

**THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS**

RECEIVED
JUN 25 2026
SC Court of Appeals

THE STATE,
Respondent,

v.

RUSSELL LEWIS WALKER,
Appellant.

APPELLATE CASE NO. 2024-000643

PETITION FOR REHEARING PURSUANT TO RULE 221(a), SCACR

Russell Lewis Walker
714 Spearhead Court
North Augusta, SC 29860
(803) 293-0558
Appellant, Pro Se

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

RECEIVED
JUN 25 2026
SC Court of Appeals

THE STATE,
Respondent,

v.

RUSSELL LEWIS WALKER,
Appellant.

APPELLATE CASE NO. 2024-000643

PETITION FOR REHEARING PURSUANT TO RULE 221(a), SCACR

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Appellant Russell Lewis Walker appears pro se. On June 10, 2026, this Court dismissed the appeal after Anders review and granted appellate counsel's motion to be relieved. State v. Walker, Op. No. 2026-UP-292 (S.C. Ct. App. filed June 10, 2026). Appellant is now without counsel and exercises his right to self-representation in filing this petition for rehearing.

The South Carolina Supreme Court has recognized that it "may, in its discretion, allow an appellant to proceed pro se in an appeal from a criminal conviction." State v. Roberts, Order dated June 3, 2005 (S.C. Sup. Ct.). Unlike Roberts, this is not a capital case, counsel has already been relieved pursuant to Anders, and Appellant raises jurisdictional defects that cannot be waived and may be raised at any time. See State v. Glover, 294 S.C. 210, 212, 363 S.E.2d 406, 407 (Ct. App. 1987).

Moreover, Rule 221(a), SCACR, permits any party to petition for rehearing. The South Carolina Pro Se Litigant Guide provides that "an individual person not admitted to practice law in South Carolina may represent himself." Appellant represents himself alone; he invokes no counsel because counsel has been relieved.

Under *Faretta v. California*, 422 U.S. 806, 814 (1975), a criminal defendant has "a correlative right to dispense with a lawyer's help." While *Faretta* addressed trial-stage self-representation, its reasoning supports Appellant's standing to file this petition now that counsel has been discharged. Appellant does not argue that he has a constitutional right to hybrid representation or to control the appeal while counsel was still appointed; he argues only that once counsel was relieved, he has the right — and the necessity — to raise jurisdictional defects on his own behalf.

This petition is timely filed within fifteen (15) days of the June 10, 2026 opinion, in compliance with Rule 221(a), SCACR.

I. POINTS OF LAW OVERLOOKED

Pursuant to Rule 221(a), SCACR, Appellant states with particularity the points of law this Court overlooked in its June 10, 2026 unpublished opinion:

1. *State v. Funderburk*, 259 S.C. 256, 259, 191 S.E.2d 520, 521 (1972), holds that "lack of jurisdiction of the cause or subject matter renders the indictment a nullity" and that a judgment entered without jurisdiction is void ab initio.

2. *State v. Porcher*, 273 S.C. 502, 504, 257 S.E.2d 720, 721 (1979), holds that the circuit court acquires subject-matter jurisdiction over a criminal case only through a valid indictment, and that where no indictment exists, the circuit court lacks jurisdiction and any resulting judgment is void ab initio.

3. *State v. Glover*, 294 S.C. 210, 212, 363 S.E.2d 406, 407 (Ct. App. 1987), and *Ex parte McLeod*, 410 S.C. 17, 25, 763 S.E.2d 321, 325 (2014), hold that subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived — not by consent, not by guilty plea, not by failing to raise it below — and may be raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal.

4. *Knuckles v. State*, Op. No. 3438 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Jan. 23, 2002), held a conviction void where the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, applying the three-part test from *Carter v. State*, 329 S.C. 355, 362, 495 S.E.2d 773, 777 (1998): the circuit court has jurisdiction only if "(1) there has been an indictment which sufficiently states the offense; (2) there has been a waiver of indictment; or (3) the charge is a lesser included offense of the crime charged in the indictment."

5. S.C. Code § 22-5-320 provides in mandatory terms: "the case shall not be transmitted to the court of general sessions or submitted to the grand jury until the preliminary hearing shall have been had, the magistrate to retain jurisdiction and the court of general sessions not to acquire jurisdiction until after such hearing." (Emphasis added.) The preliminary hearing demanded on July 21, 2021, was never held.

