

MEMORANDUM OF LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL AND EVIDENTIARY IMPLICATIONS OF AN OFFICER'S FAILURE TO ISSUE A TRAFFIC TICKET UNDER SOUTH CAROLINA LAW

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TO: Appellate Panel / Trial Court / Reviewing Authorities

FROM: Londell LaShun Alston, Pro Se Appellant

CASE: Londell LaShun Alston v. State of South Carolina (Appellate Case No. 2025-000197)

SUBJECT: Comprehensive analysis of South Carolina traffic stops jurisprudence, police discretion, and the Fourth Amendment "Abandoned Mission" doctrine (Rodriguez v. United States / State v. Provet / State v. Tindall).

SC Court of Appeals

I. INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF ISSUES

Under South Carolina law and the Fourth Amendment, what are the constitutional and evidentiary implications when a law enforcement officer initiates a traffic stop based on a minor infraction (such as an expired registration under S.C. Code Ann. § 56-3-840), but never issues a traffic citation, while prolonging the detention into an exploratory narcotics search?

Summary of Conclusions:

- 1. The Mission Defines the Scope:** While South Carolina law grants officers' statutory discretion to arrest or issue warnings under S.C. Code Ann. § 17-13-30, the Fourth Amendment mandates that a traffic stop remain strictly tied to the "mission" of addressing the observed infraction (Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348).
- 2. Failure to Ticket as Proof of Abandoned Mission:** Under South Carolina appellate precedent (State v. Tindall, 388 S.C. 518; State v. Provet, 405 S.C. 101), an officer's failure to issue a traffic ticket for the stated justification of the stop—coupled with an unexplained, prolonged detention—constitutes objective, irrefutable proof that the mission was abandoned in favor of an illegal fishing expedition.
- 3. Pretextual Fabrication:** Claiming "marijuana" as probable cause to justify an extended search while subsequently failing to file any marijuana charges reveals bad-faith evidence manufacturing that taints the entire proceeding.

II. SOUTH CAROLINA JURISPRUDENCE ON TRAFFIC STOP DURATION AND SCOPE

A. The Binding Authority of State v. Tindall and State v. Provet

South Carolina appellate courts have consistently adhered to the principle that a traffic stop is a limited seizure akin to an investigative detention under Terry v. Ohio:

- In State v. Tindall, 388 S.C. 518, 698 S.E.2d 533 (2010), the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a traffic stop supported by reasonable suspicion becomes unconstitutional when the officer's continued detention exceeds the scope necessary to address the traffic infraction.
- In State v. Provet, 405 S.C. 101, 745 S.E.2d 395 (2013), the South Carolina Supreme Court reaffirmed that a traffic stop "remains valid only as long as the purpose of the traffic stop is being actively pursued." Once the tasks tied to the traffic infraction are completed—or in Petitioner's case, entirely ignored—the continued detention without independent, reasonable suspicion of another crime violates the Fourth Amendment.

B. The Evidentiary Significance of Omitting a Citation

When an officer stops a vehicle for an expired registration tag (S.C. Code Ann. § 56-3-840) but admits under oath that no traffic ticket was ever issued, the legal fiction of a "routine traffic stop" collapses.

- 1. Absence of Lawful Prosecution:** If the officer observed a traffic violation in his view, the standard operational procedure is to issue a warning or a Uniform Traffic Ticket. The total omission of a citation demonstrates that the traffic infraction was never the true objective of the stop.

2.Pretextual Conversion: Under *Whren v. United States*, 517 U.S. 806, a subjective pretext does not invalidate an otherwise lawful stop. However, *Whren* does not give officers licenses to exceed the temporal and substantive boundaries of that stop. When the officer abandons the traffic mission without issuing a ticket and pivots an unconsented narcotics search, the stop crosses the constitutional line into an unlawful seizure.

III. APPLICATION TO THE 12:50 "JUSTIFICATION GAP"

In Petitioner's case (Case No. 2025-000197), the evidentiary record confirms a fatal chronological flaw:

- **The Stop:** Initiated at 12:32 a.m. for an expired tag.
- **The Premature Search:** Narcotics were seized at the 10:50 elapsed minute mark.
- **The Dispatch Response:** Dispatch did not respond with any firearm prohibition information until 12 minutes and 50 seconds after the drugs were found.
- **The Omission:** Officer Dakota Rhoads never issued a traffic citation.
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Under *Rodriguez* and *Tindall*, the failure to issue a ticket, combined with a 13-minute evidentiary gap before receiving dispatch verification, proves that the encounter was an unlawful, prolonged detention.

IV. CONCLUSION

The failure of Officer Rhoads to issue a traffic ticket for the stated justification of the stop is not a minor oversight; it is the constitutional "smoking gun." It proves that the traffic stop was an abandoned mission, and an illegal pretextual search designed to manufacture narcotics charges without probable cause. All evidence seized as a direct result of this prolonged detention must be suppressed.

Respectfully submitted,
Londell LaShun Alston
Appellant Pro Se
Date: August 17, 2026

REFERENCES

- [1] *Rodriguez v. United States*, 575 U.S. 348 (2015).
- [2] S.C. Code Ann. § 17-13-30 (Arrest authority for offenses in view).
- [3] *State v. Tindall*, 388 S.C. 518, 698 S.E.2d 533 (2010).
- [4] *State v. Provet*, 405 S.C. 101, 745 S.E.2d 395 (2013).
- [5] Officer Rhoads Suppression Hearing Testimony, Case No. 2025-000197.
- [6] *Whren v. United States*, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
- [7] Rock Hill Police Department Incident Report, July 14, 2023.
- [8] BWC Timestamps and CAD Logs, Incident of July 14, 2023.
- [9] Dispatch Audio Logs, Rock Hill Police Department, July 14, 2023.

MEMORANDUM OF LAW: THE CONSTITUTIONAL INVALIDITY OF THE EVIDENTIARY SEARCH AND THE UNLAWFUL COERCIVE EXPANSION OF CONSENT SCOPE

TO: The South Carolina Court of Appeals
(Case No. 2025-000197)

FROM: Londell LaShun Alston
Pro Se Appellant

DATE: August 17, 2026

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This Memorandum of Law is submitted to establish the profound constitutional invalidity of the search conducted by former Officer Dakota Rhoads on July 14, 2023. The search of Petitioner's person was an unconstitutional evidentiary search masquerading as a consensual weapons frisk.

Under the "Objective Reasonableness" standard established in *Florida v. Jimeno*, 500 U.S. 248 (1991), the scope of a search is defined by its "expressed object". In this case, Officer Rhoads explicitly asked to "check for weapons." Petitioner's response—"you can check me"—was an agreement strictly limited to a weapons frisk (Terry frisk). Officer Rhoads' subsequent attempt to broaden this scope through coercive follow-up questioning, followed by a full-scale evidentiary search for narcotics, violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

II. THE FIREARM PRETEXT: LACK OF REASONABLE SUSPICION

Prior to the request for consent, Officer Rhoads observed a firearm in the glove compartment. This discovery did not provide reasonable suspicion of criminal activity for several reasons:

1. **Compliance with Officer Requests:** The firearm was revealed only because Petitioner was complying with the officer's request to retrieve vehicle registration from the glove compartment.
2. **Lawful Possession:** The firearm was legally concealed in the glove compartment of a borrowed vehicle.
3. **Non-Threatening Behavior:** Petitioner's subsequent actions—retrieving his bank cards, wallet, and phone on the seat where the firearm had been placed—were entirely non-threatening and did not constitute an attempt to hurt the officer.

Despite the absence of any criminal activity or threat, Officer Rhoads used the mere presence of the firearm as a pretext to escalate the encounter into an unconstitutional evidentiary search.

III. THE ANCHORING EFFECT: THE OFFICER'S REQUEST DEFINES THE SCOPE

A. *The "Expressed Object" Rule (Florida v. Jimeno)*

The United States Supreme Court has held that the "scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed object" [1]. When an officer requests consent to search for a specific item (e.g., weapons), a suspect general consent is legally anchored to that specific category of items.

- **The Request:** Officer Rhoads asked: "Can I check you for weapons?"
- **The Anchor:** This request permanently anchored the scope of the encounter to weapons only.
- **The Response:** Petitioner stated: "You can check me." Critically, Petitioner responded with this exact phrase to both the initial weapons check request and the subsequent coercive "search" request. This repetition demonstrates a consistent, unwavering, and specific limitation to a

protective pat-down for weapons, not a license to conduct a deep-pocket evidentiary search for narcotics. Under any objective standard, a reasonable person would understand this as a refusal to broaden the scope beyond the initial "weapons" anchor.

B. The "Check Me" Limitation

The phrase "check me" in direct response to a request for a weapons frisk is a specific, limited grant of authority. It is not a general waiver of privacy. In *State v. Fowler*, 322 S.C. 317 (1996), South Carolina courts recognized that consent is not a "blank check" for the state to ignore the Fourth Amendment.

IV. THE COERCIVE EXPANSION: TACTICAL DECEPTION TO BROADEN SCOPE

A. Bad-Faith Questioning

After Petitioner limited the scope to a weapons check, Officer Rhoads immediately asked a broader, coercive question: "Can I search you?"

- **The Coercion and Petitioner's Re-Anchoring:** This is a tactical maneuver used to trick a suspect into "broadening" consent that has already been granted in a limited capacity. Petitioner's decision to repeat the phrase "you can check me" in response to the broader question served to re-anchor the scope to the initial weapons check, explicitly rejecting the officer's attempt to expand the search.
- **The Constitutional Bar:** Consent must be "voluntary and not the product of duress or coercion, express or implied" (*Schneckloth v. Bustamonte*, 412 U.S. 218). When an officer asks a broader question after a suspect has already agreed to a limited search, and the suspect responds by repeating the limited consent, the officer is constitutionally barred from proceeding with a general evidentiary search.

B. Transition from Terry to Evidentiary Search

A Terry frisk is strictly limited to a pat-down of outer clothing for weapons.

- **The Violation:** Officer Rhoads did not perform a pat-down. He transitioned immediately to an evidentiary search, reaching into Petitioner's pockets and manipulating items that were not reasonably believed to be weapons.
- **The Dickerson Rule:** Under *Minnesota v. Dickerson*, 508 U.S. 366 (1993), an officer may only seize contraband during a frisk if its identity is "immediately apparent" through "plain feel". Manipulation of an object to determine its identity exceeds the scope of a Terry frisk and requires independent probable cause—which Officer Rhoads did not have.

V. THE "CALL IT MARIJUANA" ADMISSION: PROOF OF PRETEXT

The most damning proof of the officer's unconstitutional intent is his recorded admission:

"Because of the cocaine you're under arrest. We're going to call it marijuana, okay?"

This statement proves that the search was never about "weapons" or "safety." It was a bad-faith exploratory search for narcotics conducted under the guise of a consensual frisk. The officer's willingness to mislabel evidence proves that he was acting outside the bounds of the law from the inception of the encounter.

VI. CONCLUSION: THE SEARCH WAS VOID AT ITS INCEPTION

The search of Petitioner's person was unconstitutional because:

1. **Scope was Anchored to Weapons:** The officer asked for weapons; Petitioner agreed to a weapons check.
2. **Coercive Questioning Failed to Broaden Scope:** The follow-up "Can I search you?" was a tactical attempt to bypass Petitioner's limitations.
3. **Evidentiary Search Exceeded Terry:** The officer reached into pockets and manipulated items without any "plain feel" justification for weapons.

WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court find the search unconstitutional and suppress all fruits of the illegal evidentiary search.

Respectfully submitted,
Londell LaShun Alston
Appellant Pro Se

REFERENCES

- [1] Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991).
- [2] Suppression Hearing Transcript, State v. Alston, Case No. 2025-000197.
- [3] State v. Fowler, 322 S.C. 317 (1996).
- [4] Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
- [5] Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
- [6] Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
- [7] Encounter Audio Transcript, Rock Hill Police Department Intercept, July 14, 2023.

