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Oct 28 2026

SC Court of Appeals

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

Appeal from Hampton County
R. Keith Kelly, Circuit Court Judge

EX PARTE: AMANDA MATNEY,

APPELLANT,

RENEE S. BEACH, PHILLIP BEACH, ROBIN BEACH,
SAVANNAH TUTEN, AND SETH TUTEN,

PLAINTIFFS,

V.

GREGORY M. PARKER, GREGORY M. PARKER, INC.
D/B/A PARKER'S CORPORATION, BLAKE GRECO,
JASON D'CRUZ, VICKY WARD, MAX FRATODDI,
HENRY ROSADO, AND PRIVATE INVESTIGATION
SERVICES GROUP, LLC,

DEFENDANTS,

OF WHOM GREGORY M. PARKER, GREGORY M.
PARKER, INC. D/B/A PARKER'S CORPORATION,
BLAKE GRECO, AND JASON D'CRUZ ARE THE

RESPONDENTS.

Appellate Case No.: 2026-002291

**APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF SUPERSEDEAS
AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO DEPOSIT FUNDS AND
TO SUSPEND POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST**

Appellant Amanda Matney petitions this Court under Rules 240 and 241, SCACR, and Rule 62(g), SCRCP, for a writ of supersedeas staying enforcement of the circuit court's July 13,

2026 Order Granting Parker's Defendants' Motion for Contempt (the "Contempt Order") while this appeal is pending. She also asks the Court to condition the writ on a deposit of the full \$176,500.00 sanction with the Clerk of Court for Spartanburg County,¹ to grant her leave to make that deposit, and to order that post-judgment interest stop accruing on the date the funds are deposited.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Appellant is not a party to the underlying civil action. The Parker's Defendants subpoenaed her for a deposition. On March 27, 2026, she did not appear at the noticed location in Bluffton and instead appeared at her own counsel's office in Bluffton. (Ex. 1 at 5-6.) On April 8, 2026, she sat for an in-person, videotaped deposition at the Spartanburg County Courthouse, as the circuit court directed. (Ex. 1 at 1 n.1, 7.)

On July 13, 2026, the circuit court held Appellant in civil contempt. (Ex. 1.) It ordered her to pay \$171,500.00 in attorney's fees and costs, divided among three law firms: \$39,900.00 to Bannister, Wyatt & Stalvey, LLC; \$45,950.00 to Deborah B. Barbier, LLC; and \$85,650.00 to Maynard Nexsen PC. (Ex. 1 at 21.) The award was not limited to the missed deposition and the contempt proceeding. It also presumably² reached the Parker's Defendants' fees for responding to Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration and her Emergency Motion to Set Deposition Location. (Ex. 1 at 20.) The court based the award on fee affidavits and itemized billing statements submitted under seal. (Ex. 1 at 21 & n.15.)

The court also imposed a \$5,000.00 fine, "due and payable within sixty days," because it believed a fine was "necessary here to deter similar conduct in the future and to promote respect for the law." (Ex. 1 at 21.) The court retained jurisdiction "to impose such additional sanctions as

¹ This case originated in Hampton County, but venue has been transferred to Spartanburg County.

² The order lacks sufficient basis to establish what hours were billed and which ones were not. Since the itemized billing was submitted under seal without Appellant's ability to examine these documents, Appellant is unaware of the specific basis for the award.

may be necessary to ensure compliance with this Order." (Ex. 1 at 21.) The fees and the fine together total \$176,500.00.

Appellant asked the circuit court more than once to suspend payment or to let her secure the sanction with the Clerk. On July 20, 2026, undersigned counsel asked the court by email to hold the payment deadline in abeyance until sixty days after it ruled on Appellant's anticipated Rule 59(e) motion. The next day, the court's law clerk responded that "the Court is not agreeable to that request." (Ex. 5, Ex. A.) On July 27, 2026, Appellant proposed a consent order allowing the full amount to be deposited with the Hampton County Clerk of Court and providing that the deposit would not waive her right to seek reconsideration or to appeal. The Parker's Defendants declined to consent on July 28, 2026. (Ex. 6 at 2.)

