

RECEIVED

Oct 05 2026

SC Court of Appeals

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In the Court of Appeals

APPEAL FROM GREENVILLE COUNTY
The Honorable Jane H. Merrill, Circuit Court Judge

Appellate Case No. 2025-002337
Trial Court Case No. 2023-GS-23-00988

The State,

Respondent,

v.

Aaron Messiah Hodari Harper,

Appellant.

APPELLANT'S INITIAL REPLY BRIEF

Michael G. Martinez, Esq.
Assistant Public Defender
THIRTEENTH CIRCUIT PUBLIC DEFENDER
305 E. North Street
Greenville, SC 29601
Telephone: (864) 467-8375
MMartinez@greenvillecounty.org

Attorney for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CASES	ii
ARGUMENT IN REPLY.....	1
I. The circuit court erred by improperly weighing the evidence and refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter when there was evidence to support the charge	1
II. The circuit court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial due to the solicitor’s inflammatory comment to show no mercy during closing argument	9
III. The circuit court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial when a juror experiencing obvious emotional turmoil expressed clear hesitancy in her verdict, signaling a non-unanimous verdict, during improper jury polling and individualized questioning	11
CONCLUSION	13

TABLE OF CASES, STATUTES, AND OTHER AUTHORITIES

CASES

<i>Herron v. Century BMW</i> , 395 S.C. 461, 719 S.E.2d 640 (2011).....	9-10
<i>Humphries v. State</i> , 351 S.C. 362, 570 S.E.2d 160 (2002).....	10
<i>State v. Cole</i> , 338 S.C. 97, 525 S.E.2d 511 (2000)	2-3
<i>State v. Gardner</i> , 319 S.C. 97, 64 S.E.2d 130 (1951).....	2, 7-8
<i>Leggette v. State</i> , 440 S.C. 590, 892 S.E.2d 153 (Ct. App. 2022)	4-6
<i>State v. Locklair</i> , 341 S.C. 352, 535 S.E.2d 420 (2000).....	4, 8
<i>State v. Niles</i> , 412 S.C. 515, 772 S.E.2d 877 (2015)	5-6
<i>State v. Patterson</i> , 337 S.C. 215, 522 S.E.2d 845 (Ct. App. 1999)	9
<i>State v. Pittman</i> , 373 S.C. 527, 647 S.E.2d 144 (2007).....	2, 6-7
<i>State v. Rogers</i> , 320 S.C. 520, 466 S.E.2d 360 (1996)	5
<i>State v. Sams</i> , 410 S.C. 303, 764, S.E.2d 511 (2014).....	1
<i>State v. Singleton</i> , 319 S.C. 312, 460 S.E.2d 573 (1995)	11
<i>State v. Starnes</i> , 388 S.C. 590, 698 S.E.2d 604 (2010).....	1-2
<i>State v. Walker</i> , 324 S.C. 257, 478 S.E.2d 280 (1996).....	1-2
<i>State v. Wilson</i> , 389 S.C. 579, 698 S.E.2d 862 (Ct. App. 2010).....	9

ARGUMENT

I. The circuit court erred by improperly weighing the evidence and refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter when there was evidence to support the charge.

The State's brief commits the same error the circuit court committed during trial by improperly weighing the evidence, claiming that Aaron's statement was a "questionable account," "self-serving," and "insufficient" evidence to support a voluntary manslaughter instruction. *See Respondent's Br.* at 12. Such arguments erroneously invade the province of the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the evidence presented and ignore the correct standard the circuit court was bound to follow. The standard for determining whether to instruct a jury on a lesser included offense is *any* evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, not *unquestioned* evidence or evidence that is not deemed by the State to be "self-serving." *State v. Starnes*, 388 S.C. 590, 596, 698 S.E.2d 604, 608 (2010); *State v. Sams*, 410 S.C. 303, 308, 764 S.E.2d 511, 513 (2014). The very notion of whether evidence is "sufficient" or "insufficient" demonstrates an improper weighing of the evidence and a departure from the determination of whether *any* evidence exists. *See SUFFICIENCY, Merriam-Webster Dictionary*, last visited Oct. 5, 2026 (defining sufficiency as "the quality or state of being *adequate*, or having an *amount* that is *enough* to meet a specific need or purpose" (emphases added)).

