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S.C. SUPREME COURT

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE SUPREME COURT
APPEAL FROM SUMTER COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas
The Honorable Edward Miller, PCR Action Judge
2022-CP-43-00342

MONTEZ DRAYTON, #290005,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

Respondent.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Montez Drayton appeals the denial of his post-conviction relief application. The post-conviction relief action was heard and denied by the Honorable Edward Miller, circuit court judge, on November 2, 2022, and was denied by written order issued filed on April 16, 2026. Applicant received notice of the judgement on April 29, 2026.

/s Chelsey F. Marto
Chelsey F. Marto, Esquire
Attorney for the Applicant
The Law Office of Chelsey F. Marto, LLC
P.O. Box 8795
Columbia, SC, 29201
(864)-404-5583

Other Counsel of Record:
Zachary Jones, Esquire
Office of the Attorney General, State of SC
P.O. Box 11549
Columbia, SC, 29211-1549

On November 15, 2021, the State called Applicant's case to trial before the Honorable R. Kirk Griffin, circuit court judge, and a jury. Following the selection and impanelment of the jury, opening statements, and the presentation of two witnesses (including the victim, Cammie Jackson), Applicant elected to forego his right to trial and changed his plea to guilty pursuant to a plea agreement with the State for a determinate sentence of fourteen years of imprisonment and the dismissal of the two counts of pointing and presenting a firearm. Following a thorough plea colloquy, Judge Griffin determined Applicant's plea was entered freely, voluntarily, and intelligently and accepted Applicant's guilty plea to ABHAN. Pursuant to the negotiated plea agreement between Applicant and the State, Judge Griffin sentenced Applicant to fourteen years of imprisonment. The pointing and presenting indictments were dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. Applicant did not appeal his conviction or sentence.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

Prior to Applicant's decision to change his plea to guilty, the State presented the testimony of the victim, Cammie Jackson. Jackson testified that she had a relationship with Applicant starting in 2013, with a period of separation from 2015 to 2017. She testified that, on June 28, 2019, she came home from a party and encountered Applicant, who thought she had been "out there dealing with somebody else" and threatened to beat her. On July 2, 2019, around 1:00 or 1:30 in the morning, Jackson was sleeping when Applicant came to the house and asked her to prepare some shrimp. Jackson got up and began boiling water in a pot on the stove. She returned to her room and lay down. Applicant came into the room and stated, "Don't make me mess your pretty face up," several times. Jackson asked him what he was talking about, then returned to the kitchen to check whether the water was boiling. When she came back to the bedroom, Applicant was going through her phone, and he began asking her to identify men who had been texting her.

Jackson testified Applicant then forced her into a corner, hit her, grabbed her hair and started punching her in her chest and stomach. Applicant continued to beat, kick, and stomp Jackson, saying he was going to kill her. Finally, he left the room. Jackson ran into another room where her grandchildren were, but Applicant came back there and grabbed her again. Jackson ran out of the room. She then heard Applicant say, "Turn around." When she turned, she saw Applicant holding the pot she had been using to boil water. He threw the hot water on her, then struck her in the head with the pot and continued to beat her. Applicant told her he was going to get his "chopper" and "kill all y'all mother fuckers." Eventually Jackson ran from the house, but Applicant kicked her in the back, knocking her down. Applicant continued to grab Jackson's hair and punch her in the face. Jackson testified she could not remember anything else until she found herself crawling up onto a neighbor's porch, with Applicant trying to pull her back down. A neighbor came out and told Applicant to "turn her loose, man, turn her loose." Applicant then took a gun from his pocket and hit Jackson across the forehead. Jackson testified she could not remember what happened after that. (Tr.pp.58-71).

Jackson described her injuries to the jury, which included broken bones, a broken nose, a broken tooth, and burns on her arm and stomach from the boiling water. She testified that she required numerous surgeries as a result of her injuries. The solicitor showed her several photos of her wounds, which had previously been admitted into evidence, and Jackson testified that they depicted the injuries she suffered at the hands of Applicant. (Tr.pp.75-81).

