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S.C. SUPREME COURT

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In the Supreme Court

APPEAL FROM LEXINGTON COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas

Walton J. McLeod, Circuit Court Judge
Case No. 2020-CP-32-01941

Opinion No. 2026-UP-089 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Feb. 25, 2026)

Appellate Case No. 2026-001342

Joseph R. Dawson, Jr., Appellant

v.

Heather Pounds, Individually, as Agent under Power of Attorney, and as Personal Representative
of the Estate of Jane Rollins Dawson, Respondent.

RETURN IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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COUNTER QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1.

Did the Court of Appeals correctly determine that the circuit court did not err in upholding the validity of the Operative Will because even if the contested witness's signature did not comply with the statutory requirements, the notary satisfied the conditions of a second witness by observing Decedent's execution of the Operative Will and thereafter signing it?

2.

If reached, does the minor witness issue justify reversal where the minor was competent to serve as a witness and the minor witness's inconsistent testimony combined with the circuit court's credibility determination was sufficient to support a finding that the minor witness's signature complied with the requirements of S.C. Code Section 62-2-502?

3.

Did the Court of Appeals correctly determine that the circuit court did not err in finding neither the Operative Will nor the addition of Respondent as joint owner of Decedent's bank account was the product of undue influence?

COUNTER STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Jane Dawson died on March 16, 2020. R. p. 87, lines 1-3. Her husband predeceased her. R. p. 87, lines 7-9. Jane had two children: John, who predeceased her, and Joseph, the Appellant ("Mr. Dawson"). R. p. 87, lines 13-19. Jane's son John was survived by three biological children and one step-daughter – Heather Pounds, the Respondent ("Mrs. Pounds"). R. p. 86, lines 21-25; R. p. 87, lines 18-21.

Mrs. Pounds's mother, Jennie Powell, began dating Jane's daughter John while Jennie was pregnant with Mrs. Pounds. R. p. 133, lines 11-17; R. p. 135, lines 18-19. Although Jennie and John did not marry until Mrs. Pounds was five years old, she always knew Jane as her grandmother

and lived with her as soon as two weeks after Mrs. Pounds's birth. R. p. 133, lines 16-18; R. p. 134, lines 6-9; R. p. 135, lines 20-22. Jennie and John subsequently had three children together, including Katelyn Jane Dawson ("Janie"), who testified at trial. R. p. 279, lines 4-18.

Janie described Mrs. Pounds and Jane as having a "great relationship" and loving each other very much. R. p. 280, lines 16-22. She stated that Mrs. Pounds would come over every day to sit and talk with Jane on the porch. R. p. 280, lines 18-10. Mrs. Pounds lived with Jane several times during her childhood, teenage years, and in adulthood. R. p. 133, line 24-p. 134, line 3. Most recently, Mrs. Pounds lived with Jane for two years after Jane told Mrs. Pounds to leave her first marriage. R. p. 134, lines 1-3. Mrs. Pounds was with Jane every day. R. p. 134, lines 3-4. Mrs. Pounds testified that Jane was her grandmother and her best friend. R. p. 86, lines 11-20.

At some point, Jane inherited bonds. R. p. 135, line 25-p. 136, line 4. With some of the bond money, she bought Mr. Dawson a house, a business, and trucks. R. p. 136, line 8-p. 137, line 7. However, she also had bonds remaining in a safe deposit box that she held with Mr. Dawson. R. p. 137, lines 10-17. Mrs. Pounds testified that Mr. Dawson added himself as co-owner of the bonds. R. p. 138, lines 7-25. According to Mrs. Pounds, the relationship between Jane and Mr. Dawson deteriorated over the bonds. R. p. 139, lines 3-20. Jane filed a police report on Mr. Dawson related to him taking the bonds. R. p. 146, line 24-p. 147, line 6. The last time Jane spoke to Mr. Dawson was a year and a half before Jane's death. R. p. 139, lines 10-12. Janie also testified that the relationship between Jane and Mr. Dawson was strained in the last couple of years before Jane's passing and that there was some disagreement between them about bonds. R. p. 280, line 23-p. 281, line 6.

In spring 2019, Jane fell in her driveway. R. p. 302, lines 14-17; R. p. 309, lines 18-25. A neighbor called Mrs. Pounds, who immediately took Jane to urgent care. R. p. 302, lines 14-16.

Mrs. Pounds tried to contact Mr. Dawson, but he did not respond. R. p. 302, lines 10-13. A few days after the fall, Jane's bruise looked terrible, and Mrs. Pounds sent Mr. Dawson a picture of the bruise. R. p. 302, lines 22-25. Mr. Dawson texted back a few days later and stated that he did not have time to deal with Jane. R. p. 303, lines 4-6.

Two weeks later, on or about April 11, 2019, Jane could not breathe and thought she was having a heart attack. R. p. 100, lines 18-25; R. p. 303, lines 7-10. Jane called Mrs. Pounds, who called an ambulance. R. p. 100, lines 10-13. Jane was transported to the hospital, where she learned she was having a panic attack. R. p. 101, lines 12-14. Jane was at the hospital for two hours and then went home. R. p. 101, lines 12-14. After this incident, Mrs. Pounds called Mr. Dawson, but he never responded. R. p. 303, lines 7-13. At trial, Mr. Dawson seemed to conflate the fall in the driveway with the panic attack. R. p. 243, line 25-p. 244, line 7.