Appellant then moved under Rule 67, SCRCF, for leave to deposit the full \$176,500.00 with the Clerk of Court for Hampton County so that interest would not accrue "during reconsideration and any appeal," and asked that the deposit not waive her right to appeal. (Ex. 6 at 2, 4.) The Parker's Defendants opposed primarily by arguing that Rule 67 is available only to "a party," that Appellant is a non-party, and that a deposit would suspend their statutory right to post-judgment interest. (Ex. 7 at 3-8.) Appellant replied and stated she would not object to the funds being held in an interest-bearing account. (Ex. 8 at 5-6.) On September 9, 2026, she also moved under Rule 62(b), SCRCF, to stay execution of the Contempt Order. (Ex. 5.)

On September 11, 2026, the circuit court issued two Form 4 orders. The first denied the Rule 67 motion "in its entirety." It states only that "the circumstances presented do not warrant granting leave to deposit the funds as requested." (Ex. 3.) The second ordered that "the sixty-day deadline for payment set forth in this Court's July 13, 2026 Contempt Order is hereby stayed for forty-five (45) days from the entry of this Order." (Ex. 4.)

On October 13, 2026, the circuit court denied Appellant's Rule 59(e) motion by Form 4 order. (Ex. 2.) On October 14, 2026, she served her Notice of Appeal from both the Contempt Order and the order denying reconsideration. Luna Shark Productions, LLC has funds available to cover the full \$176,500.00 and will deposit them on Appellant's behalf within ten days of an order of this Court. (Ex. 9.)

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

As a general rule, "the service of a notice of appeal in a civil matter acts to automatically stay matters decided in the order, judgment, decree or decision on appeal." Rule 241(a), SCACR. "The exceptions to the general rule are found in statutes, court rules, and case law." Rule 241(b), SCACR. A civil contempt order is one of those exceptions. In *Matter of Decker*, a newspaper reporter held in civil contempt asked the Supreme Court to declare that her appeal automatically stayed the order. The Court held that "an order holding a person in civil contempt is not automatically stayed by the taking of an appeal." 322 S.C. 212, 214, 471 S.E.2d 459, 461 (1995). The Court reaffirmed that rule in *Bakala v. Bakala*, explaining that "[a]n order that is not automatically stayed remains enforceable while pending appeal unless the party seeks a stay." 352 S.C. 612, 631, 576 S.E.2d 156, 166 (2003). The money judgment exception points the same way. "A notice of appeal from a judgment directing the payment of money does not stay the execution of the judgment unless the presiding judge before whom the judgment was obtained grants a stay of execution." S.C. Code Ann. § 18-9-130(A)(1); *see* Rule 241(b)(1), SCACR.

The Contempt Order therefore remains enforceable unless this Court acts. In a case subject to an exception, "any party may move for an order imposing a supersedeas of matters decided in the order, judgment, decree or decision on appeal after service of the notice of appeal." Rule 241(c)(1), SCACR.

I. Appellant asked the circuit court, which limited and/or denied the relief she requested.

An application for supersedeas must first be made to the lower court. Rule 241(d)(1), SCACR. "After the lower court . . . has ruled, any party may petition the appellate court where the appeal is pending for review of this order." Rule 241(d)(2), SCACR. Relief is proper when the petition shows that the application below "was unjustifiably denied *or* that the relief granted failed to afford the relief which the petitioner requested." *See* Rule 241(d)(4)(C), SCACR (emphasis added).

Appellant asked the circuit court to let her secure the full sanction with the Clerk and to stop post-judgment interest through reconsideration and any appeal. The court denied that request in its entirety. (Ex. 3; Ex. 6 at 2, 4.) The primary arguments presented against the deposit were that Appellant was not "a party" and that the Parker's Defendants would lose post-judgment interest. (Ex. 7 at 3-8.) The Form 4 order gives no reason of its own. (Ex. 3.) Neither argument is a reason to refuse security for a sanction that is on appeal, as shown in Part IV.

Appellant also asked the circuit court to stay enforcement until at least 60 days after the Order on the Motion to Alter or Amend. The circuit court did not grant that request. Instead, the circuit court only stayed the payment deadline for forty-five days from the original deadline. (Ex. 4.) That limited stay "failed to afford the relief which the petitioner requested." Rule 241(d)(4)(C), SCACR. Therefore the request to stay the sanction during any appeal (Ex. 3), are properly raised pursuant to Rule 241(d)(2), SCACR.

