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SC Court of Appeals

**THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE SUPREME COURT**

Appeal from Dorchester County
Court of Common Pleas

Heath P. Taylor, Circuit Court Judge

Case No. 2022-CP-18-01775

Court of Appeals Case No. 2024-000914
Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-042 (S.C. Ct. App. filed February 4, 2026)

Supreme Court Case No. 2026-001307

Kevin White,
as Personal Representative of the Estate of Mary Brisbon,

Respondent,

v.

St. George Health Care, LLC, d/b/a St. George Healthcare Center and
Vicki Sides,

Petitioners.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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CERTIFICATION OF COUNSEL

By and through their undersigned counsel, pursuant to Rule 242(d)(1), SCACR, Defendants¹ certify that the Court of Appeals decided this matter via opinion filed February 4, 2026 (the “Subject Opinion”), affirming the circuit court’s denial of Defendants’ motions to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s² claims; that Defendants timely petitioned the Court of Appeals for rehearing; and that the Court of Appeals has finally ruled on Defendants’ petition for rehearing, which it denied by order filed May 15, 2026.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

- I. Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the circuit court’s denial of the Motions to Compel Arbitration?**
 - A. Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the circuit court on the basis that the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement did not merge?**
 - B. Did the Court of Appeals err in not reaching Defendants’ remaining arguments, including especially, but not limited to, the equitable estoppel argument?**
 - C. Had the Court of Appeals reached Defendants’ remaining arguments, including especially, but not limited to, the equitable estoppel argument, as, respectfully, it should have, should the Court of Appeals have found that the circuit court erred in not finding Plaintiff equitably estopped to deny the enforceability of the Arbitration Agreement and that it (the circuit court) should have granted the Motions to Compel Arbitration?**

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

With Mr. White’s help, Ms. Brisbon was admitted as a resident of the Facility on April 24, 2019. (R. pp. 107-118.) Mr. White handled the paperwork in conjunction with the

¹ “Defendants” refers to Defendants/Appellants, St. George Healthcare, LLC d/b/a St. George Healthcare Center (the “Facility”) and Vicki Sides (“Sides”), collectively. The Facility is a skilled nursing facility.

² “Plaintiff” refers to Kevin White (“Mr. White”), as Personal Representative of the Estate of Mary Brisbon (“Ms. Brisbon”).

admission, and in so doing, he signed an Admission Agreement³ and an Arbitration Agreement⁴ on Ms. Brisbon's behalf.

Plaintiff filed this wrongful death and survival action in the Dorchester County Court of Common Pleas on November 18, 2022, based on allegedly deficient care/treatment Ms. Brisbon received at the Facility. (R. pp. 7-16.) Defendants timely answered on March 20, 2023, denying liability, raising numerous affirmative defenses, and reserving the right to compel arbitration, which they also raised as an affirmative defense. (R. pp. 17-30.)

Also on March 20, 2023, Defendants moved to compel Plaintiff's claims to arbitration based on the Arbitration Agreement Mr. White signed on behalf of Ms. Brisbon in conjunction with her admission to the Facility (the "Motions to Compel Arbitration"). (R. pp. 60-127.)^{5 6}

Following a hearing on October 23, 2023,⁷ the circuit court, the Honorable Heath P. Taylor presiding, denied the Motions to Compel Arbitration by order filed November 2, 2023. (R. pp. 1-3.) Pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCRCF, on Monday, November 13, 2023, Defendants

³ (R. pp. 107-118.)

⁴ (R. p. 63.)

⁵ Without question, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants are within the scope of the Arbitration Agreement, the plain language of which calls for arbitration of "any controversy or dispute between the parties arising out of or relating to [the] Facility's Admission Agreement, or breach thereof, or relating in any way to [Ms. Brisbon's] stay at [the] Facility, or to the provisions of care or services to [Ms. Brisbon]" (R. p. 63.) But even if there were "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues[,] [they] should be resolved in favor of arbitration" *Towles v. United HealthCare Corp.*, 338 S.C. 29, 41, 524 S.E.2d 839, 846 (Ct. App. 1999); *see also Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs.*, 346 S.C. 580, 597, 553 S.E.2d 110, 118 (2001) ("[U]nless the court can say with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible to an interpretation that covers the dispute, arbitration should be ordered.").