On April 18, 2019, Jane executed a will (the "First Will") naming Mrs. Pounds as personal representative. R. pp. 379-82. The First Will was prepared online by Jane and her long-time best friend, Donna McLees, who was also the aunt of Mrs. Pounds. R. p. 142, line 12-p. 143, line 17. Ms. McLees showed Jane a will template and they talked about Jane's bequeathments. R. p. 273, lines 14-22. The First Will left all vehicles, real property, furniture, and other personal effects to Mrs. Pounds with handwritten instructions to Mrs. Pounds "to make available to any family member wanting any residue in my home." R. pp. 380-82. The First Will also includes handwriting stating, "[Mr. Dawson] has been assigned the bonds and beneficiary of a separate policy." R. p. 382.

On April 18, 2019, Jane also executed a general power of attorney and a health care power of attorney naming Mrs. Pounds as her agent. R. pp 369-75. Jane took those documents to the courthouse herself on May 1, 2019, and filed them. R. p. 103, lines 10-18. According to Mrs.

Pounds, Jane was afraid to go into a nursing home, and she wanted Mrs. Pounds to take care of her. R. p. 106, lines 13-16. Ms. McLees also testified that Jane was concerned about Mr. Dawson putting her in a nursing home, which is why Ms. McLees helped Jane execute the durable and medical powers of attorney. R. p. 272, line 19-p. 273, line 10. Jane executed the powers of attorney so that Mrs. Pounds could take care of Jane and pay her bills if something happened to Jane. R. p. 106, lines 17-24.

Janie testified that Mrs. Pounds did not pressure Jane to change her will, name Mrs. Pounds as power of attorney, or leave an inheritance to Mrs. Pounds. R. p. 281, lines 8-19. Janie stated that at some point prior to executing the power of attorney, Jane had asked Janie if she would be the power of attorney. R. p. 281, lines 11-14. Janie declined because she did not understand legal things, but agreed it was a good idea when Jane said that she might possibly make Mrs. Pounds the power of attorney. R. p. 281, lines 14-16.

On July 14, 2019, Jane executed a new will (the “Operative Will”). R. pp. 361-65. Mrs. Pounds was not present at Jane’s home when Jane signed the Operative Will, though Mrs. Pounds did arrange for the notary to be present. R. p. 113, line 25-p. 114, line 7. Consistent with the First Will, the Operative Will named Mrs. Pounds as personal representative and devised all real property, vehicles, and residue to Mrs. Pounds. R. pp. 362-63. The Operative Will also devised the bonds in Jane’s safety deposit box to Mrs. Pounds and further notes that if Mr. Dawson “still has the bonds that he took from my safety deposit box knowing that my yearly income depended on them, he gets nothing else of my estate.” R. p. 363. The Operative Will was witnessed by Victoria Brazell and Hampton Ellis and was notarized by Kimberly Nutta. R. pp. 364-65.

Mrs. Pounds understood Jane to be in great health other than her cardiomyopathy. R. p. 99, lines 16-22. Mrs. Pounds described Jane as being able to run circles around Mrs. Pounds and her

siblings. R. p. 99, lines 21-22. Mrs. Pounds did not pay bills for Jane, manage her affairs, or conduct any business with banks or financial institutions on her behalf; Jane managed her own money. R. p. 144, lines 5-18. Although Jane and Mrs. Pounds held a safety deposit box together, Mrs. Pounds never accessed it without Jane. R. p. 144, lines 19-24. Up until she died, Jane drove herself everywhere, prepared her own meals, and took care of her own finances. R. p. 156, lines 2-10.

Jane died in her sleep on March 16, 2020, when her heart stopped. R. p. 158, lines 4-19. The day after Jane died, Mrs. Pounds filed the Operative Will. R. p. 88, lines 7-9. Pursuant to the Operative Will, Mrs. Pounds was appointed as the personal representative of Jane's estate on March 26, 2020. R. p. 88, lines 17-22.

A bench trial in this case was held before the Honorable Walton J. McLeod on April 10-11, 2024. The court upheld the validity of the Operative Will and denied Mr. Dawson's motion to reconsider. R. pp. 1-14. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals held "the circuit court did not err in upholding the validity of the Will because even if the contested witness's signature did not comply with statutory requirements, the notary satisfied the conditions of a second witness by observing Decedent's execution of the Will and thereafter signing it." *See Dawson v. Pounds*, Op. No. 2026-UP-089 at 2 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Feb. 25, 2026). The Court of Appeals further found that Mr. Dawson failed to carry his burden of showing that Jane's agency was overcome through force or coercion and accordingly found that the Operative Will was not the product of undue influence. *Id.* at 2-3. The Court of Appeals did not address whether Mr. Ellis's signature complied with South Carolina's statutory requirements. *See id.* at 2.

