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S.C. SUPREME COURT

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE SUPREME COURT
APPEAL FROM AIKEN COUNTY

Court of Common Pleas
The Honorable Deadra Jefferson, PCR Action Judge
2025-CP-02-00074

MICHAEL D. WILLIAMS, #234583,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

Respondent.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Michael D. Williams appeals the denial of his post-conviction relief application. The post-conviction relief action was heard and denied by the Honorable Deadra Jefferson, circuit court judge, on December 15, 2025, and was denied by written order issued filed on July 16, 2026. Applicant received notice of the judgement on July 17, 2026.

/s Chelsey F. Marto
Chelsey F. Marto, Esquire
Attorney for the Applicant
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF AIKEN

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

Michael D. Williams, #234583,

Case No. 2025-CP-02-00074

Applicant,

v.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

State of South Carolina,

Respondent.

Presiding Judge:
Applicant's Attorney:
Respondent's Attorney:
Date of Hearing:
Court Reporter:

Deadra L. Jefferson
Chelsey F. Marto, Esq.
Zachary W. Jones, Esq.
December 15, 2025
Penny M. Johnson

INTRODUCTION

This matter came before the Court on December 15, 2025, arising from an application for post-conviction relief ("PCR") commenced by Michael D. Williams ("Applicant") on January 13, 2025, and amended on December 11, 2025. Applicant was present. Appearing for the Applicant is Chelsey F. Marto, Esq. Assistant Attorney General Zachary W. Jones, Esq. appeared for the State. After hearing the testimony at the PCR hearing and upon full review of the record, this Court finds all of Applicant's allegations are without merit. For the reasons discussed below, this Court denies and dismisses this application with prejudice.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 23, 2021, the Aiken County Sheriff's Office SWAT team executed a search warrant at Applicant's residence based on a confidential informant purchase made with the Applicant on December 5, 2025. A revolver and a quantity of methamphetamine were located in

Applicant's bedroom. Applicant was arrested at the scene. During its April 2022 term, the Aiken County Grand Jury indicted Applicant for Trafficking Methamphetamine (10–28 grams) – Second Offense¹ (Indictment No. 2022-GS-02-00733), Possession of a Weapon During the Commission of a Violent Crime² (Indictment No. 2022-GS-02-00732), and Possession of a Weapon by a Person Convicted of a Violent Felony³ (Indictment No. 2022-GS-02-00734). The case was prosecuted by Assistant Solicitor Bradley McMillian of the Second Circuit Solicitor's Office. Applicant was represented by Barry L. Thompson, II, Esq.

On April 11, 2022, Applicant's case was called to trial before the Honorable Courtney Clyburn Pope. Applicant was present at that time and asked the trial court for a continuance so he could obtain a different attorney. Hearing Tr. 5-6.⁴ Judge Clyburn Pope denied Applicant's motion, and instructed Applicant to come back for trial the following day. Id. On April 12, 2022, Applicant was tried by jury *in absentia* before the Judge Clyburn Pope. On April 14, 2022, Applicant was found guilty of each charge as indicted. Judge Clyburn Pope sentenced the Applicant. The sentence was sealed. On May 13, 2022,⁵ Applicant was present for the unsealing of the sentence. On May 13, 2022, Judge Clyburn Pope imposed the Applicant's sentences. The applicant was sentenced to the South Carolina Department of Corrections for a period of fifteen (15) years' imprisonment for Trafficking Methamphetamine 10-28 grams Second Offense, five (5) years for Possession of a Weapon During the Commission of a Violent Crime, and five (5) years for Possession of a Weapon

¹ The offense of trafficking methamphetamine, ten grams or more, but less than twenty-eight grams, 2nd Offense, which is a violent and serious offense, is punishable by a term of imprisonment of not less than five years nor more than thirty years, no part of which may be suspended nor probation granted, and a fine of fifty thousand dollars. S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-0375(C)(1)(b).

² The offense of possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime is punishable imprisonment of five years, in addition to the punishment provided for the principal crime. S.C. Code Ann. § 16-23-0490(A).

³ The offense of possession of a weapon by a person convicted of a violent offense is punishable by imprisonment of no more than five years. S.C. Code Ann. § 16-23-0500(B)(1).

⁴ Reconstructing the Trial Record Hearing held on September 3, 2024.

⁵ On May 10, 2022, Applicant was picked up on a bench warrant and held at the Aiken County Detention Center.

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by a Person Convicted of a Violent Felony, to be served concurrently. Judge Clyburn Pope gave the Applicant credit for time served pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-40 to be calculated and applied by the SCDC.

