONS.

The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2. As Chief Justice Marshall established in *McCulloch v. Maryland*, 17 U.S. 316 (1819), when federal and state law conflict, federal law prevails.

The 2024 amendment to § 24-3-430(D) conflicts directly with federal law. Federal law - through 18 U.S.C. § 1761(c) and the BJA PIECP guidelines - requires SCDC to pay prevailing wages as

a condition of operating under the PIECP exception to the Ashurst-Sumners Act. The state amendment purports to permit SCDC to pay only federal minimum wage. These two standards are irreconcilable when applied to SCDC's PIECP-certified program. Federal law requires more; the state amendment authorizes less. The Supremacy Clause resolves this conflict: federal law governs.

This is not a case where a state is simply adding protections beyond what federal law requires - a permissible exercise of state power. This is a case where the state has attempted to authorize conduct - paying below prevailing wage in a federally certified PIECP program - that federal law forbids. That attempted authorization is void. *Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta*, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982).

III. THREE INDEPENDENT THEORIES OF PREEMPTION EACH REQUIRE THAT FEDERAL PREVAILING WAGE STANDARDS APPLY.

Federal preemption of state law can arise in three distinct ways: express preemption, field preemption, and conflict preemption. At least two - and likely all three - apply here.

A. Express Preemption: Federal Law Expressly Conditions PIECP Participation on Prevailing Wage Compliance.

Express preemption occurs when Congress explicitly states that federal law displaces state law. *English v. General Electric Co.*, 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990). Here, the BJA PIECP

guidelines - promulgated pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1761(c) - expressly state that PIECP certification requires compliance with prevailing wage requirements. There is no ambiguity. A state cannot legislate its way out of an express federal certification condition.

SCDC's PIECP certification is a federal authorization, not a state entitlement. The terms of that authorization are set by federal law. When a state law purports to modify the conditions of a federal authorization, that state law is expressly preempted to the extent of the conflict.

B. Conflict Preemption: The 2024 Amendment Makes It Impossible to Simultaneously Comply with Federal and State Law.

Conflict preemption arises when it is impossible to comply with both state and federal law simultaneously. *Arizona v. United States*, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012); *Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n*, 461 U.S. 190 (1983). SCDC cannot simultaneously satisfy the federal PIECP prevailing wage requirement and the 2024 state amendment's minimum wage authorization. To comply with federal certification requirements, SCDC must pay prevailing wages. The 2024 state amendment purports to authorize paying only minimum wage. These requirements directly conflict.

Moreover, the 2024 amendment makes it impossible for SCDC to comply with its federal PIECP obligations while remaining

within what the state legislature has authorized. This is the paradigmatic case for conflict preemption. The state law must yield.

C. Obstacle Preemption: The 2024 Amendment Stands as an Obstacle to the Full Purposes of the Federal PIECP Program.

Obstacle preemption applies when a state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." *Hines v. Davidowitz*, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); *Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council*, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). The purpose of the PIECP prevailing wage requirement is to protect free-market workers from unfair competition by prison labor that is paid below market wages. *Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n*, 505 U.S. 88 (1992). Allowing South Carolina to pay minimum wage while retaining PIECP certification directly undermines this purpose - SCDC would receive the federal benefit (authorization to sell goods in interstate commerce) without paying the price Congress required (prevailing wages). The 2024 amendment is a direct obstacle to Congress's purpose and is therefore preempted under the obstacle theory. *California v. ARC America Corp.*, 490 U.S. 93 (1989).

IV. THE 2024 AMENDMENT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION THAT DEPRIVES APPELLANT OF VESTED WAGE RIGHTS.

Even setting aside federal preemption, the 2024 amendment raises serious independent constitutional problems as applied to claims that accrued before its enactment.

South Carolina's Constitution, Article I, § 4 provides that "no... ex post facto law... shall be passed." While Article I, § 4's ex post facto clause in the state constitution applies to criminal matters, the broader prohibition on retroactive legislation affecting vested rights applies through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Appellant's wage claims accrued during the period of his employment in the Prison Industries program. During that entire period, the applicable standard was prevailing wages – confirmed by this Court's predecessor in *Torrence v. SCDC*, 433 S.C. 533 (2021). Appellant had a vested right to wages calculated at the prevailing rate for the work he performed. That right vested at the time of each pay period, as each period's wages were earned.