This Court's June 10, 2026, unpublished opinion dismissed the appeal after Anders review but did not address these jurisdictional defects. A jurisdictional defect is non-frivolous by definition — the court either had jurisdiction or it did not. The trial judge's own words, memorialized in the certified transcript, establish the absence of jurisdiction. This Court's failure to address that issue constitutes an overlooked point of law warranting rehearing.

6. Under *Anders v. California*, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), this Court is required to conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether any non-frivolous issues exist for appeal. Because subject-matter jurisdiction is a fundamental prerequisite for any valid criminal judgment, the failure to address these non-waivable jurisdictional defects means the appeal cannot be deemed "wholly frivolous." The Court's June 10, 2026, opinion does not resolve whether the Court of General Sessions ever acquired jurisdiction; therefore, the matter must be reheard to determine whether the judgment is void ab initio.

This Court's June 10, 2026, unpublished opinion dismissed the appeal after Anders review but did not address these jurisdictional defects. A jurisdictional defect is non-frivolous by definition — the court either had jurisdiction or it did not. The trial judge's own words, memorialized in the certified transcript, establish the absence of jurisdiction. This Court's failure to address that issue constitutes an overlooked point of law warranting rehearing.

II. FACTS ESTABLISHED BY THE RECORD ON APPEAL

The certified transcript in the Record on Appeal establishes the following undisputed facts. Each is drawn from the trial judge's own words or the words of counsel memorialized on the record.

A. Defense Counsel Raised a Formal Jurisdictional Challenge

During the April 9, 2024, pretrial hearing, the court itself identified the pending motion: "And how about a motion to dismiss based on the lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the state's failure to conduct a preliminary hearing?" (Record on Appeal, Transcript of April 9, 2024, at 10:15–17.) Counsel argued the motion under S.C. Code § 22-5-320, explaining that "the circuit court does not acquire jurisdiction until that preliminary hearing." (Tr. at 12:12–18.) Counsel expressly cited the statute: "that statute pretty much clearly says that, you know, until — if a preliminary hearing's requested, the circuit court does not acquire jurisdiction until that preliminary hearing." (Tr. at 12:12–18.)

The preliminary hearing had been requested on July 21, 2021 — the day after arrest — but was never held. (Tr. at 10:17–25, 11:1–25.) Defense counsel documented the magistrate court record confirming the demand. (Tr. at 11:17–25, 12:1–8.)

B. The Circuit Court Acknowledged the Absence of an Indictment

During argument on that motion, Judge McCaslin stated: "This case has not been indicted and we've got it on the trial docket?" (Tr. at 11:8–10.) The State confirmed that new indictments had been "prepared" but had not yet been presented to the grand jury. (Tr. at 11:10–14.) The trial judge thus acknowledged on the record, on April 9, 2024, that no valid indictment existed.

C. The Circuit Court Denied the Jurisdictional Motion

The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. (Tr. at 13:19–20: "I'm going to deny that motion. Let's move on.")

D. The Circuit Court Declared Jurisdiction "Doesn't Matter"

When the jurisdictional argument was renewed during the bond revocation hearing later the same day, counsel stated: "Just my concern is we're in court today on a case that isn't indicted yet."

Judge McCaslin responded:

"I — I'm going to tell you, Mr. Chiarenza, it doesn't matter whether he's indicted or not. This is the problem. He was given a bond and he contacted the victim in violation of the bond. I'm revoking it, period. It's simple." (Tr. at 24:1–12.)

E. The Bond Revocation and Arrest

After the pretrial hearing concluded and Walker had departed the courthouse, the State approached the bench ex parte and reported an alleged bond violation. (Tr. at 20:5–14.) Judge McCaslin ordered: "Let's pick him up and bring him — let's do a bench warrant on him. No, I'm going to do an order to pick him up." (Tr. at 20:15–17.) Walker was subsequently arrested without a warrant and transported to the McCormick County Detention Center.

