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AUG 14 2026

S.C. SUPREME COURT

State Of South Carolina
Supreme Court

Appeal From Greenville County
Court of Common Pleas
13th Circuit Judge Jessica A Salvini

Notice
of
Appeal

#2024-CP-23-00478

Kevin Lamont Lee# 285227..... Petitioner

vs.

State of Carolina.....Respondent

Other Counsel of Record
Sydney Willingham
Att. General's Office
P.O. Box 11549
Columbia, SC 29211-1549


Kevin L. Lee
Livesay CI
P.O. Box 580
Una, SC 29378

State Of South Carolina
Supreme Court

Appeal From Greenville County
Court of Common Pleas
13th Circuit Judge Jessica A Salvini

#2024-CP-23-00478

Kevin Lamont Lee#285227 appeals The order of Final Order of Dismissal and Final Order regarding Motion to reconsider of The Honorable Jessica A. Salvini dated March 11th 2026 and July 24th, 2026. Petitioner received written notice of entry of the final order regarding motion to Reconsider on July 30th, 2026

 8/10/26

Kevin L. Lee
Livesay CI
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Una, SC 29378

Other Counsel of Record
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(2)

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AUG 14 2026

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF GREENVILLE

Kevin Lamont Lee, SCDC #285227,

Applicant,

v.

State of South Carolina,

Respondent.

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, S.C. SUPREME COURT
THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

Case No.: 2024-CP-23-0478

FINAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL
(with prejudice)

This matter comes before the Court by way of an application for post-conviction relief filed on January 3, 2024, by Applicant Kevin Lamont Lee. Respondent made its return on or about March 11, 2026, and moved for the summary dismissal of the application. Respondent conjunctively submitted a proposed conditional order. Respondent asserted that the application is barred as untimely, barred by the statute of limitations, successive to Applicant's previous applications, barred by the doctrine of *res judicata*, barred by the equitable doctrine of *laches*, and for failing to comply with the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act, S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-10 *et seq.* (2014).

After consideration of the application, return and relevant documents attached thereto, this Court issued a Conditional Order of Dismissal on March 11, 2026, finding that the action should be dismissed as untimely, barred by the statute of limitations, successive to Applicant's previous applications, barred by the doctrine of *res judicata*, barred by the equitable doctrine of *laches*, and for failing to comply with the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act, S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-10 *et seq.* (2014). Applicant was given the opportunity to respond and show cause as to why the Conditional Order should not become final. As evidenced by the attached Affidavit of Service, Applicant was served with the Conditional Order on March 20, 2026. (Attachment 1). Applicant has not provided a response.

This Court has reviewed its prior Conditional Order and finds that Applicant has failed to show cause as to why the Order should not become final. Applicant has presented no specific factual or legal reasons on the timeliness of the issue and has failed to show any applicable exception to the aforementioned procedural bars. Applicant was sentenced on June 25, 2003. Applicant did not appeal his conviction and sentence. Therefore, a timely application was due on or before June 25, 2004, and this application was not filed until January 3, 2024. To timely file a successive PCR action, the allegations must be newly discovered and presented within a year of "actual discovery" or within one year "after the date when the facts could have been ascertained by the exercise of reasonable diligence." S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-45(c). The allegations Applicant now makes could have been raised in his prior PCR action(s) and were discoverable at the time of trial. Thus, Applicant has not timely raised the issues in his current application and has provided no response as to specific factual or legal reasons on the timelines of his claims.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that for the reasons set forth in the Court's conditional order of dismissal, the Application for post-conviction relief is hereby **DENIED AND DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE**.

This Court hereby advises Applicant that he must file and serve a notice of appeal within thirty days of the service of this Order to secure appellate review. See Rule 203, SCACR. Applicant's attention is directed to Rule 243, SCACR, for the procedures following the filing and service of the notice of appeal.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED this _____ day of _____, 2026.