CURRENT APPLICATION

In his application for post-conviction relief, Applicant alleges he is entitled to relief based on the following grounds:

10 (a) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel based on "erroneous advice to plead guilty"

11(a)(1): “Counsel advised me to plead guilty when I was not aware of the statement made by one of the key witnesses [Fantasia Foy] in this case.”

11(a)(2): “Counsel also gave me erroneous advice to plead guilty when I was not aware of the medical record of Cammie Jackson.”

11(a)(3): Counsel failed to file an appeal of his guilty plea

11(a)(4): Counsel was not prepared for trial, including failing to get an expert witness upon Applicant’s request, failing to compel discovery, and failing to order the bond hearing transcript to show the inconsistencies in the State’s key witnesses

10 (b) “[M]y plea of guilty was not freely, knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily given to the court”

11(b)(1): Plea was involuntary based on ineffective assistance of counsel

11(b)(2): Plea was involuntary based on a lack of knowledge of material evidence

11(b)(3): Plea was involuntary based on a lack of knowledge of the requirements of *Boykin v. Alabama*, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).

As requested relief, Applicant states “I want to be released from custody.”

FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This Court has reviewed the testimony presented at the PCR hearing, observed the witnesses, passed upon their credibility, and weighed their testimony accordingly. Before the Court are the application for PCR, the records of the Sumter County Clerk of Court concerning the subject conviction, and the records of Applicant’s trial and plea proceedings. After hearing the testimony presented and considering the legal arguments by counsel, as well as the record in this action incorporated by way of the State’s return, this Court finds all of Applicant’s allegations are without merit. Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-80, this Court makes the following findings of

facts and conclusions of law based upon all of the probative evidence presented:

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, Generally

In a PCR action, the applicant bears the burden of proving the allegations in his application by a preponderance of the evidence. *Butler v. State*, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985); Rule 71.1(e), SCRPC. Where the application alleges ineffective assistance of counsel as a ground for relief, the applicant must prove that “counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that [it] cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result.” *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); *Butler*, 286 S.C. at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814.

In evaluating allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, the reviewing court applies the two-pronged test outlined in *Strickland*. First, Applicant must prove that Counsel’s performance was deficient. *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 687; *Cherry v. State*, 300 S.C. 115, 117, 386 S.E.2d 624, 625 (1989). Under this prong, the court measures an attorney’s performance by its “reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117, 386 S.E.2d at 625 (quoting *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 690). The proper measure of performance is whether the attorney provided representation within the range of competence required in criminal cases. *Butler*, 286 S.C. at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814. “Counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” *Id.* (quoting *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 690). “When counsel focuses on some issues to the exclusion of others, there is a strong presumption that he did so for tactical reasons rather than through sheer neglect.” *Yarborough v. Gentry*, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (citing *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 690). The Court, in determining deficiency, must affirmatively entertain the range of possible reasons Counsel may have had for proceeding as he did. *Cullen v. Pinholster*, 563 U.S. 170, 196 (2011); *Harrington v. Richter*, 562 U.S. 86, 109–10 (2011). “[E]ven if an omission is inadvertent, relief

is not automatic. The Sixth Amendment guarantees reasonable competence, not perfect advocacy judged with the benefit of hindsight.” *Yarborough*, 540 U.S. at 6; *see also* *Murphy v. Davis*, 901 F.3d 578, 592 (5th Cir. 2018) (“[C]ounsel’s performance need not be optimal to be reasonable.”).

Second, Counsel's deficient performance must have prejudiced Applicant such that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for Counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117–18, 386 S.E.2d at 625 (quoting *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 694). “This does not require a showing that counsel’s actions ‘more likely than not altered the outcome,’ but the difference between *Strickland*’s prejudice standard and a more-probable-than-not standard is slight and matters ‘only in the rarest case.’” *Harrington*, 562 U.S. at 111–12 (quoting *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 697). “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” *Id.* at 112.

