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May 15 2026

S.C. SUPREME COURT

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE SUPREME COURT
APPEAL FROM BEAUFORT COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas
The Honorable G.D. Morgan Jr., PCR Action Judge
2025-CP-07-00079

DELMAR SANDERS #364856,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

Respondent.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Delmar Sanders appeals the denial of his post-conviction relief application. The post-conviction relief action was heard and denied by the Honorable G.D. Morgan, circuit court judge, on January 7, 2026, and was denied by written order issued filed on May 8, 2026. Applicant received notice of the judgement on May 15, 2026.

/s Chelsey F. Marto
Chelsey F. Marto, Esquire
Attorney for the Applicant
The Law Office of Chelsey F. Marto, LLC
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Columbia, SC, 29201
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Other Counsel of Record:
Kylee Kanealey, Esquire
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Columbia, SC, 29211-1549

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA COUNTY OF BEAUFORT	)	IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
Delmar R. Sanders, #364856, Applicant, v. State of South Carolina, Respondent.	)	CASE NO. 2025–CP–07–00079 **ORDER OF DISMISSAL**

This matter comes before the Court by way of Applicant Delmar R. Sanders application for post-conviction relief (PCR) filed on January 14, 2025. Respondent filed its Return requesting an evidentiary hearing. On January 7, 2026, an evidentiary hearing was held at the Beaufort County Courthouse before the Honorable G.D. Morgan Jr. Applicant was present and represented by Chelsey F. Marto, Esquire. Assistant Attorney General Kylee Kanealey represented Respondent. Applicant proceeded forward on the allegations in his amended application. In support of these claims, Applicant testified on his own behalf and presented the testimony of Matthew S. Paulk (Trial Counsel).

Following a thorough review of the record, along with the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, this Court finds Applicant has failed to establish any constitutional violations or deprivations entitling him to relief and, accordingly, denies and dismisses this action with prejudice.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Applicant is presently confined in the South Carolina Department of Corrections serving an aggregate forty-year sentence. In April 2022, the Beaufort County Grand Jury indicted Applicant for murder (2021-GS-07-01220), attempted murder (-01219), and possession of a

weapon during the commission of a violent crime (-01221). Following a pretrial immunity hearing that was denied, Applicant proceeded to a jury trial August 22-25, 2022, before the Honorable Heath P. Taylor. Deputy Public Defender Seth Paulk represented Applicant. Assistant Solicitors Mary Jones and Samantha Milina represented the State. The jury acquitted Applicant of attempted murder but convicted him of the weapon charge and, as to the murder indictment, the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. Judge Taylor sentenced Applicant to consecutive terms of thirty years for voluntary manslaughter and five years for the weapon charge.

Applicant filed a timely notice of appeal, which was perfected by Appellate Defender David Alexander through the filing of a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal pursuant to Anders, and the remittitur was sent December 12, 2024.

CURRENT APPLICATION

On January 14, 2025, Applicant filed this PCR action alleging:

> Ineffective assistance of counsel / Violation of Sixth Amendment: counsel should have objected to trial court's erroneous instruction on voluntary manslaughter, which was a comment on the facts.

On April 21, 2025, Applicant filed his first amended application alleging:

> Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to bring to the Court's attention or objection the judge did not charge criminal intent to the jury upon his recharge.

On January 7, 2026, Applicant filed his second amended application alleging:

Ineffective assistance of counsel for:

a. Failure to object to charging voluntary manslaughter
b. Failure to object to the instruction that malice can be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon
c. Failure to request a jury charge telling the jury that malice is not an element of voluntary manslaughter
d. Failure to properly communicate

e. Failure to prepare applicant for trial and to explain the trial process to Applicant
f. Failure to gather evidence and obtain a full copy of discovery
g. Failure to request a continuance
h. Failure to discuss trial strategy with applicant
i. Failure to properly investigate the case
j. Failure to mitigate the sentence.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act[1] (the Act) provides that any person who has been convicted of a crime may seek post-conviction relief based upon the following types of allegations:

1) That the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of this State;
2) That the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence;
3) That the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law;
4) That there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice;
5) That his sentence has expired, his probation, parole or conditional release unlawfully revoked, or he is otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other restraint; or
6) That the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error heretofore available under any common law, statutory or other writ, motion, petition, proceeding or remedy[.]

S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-20(A).