II. A writ of supersedeas is necessary to keep the contested issues from becoming moot.

In deciding whether to grant supersedeas, this Court "should consider whether such an order is necessary to preserve jurisdiction of the appeal or to prevent a contested issue from

becoming moot." Rule 241(c)(2), SCACR. Without a writ, Appellant will have to choose between violating the court's order and losing her ability to appeal.

If she complies with the lower court's order, this Court is robbed of jurisdiction. "Where one held in contempt for violation of a court order complies with the order, his compliance renders the question concerning whether he was in contempt academic or moot and precludes appellate review of the contempt proceedings." *Chappell v. Chappell*, 282 S.C. 376, 377, 318 S.E.2d 590, 591 (Ct. App. 1984). "The payment of a fine imposed in contempt proceedings also waives the right of review." *Id.* The \$5,000.00 fine is one of the central issues in this appeal. Paying it, or the fee award, would invite the argument that the appeal is moot.

If Appellant does not pay, she remains exposed to further sanctions. The circuit court expressly retained jurisdiction to impose "additional sanctions as may be necessary to ensure compliance with this Order." (Ex. 1 at 21.) Appellant would face the prospect of new contempt proceedings for not paying a sanction she is actively appealing. This is the situation supersedeas are made to prevent.

In *Decker*, the Supreme Court granted a writ of supersedeas staying enforcement of a civil contempt order against a reporter during her appeal because the appeal presented novel questions about the news media privilege under S.C. Code Ann. § 19-11-100 and the First Amendment. 322 S.C. at 214, 471 S.E.2d at 461. In *Brunson v. Brunson*, the Chief Justice stayed a contempt order pending appeal on the condition that the appellant post a bond "to save the respondent harmless." 91 S.C. 411, 74 S.E. 928, 928-29 (1912). In *State v. Highsmith*, the Court suspended a contempt order pending appeal on the execution of a surety bond. 103 S.C. 168, 87 S.E. 482, 482 (1916). And in *Bakala*, the Court noted that a contemnor who wanted to preserve his appeal "could have

sought a stay of that order." 352 S.C. at 633 n.5, 576 S.E.2d at 167 n.5. Appellant is doing what *Bakala* described.

The appeal also presents substantial questions, each raised in Appellant's Rule 59(e) motion. First, the \$5,000.00 fine has the marks of criminal contempt. "The primary purposes of criminal contempt are to preserve the court's authority and to punish for disobedience of its orders." *Poston v. Poston*, 331 S.C. 106, 111, 502 S.E.2d 86, 88 (1998). "If the sanction is a fine, it is punitive when it is paid to the court." *Id.* at 112, 502 S.E.2d at 89. A non-compensatory fine "is civil only if the contemnor is afforded an opportunity to purge." *Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell*, 512 U.S. 821, 829, 114 S. Ct. 2552, 2558 (1994). The circuit court imposed the fine "to deter similar conduct in the future and to promote respect for the law." (Ex. 1 at 21.) Appellant had already been deposed three months earlier. (Ex. 1 at 7.) Nothing remained for her to do to purge the fine. Criminal contempt requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, *Poston*, 331 S.C. at 113, 502 S.E.2d at 89, but the circuit court applied the clear and convincing standard. (Ex. 1 at 9, 13-14.)

Second, the fee award reaches beyond what civil contempt permits. In civil contempt, the contemnor may be required to reimburse the complainant "for the costs he incurred in enforcing the court's prior order, including reasonable attorney's fees." *Poston*, 331 S.C. at 114, 502 S.E.2d at 90. The award here also covered the Parker's Defendants' fees for opposing Appellant's own Motion for Reconsideration and Emergency Motion to Set Deposition Location. (Ex. 1 at 20.) Third, the award rests on sealed fee affidavits and billing statements, which Appellant contends she was never permitted to review or contest. (Ex. 1 at 21 & n.15.)

III. The Court should condition the writ on a deposit of the full sanction and order that post-judgment interest stop on deposit.