JESSICA ANN SALVINI
Chief Administrative Judge
Thirteenth Judicial Circuit

_____, South Carolina.

SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

Post Office Box 21787 - Columbia, South Carolina 29221

Pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, the Director of the South Carolina Department of Corrections has designated Sgt P. Sawyer (Server) as his duly authorized agent for the purpose of making service of the process on the below named individual.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)
COUNTY OF Spandanburg)

AFFIDAVIT OF PERSONAL SERVICE

On this 20 day of March, 2026, I served the Conditional Order of Dismissal (2024-CP-23-00478), on Inmate KEVIN L. LEE, SCDC Inmate #285227, Room/Bay #N4-0016-A by delivering personally and leaving a copy of the same at LIVESAY Correctional Institution. Deponent is not a party to this action.

Sgt P. Sawyer

SCDC Server

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME

this 20 day of March, 2026

Audrey Aileen Webster Horton (L.S.)
Notary Public for South Carolina


My Commission Expires: 05-22-2034

ADMISSION OF SERVICE

Service of a copy of the within Conditional Order of Dismissal (2024-CP-23-00478) is admitted at the South Carolina Department of Corrections (Livesay Correctional Institution), 504 Broadcast Dr, Spandanburg County, SC this 20 day of March, 2026.

Kevin L. Lee
Inmate
SCDC Inmate #: _____

2024-CP-23-00478



FILED: 26MAR27 PM 1:25
006 JAY GRESHAM 001 SC

(2a)

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF GREENVILLE

Kevin Lamont Lee, #285227,

Applicant,

v.

State of South Carolina,

Respondent.

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

Case No.: 2024-CP-23-0478

CONDITIONAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL

ENTERED COMPUTER

FILED: 2024-11-13
Clerk of Court
Greenville County, SC

Applicant, Kevin Lamont Lee, filed the above captioned application for post-conviction relief on January 23, 2024. Respondent has moved for summary dismissal alleging the records attached to the return and motion show that the application is barred as untimely, barred by the statute of limitations, successive to Applicant's previous applications, barred by the doctrine of *res judicata*, barred by the equitable doctrine of *laches*, and for failing to comply with the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act, S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-10 *et seq.* (2014). Having reviewed the application, and the return and motion, this Court agrees and makes the following findings:

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Applicant is confined in the South Carolina Department of Corrections pursuant to orders of commitment of the Clerk of Court for Greenville County. The Applicant was indicted at the October 1999 term of the Greenville County Grand Jury for murder (1999-GS-23-6473). He was represented by Steven J. Henry, Esquire.

On June 25, 2003, the Applicant pled guilty. He was sentenced by the Honorable John W. Kittredge to confinement for a period of thirty years imprisonment. The applicant did not file an appeal.

FIRST PCR ACTION: 2003-CP-23-4381

The Applicant filed his *first* PCR application on June 27, 2003 (2003-CP-23-4381). The Applicant raised the following issues:

1. Denial of procedural due process and equal protection:
 - a. Violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 17-13-50, S.C. Code Ann. § 22-3-710, and S.C. Constitution, Article I, § 3.
2. Ineffective assistance of counsel:
 - a. "At this Bench trial, (S.C. Code Ann. § 17-23-60), the Applicant was prejudicially prosecuted in his absence, without the assistance of counsel, or being informed of this right, and the Applicant did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his entitlements of S.C. Code Ann. § 17-13-50."

An evidentiary hearing was convened on December 4, 2003 at the Greenville County Courthouse. Rodney W. Richey, Esquire represented the Applicant. The Honorable J. Michael Baxley denied and dismissed the PCR application by order filed February 16, 2004.

The Applicant filed a notice of appeal. Joseph L. Savitz, III, Esquire of the South Carolina Office of Appellate Defense perfected the appeal in the form of a Johnson¹ petition. The South Carolina Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari on October 5, 2005. The remittitur was issued on October 21, 2005.

FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS ACTION: 2:07-0222-HMH-RSC

The Applicant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina (2:07-0222-HMH-RSC). The Respondent submitted a motion for summary judgment on June 6, 2007. The Honorable Robert S. Carr, United States Magistrate Judge, issued a report and recommendation to dismiss the petition as untimely dated September 17, 2007. On October 11, 2007, the Honorable Henry M. Herlong, Jr., United States District Judge, issued an order adopting the report and recommendation and dismissing the petition as untimely.

¹ Johnson v. State, 294 S.C. 310, 364 S.E.2d 201 (1988).

SECOND PCR ACTION: 2015-CP-23-0990

The Applicant filed his *second* PCR application on February 9, 2015 (2015-CP-23-0990).

The Applicant raised the following issues:

1. Ineffective assistance of counsel
 - a. Failed to attack the Applicant's statement because the investigator "altered and committed 'perjury' by using some of his own words in statement."
 - b. Failed to attack the murder charge "where there is evidence of a lesser included offense."

The State made its return on August 25, 2015, requesting the Application be summarily dismissed. On September 1, 2015, the court issued a "Conditional Order of Dismissal" and expressed its intent to summarily dismiss the matter unless Applicant advises the court with specific reasons, factual or legal, why it should not dismiss the matter in its entirety. The Applicant was granted twenty (20) days from the date of service of the Order to show the Court he has specific reasons supporting his allegations. Applicant filed a document titled "Explanation" on September 24, 2015. The Court issued its "Final Order of Dismissal" on November 20, 2015, finding that Applicant's PCR application was filed well after the statute of limitations and Applicant should have raise all cognizable claims for relief in his previous PCR application.

The Applicant filed a pro se notice of appeal with the Greenville County Clerk of Court on December 28, 2015. However, Applicant did not file a notice of appeal with the appellate court in compliance with Rule 203, SCACR.

CURRENT ALLEGATIONS AND RELIEF SOUGHT

In his current PCR application, the Applicant alleges he is being held in custody unlawfully for the following reasons:

1. Ineffective Assistance of Plea Counsel
 - a. "Plea Counsel was ineffective for giving Applicant erroneous sentencing advise and Plea Counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure that the State adhered to the original negotiated plea agreement of 30 years, which

Applicant would be required to serve 85% of the sentence imposed. This violated petitioner's 6th Amendment right of effective assistance of counsel and 14th Amendment rights of due process and equal protection of the laws of the United States Constitution; and violated Applicant's S.C. Constitution Article 1, 3 rights of due process and equal protection of the laws."

(App. at 3 and attachment)

Applicant asks this Court for relief in the following form: "sentence should be changed to the 85% 30 year negotiated plea offer he was promised and plead to; to which Applicant should only have to serve 25 years and 6 months of his sentence." (App. at 6).

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This Court has reviewed the pleadings, the records submitted to it by the parties, and the applicable law. Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-70(c) and -80, this Court informs the parties of its intent to dismiss the applications as there is no genuine issue of material fact which would necessitate an evidentiary hearing. See S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-70(b) (establishing procedure for summary disposition of PCR applications); Leamon v. State, 363 S.C. 432, 434, 611 S.E.2d 494, 495 (2005) (summary disposition is appropriate when there is no need to develop facts and the applicant is not entitled to relief). Respondent moves for summary dismissal, and this Court finds summary dismissal is appropriate for the following reasons:

Failure to State a Cognizable Claim

Respondent moved to summarily dismiss Applicant's claims challenging calculation of his sentence and credit for time served, asserting these allegations were not cognizable PCR claims. See S. Leamon v. State, 363 S.C. 432, 434, 611 S.E.2d 494, 495 (2005) (summary disposition appropriate when there is no need to develop facts and the applicant is not entitled to relief).