The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution guarantee Applicant, like all other defendants, the right to effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Taylor v. State, 404 S.C. 350, 359, 745 S.E.2d 97, 101 (2013). Ordinarily, PCR allegations are centered upon an allegation that the applicant did not receive *effective* assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. The allegation of denial of such representation sets forth a *prima facie* violation of this constitutional right and raises a

[1] S.C. Code Ann. §§ 17-27-10 to -160.

question of fact that can only be determined by an evidentiary hearing. Rogers v. State, 261 S.C. 288, 291, 199 S.E.2d 761, 762 (1973).

In a post-conviction relief action, the applicant bears the burden of proving the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence—a mere allegation of ineffective assistance is not sufficient to warrant granting relief. Rule 71.1(e), SCRCP; Butler v. State, 286 S.C. 441, 442, 334 S.E.2d 813, 814 (1985). The reviewing court applies the two-part test outlined in Strickland v. Washington to determine whether counsel's conduct "was so [ineffective] as to require reversal" of the applicant's conviction. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To obtain relief, a PCR applicant must prove (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) the applicant sustained prejudice as a result of counsel's deficient performance. Id. at 687–88; accord. Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 117–18, 386 S.E.2d 624, 625 (1989). Failure to make the required showing of either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700; see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695 (2002) (explaining that "[w]ithout proof of both deficient performance and prejudice to the defense, . . . it could not be said that the sentence or conviction resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that rendered the result of the proceeding unreliable" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Regarding the deficiency prong of the Strickland analysis, the proper measure of performance is whether counsel provided representation within the reasonable range of competence required in criminal cases. Butler, 286 S.C. at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814. When analyzing counsel's performance, the reviewing court will strongly presume counsel provided adequate assistance, and the applicant is responsible for rebutting that presumption "by proving that his attorney's representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and that the challenged action was not sound strategy." Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384 (1986);

cf. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 189 (2011) (explaining a defendant must show defense counsel failed to act reasonably considering all the circumstances in order to overcome the presumption of adequate representation).

Furthermore, the reviewing court will scrutinize counsel's performance in a highly deferential manner, make every effort "to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight," and "evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time" in light of then-existing circumstances. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. In order to establish counsel's performance was deficient, the applicant must demonstrate that "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 687. Accordingly, counsel's performance will be considered deficient only when it was objectively incompetent under prevailing professional norms and *not* when it simply "deviated from best practices or most common custom." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011).

Beyond satisfying the burden required by the deficiency prong, an applicant also bears the burden of establishing prejudice in order to be entitled to relief as "[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. To meet this burden, counsel's deficient performance must have prejudiced the applicant to such an extent, there is a reasonable probability the result of the proceeding would have been different but for counsel's unprofessional errors. Cherry, 300 S.C. at 117–18, 386 S.E.2d at 625; see Johnson v. State, 325 S.C. 182, 186, 480 S.E.2d 733, 735 (1997) ("To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a PCR applicant has the burden of proving counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and, but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability the result at trial would have been different."). Importantly, "[t]he likelihood of a different result must be

substantial, not just conceivable." Richter, 562 U.S.at 112.

Finally, the Strickland standard must be applied with scrupulous care, lest "intrusive post-trial inquiry" threaten the integrity of the very adversary process the right to counsel is meant to serve. 466 U.S. at 689–90. Courts must be wary of second-guessing counsel's trial tactics, and where counsel articulates a valid reason for employing such strategy, such conduct is not ineffective assistance of counsel. Whitehead v. State, 308 S.C. 119, 417 S.E.2d 529 (1992). The applicant's burden of proving both Strickland components is heavy in light of the strong presumption that counsel's conduct fell within the range of reasonable professional legal assistance. 466 U.S. at 690. Representation is constitutionally ineffective only if counsel's conduct "so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process" that the defendant was denied a fair proceeding. Id. at 686; see Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 175 (1986) (noting that under Strickland, the "benchmark" of the right to counsel is the "fairness of the adversary proceeding"); cf. United States v. Morrow, 977 F.2d 222, 229 (6th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he threshold issue is not whether [the applicant's] attorney was inadequate; rather, it is whether he was so *manifestly* ineffective that defeat was snatched from the hands of probable victory.")

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This Court has had the opportunity to review the records before it, including the Beaufort County Clerk of Court records of the underlying conviction, Applicant's records from the South Carolina Department of Corrections, the trial transcript, Applicant's appellate records, and the records from this PCR action. This Court has further had the opportunity to observe the witnesses presented at the hearing, closely pass upon their credibility, and weigh their testimony accordingly. After a careful review based on the Strickland standard set forth above, this Court finds Applicant has failed to carry his burden of proof. Below are the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of

law as required by section 17-27-80 of the South Carolina Code (2017).