⁶ There is also no question that the Arbitration Agreement covers both the Facility and Sides. The Arbitration Agreement states, "It is the intention of the parties to this Agreement to bind not only themselves, but also their successors, assignees, personal representatives, guardians, or any persons deriving their claims through or on behalf of Resident." (R. p. 63.) By its terms, the Arbitration Agreement is binding on the Facility's "agents, employees, and servants." (R. p. 63.) This includes Sides, whom Plaintiff sues as "the Administrator of the Facility." (R. p. 9 ¶ 3.)

⁷ (R. pp. 31-59.)

timely moved the circuit court to alter, amend, and/or reconsider its decision. (R. pp. 128-149.) The circuit court denied that motion by order filed May 2, 2024. (R. pp. 4-6.)

By notice served and filed Monday, June 3, 2024, this appeal timely followed. (R. pp. 162-168.) In due course, the appeal was briefed and made ready for decision and decided by the Court of Appeals without oral argument via the Subject Opinion, filed February 4, 2026.

As certified above, Defendants timely petitioned the Court of Appeals for rehearing, and the Court of Appeals denied rehearing by order filed May 15, 2026.

This petition for a writ of certiorari timely follows.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A circuit court's determination of whether a claim is subject to arbitration is reviewed de novo on appeal. *Gissel v. Hart*, 382 S.C. 235, 240, 676 S.E.2d 320, 323 (2009). This includes de novo review of the determination of whether an arbitration agreement is enforceable against a nonsignatory. *Wilson v. Willis*, 426 S.C. 326, 334, 827 S.E.2d 167, 172 (2019). "Under de novo review, a circuit court's factual findings will not be reversed on appeal if any evidence reasonably supports those findings." *Id.* Issues of law, however, are reviewed without any particular deference to the circuit court. *See, e.g., Duke Energy Corp. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue*, 415 S.C. 351, 782 S.E.2d 590 (2016). Even where a ruling is on a matter within circuit court's discretion, if the ruling is based on a misunderstanding of the law, rather than upon the exercise of discretion, the question presented on appeal is one of law. *See Bain v. Self Mem'l Hosp.*, 281 S.C. 138, 152, 314 S.E.2d 603, 611 (Ct. App. 1984).

ARGUMENT

I. The Court erred in affirming the circuit court’s denial of the Motions to Compel Arbitration.

A. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the circuit court on the basis that the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement did not merge.⁸

Defendants’ merger/equitable estoppel argument is a standalone argument that does not depend on any showing of authority (actual, apparent, or otherwise) on the part of Mr. White or otherwise on the existence of any per se valid and enforceable agreement between the parties. *See Wilson*, 426 S.C. at 338, 827 S.E.2d at 174 (observing that South Carolina has recognized numerous theories that can bind nonsignatories to arbitration agreements, including estoppel); *Coleman v. Mariner Health Care, Inc.*, 407 S.C. 346, 354–55, 755 S.E.2d 450, 455 (2014) (acknowledging the possibility of enforcing an arbitration agreement against a nonsignatory via merger and equitable estoppel); *id.* (explaining “Appellants’ equitable estoppel argument,” which “[wa]s premised on [Appellants’] contention that, under state law, the admission agreements and the [arbitration agreements] merged,” as follows: “Appellants contend that even if Sister lacked capacity to execute the [arbitration agreement] . . . , she is nevertheless *equitably estopped to deny the [arbitration agreement’s] enforceability.*”) (emphasis added).

Conceptually, the merger/equitable estoppel argument is not an argument for the *enforceability* of the Arbitration Agreement per se but rather for Plaintiff to be *estopped to deny the enforceability* of the Arbitration Agreement. In short, the idea is that the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement merged, and because Ms. Brisbon effectively embraced and directly benefitted from the Admission Agreement, Ms. Brisbon, and, therefore,

⁸ (Subject Opinion (“[W]e hold the circuit court did not err in denying Appellants’ motions to compel arbitration because the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement did not merge.”).)

Plaintiff, who stands in Ms. Brisbon's shoes, is estopped to deny the enforceability of the Arbitration Agreement merged therewith. Accordingly, any lack of authority on the part of Mr. White is beside the point and unavailing to refute the merger/equitable estoppel argument, which, again, turns not on the question of whether the Arbitration Agreement is enforceable *per se* but whether Ms. Brisbon, and, in turn, Plaintiff, should be estopped to deny that the Arbitration Agreement is enforceable—and, most respectfully, the answer is yes.

