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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)

COUNTY OF LEXINGTON)

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

Civil Action No. 2011-CP-32-02968

BETHA G. GIBBS

Elizabeth L. Snow (f/k/a Elizabeth S. Bell),)
Mark S. Campitella, Chrissie E. Campitella,)
Henry D. Gehlken, Sr., Vivian S. Gehlken,)
Kenneth W. Kelly and Anita B. Kelly,)
Stephen F. Linder, Sr. and Jackie Bower)
Linder, and Kathryn A. McDaniel)

Plaintiffs,

vs.

Judson P. Smith, Christy Brabham Bell,)
Charles S. Coleman, Jr., J. Thomas)
Coleman, Jacob C. Coleman, Valiska C.)
Freeman, George Arthur Stoudenmire,)
George Arthur Stoudenmire as trustee for)
the benefit of William E. Stoudenmire)
Linda B. Stoudenmire, Stacey S. Dershaw)
f/k/a Stacey Michell Stoudenmire and Laura)
Brittany Stoudenmire, and Trust "B")
Created by U/W Everett L. Stoudenmire and)
Valiska F. Coleman)

Defendants

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ORDER

SC Court of Appeals



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The parties tried this Hilton Place Subdivision Lake Access easement obstruction case on July 30, 2013. Thomas B. Smith, Esq. represented the Plaintiffs, while H. Clayton Walker, Jr., Esq. represented the Defendants.

Hilton Place Subdivision was developed in 1983. In 2010, Defendants Smith and Bell bought the Lake Access parcel, cleaned the lot, erected a gazebo, fire pit, a storage shed/bathroom/outhouse, and generally improved the lake access lot. While Plaintiffs dispute Smith and Bell's right to place improvements on the Lake Access lot, they admit that neither the gazebo nor the storage shed/bathroom/outhouse obstruct their lake access. Smith and Bell

testified that they do not intend to obstruct the lake access easement and have not, except for possible temporary events relating to construction activities, ever blocked or intended to block the lake access.

Plaintiffs claim (1) the subdivision restrictions prohibit building structures on the Lake Access, (2) the access easement should be construed to include access across the entire parcel, at all times, not just the portion necessary for lake access, (3) the grantor has a fiduciary duty to either convey the property as a common area to the homeowner's association or, alternatively, not to convey the property to Defendant Smith and Bell, and (4) equity favors the Plaintiff.

Defendants argue that (1) the subdivision restrictions do not apply to the Lake Access, or if they did, a subsequent modification cured any violation, (2) the easement is limited in scope to lake access and as the owner of the underlying or serviant estate, the Defendant can improve the Lake Access so long as improvements do not obstruct access to the lake, and (3) the work performed by the Defendants improved the value of the Lake Access and surrounding property.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Court has reviewed the exhibits and weighed the testimony of the witnesses and finds the following:

This case involves lake property developed by Charles Coleman and E.L. Stoudenmire. A plat dated September 19, 1983 shows numerous numbered lots in a subdivision named Hilton Place. Including on the plat is a piece of property entitled "Lake Access". See Lexington County Register of Deeds, Plat Book 194-G at Page 60; re-recorded at Plat Book 242 at Page 150.

Restrictions on the subdivision dated October 11, 1983 were filed on October 12, 1983 and are common and straightforward. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 4. They state the restrictions are

“imposed upon all lots hereinafter designated” and later says they apply to “all those lots shown on [the] plat”. *Id.* at Preamble and ¶ 12. Additionally, the Restrictions specify “they are for the benefit of the Grantors who may change or modify the terms contained herein at any time”. *Id.*

As is typical, the Restrictions were from time to time modified. *See* Record Book 789, Page 217 (allowing a residence within utility easement); Record Book 880, Page 34 (allowing a storage building otherwise in a setback); Record Book 1883, Page 262 (allowing construction otherwise in a setback).