A. Heat of Passion

The State's brief predominantly relies on the Supreme Court's decision in *State v. Walker*, 324 S.C. 257, 478 S.E.2d 280 (1996). Yet, *Walker* is distinguishable on its facts. The defendant in *Walker* extensively described his state of mind at the time and his intention and desire to "get away from [the victim]" and allow the tension and conflict with her to "simmer down." *Id.* at 259, 478 S.E.2d at 280-81 (noting the defendant's attempt to "diffuse" the

situation). In contrast, Aaron stated that he “blanked out” after being threatened with firearms and “ain’t know what the fuck happened. *I’m just like, I see gun. Motherfucker point a gun at me. Boom boom boom boom boom, go on and get the fuck out.*” State’s Exh. 25 at 53:10 to 53:17 (emphases added); *cf. Starnes*, 388 S.C. 590, 698 S.E.2d 604 (finding voluntary manslaughter instruction not appropriate because the defendant’s fear “alone” did not establish heat of passion).

Although Aaron’s statement that he “blanked out” is a significant element of his state of mind and evidence of heat of passion, it was not the *sole* evidence about his state of mind. *See Appellant’s Br.* at 5-8 (outlining the numerous expressions in Aaron’s interview of what was going through his mind at the time after being threatened with firearms, more than satisfying the any evidence standard as to heat of passion). Additionally, unlike what Aaron experienced here, the defendant in *Walker* was faced only with the victim allegedly running at him—not a threat with a deadly weapon, a significantly different encounter. *See id.* at 259, 478 S.E.2d at 280-81.

Further, the State’s argument that Aaron’s return to the bathroom itself showed coolness and control is simply an expression of the eye of the beholder. Aaron’s actions equally demonstrate “an uncontrollable impulse to do violence.” Yet, this is precisely the type of assessment of the evidence that should be left to the jury. *See State v. Gardner*, 319 S.C. 97, 104-05, 64 S.E.2d 130, 134-35 (1951) (reasoning that resolving multiple conflicting constructions of evidence should be left to a jury). Furthermore, the seventeen seconds that elapsed from the time he left the bathroom to when he stormed back to it is a remarkably short amount of time and consistent with a person succumbing to an “uncontrollable urge to do violence,” rather than a deliberate, controlled action. *Cf. State v. Pittman*, 373 S.C. 527, 647 S.E.2d 144 (2007) (finding a lack of heat of passion due to a cooling off period of at least ten minutes); *State v. Cole*, 388 S.C.

97, 525 S.E.2d 511 (2000) (finding a lack of heat of passion when a three to four-minute cooling off period elapsed).

The State also points to the surveillance footage, which the State claims shows Aaron “*calmly* talking to people and walking around outside the men’s bathroom” *Respondent’s Br.* at 18 (emphasis added). The State’s argument entirely speculates that Aaron was “calm” during the mere seventeen seconds between being threatened with firearms by the same individuals who shot him less than a year before and returning to that bathroom. Again, the State’s argument is *characterizing* the evidence, which would be proper in a closing argument but exceeds the determination of whether there was *any* evidence to support the lesser offense.

The surveillance footage the State’s argument relies on lacks any audio and Aaron is wearing a hat and a gaiter mask that predominantly covered his face. Nothing in the surveillance video reflects what Aaron may have been actually experiencing internally or what he sounded like. At no point during the trial did the State elect to call Tienna Smith or Devonte Lark to testify about Aaron’s demeanor, tone of voice, or temperament during that time frame. The *only* indication of Aaron’s state of mind comes from Aaron himself. *See e.g.*, State’s Exh. 25 at 33:47 to 34:15 (“I come out the bathroom. When I’m coming out the bathroom. I turn around like that. Before I even open the door. I turn around like that. *I just realizing, like damn, who the fuck these niggas really is. These niggas done, they done pulled out on me.* Phew phew phew. So I go outside. I do just like this. *I tell Tie. . . . Tie, like Go. Leave. Right now. Leave.*” (emphases added)); *id.* at 53:10 to 53:17 (“*I just blanked out, I ain’t know what the fuck happened. I’m just like, I see gun. Motherfucker point a gun at me. Boom boom boom boom boom, go on and get the fuck out.*” (emphases added)).