In *Coleman*, even though this Court found against merger on the particular *facts* of the case, it nonetheless confirmed the validity of the general proposition of *law* on which the *Coleman* appellants based their merger/equitable estoppel argument:

Appellants contend that even if Sister lacked capacity to execute the [arbitration agreement] under the [Adult Health Care Consent] Act, she is nevertheless equitably estopped to deny the [arbitration agreement's] enforceability. The circuit court held there was no estoppel here, and we agree.

Appellants' equitable estoppel argument is premised on their contention that, under state law, the admission agreements and the [arbitration agreements] merged. In South Carolina,

The general rule is that, in the absence of anything indicating a contrary intention, where instruments are executed at the same time, by the same parties, for the same purpose, and in the course of the same transaction, the courts will consider and construe the documents together. The theory is that the instruments are effectively one instrument or contract.

Klutts Resort Realty, Inc. v. Down 'Round Dev. Corp., 268 S.C. 80, 88, 232 S.E.2d 20, 24 (1977).

Here, *the documents were executed at the same time, by the same parties, for the same purposes, and in the course of the same transaction. Unless there is a contrary intention, appellants are correct that there was a merger.*

407 S.C. at 354–355, 755 S.E.2d at 455 (emphasis added).

Here, like the circuit court, the Court of Appeals erred in rejecting the merger argument, failing to recognize material differences between the facts and arguments involved in the instant case and those that controlled (or were simply not addressed in) *Coleman* and its progeny *Thompson v. Pruitt Corp.*, 416 S.C. 43, 784 S.E.2d 679 (Ct. App. 2016), *Hodge v. UniHealth Post-Acute Care of Bamberg, LLC*, 422 S.C. 544, 813 S.E.2d 292 (Ct. App. 2018), and *Solesbee v. Fundamental Clinical and Operational Services, LLC*, 438 S.C. 638, 885 S.E. 2d 144 (Ct. App. 2023), concluding:

Here, as in *Solesbee*⁹ and *Hodge*¹⁰, (1) the two agreements were governed by different bodies of law because the Admission Agreement was governed by state law and the Arbitration Agreement was governed by federal law; (2) each document was separately labeled, numbered, and contained its own signature page; (3) the Arbitration Agreement recognized the two documents were separate, stating the Arbitration Agreement “shall survive any termination or breach of this Agreement or the Admission Agreement”; and (4) the Facility acknowledged that signing the Arbitration Agreement was not a prerequisite to admission to the Facility.

(Subject Opinion.)

⁹ In affirming the circuit court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration at issue in *Solesbee*, the *Solesbee* Court likened that case to *Coleman* and *Hodge* and found that the circuit court had correctly determined that there was no merger of the admission agreement and the arbitration agreement and, in turn, had properly denied the equitable estoppel argument. *Solesbee*, 438 S.C. at 649, 885 S.E.2d at 149 (“Thus, like the *Coleman* and *Hodge* courts, we find there was no merger in this case and [the Facility’s] equitable estoppel argument was properly denied.”).) While Defendants concede that the Arbitration Agreement and Admission Agreement in issue in the instant case are the same form documents as in *Solesbee*, most respectfully, as addressed below, the merger analysis in *Solesbee* is erroneous and incomplete and should not control the disposition of this case.

¹⁰ To be clear, as explained in Defendants’ prior briefing and herein, the admission agreement and arbitration agreement in *Hodge* were materially different from the instant Admission Agreement and Arbitration Agreement. Moreover, the plain language of *Hodge* makes clear that its finding against merger is based on its assessment of a multitude of particular factors taken together, 422 S.C. at 563, 813 S.E.2d at 302 (“Based on all of this, we find the Admissions Agreement and Arbitration Agreement did not merge.”) (emphasis added)), and does not support the view that any of the cited factors standing alone—without regard to their context or the impact of other factors—can support a reasonable, non-speculative finding against merger.