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In a PCR action, an applicant bears the burden of proving the allegations in his application. Butler v. State, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985). To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, the applicant must show counsel was deficient, and the deficiency prejudice applicant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). When evaluating deficiency, courts measure an attorney's performance by its "reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Cherry, 300 S.C at 117, 386 S.E. 2d at 635 (quoting Strickland, 366 U.S. at 690). "Counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Butler, 286 S.C. at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). The applicant must overcome this presumption to received relief. Cherry, 300 S.C. at 118, 386 S.E.2d at 625. To prove prejudice, an applicant must prove counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the applicant such that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625.

Failure to Object to Charging Voluntary Manslaughter

Applicant alleged Counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the voluntary manslaughter charge. This Court finds this allegation is without merit. Applicant testified that Counsel failed to object to "not reading the applicable law of voluntary manslaughter" because the judge did not charge criminal intent. (PCR Tr. p. 12, 23).

Counsel testified that he recalls having the discussion and conversation with Applicant about whether or not they should oppose or consent to the voluntary manslaughter charge. (PCR Tr. p. 29). Applicant did not provide any legal basis to which the voluntary manslaughter charge

could have been objected to. Applicant testified that Counsel should have objected because the applicable law of voluntary manslaughter was not read, however the record refutes this. Further, the record reflects a jury charge on criminal intent was given in the initial charge and again in the recharge. (Trial Tr. pp. 720, 721, 739, 740). This Court finds the standard charges were given for voluntary manslaughter and criminal intent and therefore any objection would have been non-meritorious. See Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that if a petitioner challenges a futile objection, he fails both Strickland prongs); U.S. ex rel. Link v. Lane, 811 F.2d 1166, 1170 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding there is no prejudice from the failure to object unless there is a legally supportable argument for exclusion of the evidence). Applicant has failed to prove deficiency and prejudice and therefore, this claim is denied.

Failure to Object to the Instruction that Malice can be Inferred

Applicant alleged Counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the instruction that malice can be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon. This Court finds this allegation is without merit. The trial transcript directly refutes this allegation and reflects that this instruction was never given. Therefore, this claim is denied.

Failure to Request a Jury Charge that Malice is not an Element of Voluntary Manslaughter

Applicant alleged Counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury charge that malice is not an element of voluntary manslaughter. Counsel testified that he did not consider requesting this charge because the elements of manslaughter are read during the charge on manslaughter and malice is not included in those elements. (PCR Tr. p. 28). There is no caselaw requiring an attorney to request a judge list off all the elements that are not included in a charge in addition to the charge. This would not be reasonable under prevailing professional norms to do so. This Court finds Counsel was not deficient for not requesting a specific jury charge that malice is not an element of

voluntary manslaughter. Further, Applicant failed to prove that had Counsel requested this, that there is a reasonable probability the outcome of his trial would have been different. Applicant has failed to prove deficiency and prejudice and therefore, this claim is denied.

Failure to Properly Communicate, Failure to Gather Evidence and Obtain a Full Copy of Discovery, Failure to Properly Investigate[2]

Applicant alleged counsel was ineffective for failing to properly communicate, failing to gather evidence and obtain a full copy of discovery, and failing to properly investigate. This Court finds these allegations are without merit.

An applicant who alleges his or her defense attorney was ineffective in failing to spend more time preparing or providing a copy of the discovery materials must demonstrate prejudice by showing what evidence could have been discovered or what other defenses could have been pursued. Harris v. State, 377 S.C. 66, 75-76, 659 S.E.2d 140, 145-46 (2008) (citing Jackson v. State, 329 S.C. 345, 353-54, 495 S.E.2d 768, 772 (1998)), abrogated on other grounds by Smalls, 422 S.C. 174, 810 S.E.2d 836. Furthermore, an applicant must also show how the new evidence or defenses would have resulted in a different outcome. Id. (citing David v. State, 326 S.C. 283, 288, 486 S.E.2d 747, 749 (1997); Skeen v. State, 325 S.C. 210, 214, 481 S.E.2d 129, 132 (1997)). Mere speculation as to how the alleged lack of preparation prejudiced an applicant is not sufficient to support a grant of relief. Id., 377 S.C. at 75, 659 S.E.2d at 145 (citing Glover v. State, 318 S.C. 496, 498, 458 S.E.2d 538, 540 (1995)).