Aaron’s description of what happened that night and what he was experiencing, including the statement just quoted, constitutes the existence of evidence about Aaron’s state of mind and specifically the heat of passion. Any argument about what the surveillance footage may show simply delves into a credibility determination best reserved for a jury.

B. Source of the Provocation

The State also argues that Aaron is attempting to “transform the doctrine of legal provocation requiring an overt, threatening act coming from the victim into an amorphous, ill-defined concept that at least in this case essentially means guilt by association.” Aaron has made no such attempt. Instead, Aaron seeks the logical application of the rule that legal provocation supporting voluntary manslaughter must come “from some act of *or related to* the victim.” See *State v. Locklair*, 341 S.C. 352, 362, 535 S.E.2d 420, 425 (2000); see also *Leggette v. State*, 440 S.C. 590, 892 S.E.2d 153 (Ct. App. 2022).

Aaron’s actions were directly and sufficiently provoked by Mr. McDuffie because he was part of the overall threatening group that was threatening him with firearms, analogous to the defendant in *Leggette*. There, testimony from Leggette and others indicated that a group that included Tisdale and Ingram “rushed up on [Leggette] out of nowhere,” that Leggette heard someone behind him make a threatening comment, and when he turned around Ingram and Tisdale were a few feet away, and Leggette saw Ingram reach for his waist, which prompted Leggette to pull his gun and shoot several times. *Id.* at 594–98, 892 S.E.2d at 155–58. This Court found a voluntary manslaughter charge was appropriate despite the fact that Ingram, and not the victim, Tisdale, was the one that Leggette believed was reaching for a gun because “[a]lthough Petitioner’s testimony established the main provocation on the night of the shooting came from Ingram, *Tisdale accompanied Ingram* in following Petitioner and both were *clearly part of the*

approaching, threatening westside group.” Id. at 604, 892 S.E.2d at 161 (emphases added). The State’s brief makes no attempt to distinguish the facts in *Leggette* to the facts here, which are, in fact, directly analogous and voluntary manslaughter should have been charged as it was there.

The State cites to several cases in support its contention that Mr. McDuffie did not engage in any conduct that constituted sufficient legal provocation, but none are persuasive in these circumstances. First, in *State v. Rogers*, the Supreme Court held a voluntary manslaughter instruction was not appropriate when the defendant’s own statement alluded only to racist comments and the victim’s father “leaning” into his truck because “mere words, no matter how opprobrious, are insufficient to constitute adequate legal provocation when death is caused by the use of a deadly weapon.” 320 S.C. 520, 525-26, 466 S.E.2d 360, 362-63 (1996). Here, Aaron told Investigator McHale that he was threatened several times *with firearms* while inside the bathroom, a fundamentally different encounter than shooting and killing someone after being threatened solely with “mere words.” See State’s Exh. 25 at 22:15 to 22:22; 24:17 to 26:20; 27:50 to 31:45; 32:31 to 36:00; 39:05 to 39:25; 41:43 to 43:03; 50:40 to 50:51; 53:10 to 54:20; 55:23 to 59:40; 1:00:00 to 1:04:10.

Next, *State v. Niles* involved two hotly-contested versions of events where the defendant ultimately shot and killed a person from whom he was buying marijuana. 412 S.C. 515, 772 S.E.2d 877 (2015). The defendant and co-defendant differed significantly on what happened and whose idea it was to rob the victim. *Id.* The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that voluntary manslaughter was not appropriate because the defendant’s testimony that he did not want to hurt the victim but was merely attempting to stop the victim from shooting at his car focused on who the aggressor was in the encounter, “apparently to support [his] theory of self-defense.” *Id.* at 522-24, 772 S.E.2d at 880-81.