The Subject Opinion erroneously concludes that the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement are separate contracts that do not merge. The merger question examines whether, “where instruments are executed at the same time, by the same parties, for the same purpose, and in the course of the same transaction,”¹¹ as indeed the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement were here,¹² there is evidence to upset the *presumption in favor of merger*, i.e., the presumption that the instruments should be construed together as effectively one contract. This is a question of intention. *Id.* at 355, 755 S.E.2d at 455 (“in the absence of anything indicating a contrary *intention* . . .”) (emphasis added). And “in attempting to ascertain th[e] [parties’] intention,” our courts “endeavor to determine the situation of the parties, as well as their purposes, at the time the contract was entered into.” *Klutts*, 268 S.C. at 89, 232 S.E.2d at 25.

For the merger presumption to mean anything in practice, it cannot be upset based on mere conjecture, but only on actual evidence that—notwithstanding the concurrence of all the particular circumstances necessary for the presumption to even arise in the first place (same time, parties, purpose, and transaction)—can nonetheless support a reasonable, non-speculative inference that the parties’ intention was contrary to merger. *Cf. The Huffines Co., LLC v. Lockhart*, 365 S.C. 178, 188, 617 S.E.2d 125, 130 (Ct. App. 2005) (“[V]erdicts may not be permitted to rest upon surmise, conjecture, or speculation.”). No such inference can be drawn

¹¹ *Coleman*, 407 S.C. at 355, 755 S.E.2d at 455.

¹² As the *Coleman* Court expressly observes regarding the admission and arbitration agreements before it (which in *this* respect—but not in respect of the material facts bearing on the question of whether the presumption of merger is rebutted—are no different from the instant agreements), “the documents were [indeed] executed at *the same time, by the same parties, for the same purposes, and in the course of the same transaction.*” 407 S.C. at 355, 755 S.E.2d at 455 (emphasis added).

here. Indeed, it does not even make sense that there would have been an intention contrary to merger of the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement.

Unlike the arbitration agreements at issue in *Coleman*, *Hodge*, and *Thompson*, all of which provided that they could be disclaimed or revoked within 30 days of their signing (while the corresponding admission agreements contained no such provision), the instant Arbitration Agreement has no such disclaimer/revocation provision. (*See* R. p. 63.) Moreover, while the instant Admission Agreement does contain an “Entire Agreement” clause, it does not reference the Arbitration Agreement as a separate contract. (R. p. 118.) Indeed, directly contradicting the idea of “separatedness” (in the parlance of the *Coleman* Court¹³), the “Entire Agreement” clause in the instant Admission Agreement expressly states that “other Admissions materials” are part of the Admission Agreement, thereby expressly contemplating the lack of its own supposed “separatedness.” (R. p. 118.) And without question, the Arbitration Agreement is among these other Admissions materials. *See Stott v. White Oak Manor, Inc.*, 426 S.C. 568, 571–72, 828 S.E.2d 82, 84 (Ct. App. 2019) (“The same day as Decedent’s admission to White Oak, Stott, acting as Decedent’s authorized representative, signed White Oak’s *admission documentation—including the Arbitration Agreement.*”) (emphasis added) (internal footnote omitted); *Hodge*, 422 S.C. at 550, 813 S.E.2d at 295 (“Her husband . . . executed various documents *related to her admission*, including an *Arbitration Agreement* and an *Admission Agreement.*”) (emphasis added)).¹⁴

¹³ 407 S.C. at 356, 755 S.E.2d at 455 (explaining how, in *Coleman*—unlike the instant case—the “Entire Agreement” clause expressly referred to a separate arbitration agreement and, thus, “recognize[d] the ‘*separatedness*’ of the [arbitration agreement] and the admission agreement, not a merger of the two contracts.”) (emphasis added).

¹⁴ To be clear, the point here is not that the holding of either *Stott* or *Hodge* established a legal standard for what counts as admission paperwork, but rather that the very fact that the language that the *Stott* and *Hodge* Courts used in discussing the facts of the cases so

Like the *Solesbee* Court (and, for that matter, the *Hodge* Court, even though, again, different admission and arbitration agreements were at issue in *Hodge*), the Court of Appeals erred in finding against merger on the basis that the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement were governed by different bodies of law “because the Admission Agreement was governed by state law and the Arbitration Agreement was governed by federal law.” (Subject Opinion.)