Counsel testified that he met with Applicant more than ten times. (PCR Tr. p. 26). Counsel testified that he had adequate time to meet with Applicant before trial. (PCR Tr. p. 28, 29). Counsel testified that he gave Applicant a full copy of the discovery. (PCR Tr. p. 26). Counsel testified that there were several people that Applicant wanted his counsel to make phone calls to, and that there

[2] This section addresses allegations (d), (f) and (i).

was a lot of additional evidence that was gathered since they did put up a case. (PCR Tr. p. 30). Counsel testified that he does not feel like there was anything he need to investigate that he did not and he did a fairly thorough job of investigating the case. (PCR Tr. p. 27). This Court finds Counsel's testimony *credible*.

This Court finds Counsel's investigation and communication to be reasonable under prevailing professional norms and not deficient. Applicant failed to produce what evidence or defenses should have been investigated further and thus failed to prove prejudice. See Skeen v. State, 325 S.C. 210, 481 S.E.2d 129 (1997) (applicant not entitled to relief where no evidence presented at PCR hearing to show how additional preparation would have had any possible effect on the result at trial; Moorehead v. State, 329, 496 S.E.2d 415 (1998) (failure to conduct an independent investigation does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel when the allegation is supported only by mere speculation as to the result). Applicant has failed to prove deficiency and prejudice and therefore, this claim is denied.

Failure to Prepare Applicant for Trial, Explain the Trial Process and Discuss Trial Strategy[3]

Applicant alleged the Counsel was ineffective for failing to prepare Applicant for trial, explain the trial process, and discuss trial strategy with Applicant. This Court finds these allegations are without merit.

Counsel testified that he discussed the trial process with Applicant, and he seemed to fully understand everything. (PCR Tr. p. 26). Counsel testified that his strategy was that Applicant was being robbed and this was a self-defense case. Counsel testified that they did a stand your ground hearing, a Duncan motion pre-trial, and Applicant testified to this effect at his trial. (PCR Tr. p. 27). This Court finds Counsel's testimony *credible*.

[3] This section addresses allegations (e) and (h).

Applicant failed to provide what more Counsel should have done to prepare Applicant for trial, and what more of the trial process and trial strategy should have been discussed, resulting in mere speculation. This Court finds Counsel articulated a valid trail strategy, explained the strategy and process with Applicant and was reasonable under prevailing professional norms. Applicant has failed to prove deficiency and prejudice, and this claim is denied.

Failure to Request a Continuance

Applicant alleged Counsel was ineffective for failing to request a continuance. This Court finds this allegation is without merit.

Counsel testified that he did not feel like he needed more time to try the case properly. (PCR Tr. pp. 25-26). Counsel testified that he did not see any need to request a continuance. (PCR Tr. p. 30). This Court finds Counsel's testimony *credible*. Applicant did not testify to what basis there was for a continuance granted what more Counsel should have done had a continuance been granted. Further, Applicant failed to prove that had counsel been granted a continuance, that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different. Applicant has failed to prove deficiency and prejudice, and this claim is denied.

Failure to Mitigate the Sentence

Applicant alleged Counsel was ineffective for failing to mitigate the sentence. This Court finds this allegation is without merit. Counsel testified that his sister and mother both spoke at his sentencing in mitigation. (PCR Tr. p. 30). Counsel testified that he and Applicant "had a conversation after the verdict was rendered but before sentenced about whether or not he was going to speak during sentencing" and that "ultimately, it's the decision of the client if they want to speak or not." (PCR Tr. p. 28). This Court finds Counsel's testimony *credible*. Applicant did not testify

to what more he wished Counsel had presented in mitigation. Applicant has failed to prove deficiency and prejudice, and this claim is denied.

CONCLUSION

Based on all the foregoing, this Court finds and concludes that Applicant has not established any constitutional violations or deprivations that would require this Court to grant his application. Therefore, this application for post–conviction relief is **DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE**.