ARGUMENT AGAINST CERTIORARI

1.

Petitioner's primary issue does not warrant certiorari review
because it is not outcome determinative.

Petitioner's principal contention is that this Court should determine whether a minor may serve as a witness to a will under South Carolina law. Even assuming that issue has not been directly addressed by a reported South Carolina appellate decision, it does not warrant review in this case because the Court of Appeals expressly held that the Operative Will remained valid even if Mr. Ellis's signature did not satisfy the statutory requirements. *See Dawson* at 2.

The Court of Appeals held that the notary satisfied the requirements of a second witness by observing the execution and the signing of the Operative Will. *Id.* As a result, Petitioner's proposed issue concerning Mr. Ellis's competency would not alter the outcome of the appeal even if decided entirely in Petitioner's favor.

The Supreme Court's discretionary certiorari jurisdiction is intended to resolve important legal questions, not to provide a third level of review whenever a litigant disagrees with the factual conclusions reached by both the circuit court and the Court of Appeals. There is no new legal question that has not already been resolved.

For that reason alone, the Petition does not present a special and important reason for certiorari review.

2.

The Petition presents no conflict in South Carolina law.

Petitioner identifies no conflict among decisions of this Court or the Court of Appeals. Nor does Petitioner identify any disagreement among lower courts requiring clarification by this Court.

The Court of Appeals simply applied settled principles governing will execution, self-proving wills, and undue influence to the specific facts presented in this case. Such fact-bound application of existing law does not ordinarily warrant certiorari review. *See* Rule 242(b), SCACR. For this reason, the Petition does not require the attention of the Supreme Court's review.

3.

The undue influence issue is fact-specific and does not present a certiorari-worthy question.

Petitioner's undue influence argument likewise presents no issue warranting further review. The circuit court recognized the existence of a fiduciary relationship and correctly applied the resulting presumption. The circuit court nevertheless concluded that Respondent rebutted the presumption and that Petitioner failed to establish the force or coercion necessary to invalidate either the Operative Will or the bank account designations.

The Court of Appeals resolved this matter through an unpublished opinion applying settled principles of probate law to the particular facts presented. The unpublished nature of the decision further demonstrates that the case does not present a novel or unsettled legal question requiring clarification by this Court.

Petitioner identifies no new legal rule, no conflict in authority, and no issue of statewide importance. Instead, he simply asks this Court to reweigh evidence regarding family relationships, witness credibility, powers of attorney, bank accounts, and alleged restrictions on communication. Such issues are uniquely factual and do not provide a basis for certiorari review.

ARGUMENT ON THE MERITS

1.

The Court of Appeals correctly determined that the circuit court did not err in upholding the validity of the Operative Will because even if the contested witness's signature did not comply with the statutory requirements, the notary satisfied the conditions of a second witness by observing Decedent's execution of the Operative Will and thereafter signing it.

Without addressing whether the minor witness's signature complied with South Carolina's statutory requirements for will execution, the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's finding that the Operative Will was valid under South Carolina law because it was signed by another witness and the notary.

Under South Carolina law, a valid will "shall be: (1) in writing; (2) signed by the testator . . . ; and (3) signed by at least two individuals each of whom witnessed either the signing or the testator's acknowledgment of the signature or of the will." S.C. Code Ann. § 62-2-502. As Mr. Dawson recognizes, the Probate Code allows a person who signs as a witness to a will to also serve as a notary. *See* Pet. for Writ of Certiorari at 12. In the present case, Plaintiff has not alleged any deficiency in the signatures of either the notary or the other witness on the Operative Will. Thus, the Operative Will meets South Carolina's execution requirements even without the signature of Mr. Ellis.

Additionally, even in the absence of Mr. Ellis' signature, the Operative Will is self-proving. The last page of the Will contains the statutory language required for self-proof. *See* R. p. 365; *see also* S.C. Code Ann. § 62-2-503. Pursuant to Section 62-2-503, a will is self-proved "upon the acknowledgement by the testator and the affidavit of at least one witness, each made before an officer authorized to administer oaths under the laws of the state where execution occurs." In other words, a will is self-proved through an instrument signed by the decedent, *one witness*, and a

notary. The plain language of the statute makes clear that only one witness is required for a will to be self-proved. Thus, the remaining witness and notary on the “Affidavit” page of the Operative Will are sufficient to render it self-proving.

While rebuttal of self-proof is contemplated by Section 62-3-406(1), Mr. Dawson has not rebutted the self-proving nature of the Operative Will. His argument to rebut the presumption focuses solely on issues related to Mr. Ellis. Given the Operative Will was self-proving even without Mr. Ellis as a witness and Mr. Dawson has raised no issues with the signatures of the other witness or the notary, Mr. Dawson has not rebutted the self-proving nature of the Operative Will. For these reasons, Mrs. Pounds was not required to produce the testimony of the notary or the other witness to establish the Operative Will’s validity.