As an initial matter, the Court of Appeals’ assertion about state law governing one instrument (the Admission Agreement) while federal law governs the other (the Arbitration Agreement) is simply incorrect. Regarding governing law, the Admission Agreement states, “This Agreement will be governed by and construed in accordance with applicable Federal regulations and those laws of the State in which the Facility is located.” (R. p. 116.) And the Arbitration Agreement states:

The parties acknowledge and agree that, because the services and reimbursement thereof effects a transaction that involves interstate commerce, the enforcement of this Arbitration Agreement is not subject to the South Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act and shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (Title 9 of the United States Code), notwithstanding any contrary provision of this Agreement or contrary state law.

readily made the natural and logical connection between arbitration agreements signed in conjunction with admission and “admission documentation” / “documents related to . . . admission” that it illustrates that, in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense, “Admissions materials” includes the Arbitration Agreement. *See Beaufort Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. United Nat’l Ins. Co.*, 392 S.C. 506, 516, 709 S.E.2d 85, 90 (Ct. App. 2011) (“If the contract’s language is clear and unambiguous, the language alone, understood in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense, determines the contract’s force and effect.”). Moreover, this connection between the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement (with the Arbitration Agreement being understood in the plain, ordinary, and popular sense as included in the term “Admissions materials”) is underscored by the *Coleman* Court’s recognition that an admission agreement and arbitration agreement signed in conjunction with resident’s admission to a nursing facility are indeed “executed at the same time, by the same parties, *for the same purposes, and in the course of the same transaction.*” 407 S.C. at 355, 755 S.E.2d at 455 (emphasis added).

(R. p. 63.) Accordingly, the provisions of the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement regarding governing law are not to the effect that state law governs one instrument and federal law the other, but rather that South Carolina law applies to both except where displaced by federal law.

Moreover, the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (the “FAA”), applies to the Arbitration Agreement, as it does to “to any arbitration agreement regarding a transaction that in fact involves interstate commerce, regardless of whether or not the parties contemplated an interstate transaction.” *Munoz v. Green Tree Fin. Corp.*, 343 S.C. 531, 538, 542 S.E.2d 360, 363 (2001); *see also Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson*, 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995) (holding that the reach of the FAA extends to the broadest permissible exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause); *Allied-Bruce*, 513 U.S. at 273–77 (explaining that, unless the parties specifically contract otherwise, the FAA applies whenever an arbitration agreement involves interstate commerce). And this Court has expressly held that skilled nursing facility admission agreements implicate interstate commerce and, thus, the FAA. *Dean v. Heritage Healthcare of Ridgeway, LLC*, 408 S.C. 371, 381–82, 759 S.E.2d 727, 732–33 (2014).

The rule that the FAA applies whenever an arbitration agreement involves interstate commerce of course applies even where an arbitration clause is included in a single instrument that is otherwise governed by South Carolina law. *See Southland Corp. v. Keating*, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984) (The FAA “create[d] a body of federal substantive law,” which is “applicable in state and federal courts.”); *Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna*, 546 U.S. 440, 445–46 (2006) (“[A]s a matter of substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration provision is severable from the remainder of the contract.”); *see also Allied-Bruce*, 513 U.S. 265, 270–77. Moreover, even under the FAA, the general state law of contracts continues to apply. *Allied-Bruce*, 513 U.S. at

281 (“States may regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general contract law principles and they may invalidate an arbitration clause ‘upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’ What States may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause. The Act makes any such state policy unlawful, for that kind of policy would place arbitration clauses on an unequal ‘footing,’ directly contrary to the Act’s language and Congress’ intent.”) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Further still, the Arbitration Agreement expressly calls for the arbitration proceedings to be conducted pursuant to the South Carolina ADR Rules. (R. p. 63.)

Again, essentially, the provisions of the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement regarding governing law are to the effect that South Carolina law applies to both except where displaced by federal law, and indeed, even if the Arbitration Agreement had been included as a provision within the Admission Agreement itself, the FAA would still apply separately to the Arbitration Agreement. In other words, any difference between the governing law as to the Arbitration Agreement and the governing law as to the Admission Agreement would still exist even if the Arbitration Agreement had been included as a provision within the Admission Agreement itself. Thus, the supposed difference in the governing law cannot support any reasonable inference of an intent contrary to merger.

