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S.C. SUPREME COURT

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court

APPEAL FROM FLORENCE COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas

The Honorable George M. McFaddin, Jr., Post-Conviction Relief Court Judge

Case No. 2019-CP-21-00545

Miranda D. Sabb, #377544 Respondent,

v.

State of South Carolina,Petitioner.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

The State of South Carolina appeals the Honorable George M. McFaddin's order granting post-conviction relief filed on July 14, 2025. The State filed a timely motion to reconsider, alter, or amend pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCRCP, which Judge McFaddin denied by written order filed on September 14, 2026, and received on September 15, 2026. Copies of both orders are attached hereto.

October 8, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

ALAN WILSON
Attorney General

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Other counsel of record:
Jonathan D. Waller, Esquire
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156 Laurens Street NW
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Attorney for Applicant Miranda D. Sabb

By:  Esq.
Attorneys for Petitioner

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF FLORENCE

) IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
) TWELFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

FILED

Miranda Denise Sabb, #377544,

2025 JUL 14 P 2:40

C.A. No. 2019-CP-21-00545

Applicant, DORIS POULOS O'HARA
CCCP & GS
FLORENCE COUNTY, SC

v.

**ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF**

State of South Carolina,

Respondent.

This matter comes before the Court by way of an application for post-conviction relief (PCR) filed by Miranda Denise Sabb (Applicant) on February 25, 2019. Applicant filed an Amendment to Application for Post Conviction Relief on October 24, 2022. Respondent made its Return and Partial Motion to Dismiss on May 10, 2019. An evidentiary hearing on the matter was convened on December 12, 2022, at the Florence County Courthouse. Applicant was present at the hearing and represented by Jonathan Waller, Esquire. D. Russell Barlow, II, Esquire, of the South Carolina Office of the Attorney General represented Respondent.

Applicant testified on her own behalf. Kevin Etheridge, Esquire, testified for the State. The Court had before it the plea transcript, the Florence County Clerk of Court records, Applicant's records from the South Carolina Department of Corrections, Applicant's application with amendments, and Respondent's Return and Partial Motion to Dismiss.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Applicant is incarcerated with the South Carolina Department of Corrections pursuant to the Florence County Clerk of Court's orders of commitment. Applicant was indicted at the June 2018 term of the Florence County Grand Jury for felony driving under the influence (DUI) involving death,

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reckless vehicular homicide, and driving under suspension (DUS). Applicant was represented by Kevin R. Etheridge, Esquire, of The Gardner Law Firm (Counsel). On August 27, 2018, Applicant pleaded guilty to felony DUI involving death before the Honorable Thomas A. Russo. Applicant's plea was entered without negotiations or recommendations—straight-up. Judge Russo accepted Applicant's guilty plea and sentenced her to serve eighteen years' imprisonment and pay a \$15,000 fine. Applicant did not appeal her conviction or sentence.

ALLEGATIONS

In her Application and amendments, Applicant alleges she is being held in custody unlawfully for the following reasons:

1. Ineffective assistance of counsel
 - a. "Attorney failed to advise me that I should have gone to trial."
 - b. "Failed to insure that I receive[d] due process afforded by the state and U.S. Constitutions."
2. Newly Discovered Evidence
 - a. "Have since learned issues not presented at plea: Petitioner not at fault for wreck which is subject of this case."
3. Excessive Sentencing Due to Circumstances

At the commencement of the evidentiary hearing, counsel for Applicant indicated she would be proceeding on a claim of ineffective assistance of plea counsel and clarified that each of the above allegations would be presented as claims of ineffective assistance of plea counsel

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This Court has had the opportunity to review the record in its entirety and has heard the testimony and arguments presented at the PCR hearing. This Court has further had the opportunity to observe each witness who testified at the hearing, and to closely pass upon their credibility. This Court has weighed the testimony accordingly. Set forth below are the relevant findings of fact and conclusion of law as required by S.C. Code Ann. Sec. 17-27-80 (2003).