F. The Guilty Plea — April 10, 2024

On April 10, 2024, while Walker was incarcerated at the McCormick County Detention Center solely because of the bond revocation ordered on April 9, Judge McCaslin conducted a plea colloquy. The court acknowledged on the record:

"Your indictment has not been presented to the grand jury. You going to waive presentment?" (Tr. at 28:22–29:2.)

Walker responded: "Yes, ma'am." The same exchange occurred for the resisting arrest charge. (Tr. at 29:16–19.) Walker pled guilty to Assault and Battery 2nd Degree (2024-GS-19-00052, 3 years suspended to 268 days time served plus 1 year probation) and Resisting Arrest (2024-GS-19-00053, 268 days time served).

G. The Inconsistencies and Factual Impossibilities Regarding the Indictments

The Record on Appeal contains two indictments. The Resisting Arrest indictment (2024-GS-19-00053) purports to have been presented at 'Edgefield County General Sessions, convened on April 8, 2024'—one day before the pretrial hearing (Record on Appeal at 43). However, this is a demonstrable factual impossibility, as no Grand Jury was convened in Edgefield County on that date. See Exhibit A, 11th Judicial Circuit Court Terms - April 2024, available at:

<https://www.sccourts.org/terms-of-court/circuit-and-family-court/?circuit=11&term=2024-04>.

Furthermore, the Assault and Battery 2nd Degree sentence sheet (2024-GS-19-00052) relies on a 'Waiver of Presentment' purportedly executed on April 10, 2024, while Appellant was incarcerated in the McCormick County Detention Center, making his physical presence before the Clerk of Court in Edgefield County impossible. These facially invalid and factually impossible documents in the record demonstrate that the jurisdictional basis for the proceedings was never properly established, yet this issue was entirely overlooked in the Court's Anders review."

III. ARGUMENT

A. The Circuit Court Lacked Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

The South Carolina Supreme Court has consistently held that subject-matter jurisdiction in a criminal case derives from a valid indictment. Funderburk, 259 S.C. at 259; Porcher, 273 S.C. at

504. As the Court of Appeals explained in *Knuckles*, the three recognized paths are: "(1) there has been an indictment which sufficiently states the offense; (2) there has been a waiver of indictment; or (3) the charge is a lesser included offense of the crime charged in the indictment." *Carter*, 329 S.C. at 362, 495 S.E.2d at 777.

On April 9, 2024, the circuit court acknowledged that no indictment existed for the AB 2nd charge. The State confirmed new indictments had been "prepared" but not presented. The court nonetheless asserted jurisdiction, with the trial judge declaring "it doesn't matter whether he's indicted or not." (Tr. at 24:1–12.) Under *Funderburk* and *Porcher*, the court never acquired subject-matter jurisdiction. Every subsequent proceeding — including the bond revocation, the arrest, the detention, and the plea — is void ab initio.

B. S.C. Code § 22-5-320 Operated as an Independent Jurisdictional Bar

The preliminary hearing demanded on July 21, 2021, was never held. S.C. Code § 22-5-320 states in mandatory terms: "the case shall not be transmitted to the court of general sessions or submitted to the grand jury until the preliminary hearing shall have been had" and "the court of general sessions not to acquire jurisdiction until after such hearing." (Emphasis added.)

The Legislature deliberately chose the word "jurisdiction." The statute does not say the court "should defer" or "may postpone" proceedings — it says the court is "not to acquire jurisdiction." This is an absolute statutory bar. The preliminary hearing was not merely a procedural right that could be waived; it was a condition precedent to the circuit court ever acquiring jurisdiction in the first instance.

The State may argue that the right to a preliminary hearing is statutory, not constitutional, and therefore can be waived. But that argument conflates two distinct questions. Whether the right can be waived by a defendant who fails to demand it is one question; whether the circuit court can acquire jurisdiction when the hearing was timely demanded and never held is another. The statute answers the second question in explicit jurisdictional terms: the court "not to acquire jurisdiction." Where the Legislature has spoken in jurisdictional language, this Court must give effect to that language. See *State v. Funderburk*, 259 S.C. at 259 ("It is elementary that lack of jurisdiction of the cause or subject matter renders the indictment a nullity.").

C. The April 10 Waiver of Presentment Was Invalid

Appellant recognizes that *Carter v. State* identifies waiver of indictment as one of three paths to circuit court jurisdiction. The State will argue that Walker's April 10 waiver of presentment satisfies this path. That argument fails for two independent reasons.