This Court has the authority to grant the security and interest relief the circuit court refused. The granting of supersedeas "may be conditioned upon such terms, including but not limited to the filing of a bond or undertaking, as the . . . appellate court . . . may deem appropriate." Rule 241(c) (3), SCACR. Where a writ of supersedeas "is insufficient to afford complete relief," this Court "may order other affirmative relief upon such terms as are deemed appropriate." *Id.* The Rules of Civil Procedure likewise preserve this Court's power "to make any order appropriate to preserve the status quo or the effectiveness of the judgment subsequently to be entered." Rule 62(g), SCRCRCP.

A deposit of the full \$176,500.00 is the most complete security available. When a court stays execution of a money judgment and requires a bond or other surety, "the amount of the bond or other surety may not exceed the amount of the judgment." S.C. Code Ann. § 18-9-130(A)(1). Appellant offers the entire amount in cash, held by the Clerk. (Ex. 9.) This would allow the Parker's Defendants to be paid in full from funds in the control of the Court if the Contempt Order is upheld.

The deposit should also stop post-judgment interest. The Supreme Court has held that "a judgment debtor's deposit of funds into the court pending his own appeal prevents further accrual of interest." *Russo v. Sutton*, 317 S.C. 441, 444, 454 S.E.2d 895, 896 (1995). The Court explained that "[s]uch a rule encourages the debtor to pay the judgment and assures the judgment creditor the funds will be available at the conclusion of the appeal." *Id.* The deposit must be made on notice and "under an order of the court." *Id.* at 444, 454 S.E.2d at 896-97. In *Russo*, the debtor's deposit failed because he gave no notice and obtained no leave of court. *Id.* at 444-45, 454 S.E.2d at 897. Appellant has given notice at every stage and seeks the order that *Russo* requires. The court may also direct that the deposited funds be placed in an interest-bearing account. *Id.* at 444 n.3, 454

S.E.2d at 897 n.3. Appellant asks that it do so, so that any interest the funds earn follows the funds to whoever is entitled to them at the end of the appeal.

Without this relief, the interest alone creates a penalty for Appellant pursuing her rights. Post-judgment interest runs at the prime rate plus four percentage points, compounded annually. S.C. Code Ann. § 34-31-20(B). For 2026, that rate is 10.75%. *Re: Interest Rate on Money Decrees and Judgments*, S.C. Sup. Ct. Order dated Jan. 7, 2026. On the \$171,500.00 fee award alone, that is \$18,436.25 in the first year of the appeal. If the funds are available to be deposited now, the only thing interest would do is penalize a Party from pursuing her constitutional rights.

Contrary to previous assertion by Respondents, Rule 67's reference to "a party" does not limit this Court's authority to allow the funds to be deposited. Appellant is the Appellant in this Court, and Rule 241(c)(1) permits "any party" to seek supersedeas. The power to set terms for a writ of supersedeas and to order other affirmative relief comes from Rule 241(c)(3), SCACR, and Rule 62(g), SCRCP, not from Rule 67. Nor does *Bakala* bar a deposit here. In *Bakala*, the husband never contested the underlying order requiring him to pay his wife and argued that his deposit purged his contempt. 352 S.C. at 632-33, 576 S.E.2d at 166-67. The Court held that "[w]here payment has been ordered and not appealed, and a contempt order is issued to compel payment, a deposit of funds under Rule 67 will not constitute a purge." *Id.* at 632, 576 S.E.2d at 167. Appellant has appealed the order requiring payment, and she does not claim that a deposit purges anything. She asks only that the sanction be secured while this Court decides whether it should stand.

Finally, in *Russo* the Supreme Court treated the request to place funds in an interest-bearing account as a matter for the circuit court, because the Rules of Civil Procedure governed the deposit and the lower court retained jurisdiction over matters not affected by the appeal. 317 S.C. at 444

nn.2 & 4, 454 S.E.2d at 896-97 nn.2 & 4. Here, the circuit court has already ruled and denied the deposit. (Ex. 3.) Rule 241(d)(2) provides for review of that ruling in this Court.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Appellant respectfully asks the Court to:

- (1) pending its ruling on this Petition, temporarily stay enforcement of the Contempt Order under Rule 241(d)(2), SCACR;
- (2) issue a writ of supersedeas staying enforcement of the Contempt Order, including the \$171,500.00 award of attorney's fees and costs, the \$5,000.00 fine, and any further sanction for non-payment, until this appeal is finally decided;
- (3) condition the writ on the deposit of \$176,500.00 with the Clerk of Court for Spartanburg County within ten (10) days of this Court's order;
- (4) grant leave for Luna Shark Productions, LLC to make the deposit on Appellant's behalf;
- (5) direct the Clerk to hold the funds in an interest-bearing account and to disburse them only on further order after the remittitur issues, with any funds not ordered paid returned to Luna Shark Productions, LLC;
- (6) order that post-judgment interest on the Contempt Order stop accruing on the date the funds are deposited;
- (7) provide that the deposit is security and not payment, and that it does not purge the contempt or waive any issue on appeal; and
- (8) grant such other relief as the Court deems just.

Respectfully submitted,

s/ Tristan Shaffer

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October 28, 2026

LIST OF EXHIBITS

- Ex. 1** Order Granting Parker's Defendants' Motion for Contempt, filed July 13, 2026 (C/A No. 2021-CP-25-00392)
- Ex. 2** Form 4 Order denying Rule 59(e) Motion to Reconsider, filed October 13, 2026 (C/A No. 2026-CP-42-04208)
- Ex. 3** Order denying Rule 67 Motion for Leave to Deposit Funds, filed September 11, 2026, 1:13 PM (C/A No. 2026-CP-42-04208)
- Ex. 4** Order staying the payment deadline for forty-five days, filed September 11, 2026, 1:51 PM (C/A No. 2026-CP-42-04208)
- Ex. 5** Amanda Matney's Motion to Stay Enforcement of Judgment Pursuant to Rule 62, SCRCP, with Exhibit A (July 20-21, 2026 email exchange with the circuit court), filed September 9, 2026
- Ex. 6** Motion for Leave to Deposit Funds with the Clerk of Court Pursuant to Rule 67, SCRCP, filed August 3, 2026
- Ex. 7** Parker's Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Rule 67 Motion, filed August 18, 2026
- Ex. 8** Reply in Support of Rule 67 Motion, filed September 4, 2026
- Ex. 9** Affidavit of David Moses, President of Luna Shark Productions, LLC, dated October 27, 2026

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF HAMPTON

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

C/A No. 2021-CP-25-00392

RENEE S. BEACH, PHILLIP BEACH,
ROBIN BEACH, SAVANNAH TUTEN,
AND SETH TUTEN,

**ORDER GRANTING PARKER'S
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
CONTEMPT**

Plaintiffs,

v.

GREGORY M. PARKER, GREGORY
M. PARKER, INC. d/b/a PARKER'S
CORPORATION, BLAKE GRECO,
JASON D'CRUZ, VICKY WARD,
MAX FRATODDI, HENRY ROSADO,
AND PRIVATE INVESTIGATION
SERVICES GROUP, LLC,

Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court upon the Motion for Rule to Show Cause ("Motion") filed by Defendants Gregory M. Parker, Gregory M. Parker, Inc. d/b/a Parker's Corporation, Blake Greco, and Jason D'Cruz (collectively, the "Parker's Defendants") regarding the failure of non-party Mandy Matney ("Ms. Matney") to appear for her noticed deposition on March 27, 2026. The Parker's Defendants request that the Court hold Ms. Matney in contempt pursuant to Rule 45(e), SCRPC, and award appropriate sanctions, including reasonable expenses and attorneys' fees.¹

¹ The Parker's Defendants also sought an order compelling Ms. Matney to attend a deposition and an extension of time within which to complete discovery. Ms. Matney was deposed on April 8, 2026.

On April 1, 2026, after the Motion was fully briefed, the Court scheduled an evidentiary hearing for April 7, 2026, and required Ms. Matney to appear in person. The parties were advised to contact the Court if they had any concerns or questions regarding this matter or the hearing. At the hearing, sworn testimony was taken from Ms. Matney and attorney Mark Tinsley. After carefully considering the Motion, Ms. Matney's Response and Supplemental Response, the record, the arguments of counsel, and the testimony presented, the Court granted the Parker's Defendants' Motion for a Rule to Show Cause and ordered Ms. Matney to appear at a hearing on May 15, 2026 for her to show cause, if she could, as to why she should not be held in contempt.