Like the *Hodge* and *Solesbee* Courts, the Court of Appeals erred in finding against merger on the basis that “each document was separately labeled, numbered, and contained its own signature page.” (Subject Opinion.) The fact that the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement have their own titles, are separately paginated, and are separately signed provides no reasonable inference of an intent contrary to merger. Respectfully, to point to such

things is really to do no more than to point out that the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement are separate instruments, a fact which does not actually suggest anything probative about the intent of the contracting parties as to whether they should be construed together. Indeed, the question of merger will not arise in the first place unless there are multiple instruments involved. Obviously, it cannot be the case that the mere existence of the necessary factual predicate for the question of merger to arise, i.e., separate instruments, shows an intention contrary to merger. The very nature of *merger* is to *merge* separate documents.

Like the *Solesbee* Court (and, for that matter, the *Hodge* Court, even though, again, different admission and arbitration agreements were at issue in *Hodge*), the Court of Appeals erred in finding against merger on the basis that “the Arbitration Agreement recognized the two documents were separate, stating the Arbitration Agreement ‘shall survive any termination or breach of this Agreement or the Admission Agreement.’” (Subject Opinion.) Unlike in *Hodge*, and, for that matter, *Coleman*, and unaddressed by the *Solesbee* Court, the supposed textual recognition of the Admission Agreement as being separate from the Arbitration Agreement is not included in the “Entire Agreement” provision. Rather, the “Entire Agreement” provision of the Admission Agreement expressly states, “other Admissions materials . . . are made a part of this Agreement by reference.” (R. p. 118.) And again, the Arbitration Agreement was signed in conjunction with Ms. Brisbon’s admission and is clearly among these “other Admissions materials.” Moreover, that the Arbitration Agreement “shall survive any termination or breach of this Agreement or the Admission Agreement” just means that any claims relating to/arising out of the Admission Agreement would still have to be arbitrated even if they are not asserted until after termination of the Admission Agreement. In other words, the Arbitration Agreement is still connected to the Admission Agreement even after the termination of the Admission

Agreement. This is simply how arbitration agreements work—and would be the same *even were the agreement to arbitrate in the form of a clause included within a single instrument*—so this cannot logically provide probative evidence of an intent contrary to merger. *See Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips*, 39 F. Supp. 2d 582, 612–13 (D.S.C. 1998) (“Under South Carolina arbitration law, the duty to arbitrate under an arbitration clause in a contract survives termination of the contract.”).

Like the *Hodge* and *Solesbee* Courts, the Court of Appeals erred in finding against merger on the basis of the voluntariness of the Arbitration Agreement, i.e., in relying on the fact “that signing the Arbitration Agreement was not a prerequisite to admission to the Facility”¹⁵ as evidence of intention contrary to merger. To be sure, the Arbitration Agreement was indeed optional, i.e., agreeing to arbitration is not required to gain admission to the Facility. But all that this means is that it did not have to be agreed to for Ms. Brisbon to be admitted, i.e., the Arbitration Agreement did not have to be executed at all. It does not mean that the Arbitration Agreement did not become a part of the admissions materials once it was in fact executed. Indeed, the fact that the Arbitration Agreement was not required for admission underscores its *connectedness* to the Admission Agreement. The two go together hand in glove. Without the hand (the Admission Agreement), there is no reason for the glove (the Arbitration Agreement).

While it is true that the Arbitration Agreement is not necessary to the Admission Agreement, the converse is not true: the Admission Agreement *is* necessary to the Arbitration Agreement. That is, the Admission Agreement *could* have stood on its own, i.e., without the Arbitration Agreement ever having been executed, in which case no question of merger would have even arisen to begin with—but that is not what happened. The Arbitration Agreement was

¹⁵ (Subject Opinion.)

in fact executed, and it was executed under the particular circumstances that give rise to the presumption of merger—same time, parties, purpose, and transaction—but unlike the Admission Agreement, which is capable of making sense either standing alone or together with the Arbitration Agreement, *the Arbitration Agreement only makes sense together with the Admission Agreement*, which is its (the Arbitration Agreement’s) sole reason for being. (See R. p. 63 (providing for arbitration of “any controversy or dispute between the parties arising out of or relating to Facility’s Admission Agreement, or breach thereof, or relating in any way to Resident’s stay at Facility, or to the provisions of care or services to Resident”); *id.* (“This [Arbitration] Agreement shall remain in effect for all care rendered at Facility”).)