As the Court of Appeals recognized, Mr. Dawson’s attempt to characterize the last page of the Operative Will as a separate document is unavailing. *See Dawson* at 2. The last page of the Operative Will, as introduced by Mr. Dawson’s counsel at trial, is signed by Jane, two witnesses, and a notary. *See R. p. 365*. A plain reading of the text makes clear that the document is a part of the Will. For example, the document provides, “I sign and execute *this instrument* as my Last Will.” *R. p. 365* (emphasis added). The document further provides, “[T]he Testatrix signs and executes *this instrument* as the Testatrix’s Last Will . . . and each of us . . . hereby signs *this* Last Will as witness to the Testatrix’s signing.” *R. p. 365* (emphasis added).

While the witnesses signed both the fourth and fifth pages of the Will, those duplicative signatures do not mean that the page entitled “Affidavit” was a separate document from the Will. The Will does not include page numbers and was prepared by a non-lawyer. Furthermore, it was not until this appeal that Mr. Dawson made the claim that the Operative Will, which his counsel introduced as a single document at trial, was only the first four pages of the document. Rather,

questioning at trial directly contradicts this contention. When questioning Mrs. Pounds, Mr. Dawson's counsel referred to "the last page of Exhibit 1, the will, . . . where it says, 'LegalContracts.com' at the bottom." R. p. 112, lines 11-12. The only page that says LegalContracts.com at the bottom is the page with the "Affidavit" title. Thus, the Operative Will includes the signatures of two witnesses – the second witness and the notary – aside from Mr. Ellis and continues to be self-proving even in the absence of Mr. Ellis' signature.

For the foregoing reasons, the Operative Will was validly executed as was properly held by the circuit court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

2.

Even if reached, the minor witness issue does not justify reversal.

Relevant Facts

Hampton Ellis ("Mr. Ellis"), Jane's next-door neighbor, was a witness to the Operative Will. R. pp. 361-65; R. p. 79, lines 18-19. At trial, he testified that he remembered going to Jane's home to sign documents. R. p. 80, line 24-p. 81, line 1. When presented with the Operative Will during trial, he confirmed that he recognized the document and identified it as the will of Jane Dawson. R. p. 81, lines 14-19. He also confirmed that his signature was on the document and that he recalled signing it. R. p. 82, lines 8-12. Mr. Ellis testified that he could not remember the events exactly but remembered being called over to Jane's house and being asked to sign the document. R. p. 82, lines 13-26. He recalled Jane and two other people he did not know being present at Jane's house. R. p. 82, lines 17-20. He stated that the people present at Jane's house gave him "a brief rundown of what [the document] was" and asked if he would sign it. R. p. 82, line 23-p. 83, line 1.

Although Mr. Ellis had just testified that he was given a “brief rundown” of the document, he next testified that he had “no clue” what he was signing, that he did not see Jane sign the document, that Jane did not acknowledge her signature to him, and that he did not remember if Jane spoke to him. R. p. 83, lines 2-10. However, he estimated that he was at Jane’s house for “[p]robably 10 to 15 minutes.” R. p. 83, lines 11-12. When asked whether the will he was shown was a complete copy that had not changed since he signed it in July 2019, he responded “yes.” R. p. 83, lines 13-16. When Mr. Dawson’s counsel asked how Mr. Ellis knew that it was a complete copy given that he had not signed any pages except the last, Mr. Ellis responded that the signature page was “the only page [he] really saw.” R. p. 83, lines 17-20. Mr. Dawson’s counsel then followed up with, “So you wouldn’t have seen pages 1 through 4?” to which Mr. Ellis responded that he did not read those pages on that day. R. p. 83, lines 22-23. The Operative Will, however, shows that Mr. Ellis signed both pages 4 and 5 of the document. R. pp. 364-65.

On cross-examination, Mr. Ellis testified that he recalled someone coming out and asking him to come over to Jane’s house, but he did not recall who made the request. R. p. 84, line 10-p. 85, line 2. Despite his earlier testimony regarding Jane being present, he testified that he did not remember if Jane was present. R. p. 84, lines 13-16. When asked whether Mrs. Pounds was present, he testified “I don’t remember exactly. I want to say she was, but I don’t remember. I don’t remember what happened that day very well at all because I didn’t know what was going on, to be honest.” R. p. 85, lines 5-9.

On June 10, 2024, in its final order following the bench trial held in April 2024, the circuit court upheld the validity of the Operative Will. R. pp. 4-5. In so holding, the circuit court noted that “Mr. Ellis testified he was given a brief synopsis of the paperwork and then asked to sign.” R. p. 4. The circuit court acknowledged that Mr. Ellis testified he did not witness Jane sign the

paperwork and noted that Mr. Ellis “could not recall whether [Jane] expressly indicated she had signed the paperwork.” R. p. 5. In holding that the Operative Will was valid, the circuit court relied on (1) the inability of Mr. Ellis being able to remember the details of the execution of the Operative Will as insufficient to invalidate the Operative Will and (2) proper notarization of the Operative Will establishing the presumption of its validity. R. p. 5. The circuit court indicated that Mr. Ellis “did not testify that [Jane] failed to acknowledge her signature of the will, but instead stated he could not recall.” R. p. 5.