A Confirmatory Amendment to Restrictions on Hilton Place Subdivision was signed on February 4, 1999 and filed on February 5, 1999. *See* Defendant’s Exhibit 11. Said recording notes the restrictions were intended to be imposed on those numbered lots shown on the initial plat and specified those as Lots 1-16 of Block A, Lots 1-9 of Block B, Lots of 1-6 Block C, and Lots of 1-2 Block D and restates that the restrictions only apply to those numbered lots. It also states “Nothing contained herein shall be construed to impose any covenants, conditions or restrictions on any other property shown on the aforesaid plat.” Said modification was signed by Charles Coleman’s wife, as Mr. Coleman was then deceased. It was also signed by Everette L. Stoudenmire Jr, and Ernestine K. Stoudenmire as Co-Trustees of a Trust created by Everette L. Stoudenmire.

In July, 2010, the Lake Access was deeded to Judson P. Smith and Christy Brabham Bell by deed signed by Charles S. Coleman; Thomas Coleman; Jacob C. Coleman; Valiska C. Freeman; George A. Stoudenmire, individually and as Trustee for William W. Stoudenmire; and, Linda B. Stoudenmire, individually and as Attorney in Fact for Stacey S. Dershaw f/k/a Stacey Michelle Stoudenmire and Laura Brittany Stoudenmire. *See* Plaintiff Exhibit 16. The Coleman and Freeman grantors held one-half of the property by virtue of a deed of distribution from the

Estate of Valiska F. Coleman. The Stoudenmire grantors held one-half of the property by virtue of a deeds from the Trust of Everette L. Stoudenmire and deed of distribution from the Estate of Everette L. Stoudenmire Jr. The deed was in exchange for consideration of \$25,000. Additionally, the deed stated "This conveyance is made subject to easements, conditions and restrictions of record affecting subject property."

After purchase of the property, Smith and Bell performed work on an existing boat ramp, and built a dock, gazebo, and storage building with a bathroom. See Trial Transcript, J. Smith's testimony, 199-200; see also Defendant Exhibits 2 and Plaintiff's Exhibits 5-8.

A driveway runs through the Lake Access from the public road to the boat ramp. See Defendant Exhibits 1 and 6 and Plaintiff's Exhibits 6-8.

In January 2013, the Defendant Grantors waived any right to approve or, alternatively, approved construction of the improvements to the Lake Access. See Attachment C of Defendant's Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Dismiss.

This suit has been brought by owners of lots 7, 8, 9, and 10 of Block A; lots 2 and 4 of Block B; and, lots 5 and 6 of Block C. Plaintiffs have admitted there is no permanent, physical impediment (fence, ditch, etc.) to their use of the Lake Access and that no one has ever denied them use of the property for lake access. See Trial Transcript, V. Gehlken testimony, 76 and, S. Linder testimony, 48. Defendant Smith also testified the Lake Access has been available for use as access to Lake Murray since his purchase of the property, with the exception of limited and temporary times during the construction of improvements on the property. See Trial Transcript, J. Smith's testimony, 192-193.

LAW/ANALYSIS

1. Application of the Subdivision Restrictions to the Lake Access.

Plaintiffs argue that the general subdivision restrictions apply to the Lake Access and prevent the construction of the improvements that have been placed on the Lake Access. Defendants argue the restrictions do not apply to the Lake Access and, alternatively, that the subsequent 1999 Confirmatory Amendment and 2013 Approval and Waiver cures any defect.

It is well settled in South Carolina that restrictions can be created by deed, declaration, or implication, as through filing of a plat. *Queen's Grant II Horizontal Property Regime v. Greenwood Development Corp.*, 628 S.E.2d 902, 913, 368 S.C. 342 (Ct. App. 2006). Regarding the interpretation of restrictions, restrictions on the use of property will be strictly construed with all doubts resolved in favor of free use of the property. *Seabrook Island Property Owners Ass'n v. Marshland Trust, Inc.*, 596 S.E.2d 380, 383, 358 S.C. 655 (Ct. App. 2004); *Tupper v. Dorchester County*, 326 S.C. 318, 326, 487 S.E.2d 187, 191 (1997).

Furthermore, the state Supreme Court has said in reference to the restriction of use of property and creation of an easement "that in the interpretation of maps and plats intention will not be inferred from symbols of uncertain meaning". *Hamilton v. CCM, Inc.*, 274 S.C. 152, 157, 263 S.E.2d 378, 380 (1980). An easement is also limited to a use which is reasonably necessary and convenient and as little burdensome to the servient estate as possible. *See generally Hill v. Carolina Power & Light Co.*, 204 S.C. 83, 28 S.E.2d 545 (1943). Finally, "Covenants in deeds impose restrictions on specific lots or parcels of property, rather than covenants which apply to an entire subdivision." *See South Carolina Equity: A Practitioner's Guide* (Lowell et al., 2010) at 132-133.