In a post-conviction relief action, the applicant bears the burden of proving the allegations in

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his or her application. Butler v. State, 286 S.C. 441, 442, 334 S.E.2d 813, 814 (1985). Where the application alleges ineffective assistance of counsel as a ground for relief, the applicant must prove that "counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Butler, 286 S.C. at 443, 334 S.E.2d at 814. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the PCR applicant must prove (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) the applicant sustained prejudice as a result of counsel's deficient performance. Id., at 687-88 ; Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 117-18 (1989). "The test for effective assistance of counsel is whether the representation was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Watson v. State, 287 S.C. 356 (1985). The courts presume that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Applicant must overcome this presumption in order to receive relief. Cherry, 300 S.C. at 118.

A defendant who pleads guilty on the advice of counsel may collaterally attack the plea only by showing that (1) counsel's performance was deficient and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the defendant would not have pled guilty. Johnson v. Catoe, 336 S.C. 354, 520 S.E.2d 617 (1999); Wolfe v. State, 326 S.C. 158, 485 S.E.2d 367 (1997); Satterwhite v. State, 325 S.C. 254, 481 S.E.2d 709 (1997). An applicant who enters a plea on the advice of counsel may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the plea by showing that trial counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for trial's errors, the defendant would not have pled guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial. See Roscoe v. State, 345 S.C. 16, 546 S.E.2d 417 (2001). Because the defendant waives several constitutional rights by pleading guilty, the Due Process Clause requires that guilty

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pleas are entered into voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709 (1969); Pittman v. State, 337 S.C. 597, 524 S.E.2d 623 (1999).

A. Ineffective Assistance of Plea Counsel

In this post-conviction relief (PCR) action, I grant Petitioner the relief she seeks. I preface, however, the reasons or reasons by stating that in a PCR action, this court, as it should, considers the trial-level or plea level actions Petitioner's attorney at that level. Thusly, generally this court's PCR rulings are not by counsels' actions at the PCR hearing level.

In this action, one of Petitioner's allegations is that her plea attorney's representation was ineffective. I agree. At the PCR hearing, Petitioner's plea attorney candidly stated that (1) he did not meet Petitioner before her plea; (2) he did not talk to her before the plea; (3) he did not discuss with Petitioner any defenses; and, (4) he did not discuss the trial process or going to trial with Petitioner. He further stated at the PCR hearing that he and Petitioner did not discuss the elements of the offense or the blood draw related to the felony DUI offense. Petitioner testified that she retained Johnny Etheridge, Esquire to represent her on her charges. She further testified that she met with Mr. Etheridge briefly when he was first retained and that she had talked with him on the telephone, but they were not able to fully discuss the evidence in the case as the full discovery had not been produced at the time of their conversations. Petitioner testified that, on the day of her plea, she believed that she was going to court for an appearance. She further testified that she was surprised when Kevin Etheridge, Esq., appeared in court and represented her during her plea. Finally, Petitioner testified that she and Kevin Etheridge did not discuss her constitutional rights, the merits of the case, potential defenses, or anything beyond a brief discussion of the sentencing she could expect following her plea. I find that plea counsel's performance fell below the noted

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standard of reasonableness, and that Petitioner was prejudiced by not being able to offer and give a plea “knowingly.”

It is undisputed that Kevin Etheridge was covering the case and court appearance for Johnny Etheridge, a member of the same firm, who was dealing with health issues that rendered his presence impossible. This court wishes to note that plea counsel found himself in a fast-moving plea situation, one that all trial lawyers find themselves in when representing defendants in criminal courts. Decisions often are made quickly. Nothing in this ruling is meant to condemn plea counsel.