First: The waiver was obtained during unlawful detention. Walker was in the McCormick County Detention Center on April 10 solely because of the bond revocation ordered on April 9 — the very hearing where Judge McCaslin stated that jurisdiction "doesn't matter." The bond revocation order was itself an act of a court without jurisdiction, and is therefore void ab initio. Every action flowing from that void order — the arrest, the detention, and the plea — is tainted by the original jurisdictional defect.

A waiver of presentment, like a guilty plea, must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. *Brady v. United States*, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). A waiver extracted from a defendant held under unlawful custody — custody ordered by a court that acknowledged it had no indictment —

cannot satisfy this standard. Walker was in jail, facing the prospect of indefinite confinement on charges for which the court had no jurisdiction, when he "waived" presentment. The coercion inherent in that situation renders the waiver invalid.

Second: A waiver cannot retroactively confer jurisdiction where the statutory bar was never lifted. S.C. Code § 22-5-320 provides that the circuit court "not to acquire jurisdiction" until the preliminary hearing is held. That bar was never lifted. The court acted without jurisdiction on April 9 — revoking bond, ordering arrest, detaining Walker. Those are void acts that cannot be ratified or rehabilitated by a subsequent waiver. A void act "is not a mere irregularity; it is a nullity." McLeod, 410 S.C. at 25.

Moreover, the waiver itself was a product of the void proceedings. Walker would not have been in custody, facing the prospect of indefinite confinement, absent the April 9 bond revocation ordered without jurisdiction. A waiver that is the fruit of a void proceeding is itself void.

D. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Cannot Be Waived and May Be Raised at Any Time

The State may argue that Walker's guilty plea waived all defects. That proposition is correct as to non-jurisdictional defects but irrelevant here. Subject-matter jurisdiction is not waivable.

"Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived, even by consent of the parties, and should be taken notice of by this Court. It is well-settled that issues related to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal." Brown v. State, 343 S.C. 342, 346, 540 S.E.2d 846, 848-49 (2001).

"The action of a court, regarding a matter as to which it has no jurisdiction, is void." Funderburk, 259 S.C. at 261, 191 S.E.2d at 522.

This Court's Anders dismissal does not bar the present petition. Under *State v. Lyles*, Order dated Feb. 19, 2009 (S.C. Sup. Ct.), an Anders dismissal "is not a decision on the merits of the appeal, and thus does not finally adjudicate the substantive issues raised by the litigant." Walker is not procedurally barred from raising a jurisdictional defect that may be raised at any time.

E. This Court's Anders Review Overlooked Non-Frivolous Issues

Under *Anders v. California*, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), this Court must independently review the record for non-frivolous issues. A jurisdictional defect is non-frivolous by definition — the court either had jurisdiction or it did not. The trial judge's own words establish that the court acknowledged the absence of an indictment and the failure to hold the required preliminary hearing, yet proceeded to revoke bond, order arrest, detain Walker, and extract a guilty plea.

The June 10, 2026 dismissal opinion does not address the jurisdictional argument that Appellant raised in his pro se supplemental submission, which this Court accepted by Order dated April 24, 2026. That omission is the point of law this Court overlooked.

IV. ANTICIPATED STATE ARGUMENTS AND RESPONSES

To assist the Court and to preempt claims that this petition is procedurally barred, Appellant addresses the State's likely arguments below.

State argument: "The waiver of presentment on April 10, 2024, cured any jurisdictional defect under *Carter v. State*."

Response: The waiver was obtained during unlawful detention ordered by a court without jurisdiction. A waiver extracted under coercion is void. A waiver cannot retroactively confer jurisdiction where (a) the § 22-5-320 bar was never lifted, and (b) the court had already acted without jurisdiction by revoking bond and ordering arrest. Void acts cannot be ratified. *McLeod*, 410 S.C. at 25.

State argument: "The guilty plea waives all defects, including jurisdictional ones."

Response: This is a misstatement of South Carolina law. *Glover*, 294 S.C. at 212: "Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, not by consent, not by guilty plea, not by failing to raise it below, and may be raised at any time." *Brown*, 343 S.C. at 346 (same). The question is not whether Walker waived a right; the question is whether the court had jurisdiction to accept the plea in the first instance. It did not.