Should Applicant wish to secure appellate review, he must file and serve a notice of appeal within thirty days of receipt by counsel of written notice of entry of judgment. See Rule 203, SCACR. Pursuant to Austin v. State, 305 S.C. 453, 409 S.E.2d 395 (1991), an Applicant has a right to an appellate counsel's assistance in seeking review of the denial of PCR. Rule 71.1(g), SCRCP, provides that PCR counsel must serve and file a Notice of Appeal on the Applicant's behalf if the Applicant wishes to seek appellate review. Attention is directed to South Carolina Appellate Court Rule 243 for appropriate procedures for appeal.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. The Application for Post–Conviction Relief is denied and dismissed with prejudice; and

2. Applicant shall be remanded to and remain in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED this 30 **day of** April **, 2026.**

THE HONORABLE G.D. MORGAN, JR.
Presiding Judge
Fourteenth Judicial Circuit

Greenville, South Carolina

FORM 4

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF BEAUFORT
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
CASE NUMBER 2025CP0700079

Delmar R Sanders		**South Carolina State Of**	

PLAINTIFF(S) **DEFENDANT(S)**

Submitted by: **Attorney for:** ☐ Plaintiff ☐ Defendant ☐ Self-Represented Litigant

DISPOSITION TYPE (CHECK ONE)

☐ **JURY VERDICT.** This action came before the court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and a verdict rendered.

☒ **DECISION BY THE COURT.** This action came to trial or hearing before the court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision rendered. ☐ See Page 2 for additional information.

☐ **ACTION DISMISSED (*CHECK REASON*):** ☐ Rule 12(b), SCRCP; ☐ Rule 41(a), SCRCP (Vol. Nonsuit); ☐ Rule 43(k), SCRCP (Settled); ☐ Other: _____

☐ **ACTION STRICKEN (*CHECK REASON*):** ☐ Rule 40(j) SCRCP; ☐ Bankruptcy; ☐ Binding arbitration, subject to right to restore to confirm, vacate or modify arbitration award; ☐ Other: _____

☐ **STAYED DUE TO BANKRUPTCY**

☐ **DISPOSITION OF APPEAL TO THE CIRCUIT COURT (CHECK APPLICABLE BOX):**
☐ Affirmed; ☐ Reversed; ☐ Remanded; ☐ Other: _____

NOTE: ATTORNEYS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR NOTIFYING LOWER COURT, TRIBUNAL, OR ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OF THE CIRCUIT COURT RULING IN THIS APPEAL.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: ☒ See attached order; (formal order to follow) ☐ Statement of Judgment by the Court:

ORDER INFORMATION

Order of Dismissal

This order ☒ ends ☐ does not end the case.
Additional Information for the Clerk: _____

INFORMATION FOR THE JUDGMENT INDEX

Complete this section below when the judgment affects title to real or personal property or if any amount should be enrolled. If there is no judgment information, indicate "N/A" in one of the boxes below.

Judgment in Favor of (List name(s) below)	Judgment Against (List name(s) below)	Judgment Amount To be Enrolled (List amount(s) below)

If applicable, describe the property, including tax map information and address, referenced in the order:

The judgment information above has been provided by the submitting party. Disputes concerning the amounts contained in this form may be addressed by way of motion pursuant to the SC Rules of Civil Procedure. Amounts to be computed such as interest or additional taxable costs not available at the time the form and final order are submitted to the judge may be provided to the clerk.
Note: Title abstractors and researchers should refer to the official court order for judgment details.
E-Filing Note: In E-Filing counties, the Court will electronically sign this form using a separate electronic signature page.

s/ G. D. Morgan, Jr.	2773	4/30/2026
Circuit Court Judge	**Judge Code**	**Date**

For Clerk of Court Office Use Only

This judgment was entered on **May 8, 2026**, and a copy mailed first class or placed in the appropriate attorney's box on **May 11, 2026**, to attorneys of record or to parties (when appearing pro se) as follows:

Delmar R Sanders #364856 Kirkland Corr. Inst. E-B2-11
4344 Broad River Rd Columbia, SC 29210
Chelsey Faith Marto PO Box 8795 Columbia, SC 29201

Kylee Marcella Kanealey PO Box 11549 Columbia, SC 29211-1549

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE PLAINTIFF(S)

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE DEFENDANT(S)

Court Reporter

Jerri Ann Roseneau - Clerk of Court

Court Reporter:

E-Filing Note: In E-Filing counties, the date of Entry of Judgment is the same date as reflected on the Electronic File Stamp and the clerk's entering of the date of judgment above is not required in those counties. The clerk will mail a copy of the judgement to parties who are not E-Filers or who are appearing pro se. See Rule 77(d), SCRCP.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING DECISION BY THE COURT AS REFERENCED ON PAGE 1.

This action came to trial or hearing before the court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision rendered.