The General Assembly cannot retroactively eliminate a vested wage right by amending the governing statute after the right has accrued. To permit this would mean that a government employer could underpay workers, wait for the courts to confirm the workers' rights, and then simply legislate those rights away. Due process forbids this result. *United States v. Georgia*, 546 U.S. 151 (2006); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (providing a

civil remedy for state action that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and federal laws).

The targeted, litigation-driven nature of the 2024 amendment – enacted specifically in response to Torrence and the claims that followed – makes the retroactive intent evident on the face of the legislative history. A court should view such targeted retroactive legislation with heightened skepticism. The amendment should be held unconstitutional as applied to claims that accrued before its effective date of May 21, 2024.

V. THE 2024 AMENDMENT VIOLATES THE CONTRACT CLAUSE AS TO VESTED WAGE AGREEMENTS.

The Contract Clause of the United States Constitution, Article I, § 10, cl. 1, prohibits any state from passing a law "impairing the Obligation of Contracts." While the Contract Clause's application has been limited over time, it retains force against legislation that substantially impairs existing contractual rights, particularly where the state itself is a party to the contract.

Each pay period in which Appellant worked in the Prison Industries program gave rise to a contractual obligation by SCDC – as employer – to compensate Appellant at the applicable legal rate. SCDC's obligation to pay the prevailing wage was a term of the employment relationship, mandated by both state and federal

law at the time the work was performed. The 2024 amendment purports to retroactively redefine that term to SCDC's benefit.

When a state is a party to the contract it purports to impair, courts apply heightened scrutiny. The state must demonstrate a significant and legitimate public purpose justifying the impairment, and the impairment must be reasonable and necessary to accomplish that purpose. The 2024 amendment fails this test. Its sole discernible purpose is to reduce SCDC's liability for wage violations already adjudicated and pending in the courts. That is not a legitimate public purpose; it is an attempt to escape legal accountability. Vested contractual wage rights cannot be eliminated by post-hoc legislative amendment.

VI. SCDC CANNOT RETAIN THE BENEFITS OF FEDERAL PIECP CERTIFICATION WHILE EVADING THE WAGE OBLIGATIONS THAT ARE THE PRICE OF THAT CERTIFICATION.

This argument is simple and foundational: you cannot have it both ways.

SCDC's PIECP certification gives it an enormously valuable benefit: the right to manufacture goods using prison labor and sell those goods in interstate commerce, free from the prohibition of the Ashurst-Sumners Act. This benefit is worth millions of dollars in revenue annually to SCDC's Prison Industries program. SCDC actively markets Prison Industries

goods commercially, contracts with private sector partners, and competes in the open market - all pursuant to and dependent upon its federal PIECP certification.

The price of that certification - set by Congress - is the prevailing wage. Congress made a deliberate policy choice: prison industry programs may compete in the marketplace, but they must do so without the competitive advantage of below-market labor. The prevailing wage requirement is the mechanism that enforces this condition. It protects free-market workers from unfair competition. It is not a suggestion or a guideline - it is the quid pro quo for federal authorization.

If SCDC wishes to pay minimum wage rather than prevailing wage, it is free to do so - but only by surrendering its PIECP certification and withdrawing from the federal program. What it cannot do is retain the federal certification, sell goods in interstate commerce pursuant to that certification, and simultaneously refuse to pay the prevailing wages that are the condition of the certification. That is not a legitimate exercise of state legislative power. It is an attempt to free-ride on a federal program while evading the federal conditions attached to it.

The Supremacy Clause, the Contract Clause, and basic principles of equity all forbid this result. A party that has accepted the benefits of a federal certification cannot by state

legislation extinguish the obligations that are the condition of those benefits.

VII. TORRENCE v. SCDC CONFIRMS THAT THE PREVAILING WAGE OBLIGATION IS REAL, ENFORCEABLE, AND CONTINUING.

This Court need not reach this question without precedential guidance from its own jurisprudence. In *Torrence v. SCDC*, 433 S.C. 533, 861 S.E.2d 36 (2021), rehearing denied Aug. 4, 2022, the South Carolina Court of Appeals upheld the prevailing wage requirement applicable to SCDC's Prison Industries program. The *Torrence* decision confirms that the obligation is genuine, judicially recognized, and enforceable.

The General Assembly's response to *Torrence* – amending § 24-3-430(D) to reduce the wage standard – does not and cannot overrule a judicial decision interpreting federal law and federal certification requirements. The legislature can amend state statutes; it cannot amend federal statutes or override federal certification requirements. To the extent *Torrence* rested on the federal PIECP prevailing wage mandate – which it necessarily must have, given that the federal requirement is what gives the state obligation its teeth – the 2024 amendment is simply irrelevant. Federal law has not changed. The PIECP prevailing wage requirement remains in full force.