On May 13, 2022, Defendant made a Motion for A New Trial, which Judge Clyburn Pope denied on May 19, 2022. On May 13, 2022, Defendant also made a Motion to Reconsider Sentence, which Judge Clyburn Pope denied on May 19, 2022.

Applicant filed a timely notice of appeal. On December 19, 2024, Applicant filed a motion to withdraw his appeal. On December 23, 2024, the South Carolina Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the appeal. The remittitur was sent on January 8, 2025.

CURRENT APPLICATION

In his initial application for post-conviction relief, Applicant alleges he is being held in custody unlawfully based on the following:

1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
 - a. Counsel failed to present a defense.
 - i. "Drugs belonged to co-[defendant] and she would testify."
 - b. Counsel failed to investigate.
 - i. "Available evidence of police misconduct and conspiracy."

Applicant requested relief as follows:

"Reverse conviction and remand."

Respondent filed its Return and Partial Motion to Dismiss on May 21, 2024. Subsequently, Applicant filed an amended application on December 11, 2025, raising the following allegations:

1. "Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for:
 - a. Failure to request Logan charge.
 - b. Failure to object to search for the truth language.
 - c. Failure to present a valid defense and to effectively argue that the drugs belonged exclusively to Applicant's co-defendant.
 - d. Failure to investigate the co-defendant to gauge her willingness to claim the drugs at Applicant's trial.
 - e. Failure to investigate police misconduct.
 - f. Failure to effectively communicate.

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- g. Failure to pursue post-trial motion on the grounds of officer misconduct.”
2. “Conflict of interest – the Public Defender’s Office represented both defendants.”

At the evidentiary hearing, Applicant proceeded on the allegations raised in the amended application, with the exception of issue 1(b) relating to “search for the truth language,” which was abandoned.

FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Before this Court are the Aiken County Clerk of Court records regarding the subject convictions, Applicant’s records from the South Carolina Department of Corrections, the trial transcript, the records of the current PCR action, and the exhibits admitted into evidence at the evidentiary hearing.

This Court has reviewed the testimony presented at the PCR hearing, observed the witnesses, passed upon their credibility, and weighed their testimony accordingly. Before the Court are the initial and amended applications for PCR, the records of the Aiken County Clerk of Court concerning the subject convictions, the records of Applicant’s trial and sentencing proceedings, and the records of Applicant’s direct appeal. After hearing the testimony presented and considering the legal arguments by counsel, as well as the record in this action incorporated by way of the State’s return, this Court finds Applicant’s allegations are without merit. Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-80, this Court makes the following findings of facts and conclusions of law based upon all of the probative evidence presented:

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, Generally

In a PCR action, Applicant bears the burden of proving the allegations in his application by a preponderance of the evidence. Butler v. State, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985); Rule 71.1(e), SCRCP. Where the application alleges ineffective assistance of counsel as a ground for

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relief, Applicant must prove that “counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that [it] cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); Butler, 286 S.C. at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814.

In evaluating allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, the reviewing court applies the two-pronged test outlined in Strickland. First, Applicant must prove that counsel's performance was deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 117, 386 S.E.2d 624, 625 (1989). Under this prong, the court measures an attorney's performance by its “reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Cherry, 300 S.C. at 117, 386 S.E.2d at 625 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). The proper measure of performance is whether the attorney provided representation within the range of competence required in criminal cases. Butler, 286 S.C. at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814. “Counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). “When counsel focuses on some issues to the exclusion of others, there is a strong presumption that he [or she] did so for tactical reasons rather than through sheer neglect.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). The Court, in determining deficiency, must affirmatively entertain the range of possible reasons counsel may have had for proceeding as they did. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 196 (2011); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 109–10 (2011). “[E]ven if an omission is inadvertent, relief is not automatic. The Sixth Amendment guarantees reasonable competence, not perfect advocacy judged with the benefit of hindsight.” Yarborough, 540 U.S. at 6; see also Murphy v. Davis, 901 F.3d 578, 592 (5th Cir. 2018) (“[C]ounsel's performance need not be optimal to be reasonable.”).

Second, counsel's deficient performance must have prejudiced Applicant such that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” Cherry, 300 S.C. at 117–18, 386 S.E.2d at 625 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). “This does not require a showing that counsel’s actions ‘more likely than not altered the outcome,’ but the difference between Strickland’s prejudice standard and a more-probable-than-not standard is slight and matters ‘only in the rarest case.’” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 111-12 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Id. at 112.


The standards do not establish mechanical rules; the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. A court need not first determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies; if it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, that course should be followed. Id. at 696–97.