In the context of a guilty plea, the applicant must show there is a reasonable probability that, but for ineffective assistance of counsel, he or she would not have pled guilty but, instead, would have insisted on going to trial. *Hill v. Lockhart*, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). Because a guilty plea is a solemn, judicial admission of the truth of the charges against an individual, the PCR applicant’s right to contest the validity of such a plea is usually, but not invariably, foreclosed. *See Blackledge v. Allison*, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (“Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity. The subsequent presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to summary dismissal, as are contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible.”). “Indeed, where a thorough colloquy is conducted, courts must exercise caution in setting aside the guilty plea.” *Garren v. State*, 423 S.C. 1, 12, 813 S.E.2d 704, 712 (2018); *see Jamison v. State*, 410 S.C. 456, 469–71, 765 S.E.2d 123, 129–30 (2014) (observing that “guilty plea[s] must be treated as final in the vast majority of cases” and instructing that

caution must be exercised so as not to “undermine the solemn nature of a guilty plea and the finality that generally attaches to a guilty plea”). Absent valid reasons why the applicant is entitled to depart from previous judicial admissions made at the plea hearing, statements made during the original proceeding remain conclusive. *Dalton v. State*, 376 S.C. 130, 137–38, 654 S.E.2d 870, 874 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing *Crawford v. United States*, 519 F.2d 347, 350 (4th Cir. 1975)).

The standards do not establish mechanical rules; the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged. *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 696. A court need not first determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies; if it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, that course should be followed. *Id.* at 696–97.

1. Fantasia Foy’s Statement

Applicant claims that Counsel was ineffective for advising him to plead guilty without knowledge of the statement made by Fantasia Foy to law enforcement. In support of this claim, Applicant attached to his PCR application a three-page statement that Ms. Foy gave Sumter County Sheriff’s Office regarding her knowledge of the altercation between Applicant and the victim. Applicant avers that he would not have pled guilty had he been aware of the statement. Applicant appears to believe Foy’s statement is inconsistent with the victim’s testimony presented at trial and would have supported the theory of the defense.

However, this Court is unable to discern any material discrepancy between Foy’s statement and Jackson’s testimony at the trial. Foy’s statement indicates that she was in another room and did not personally witness the beginning of the altercation. However, Foy did hear Applicant tell Jackson he was going to “fuck up” Jackson’s “pretty face” and “kill everybody in this house”; she

saw Applicant chase Jackson with the pot in his hands; at one point, she saw Applicant holding a gun; and she watched as Jackson ran up the neighbor's porch while Applicant tried to pull her down. All of these details tend to corroborate Jackson's testimony at trial. Moreover, far from supporting any defense theory, Foy's statement is strong evidence of Applicant's guilt.

Even assuming Applicant was not aware of Foy's statement at the time he entered his guilty plea, the Court finds he has failed to show prejudice as required by *Hill v. Lockhart*. Simply put, the Court finds Applicant has not shown a "reasonable probability" that knowledge of Foy's statement would have caused Applicant to change his mind, reject the plea agreement, and insist on going to trial. On the contrary, Foy's statement corroborates many of the damning details of Jackson's testimony; it would only have strengthened the State's case at trial. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed as meritless.

2. Victim's Medical Records

Applicant claims that Counsel was ineffective for advising him to plead guilty without knowledge of Jackson's medical records. However, Applicant did not introduce Jackson's medical records at the evidentiary hearing to substantiate this allegation.

To prove prejudice from counsel's alleged failure to procure or present evidence, a PCR applicant must present the omitted evidence at the PCR hearing. *Garren*, 423 S.C. at 13, 813 S.E.2d at 711. Mere speculation and conjecture by the applicant is insufficient to support a finding of prejudice. *Id.* at 13–14, 813 S.E.2d at 711; *see, e.g., Palacio v. State*, 333 S.C. 506, 513, 511 S.E.2d 62, 66 (1999) (holding PCR applicant failed to present any probative evidence of prejudice from counsel's failure to obtain certain documents, where "the contents of these documents were never revealed at the PCR hearing.").