A brief chronology of the facts is helpful. The testimony and evidence is:

- 1) in October 1983 the Hilton Place plat and restrictions were recorded, *see* Plaintiff's Exhibit 4;

- 2) in April 1990, a deed was issued to Plaintiff Snow reflecting an easement over the Lake Access, *see* Plaintiff's Exhibit 2;
- 3) in May 1992 a deed was issued to Plaintiff Kelly, *see* Plaintiff's Exhibit 13;
- 4) in October 1992 a meeting was held by some owners to discuss making improvements to the Lake Access, *see* Plaintiff's Exhibit 18A;
- 5) in September 1997 a deed was issued to Plaintiff Campitella, *see* Plaintiff's Exhibit 22;
- 6) in February 1999 Confirmatory Amendment to the Restrictions was recorded, which notes that the initial restrictions were intended to be imposed on the numbered lots and only on the numbered lots, and that the restrictions were not intended to apply to any other piece of property on the plat, *see* Defendant's Exhibit 11;
- 7) in January 2010 the Lake Access was listed for sale, for the second time, *see* Plaintiff's Exhibit 23;
- 8) in July 2010, the Lake Access was deeded to Defendants Smith and Brabham, *see* Plaintiff's Exhibit 16;
- 9) Plaintiffs later objected to an outbuilding, deck, gazebo and dock that had recently been built, *see* Trial Transcript, J. Smith testimony 200-201 (stating the only complaint he received from neighbors during the construction was from Steve Linder regarding repair of a sewer line); and
- 10) in January 2013, the heirs of the original grantors signed a Waiver and Approval of Construction on the Lake Access, *see* Attachment C of Defendant's Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Dismiss.

The Court is persuaded that the plain language of the restrictions suggests they were not intended to apply to the Lake Access. Plaintiff argues that the recorded restrictions apply to the Lake Access lot. While, the court requested direct authority on this issue, neither party furnished any to the court. Plaintiff's argument seems flawed for the following reasons: (1) The grantor created the lake access and restrictions at the same time; both sprang into existence simultaneously for different purposes—one to govern building etc put on residential lots, the other to provide back lot owners with lake access. (2) Such an application of the restrictions to

the lake access parcel would defeat the very purpose of lake access. For instance, Restriction number one states "No lot or property conveyed hereunder shall be used for any other than private residential purposes." Restriction number two requires a residence be at least 1,200 square feet and prohibits basements. (3) Further under ordinary easement law, the owner of the dirt, under proper circumstances, can place a gate across the access. A gate could certainly be a structure. On their face, these restrictions and the restrictions in their entirety are simply inapplicable to the Lake Access.

The Court finds the restrictions relating to residential lots do not apply to the Lake Access lot. Instead, a reading of the restrictions makes apparent they are meant to maintain certain standards with regard to the appearance of residences. For instance, restrictions regarding appearance include "no trailer, tent, shack or temporary structure" and that "[a]ll rubbish, garbage and trash shall be kept in closed cans ... behind the house". See Restriction Number 5. The general scheme and specific language of the restrictions suggests they are related to the residential lots in the development. Thus, the restrictions simply do not apply to the Lake Access.

Furthermore, even if the Court found an ambiguity in the language and application of the restrictions, the Court would find existing case law compels a finding that the construction of the restrictions should be resolved in favor of the free use of the land. This would result in a finding that the restrictions do not apply to the Lake Access.

The Court has also considered the application of the February 1999 Confirmatory Amendment to the Restrictions as well as the January 2013 waiver of any restrictions relevant to the Lake Access.