Applicant further claims she has since learned of issues not presented at her plea hearing. Specifically, Applicant claims she has learned she was not at fault for causing the accident. Applicant’s allegation is refuted by the plea transcript. Further, no evidence was presented to this court that Johnny Etheridge failed to investigate the cause of the accident and the potential defenses available based on that investigation. The testimony to this court was simply that Applicant had no knowledge of any investigation and its results. “[C]riminal defense attorneys have a duty to undertake a reasonable investigation, which at a minimum includes interviewing potential witnesses and making an independent investigation of the facts and circumstances of the case.” Walker v. State, 397 S.C. 226, 235, 723 S.E.2d 610, 615 (Ct. App. 2012), overruled on other grounds by Walker v. State, 407 S.C. 400, 756 S.E.2d 744 (2014). Further, this would be an issue in the civil arena in a civil action. While the general discussion of causation and potential defenses should have taken place prior to her plea, as found above, the allegation is not an issue here. This court does not grant Petitioner relief based on this factor or allegation.

Additionally, Applicant’s claim of excessive sentencing is without merit. A trial court has broad discretion in imposing criminal sentences within the limits prescribed by law. State v.

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Franklin, 267 S.C. 240, 246 (1976); Clark v. State, 259 S.C. 378, 382-83 (1972). Courts normally have no discretion to correct a sentence given within statutory limits, absent a showing of an improper basis for the sentence. To be entitled to relief, Applicant must prove that the alleged excessive sentence was the result of partiality, prejudice, oppression or corrupt motive, or that the sentence constitutes per se cruel and unusual punishment. Clark, 259 S.C. at 210. Here, the plea court sentenced Applicant within the statutorily defined sentencing range. This court does not grant relief related to this allegation.

CONCLUSION

Based on all the forgoing, this Court finds and concludes Applicant has established deficiency in the representation of plea counsel. This Court also finds that Applicant was prejudiced by Counsel's representation. Therefore, this Applicant's Application for post-conviction relief is hereby granted and remanded to the Court of General Sessions for further proceedings consistent with this Order.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

1. The Application for Post Conviction Relief is hereby granted and Applicant's criminal case is hereby remanded to the Court of General Sessions;
2. Applicant shall be released from the Department of Corrections and transported to the

Florence County Detention Center for further proceedings consistent with this Order.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED this

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day of

George M. McFaddin, Jr.
Presiding Judge

[Signature], South Carolina

FILED
2025 JUL 14 PM 2:40
DORIS PULLOS O'HARA
CCJP & GS
FLORENCE COUNTY, SC

FORM 4

**STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF FLORENCE
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS**

**JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
CASE NUMBER 2019CP2100545**

Miranda Denise Sabb	FILED	South Carolina State Of	
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PLAINTIFF(S) Submitted by: <u>DORIS POULOS O'HARA</u> CC01008	DEFENDANT(S) Attorney for: ☐ Plaintiff ☐ Defendant ☐ Self-Represented Litigant
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DISPOSITION TYPE (CHECK ONE)

☐ **JURY VERDICT.** This action came before the court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and a verdict rendered.

☐ **DECISION BY THE COURT.** This action came to trial or hearing before the court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision rendered. ☐ See Page 2 for additional information.

☐ **ACTION DISMISSED (CHECK REASON):** ☐ Rule 12(b), SCRCP; ☐ Rule 41(a), SCRCP (Vol. Nonsuit);
☐ Rule 43(k), SCRCP (Settled); ☐ Other: _____

☐ **ACTION STRICKEN (CHECK REASON):** ☐ Rule 40(j) SCRCP; ☐ Bankruptcy;
☐ Binding arbitration, subject to right to restore to confirm, vacate or modify arbitration award; ☐ Other: _____

☐ **STAYED DUE TO BANKRUPTCY**

☐ **DISPOSITION OF APPEAL TO THE CIRCUIT COURT (CHECK APPLICABLE BOX):**
☐ Affirmed; ☐ Reversed; ☐ Remanded; ☐ Other: _____

NOTE: ATTORNEYS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR NOTIFYING LOWER COURT, TRIBUNAL, OR ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OF THE CIRCUIT COURT RULING IN THIS APPEAL.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: ☐ See attached order; (formal order to follow) ☐ Statement of Judgment by the Court:

ORDER INFORMATION

This order ☐ ends ☐ does not end the case.