At the May 15, 2026 hearing, Ms. Matney testified and presented evidence as to why she should not be held in contempt. At the end of the day, the May 15th hearing was recessed and continued on June 22, 2026, with Ms. Matney's cross-examination and the testimony of two witnesses: attorney Eric Bland, and Ms. Matney's husband, David Moses. At the end of the hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement.

BACKGROUND/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1. On October 17, 2025, the Parker's Defendants served Ms. Matney with a subpoena duces tecum which noticed her for a deposition for October 29, 2025, at a law firm in Bluffton, South Carolina.

2. After Ms. Matney objected, on November 5, 2025, the Parker's Defendants noticed another deposition at the same location for November 17, 2025.

3. On November 12, 2025, Ms. Matney filed a Motion to Quash or, alternatively, for a Protective Order. Ms. Matney argued that she was shielded by the Reporter's Privilege, codified in S.C. Code Ann. § 19-11-100; the deposition was an undue burden under Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(iv),

SCRCF; and her testimony lacked relevance. She did not raise any concerns with location of the noticed deposition.

4. On November 25, 2025, Ms. Matney filed an affidavit in which she averred that she moved to quash the subpoena because she was not available on the requested date; her testimony would require her to divulge information protected by the Reporter's Privilege; and the subpoena imposed an undue burden on her. She explained that she and her husband produce two weekly podcasts and are Executive Producers on a Hulu series which required travel, and any interruption would negatively affect her household finances. She also averred that she did not have any relevant information in this case and the deposition was part of the Parker's Defendants' goal to harass and humiliate her.

5. The Court held a hearing on November 26, 2025, and took the motion under advisement.

6. On February 5, 2026, the Court denied Ms. Matney's Motion to Quash and her alternative Motion for a Protective Order. The Court concluded that the Reporter's Privilege did not provide blanket protection from being deposed; Ms. Matney's testimony was relevant; and she had failed to establish an undue burden. (Form 4 Order filed Feb. 5, 2026.)

7. On February 10, 2026, counsel for the Parker's Defendants emailed counsel for Ms. Matney a subpoena for her deposition on March 2, 2026, again listing the same location as noticed in the previous subpoenas.

8. On February 17, 2026, Ms. Matney filed a Motion to Reconsider. Ms. Matney again argued that she was entitled to protection under the Report's Privilege; the deposition would impose an undue burden; and that she was subject to unusual harassment related to this litigation. She again did not raise any concerns with location of the noticed deposition.

9. On February 18, 2026, counsel for Ms. Matney responded to the February 10th email confirming acceptance of the Second Subpoena and raised no objection as to the location listed in the Second Subpoena. Counsel indicated she was not available on March 2, 2026, or certain other dates in March but she identified no conflict with the week of March 23, 2026.

10. On February 19, 2026, counsel for the Parker's Defendants agreed to change the deposition date to March 23, 2026. Accordingly, on February 24, 2026, counsel for the Parker's Defendants served another subpoena that amended the date to March 23rd, listing the same location as the previous subpoenas.

11. On March 8, 2026, counsel for Ms. Matney informed the Parker's Defendant that because her motion to reconsider remained pending, she did not intend to appear for a deposition on March 23, 2026. Again, counsel raised no objection to the noticed location.

12. On March 11, 2026, Ms. Matney's counsel requested that no deposition date be scheduled until the Court ruled on her pending motion to reconsider. Counsel further indicated that she was unavailable on March 23, 2026, due to a federal court hearing that had just been scheduled but was available on March 27, 2026. Again, counsel for Ms. Matney raised no objection as to the location listed in all of the subpoenas to date.

13. On March 12, 2026, the Court's law clerk asked the parties to provide the Court with a scheduling agreement outlining the selected date that the deposition would occur. The next day, counsel for the Parker's Defendants sent a proposed scheduling agreement to Ms. Matney's counsel. Counsel for the Parker's Defendants also offered to conduct the deposition at either the Bluffton location previously identified in all of the subpoenas or the law office of Maynard Nexsen in Columbia, South Carolina.