Current South Carolina law allows modification of restrictions if five factors are met. *AJG Holdings LLC v. Dunn*, 706 S.E.2d 23, 391 S.C. 463 (Ct. App. 2011). These factors are (1) the right to amend the covenants must be unambiguously set forth in the original declaration of covenants; (2) the developer, at the time of the amended covenants, must possess a sufficient property interest in the development; (3) the developer must strictly comply with the amendment procedure as set forth in the declaration of covenants; (4) the developer must provide notice of amended covenants in strict accordance with the declaration of covenants and as otherwise may be provided by law; and (5) the amended or new covenants must not be unreasonable, indefinite, or contravene public policy. *Id.*

The Court has considered the February 1999 Confirmatory Amendment to the Restrictions as well as the January 2013 waiver of any restrictions relevant to the Lake Access, but does not believe Defendants' case relies on either of these documents as they merely confirm the original purpose and plain meaning of the parcel shown on the 1983 subdivision plat—that the restrictions were imposed on the numbered lots and not the area marked "Lake Access".

2. *Easements are limited to reasonable use.*

Plaintiffs argue that they have an unrestricted and unfettered right to use every inch of the Lake Access, essentially asking that the Lake Access be treated as a common area. Defendants argue the use and scope of the easement must be reasonably necessary and convenient to provide access to the lake, and as little burdensome to the Defendants' estate as possible.

General principles related to easements say the "use of an easement claimed must be confined strictly to the purposes for which it was granted". 25 Am.Jur.2d *Easements* § 82. "Where the grant of an easement such as a way does not definitely locate it, a reasonable and convenient way for all parties is thereby implied, in view of all the circumstances. The location

of an undefined right of way must be reasonable to both the dominant and servient estates, considering the condition of the place, the purpose for which it was intended, and the acts of the grantee." 25 Am.Jur.2d, *Easements* § 64. "It is often said that the parties are to be presumed to have contemplated such a scope for the created easement as would reasonably serve the purposes of the grant." 3 Powell, Real Property at 34-140. "When the easement has been created only by a reference in the conveyance to a map ..., the scope of the intended easement rests on inference from the circumstances." 3 Powell, Real Property at 34-140.

"Ordinarily, a grant or reservation of a right of way 'over' a particular area, strip, or parcel of ground is *not* to be construed as providing for a way as broad as the ground referred to." 25 Am.Jur.2d, *Easements* § 77 (emphasis added). *See also Andersen v. Edwards*, 625 P.2d 282, 286 (Alaska, 1981) ("To sustain (a) contention (that an easement grants the right to use any and all of a strip of land), the plaintiff must point to language in the deed which clearly and definitely fixes the width of the right of way."); *Barton's Motel, Inc. v. Saymore Trophy Co.*, 113 N.H. 333, 306 A.2d 774, 775 (N.H.1973) ("A grant or reservation of a right of way 'over' a particular area, strip, or parcel of ground is not ordinarily to be construed as providing for a way as broad as the ground referred to.").

Finally, "Where language in a plat reflecting an easement is capable of more than one construction, that construction which least restricts the property will be adopted." *Tupper v. Dorchester County*, 326 S.C. 318, 326, 487 S.E.2d 187, 191 (1997). Furthermore, the state Supreme Court has said in reference to the restriction of use or property and creation of an easement "that in the interpretation of maps and plats intention will not be inferred from symbols of uncertain meaning". *Hamilton v. CCM, Inc.*, 274 S.C. 152, 157, 263 S.E.2d 378, 380 (1980).

Additionally, an easement is limited to a use which is reasonably necessary and convenient *and as little burdensome to the servient estate as possible*. See generally *Hill v. Carolina Power & Light Co.*, 204 S.C. 83, 28 S.E.2d 545 (1943) (emphasis added). In *Clemson University v. First Provident Corp.*, 260 S.C. 640, 651, 197 S.E.2d 914, 919 (1973), the state Supreme Court said, “the rights of the easement owner and of the landowner are not absolute, irrelative, and uncontrolled, but are so limited, each by the other, *that there may be a due and reasonable enjoyment of both the easement and the servient tenement*. The owner of an easement is said to have all rights incident or necessary to its proper enjoyment, but nothing more.” (emphasis added).

The Court finds the Defendants’ arguments are persuasive. First, the plat designates the property as a “Lake Access” and not as a park or common area. “Access” has been defined as “[a]n opportunity or ability to enter, approach, pass to and from, or communicate with.” See Black’s Law Dictionary 14 (8th ed., 2004).¹ If this definition of “access” is modified by “lake”, then the only permissible interpretation can be that the easement allows someone to enter into, approach, or pass to and from the lake. The clear intent of the words “Lake Access” has to be to provide a way of ingress and egress to the lake through the property. This interpretation is the least restrictive and burdensome reading of the easement. This interpretation also preserves Plaintiffs’ access to the lake, which is consistent with the plain meaning of the plat.