Furthermore, the 2024 amendment cannot retroactively apply to claims that accrued before its effective date of May 21,

2024. Appellant's claims arose during his employment prior to that date. Under Torrence, which was the controlling law at the time his wages were earned, he was entitled to prevailing wages. The 2024 amendment does not eliminate that entitlement.

VIII. DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IS WARRANTED.

Appellant respectfully requests that this Court grant the following declaratory and equitable relief based on the foregoing constitutional arguments:

1. DECLARE that S.C. Code Ann. § 24-3-430(D) as amended May 21, 2024 is preempted by federal law – specifically 18 U.S.C. § 1761(c) and the BJA PIECP certification requirements – and is therefore void and unenforceable as applied to SCDC's federally certified PIECP Prison Industries program under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution;
2. DECLARE that SCDC's obligation to pay participating inmates prevailing wages – defined as wages not less than those paid for work of similar nature in the locality – remains in full force and effect as a condition of its federal PIECP certification, notwithstanding the 2024 amendment to § 24-3-430(D);
3. DECLARE that the 2024 amendment to § 24-3-430(D) may not be applied retroactively to wage claims that accrued before

its effective date of May 21, 2024, as such retroactive application would constitute an unconstitutional deprivation of vested rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and an impairment of contractual obligations under the Contract Clause of Article I, § 10;

4. ORDER SCDC to produce a complete accounting of all wages paid to Appellant during his employment in the Prison Industries program, calculated at the applicable D.E.W. prevailing wage rate, and ORDER SCDC to pay the difference between the prevailing wage rate and the wages actually paid, together with appropriate interest;
5. ORDER SCDC to comply with S.C. Code Ann. § 24-3-40 with respect to all wage payments to Appellant, including the required 10% long-term savings deposit; and
6. REMAND to the Administrative Law Court for a full evidentiary hearing on the wage calculation question with directions to apply the federal PIECP prevailing wage standard.

CONCLUSION

The South Carolina General Assembly has the power to set wage standards for state programs. It does not have the power to override federal law. When South Carolina enrolled in the

federal PIECP program in 1984 and accepted federal certification, it accepted the conditions that come with that certification – including the prevailing wage mandate. Those conditions are set by Congress and administered by the Bureau of Justice Assistance. A state legislature cannot unilaterally amend them away.


The May 21, 2024 amendment to § 24-3-430(D) is preempted by federal law under the Supremacy Clause, unconstitutional as retroactive deprivation of vested rights, and in violation of the Contract Clause. SCDC cannot continue to hold federal PIECP certification – and to sell prisoner-made goods in interstate commerce pursuant to that certification – while paying wages below what federal law requires as the condition of that certification.

The question this amendment raises is not merely about Bernard Jackson's wages. It is about whether South Carolina will honor its federal obligations or whether it will continue to exploit the labor of incarcerated people while evading the federally mandated protections that are the price of that exploitation. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides the answer. Federal law is supreme. The 2024 amendment cannot stand.

For all the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully urges this Court to grant the declaratory relief requested, reverse

the ALC's order of dismissal, and remand for a full hearing on the merits applying the federal PIECP prevailing wage standard.

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ 


Bernard Jackson, #210745
Pro Se Litigant
Tyger River Correctional Institution
200 Prison Road
Enoree, South Carolina 29335

Dated: February 24, 2026

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE


I, Bernard Jackson, #210745, hereby certify that on the 26 day of February, 2026, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Supplemental Brief and Motion for Declaratory Relief upon the following by placing the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid:

Christina C. Bigelow, Deputy General Counsel
South Carolina Dept. of Corrections
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Columbia, South Carolina 29221



AND

Clerk of Court
South Carolina Court of Appeals
P. O. Box 11629
Columbia, South Carolina 29201

/s/ 
Bernard Jackson, #210745

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
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Administrative Law Judge Crystal M. Rookard

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
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SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

RESPONDENT.