14. On March 16, 2026, the Court denied Ms. Matney's Motion for Reconsideration, finding that she failed to present any newly discovered evidence, manifest errors of law or fact, or an intervening change in controlling law that would warrant relief under Rule 59(e), SCRCP. (Form 4 Order filed March 16, 2026.) The Court ordered that she be deposed within fourteen days from the entry of the Order. (*Id.* at 1.) On March 17, 2026, the Parker's Defendants noticed Ms. Matney's deposition for March 27, 2026, at the same location in Bluffton as the previous subpoenas.

15. On March 19, 2026, having not heard from Ms. Matney's counsel, the Parker's Defendants' counsel contacted Ms. Matney's counsel to confirm March 27th as the date for the deposition, as had been previously agreed. The next day, on March 20, 2026, Ms. Matney's counsel responded by stating that Ms. Matney would not appear at the noticed location and would only agree to be deposed at another location in Bluffton, the office of her lawyer, Meredith Bannon. Ms. Matney claimed, through counsel, that she felt unsafe at the noticed location, a known and well-regarded law firm in Bluffton. March 20, 2026—less than a week before her deposition was scheduled to occur—was the first time Ms. Matney, through her counsel, objected to the location that had been identified for months.

16. On March 21, 2026, the Parker's Defendants responded and offered to move the deposition to the Maynard Nexsen law firm in Columbia, which is located in a building with security, or a hotel conference room in Bluffton. Ms. Matney rejected both of these alternate locations and insisted that she be deposed at Ms. Bannon's law firm. Ms. Matney also insisted that her husband, a non-party, be allowed to attend her deposition. Ms. Matney failed to offer a location

suitable to the Parker's Defendants, so the Parker's Defendants insisted that she appear at the place and time noticed in the subpoena.²

17. On March 25, 2026, less than 36 hours before the scheduled deposition, Ms. Matney filed an Emergency Motion to Set Deposition Location. The Parker's Defendants filed a response opposing the Emergency Motion on March 26, 2026.

18. On March 27th, at the scheduled time, Ms. Matney did not appear at the deposition at the noticed location in Bluffton. Instead, she informed the Parker's Defendants via Zoom that she was located at the Bannon Law Firm in Bluffton and there she would remain, alongside her husband, as well as Plaintiffs' counsel who also appeared at the office of the Bannon Law Firm in Bluffton. Counsel for the Parker's Defendants informed Ms. Matney that they would remain at the noticed location until 11:00 a.m., and that if Ms. Matney did not appear, they would pursue all remedies available. Ms. Matney and her counsel, along with Plaintiffs' counsel, elected to remain at the other location and not appear at the noticed location.

19. At 3:00 p.m. on March 27, 2026, Ms. Matney filed a Status Update on Emergency Motion to Set Deposition Location wherein she relayed that she had "appeared at the deposition location [she] had arranged" with private security and waited until noon. Ms. Matney's social media posts from later that same day³ included pictures of her eating lemon pound cake with Plaintiffs' lead counsel after the attempted deposition was adjourned and toasting herself with a

² Ms. Matney did not offer a location for her deposition at any place other than the Bannon Law Firm in Bluffton prior to her failure to appear at noticed location on March 27, 2026. After the Parker's Defendants filed their Motion for Rule to Show Cause, Ms. Matney ultimately offered to appear at other locations outside the Bluffton area: (1) the law office of her podcaster collaborator, Mr. Bland, in Lexington, South Carolina; (2) Ms. Lindhal's office in Charlotte; (3) the Beaufort County courthouse; or (4) the other Bannon law firm locations in the Savannah and Charleston areas. (Matney's Resp. to RTSC Ex. 1 at 2–3.)

³ These social media posts were absent from Ms. Matney's Status Update but attached as exhibits to filings submitted by the Parker's Defendants.

beverage at an outdoor location. She also posted pictures of herself, her counsel, and her husband having what appears to be a celebratory meal outing in Savannah. The Court observes that Ms. Matney's posts memorializing these activities evidence her intent to defy her obligation to appear at the noticed deposition location.

20. In a Form 4 Order filed on March 30, 2026, the Court denied Ms. Matney's "Emergency" Motion, explaining that emergency motions are "generally disfavored" and that emergency relief is not to be provided to the dilatory.⁴ The Court noted that "[t]he parties have had *nearly five months* since the first notice of this deposition to agree on a location, and Ms. Matney sought to raise this issue *less than one week* prior to the scheduled deposition."