Additional Information for the Clerk: _____

INFORMATION FOR THE JUDGMENT INDEX

Complete this section below when the judgment affects title to real or personal property or if any amount should be enrolled. If there is no judgment information, indicate "N/A" in one of the boxes below.

Judgment in Favor of (List name(s) below)	Judgment Against (List name(s) below)	Judgment Amount To be Enrolled (List amount(s) below)

If applicable, describe the property, including tax map information and address, referenced in the order: _____

The judgment information above has been provided by the submitting party. Disputes concerning the amounts contained in this form may be addressed by way of motion pursuant to the SC Rules of Civil Procedure. Amounts to be computed such as interest or additional taxable costs not available at the time the form and final order are submitted to the judge may be provided to the clerk.

Note: Title abstractors and researchers should refer to the official court order for judgment details.

E-Filing Note: In E-Filing counties, the Court will electronically sign this form using a separate electronic signature page.

Circuit Court Judge	Judge Code	Date <u>7/14/2025</u>
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For Clerk of Court Office Use Only

This judgment was entered on **July 14, 2025**, and a copy mailed first class or placed in the appropriate attorney's box on **July 15, 2025**, to attorneys of record or to parties (when appearing pro se) as follows:


Jonathan D Waller 156 Laurens Street NW Aiken, SC 29801

D. Russell Barlow II PO Box 11549 Columbia, SC 29211
Hand Delivered General Sessions Court
Hand Delivered Solicitor's Office

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE PLAINTIFF(S)

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE DEFENDANT(S)

Court Reporter



Doris Poulos O'Hara - Clerk of Court

Court Reporter:

E-Filing Note: In E-Filing counties, the date of Entry of Judgment is the same date as reflected on the Electronic File Stamp and the clerk's entering of the date of judgment above is not required in those counties. The clerk will mail a copy of the judgement to parties who are not E-Filers or who are appearing pro se. See Rule 77(d), SCRCP.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING DECISION BY THE COURT AS REFERENCED ON PAGE 1.

This action came to trial or hearing before the court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision rendered.

**STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF FLORENCE**

**COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
TWELFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT**

FILED

Miranda Denise Sabb, #377544,

Applicant,

vs.

State of South Carolina,

Respondent.

2025 SEP 14 P 3:57

C/A No.: 2019-CP-21-00545

DORIS POULOS O'HARA

CCCP & GS
FLORENCE COUNTY, SC

**ORDER DENYING STATE'S MOTION
TO RECONSIDER, ALTER, OR AMEND
PURSUANT TO RULE 59(e), SCRCP**

This matter comes before the Court by way of an application for post-conviction relief (PCR) filed by Miranda Denise Sabb (Applicant) on February 25, 2019. Applicant filed an Amendment to Application for Post Conviction Relief on October 24, 2022. Respondent made its Return and Partial Motion to Dismiss on May 10, 2019. An evidentiary hearing on the matter was convened on December 12, 2022, at the Florence County Courthouse. By Order filed July 14, 2025 (the "Order"), this Court granted Applicant relief. Respondent filed its Motion to Reconsider, Alter, or Amend Pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCRCP, on August 1, 2025. Applicant filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration on October 17, 2025. This Court has had the opportunity to review the record in its entirety and has further reviewed Respondent's Motion and Applicant's Memorandum in Opposition. Pursuant to Rule 59(f), SCRCP, and in its discretion, this Court denies Respondent's Motion, in whole, based on the briefs filed by the parties without oral argument. Set forth below are specific findings of the Court.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Applicant is incarcerated with the South Carolina Department of Corrections pursuant to the Florence County Clerk of Court's orders of commitment. Applicant was indicted at the June 2018



term of the Florence County Grand Jury for felony driving under the influence (DUI) involving death, reckless vehicular homicide, and driving under suspension (DUS). Applicant was represented by Kevin R. Etheridge, Esquire, of The Gardner Law Firm (“Plea Counsel”). On August 27, 2018, Applicant pleaded guilty to felony DUI involving death before the Honorable Thomas A. Russo. Applicant's plea was entered without negotiations or recommendations—straight-up. Judge Russo accepted Applicant's guilty plea and sentenced her to serve eighteen years' imprisonment and pay a \$15,000 fine. Applicant did not appeal her conviction or sentence.