MEMORANDUM OF LAW: FOURTH AMENDMENT PLAIN-FEEL DOCTRINE VIOLATIONS

TO: Appellate Courts / General Sessions Court

FROM: Londell LaShun Alston, Pro Se (Case No. 2025-000197)

DATE: August 17, 2026

SUBJECT: Fourth Amendment Violation: Unconstitutional Tactile Manipulation, Lack of Plain Feel Recognition (Minnesota v. Dickerson), and Impermissible Interrogation During a Terry Frisk

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

This Memorandum of Law examines the strict constitutional limits governing protective pat-down searches under *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and the "plain feel" doctrine established in *Minnesota v. Dickerson*, 508 U.S. 366 (1993). In the prosecution of Londell LaShun Alston (Case No. 2025-000197), former Officer Dakota Rhoads exceeded the lawful scope of a consensual weapons check when he encountered a non-threatening soft object during a pat-down. Rather than terminating the frisk upon realizing the object was not a weapon, Officer Rhoads engaged in unauthorized tactile exploration, improperly interrogated the Defendant ("What is this?"), and initiated a warrantless evidentiary search. This memorandum establishes that under binding federal and state precedent, the seized items and derivative evidence are constitutionally tainted and must be suppressed.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND REGARDING THE FRISK

1. **The Anchored Consent:** During the July 14, 2023, traffic stop, Officer Rhoads asked: "Can I check you for weapons?" Defendant responded: "You can check me." This established a strict constitutional anchor limiting the encounter to a protective weapons frisk.
2. **The Soft Object Encounter:** During the pat-down, Officer Rhoads felt a soft object that bore no physical resemblance, mass, or contour indicative of a weapon.
3. **Failure of Plain Feel Recognition:** Officer Rhoads did not—and legally could not—immediately recognize the soft object as contraband through tactile "plain feel."
4. **Unauthorized Interrogation:** Instead of concluding the frisk or withdrawing his hands, Officer Rhoads stopped, interrogated the Defendant, and asked, "What is this?" This question transformed a protective weapons check into an exploratory custodial interrogation without probable cause.

III. LEGAL ARGUMENTS AND BINDING PRECEDENT

A. The Strict Parameters of a Protective Pat-Down (*Terry v. Ohio*)

Under *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), a police officer may conduct a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual.

- Limited Purpose: A Terry frisk is "not engendered by any need to detect evidence of crime"; its sole justification is the protection of the police officer and others nearby.
- No Exploratory Searches: The search must be strictly "limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer" (*Terry*, 392 U.S. at 26).

B. The Plain-Feel Doctrine and the Prohibition Against Squeezing (*Minnesota v. Dickerson*)

In *Minnesota v. Dickerson*, 508 U.S. 366 (1993), the United States Supreme Court evaluated whether tactile discovery of contraband during a Terry frisk justifies warrantless seizure:

"If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer's search for weapons..." (Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375).

However, *Dickerson* drew a bright-line constitutional boundary against further manipulation:

"The officer's continued exploration of the pocket after having concluded that it contained no weapon was unauthorized under Terry. Simply put, this search was invalid under the Fourth Amendment." (Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 378).

- Application to Alston: Officer Rhoads felt a "soft object." Because a soft object is neither a weapon nor immediately apparent as contraband, the officer's authority under *Terry* and *Dickerson* terminated instantly. Continuing to manipulate, question, or search the pocket violated the Fourth Amendment.

C. Impermissible Interrogation During a Frisk

An officer conducting a pat-down lacks the constitutional authority to cross-examine a citizen regarding the tactile sensations felt during the frisk.

- Asking "What is this?" While manipulating a suspect's clothing is an investigative technique designed to elicit self-incriminating admissions when probable cause is lacking.
- In *State v. Simons*, 337 S.C. 28, 522 S.E.2d 597 (Ct. App. 1999), South Carolina courts reaffirmed that law enforcement cannot convert a routine or consensual pat-down into an exploratory interrogation to bridge the gap of missing probable cause.

D. Fruit of the Poisonous Tree

Because the evidence was obtained through an unconstitutional extension of the Terry pat-down, lack of plain-feel recognition, and improper interrogation, all physical contraband, statements, and subsequent vehicle searches are tainted. Under *Wong Sun v. United States*, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) and *Brown v. Illinois*, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), the exclusionary rule mandates the complete suppression of all poisoned fruits.

IV. CONCLUSION

Officer Rhoads' search violated the core tenets of *Terry v. Ohio* and *Minnesota v. Dickerson*. By exploring a non-threatening soft object, interrogating the Defendant during the frisk, and failing to meet the "plain feel" standard, the officer engaged in an unconstitutional exploratory search. The resulting evidence must be suppressed.

Respectfully submitted,
Londell LaShun Alston
Defendant Pro Se
Date: August 17, 2026

REFERENCES

- [1] *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
- [2] *Sibron v. New York*, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
- [3] *Minnesota v. Dickerson*, 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
- [4] *Wong Sun v. United States*, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
- [5] *Brown v. Illinois*, 422 U.S. 590 (1975).

MEMORANDUM OF LAW: THE 10:50 DRUG DISCOVERY VS. THE 12-MINUTE 50-SECOND DISPATCH GAP AND THE ABANDONED MISSION DOCTRINE

TO: South Carolina Court of Appeals / York County General Sessions Court

FROM: Londell LaShun Alston, Pro Se

DATE: August 17, 2026

RE: The Factual and Legal Significance of the 12-Minute 50-Second Dispatch Delay Following the 10:50 Drug Discovery in State v. Alston (Case No. 2025-000197)

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

This Memorandum of Law is submitted to highlight the dispositive constitutional significance of the precise sequence during the roadside encounter on July 14, 2023. As established by the objective record and Officer Dakota Rhoads' own testimony, the search and discovery of narcotics occurred at the 10:50 elapsed minute mark, whereas dispatch did not respond regarding any federal firearm prohibition until 12 minutes and 50 seconds after the drugs were already found. This timeline proves that the search was conducted prematurely without reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or dispatch support.

II. THE CHRONOLOGICAL "SMOKING GUN": 10:50 DISCOVERY VS. 12:50 DISPATCH GAP

The Fourth Amendment violation in this case is anchored by three undeniable chronological facts:

1. 12:32 A.M. (The Initiation): Officer Rhoads seized Appellant for an alleged expired registration tag (S.C. Code Ann. § 56-3-840). At this moment, the "mission" of the stop was strictly limited to addressing the tag infraction.

2. 10:50 Elapsed Minutes (The Premature Search): Officer Rhoads discovered and seized narcotics at the 10:50 elapsed minute mark of the stop [1]. Prior to this discovery, dispatch was informed of nothing except the concealed firearm after it was uncovered during the registration search.

3. 12 Minutes and 50 Seconds Later (The Dispatch Gap): Official dispatch logs and body-worn camera (BWC) footage establish that dispatch did not respond with any federal firearm prohibition information until 12 minutes and 50 seconds after the narcotics had already been unlawfully seized.

III. LEGAL ARGUMENT: PREMATURE SEARCH WITHOUT DISPATCH SUPPORT

A. The Rodriguez "Diligence" Requirement

In *Rodriguez v. United States*, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the tolerable duration of a traffic stop is determined by the seizure's "mission"—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns. The Court emphasized that an officer must act with reasonable diligence to complete the mission.

- The "Abandoned Mission": Officer Rhoads admitted under oath that no traffic citation was ever issued. This admission, coupled with the fact that narcotics were seized at 10:50 elapsed minutes before dispatch responded nearly 13 minutes later, proves that the officer was not diligently pursuing the traffic mission, but was instead engaged in an unauthorized exploratory search.

B. Retroactive Justification is Prohibited

The State's attempt to use information discovered or checked after the search to justify a seizure that occurred prematurely is a direct violation of the "Justification at Inception" rule.

- Under *Beck v. Ohio*, 379 U.S. 89, the legality of a search depends on the facts known to the officer at the time of the search.

- Because the search occurred at 10:50, prior to any dispatch response 12 minutes and 50 seconds later, the subsequent checks cannot retroactively cure the Fourth Amendment violation (State v. Williams, 439 S.C. 202).

IV. CONCLUSION

The 10:50 drug discovery followed by the 12-minute 50-second dispatch gap is the factual anchor of this appeal. It proves that narcotics were seized prematurely before any dispatch check or independent reasonable suspicion was established. Under the Fourth Amendment and the South Carolina Constitution, the evidence seized during this unconstitutional extension must be suppressed.

Respectfully submitted,
Londell LaShun Alston
Appellant Pro Se

REFERENCES

- [1] Suppression Hearing Transcript and Dispatch Logs, State v. Alston, Case No. 2025-000197.
- [2] Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015).
- [3] Officer Rhoads Suppression Testimony, Case No. 2025-000197.
- [4] Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
- [5] State v. Williams, 439 S.C. 202 (2022).

MEMORANDUM OF LAW: SUPPRESSION OF VEHICLE SEARCH AS 'FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE' AND PRETEXTUAL ESCALATION

TO: The South Carolina Court of Appeals
(Case No. 2025-000197)

FROM: Londell LaShun Alston
Pro Se Appellant

DATE: August 17, 2026

I. INTRODUCTION AND LEGAL DOCTRINE

This Memorandum of Law establishes that the search of Appellant's vehicle on July 14, 2023, was unconstitutional as it was the direct and primary product of a prior illegal search of Appellant's person and a pretextual escalation based on a legally concealed firearm. Under the "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" doctrine, evidence derived from an initial unconstitutional act must be suppressed to protect the integrity of the Fourth Amendment.

As established in *Wong Sun v. United States*, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), the exclusionary rule applies not only to the immediate products of an illegal search but also to any evidence subsequently discovered by exploitation of that initial illegality.

II. THE PRETEXTUAL ESCALATION: THE LEGALLY CONCEALED FIREARM

The encounter was unconstitutionally escalated based on the discovery of a firearm that was in a lawful location and revealed only through Appellant's compliance with police orders.

- **Lawful Possession and Storage:** The firearm was located in the glove compartment—a lawful place for a concealed weapon in South Carolina. Appellant only opened the glove compartment to retrieve the vehicle registration specifically requested by Officer Rhoads.
- **Lack of Reasonable Suspicion:** The mere presence of a firearm, without more, does not provide probable cause for a narcotics search. Officer Rhoads testified that he used the firearm as the basis to remove Appellant from the vehicle and initiate a "weapons check".
- **Failure to Verify:** Crucially, Officer Rhoads admitted that he never checked the firearm's serial number to determine if it was stolen or illegally possessed before proceeding to an evidentiary search of Appellant's person for narcotics. The officer bypassed the "safety" mission to engage in a "narcotics" mission without any independent legal justification.

III. THE POISONOUS TREE: THE ILLEGAL SEARCH OF THE PERSON

The "tree" in this encounter became poisonous at the moment Officer Rhoads exceeded the limited scope of Appellant's consent.

- **The Primary Illegality:** Appellant consented only to a "check for weapons". Officer Rhoads abandoned this limited mission and conducted a deep-pocket evidentiary search for narcotics without probable cause or valid consent.
- **The Rodriguez Violation:** This search occurred during an unconstitutional extension of a traffic stop, where the regulatory mission (tag registration) had been abandoned.
- **Fabricated Grounds:** The officer's recorded admission—"We're going to call it marijuana"—proves the initial discovery was a bad-faith fabrication used to justify an arrest.

IV. THE POISONOUS FRUIT: THE SUBSEQUENT VEHICLE SEARCH

The search of the vehicle was a direct exploitation of the illegal search of Appellant's person and the pretextual escalation involving the firearm.

- **Causal Link:** But for the illegal evidentiary search of Appellant's person and the subsequent arrest based on mislabeled evidence, the officers would have had no legal basis to search the vehicle.
- **Search Incident to Illegal Arrest:** The vehicle search was purportedly conducted "incident to arrest." Because the arrest itself was predicated on an illegal search and a pretextual escalation, the arrest is void, and any search incident to that arrest is equally void.
- **No Attenuation:** There were no intervening circumstances. The 13-minute dispatch gap proves the officers were acting on the "fruits" of the illegal search long before they received any information regarding Appellant's prohibited status.

V. CONCLUSION: MANDATORY SUPPRESSION

Under *State v. Copeland*, 321 S.C. 318 (1996), when an initial search is unconstitutional, the evidence obtained thereafter is "fruit of the poisonous tree" and must be excluded. The combination of the pretextual firearm escalation and the illegal search of the person render the entire vehicle search unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court find the vehicle search to be the "fruit of the poisonous tree" and suppress all evidence derived therefrom.