Second, the request for unfettered access to each and every inch of the Lake Access ignores the property rights of Defendants Smith and Bell as well as established case law that states an easement’s scope is to be limited to that which is reasonably necessary and as little burdensome as possible. The Court finds an interpretation of this easement as granting to the

¹ “Access easement” is also defined as “An easement allowing one or more persons to travel across another’s land to get to a nearby location, such as a road.” Black’s Law Dictionary 548 (8th ed., 2004).

Plaintiffs a right to use the 15 foot driveway to access Lake Murray by foot or to put a boat into the water serves the purpose of providing the Plaintiffs with lake access. The Court finds the intent as found in the plain language of the grant on the plat is to provide "lake access." This finding combined with case law calling for the least restrictive construction of an easement compels a finding that the Lake Access only grants reasonable access to and from Lake Murray.

The Plaintiffs' request for unrestricted and unfettered access to every inch of the Lake Access at any time, would transform the lot from a lake access easement into a common area. This argument is not supported by the factual evidence, an analysis of the restrictions nor, the plat or case law which requires an easement to be limited to a use which is reasonably necessary and convenient and as little burdensome to the servient estate as possible. *See generally Hill v. Carolina Power & Light Co.*, 204 S.C. 83, 28 S.E.2d 545 (1943).

Hill v. Beach Co., 279 S.C. 313, 306 S.E.2d 604 (1984), involved an easement to access the beach through private property. There, the Supreme Court upheld the provision of pathways across private land to the beach. Similarly, here the Court finds the Plaintiffs have the right to enter from the street and use the driveway to the boat ramp on the Lake Access as a pathway to and from Lake Murray.

3. *No Fiduciary Duty Exists or Has Been Breached.*

The Plaintiffs argue some of the Defendants breached a fiduciary duty owed to the Plaintiffs when they sold the Lake Access to Defendants Smith and Bell rather than either retaining the property or conveying it to a homeowner's association.

As to breach of a fiduciary duty, the Court is cognizant of a growing body of case law that discusses a developer's fiduciary duty to residents of a subdivision. *See e.g. Concerned Dunes West Residents, Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.*, 562 S.E.2d 633, 349 S.C. 251 (2002);

Goddard v. Fairways Dev. Gen. Partn., 310 S.C. 408, 426 S.E.2d 828 (Ct. App. 1993). However, the facts of this case are distinguishable from this developing case law. First, there is no homeowner's association in the case and no evidence the original grantors accepted responsibility to create a homeowner's association. Second, there is no persuasive evidence that the original grantors ever agreed to convey the Lake Access lot to a homeowner's association. Furthermore, conveying the Lake Access to a homeowner's association would be redundant as the developer had conveyed to various lot owners an easement over the Lake Access. Finally, it is widely recognized that the servient estate holder can convey the servient estate. This Court does not believe exercising the right to convey the underlying estate qualifies as a breach of a fiduciary duty under the facts present in this case.

4. *Fraud*

Plaintiffs also argue the Defendant Grantors committed fraud in either the original conveyance of the Plaintiff's residential lots, the 1999 modification of the restrictions, or the conveyance of the Lake Access.

The Court finds the no persuasive evidence evidencing any indication of fraud nor even an agreement, or promise to convey the Lake Access to any future homeowner's group. The Court also finds the 1999 modification to the restrictions was consistent with the intent of the original restrictions and merely clarified the original intention. Finally, the Court finds the Defendant Grantors had a right to convey the Lake Access and that nothing in that action constituted a fraud against the Plaintiffs.

5. *Equities of the Case.*

Plaintiffs argue the equities of the transfer of the property support a finding that they

should have unfettered and unrestricted access to every inch of the Lake Access. However, based on the evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds the existing structures do not obstruct or interfere with lake access. The Court also finds the Defendants have not tried to stop access to the lake and that any testimony of an obstruction was one that was related to either temporary construction activity or normal temporary activity (such as putting a boat in the water).