State argument: "Appellant cannot proceed pro se under *State v. Roberts*."

Response: The June 3, 2005 *Roberts* order declared that "We may, in our discretion, allow an appellant to proceed pro se in an appeal from a criminal conviction." The court declined to exercise that discretion in *Roberts* because (1) the request was untimely, (2) the case was capital, and (3) counsel had discretion over which non-frivolous issues to brief. None of those factors

applies here. This petition is timely. This is not a capital case. Counsel has been relieved. Walker raises jurisdictional defects that cannot be waived.

State argument: "This claim belongs in PCR, not on direct appeal."

Response: Subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, in any court, including for the first time on direct appeal. *Brown*, 343 S.C. at 346. PCR is the appropriate vehicle for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, newly discovered evidence, or other non-jurisdictional defects. It is not the exclusive vehicle for claims that the court never had jurisdiction in the first place. A void conviction "is no conviction at all" and can be challenged at any time in any forum. *McLeod*, 410 S.C. at 25.

State argument: "§ 22-5-320 creates only a statutory right, not a jurisdictional prerequisite."

Response: The statute uses the word "jurisdiction" — deliberately and repeatedly. "The court of general sessions not to acquire jurisdiction until after such hearing." The Legislature knows how to distinguish between procedural rights and jurisdictional prerequisites. When the text says "jurisdiction," it means jurisdiction. See *Funderburk*, 259 S.C. at 259 (treating statutory prerequisites to indictment as jurisdictional). The preliminary hearing is the mechanism by which the magistrate court determines probable cause before the case proceeds. Bypassing that mechanism means any subsequent indictment — and any waiver — rests on a foundation that the Legislature declared inadequate to confer jurisdiction.

F. The Federal District Court's Recognition

On June 15, 2026 — five days after this Court's dismissal — the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina issued an Opinion and Order in *Walker v. McCaslin*, No. 6:25-cv-12442-JDA (D.S.C. June 15, 2026) (Doc. 39), vacating a prior Heck dismissal. The federal court found: (a) that Walker had adequately alleged false arrest and false imprisonment without probable cause; (b) that "the Court has no basis at this stage of the case to conclude that there is any overlap between the basis for Plaintiff's arrest on April 9, 2024, and the facts comprising the charge to which he subsequently pled guilty" (Doc. 39 at 13); and (c) that Judge McCaslin's alleged actions may have been taken "outside the context of any judicial proceeding" (id. at 13).


While the federal ruling concerns § 1983 claims and does not directly adjudicate the validity of the state conviction, it independently corroborates the central premise of this petition: that the April 9, 2024, proceedings may have been conducted without lawful jurisdiction. **This Court should not be the last to recognize what the federal court has already acknowledged.**

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court: (1) grant rehearing pursuant to Rule 221(a), SCACR; (2) find that the Circuit Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the proceedings conducted on April 9–10, 2024; (3) vacate the conviction as void ab initio; and (4) dismiss the underlying charges because the Circuit Court never acquired jurisdiction to hear them.

Respectfully submitted,

June 25, 2026



Russell Lewis Walker

714 Spearhead Court

North Augusta, SC 29860

(803) 293-0558

Appellant, Pro Se

RECEIVED
JUN 25 2026
SC Court of Appeals

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on June 25, 2026, I caused a true copy of the foregoing **PETITION FOR REHEARING PURSUANT TO RULE 221(a), SCACR** (Appellate Case No. 2024-000643), with Exhibit A (11th Judicial Circuit Court Terms - April 2024), to be served by electronic mail upon:

Clerk of Court

South Carolina Court of Appeals

coafilings@sccourts.org

The Honorable Jenny Abbott Kitchings, Clerk

South Carolina Court of Appeals

jkitchings@sccourts.org

Mark Reynolds Farthing, Esquire

Office of the Attorney General


mfarthing@scag.gov

and by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on:

Mark Reynolds Farthing, Esquire
Office of the Attorney General
P.O. Box 11549
Columbia, SC 29211
Attorney for Respondent

and by hand-delivery to:

The Office of The Clerk of Court
The Honorable Jenny Abbott Kitchings, Clerk
South Carolina Court of Appeals
1220 Senate Street
Columbia, SC 29201

A handwritten signature in blue ink, reading "Russell L. Walker". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Russell" and last name "Walker" clearly legible.