Applicant bears the burden of proving he was prejudiced by not receiving Jackson's

medical records; by failing to present those records at the evidentiary hearing, Applicant has failed to meet his burden. Accordingly, the Court finds this allegation meritless.

3. Failure to Appeal

Applicant claims that Counsel was ineffective for failing to file an appeal from his guilty plea. The Court finds this allegation meritless.

Where a PCR applicant can establish that he was denied a direct appeal due to counsel's deficient performance, he is entitled to seek belated review of direct appeal issues. *White*, 263 S.C. 110, 208 S.E.2d 35. Counsel has an obligation "to follow the defendant's express instructions with respect to an appeal," and failure to do so constitutes deficient performance. *Roe v. Flores-Ortega*, 528 U.S. 470, 478 (2000).

In this case, however, there was no evidence that Applicant gave Counsel any "express instructions" to file an appeal. On the contrary, Applicant complained that he was unaware of his right to appeal because Counsel never informed him he had such a right. Counsel, on the other hand, testified that he always tells his clients about their appeal and post-conviction remedies following an unsuccessful defense. The Court finds Counsel's testimony credible, and Applicant's contrary testimony not credible, as to this issue. Nevertheless, even if this Court were to accept Applicant's testimony on this point, the Court finds Applicant has failed to prove that Counsel's failure to consult with him about filing an appeal from his guilty plea was professionally unreasonable.

In cases—such as this one—where a defendant did *not* clearly instruct counsel to file an appeal, the court must determine whether counsel had an obligation to consult with the defendant about an appeal. *Flores-Ortega*, 528 U.S. at 478. Although counsel is required to make certain

that a defendant is made fully aware of his or her right to appeal after a *trial*, a different standard applies to a guilty plea:

Absent extraordinary circumstances, such as when there is reason to think a rational defendant would want to appeal (for example, because there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal) or when the defendant reasonably demonstrated an interest in appealing, there is no constitutional requirement that a defendant be informed of the right to a direct appeal from a guilty plea.

Turner v. State, 380 S.C. 223, 224–25, 670 S.E.2d 373, 374 (2008) (citations omitted). This is because a guilty plea reduces the scope of appealable issues and indicates that the defendant seeks an end to further judicial proceedings. *Flores-Ortega*, 528 U.S. at 480 (2000). Therefore, in a collateral action attacking a guilty plea, the “bare assertion that a defendant was not advised of appellate rights is insufficient to grant relief.” *Jones v. State*, 382 S.C. 589, 596, 677 S.E.2d 20, 23–24 (2009) (quoting *Weathers v. State*, 319 S.C. 59, 61, 459 S.E.2d 838, 839 (1995)), *abrogated on other grounds by Smalls v. State*, 422 S.C. 174, 810 S.E.2d 836 (2018). “Instead, there must be proof that extraordinary circumstances exist such that the defendant should have been advised of the right to appeal.” *Id.* at 596, 677 S.E.2d at 24.

Applicant has provided no evidence of “extraordinary circumstances” in this case sufficient to impose upon Counsel a duty to consult with him about filing an appeal from his guilty plea. Accordingly, the Court finds Applicant has not met his burden of proving Counsel acted deficiently in failing to discuss a direct appeal with Applicant or to file a notice of appeal on his behalf.

In addition, the transcript reflects that the plea court advised Applicant of his right to a direct appeal during the plea proceeding, and Applicant indicated that he understood. (Tr.p.104, lines 7–12). Where an applicant has already been advised by the sentencing court about his right to an appeal, “counsel might then reasonably decide that he need not repeat that information.” *Roe*, 528 U.S. at 479–80 (2000) (recognizing that “a sentencing court’s instructions to a defendant

about his appeal rights in a particular case” may be “so clear and informative as to substitute for counsel’s duty to consult” with his client about filing an appeal).

For all these reasons, the Court finds Applicant has failed to prove Counsel provided ineffective assistance as to this allegation.