This case differs from *Niles* because Aaron admitted to deliberately firing the five gunshots out of fear and anger and disbelief that the same men who almost killed him had again threatened him with firearms. See State's Exh. 25 at 30:12 to 30:30 ("Once y'all pull your guns out, like y'all fitting to do something to me, *I'm not going for it. I done been shot already.* I got a bullet hole in me still. If they remove the bullet hole, I'm going to die. *I'm not going for this shit again.*" (emphases added); *id.* at 33:47 to 34:15 ("When I'm coming out the bathroom. I turn around like that. Before I even open the door. I turn around like that. *I just realizing, like damn, who the fuck these niggas really is. These niggas done, they done pulled out on me.*" (emphasis added)).

The State places undue emphasis on Aaron's regret that he killed Mr. McDuffie and his statement that he was not *intending* to kill *him*. A person can simultaneously regret taking an action and its consequences without eliminating the underlying justification for the action. Aaron's expressions of regret do not change the fact that he was legally provoked when he was threatened with firearms by people who had shot him less than a year earlier. The question here is the existence of evidence that Mr. McDuffie was *part of the source* of the provocation, a question that *Leggette* answers affirmatively. Just like Tisdale was not the intended target in *Leggette* but was still a source of the sufficient legal provocation, Mr. McDuffie can simultaneously be part of the source of the provocation while Aaron did not intend to kill him and has serious regret and remorse for doing so. See *Leggette*, 440 S.C. at 604, 892 S.E.2d at 161.

Even *State v. Pittman*, 373 S.C. 527, 647 S.E.2d 144 (2007), another case cited favorably by the State, actually weakens its argument because it demonstrates a distinction between *Leggette* and therefore this case. There, the defendant was charged with the murders of his

grandfather and grandmother, and the Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter for both victims. *Id.* at 570-76, 647 S.E.2d at 166-70. Critically, the Supreme Court held there was not sufficient legal provocation for the killing of his *grandmother* because the defendant's statement attributed his reason for killing them was because his *grandfather* beat him with a paddle. *Id.* at 573-74, 647 S.E.2d at 168. The Court effectively assumed sufficient legal provocation existed for the grandfather's killing but found the passage of at least ten minutes between the beating and the killings demonstrated a lack of heat of passion. *Id.* at 573-76, 647 S.E.2d at 168-69.

That is distinguishable from the circumstances here where Aaron was threatened with firearms—an indisputably deadly weapon—by the same people who had nearly killed him a year earlier, and Mr. McDuffie was not only standing directly next to these men as they engaged in these violent threats but he was “always” with these same men. *See* Tr. 492, ll. 13-21; Tr. 497, l. 16 – 498, l. 2; Tr. 502, l. 13 – 503, l. 6; State's Exh. 25 at 27:45 to 29:00; 29:30 to 30:00; 31:15 to 31:45; 33:28 to 33:35; 34:57 to 36:00; 49:52 to 50:15; 53:43 to 53:38. A person who is married to and lives with someone who even exceeds the bounds of permissible corporal punishment but was not present for or participated in the excessive corporal punishment is distinctively different from an individual who surrounds himself with violent people who have shot people in the past and continues to stand directly next to them when they threaten other people with firearms. *Cf. Pittman*, 373 S.C. 527, 647 S.E.2d 144. The grandmother in *Pittman* stands in much different shoes than Mr. McDuffie.

The State also misreads *State v. Gardner*, 319 S.C. 97, 64 S.E.2d 130 (1951). Contrary to the State's brief, the Supreme Court *reversed* the defendant's conviction when the trial court failed to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter despite conflicting views of the evidence

because the determination what the evidence showed was a matter for a jury. *Id.* at 104-05, 64 S.E.2d at 134-35. The Court reasoned:

[A] jury would still be warranted under the evidence in concluding that he assaulted and stabbed [his wife] in a fit of anger because she refused to withdraw the charge of non-support. Under this view of the evidence, a sufficient legal provocation would be wholly lacking. *But is this the only inference to be drawn from appellant's testimony?* He says that his wife 'jumped on me' and 'me and her got into it.' These expressions can reasonably be construed as meaning nothing more than that appellant's wife severely reprimanded or violently censured him, and that they became engaged in a heated argument. *On the other hand*, they might be subject to the construction that there was some overt, threatening act or a physical encounter. At least there is sufficient doubt thereabout, we think, to *warrant submission to the jury of the question of manslaughter.*

Id. (emphases added). As in *Gardner*, the circuit court here erred in refusing to submit voluntary manslaughter to the jury because it improperly infringed on the jury's role to weigh the evidence.