Respectfully submitted,
Londell LaShun Alston
Appellant Pro Se

REFERENCES

- [1] *Mapp v. Ohio*, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
- [2] *Wong Sun v. United States*, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
- [3] S.C. Code Ann. § 16-23-20 (Lawful possession of firearms).
- [4] Suppression Hearing Transcript, *State v. Alston*, Case No. 2025-000197.
- [5] Officer Rhoads Suppression Testimony, Case No. 2025-000197.
- [6] Trial Record and Cross-Examination of Officer Rhoads, Case No. 2025-000197.
- [7] *Florida v. Jimeno*, 500 U.S. 248 (1991).
- [8] *Rodriguez v. United States*, 575 U.S. 348 (2015).
- [9] Encounter Audio Transcript, Rock Hill Police Department Intercept, July 14, 2023.
- [10] *Arizona v. Gant*, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
- [11] Dispatch Logs and BWC Timestamps, July 14, 2023.
- [12] *State v. Copeland*, 321 S.C. 318 (1996).

LEGAL MEMORANDUM: THE EVIDENTIARY AND CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF AN OFFICER'S FAILURE TO ISSUE A TRAFFIC TICKET

TO: Appellate Panel / Trial Court / Reviewing Authorities

FROM: Londell LaShun Alston, Pro Se Appellant

CASE: Londell LaShun Alston v. State of South Carolina (Appellate Case No. 2025-000197)

SUBJECT: Legal analysis of police discretion, the Fourth Amendment "Abandoned Mission" doctrine (Rodriguez v. United States), and the failure to issue a traffic ticket for expired registration or a charge for simple marijuana possession.

I. INTRODUCTION AND QUESTION PRESENTED

Under South Carolina law and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, is an officer required to issue a ticket or citation when a traffic infraction (such as an expired registration under S.C. Code Ann. § 56-3-840) is committed in their view?

The Short Answer: While South Carolina law grants law enforcement officers statutory discretion (may arrest or issue a ticket under S.C. Code Ann. § 17-13-30), the Fourth Amendment imposes a strict functional limitation. When an officer initiates a traffic stop based solely on a traffic violation, that violation defines the "mission" of the stop. If the officer fails to issue a citation or warning for that infraction and instead pursues an unrelated exploratory narcotics investigation, the stop violates the Abandoned Mission doctrine established in Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015). Furthermore, claiming "marijuana" as probable cause while failing to file any marijuana charges exposes bad-faith evidence fabrication.

II. STATUTORY DISCRETION VS. FOURTH AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS

1. South Carolina Law on Police Discretion

Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 17-13-30, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs may arrest without a warrant any persons who violate state criminal laws within their view. Similarly, under standard traffic enforcement procedures, officers possess the administrative discretion to issue a Uniform Traffic Ticket or give a verbal warning. Therefore, standing alone, an officer's choice not to issue a ticket for a minor infraction does not violate a standalone state statute. However, discretion is not a constitutional shield. An officer cannot use prosecutorial discretion as an after-the-fact justification to convert a routine traffic stop into a prolonged, exploratory drug raid without independent reasonable suspicion.

2. The Rodriguez "Mission-Based" Constraint

In Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), the United States Supreme Court addressed the limits of police discretion during traffic stops. The Court held that a traffic stop "becomes unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a ticket for the violation."

- **The Inherent Contradiction:** The entire legal justification for Officer Dakota Rhoads seizing Petitioner at 12:32 a.m. was an alleged expired registration. Under Rodriguez, the officer's authority is strictly limited to addressing that specific infraction (checking license, registration, proof of insurance, and issuing a citation or warning).
- **The Abandoned Mission:** Officer Rhoads admitted under oath that he never issued a traffic ticket for the expired registration. By failing to issue a ticket, the state's own evidence proves that the "mission" of addressing the traffic violation was abandoned. The encounter was unlawfully transformed into a fishing expedition without independent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

III. THE EVIDENTIARY SIGNIFICANCE OF FAILING TO CHARGE MARIJUANA

In addition to failing to ticket the expired tag, Officer Rhoads' conduct regarding the alleged "marijuana" reveals bad-faith evidence fabrication:

1.The Recorded Admission: Body-worn camera (BWC) audio captures Officer Rhoads explicitly stating: "Because of the cocaine you're under arrest. We're going to call it marijuana, okay?"

2.The Omission of Charges: Despite claiming that marijuana provided the probable cause to search the vehicle or individual, no marijuana charges were ever formally filed against Petitioner.

3.Legal Conclusion: An officer cannot invoke an alleged drug offense (marijuana) to justify an extended search or arrest and subsequently omit that charge from the charging instruments when it serves their narrative. This omission, combined with the failure to ticket the expired tag, provides undeniable proof that the entire encounter was a pretextual fabrication designed to manufacture probable cause after the fact.

IV. CONCLUSION

While South Carolina law grants officers discretion in issuing tickets, the Fourth Amendment does not permit officers to use a phantom traffic violation as an indefinite license to search citizens. Officer Rhoads' failure to issue a traffic ticket, coupled with his failure to charge marijuana after citing it as justification, proves that the traffic stop was an illegal Abandoned Mission under *Rodriguez v. United States*.

Respectfully submitted,
Londell LaShun Alston
Appellant Pro Se
Date: August 17, 2026

REFERENCES

- [1] S.C. Code Ann. § 17-13-30 (Officers may arrest without warrant for offenses committed in view).
- [2] *Rodriguez v. United States*, 575 U.S. 348 (2015).
- [3] *Id.* at 354–55.
- [4] Officer Rhoads Suppression Hearing Testimony, Case No. 2025-000197 (Admitting no traffic citation was issued).
- [5] Rock Hill Police Department Body-Worn Camera Audio Intercept, July 14, 2023.
- [6] York County General Sessions Charging Documents, Case No. 2025-000197 (Confirming absence of marijuana charges).

LEGAL MEMORANDUM: STATUTORY VIOLATIONS, ABANDONED MISSION, AND INVALID SEARCH PRETEXT

Case Name: Londell LaShun Alston v. State of South Carolina

Appellate Case No.: 2025-000197 (South Carolina Court of Appeals)

Subject: Statutory Ticketing Requirements (S.C. Code § 56-3-840 / Registration), Abandoned Mission Doctrine, Lack of Vehicle Consent, and Unlawful Pretextual Search

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This legal memorandum provides an exhaustive analysis of the statutory, constitutional, and evidentiary defects tainting the July 14, 2023, traffic stop and subsequent prosecution of Appellant Londell LaShun Alston. Specifically, this document synthesizes five independent, fatal flaws in the State's case:

1. Statutory / Ticketing Failure: The initial pretextual stop was justified under registration statutes (such as S.C. Code § 56-3-840), yet Officer Rhoads never issued a traffic citation, proving that the stop was an unauthorized "fishing expedition" rather than a legitimate regulatory traffic enforcement action

2. The "Abandoned Mission" Doctrine (Rodriguez): Under *Rodriguez v. United States*, an officer may not prolong a stop beyond the time needed to address the mission of the stop. Failing to issue a ticket while detaining Appellant for exploratory drug searches violates federal and state constitutional mandates.

3. Pretextual Marijuana Search Lacking Charges: Officer Rhoads utilized an alleged discovery of marijuana on Appellant's person (accompanied by the recorded statement, "Because of the cocaine you're under arrest. We're going to call it marijuana, okay?") to justify an evidentiary search, yet no simple possession charges for marijuana were ever filed. A search pretext abandoned at the charging stage cannot validate a warrantless vehicle search.

4. Absence of Plain View and Vehicle Consent: The vehicle searched did not belong to Appellant, nothing was in plain view inside the vehicle cabin, and Officer Rhoads never asked for or received consent to search the vehicle.

5. Illegal Expansion Beyond Person: Even assuming *arguendo* that contraband was allegedly found on Appellant's person, it provided zero independent probable cause to conduct a warrantless, exploratory search of a third-party vehicle without consent, exigency, or a standardized inventory policy.

II. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK & THE ABANDONED MISSION DOCTRINE

A. Statutory Registration Requirements and the Failure to Issue a Citation

The initial justification proffered by Officer Rhoads for seizing Appellant at 12:32 a.m. on July 14, 2023, was an alleged registration infraction (implicating statutes such as S.C. Code Ann. § 56-3-110 and § 56-3-840 governing vehicle licensing and delinquency penalties).

- **The Statutory Defect:** Under South Carolina traffic enforcement practice, a regulatory stop for a registration or tag violation requires the officer to address the infraction—either by issuing a warning ticket or a traffic citation.
- **The Admission:** Officer Rhoads admitted under oath during the suppression/trial proceedings that he never issued a traffic citation for the tag infraction.

B. Application of the Rodriguez Abandoned Mission Doctrine

In *Rodriguez v. United States*, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), the United States Supreme Court held that a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was initiated violates the Fourth Amendment.

- Because Officer Rhoads never issued a ticket and instead immediately pivoted to inquiring about the glove compartment, removing Appellant, and conducting a weapons/narcotics frisk, the lawful mission of the stop was instantly abandoned.
- Under *Rodriguez*, all actions taken after the mission was abandoned (or prolonged without independent reasonable suspicion) constitute an unconstitutional seizure.

III. INVALID SEARCH PRETEXT: THE "CALL IT MARIJUANA" FABRICATION

A. Absence of Marijuana Charges

A foundational requirement of a lawful arrest or search incident to arrest is the existence of probable cause for a specific offense.

- During the encounter, audio records capture Officer Rhoads stating: “Because of the cocaine you’re under arrest. We’re going to call it marijuana, okay?”.
- Despite this recorded admission of manufacturing or mislabeling evidence, no charges for simple possession of marijuana were ever formally brought against Appellant.

B. Pretextual Manufacturing of Probable Cause

When law enforcement utilizes a fabricated or mislabeled substance (“calling it marijuana”) to justify detaining a citizen and searching a vehicle, and subsequently drops or never files charges for that alleged offense, it exposes the underlying search as a bad-faith pretextual maneuver. Under *Whren v. United States*, 517 U.S. 806, while objective pretext may sometimes survive initial scrutiny, a search predicated on manufactured evidence and uncharged infractions violates Fourteenth Amendment Due Process.

IV. THE UNLAWFUL VEHICLE SEARCH: NON-OWNERSHIP, NO CONSENT, AND NO PLAIN VIEW

A. Lack of Vehicle Ownership and Expectation of Privacy

The vehicle searched by Officer Rhoads did not belong to Appellant.

- While non-owner drivers or occupants often face standing hurdles regarding vehicle searches, when law enforcement asserts that a search of a third-party vehicle was justified by alleged conduct or items linked to a passenger/driver, the search remains bound by the Fourth Amendment constraints governing the initial unlawful seizure (*Brendlin v. California*, 551 U.S. 249). Because the initial stop was an illegal seizure under *Rodriguez*, any connection to the vehicle is “fruit of the poisonous tree” (*Wong Sun v. United States*, 371 U.S. 471).

B. Complete Absence of Consent and Plain View

1.No Consent to Search Vehicle: Officer Rhoads never asked for, nor did Appellant ever grant, permission to search the interior of the automobile. When Rhoads asked to “check for weapons” and “search,” Appellant’s responses (“you can check me”) were strictly confined to a limited Terry frisk of his person, in accordance with *Florida v. Jimeno*, 500 U.S. 248 (limiting consent to the terms granted).

2.No Plain View: Officer Rhoads admitted under oath that the items ultimately seized were not in plain view within the vehicle cabin. Under *Coolidge v. New Hampshire*, 403 U.S. 443, a warrantless search of a vehicle cannot be sustained under the plain view doctrine where the officer must rummage through closed compartments or rely on exploratory manipulation.

3.Contraband Allegedly on Person, Not Vehicle: Even if contraband was alleged to be on Appellant’s person, it did not create probable cause to search the entire vehicle without a warrant, especially in the absence of a standardized inventory policy (*Florida v. Wells*, 495 U.S. 1).