Even though the Arbitration Agreement was not a *condition* of admission, it was agreed to in *conjunction* with admission, whereupon it was intended to be considered and construed together with the Admission Agreement, such that the two were effectively one instrument governing various interrelated aspects of Ms. Brisbon’s relationship with the Facility: the Admission Agreement setting forth the terms of her admission, the Arbitration Agreement providing for arbitration of disputes arising out of her admission. (Compare R. pp. 107-118 (setting forth the terms of Ms. Brisbon’s admission to the Facility) with p. 63 (providing for arbitration of disputes arising out of Ms. Brisbon’s admission to the Facility).)

And to be clear—besides the fact that there is no ambiguity in regard to the merger of the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement—to fall back on any notion that any ambiguity in this regard must be construed against the Facility as the drafter makes no sense in this context. It must be remembered that *merger is the default position*, i.e., it is presumed, and that this presumption arises only upon the occurrence of a specific set of circumstances, those being, as stated in the above-quoted passage from *Coleman*, where, as here, the instruments are

executed at the same time, by the same parties, for the same purpose, and in the course of the same transaction. When all these align—same time, same parties, same purpose, same transaction—our courts will consider and construe the documents together *unless* there is evidence of a contrary intention.

The plain language of the rule endorsed in *Coleman* is to the effect that to upset the merger presumption requires evidence “indicating [(i.e., affirmatively showing)] a contrary intention.” 407 S.C. at 355, 755 S.E.2d at 455. While it is true that the *Coleman* Court also cited the rule that ambiguity is construed against the drafter,¹⁶ (a) it did so in dicta¹⁷ and (b) it never addressed the logical inconsistency—which thus remains fair game as an argument in this case¹⁸—in recognizing a rule of law creating a presumption in favor of merger (i.e., in recognizing the occurrence of a set of circumstances (same time, parties, purpose, and transaction) as sufficiently probative to affirmatively tip the scales in favor of merger) while at the same time allowing that presumption to be completely overturned by evidence that is merely ambiguous, i.e., that does not even go so far as to clearly indicate a contrary intention and, indeed, is actually still susceptible to a reasonable conclusion in favor of merger. *See S.C. Dep’t of Natural Resources v. Town of McClellanville*, 345 S.C. 617, 623, 550 S.E.2d 299, 302 (2001) (“A contract is ambiguous when the terms of the contract are *reasonably* susceptible of more than one interpretation.”) (emphasis added).

¹⁶ *Id.* at 407 S.C. at 355–56, 755 S.E.2d at 455.

¹⁷ *Id.* at 407 S.C. at 355–56, 755 S.E.2d at 455 (“By their own terms, the contracts between these parties indicated an intent that the common law doctrine of merger not apply. *Even if* the ‘Entirety’ clause creates an ambiguity as to merger, the law is clear that any ambiguity in such a clause is construed against the drafter, in this case, appellants.”) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted); *see Nash v. Tindall Corp.*, 375 S.C. 36, 40–41, 650 S.E.2d 81, 83 (Ct. App. 2007) (“Judicial dicta is not essential to the decision. Dicta . . . is a statement on a matter not necessarily involved in the case, and is not binding as authority.”) (internal citations and quotations marks omitted).

¹⁸ To be clear, none of *Coleman*’s progeny has addressed this either.

Respectfully, like the circuit court's, the Court of Appeals' finding against merger relies on speculation, not evidence from which a reliable conclusion can reasonably be drawn regarding the contracting parties' intent. It must be remembered that the presumption of merger arises only where the four elements of time, parties, purpose, and transaction coincide—as the all do here. *Coleman*, 407 S.C. at 354–355, 755 S.E.2d at 455. If one of these is lacking there is no merger. This is why, for the merger presumption to mean anything in practice, it cannot be upset based on mere conjecture, but only on actual evidence that—notwithstanding the concurrence of all the particular circumstances necessary for the presumption to even arise in the first place (same time, parties, purpose, and transaction)—can nonetheless support a reasonable, non-speculative inference that the parties' intention was contrary to merger. *Cf. Huffines*, 365 S.C. at 188, 617 S.E.2d at 130 (“[V]erdicts may not be permitted to rest upon surmise, conjecture, or speculation.”). The merger presumption is “earned,” so to speak, by the fact that for it even to arise in the first place there must be, as there is here, a concurrence of particular circumstances (same time, parties, purpose, and transaction). It is the very rarity of this concurrence that both safeguards against the overzealous application of the merger doctrine and justifies ascribing to it (the concurrence) the presumptive intent of merger.