Finally, the Supreme Court in *State v. Locklair*, 341 S.C. 352, 535 S.E.2d 420 (2000) held voluntary manslaughter was not appropriate for several reasons, but the facts there actually support Aaron's argument, not the State's. First, the victim had at most gotten "smart" with the defendant, and the Supreme Court reiterated that sufficient legal provocation is not established by words alone when death is caused by a deadly weapon and that a person getting "smart" would not produce an uncontrollable impulse to do violence. *Id.* at 360-61, 535 S.E.2d at 425. Second, the act of the victim's mother throwing a cigarette case at him occurred *after* he grabbed the gun to kill the victim—an act definitively cannot *provoke* a killing when it happens after the defendant has already decided to commit the killing. *Id.* at 362-63, 535 S.E.2d at 425-26. Critically, however, the victim had "started to walk off" *prior* to her mother throwing the cigarette case; therefore, the legal provocation could not have been "of or *related to the victim.*" *Id.* This is distinguishable from Mr. McDuffie being "homeboys with" and "always around" the

three men who had shot Aaron ten months earlier and then actively standing by those same men as they threatened Aaron with firearms in the bathroom. Tr. 492, ll. 13-21; Tr. 497, l. 16 – 498, l. 2; Tr. 502, l. 13 – 503, l. 6; State’s Exh. 25 at 27:45 to 29:00; 29:30 to 30:00; 31:15 to 31:45; 33:28 to 33:35; 34:57 to 36:00; 49:52 to 50:15; 53:43 to 53:38.

Evidence existed on each element of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter and the circuit court erred in improperly weighing the evidence and refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter.

II. The circuit court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial due to the solicitor’s inflammatory comment to show no mercy during closing argument.

As an initial matter, Aaron properly objected to any curative instruction, stating “so we’d object to a curative instruction. I think, *to preserve our objection*, we have to move for a mistrial.” Tr. 616, l. 24 – 617, l. 1. Aaron was very clearly arguing that *any* curative instruction was insufficient to cure the significant prejudice caused by the Solicitor’s improper comment during closing argument. *See State v. Patterson*, 337 S.C. 215, 226, 522 S.E.2d 845, 850 (Ct. App. 1999) (“Because a trial court’s curative instruction is considered to cure any error regarding improper testimony, a party must contemporaneously object to a curative instruction as insufficient *or* move for a mistrial to preserve an issue for review.” (emphasis added)). Given Aaron’s argument regarding the comment being “patently inappropriate,” Aaron both objected to any curative instruction being sufficient *and* moved for a mistrial, thereby complying with *Patterson*. *See also State v. Wilson*, 389 S.C. 579, 583, 698 S.E.2d 862, 864 (Ct. App. 2010) (“When an objecting party is sustained, the trial court has rendered a favorable ruling, and therefore, it becomes necessary that the sustained party move to cure, *or* move for a mistrial if such a cure is insufficient, in order to create an appealable issue.” (emphasis added)); *See Herron v. Century BMW*, 395 S.C. 461, 470, 719 S.E.2d 640, 644 (2011) (“We are mindful of the need

to approach issue preservation rules with a practical eye and not in a rigid, hyper-technical manner.”).

As to the merits, the State contends that the circuit court did not err because the comment was at the end of a “routine closing argument following the presentation of overwhelming evidence.” First, this was a trial of overwhelming evidence *only* if one ignores the actual dispute in the case. The State certainly presented voluminous evidence to prove Aaron’s identity as the person who shot Mr. McDuffie, a fact that Aaron admitted in his interview with law enforcement and conceded in his opening statement. *See* Tr. 171, l. 12 – 172, l. 8. Yet, the question for the jury was whether this killing was done with malice aforethought, an issue far from being proved by overwhelming evidence given the violent threats Aaron faced in the bathroom seventeen seconds earlier from the same people who nearly killed him and Aaron’s statement about his state of mind and why he re-entered that bathroom.