4. Failure to obtain expert witness

Applicant claims that Counsel was ineffective for failing to hire an expert witness who could testify that the location of the burns on Jackson’s body were inconsistent with Jackson’s account of the altercation. The Court finds this allegation meritless.

Applicant appears to believe that the fact Jackson had burns on her arms and stomach is, somehow, inconsistent with her account that Applicant inflicted the burns by throwing boiling water on her. Applicant argues that an “expert” could have explained why Jackson’s account was implausible, and he complains that he felt pressured to plead guilty because Counsel failed to obtain an expert for that purpose. At the evidentiary hearing, Counsel testified he had no reason to believe an expert would have provided any helpful testimony.

The Court cannot discern any inconsistency between Jackson’s account of the attack and the nature of her wounds. Furthermore, Applicant did not present any expert testimony at the evidentiary hearing to substantiate this allegation. Accordingly, the Court finds Applicant has failed to meet his burden of proof as to this allegation. *See, e.g., Martin v. State*, 427 S.C. 450, 455, 832 S.E.2d 277, 279–80 (2019) (holding a PCR applicant who claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call certain witnesses must produce those witnesses or their testimony at the PCR hearing).

5. Failure to review discovery

Applicant claims that Counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately review the

discovery materials with him prior to trial. The Court finds this allegation meritless.

Applicant specifically complains that Counsel did not play the recorded 911 call for him prior to trial. Applicant also claims he did not see some thirty-five photographs until they were introduced at trial. Counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that his ability to meet with Applicant at the jail was hindered due to the COVID-19 pandemic at the time, and he was not able to give Applicant any photographs. However, he testified he was able to go over the discovery with Applicant, including Jackson's medical records and pictures that depicted her injuries. He acknowledged that he did not show Applicant all the photographs in the discovery, but he explained that a lot of the photographs did not show the victim at all and were not introduced by the State as evidence at trial.

The Court finds Applicant has not met his burden of proving that Counsel provided ineffective assistance as to this issue. To prove prejudice from failure to review discovery, a PCR applicant must present some new evidence or defenses that could have been discovered by counsel's further review of the discovery. *Harris v. State*, 377 S.C. 66, 75–76, 659 S.E.2d 140, 145–46 (2008) (citing *Jackson v. State*, 329 S.C. 345, 353–54, 495 S.E.2d 768, 772 (1998)), *abrogated on other grounds by Smalls*, 422 S.C. 174, 810 S.E.2d 836. Furthermore, the applicant must also show how the new evidence or defenses would have resulted in a different outcome. *Id.* at 76 (citing *David v. State*, 326 S.C. 283, 288, 486 S.E.2d 747, 749 (1997); *Skeen v. State*, 325 S.C. 210, 214, 481 S.E.2d 129, 132 (1997)). Mere speculation as to how the alleged lack of preparation prejudiced the applicant is not sufficient to support a grant of relief. *Id.* at 75, 659 S.E.2d at 145 (citing *Glover v. State*, 318 S.C. 496, 498, 458 S.E.2d 538, 540 (1995)). Once again, Applicant failed to produce the 911 call or any of the photographs at the evidentiary hearing to substantiate this allegation. Nor has he explained how any of that evidence might have supported

his defense or resulted in a different outcome. Accordingly, this Court finds this allegation meritless.

6. *Failure to order bond hearing transcript*

Applicant claims that Counsel was ineffective for failing to order the transcript of his bond hearing. Applicant argues that Jackson made statements during that hearing, which were inconsistent with her testimony at trial. However, Applicant did not produce the bond hearing transcript at the evidentiary hearing to substantiate this allegation. *See, e.g., Garren*, 423 S.C. at 13–14, 813 S.E.2d at 711; *Palacio*, 333 S.C. at 513, 511 S.E.2d at 66. Accordingly, the Court finds this allegation meritless.

7. *Involuntary guilty plea*

Applicant claims his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made because he was unaware of material evidence and lacked confidence in proceeding to trial with Counsel. To the extent this allegation concerns Applicant's prior complaints about missing evidence and Counsel's ineffectiveness, the Court finds the allegation baseless. As already explained, Applicant has failed to prove that any material evidence existed which would have helped his defense or changed his decision to plead guilty. Nor has he proven any of his allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.