This Court agrees and finds Applicant's allegations in his current allegation should be dismissed for failure to assert a cognizable PCR claim. The South Carolina Supreme Court has

held that “PCR is a proper avenue of relief only when the applicant mounts a collateral attack challenging the validity of his conviction or sentence....” Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 367, 527 S.E.2d 742, 749 (2000). Claims that only affect the duration of the sentence or quality of the inmate’s confinement do not affect the validity of the conviction or sentence and therefore are not considered collateral attacks on the conviction. Cooper v. State, 338 S.C. 202, 525 S.E.2d 886 (2000). An applicant may not seek review of a non-collateral or administrative matter through PCR. Al-Shabazz; Tutt v. State, 277 S.C. 525, 290 S.E.2d 414 (1982).

After Al-Shabazz, only two non-collateral matters are cognizable in PCR: 1) a claim that the applicant’s sentence expired (Delahoussaye v. State, 369 S.C. 522, 633 S.E.2d 158 (2006)) or 2) a claim that the applicant’s probation, parole or conditional release has been unlawfully revoked. Id. For credit related claims or claims concerning the conditions of confinement, the proper avenue of relief is through the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Id., 338 S.C. at 369, 527 S.E.2d at 749-50. *Ex post facto* claims also must be brought through APA rather than PCR. Jernigan v. State, 340 S.C. 256, 531 S.E.2d 507 (2000). Therefore, the Court shall summarily dismiss these claims pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-70(c) (2003).

Summary Dismissal Based on Statute of Limitations

Respondent moved this Court to summarily dismiss this application for failure to comply with the filing procedures of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act.² Specifically, the Act requires as follows:

- (A). An application for relief filed pursuant to this chapter must be filed within one year after the entry of a judgment of conviction or within one year after the sending of the Remittitur to the lower court from an appeal or the filing of the final decision upon an appeal, whichever is later.

² S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-10 to -160.

- (B). When a court whose decisions are binding upon the Supreme Court of this State or the Supreme Court of this State holds that the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of South Carolina, or both, impose upon state criminal proceedings a substantive standard not previously recognized or a right not in existence at the time of the state court trial, and if the standard or right is intended to be applied retroactively, an application under this chapter may be filed not later than one year after the date on which the standard or right was determined to exist.
- (C). If the applicant contends that there is evidence of material facts not previously presented and heard that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence, the application must be filed under this chapter within one year after the date of actual discovery of the facts by the applicant or after the date when the facts could have been ascertained by the exercise of reasonable diligence.

S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-45.

The South Carolina Supreme Court has held that the statute of limitations shall apply to all applications filed after July 1, 1996. Peloquin v. State, 321 S.C. 468, 469 S.E.2d 606 (1996). A motion for summary judgment may properly be used to raise the defense of the statute of limitations. McDonnell v. Consolidated School District of Aiken, 315 S.C. 487, 445 S.E.2d 638 (1994). Additionally, S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-70(c) authorizes the Court to “grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of [an] application when it appears from the pleadings . . . that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

In the present case, Applicant is alleging he is entitled to post-conviction relief based on an various allegations. However, Applicant failed to comply with the filing requirements under S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-45. Applicant was sentenced on June 25, 2003. Applicant did not appeal his conviction and sentence. The application was, therefore, due to be filed on or before June 25, 2004.

This application was not filed until January 23, 2024—nearly 20 years after the statutory filling period expired.

Accordingly, this application is *untimely* pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-45 and shall be dismissed for failure to file within the time mandated by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act.

Summary Dismissal Based on Successiveness

Respondent moved this Court to summarily dismiss the application because it is successive to Applicant's previous PCR application. Courts disfavor successive applications and place the burden on applicants to establish that any new ground raised in a subsequent application could not have been earlier raised in a previous application. Foxworth v. State, 275 S.C. 615, 274 S.E.2d 415 (1981); Arnold v. State, 309 S.C. 157, 420 S.E.2d 834 (1992). Section 17-27-90 of the South Carolina Code states:

All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this chapter must be raised in his original, supplemental, or amended application. Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any other proceeding Applicant has taken to secure relief, may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended application.