The Solicitor’s inflammatory comment for the jury to show no mercy to Aaron encouraged the jury to improperly decide the case on emotion. Because of the circuit court’s error in refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter, the jury was deliberating solely on whether Aaron was guilty of murder—whether he killed Mr. McDuffie with malice aforethought—thereby giving the jury the difficult task of deciding whether to set free a person who admitted to a killing but argued it was not done with malice. In this context, in which the significance of the violent threat that propelled Aaron back into the bathroom was weakened by Aaron’s inability to argue to the jury that he was guilty of voluntary manslaughter, the Solicitor’s comment served to inflame the jury against Aaron and render a verdict based on the belief that mercy or the lack thereof had any relevance to whether Aaron killed Mr. McDuffie with malice aforethought.

The Solicitor's comments alone and in conjunction with the circuit court's failure to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter "so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." *See Humphries v. State*, 351 S.C. 362, 373, 570 S.E.2d 160, 166 (2002).

III. The circuit court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial when a juror experiencing obvious emotional turmoil expressed clear hesitancy in her verdict, signaling a non-unanimous verdict, during improper jury polling and individualized questioning of the juror.

The State contends initially that any argument about the specific manner of questioning is not preserved for review. From the moment the initial polling was completed, Aaron raised the issue of Juror 201's "marked hesitation" and contended the juror's reaction demonstrated a non-unanimous verdict. Tr. 660, ll. 3-12. Following the individualized questioning, Aaron immediately moved for a mistrial, arguing that "it's like we're forcing her under duress to make a decision." Tr. 662, ll. 5-9. Aaron's arguments on this issue centered around Juror 201's response to questioning and an environment that appeared coercive and as though the circuit court and the process it undertook was forcing Juror 201 under duress to render a guilty verdict. While Aaron did not expressly object to the manner of questioning, his objection and basis for a mistrial was clearly conveyed that the totality of the circumstances indicated that Juror 201 appeared to be under duress to render a verdict, eliminating the existence of a unanimous verdict.

The State further argues that this case is controlled by *State v. Singleton*, 319 S.C. 312, 460 S.E.2d 73 (1995) and any distinctions strengthen the State's case. First, the State suggests that it is de facto less coercive for a trial court to conduct private questioning of a juror rather than before the full jury. This is not as obvious an answer as the State suggests. Juror 201 was singled out and instructed by a bailiff to come to the courtroom, where she was directed to stand before the Court for questioning. It would be wholly reasonable for a juror in such circumstances

to feel pressured and worried that she had done something wrong. Most jurors' only experience with the judicial system is during their jury service, and the judge's role as the person in control is abundantly clear. Private questioning by a judge regarding a juror's verdict should not be minimized and is not categorically less coercive than questioning before the full jury. The specific manner and circumstances of the questioning itself dictates its propriety.

The totality of the circumstances here, including the interruptions during Juror 201's attempt to answer the circuit court's questioning, Juror 201's clear emotional distress during the initial polling and subsequent private questioning, and the manner of questioning itself, are relevant in determining the propriety of the procedure utilized. In the circumstances here, the circuit court erred in denying Aaron's motion for a mistrial because the totality of the circumstances demonstrated the lack of a unanimous verdict. Juror 201's responses to the circuit court during the individualized questioning that her verdict then and now was guilty—while sobbing—cannot be separated from the circumstances that led to those responses. Despite those verbal and non-verbal responses, Juror 201's clear emotional distress and "marked hesitation" casts serious doubt on the unanimity of the verdict. As a result, the circuit court erred in denying Aaron's motion for a mistrial.

CONCLUSION

This Court should find that the circuit court improperly applied the any evidence standard when determining whether to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter and should therefore reverse Aaron's convictions and remand for a new trial. Additionally, this Court should find the circuit court erred in denying the motions for a mistrial for the solicitor's improper closing argument and in light of the juror's responses to polling and individualized questioning following the verdict.

Respectfully submitted,

s/ Michael G. Martinez

Michael G. Martinez, Esq.

Assistant Public Defender

THIRTEENTH CIRCUIT PUBLIC DEFENDER

305 E. North Street

Greenville, SC 29601

Telephone: (864) 467-8375

MMartinez@greenvillecounty.org

Attorney for Appellant

October 5, 2026