V. CONCLUSION

The state’s prosecution relied on an impossible legal fiction: that an un-ticketed registration stop (abandoned mission) could justify detaining a driver of a non-owned vehicle, searching it without consent or plain view, and utilizing uncharged, mislabeled narcotics (“call it marijuana”) as retroactive probable cause.

Under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, this chain of illegality is void. The trial court erred in denying suppression, and the South Carolina Court of Appeals must reverse the conviction.

Respectfully submitted,
Londell LaShun Alston
Appellant Pro Se

REFERENCES

- [1] S.C. Code Ann. § 56-3-110, § 56-3-840 (Vehicle licensing and registration requirements).
- [2] *Rodriguez v. United States*, 575 U.S. 348 (2015) (Abandoned mission doctrine).
- [3] Encounter Audio Transcript, Rock Hill Police Department Intercept, July 14, 2023 (“Because of the cocaine you’re under arrest. We’re going to call it marijuana, okay?”).
- [4] Trial and Suppression Hearing Transcripts, *State v. Alston*, Case No. 2025-000197 (Confirming non-ownership of vehicle, lack of vehicle search consent, and absence of plain view).
- [5] Suppression Hearing Testimony of Officer Rhoads, Case No. 2025-000197 (Admitting no traffic citation was ever issued for the tag).
- [6] Criminal Indictment and Court Records, Case No. 2025-000197 (Confirming no simple possession of marijuana charges were ever filed).

SUPPLEMENTAL APPELLATE ARGUMENT: THE ABANDONED MISSION DOCTRINE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ADMITTED FAILURE TO TICKET

Court of Appeals of South Carolina

Appellate Case No.: 2025-000197

Appellant: Londell LaShun Alston

Subject: Supplemental Argument on the Merits — Unlawful Traffic Extension, Abandoned Mission (Rodriguez v. United States), and the Admitted Failure to Issue a Traffic Citation.

I. INTRODUCTION AND PRESERVATION

This supplemental argument is submitted in support of Appellant Londell LaShun Alston's direct appeal, specifically addressing the Fourth Amendment violation arising from the unconstitutional extension of the traffic stop. In appellate review of a suppression ruling, this Court examines de novo whether the historical facts established by the State satisfy constitutional standards (*State v. Frasier*, 437 S.C. 625).

As established herein, the uncontradicted trial and suppression testimony of Officer Dakota Rhoads — specifically his admission that he never issued a traffic ticket or warning for the alleged registration infraction — proves as a matter of law that the traffic stop's mission was abandoned, converting a regulatory stop into an illegal exploratory seizure under *Rodriguez v. United States*, 575 U.S. 348 (2015).

II. ARGUMENT: THE FAILURE TO ISSUE A CITATION AS OBJECTIVE PROOF OF AN ABANDONED MISSION

A. The Governing Standard Under *Rodriguez v. United States*

Under the United States Supreme Court's landmark ruling in *Rodriguez v. United States*, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), a traffic stop is a seizure akin to an investigative detention and is strictly limited in scope and duration. The "mission" of the stop is to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns.

- Authority for the seizure ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed (*United States v. Bowman*, 884 F.3d 200).
- An officer may not prolong a traffic stop, even by a matter of minutes, to conduct unrelated criminal investigations (such as drug searches) without independent, articulable reasonable suspicion (*State v. Moore*, 415 S.C. 245).

B. Officer Rhoads' Admitted Failure to Ticket as the "Smoking Gun"

In the instant case, Officer Rhoads initiated the encounter at 12:32 a.m. on July 14, 2023, citing an alleged expired registration tag under S.C. Code Ann. § 56-3-840. However, Officer Rhoads explicitly admitted under oath during suppression and trial proceedings that he never issued a traffic citation or warning ticket for the tag infraction. On redirect examination, he attempted to excuse this omission by stating that issuing further traffic charges seemed "kind of pointless" because felony charges had already accumulated.

Under federal and state Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, this admission is legally devastating to the State's case:

1. **Objective Evidence of Pretext:** The failure to issue a citation for the foundational traffic offense provides objective, recorded proof that the officer was not diligently pursuing the "mission" of the traffic stop.
2. **Unlawful Extension:** Under *Rodriguez* and the Fourth Circuit's holding in *United States v. Martin* (2026), where an officer immediately abandons the regulatory purpose of a traffic stop to engage in an exploratory criminal investigation without independent reasonable suspicion, the detention violates the Fourth Amendment.
3. **The 12:50 Dispatch Trap:** State records confirm that the dispatch database check regarding federal firearm prohibition did not occur until the 12:50 mark—nearly two minutes after narcotics were already unlawfully seized inside the vehicle. Under *State v. Williams*, 439 S.C. 202, later-acquired information cannot travel backward in time to retroactively validate a premature, unlawful search (*Beck v. Ohio*, 379 U.S. 89).

C. State and Federal Authority Compelling Suppression

The South Carolina Supreme Court's adoption of the *Rodriguez* standard in *State v. Moore*, 415 S.C. 245 (2016), makes clear that an officer's choice to discard the traffic mission in favor of an exploratory drug search is per se unreasonable. Because Officer Rhoads admitted he never intended to complete or ticket the traffic infraction, the legal justification for the seizure evaporated, rendering the subsequent search of Appellant and the vehicle "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" (*Wong Sun v. United States*, 371 U.S. 471).

III. CONCLUSION

The uncontradicted trial record proves that Officer Rhoads abandoned the mission of the traffic stop without issuing a citation, prolonging the detention for an illegal narcotics search that preceded any valid dispatch check. Under *Rodriguez v. United States* and *State v. Moore*, this unconstitutional extension requires the immediate suppression of all physical evidence and derivative statements.

WHEREFORE, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court incorporate this supplemental argument, reverse the circuit court's suppression ruling, and vacate the convictions.

Respectfully submitted,
Londell LaShun Alston
Appellant Pro Se

REFERENCES

- [1] *Rodriguez v. United States*, 575 U.S. 348 (2015).
- [2] *State v. Moore*, 415 S.C. 245, 781 S.E.2d 897 (2016).
- [3] S.C. Code Ann. § 56-3-840 (Registration requirements).
- [4] Officer Rhoads Suppression and Trial Testimony, Case No. 2025-000197 (Admitting no citation was issued).
- [5] *United States v. Martin*, 4th Cir. (2026).
- [6] Suppression Hearing Transcript and Trial Record, Case No. 2025-000197.
- [7] *Beck v. Ohio*, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); *State v. Williams*, 439 S.C. 202 (2022).
- [8] *Wong Sun v. United States*, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES AND LEGAL MEMORANDUM: ABANDONED MISSION AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FAILURE TO TICKET

Case Name: Londell LaShun Alston v. State of South Carolina

Appellate Case No.: 2025-000197

Subject: Factual Law and Case Precedents Proving that the Failure to Issue a Traffic Citation is Evidence of an Unconstitutionally Abandoned Mission under the Fourth Amendment and South Carolina Constitution.

I. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

1. *United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment:*

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated..."

2. *South Carolina Constitution, Article I, Section 10:*

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures and unreasonable invasions of privacy shall not be violated..."

II. FEDERAL CASE LAW AUTHORITIES

1. *Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015)*

Principal Proposition: A traffic stop becomes an unlawful seizure if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the "mission" of the stop.

- **The "Mission" Defined:** The Supreme Court held that the mission of a traffic stop is to "address the traffic violation that warranted the stop" and "attend to related safety concerns."
- **The Citation Link:** The Court explicitly stated that the stop remains lawful only as long as the officer is diligently pursuing the tasks of "issuing a ticket for the violation" and checking license/registration.
- **Factual Law:** When an officer stops a vehicle for a registration violation (like S.C. Code § 56-3-840) but never issues a citation, it serves as objective evidence that the officer abandoned the mission of the stop to engage in an unrelated evidentiary search.

2. *United States v. Martin, 4th Cir. (2026)*

Principal Proposition: An officer's immediate pivot to a criminal investigation unrelated to the traffic mission constitutes a Fourth Amendment violation.

Factual Law: The Fourth Circuit held that where an officer "abandoned the mission of the stop to engage in a criminal investigation unrelated to that mission," the subsequent discovery of evidence must be suppressed.

3. *United States v. Bowman, 884 F.3d 200 (4th Cir. 2018)*

Principal Proposition: The Fourth Amendment does not permit "unconstitutional detours" from the traffic mission.

- **Factual Law:** The court emphasized that the authority for a traffic stop ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed. The failure to issue a ticket for the alleged infraction is a primary factor in determining that the officer was not diligently pursuing the traffic mission.

III. SOUTH CAROLINA CASE LAW AUTHORITIES

1. *State v. Moore, 415 S.C. 245, 781 S.E.2d 897 (2016)*

Principal Proposition: The South Carolina Supreme Court adopted the Rodriguez standard, holding that a traffic stop may not be extended for any period of time to conduct a drug investigation without independent reasonable suspicion.

- **Factual Law:** If the officer's "negligence" or choice not to issue a citation for the registration violation is coupled with a pivot to a narcotics search, the mission is deemed abandoned. The search is therefore unconstitutional because the "justification for the stop" (the registration) was discarded in favor of a "fishing expedition."

2. *State v. Provet, 405 S.C. 101, 747 S.E.2d 453 (2013)*

Principal Proposition: The duration of a traffic stop is limited by its original purpose.

- **Factual Law:** The court noted that once the "regulatory purpose" of the stop is fulfilled—or abandoned—the officer has no further right to detain the individual. The failure to issue a citation is a factual anchor proving the regulatory purpose was a mere pretext.

3. *State v. Williams*, 439 S.C. 202 (2022)

Principal Proposition: Later-acquired information cannot retroactively justify an unconstitutional extension.

- **Factual Law:** Similar to the 12:50 a.m. dispatch check in Alston, the court held that reasonable suspicion must exist before the stop is extended. If the officer abandons the mission of ticketing for the registration before finding drugs, the drugs are "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree."

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS: FAILURE TO TICKET AS PROOF OF ABANDONMENT

Under the "Abandoned Mission" Doctrine, the failure to issue a citation for the very violation that justified the stop (S.C. Code § 56-3-840) is not merely an administrative oversight; it is a constitutional defect.

- **Pretextual Abandonment:** When Officer Rhoads admitted he never issued a ticket, he effectively admitted that the "mission" of the stop was never the registration.
- **The Limitation of Action:** By choosing not to issue a citation, the officer terminated the legal authority for the seizure. Any detention occurring after that choice—specifically the search that occurred before the 12:50 a.m. dispatch check—is a warrantless seizure without probable cause.

Respectfully submitted,
Londell LaShun Alston
Appellant Pro Se

REFERENCES

- [1] *Rodriguez v. United States*, 575 U.S. 348 (2015).
- [2] *State v. Moore*, 415 S.C. 245, 781 S.E.2d 897 (2016).
- [3] *United States v. Martin*, 4th Cir. (2026).
- [4] S.C. Constitution, Article I, Section 10.
- [5] U.S. Constitution, Fourth Amendment.

LEGAL MEMORANDUM: THE EVIDENTIARY AND CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF AN OFFICER'S FAILURE TO ISSUE A TRAFFIC TICKET

TO: Appellate Panel / Trial Court / Reviewing Authorities

FROM: Londell LaShun Alston, Pro Se Appellant

CASE: Londell LaShun Alston v. State of South Carolina (Appellate Case No. 2025-000197)

SUBJECT: Legal analysis of police discretion, the Fourth Amendment "Abandoned Mission" doctrine (Rodriguez v. United States), and the failure to issue a traffic ticket for expired registration or a charge for simple marijuana possession.

I. INTRODUCTION AND QUESTION PRESENTED

Under South Carolina law and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, is an officer required to issue a ticket or citation when a traffic infraction (such as an expired registration under S.C. Code Ann. § 56-3-840) is committed in their view?

The Short Answer: While South Carolina law grants law enforcement officers statutory discretion (may arrest or issue a ticket under S.C. Code Ann. § 17-13-30), the Fourth Amendment imposes a strict functional limitation. When an officer initiates a traffic stop based solely on a traffic violation, that violation defines the "mission" of the stop. If the officer fails to issue a citation or warning for that infraction and instead pursues an unrelated exploratory narcotics investigation, the stop violates the Abandoned Mission doctrine established in Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015). Furthermore, claiming "marijuana" as probable cause while failing to file any marijuana charges exposes bad-faith evidence fabrication.