Plaintiffs have also not plead nor proven by any other equitable theory, such as adverse possession or equitable use, an entitlement to the use of the Lake Access beyond that addressed above as allowed under the easement. While there may have been discussions and a general desire by some of the Plaintiffs to form a homeowner's association, obtain title to the property and create a common area, those plans simply did not come to fruition. Instead, the evidence shows the property was advertised for sale and that the Plaintiffs did not take any affirmative steps to form a homeowner's association or purchase the property.

6. Nuisance or Diminution in Property Value.

Plaintiffs chief complaint appears to be one for nuisance or diminution in property value as a result of Defendants Smith and Bell's use of the property. While Plaintiff property owners are qualified to give an opinion on the value of their property, the only testimony regarding diminution of value was related to the bathhouse.

The Court finds Plaintiff's testimony unpersuasive. Plaintiffs testified that they simply believed that the outhouse/ bathhouse on a back lot lake access lot was not in character for their type of subdivision, and therefore, stated that their lots had been diminished in the range of \$10,000 to \$25,000.00. These witnesses admitted the downturn in the economy could have impacted their property's value, and presented no other basis for this testimony nor offered

comparable sales/conditions/ examples or expert testimony. Certain witnesses admitted on cross-examination that the Lake Access lot was now better maintained.

Defendant Smith testified that he had expended about \$100,000 as he (1) hauled off truck loads of debris from the lot (2) had hauled in approximately 20 loads of dirt (3) erected the gazebo (4) built a fire pit (5) made dock improvements (6) added concrete to and improved boat ramp (7) fixed sewer line problems (8) built the outhouse/bathhouse to permit specifications equivalent to a four bathroom house.

He testified, without objection, that he had recently obtained an equity line loan and the appraised value of his property had actually increased approximately \$15,000.00.

The greater weight of the evidence established that the Lake Access has been generally improved since acquisition by Defendants Smith and Bell. The property has been cleared of debris, septic lines have been repaired, and structures well built.

Conversion of Lake Access into a Common Area.

Plaintiffs have alternatively asked the Court for an order stating the structures on the Lake Access may remain so long as the Plaintiffs have access and use of the structures. Essentially, they ask the Court to equitably convert the Defendants' improvements into a joint ownership (Plaintiff Post Trial Memo Page 13 "Clearly the only effective relief on this issue is issuing a mandatory injunction and a finding which allows all Plaintiffs to use and enjoy the entire Lake Access Lot (including its improvements should the Court not order all of them removed as intended by the original grantor.) While this remedy is requested, the court notes that Plaintiff's Post Trial Memo Page 12 D. Common Areas/Common Elements, Plaintiff candidly admits that there was no Master HOA deed and no indication on plat that Lake Access lot was intended to be a common area.

The law regarding easements makes clear that use of the property by the servient estate holder that does not conflict with the purpose of the easement is allowed. "The right to use the land remains in the servient owners, without any express reservations to that effect, so far as such right does not conflict with the purpose and character of the easement." 25 Am.Jur.2d, *Easements* § 86. Additionally, "the servient owner may cultivate or make improvements on the land subject to an easement of way, or use the way for any purpose, provided he does not interfere with the right of passage resting in the owner of the easement." 25 Am.Jur.2d, *Easements* § 86. See also 25 Am.Jur.2d, *Easements* § 87 ("the grant [of an easement] is not interfered with by building over the way, provided there is no interference with reasonable use of the easement as a passageway.")


The Court rejects the Plaintiffs' request because the Plaintiffs' use of the easement is limited to a use which is reasonably necessary and convenient and as little burdensome to the servient estate as possible. The Court finds the structures do not interfere with the Plaintiffs' reasonable and convenient use of the Lake Access for access to Lake Murray and, in fact, the improvements to the boat ramp may aid in the Plaintiffs' use of the easement. The Court finds the Plaintiffs' suggestion is unwarranted and certainly not equitable.

CONCLUSION

Defendants' structures, as they exist, do not obstruct lake access. Therefore, all claims related to easement obstruction are denied, as are all other claims by the Plaintiffs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

November 22, 2013



The Hon. James O. Spence
Lexington County Master-in-Equity



TMS 001635-03-009

Lake Access Lot

Printed: Jul 24, 2013



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