RESPONDENT’S GROUNDS

In its Motion, Respondent argues the Court should reconsider, alter, or amend its Order for the following reasons:

1. Reconsideration Based on Factual Errors
2. Reconsideration Based on Multiple Legal Errors
 - a. This Court applied the incorrect standard in finding Applicant was prejudiced, and based on the standard laid out in Hill, Applicant failed to establish that but for Plea Counsel’s errors, she would have elected to proceed to trial.
 - b. Even if Plea Counsel failed to advise Applicant of various things prior to her plea, Plea Counsel’s deficiencies were cured by the plea court’s thorough colloquy with Applicant.
3. Motion to Amend Order to comply with Fishburne.

FINDINGS OF THE COURT

The Court finds that Respondent makes arguments for the first time in its 59(e) motion that were not presented to the Court during the PCR hearing. Those arguments have not been considered by this court. It has long been held that “[A] party cannot use a Rule 59(e)[, SCRCP] motion to advance an issue the party could have raised to the [trial] court prior to judgment, but did not.” *First Citizens Bank & Tr. Co., Inc. v. Taylor*, 431 S.C. 149, 162, 847 S.E.2d 249, 255–56 (Ct. App. 2020).



The record reflects Counsel for the Respondent made **no** argument to the court following the conclusion of testimony, cited **no** cases for the court to consider as guidance, and made **no** motion regarding Applicant's claims it now says are unsupported, factually and legally. Counsel for the Respondent made no motion for a nonsuit or directed verdict pursuant to Rules 41 (b) and 50, SCRCP at the conclusion of the hearing; the proper mechanism in the event that no evidence was presented at the hearing to support a claim or the alleged cause of action.

Further, upon reaching its decision regarding Applicant's claims for post-conviction relief, this Court instructed counsel for the Applicant to draft a proposed Order granting relief, and to provide counsel for the Respondent with a draft copy. This Court is confident that counsel for the Applicant complied with its instructions yet received no objection or request for additional language or findings from counsel for the Respondent prior to the entry of the Order granting relief.

Therefore, any issues, motions, objections, or arguments not presented to the Court at the PCR hearing, are waived and shall not be considered. The court cannot assume or anticipate arguments a party to any action before it will make.

FACTUAL ERRORS

Respondent asks this Court to reconsider its ruling based on "factual errors." In support, Respondent directs the Court to selected portions of both the transcript of the PCR hearing as well as to the transcript of Applicant's plea. Not only did the Court have an opportunity to hear the witness testimony and assess the credibility of same, but it also had in its possession, as part of the record in this case, a copy of the transcript from Applicant's plea hearing. The transcripts of both proceedings speak for themselves, and the testimony contained was considered in its entirety and not in the limited portions Respondent has selected and presented to the court. For example, Respondent's motion states that "Plea Counsel testified that he did not have an independent recollection of going over the breath



test or blood draw. (PCR Tr. pp. 37-38).” However, on cross examination, Plea Counsel testified “I do not believe so” when asked if he discussed the blood draw with Applicant. (PCR Tr. p. 45 l. 13). Plea Counsel gave an identical response when asked whether he discussed the timing of the administration of the breath test with Ms. Sabb. (PCR Tr. p. 45-46). As the finder of fact, this Court had all of the testimony and record it needed and did in fact consider the testimony in its entirety and pass upon the credibility of the witnesses.