Counsel’s Failure to Request a Logan Charge

Applicant argues Counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the law of circumstantial evidence be charged according to the language first promulgated in State v. Logan, 405 S.C. 83, 99, 747 S.E.2d 444, 452 (2013):

There are two types of evidence which are generally presented during a trial—direct evidence and circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence directly proves the existence of a fact and does not require deduction. Circumstantial evidence is proof of a chain of facts and circumstances indicating the existence of a fact.

Crimes may be proven by circumstantial evidence. The law makes no distinction between the weight or value to be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence, however, to the extent the State relies on circumstantial evidence, all of the circumstances must be consistent with each other, and when taken together, point conclusively to the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. If these circumstances merely portray the defendant’s behavior as suspicious, the proof has failed.

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The State has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden rests with the State regardless of whether the State relies on direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or some combination of the two.

The Court finds this allegation is without merit.

The trial court in this case gave the following circumstantial evidence instruction:

There are two types of evidence which are generally presented during a trial: Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence is the testimony of a person who claims to have actual knowledge of a fact, such as an eyewitness. Circumstantial evidence is proof of a chain of facts and circumstances indicating the existence of a fact.

The law makes absolutely no distinction between the weight or value to be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence. You should weigh all of the evidence in the case. After weighing all of the evidence, if you are not convinced of the guilt of the Defendant beyond a reasonable doubt you must find the Defendant not guilty.

(April 13-14 Trial Tr. 89: 3-16). The language used by the trial court was taken directly from the jury charge expressly recommended by our Supreme Court in State v. Grippon, 327 S.C. 79, 83-84, 489 S.E.2d 462, 464 (1997):

There are two types of evidence which are generally presented during a trial—direct evidence and circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence is the testimony of a person who asserts or claims to have actual knowledge of a fact, such as an eyewitness. Circumstantial evidence is proof of a chain of facts and circumstances indicating the existence of a fact. The law makes absolutely no distinction between the weight or value to be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence. Nor is a greater degree of certainty required of circumstantial evidence than of direct evidence. You should weigh all the evidence in the case. After weighing all the evidence, if you are not convinced of the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find [the defendant] not guilty.

See Cherry, 361 S.C. 588, 601, 606 S.E.2d 475, 482 (2004) (“[W]e hold that the recommended language in Grippon is the sole and exclusive charge to be given in circumstantial evidence cases

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in this state . . .”).

Although Logan came after Grippon and Cherry and proposed a new recommended circumstantial evidence charge, the Logan court was explicit that the Grippon charge remains a correct statement of the law. See Logan, 405 S.C. 83, 100, 747 S.E.2d 444, 452–53 (“This holding does not prevent the trial court from issuing the circumstantial evidence charge provided in Grippon and Cherry.”).

This Court finds the circumstantial evidence charge given by the trial court was a correct statement of law, taken almost verbatim from the language expressly approved in Grippon, Cherry, and indeed in Logan itself. The Applicant has failed to establish how Counsel’s failure to request the slightly different language approved by Logan could have resulted in any prejudice to Applicant’s case, where the trial court’s charge was not erroneous. This Court finds Applicant has not met his burden of proving Counsel was ineffective as to this issue. The jury charge on circumstantial evidence accurately stated the applicable law. Jury instructions must be evaluated as a whole rather than in isolated portions, and the charge, taken in its totality, adequately informed the jury of the governing legal principles. See State v. Stewart, 433 S.C. 382, 390, 858 S.E.2d 808, 812 (2021); State v. Curry, 370 S.C. 674, 682, 636 S.E.2d 649, 653 (Ct. App. 2006). Accordingly, Applicant has failed to establish that any alleged deficiency in the instruction resulted in prejudice or otherwise undermined confidence in the outcome of the proceeding. Moreover, Counsel testified credibly that the basis of the State’s proof was a confidential informant buy captured on audio and video thereby establishing a direct and not circumstantial showing of proof. Counsel further testified that he was unable to discern how a Logan charge would have been helpful or changed the result.

Accordingly, this Court finds this allegation is Denied.

Counsel's Failure to Communicate, Investigate, and Otherwise Prepare a Defense Based on Arguing that the Drugs Belonged Exclusively to Applicant's Co-Defendant

Applicant argues Counsel was ineffective for failing to present a defense based on arguing that the drugs found during the search belonged exclusively to Applicant's co-defendant, who at the time was his fiancée. Applicant claims his co-defendant was available and was willing to testify that the drugs belonged exclusively to her, not to Applicant. Applicant also claims Counsel failed to effectively communicate with him prior to trial, which exacerbated these alleged deficiencies because Applicant would have told Counsel that his co-defendant was willing to claim ownership of the drugs. The Court finds this allegation without merit.