Under this statute, successive post-conviction relief applications are forbidden unless an applicant can indicate a “sufficient reason” why new grounds for relief were not raised or were not properly raised in previous applications. Aice v. State, 305 S.C. 448, 409 S.E.2d 392 (1991). Any new ground raised in a subsequent application is limited to those grounds that “could not have been raised ... in the previous application.” Id. at 450, 409 S.E.2d at 394. If Applicant could have raised these allegations in a previous application, then Applicant may not raise those grounds in successive applications. Id. Applicant bears the burden of showing the allegations could not have

been previously raised. Land v. State, 274 S.C. 243, 262 S.E.2d 735 (1980).

Applicant's current allegations *were or could have been* raised in the proceedings based on Applicant's prior application(s) for post-conviction relief; thus, the current application is successive and barred under S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-90. Applicant has failed to establish any sufficient reason why he could not have raised his current allegations in his previous application(s) for post-conviction relief. Therefore, he has failed to meet the burden imposed upon him.

Therefore, the Application shall be summarily dismissed as successive to Applicant's previous PCR application.

Summary Dismissal Based on the Doctrine of Res Judicata

Additionally, Respondent moved this Court to summarily dismiss this application because it is barred by the doctrine of *res judicata*. Bell v. Bennett, 307 S.C. 286, 414 S.E.2d 786 (Ct. App. 1992). A final judgment on the merits of a prior action bars subsequent consideration of those issues in a new action. Foran v. USAA Casualty Ins. Co., 311 S.C. 189, 427 S.E.2d 918 (Ct. App. 1993). *Res judicata* also bars any issues that could have been raised in the former action. Id.; see also Foxworth v. State, 275 S.C. 615, 274 S.E.2d 415 (1981).

Applicant had a full opportunity to litigate any and all of his allegations in his *prior* PCR actions. The prior PCR Court issued final judgments on the merits of the same or similar issues Applicant raises in this successive action. The finality of the previous court's rulings should be respected, and the application should be summarily dismissed as barred by the doctrine of *res judicata*.

Summary Dismissal Based on the Equitable Doctrine of Laches

Respondent moved this Court to summarily dismiss the application because it is barred by the equitable doctrine of *laches*. To ensure the finality of litigation, our courts require reasonable

diligence in pursuing collateral relief. McElrath v. State, 276 S.C. 282, 283, 277 S.E.2d 890 (1981). Requiring reasonable diligence “guards the state’s legitimate expectation that it will not be called upon without due cause, to defend the integrity of convictions that occurred many years ago, where records and witnesses are no longer available.” Id. (quoting Honeycutt v. Ward, 612 F.2d 36, 42 (2nd Cir. 1979)). Where an applicant for post-conviction relief fails to exercise reasonable diligence, the State may seek the summary dismissal through the equitable doctrine of laches, which is defined as “neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, under circumstances affording opportunity for diligence, to do what in law should have been done.” Bray v. State, 366 S.C. 137, 140, 620 S.E.2d 743, 745 (2005) (quoting Whitehead v. State, 352 S.C. 215, 219, 574 S.E.2d 200, 202 (2002)). “Whether a claim is barred by laches is to be determined in light of the facts of each case, taking into consideration whether the delay has worked injury, prejudice, or disadvantage to the other party; delay alone in assertion of right does not constitute laches.” Id.

Applicant seeks post-conviction relief nearly *twenty years* after his conviction. Absent some explanation or justification for the delay in seeking post-conviction relief, laches will prevent an applicant from seeking collateral review of his conviction, significantly where the delay affects the availability of evidence to review the applicant’s claims. McElrath, 276 S.C. at 283, 277 S.E.2d at 890. Applicant has offered no legitimate justification for the delay. Because of the delay, witness memories, and physical evidence will have naturally faded and degraded. See e.g., Bray, 366 S.C. at 140, 620 S.E.2d at 745 (affirming PCR judge’s ruling that laches barred belated review of denial of PCR seven years after PCR hearing was held); State v. Serrette, 375 S.C. 650, 654 S.E.2d 554 (Ct. App. 2007) (declining to remand for reconstruction of record noting such remedy “would undoubtedly be futile considering the passage of over ten years’ time” when the

delay was caused by appellant). As a result, Applicant's delay in bringing this action has affected the availability of evidence for this Court to review his claims. Therefore, this application shall be summarily dismissed as barred by the equitable doctrine of *laches*.