In his motion for reconsideration filed June 20, 2024, Mr. Dawson argued that the circuit court incorrectly recollected Mr. Ellis’s testimony regarding acknowledgement of the Operative Will. R. p. 55. Mr. Dawson argued that Mr. Ellis testified that he did not witness Jane sign the Operative Will and that her signature was not acknowledged to him. R. p. 55. Counsel for Mr. Dawson indicated that he had ordered the transcript of Mr. Ellis’s testimony and would further amend or modify the motion to reconsider as necessary upon receipt of the transcript. R. p. 55, n.1.

On July 23, 2024, Mrs. Pounds filed her response to the motion for reconsideration along with a motion for expedited ruling. Mrs. Pounds argued that Mr. Ellis was competent to serve as a witness despite being a minor, that the Operative Will was executed in compliance with statutory requirements, and that, even if Mr. Ellis were not a competent witness, the notary who signed the Operative Will could serve as the second witness. R. pp. 66-67. In her motion for expedited ruling, Mrs. Pounds argued that in light of the validity of the Operative Will even without Mr. Ellis’ signature, the circuit court could rule on the motion for reconsideration without waiting for the transcript. R. pp. 60-61.

Mr. Dawson did not respond to the motion for expedited ruling or file a reply in support of his motion for reconsideration. There is no indication other than a footnote in the motion for

reconsideration that his counsel ever requested the trial transcript. Nevertheless, the circuit court waited to issue its order denying the motion for reconsideration until September 23, 2024, noting the lack of any response by Mr. Dawson to the July 23rd filings. R. p. 12.

On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to reach the question of whether Mr. Ellis's signature complied with South Carolina's statutory requirements. *See Dawson v. Pounds*, Op. No. 2026-UP-089 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Feb. 25, 2026). Instead, the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's conclusion that the Operative Will was valid in the notary serving as the second witness to the Operative Will's execution. *Dawson* at 2.

Discussion

A. Mr. Ellis was competent to be a witness to the Operative Will.

Mr. Dawson argues that Mr. Ellis was not competent to witness the Operative Will because (1) he was a minor and (2) he did not know what he was signing.

First, although Mr. Ellis was fifteen years old at the time he signed the Operative Will, his age did not render him incompetent to serve as a witness. While there is no South Carolina law directly addressing the question of whether a minor can serve as witness to a will under the Probate Code, Section 62-2-502(3) does not require witnesses to be a particular age. Rather, the language used in the statute – “signed by at least two *individuals*” – is broad enough to permit witnesses to be minors. *See* S.C. Code Ann. § 62-2-502(3) (emphasis added). Mr. Dawson's reliance on the Probate Code's prohibition on minors making wills does not reasonably lead to the conclusion that Mr. Ellis did not have the capacity to serve as a witness to Operative Will. Rather, the legislature included language prohibiting minors from making wills but did not include that same language regarding witnesses. The plain language of the statute, therefore, leads to the conclusion that the capacity required to execute a will is different from the capacity required to witness a will. In light

of the statutory language, Rule 601 of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence should be used to determine Mr. Ellis's competency. Under that Rule, "children are presumed to be competent unless it is shown otherwise." Rule 601, S.C.R.E. cmt. The record in this case contains no evidence that Mr. Ellis lacked competency to serve as a witness.

Pre-Probate Code case law further supports the contention that a minor may serve as a witness to a will. In *Stevens v. Royals*, the Supreme Court of South Carolina rejected handwritten changes to a will because they were made before the last witness, who was a minor around 13 or 14, signed the will. *Stevens v. Royalls*, 223 S.C. 510, 513-14, 77 S.E.2d 198, 200 (1953). The South Carolina Supreme Court held that because there was only one witness to these changes, they were invalid due to codicil formalities not being followed. *Id.* at 14–17. The Court considered the minor to be a witness and focused on the fact that there was only one witness when the codicil formalities required three. *Id.*

Persuasive authority likewise supports the idea that minors are permitted to serve as attesting witnesses to wills. The Restatement (Third) of Property provides:

A minor is not usually disqualified from serving as an attesting witness to a will, although a few states specifically provide by statute a minimum age, such as 18, for attesting witnesses. More commonly, however, no age is specified in the statute. If no age is specified in the statute, a minor is a valid witness, unless the minor was not old enough to observe, remember, and relate the facts occurring at the execution ceremony.

See Restatement (Third) of Property § 8.2 cmt. h. Based on the foregoing, Mr. Ellis's age did not render him incompetent to serve as a witness.