At the evidentiary hearing, Applicant complained that he felt forced to plead guilty because he did not think Counsel was adequately prepared for trial. Absent any objective deficiency or prejudice related to Counsel's conduct, however, this Court finds that Applicant's merely subjective dissatisfaction with Counsel's preparation for trial does not render his plea involuntary. *See United States v. Rodriguez-DeMaya*, 674 F.2d 1122, 1128 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding district court properly found guilty plea was free and voluntary despite defendant's claim "that she feared

that her court-appointed attorney would not defend her if she pleaded not guilty”).

Applicant also complained that he was erroneously advised that he could receive a sentence of 90 years’ imprisonment if convicted at trial, whereas ABHAN only carries a maximum sentence of 20 years. However, at the evidentiary hearing, Counsel credibly testified that the ABHAN charge was only one of Applicant’s thirteen pending charges in Sumter County. Counsel explained that many of the other charges arose out of separate incidents, and many were serious charges like carjacking that carried substantial exposure. Counsel agreed that Applicant was probably facing up to 90 years if convicted on all charges. Counsel explained the solicitor was initially reluctant to make any plea offers but finally offered to let Applicant plead to ABHAN for a negotiated fifteen years.

Counsel testified that Applicant rejected the fifteen-year offer, so they went to trial. However, Counsel testified that Applicant expressed a desire to accept the offer after the victim finished testifying. Counsel was ultimately able to convince the solicitor to offer a plea to ABHAN for a negotiated fourteen-year sentence and the dismissal of all other pending Sumter County charges. Counsel conveyed that offer to Applicant and told him it was up to Applicant whether to accept it or proceed with the trial; Applicant decided to take the offer.

The Court finds Counsel’s testimony on this point credible. Accordingly, the Court finds Applicant has failed to prove that his decision to plead guilty was based on erroneous advice about his potential sentencing exposure. On the contrary, it appears that Applicant was correctly advised that he faced approximately 90 years’ imprisonment if convicted and sentenced consecutively for all of his thirteen pending charges. In addition, Counsel commendably overcame the solicitor’s initial reluctance to make a plea offer, and he ultimately succeeded in negotiating a plea deal that would resolve all of Applicant’s pending charges in exchange for a fourteen-year sentence. The

fact that Counsel was able to negotiate such a favorable plea in the middle of trial is especially impressive. Finally, the Court notes that Applicant expressly affirmed, under oath, that he was entering the plea freely and voluntarily, as reflected in the transcript of the plea proceeding. (Tr.p.103, lines 7–16). The Court finds Applicant has failed to present any “valid reasons why he should be allowed to depart from the truth of his statements.” *Dalton*, 376 S.C. at 137–38, 654 S.E.2d at 874. Accordingly, the Court finds Applicant has not met his burden of proving that his guilty plea was not freely, voluntarily, and intelligently entered.

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CONCLUSION


Based on the foregoing, this Court finds Applicant has not established any constitutional violations or deprivations that would require this Court to grant his application for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, this application must be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Applicant must file and serve a notice of appeal within thirty days from PCR counsel's receipt of written notice of entry of judgment to secure the appropriate appellate review pursuant to Rule 203, SCACR. Applicant has a right to appellate counsel's assistance in seeking review of the denial of PCR. *Austin v. State*, 305 S.C. 453, 409 S.E.2d 395 (1991). Rule 71.1(g), SCRCR, provides that if Applicant wishes to seek appellate review, PCR counsel must serve and file a notice of appeal on Applicant's behalf. Applicant is directed to Rule 243, SCACR, for appropriate procedures for appeal.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. The PCR application is denied and dismissed with prejudice; and
2. Applicant shall be remanded to the custody of the State.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED this 2 day of April, 2026.


THE HONORABLE EDWARD W. MILLER
Presiding Judge
Third Judicial Circuit

Greenville, South Carolina