II. STATUTORY DISCRETION VS. FOURTH AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS

1. South Carolina Law on Police Discretion

Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 17-13-30, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs may arrest without a warrant any persons who violate state criminal laws within their view. Similarly, under standard traffic enforcement procedures, officers possess the administrative discretion to issue a Uniform Traffic Ticket or give a verbal warning. Therefore, standing alone, an officer's choice not to issue a ticket for a minor infraction does not violate a standalone state statute. However, discretion is not a constitutional shield. An officer cannot use prosecutorial discretion as an after-the-fact justification to convert a routine traffic stop into a prolonged, exploratory drug raid without independent reasonable suspicion.

2. The Rodriguez "Mission-Based" Constraint

In Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), the United States Supreme Court addressed the limits of police discretion during traffic stops. The Court held that a traffic stop "becomes unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a ticket for the violation."

- **The Inherent Contradiction:** The entire legal justification for Officer Dakota Rhoads seizing Petitioner at 12:32 a.m. was an alleged expired registration. Under Rodriguez, the officer's authority is strictly limited to addressing that specific infraction (checking license, registration, proof of insurance, and issuing a citation or warning).
- **The Abandoned Mission:** Officer Rhoads admitted under oath that he never issued a traffic ticket for the expired registration. By failing to issue a ticket, the state's own evidence proves that the "mission" of addressing the traffic violation was abandoned. The encounter was unlawfully transformed into a fishing expedition without independent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

III. THE EVIDENTIARY SIGNIFICANCE OF FAILING TO CHARGE MARIJUANA

In addition to failing to ticket the expired tag, Officer Rhoads' conduct regarding the alleged "marijuana" reveals bad-faith evidence fabrication:

1.The Recorded Admission: Body-worn camera (BWC) audio captures Officer Rhoads explicitly stating: "Because of the cocaine you're under arrest. We're going to call it marijuana, okay?"

2.The Omission of Charges: Despite claiming that marijuana provided the probable cause to search the vehicle or individual, no marijuana charges were ever formally filed against Petitioner.

3.Legal Conclusion: An officer cannot invoke an alleged drug offense (marijuana) to justify an extended search or arrest and subsequently omit that charge from the charging instruments when it serves their narrative. This omission, combined with the failure to ticket the expired tag, provides undeniable proof that the entire encounter was a pretextual fabrication designed to manufacture probable cause after the fact.

IV. CONCLUSION

While South Carolina law grants officers discretion in issuing tickets, the Fourth Amendment does not permit officers to use a phantom traffic violation as an indefinite license to search citizens. Officer Rhoads' failure to issue a traffic ticket, coupled with his failure to charge marijuana after citing it as justification, proves that the traffic stop was an illegal Abandoned Mission under *Rodriguez v. United States*.

Respectfully submitted,
Londell LaShun Alston
Appellant Pro Se
Date: August 17, 2026

REFERENCES

- [1] S.C. Code Ann. § 17-13-30 (Officers may arrest without warrant for offenses committed in view).
- [2] *Rodriguez v. United States*, 575 U.S. 348 (2015).
- [3] *Id.* at 354–55.
- [4] Officer Rhoads Suppression Hearing Testimony, Case No. 2025-000197 (Admitting no traffic citation was issued).
- [5] Rock Hill Police Department Body-Worn Camera Audio Intercept, July 14, 2023.
- [6] York County General Sessions Charging Documents, Case No. 2025-000197 (Confirming absence of marijuana charges).

LEGAL MEMORANDUM: STATUTORY VIOLATIONS, ABANDONED MISSION, AND INVALID SEARCH PRETEXT

Case Name: Londell LaShun Alston v. State of South Carolina

Appellate Case No.: 2025-000197 (South Carolina Court of Appeals)

Subject: Statutory Ticketing Requirements (S.C. Code § 56-3-840 / Registration), Abandoned Mission Doctrine, Lack of Vehicle Consent, and Unlawful Pretextual Search

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This legal memorandum provides an exhaustive analysis of the statutory, constitutional, and evidentiary defects tainting the July 14, 2023, traffic stop and subsequent prosecution of Appellant Londell LaShun Alston. Specifically, this document synthesizes five independent, fatal flaws in the State's case:

- 1. Statutory / Ticketing Failure:** The initial pretextual stop was justified under registration statutes (such as S.C. Code § 56-3-840), yet Officer Rhoads never issued a traffic citation, proving that the stop was an unauthorized "fishing expedition" rather than a legitimate regulatory traffic enforcement action
- 2. The "Abandoned Mission" Doctrine (Rodriguez):** Under *Rodriguez v. United States*, an officer may not prolong a stop beyond the time needed to address the mission of the stop. Failing to issue a ticket while detaining Appellant for exploratory drug searches violates federal and state constitutional mandates.
- 3. Pretextual Marijuana Search Lacking Charges:** Officer Rhoads utilized an alleged discovery of marijuana on Appellant's person (accompanied by the recorded statement, "Because of the cocaine you're under arrest. We're going to call it marijuana, okay?") to justify an evidentiary search, yet no simple possession charges for marijuana were ever filed. A search pretext abandoned at the charging stage cannot validate a warrantless vehicle search.
- 4. Absence of Plain View and Vehicle Consent:** The vehicle searched did not belong to Appellant, nothing was in plain view inside the vehicle cabin, and Officer Rhoads never asked for or received consent to search the vehicle.
- 5. Illegal Expansion Beyond Person:** Even assuming *arguendo* that contraband was allegedly found on Appellant's person, it provided zero independent probable cause to conduct a warrantless, exploratory search of a third-party vehicle without consent, exigency, or a standardized inventory policy.

II. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK & THE ABANDONED MISSION DOCTRINE

A. Statutory Registration Requirements and the Failure to Issue a Citation

The initial justification proffered by Officer Rhoads for seizing Appellant at 12:32 a.m. on July 14, 2023, was an alleged registration infraction (implicating statutes such as S.C. Code Ann. § 56-3-110 and § 56-3-840 governing vehicle licensing and delinquency penalties).

- **The Statutory Defect:** Under South Carolina traffic enforcement practice, a regulatory stop for a registration or tag violation requires the officer to address the infraction—either by issuing a warning ticket or a traffic citation.
- **The Admission:** Officer Rhoads admitted under oath during the suppression/trial proceedings that he never issued a traffic citation for the tag infraction.

B. Application of the *Rodriguez* Abandoned Mission Doctrine

In *Rodriguez v. United States*, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), the United States Supreme Court held that a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was initiated violates the Fourth Amendment.

- Because Officer Rhoads never issued a ticket and instead immediately pivoted to inquiring about the glove compartment, removing Appellant, and conducting a weapons/narcotics frisk, the lawful mission of the stop was instantly abandoned.
- Under *Rodriguez*, all actions taken after the mission was abandoned (or prolonged without independent reasonable suspicion) constitute an unconstitutional seizure.

III. INVALID SEARCH PRETEXT: THE "CALL IT MARIJUANA" FABRICATION

A. Absence of Marijuana Charges

A foundational requirement of a lawful arrest or search incident to arrest is the existence of probable cause for a specific offense.

- During the encounter, audio records capture Officer Rhoads stating: "Because of the cocaine you're under arrest. We're going to call it marijuana, okay?"
- Despite this recorded admission of manufacturing or mislabeling evidence, no charges for simple possession of marijuana were ever formally brought against Appellant.

B. Pretextual Manufacturing of Probable Cause

When law enforcement utilizes a fabricated or mislabeled substance ("calling it marijuana") to justify detaining a citizen and searching a vehicle, and subsequently drops or never files charges for that alleged offense, it exposes the underlying search as a bad-faith pretextual maneuver. Under *Whren v. United States*, 517 U.S. 806, while objective pretext may sometimes survive initial scrutiny, a search predicated on manufactured evidence and uncharged infractions violates Fourteenth Amendment Due Process.

IV. THE UNLAWFUL VEHICLE SEARCH: NON-OWNERSHIP, NO CONSENT, AND NO PLAIN VIEW

A. Lack of Vehicle Ownership and Expectation of Privacy

The vehicle searched by Officer Rhoads did not belong to Appellant.

- While non-owner drivers or occupants often face standing hurdles regarding vehicle searches, when law enforcement asserts that a search of a third-party vehicle was justified by alleged conduct or items linked to a passenger/driver, the search remains bound by the Fourth Amendment constraints governing the initial unlawful seizure (*Brendlin v. California*, 551 U.S. 249). Because the initial stop was an illegal seizure under *Rodriguez*, any connection to the vehicle is "fruit of the poisonous tree" (*Wong Sun v. United States*, 371 U.S. 471).

B. Complete Absence of Consent and Plain View

1.No Consent to Search Vehicle: Officer Rhoads never asked for, nor did Appellant ever grant, permission to search the interior of the automobile. When Rhoads asked to "check for weapons" and "search," Appellant's responses ("you can check me") were strictly confined to a limited Terry frisk of his person, in accordance with *Florida v. Jimeno*, 500 U.S. 248 (limiting consent to the terms granted).

2.No Plain View: Officer Rhoads admitted under oath that the items ultimately seized were not in plain view within the vehicle cabin. Under *Coolidge v. New Hampshire*, 403 U.S. 443, a warrantless search of a vehicle cannot be sustained under the plain view doctrine where the officer must rummage through closed compartments or rely on exploratory manipulation.

3.Contraband Allegedly on Person, Not Vehicle: Even if contraband was alleged to be on Appellant's person, it did not create probable cause to search the entire vehicle without a warrant, especially in the absence of a standardized inventory policy (*Florida v. Wells*, 495 U.S. 1).

V. CONCLUSION

The state's prosecution relied on an impossible legal fiction: that an un-ticketed registration stop (abandoned mission) could justify detaining a driver of a non-owned vehicle, searching it without consent or plain view, and utilizing uncharged, mislabeled narcotics ("call it marijuana") as retroactive probable cause.

Under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, this chain of illegality is void. The trial court erred in denying suppression, and the South Carolina Court of Appeals must reverse the conviction.

Respectfully submitted,
Londell LaShun Alston
Appellant Pro Se

REFERENCES

- [1] S.C. Code Ann. § 56-3-110, § 56-3-840 (Vehicle licensing and registration requirements).
- [2] *Rodriguez v. United States*, 575 U.S. 348 (2015) (Abandoned mission doctrine).
- [3] Encounter Audio Transcript, Rock Hill Police Department Intercept, July 14, 2023 ("Because of the cocaine you're under arrest. We're going to call it marijuana, okay?").
- [4] Trial and Suppression Hearing Transcripts, *State v. Alston*, Case No. 2025-000197 (Confirming non-ownership of vehicle, lack of vehicle search consent, and absence of plain view).
- [5] Suppression Hearing Testimony of Officer Rhoads, Case No. 2025-000197 (Admitting no traffic citation was ever issued for the tag).
- [6] Criminal Indictment and Court Records, Case No. 2025-000197 (Confirming no simple possession of marijuana charges were ever filed).

Search and SeizureRock Hill Police Department Policy**I. PURPOSE**

To establish procedures for warrantless searches and seizures conducted by Department officers.

II. POLICY <44.2.2 c.>

Officers will obtain search warrants on proper legal authority whenever practical. However, it is not always practical to obtain a warrant in advance.; Officers will conduct warrantless searches and seizures under certain conditions prescribed by law and in accordance with Department policy.

III. PROCEDURES**A. Searches Incident to Arrest**

Officers will conduct searches incident to arrest, subject to the following conditions:

1. The arrest is lawful and the search is reasonably related to the circumstances of the arrest.
2. For the purpose of seizing fruits, instrumentalities, contraband and/or other evidence of the crime for which the arrest was made and to prevent the destruction or concealment of evidence, or to remove weapons or dangerous instrumentalities that the arrested person might use to resist or effect an escape.
3. When the arrest is not an excuse to conduct the search.
4. The search is limited in scope to the person of the suspect and the immediate surrounding area. Immediate surrounding area means the area from which the suspect can either obtain a weapon or destroy evidence. In some cases the entire room in which the arrest took place is deemed a surrounding area. Once an arrestee has been removed from this area or room, (s)he could not get a weapon or destroy evidence; therefore, the search will terminate.
5. The search is substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and conducted in the immediate vicinity of the arrest. An exception to this procedure is that an arrested person may be more thoroughly searched at the holding area prior to lockup.
6. An officer conducting a search incident to arrest may use the degree of force reasonably necessary to perform his or her duty.