Mr. Dawson's second argument – that Mr. Ellis was not competent because he did not know what he was signing – is likewise unavailing. Mr. Ellis's trial testimony is contradictory. When shown the Operative Will at trial, Mr. Ellis testified that he recognized the document. R. p. 81, lines 16-19. He further testified that upon arriving at Jane's house, the people present there gave

him “a brief rundown of what [the document] was” and asked if he would sign it. R. p. 82, line 23-p. 83, line 1. This testimony directly contradicts his testimony that he had “no clue” what he was signing. R. p. 83, lines 1-8. Where, as here, a case is tried without a jury, “questions regarding the credibility and the weight of evidence are exclusively for the trial judge.” *See In re Estate of Anderson*, 381 S.C. 568, 573, 674 S.E.2d 176, 179 (Ct. App. 2009) (quoting *Golini v. Bolton*, 326 S.C. 333, 342, 482 S.E.2d 784, 789 (Ct. App. 1997)). The circuit court judge, who was in the best position to assess Mr. Ellis’s credibility, determined that Mr. Ellis was sufficiently apprised of the contents of the document to serve as a competent witness. This holding should not be disturbed on appeal.

B. Mr. Ellis’s inconsistent testimony and the circuit court’s credibility determination were sufficient to support a finding that Mr. Ellis’ signature complied with the requirements of S.C. Code Section 62-2-502.

Mr. Dawson also argues that Mr. Ellis was not an acceptable witness under Section 62-2-502 because he did not witness “either the signing or the testator’s acknowledgment of the signature or of the will.” *See* S.C. Code Ann. § 62-2-502(3). The Operative Will in this case was self-proved, however, and Mr. Dawson has failed to rebut the presumption of due execution.

“A self-proved will incorporates an affidavit signed by the testator, the witnesses, and a notary into the will, declaring due execution of the will, testator’s testamentary capacity, and that there was no undue influence upon the testator.” *Smith v. Lawton*, 435 S.C. 179, 188, 865 S.E.2d 782, 786 (Ct. App. 2021) (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 62-2-503). “A self-proved will does not require the production of evidence as to the due execution of the will.” *Id.* (citing S.C. Code Ann. §§ 62-3-405 to -406).

As is noted above, the Operative Will was self-proving because the last page of the Will contains the statutory language required for self-proof, *see* R. p. 365; *see also* S.C. Code Ann. §

62-2-503. Even assuming Mr. Ellis's signature was required to make the Operative Will self proving, Mr. Dawson's argument to rebut the presumption of due execution relies on the same facts as the argument that Mr. Ellis was not competent because he did not know what he was signing and likewise ignores the contradictions present in Mr. Ellis's testimony. While it is true that Mr. Ellis testified that he did not see Jane sign the document, that she did not acknowledge her signature, and that he had "no clue" what he was signing, this testimony was on direct examination by Mr. Dawson's counsel and contradicted other testimony regarding the same issues. For example, Mr. Ellis testified that he was given a "brief rundown of what [the document] was" and *did not remember* Jane saying anything to him or speaking to him. R. p. 82, line 24-p. 83, line 10. He also testified that he was at the house for "probably 10 to 15 minutes," R. p. 83, lines 11-12, which would have been a long time to have had "no idea" what he was signing. Further, he contradicted himself by first saying he recalled Jane and two other people he did not know being present at Jane's house and later saying that he did not remember if Jane was present. R. p. 82, lines 17-20; R. p. 84, lines 13-16.

Additionally, Mr. Ellis's testimony that "the only page [he] really saw of the document was the signature page" and he "wouldn't have seen pages 1 through 4," R. p. 83, lines 19-23, is contradicted by the fact that he signed pages four and five of the Operative Will. *See* R. pp. 364-65. Page four of the Operative Will, signed by Mr. Ellis, uses the term "will" seven times. R. p. 364. Page five of the Operative Will, signed by Mr. Ellis, uses the term "will" four times. R. p. 365. Taken together, these facts and Mr. Ellis's contradictory testimony support the circuit court's credibility determination and conclusion that Mr. Ellis's "inability to expressly recall the details of the signing of the July 2019 Will, when it occurred approximately five years ago, is alone not enough to invalidate the will." R. p. 5.

Furthermore, South Carolina law provides that a will is valid so long as the witness observes “the testator’s acknowledgment of the signature *or of the will*.” See S.C. Code Ann. § 62-2-502(3) (emphasis added). Thus, Mr. Dawson’s focus on whether Jane acknowledged her signature to Mr. Ellis is misplaced. So long as Mr. Ellis understood from Jane that the document he signed on July 14, 2019, was her will and she acknowledged the will as her own, the will was executed in accordance with the statutory requirements. Mr. Dawson has not presented sufficient and reliable evidence that Mr. Ellis did not understand what he was signing to rebut the presumption of due execution or to demonstrate a legal error by the circuit court.

3.

The Court of Appeals correctly determined that the circuit court did not err in finding neither the Operative Will nor the addition of Respondent as joint owner of Decedent’s bank account was the product of undue influence.

Relevant Facts

Mrs. Pounds’ sister, Janie, testified that Mrs. Pounds and Jane had a “great relationship” and saw each other on a daily basis. R. p. 280, lines 16-22. Mrs. Pounds also testified that she saw Jane every day and that Jane was her best friend. R. p. 86, lines 11-20; R. p. 134, lines 3-4. On the contrary, Mr. Dawson’s relationship with Jane was strained in the last couple of years before her death, primarily related to their disagreements over the bonds. R. p. 280, line 23-p. 281, line 6. The last time Jane spoke to Mr. Dawson was a year and a half before Jane’s death. R. p. 139, lines 10-12.