Russell Lewis Walker

June 25, 2026

Terms of Circuit and Family Court

Exhibit A

Circuit 11

April 2024

04/01/2024	04/08/2024	04/15/2024	04/22/2024	04/29/2024
Common Pleas/Common Pleas Nonjury Lexington 04-01-2024-04-05-2024 Keesley, William P. <u>No CR Needed</u> 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 General Sessions Lexington 04-01-2024-04-05-2024 McCaslin, Debra R. <u>Harris</u> 1 <u>Spires</u> 2, 3, 4, 5 Common Pleas Non-Jury 04-03-2024-04-03-2024 Keesley, William P. <u>WebEx</u> 3	General Sessions McCormick 04-08-2024-04-12-2024 McCaslin, Debra R. <u>Jones, DCRP</u> 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 Common Pleas Non-Jury 04-08-2024-04-12-2024 Young, Roger M., Sr. <u>WebEx</u> 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 Common Pleas/Common Pleas Nonjury Lexington 04-08-2024-04-12-2024 McLeod, Walton J., IV <u>No CR Needed</u> 8, 9 <u>Grice, DCRP</u> 10, 11 am <u>Grice, DCRP</u> 12 am General Sessions Non-Jury 04-10-2024-04-10-2024 McCaslin, Debra R. <u>Jones, DCRP</u> 10	General Sessions Non-Jury 04-15-2024-04-19-2024 Coble, Daniel <u>Reed</u> 15 <u>Amick</u> 16 <u>No CR Needed</u> 17 <u>Provost</u> 18 <u>Amick</u> 19 Common Pleas/Common Pleas Nonjury Lexington 04-15-2024-04-15-2024 Keesley, William P. <u>No CR Needed</u> 15, 16, 17 <u>Jones, DCRP</u> 18 <u>WebEx</u> 19 General Sessions Lexington 04-15-2024-04-19-2024 McCaslin, Debra R. <u>Johnson</u> 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 Common Pleas/Common Pleas Nonjury Lexington 04-17-2024-04-19-2024 Keesley, William P. <u>No CR Needed</u> 17	Common Pleas Non-Jury 04-22-2024-04-26-2024 Keesley, William P. <u>WebEx</u> 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 General Sessions Edgefield 04-22-2024-04-26-2024 McCaslin, Debra R. <u>Jones, DCRP</u> 22, 23, 24 <u>Johnson, DCRP</u> 25 <u>Wright, DCRP</u> 26 am Common Pleas/Common Pleas Nonjury McCormick 04-22-2024-04-26-2024 McLeod, Walton J., IV <u>Hoskins, DCRP</u> 22 <u>Amick</u> 23 <u>Hoskins, DCRP</u> 24, 25, 26 Common Pleas Non-Jury/PCR 04-26-2024-04-26-2024 Curtis, Kristi F. <u>Smith</u> 26 am	Common Pleas Non-Jury 05-02-2024-05-02-2024 McLeod, Walton J., IV <u>Amick</u> 2 General Sessions Non-Jury 05-02-2024-05-02-2024 McLeod, Walton J., IV <u>Amick</u> 2 Common Pleas Non-Jury 05-02-2024-05-02-2024 Keesley, William P. <u>WebEx</u> 2