B. Consent Searches <1.2.4>

Officers may conduct a search of persons even though the officer does not have a warrant or probable cause if the officer has obtained the prior consent of the person who will be affected by the search or of someone who has the right and authority to act for the person who will be affected by the search. Keep in mind the following:

1. That consent will be positive.
2. That silence in and of itself does not solely indicate consent.
3. That the person asked for consent may not be coerced in any manner.
4. The person may withdraw consent at any time during the search and the search will stop.
5. Whenever practical, officers requesting consent will obtain a written waiver from the person in lawful possession of the premises or object to be searched. This written waiver is commonly known as a Consent to Search Form.

C. Movable Vehicle Exception

An officer may make a warrantless search of a car, truck, RV, boat, airplane or other vehicle in the following situations:

1. When the vehicle is in motion or at least mobile when seized; and
2. There is probable cause to believe it contains contraband or evidence of a crime; and
3. Taking time to obtain a warrant will delay in the search, permitting the vehicle to be moved and possibly preventing the search.

D. Motor Home/Mobile Home

Officers may conduct warrantless searches of mobile/motor homes if they fall under the movable vehicle exception requirement (that is, they are mobile and capable of being driven on the road). A mobile/motor home meets the vehicle exception requirements when the vehicle is moving or readily mobile by the turn of a switch key. The determinant is whether it is a vehicle rather than a home. Factors to consider are:

1. Location
2. Readily mobile
3. Elevated on blocks
4. Vehicle licensed
5. Vehicle connected to utilities (i.e., electricity, sewer, water)
6. Convenient access to a public road

E. Crime Scenes

1. During the initial response to a call for service, there is no requirement for a search warrant where a crime has occurred and the crime scene has been secured for the purpose of processing the scene for evidence. However, when the crime scene search will be intensive and time consuming and when evidence may be obtained to be used against an owner /occupant of the crime scene, it is beneficial to obtain a search warrant early in the process.
2. Once police have completed processing a crime scene and relinquished control of it, the location is again subject to all constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. For more detail on crime scene searches, see General Order Chapter 83, Section #1.01 (Collection and Preservation of Evidence).

F. Exigent Circumstances

Officers may make a warrantless search of a person, personal belonging, a vehicle, or a building when there is good reason to believe it necessary to:

1. Save a life
2. Prevent injury; or
3. Prevent serious property damage

G. Impounded Vehicles

1. Officers will routinely conduct a warrantless inventory of any lawfully impounded vehicle to:
 - a. Protect the owner's property;
 - b. Protect the Department against claims of lost or stolen property;
 - c. Make sure that no weapons or other dangerous instruments fall in the hands of vandals or thieves.
2. Officers will complete a Vehicle Inventory Sheet on every impounded vehicle. Please refer to General Order Chapter 61, Section #1.06 (Traffic Ancillary Services) for more information on Impounded Vehicle Searches.

H. Hot Pursuit

1. If an officer is pursuing a person and has probable cause to believe that (s)he has just committed a crime, officers may search the structure or premises into which the officer has pursued the person if necessary to:
 - a. Protect his or her safety;
 - b. Protect the safety of the public; or
 - c. Prevent an escape.
2. Hot pursuit searches occur prior to arrest. Authority is limited. Once the suspect has been apprehended, the search will immediately cease.

I. Abandoned Property

Officers may, without a warrant, search and seize property that (s)he has good reason to believe has been abandoned.

J. Open Fields

An officer may enter and search any unoccupied or undeveloped area that lies outside the curtilage of a dwelling. Curtilage is the area around the home to which the home life activity extends. The curtilage protection only applies to the property owner.

K. Plain View

There is no requirement that a warrant be obtained before seeing objects brought into public places open to plain view. However, officers will have a good reason to be at the place where the evidence is found. Officers may, without a warrant, seize any contraband or evidence of a crime that is in "plain view" of where the officer is:

1. Lawfully present; and
2. Had no expectation of finding the contraband or crime evidence; and
3. When it is not practical to get a warrant.

L. Stop and Frisk

"Stop and frisk" or Terry searches are covered under General Order Chapter 41, Section #1.03 (Field Interviews).
</44.2.2 c.>

BY ORDER OF:

Chris Watts
Chief of Police

<CALEA Standards: 1.2.4 & 44.2.2 c.>

1 Given this argument, my client is basically making an
2 argument that there's a -- the fruit of the poisonous tree,
3 that once the stop was abandoned -- or once the traffic
4 ticket was abandoned and usurped, that any evidence that
5 follows after that should be excluded under the exclusionary
6 rule. Thank you, your Honor.

7 THE COURT: Thank you. Yes, ma'am.

8 MS. HAMILTON: Thank you, your Honor. I'll start with
9 the length of the traffic stop that he is asserting in his
10 argument. I believe, based on the video and all that we saw
11 today, that the length of time at the traffic stop was more
12 than reasonable. There was continued investigation from the
13 moment that he sees that weapon. He's calling it a dispatch,
14 trying to figure out the status of the Defendant as to the
15 driver's license, status of the Defendant as being federally
16 prohibited.

17 You hear the response as to being federally prohibited
18 at 12 minutes and 50 seconds in, that is actually almost two
19 minutes past when he finds the initial drugs within the
20 vehicle. So he's continuing his investigation and has yet to
21 hear back from dispatch as to the status of him and the gun
22 at that point. So it is a continuous investigation that's
23 still ongoing at that moment that he finds those drugs within
24 that vehicle.

25 When he pulls that vehicle over, the gun is brought

1 out. So that brings in a whole another part of the
2 investigation past the expired decal that the officer needs
3 to investigate. I believe based on case law, there was a
4 continuous investigation throughout. The Defendant was not
5 using methods to delay time, to use tactics to extend this
6 traffic stop for the benefit of him. And basically, a
7 fishing expedition.

8 I would assert that throughout this investigation, he
9 had found marijuana, he had found -- found a gun. Based on
10 the marijuana, he was going to search the car. Additionally,
11 he would have to tow the vehicle based on the expired tags.
12 He had also called into dispatch as to insurance and status
13 of registration, and he was awaiting results on those. So I
14 would just say the length to time in this case is more than
15 reasonable based on the case law.

16 Additionally, as to the search, I have not read this
17 case, but I do not think this is a fruit of the poisonous
18 tree kind of situation. I think this is -- based on the
19 stop, this is a probable cause search, and, most at its core,
20 an inventory search. This was an expired tag as Officer --
21 Officer Rhoads stated on the stand. This was a vehicle that
22 was not street legal. It was not going to be able to be
23 driven at that point. There was the only occupant of the
24 vehicle. The Defendant was being arrested. This vehicle
25 could not be driven on the road. This vehicle had to be

1 towed. The vehicle was going to be inventoried.

*2 Additionally, the Defendant was in that vehicle with
3 marijuana taken out of that vehicle, with marijuana on his
*4 person, thus giving probable cause to search the vehicle.

5 Also, if you deemed this not to be a true inventory search,
6 which the State is arguing it ultimately is, so we would ask
7 that you find that the Fourth Amendment was not violated, and
8 that this was not an illegal search based on those arguments,
9 your Honor.

10 THE COURT: Okay. As to number two, Counsel?

11 MR. NIEMIEC: Thank you, your Honor. This is a case my
12 -- my client and I would like the Court to pay attention to,
13 is State versus Miller. I do have copies of this case. It's
14 a fairly well-known case in this type of analysis of
15 Jackson v. Denno. The cite is 652 Southeastern 2d 444. What
16 they talk about in -- or what we specifically want to talk
17 about in our argument in this case is whether or not the
18 Defendant voluntarily made a statement and whether or not his
19 will to do so was overborne by the circumstances then in
20 their existing.

21 He had just been arrested. He has been arrested in a
22 car that's not -- does not belong to him. He has been
23 arrested with a gun that he does not -- that he says does not
24 belong to him. That was all evident on the previous video.
25 He is then brought into a room with two detectives who start

1 Rhoads -- Officer Dakota Rhoads.

2 OFFICER DAKOTA RHOADS,

3 being duly sworn, testified as follows:

4 THE CLERK: Thank you.

5 THE COURT: Sir, if you'll adjust the microphone to
6 suit yourself. Tell us who you are and spell your last name
7 for the court reporter, please.

8 THE WITNESS: My name is Dakota Rhoads. Name is
9 spelled R-H-O-A-D-S.

10 THE COURT: Thank you. Solicitor?

11 MS. HAMILTON: Thank you, your Honor.

12 DIRECT EXAMINATION

13 BY MS. HAMILTON:

14 Q. Okay. Good afternoon.

15 A. Afternoon.

16 Q. Could you please state your full name for the
17 Court?

18 A. Dakota Rhoads.

19 Q. Okay. And what is your occupation?

20 A. I'm currently a stay-at-home dad.

21 Q. What was your occupation prior to being a
22 stay-at-home dad?

23 A. I was a police officer for the city of Rock Hill.

24 Q. Okay. And how long have you been in law
25 enforcement prior to becoming a stay-at-home dad?

1 A. Just under four years.

2 Q. Were you employed as an officer with the Rock Hill
3 Police Department the evening of July 14, 2023?

4 A. I was.

5 Q. I'd like to draw your attention to that evening
6 around 12:30 a.m. Do you remember what you were doing?

7 A. I do. I was on routine patrol the area of Cherry
8 Road and McConnell's Highway.

9 Q. Okay. And did something come to your attention
10 that made you initiate a traffic stop?

11 A. I observed a white Dodge Magnum, the tag and decal
12 on that license plate were expired, so I initiated traffic
13 stop in that vehicle.

14 Q. Okay. And what location did you initiate that
15 traffic stop?

16 A. It was right at Cherry Road and McConnell's
17 Highway.

18 Q. Is that in York County?

19 A. Yes. York County, within the City of Rock Hill.

20 Q. Okay. And what happened next once you initiated
21 that traffic stop?

22 A. I made contact with the sole occupant and driver,
23 Londell Alston. He identified himself with his license.

24 Q. And what did you do next once he identified
25 himself?

1 A. I requested, obviously, for his registration proof
2 insurance as well. And at that point, he began the searching
3 for his -- his rest of his information.

4 Q. Did he hand you his driver's license at that time?

5 A. I don't recall. I think it was later on, but at
6 some point later on, he did give me his -- his license.

7 Q. And what did he proceed to do when he started
8 looking for those items?

9 A. So he was looking through the -- the glove box and
10 at some point, he'd picked up a firearm in his left hand.

11 And I even asked him, I was like, "Is that a real gun?" And
12 he said, "Yes." I was like, "Okay. Well, let's go ahead and
13 put that down." He sat it down right on the passenger side
14 seat, and I was like, "Why are we pulling out a gun in the
15 middle of a traffic stop? At least let me know or
16 something." And he started reaching again towards the gun.
17 I said, "You know what? Just get out of the car." Just for
18 my safety and his at that point. So I had him exit out of
19 the vehicle.

20 Q. And then at that time, did you ask for consent to
21 search? Did you search the Defendant at that time?

22 A. Yeah, once he got out of the car, obviously, I had
23 no idea what else he had on him, any other weapons or
24 anything like that. So I just asked him if I could -- you
25 know, have consent to search his person, which he did grant.

1 So I did search his person.

2 Q. Okay. Did you find anything of importance at that
3 time?

4 A. I did. I found marijuana on his person.

5 Q. Okay. And then what did you proceed to do after
6 you found that?

7 A. After I pulled up the marijuana, he got extremely
8 nervous. He started to kind of move around a little bit. I
9 felt a little uncomfortable, so I detained him for the time
10 being to figure out what we had with the marijuana, obviously
11 with the expired tag. We had him stand in front of the --
12 the front of my patrol vehicle, see when we hit by a car,
13 because right in the middle of the road. And then again, I
14 continued my search and he had told me -- because I had asked
15 him, "Is there anything else illegal on you?" He said,
16 "Yeah, I got a -- a -- a weed pen." Is what -- I think is
17 what he said. Then I pulled out a THC vape.