APPELLANT'S MOTION TO EXPEDITE APPEAL

INTRODUCTION

Appellant Bernard Jackson, pro se, respectfully moves this Court pursuant to the South Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure to expedite the disposition of this appeal. Good cause exists for expedited consideration on the following grounds: (1) Appellant is an incarcerated person suffering an ongoing, daily deprivation of wages and statutory funds to which he is entitled by law; (2) the legal questions presented – including whether federal PIECP prevailing wage requirements preempt the May 2024 amendment to S.C. Code Ann. § 24-3-430(D) – are systemic in

nature and affect every inmate employed in South Carolina's PIECP-certified Prison Industries program; (3) the appeal has been pending since late 2024 and the case record is fully developed; and (4) the ongoing nature of the wage violation causes Appellant compounding and irreparable harm with each day of delay.

GROUND FOR EXPEDITED REVIEW

I. APPELLANT IS SUFFERING ONGOING IRREPARABLE HARM.

Appellant is currently incarcerated and employed in SCDC's Prison Industries program. Each day of delay in resolving the legal questions presented in this appeal is a day during which Appellant and similarly situated inmates continue to be paid wages that may be below the rate mandated by federal PIECP certification requirements. Unlike a commercial plaintiff who can be made fully whole by a damages award, an incarcerated person has no ability to mitigate this harm, pursue alternative employment, or seek relief through ordinary market mechanisms. The deprivation is ongoing and compounds daily.

Furthermore, SCDC has already deducted statutory amounts from Appellant's settlement funds and refused to place the required 10% into Appellant's long-term savings account as mandated by S.C. Code Ann. § 24-3-40. Those funds are being held

- or have been diverted - to an unknown purpose, and with each passing day the prospect of full recovery diminishes.

II. THE LEGAL QUESTIONS PRESENTED ARE SYSTEMIC AND AFFECT A CLASS OF PERSONS.

This appeal presents questions of law that extend well beyond Appellant's individual case. The central question - whether the federal PIECP prevailing wage mandate preempts the state legislature's May 21, 2024 amendment to § 24-3-430(D) - affects every inmate currently employed in South Carolina's PIECP-certified Prison Industries program. The General Assembly's amendment was enacted directly in response to the wave of prevailing wage claims that followed *Torrence v. SCDC*, 433 S.C. 533, 861 S.E.2d 36 (2021). If the amendment is preempted by federal law, then SCDC has been and continues to underpay a class of incarcerated workers on a systemic basis. The longer this question remains unresolved, the greater the aggregate harm to that class and the greater the potential liability to SCDC - making early resolution in the interests of all parties.

Cases presenting systemic legal questions of public importance, particularly those affecting the rights of a vulnerable class with limited access to the courts, are prime candidates for expedited consideration. See generally S.C. App. Ct. R. 221.

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Cases presenting systemic legal questions of public importance, particularly those affecting the rights of a vulnerable class with limited access to the courts, are prime candidates for expedited consideration. See generally S.C. App. Ct. R. 221.

III. THE RECORD IS FULLY DEVELOPED AND THE CASE IS RIPE FOR DECISION.

The record on appeal is complete. The Initial Brief of Appellant, the Final Brief of Respondent, and Appellant's Reply Brief have all been filed. No further factual development is required. The primary questions before the Court are legal – involving statutory interpretation, federal preemption, and the validity of a settlement obtained from an unrepresented prisoner – that can be resolved on the existing record without additional proceedings. There is no reason this matter cannot be scheduled for decision promptly.

IV. APPELLANT'S PRO SE, INCARCERATED STATUS WARRANTS SPECIAL CONSIDERATION.


Appellant is an incarcerated person proceeding without legal counsel in a complex administrative appeal against a well-resourced institutional defendant represented by the State's Deputy General Counsel. He has demonstrated diligence, preparing thorough briefs, conducting legal research under extraordinarily difficult circumstances, and timely pursuing every available procedural avenue. The Court's inherent equitable authority supports expediting consideration of meritorious appeals by pro se incarcerated persons who face structural disadvantages in accessing the justice system.

RELIEF REQUESTED

For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court:

1. GRANT this Motion to Expedite and place this appeal on the Court's earliest available calendar for decision;
2. DIRECT the Clerk to notify all parties of the expedited schedule; and
3. GRANT such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ 

Bernard Jackson, #210745
Pro Se Litigant

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
Dated: February 26, 2026

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Bernard Jackson, #210745, hereby certify that on the 26 day of February, 2026, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Expedite upon the following by placing the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid:

Christina C. Bigelow, Deputy General Counsel, SCDC, P.O. Box 21787, Columbia, SC 29221

Clerk of Court, South Carolina Court of Appeals, P.O. Box 11629
, Columbia, SC 29201

/s/ 
Bernard Jackson, #210745

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