Respondent asserts that Plea Counsel representation was “building on the work of prior attorneys”, arguing that any deficiencies in Plea Counsel’s representation as excusable because of the short time period of his representation and the fact that Applicant had prior representation. This Court rejects the assertion, as in the context of representing a defendant on criminal charges, any assumption that a prior attorney provided proper representation has the potential to lead to a violation of a defendant’s due process rights.

Further, Respondent was aware of Applicant having prior counsel yet failed to present those prior counsel as witnesses so that this Court could determine if the totality of representation Applicant received was sufficient. Respondent argues, without supporting testimony, that because Ms. Sabb was previously represented that she had a complete understanding of the charges, the evidence in the case, potential defenses, burden of proof, and procedures of trial. The testimony of Plea Counsel runs contrary to Respondent argument as he was asked where and how he obtained his copy of the file¹ and responded, “I’m assuming from the last attorney of record.” (PCR Tr. 47).

Respondent further argues that Applicant’s criminal history, including multiple prior DUI convictions, one of which by guilty plea, is relevant to its argument. This Court rejects Respondent’s assertions that Applicant, who has no formal legal training, knew or should have had an understanding

¹ Which he characterized as “a pretty hefty file.” (PCR Tr. p. 45, l. 20)



of the intricacies of the law in one of the more complicated and challenged areas of criminal law; sufficient enough to cure any deficiencies in Plea Counsel's representation.

Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration based on Factual Errors is DENIED.

LEGAL ERRORS

Respondent next asks this Court to reconsider its granting of Ms. Sabb's Application based upon Respondent's argument that the court did not apply the appropriate legal standard. As was stated above, counsel for Respondent failed to present **any** case law, argument, or legal standard to the court during the hearing. Again, "A party cannot for the first time raise an issue by way of a Rule 59(e) motion which could have been raised at trial." *Patterson v. Reid*, 318 S.C. 183, 456 S.E.2d 436, 437 (Ct. App. 1995).

Further, this Court considered a complete record as well as the testimony from the PCR hearing in which to base its ruling. In support, Respondent submits selected testimony of both applicant and plea counsel in its motion. While any statement made under oath is just that, those statements and testimony must be looked at in the context in which they were made. Statements made in mitigation by an Applicant, after an unknowingly entered into plea, should be viewed in the context in which they were made. A statement made in mitigation should be viewed in a much different context than testimony given during the PCR hearing.

This Court reviewed not only the plea transcript and testimony at the PCR hearing but also considered the totality of circumstances when reaching its decision, as it should. As Respondent correctly points out, "[i]n determining whether a guilty plea was taken in accordance with constitutional standards, the reviewing judge must analyze and consider the entire record, including the transcript of the plea and the evidence presented at the PCR hearing. *Harres v. Leeke*, 282 S.C. 131, 318 S.E.2d 360 (1984).



Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration based on Legal Errors is DENIED.

MOTION TO AMEND ORDER TO COMPLY WITH FISHBURNE

Respondent's motion asserts that the Order granting relief failed to address issues raised at the evidentiary hearings and provides a list of three (3) examples. This Court finds that Applicant raised the listed claims as specific instances of Plea Counsel's overall ineffective assistance. As discussed above, because Respondent failed to make any motion at the conclusion of testimony pursuant to Rules 41 (b) and 50, SCRCP that no evidence presented on an issue, any issues, motions, objections, or arguments not presented to the Court at the PCR hearing, are waived.


This Court hereby declines to amend its Order and Respondent's Motion to Amend Order to Comply With Fishburne is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, this Court denies Respondent's Motions to Reconsider, Alter, or Amend its July 14, 2025, Order. The matter shall be remanded to the Court of General Sessions for further proceedings consistent with the Order.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT RESPONDENT'S MOTION IS DENIED.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED this ____ day of _____, 2026.



George M. McFaddin, Jr.
Presiding Judge

_____, South Carolina