Counsel credibly testified with emphasis that Applicant was the most uncooperative client he had ever worked with. Counsel explained that Applicant, who was out on bond prior to trial, refused to come see him. In fact, Applicant only came to the public defender's office one time: not to see Counsel, but merely to bring his co-defendant to see her lawyer, Grant Gibbons, Esq. He further testified that on this occasion he had to go outside to speak with the Applicant. Counsel testified that it was impossible to get Applicant to discuss the facts of the case, and Applicant did not want to review discovery or to watch the videos. He further testified that Applicant only concern was to put off the case. Moreover, that Applicant wanted to and seemed to be under the misapprehension that he could indefinitely delay the disposition of his charges based on his "health."

Counsel acknowledged that Applicant believed his co-defendant would claim ownership of the drugs, and Counsel prepared his defense strategy around this happening. Counsel was also told by Attorney Gibbons, the co-defendant's lawyer, that she was planning to help Applicant by admitting the drugs were hers. Counsel prepared a subpoena and tried to serve it on the co-defendant on April 4, 2022, but she would not come to the door.

Attorney Gibbons gave Counsel permission to speak to the co-defendant after Applicant received the trial notice. However, when Counsel sent his investigator to the co-defendant, he discovered that Applicant had reached her first, driven her away, and convinced her to go into hiding. Counsel testified he had no choice but to proceed to trial, without his client and without the witness.

The Court finds Counsel's testimony credible, and Applicant's contrary testimony not credible, as to this allegation. The Court finds Counsel made reasonable efforts to meet with Applicant in order to discuss the facts of his case with him, but Applicant refused to cooperate. The Court also finds Counsel reasonably attempted to contact Applicant's co-defendant and arrange for her to testify, but those efforts were thwarted by Applicant's own obstructive conduct in hiding his co-defendant after he received the trial notice. The trial transcript clearly shows that Counsel *did* present a defense based on arguing, in his opening and closing statements to the jury, that the drugs likely belonged to Applicant's co-defendant, not to Applicant himself. While Counsel's arguments may have been deprived of much of their persuasive force due to the absence of Applicant and his co-defendant, the Court finds Applicant alone bears the blame for and is the architect of his own dilemma. Accordingly, Applicant has failed to prove that Counsel's performance was deficient on this ground.

Further, Applicant failed to procure the presence of and testimony of his co-defendant at the evidentiary hearing. An applicant who claims his attorney was ineffective for failing to present a given witness at trial *must* substantiate that allegation by introducing that witness's testimony at the PCR hearing; failure to do so precludes a finding of prejudice. See, e.g., Martin v. State, 427 S.C. 450, 455, 832 S.E.2d 277, 279–80 (2019) (holding a PCR applicant who claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call certain witnesses must produce those witnesses or their testimony

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at the PCR hearing). This Court finds Applicant has not met his burden of proving either prejudice or deficiency as to these allegations.

Accordingly, this Court finds this allegation is Denied.

Counsel's Failure to Investigate and File Post-Trial Motions Based on Police Misconduct

Applicant argues Counsel failed to adequately investigate and file post-trial motions based on allegations of misconduct concerning Lieutenant Chavous, one of the police officers involved in his case. The Court finds this issue lacks merit.

Applicant introduced into evidence two (2) letters he received from Counsel *after* Applicant's conviction. In those letters, Counsel refers vaguely to an "allegation that [Chavous] had sex with a confidential informant" and encourages Applicant to file a PCR application based on after-discovered evidence. However, this Court finds these letters do not, in and of themselves, have any probative value in showing whether Lieutenant Chavous actually committed misconduct which would have altered the outcome of this trial. Nor did Applicant provide any other evidence of police misconduct in this case.

Counsel acknowledged sending the two (2) letters. He explained that, after Applicant's trial, Applicant contacted him about rumors that Lieutenant Chavous had engaged in an inappropriate relationship with an informant. Counsel credibly testified that he looked into the matter. He discovered that Lieutenant Chavous had been taken off the narcotics team, and he explained that there was "word on the street" of misconduct involving Chavous at the time. However, Counsel credibly testified he was never able to obtain any proof substantiating these rumors. Counsel clarified that all of this happened *after* Applicant had already been convicted and sentenced, which is why he counseled Applicant to pursue the issue by filing a PCR application.