On April 18, 2019, Jane executed a durable power of attorney and a health care power of attorney naming Mrs. Pounds as her agent. R. pp. 369-75. Jane was afraid Mr. Dawson would put her into a nursing home, and she wanted Mrs. Pounds to take care of her. R. p. 106, lines 13-16; R. p. 272, line 19-p. 273, line 10.

Jane also executed two wills approximately three months apart. In both the First Will dated April 18, 2019, and the Operative Will dated July 14, 2019, Jane named Mrs. Pounds as personal representative. R. pp. 379-82; R. pp. 361-65. Both wills left all real property, vehicles, and residue to Mrs. Pounds. R. pp. 380-82; R. pp. 362-63. There is no evidence that Mrs. Pounds was present for the execution of either will. *See* R. p. 113, line 25-p. 114, line 7; R. p. 269, line 25-p. 270, line 5.

On May 1, 2019, Jane converted one of her bank accounts into a joint account with Mrs. Pounds. R. p. 95, line 19-p. 96, line 1. Jane made this decision on her own after she tried to present the bank with her durable power of attorney naming Mrs. Pounds as her agent and was told it was not effective because it had not been filed. R. p. 107, lines 7-19. That afternoon, Jane filed the durable power of attorney and health care power of attorney at the courthouse herself. R. p. 103, lines 10-18. On June 20, 2019, Jane and Mrs. Pounds opened a joint saving account. R. p. 96, lines 2-7.

Prior to her death, Jane was in very good health other than her cardiomyopathy. R. p. 99, lines 16-22. Up until she died, Jane drove herself everywhere, prepared her own meals, and took care of her own finances. R. p. 156, lines 2-10. Despite the durable power of attorney, Mrs. Pounds did not pay bills for Jane, manage her affairs, or conduct any business with banks or financial institutions on her behalf. R. p. 144, lines 5-18. Although Jane and Mrs. Pounds held a safety deposit box together, Mrs. Pounds never accessed it without Jane. R. p. 144, lines 19-24. Janie testified that Mrs. Pounds did not pressure Jane to change her will, get a power of attorney, or leave an inheritance to Mrs. Pounds. R. p. 281, lines 8-19.

In its final order, the circuit court held there was no evidence of undue influence as to the execution of the Operative Will or the retitling of Jane's accounts. With regard to the Operative

Will, the circuit court held that “the record [was] devoid of convincing evidence to establish [Mrs. Pounds] unduly influenced [Jane]” and “[n]o competent evidence was produced to establish [Jane] was infirm, either mentally or physically, at the time of execution.” R. pp. 6-7. The court noted that “[a] change in disposition of assets is not enough to establish undue influence,” found that Jane’s will was “the product of her own intents,” and held that Mrs. Pounds had overcome the presumption of undue influence due to the fiduciary relationship. R. p. 7. With regard to the retitling of accounts, the circuit court found that “[o]ther than expressing his distrust and displeasure with [Mrs. Pounds] being involved in [Jane’s] financial accounts, [Mr. Dawson] was unable to point to any additional evidence to establish [Mrs. Pounds] coerced or constrained [Jane] in the making of these decisions.” R. p. 8.

The circuit court denied Mr. Dawson’s motion to reconsider, and the Court of Appeals held the circuit court did not err in its finding regarding undue influence.

Discussion

Mr. Dawson bases his undue influence argument on the fiduciary relationship between Mrs. Pounds and Jane. Mrs. Pounds does not dispute the fiduciary relationship in existence at the time Jane executed the Operative Will. Where a fiduciary relationship, such as power of attorney, exists between beneficiary and decedent, a presumption of undue influence arises. *See In re Estate of Cumbee*, 333 S.C. 664, 673-73, 511 S.E.2d 390, 394 (Ct. App. 1999). While a fiduciary relationship shifts the burden of establishing rebuttable evidence to the defendant in a will contest, “the contestants of the will still retain the ultimate burden of proof to invalidate the will.” *Howard v. Nasser*, 364 S.C. 279, 288, 613 S.E.2d 64, 68-69 (Ct. App. 2005).

The bar for establishing undue influence is high: “undue influence must be shown by unmistakable and convincing evidence, which is usually circumstantial.” *Russell v. Wachovia*

Bank, N.A., 353 S.C. 208, 217, 578 S.E.2d 329, 333 (2003). “[F]or [a] will to be void due to undue influence, ‘[a] contestant must show that the influence was brought directly to bear upon the testamentary act.’” *Id.* at 219, 578 S.E.2d at 335 (quoting *Mock v. Dowling*, 266 S.C. 274, 277, 222 S.E.2d 773, 774 (1976)). “A mere showing of opportunity or motive does not create an issue of fact regarding undue influence.” *In re Estate of Cumbee*, 333 S.C. at 671, 511 S.E.2d at 394.