Respectfully, like the circuit court, the Court of Appeals should have found that the Arbitration Agreement merged with the Admission Agreement. The instruments were executed at the same time, by the same parties, for the same purposes, and in the course of the same transaction, the whole of which related to Ms. Brisbon's admission to the Facility and would not have been done at all but for her admission to the Facility. Any finding against merger improperly relies on speculation, not evidence from which a reliable conclusion can reasonably be drawn regarding intent.

B. The Court of Appeals erred in not reaching Defendants’ remaining arguments, including especially, but not limited to, the equitable estoppel argument.

As explained in the Subject Opinion, the Court of Appeals did not reach Defendants’ remaining arguments, including especially, but not limited to, the equitable estoppel argument, because of its finding that the Arbitration Agreement and the Admission Agreement did not merge. (Subject Opinion (“[B]ecause we find the agreements did not merge—a controlling consideration in whether the Arbitration Agreement bound Mary Brisbon—we decline to reach Appellants’ remaining arguments.”).) Therefore, for the same reasons that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the circuit court’s finding that these instruments did not merge, it likewise erred in not reaching Defendants’ remaining arguments, including especially, but not limited to, the equitable estoppel argument.

C. Had it reached Defendants’ remaining arguments, including especially, but not limited to, the equitable estoppel argument, as, respectfully, it should have, the Court of Appeals should have found that the circuit court erred in not finding Plaintiff equitably estopped to deny the enforceability of the Arbitration Agreement and that it (the circuit court) should have granted the Motions to Compel Arbitration.

All of these issues/arguments are already addressed in Defendants’ briefs to the Court of Appeals, the entirety of which are adopted and incorporated herein by reference.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, along with any other or further reason(s) set forth in their appellate briefs already on file, the entirety of which they hereby adopt and incorporate herein by reference and reiterate/reassert in support hereof, Defendants ask this Honorable Court to grant the instant petition, reverse the Subject Opinion, and to decide this appeal anew via an opinion that reverses the denial of the Motion to Compel Arbitration and stays Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in favor of arbitration (or, alternatively, that remands this matter to the circuit court

with instructions that it grant the Motion to Compel Arbitration and stay Plaintiff's claims against Defendants in favor of arbitration, or, alternatively, that reverses the Court of Appeals on the issue of merger and remands the matter to the Court of Appeals to address the arguments that it did not reach previously to determine whether the circuit court's denial of the Motion to Compel Arbitration should be reversed).

Respectfully submitted,
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July 6, 2026

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SC Court of Appeals

**THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE SUPREME COURT**

Appeal from Dorchester County
Court of Common Pleas

Heath P. Taylor, Circuit Court Judge

Case No. 2022-CP-18-01775

Court of Appeals Case No. 2024-000914
Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-042 (S.C. Ct. App. filed February 4, 2026)

Supreme Court Case No. 2026-001307

Kevin White,
as Personal Representative of the Estate of Mary Brisbon,

Respondent,

v.

St. George Health Care, LLC, d/b/a St. George Healthcare Center and
Vicki Sides,

Petitioners.

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I, Russell G. Hines, of Clement Rivers, LLP, attorneys for Petitioners, hereby certify that Petitioners' **PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI** was served on Respondent on July 6, 2026, by emailing (see attached email) a copy of the same to Respondent's counsel of record:

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July 6, 2026

Hines, Russell

From: Hines, Russell
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To: lcope@parkerlawgroupsc.com; jayparker@parkerlawgroupsc.com; 'Margie Matthews' (Margie@brightmatthewslaw.com)
Cc: Brown, Stephen L.; Davis, Jay; Riddle, Matthew; Phillips, Ashton; Beach, Sarah; Justman, Aimee
Subject: White (Sup. Ct. 26-001307; 24-000914) -- Cert Petition
Attachments: White (Sup. Ct. 26-001307; 24-000914) -- Cert Petition.pdf

Attached for service in the above-referenced matter please find our **Petition for a Writ of Certiorari**.

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