18 Q. Did you proceed to search the vehicle after all of
19 that?

20 A. I did. At that point, with the registration being
21 expired, it means it's not street legal. We were going to
22 have to tow the vehicle at that point, so we'd have to do a
23 tow inventory. And then also with him having the marijuana,
24 we had probable cause to search the vehicle at that point.

25 So I did search the vehicle, yes.

1 screaming. He was extremely angry at that point.

* 2 Q. What did you proceed to do next once you had
3 located all of the narcotics within that vehicle,
4 specifically, in regards to the gun?

5 A. At that point, I had given -- dispatched his
6 information -- the Defendant's information. They had told me
7 that he was federally prohibited from possessing a firearm.
8 So I would've -- eventually did seize the firearm and secured
* 9 that in my -- my vehicle as well.

10 Q. Okay. So once all the drugs are secured within
11 your vehicle, what happens next?

12 A. Once everything was secure, we had the firearm, we
13 had the -- the drugs, we completed our search at that point,
14 I -- I drove the Defendant down to the jail.

15 Q. Did you place a call to anyone prior to
16 transporting the Defendant to the jail?

17 A. I did, to Investigator Leary with the narcotics
18 unit.

19 Q. Okay. And why did you place a call to
20 Investigator Leary?

21 A. Whenever we find a -- a high amount of drugs, we
22 have to contact narcotics anyway, he had actually notified me
23 over the radio that night to -- to give him a call.

24 Q. Okay. And what did you proceed to do once you got
25 back to the police station with the Defendant?

1 A. It's an Axon body camera.

2 Q. And have you received training prior to operating
3 that body camera?

4 A. Yes, ma'am.

5 Q. And on the evening of July 14, 2023, was your body
6 camera activated manually or automatic?

7 A. It was manual.

8 Q. Okay. So looking at State's Exhibit 1, how do you
9 recognize that?

10 A. My signature is right on here and date as well.

11 Q. And have you had a chance to view the contents of
12 that DVD of State's Exhibit 1 prior to today?

13 A. Yes, ma'am.

14 Q. And when was the date that you had viewed that?

15 A. November 14th of 2024.

16 Q. And the video that you watched on that DVD, is
17 that a fair and accurate representation of the events that
18 occurred that evening and early morning, July 14, 2023, when
19 you pulled over the Defendant?

20 A. Yes, ma'am.

21 Q. Are there any material alterations to the video
22 since you removed it from your camera?

23 A. No, ma'am.

24 MS. HAMILTON: Your Honor, this -- the State would
25 offer Exhibit Number 1 for admission into evidence.

1 THE COURT: Any objection?

2 MR. NIEMIEC: Yes, your Honor. The Defense would
3 object under the same parameters of the pretrial motion that
4 we made.

5 THE COURT: Okay. Over his objection. Yes, admitted.

6 (State's Exhibit 1 admitted into evidence.)

7 MS. HAMILTON: Your Honor, the State would request to
8 publish for the jury.

9 THE COURT: Yes, ma'am.

10 MS. HAMILTON: Thank you.

11 (Video starts at 3:25:31 p.m.)

12 OFFICER RHOADS: What's that?

13 MR. ALSTON: (Inaudible.)

14 OFFICER RHOADS: Nah, you don't worry about that, man.
15 You (inaudible). Yeah. That's your car?

16 MR. ALSTON: No.

17 OFFICER RHOADS: Girl's car?

18 MR. ALSTON: (Inaudible).

19 OFFICER RHOADS: Okay. I need your license and
20 registration, man. And your -- your girlfriend's car has no
21 decal, it's expired, the tag is expired, (inaudible). Yeah.
22 At least -- I mean, yeah. At least, let us know you're to
23 pull out a gun (inaudible), man. I don't know. You right?
24 You're cool (inaudible). No, you're not, but come on now.
25 Yeah -- yeah. Like, "Hey, man, I got a gun right here

1 (inaudible)."

2 All right. Because of the cocaine, you're under
3 arrest. We're going to call it marijuana, okay? Because the
4 gun in the car and everything (inaudible) handcuffs
5 (inaudible). One second. Then we'll stopped, okay? Hold
6 on, hold on, hold on. Don't refrain or anything (inaudible)
7 handcuffs (inaudible). Additional (inaudible). You're good.
8 We're going to put you in, double you up (inaudible). Put
9 your hands behind your back (inaudible).

10 MR. ALSTON: Okay.

11 OFFICER RHOADS: You're not listening (inaudible) and
12 we're looking -- going to search you, correct? Okay. I
13 didn't finish my search yet, so -- what else we got on him?
14 You already moving (inaudible) eight people?

15 MR. ALSTON: Yeah.

16 OFFICER RHOADS: Okay. Pills, do you have any crack,
17 do you have any meth?

18 MR. ALSTON: No.

19 OFFICER RHOADS: Okay. Nothing other than (inaudible)
20 like marijuana on you and everything? (Inaudible), okay?
21 (inaudible) all your cards (inaudible)? Lot of that
22 (inaudible).

23 (Video stops at 3:33:55 p.m.)

24 MS. HAMILTON: For time purposes, I'm going to kind of
25 fast forward a little bit, ask you some questions.

1 (Video plays at 3:34:00 p.m.)

2 OFFICER RHOADS: (Inaudible) you're good, bro. Pull
3 the door on him. Back on camera. (Inaudible).

4 (Video stops at 3:34:43 p.m.)

5 BY MS. HAMILTON:

6 Q. What did you just pick up in that moment?

7 A. It was the blue drawstring bag where I found the
8 drugs in.

9 Q. Was that hidden or was that placed in plain view,
10 easy access?

11 A. It was just sitting right there in plain view at
12 the back seat.

13 (Video starts at 3:35:00 p.m.)

14 OFFICER RHOADS: (Inaudible) yep.

15 (Video stops at 3:36:27 p.m.)

16 BY MS. HAMILTON:

17 Q. When you just opened that black container, what
18 did you believe to be in that black container?

19 A. It was marijuana.

20 (Video starts at 3:36:33 p.m.)

21 OFFICER RHOADS: Unless you want another charge to
22 stop. You're going to stop -- you're going to stop. Stop
23 right now.

24 MR. ALSTON: I swear to God I just got (inaudible).

25 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah -- yeah, I saw my morning

1 (State's Exhibit 32 admitted into evidence.)

2 MS. HAMILTON: Thank you, your Honor.

3 BY MS. HAMILTON:

4 Q. So this was definitely a large amount of drugs.

5 Do you see the person in the courtroom today who was in
6 possession of these drugs and within that Dodge Charger on
7 the evening -- and the gun the evening of July 14, 2023?

8 A. Yes, ma'am.

9 Q. Okay. Could you please point him out on the
10 record?

11 A. He's sitting right there.

12 Q. Okay. And what is he wearing?

13 A. Looks like a collared shirt.

14 MS. HAMILTON: Okay. Thank you. I beg the Court's
15 indulgence.

16 Please answer any questions that Defense might have.

17 THE WITNESS: Yes, ma'am.

18 THE COURT: Take a quick break here. Mr. -- Madam
19 Forelady, the ladies and gentlemen of the jury, as I promised
20 you, we wouldn't sit more than about 90 minutes. You're a
21 little shy of that, but we were in here before that, and so
22 we were right at a hundred minutes or so. So anyway, we're
23 going to take an afternoon break here. It'll be about 15
24 minutes. Get some coffee, get some water, whatever you might
25 -- might need. The bailiff will take good care of you.

1 Don't talk about the case. We're just beginning in the case.

2 So nothing to really discuss at this point in time.

3 Mr. Bailiff, if you'll take the jury out.

4 (Jury exits at 4:02 p.m.)

5 THE COURT: Okay. We're going to take about a

6 20-minute break here, so that brings --

7 (Off the record at 4:03 p.m.)

8 (On the record at 4:29 p.m.)

9 THE COURT: Madam Forelady, everybody good?

10 JUROR NUMBER 39: Yes, your Honor.

11 THE COURT: All right. We are ready. Counsel?

12 MR. NIEMIEC: Thank you, your Honor.

13 CROSS-EXAMINATION

14 BY MR. NIEMIEC:

15 Q. Officer Rhoads, good afternoon.

16 A. Afternoon.

17 Q. You knew that car didn't belong to Londell Alston
18 when you pulled him, is that true?

19 A. I believe so. It was registered to a female.

20 Q. And not only that, there was an alert on that car,
21 isn't that correct?

22 A. At some point, I believe there was an alert on
23 that vehicle. Yes, sir.

24 Q. And you knew that before you approached him?

25 A. Briefly. I don't think (inaudible) right through

1 the alert. I think I just saw it popped up. There was some
2 sort of alert to the vehicle. I don't recall what
3 information was on there.

4 Q. You had done a computer search on that car while
5 you were pulling it over?

6 A. I had searched up NCIC at that point, and just
7 showed that tag and decal was expired.

8 Q. But it also showed you who owned that car?

9 A. Yes, sir.

10 Q. And at some point on the video, you mentioned
11 having stopped Zachary McCarver (ph) before?

12 A. Yes, sir.

13 Q. In that car, isn't that correct?

14 A. Yes, sir.

15 Q. And you stopped him more than once in that car,
16 isn't that correct?

17 A. I don't know about more than once. I just recall
18 maybe once -- one other time, a few months prior.

19 Q. I'm not trying to be argumentative, but can we
20 listen to it?

21 A. Sure, absolutely.

22 MR. NIEMIEC: May I approach the witness?

23 THE COURT: Yes, sir.

24 BY MR. NIEMIEC:

25 Q. While we wait for it to be queued up, what is --

1 you -- you know Officer Leary, correct?

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. What is his general role as an officer?

4 A. He is a narcotics investigator.

5 Q. And did you have reason to believe that he also

6 had had interactions with Zachary McCarver?

7 A. I -- I -- not that I recall. No, sir.

8 (Video starts at 4:32:52 p.m.)

9 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (Inaudible) but Zachary McCarver
10 car (inaudible).

11 OFFICER RHOADS: Yeah, I saw him before in this car.

12 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay. Are we good to tell it,
13 though?

14 (Video stops at 4:33:07 p.m.)

15 BY MR. NIEMIEC:

16 Q. Okay. So you just seen him before, you didn't
17 specifically mention that or anything?

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. How long have you -- were you on the force at that
20 time?

21 A. It had been probably about -- I would say two and
22 a half years.

23 Q. And primarily doing traffic, for lack of a better
24 term?

25 A. I was a patrol officer.

1 Q. Patrol officer. And that deals with a lot of
2 traffic stops?

3 A. It's a long range of all sorts of different crimes
4 and investigations, sir.

5 Q. I understand that, but is part of that long range
6 a lot of traffic stops?

7 A. Yes, sir.

8 Q. Would it be fair to say that in your experience
9 during those traffic stops, a lot of people left their
10 registration in the glove box?

11 A. Sure.

12 Q. Was the gun that you -- that Mr. Alston took at --
13 was it in the glove box when he discovered it?

14 A. Yes, sir. I believe so.

15 Q. Now you took him out of the vehicle because you
16 feared for your safety?

17 A. At first. Yes, sir.

18 Q. And I believe you indicated at the time on the
19 video that you felt like he was reaching for the gun, is that
20 correct?

21 A. Yes, sir.

22 Q. Isn't it true that both times his hand goes to the
23 passenger side seat, he grabs something other than the gun?

24 A. Well, I've seen that moment. I didn't know that.

25 Q. But now that you've seen the video, you do know

1 that?

2 A. I wouldn't say I know that. I don't know for sure
3 what he was reaching for.

4 MR. NIEMIEC: Could we go ahead and start it? Start it
5 for me.

6 (Video starts at 4:34:50 p.m.)

7 OFFICER RHOADS: (Inaudible). Hold on. A real gun?
8 (Inaudible).

9 (Video stops at 4:34:54 p.m.)