	Common Pleas Non-Jury 04-12-2024-04-12-2024 Keesley, William P. No CR Needed 12	Jones, DCRP 18 WebEx 19 Common Pleas Non-Jury 04-19-2024-04-19-2024 Keesley, William P. WebEx 19		
Family Court Lexington 04-01-2024-04-05-2024 Newton, Robert E. Szoke 1 Carter 2, 3 Szoke 4, 5 Family Court Edgefield, McCormick, Saluda 04-01-2024-04-05-2024 Seigler, W. Greg Kaiser 1, 2, 3 Jones, DCRP 4, 5 Family Court Lexington 04-01-2024-04-05-2024 Crouch, Huntley S. Derrick 1, 2 McBride 3 Kaiser 4, 5	Family Court Lexington 04-08-2024-04-12-2024 Martin, Daniel E., Jr. Amick 8 am, 9 am No CR Needed 10 Amick 11, 12 Family Court Lexington 04-08-2024-04-12-2024 Zimmerman, Mindy W. WebEx 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 Family Court Lexington 04-08-2024-04-12-2024 Seigler, W. Greg Perry 8 Perry 9, 10, 11, 12	Family Court Lexington 04-15-2024-04-15-2024 Newton, Robert E. Kaiser 15 Family Court McCormick 04-15-2024-04-15-2024 Newton, Robert E. Kaiser 15 Family Court Saluda 04-16-2024-04-16-2024 Crouch, Huntley S. Derrick 16 Family Court Lexington 04-16-2024-04-16-2024 Crouch, Huntley S. Derrick 16 Family Court Lexington 04-17-2024-04-17-2024 Seigler, W. Greg No CR Needed 17	Family Court Lexington 04-22-2024-04-26-2024 Newton, Robert E. Kaiser 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 Family Court Lexington 04-22-2024-04-26-2024 Seigler, W. Greg Johnson 22, 23, 24 am No CR Needed 25 Johnson 26 Family Court Lexington 04-22-2024-04-26-2024 Crouch, Huntley S. Derrick 22, 23, 24, 25, 26	Family Court Edgefield, McCormick, Saluda 04-29-2024-05-03-2024 Seigler, W. Greg Kaiser 29, 30, 1, 2 No CR Needed 3 Family Court Lexington 04-29-2024-05-03-2024 Newton, Robert E. Derrick 29, 30, 1, 2, 3 Family Court Lexington 04-29-2024-05-03-2024 Crouch, Huntley S. Johnson 29, 30, 1, 2, 3

PETITION FOR REHEARING PURSUANT TO RULE 221(a), SCACR (Appellate Case No. 2024-000643), with Exhibit A (11th Judicial Circuit Court Terms - April 2024)

From: Doc (harley74rlw@yahoo.com)
To: agwilson@scag.gov
Cc: harley74rlw@yahoo.com
Bcc: slwwingate@gmail.com; lfsmba@aol.com
Date: Thursday, June 25, 2026 at 12:55 PM EDT

The Honorable Allen Wilson,

Attached please find the **PETITION FOR REHEARING PURSUANT TO RULE 221(a), SCACR** (Appellate Case No. 2024-000643), with Exhibit A (11th Judicial Circuit Court Terms - April 2024)

Attached Filename:
2026_06_25_Petition For Rehearing 2024-000643.pdf
PDF 4.7 MB

Russell Lewis Walker
Appellant
714 Spearhead Court
North Augusta, SC 29860
(803) 293 - 0558

Timely served on this 25th day of June 2026



2026_06_25_Petition For Rehearing 2024-000643_150.pdf
4.7 MB

Russell Lewis Walker - Petition For Rehearing - Appellate Case No. 2024-000643 with Attachment

From: Doc (harley74rlw@yahoo.com)
To: coafilings@sccourts.org
Cc: mfarthing@scag.gov; jkitchingssc@sccourts.org; harley74rlw@yahoo.com
Bcc: slwwingate@gmail.com; lfsmba@aol.com
Date: Thursday, June 25, 2026 at 01:01 PM EDT

Dear Ms. Kitchings,

Attached please find the Petition For Rehearing - Appellate Case No. 2024-000643 with Attachment of Appellant in the above referenced case, as well as the email proof of service to the Attorney General.

Attached Filename:
2026_06_25_Petition For Rehearing 2024-000643.pdf
PDF 4.7 MB

Russell Lewis Walker
Appellant
714 Spearhead Court
North Augusta, SC 29860
(803) 293 - 0558

Timely served on this 25th day of June 2026



2026_06_25_Petition For Rehearing 2024-000643_150 - email proof of service.pdf
121 KB



2026_06_25_Petition For Rehearing 2024-000643_150.pdf
4.7 MB

Russell L. Walker
714 Spearhead Ct.
North Augusta, SC 29860

Mark Reynolds Farthing, Esquire
Office of the Attorney General
P.O. Box 11549
Columbia, SC 29211