Frustration of Finality of Convictions

As a final matter, both the United States Supreme Court and the South Carolina Supreme Court have emphasized the necessity for finality of litigation in criminal cases. The Court in Aice explained that:

Finality must be realized at some point in order to achieve a semblance of effectiveness in dispensing justice. At some juncture judicial review must stop, with only the very rarest of exceptions, when the system has simply failed a defendant and where to continue the defendant's imprisonment without review would amount to a gross miscarriage of justice. . . . [Here], Aice seeks to have more than one procedural "bite" at the apple. Aice has filed an original PCR application and has been allowed to seek review of the ruling against him. We refuse to grant his request for a second chance, and again we do so in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act and rules.

305 S.C. at 451–52, 409 S.E.2d at 394–95 (citations omitted).

“[T]he principle of finality . . . is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system. Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect.” Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989). “Relitigation of a conviction is a rear-view mirror, while a respect for finality encourages those in custody to contemplate the future prospect of ‘becoming a constructive citizen.’” United States v. Fugit, 703 F.3d 248, 252 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 262 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring)). In his concurring and dissenting opinion in Mackey v. United States, Justice Harlan wrote:

Finality in the criminal law is an end which must always be kept in plain view. . . . At some point, the criminal process, if it is to function at all, must turn its attention from whether a man ought properly to be incarcerated to how he is to be treated once convicted. If law,

criminal or otherwise, is worth having and enforcing, it must at some time provide a definitive answer to the question litigants present or else it never provides an answer at all. Surely it is an unpleasant task to strip a man of his freedom and subject him to institutional restraints. But this does not mean that in so doing, we should always be halting or tentative. No one, not criminal defendants, not the judicial system, not society as a whole is benefited by a judgment providing that a man shall tentatively go to jail today, but tomorrow and every day thereafter his continued incarceration shall be subject to fresh litigation.

401 U.S. 667, 691 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part). Seven years after Mackey, the South Carolina Supreme Court quoted Justice Harlan's opinion with approval in Anderson v. Leeke, 271 S.C. 435, 441-42, 248 S.E.2d 120, 123 (1978). Applicant's attempt to relitigate his successive and time-barred application is contrary to the recognized need for finality of litigation. Therefore, Applicant's claims should be dismissed.

[CONCLUSION AND SIGNATURE ON FOLLOWING PAGE]

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Kevin Lamont Lee | Conditional Order of Dismissal | 2024-CP-23-0478


CONCLUSION

Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-70(b), the Court intends to dismiss this application with prejudice unless Applicant provides specific reasons, factual or legal, why the application should not be dismissed in its entirety. Applicant is granted twenty (20) days from the date of service of this Order upon him to show why this Order should not become final. Applicant shall file any reasons he may have with the Greenville County Clerk of Court and shall serve opposing counsel at the following address:

Office of the Attorney General
PCR Division – 13th Circuit
P.O. Box 11549
Columbia, South Carolina 29211

Applicant is cautioned that his response to this order must be actually received by the Greenville County Clerk of Court and opposing counsel within twenty (20) days from the date of the service of this Order and that the Court will not consider any issues raised in his response if not so timely filed and served.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED this 11 day of March, 2026.


JESSICA ANN SALVINI
Chief Administrative Judge
Thirteenth Judicial Circuit

Greenville, South Carolina

Copy mailed to
Attorney <u>general / Applicant</u>
on <u>3</u> / <u>11</u> / <u>2026</u>

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