10 BY MR. NIEMIEC:

11 Q. What's in his hand right there?

12 A. I believe it's his wallet, sir.

13 MR. NIEMIEC: Okay. Move forward.

14 (Video starts at 4:34:59 p.m.)

15 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (Inaudible).

16 (Video stops at 4:35:07 p.m.)

17 MR. NIEMIEC: Can you pause it?

18 BY MR. NIEMIEC:

19 Q. See what he held at that particular time?

20 A. It might have been his, like, credit cards or
21 something like that.

22 Q. At no point in time did he actually touch that
23 gun.

24 A. It was in his left hand.

25 Q. A piece of white papers in his left?

1 A. No. You said he -- you said he never touched a
2 gun at any point in time. It was in his hand at one point.

3 Q. At those two times that he's reaching over, he
4 does not touch it?

5 A. From what I can see from the video, yes.

6 Q. In the video you indicate when you search him,
7 "You got a little marijuana on you. That's cool. We can
8 work with that." Is that correct?

9 A. Yes, sir.

10 Q. And then you say, "Not going to sweat over a
11 little bit of marijuana." Is that correct?

12 A. Yes, sir.

13 Q. In your direct testimony, you indicate that he got
14 nervous when you found the marijuana, is that correct?

15 A. Yes, sir.

16 MR. NIEMIEC: Could we go to 36th minute?

17 (Video starts at 4:35:48 p.m.)

18 OFFICER RHOADS: (Inaudible) marijuana in the car and
19 everything? (Inaudible), okay? Hold on -- hold on. Don't
20 refrain (inaudible).

21 (Video stops at 4:36:05 p.m.)

22 BY MR. NIEMIEC:

23 Q. Isn't it true from that video that he gets more
24 agitated that the handcuffs are going on rather than
25 marijuana was found on his person?

1 A. I don't know. I mean -- maybe agitated, yes, but
2 he was already extremely nervous from beforehand.

3 Q. Can we go to the (inaudible).

4 (Video starts at 4:36:27 p.m.)

5 MR. ALSTON: (Inaudible).

6 OFFICER RHOADS: What's that?

7 MR. ALSTON: (Inaudible).

8 OFFICER RHOADS: Don't worry about that (inaudible).

9 (Video stops at 4:36:42 p.m.)

10 MR. NIEMIEC: Can we pause it?

11 BY MR. NIEMIEC:

12 Q. So the first thing he tells you is that he had an
13 encounter with a police officer earlier that night, isn't
14 that correct?

15 A. Yes, sir.

16 Q. And I believe in the opening of the State's case,
17 they said the first thing he said was, "This wasn't my car.
18 This wasn't my car." But he in fact says, "I had an
19 encounter about a taillight with a prior officer." Isn't
20 that correct?

21 A. Yes, sir.

22 MR. NIEMIEC: And then he tells you this is not his
23 car. Can we play it, please?

24 (Video plays at 4:37:11 p.m.)

25 OFFICER RHOADS: It's your -- your girlfriend's car

* 1 Q. Do you have any doubt now that that was his car?

2 A. Is it either "Was he the registered owner", or
3 "Was he in possession of it"? He obviously wasn't the
4 registered owner, that's all I know.

5 Q. He did not own that car?

6 A. He was not the registered owner.

7 MR. NIEMIEC: Can we keep playing?

8 (Video starts at 4:41:08 p.m.)

9 OFFICER RHOADS: (Inaudible) marijuana on and
10 everything? (Inaudible) out of your car (inaudible).

11 (Video stops at 4:41:29 p.m.)

12 BY MR. NIEMIEC:

13 Q. At this point, does he seem to be following your
14 directives?

* 15 A. For the most part at this point, I guess, yeah.

16 MR. NIEMIEC: Play it, please.

17 (Video starts at 4:41:39 p.m.)

18 OFFICER RHOADS: Hold on (inaudible).

19 (Video stops at 4:41:59 p.m.)

20 BY MR. NIEMIEC:

21 Q. Isn't it true that only after drugs were
22 discovered in the car, does he truly get agitated?

23 A. Agitated? Yeah. I'd say after we found something
24 in the car, he got angry. Yes.

* 25 Q. And I think you mentioned in your direct testimony

1 that the bag was in plain view, is that correct?

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. Were the drugs in plain view or just the bag
4 containing the drugs?

5 A. Just the bag containing the drugs, sir.

6 Q. So it would not be readily apparent walking up on
7 the car that there were drugs in a blue bag behind the
8 driver's seat?

9 A. Correct, sir.

10 Q. And again, the gun was in the glove compartment,
11 correct?

12 A. Yes, sir.

13 Q. So that would not be readily apparent upon walking
14 up to the car that there was a gun in the glove compartment?

15 A. Not until he put it in his hand, no.

16 Q. And he didn't put it in his hand until he reached
17 for the registration, is that correct?

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. Was the black tar heroin covered up by the bag?

20 A. By which bag?

21 Q. The blue bag?

22 A. No, sir. Not that I -- not that I recall. I'd
23 have to look back. I believe the bag was sitting on the --
24 the seat and the black tar heroin was set on the floorboard,
25 but there was some stuff over it.

1 Q. It wasn't readily apparent upon your initial
2 inspection of the car?

3 A. The initial one? No, sir.

4 Q. You wouldn't say it was in plain view?

5 A. No, sir.

6 MR. NIEMIEC: I beg the Court's indulgence, your Honor?

7 THE COURT: Yes, sir.

8 BY MR. NIEMIEC:

9 Q. Isn't it true you didn't issue a ticket for an
10 expired tag?

11 A. Yes, sir. I did not issue a ticket.

12 Q. Isn't it true you didn't make any of -- any
13 charges against Mr. Alston for possession of marijuana?

14 A. Yes, sir.

15 MR. NIEMIEC: That's all the questions I have, your
16 Honor.

17 THE COURT: Thank you. Anything at all from the State?

18 MS. HAMILTON: Just briefly, your Honor.

19 RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION

20 BY MS. HAMILTON:

21 Q. In watching that video again talking about the
22 gun, did he act surprised when he found that gun, when you
23 pulled that out of the -- when he pulled it out of the glove
24 box?

25 A. No. Like, he knew it was in there.

1 Q. And did he know it was real?

2 A. Yes, he told me it was real.

3 Q. And I know there were some serious drug charges
4 out of this. The expired decal and the marijuana charges,
5 did you think those were important to charge at that point?

6 A. We had so many felony charges, it seemed kind of
7 pointless at that point.

8 MS. HAMILTON: Thank you. State has nothing further,
9 your Honor.

10 THE COURT: Anything at all?

11 MR. NIEMIEC: No, your Honor.

12 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. You may leave the
13 witness stand. Thank you. Okay. Let's see the lawyers to
14 talk about time.

15 MS. HAMILTON: Your Honor, could I have him -- Officer
16 Rhoads excused?

17 THE COURT: Any objection?

18 MR. NIEMIEC: No objection, your Honor.

19 THE COURT: All right. You're released from your
20 subpoena, you may stay or go.

21 (Bench conference at 4:46 p.m.)

22 THE COURT: Okay. Madam Forelady, ladies and
gentlemen, we're very close to the 5:00 hour. I don't -- I
don't -- I don't mind running up to 5:30, but I hate to
pick up testimony. We don't have a witness that we could



Current Plate

VIN: 2D4FV47V66H122163
Empty Weight: 3770

Year: 2006

Make: DODG

Model: MAGNUM

Body: SU

Title Number: 770460395842988
Status: CURRENT TITLE

Issue Date: 01/07/2021

Dup: N

Owner Number: 33028202
Owner Name: SPRATLEY, REBECCA ANN
Owner Address: 741 MITCHELL RD YORK SC, 297459027

Last Transaction: COUNTY RENEW ERROR

Plate Number: 5005PG
Date of Issue: 01/07/2021
GVW: 0

Plate Class: GT1 IN GOD WE TRUST
Plate Exp Date: 01/31/2023
Empty Weight: 3770
Municipality: 0

Decal Exp Date: 01/31/2023
Equip Number:
School District: 00

Vehicle Type: 1

Annual Fee: \$40.00

County: 46 - YORK
Vehicle Housed Address: 741 MITCHELL RD YORK SC, 297459027
Sale Price: \$1.00
Tax Credit: \$0.00

Trade-In Amount: \$0.00
Tax Exemption: BGI

Sales Tax Number: 0
State Tax Paid:

Insurance: CONFIRMED
Insurance Company NAIC: 38628
Insurance Company Name: PROGRESSIVE NORTHERN INSURANCE COMPANY
Insurance Policy Number: 945388258

Vehicle Not Currently Registered

End of Report

3 YEAR DRIVER RECORD

Customer No: 22063075

Driver License No: 11429330

Name: ALSTON, LONDELL LASHUN

SC Driver License Surrendered

License Type: DL

Class: D

Function: Duplicate

Posted: 04/07/2021

Issued: 05/07/2015

Date Surrendered: 04/07/2021

Duplicate DOI: 01/13/2016

Reason for Return: RETURNED VOLUNTARILY

Returning State: SC

SC Driver License Surrendered

License Type: DL

Class: D

Function: Duplicate

Posted: 04/07/2021

Issued: 05/07/2015

Date Surrendered: 04/07/2021

Duplicate DOI: 11/02/2015

Reason for Return: RETURNED VOLUNTARILY

Returning State: SC

SC Driver License Surrendered

License Type: DL

Class: D

Function: Modify

Posted: 04/07/2021

Issued: 11/06/2017

Date Surrendered: 04/07/2021

Reason for Return: RETURNED VOLUNTARILY

Returning State: SC

SC Driver License Surrendered

License Type: DL

Class: D

Function: Modify

Posted: 04/07/2021

Issued: 10/10/2014

Date Surrendered: 04/07/2021

Reason for Return: RETURNED VOLUNTARILY

Returning State: SC

End of Report

000079

COMMITMENT

- ☐ Original Commitment
☐ Additional Charge(s)

TO: Director York County Detention Center

Date: 7/14/2023

You are hereby commanded by this Court to hold in your custody,

Londell Lashun Alston

DOB: 03/16/1985

Race: B

Sex: M

(Defendant's name)

250 Cornelius Dr

Rock Hill, SC 29730-5542

(Address)

Bonding Company:

Case number	Charge	Trial Court	Bond Type	Amount
2023A4610201800	Drugs / Trafficking in Heroin, morphine, etc., 28 g or more	York County General Sessions	No Bond	
2023A4610201801	Drugs / Trafficking in Fentanyl, 28 grams or more	York County General Sessions	No Bond	
2023A4610201802	Drugs / Trafficking in meth. or cocaine base - 200 g or more, but less than 400 g	York County General Sessions	No Bond	
2023A4610201803	Weapons / Poss. weapon during violent crime, if not also sentenced to life without parole or death	York County General Sessions	No Bond	
2023A4610201804	Firearms / Poss. of firearm or ammunition by person convicted of PWID, manufacturing, distr., or trafficking controlled substance	York County General Sessions	No Bond	
2023A4610201805	Drugs / Trafficking in Heroin, morphine, etc., 28 g or more	York County General Sessions	No Bond	
2023A4610201806	Drugs / Trafficking in Fentanyl, 28 grams or more	York County General Sessions	No Bond	

No Marijuana Charges At All

ANGIE M. BRYANT
C.C.P. & GS
YORK COUNTY, SC

2023 JUL 19 PM 3:52

FILED-RECEIVED

Initial Appearance: 9/11/23 at 8:30 AM Bond Returnable: 10/17/23 at 8:30 AM at Moss Justice Center: 1675 York Hwy York, SC

That you are commanded by this Court to continue custody of the named person until the person in custody is ordered to be released by a Judicial Officer.

Judge

Walter J. [Signature]

York County, SC

Brown III, James H

Y23 Buddy.Brown@yorkcountygov.com

8/8

9:13

2023

Londell L. Alston #308837
Tiger River Comm Inst
208 Prison Rd, Enoree, SC, 29335



Jenny Abbott Kitchings
The Clerk of Court
S.C. Court of Appeals
P.O. Box 11629
Columbia, South Carolina, 29211

RECEIVED
OCT 06 2026
TYGER RIVER MAIL ROOM