“The influence necessary to void a will must amount to force and coercion.” *Wilson v. Dallas*, 403 S.C. 411, 437, 743 S.E.2d 746, 760 (2013). “The evidence must show that the free will of the testator was taken over by someone acting on testator’s behalf.” *Russell*, 353 S.C. at 217, 578 S.E.2d at 333. “If the testator had the testamentary capacity to dispose of [her] property and was free and unrestrained in [her] volition at the time of making the will, the influence that may have inspired it or some provision of it will not be undue influence.” *Swiger by & through DeHaven v. Smith*, 426 S.C. 408, 417, 827 S.E.2d 200, 204 (Ct. App. 2019) (quoting *Howard*, 364 S.C. at 289, 613 S.E.2d at 69).

Mrs. Pounds has rebutted the presumption of undue influence arising out of her fiduciary relationship with Jane through the complete absence of evidence showing Mrs. Pounds violated her fiduciary duty to Jane or exerted any influence over Jane’s decision making. Mrs. Pounds was a reliable granddaughter who took good care of her grandmother in old age, visiting Jane frequently, and taking Jane for medical attention when asked. Jane retained the ability to care for herself and make her own financial decisions up until her death. *See R.* p. 156, lines 2-10.

Mr. Dawson has presented no evidence to show that Jane was coerced or forced into executing the Operative Will or retitling the bank accounts. The “ample evidence” cited by Mr. Dawson to show undue influence does nothing of the sort. Jane having a friend, who was also Mrs. Pounds’s aunt, help draft a basic will does not demonstrate coercion or force by Mrs. Pounds. Any

change in Mr. Dawson's relationship with his mother was due to their fallout over the bonds rather than to any actions taken by Mrs. Pounds. *See* R. p. 280, line 23-p. 281, line 6. Mr. Dawson's contention that "Mrs. Pounds took Jane to the bank to be added as a joint owner of her bank accounts and to file the powers of attorney" is contradicted by the evidence. Jane's decision to add Mrs. Pounds to her bank account was made on the spur of the moment at the bank, and Mrs. Pounds was not even present when Jane filed the powers of attorney at the courthouse. *See* R. p. 107, lines 7-19; R. p. 103, lines 10-18. Mr. Dawson's testimony that he was "threatened by Mrs. Pounds on Facebook" was contradicted by the evidence showing that the alleged threat came from a fraudulent Facebook account. *See* R. p. 294, line 20-p. 297, line 22; R. p. 383.

Similarly, Mr. Dawson's contention that Jane "disposed of her assets in an unnatural way" is not borne out by the evidence. Though not related by blood, Mrs. Pounds was Jane's granddaughter from the day she was born, even living with Jane as an infant and later in life. Even Mr. Dawson agreed that from the time Mrs. Pounds was born, she was a part of the Dawson family. *See* R. p. 201, lines 6-11. Mrs. Pounds saw Jane every day, whereas Mr. Dawson did not speak with Jane for the last year and a half of her life. *See* R. p. 139, lines 10-12; R. p. 280, lines 16-22. Jane trusted Mrs. Pounds to take care of her, whereas she was afraid that Mr. Dawson would put her in a nursing home. *See* R. p. 106, lines 13-16; R. p. 272, line 19-p. 273, line 10. Based on these facts, the disposition of Jane's assets in the Operative Will is in no way unnatural and does not provide evidence of undue influence. The disposition of assets is also consistent with the disposition in the First Will, and no evidence exists to show any undue influence in the execution of the First Will.

Additionally, the cases cited by Mr. Dawson in his brief are easily distinguishable from the facts of the present case. In *Byrd v. Byrd*, prior to the making of the will, the decedent had difficulty

recognizing people he had known for a long time (including his own children), became lost while driving in familiar areas, and was heavily medicated. 279 S.C. 425, 428, 308 S.E.2d 788, 790 (1983). Additionally, the defendant son continuously threatened decedent with putting him in a nursing home, even though his fear and dislike of nursing homes was well known to his children. *Id.* at 428, 308 S.E.2d at 790. Based on these facts and others, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the issue of undue influence was properly submitted to the jury. *Id.* at 431, 308 S.E.2d at 791-92. In *Moorer v. Bull*, the Supreme Court of South Carolina found that there was evidence to support the jury's verdict that there was undue influence exercised in the procurement of the will. 212 S.C. 146, 149, 46 S.E.2d 681, 682 (1948). The evidence showed that the son transacted the decedent's business for her for many years, the decedent "was in fear of him," and the son "on at least one occasion, made the statement, in substance, that he would procure for himself her estate through one means or another." *Id.*

Other than the existence of a fiduciary relationship, none of the facts present in *Byrd* or *Moorer* are present in this case. Mr. Dawson has presented no evidence that Jane's mind or body was frail at the time of the will execution and the retitling of accounts. Rather, the evidence shows that she was fully capable of managing her own affairs, taking care of her daily needs, and driving herself wherever she needed to go. In the absence of any evidence of coercion or duress that would have resulted in Jane executing the Operative Will or retitling her accounts, the circuit court's decision that these actions were not the product of undue influence must be affirmed.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court's order upholding the validity of the Operative Will and finding no evidence of undue influence should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted this 15th day of July, 2026.

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