The Court finds Applicant has failed to meet his burden of proof as to this issue, whether

it be framed as an after-discovered evidence claim or a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Applicant has presented no credible evidence tending to prove that any misconduct actually occurred which would have positively impacted or altered the presentation of his case. At best, he has presented Counsel's own statements concerning "word on the street," in other words, pure conjecture and hearsay, which Counsel himself testified was never corroborated by any objective evidence he could find.

Further, even if there had been some proof of misconduct committed by Lieutenant Chavous, Applicant has not explained how it had any appreciable difference or any bearing on *his* case. Applicant has failed to establish any connection between Chavous's alleged misbehavior and the facts of Applicant's case.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Applicant has not established the existence of any "after-discovered evidence" of police misconduct, nor has he demonstrated that such evidence would probably have altered the result of his trial. See, e.g., Jamison v. State, 410 S.C. 456, 467, 765 S.E.2d 123, 128 (2014) (holding a person convicted after a trial, who requests a new trial based on after-discovered evidence, "must show that the evidence: (1) would probably change the result if a new trial is had; (2) has been discovered since trial; (3) could not have been discovered before trial; (4) is material to the issue of guilt or innocence; and (5) is not merely cumulative or impeaching.") (quoting McCoy v. State, 401 S.C. 363, 368 n. 1, 737 S.E.2d 623, 625 n. 1 (2013)); Taylor v. State, 258 S.C. 369, 378, 188 S.E.2d 850, 854 (1972) (holding a PCR applicant's allegation that his trial counsel failed to adequately investigate his case was unsupported where the applicant failed to point out any beneficial evidence which could have been discovered by further investigation).

Accordingly, this Court finds this allegation is Denied.

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Conflict of Interest

Applicant argues Counsel was burdened by a “conflict of interest” on the ground that both Counsel and Attorney Gibbons, the lawyer who represented Applicant’s co-defendant, worked at the Aiken County Public Defender’s office at the same time. The Court finds this allegation without merit.

“[A] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest.” Rule 1.7, RPC, Rule 407, SCACR.

A lawyer representing a client of a *public defender office*, legal service association, or similar program serving indigent clients *shall not be disqualified under this Rule* because of the program’s representation of another client in the same or substantially related matter if: (1) the lawyer is screened in a timely manner from access to confidential information relating to and from any participation in the representation of the other client; and (2) the lawyer retains authority over the objectives of the representation pursuant to Rule 5.4(c).

Rule 1.10(e), RPC, Rule 407, SCACR (emphasis added).

At the evidentiary hearing, Counsel acknowledged that he and Attorney Gibbons represented Applicant and Applicant’s co-defendant, respectively, at the same time while working for the Aiken County Public Defender’s office. However, Counsel credibly testified that the office had in place a “Chinese Wall” policy to screen both sides from accessing the other’s confidential information or participating in the other’s representation. Counsel credibly testified that he did not exchange any confidential information with Attorney Gibbons related to his representation of Applicant, and he did not believe there was a “conflict of interest” under those circumstances.

The Court finds Applicant has failed to prove there was a conflict of interest in this case. Counsel credibly testified that the Aiken County Public Defender’s office followed the proper procedure required by Rule 1.10(e) for screening two lawyers within the same office. See State v.

Wright, 424 S.C. 335, 340, 818 S.E.2d 236, 238 (Ct. App. 2018) (“Rule 1.10(e) provides a public defender may continue representing a client, even with an imputed conflict of interest, if there is proper screening to prevent the exchange of confidential information. . . . [T]he testimony indicates such a wall existed in this case.”). The Court finds Applicant has not met his burden of proving this allegation.

Accordingly, this Court finds this allegation is Denied.


CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, this Court finds Applicant has not established any constitutional violations or deprivations that would require this Court to grant his application for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, this application must be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Applicant must file and serve a notice of appeal within thirty days from PCR counsel’s receipt of written notice of entry of judgment to secure the appropriate appellate review pursuant to Rule 203, SCACR. Applicant has a right to appellate counsel’s assistance in seeking review of the denial of PCR. Austin v. State, 305 S.C. 453, 409 S.E.2d 395 (1991). Rule 71.1(g), SCRCP, provides that if Applicant wishes to seek appellate review, PCR counsel must serve and file a notice of appeal on Applicant’s behalf. Applicant is directed to Rule 243, SCACR, for appropriate procedures for appeal.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, JUDGED, AND DECREED that Applicant’s application for PCR is Denied and Dismissed with Prejudice; and Applicant must remain in the custody of the State.

IT IS SO ORDERED.


Hon. Deadra L. Jefferson
Presiding Judge
Second Judicial Circuit

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July 7, 2026
Charleston, SC at Chambers