21. On March 30, 2026, the Parker's Defendants filed the instant Motion for a Rule to Show Cause ("RTSC") seeking to hold Ms. Matney in contempt and compelling her attendance at an in-person, videotaped deposition.

22. On April 4, 2026, Ms. Matney filed a response opposing the Motion, and an affidavit from her podcast co-host Elizabeth Farrell on April 6, 2026.

23. As noted above, on April 7, 2026, the Court conducted a hearing at which testimony was taken, including from Ms. Matney, who testified that she made the decision not to go to the noticed deposition location and that she was not physically unable to appear there. The Court directed that Ms. Matney appear the following day for an in-person deposition at the Spartanburg County Courthouse.⁵

24. On April 8, 2026, Ms. Matney sat for an in-person, videotaped deposition at the Spartanburg County Courthouse, as directed by the Court.

⁴ The Order was not docketed until March 30, 2026.

⁵ The Court also rejected Ms. Matney's request that her husband (the co-owner of her media business) be allowed to attend her deposition.

25. On April 30, 2026, the Court granted the Parker's Defendants Motion for a Rule to Show Cause and ordered Ms. Matney to appear on May 15, 2026, to show cause, if she could, as to why she should not be held in contempt for willfully failing to comply with a duly issued subpoena requiring her to appear for a deposition on March 27, 2026, at the noticed location, and the March 16, 2026 Order of the Court.

26. On May 13, 2026, Ms. Matney filed an Objection to Non-sworn Contempt Motion, in which she objected to the contempt motion "being heard at all" on May 15th, arguing that the Parker's Defendants' contempt petition was not verified or accompanied by an affidavit, which she contended to be a fatal defect that could not be cured. The Parker's Defendants responded, citing *State v. Nathans*, 49 S.C. 199, 27 S.E. 52, 57 (1897) for the proposition that the affidavit requirement can be waived or met through substantial compliance. At the end of the hearing on June 22, 2026, the Court ruled from the bench that it had issued the RTSC based on Ms. Matney's sworn testimony at the April 7, 2026 hearing, where she acknowledged that she did not attend the deposition at the noticed location. As the Court held in *Nathans*, there was no risk of any false allegations of conduct being used to support the issuance of an RTSC. Additionally, Ms. Matney waived this issue as she failed to raise it during the April 7th hearing during which the Court noted that the hearing was to determine if an RTSC should issue.

27. A hearing was held on May 15, 2026, and continued on June 22, 2026, during which Ms. Matney presented evidence and witnesses, and the Court took the matter under advisement.

LEGAL STANDARD

"The power to punish for contempt[] is inherent in all courts." *Miller v. Miller*, 375 S.C. 443, 453, 652 S.E.2d 754, 759 (Ct. App. 2007) (quoting *In re Terry*, 128 U.S. 289, 303 (1888)). The trial court's power includes the ability to maintain order and decorum of the court. The power

“is essential to . . . the enforcement of the judgments, orders and writs of the courts; and consequently to the due administration of justice.” *Id.* (quoting *In re Terry*, 128 U.S. at 303). “Without such power . . . the administration of the law would be in continual danger of being thwarted by the lawless.” *Id.* at 453–54, 652 S.E.2d at 759 (citing *In re Terry*, 128 U.S. at 303).

“Contempt results from the willful disobedience of an order of the court.” *Bigham v. Bigham*, 264 S.C. 101, 104, 212 S.E.2d 594, 596 (1975). “A willful act is one which is ‘done voluntarily and intentionally with the specific intent to do something the law forbids, or with the specific intent to fail to do something the law requires to be done’” *Miller*, 375 S.C. at 454, 652 S.E.2d at 759–60 (quoting *Widman v. Widman*, 348 S.C. 97, 119, 557 S.E.2d 693, 705 (Ct. App. 2001)). “Failure by any person without adequate excuse to obey a subpoena served upon that person may be deemed a contempt of the court from which the subpoena issued.” Rule 45(e), SCRCP.

“Civil contempt must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.” *Poston v. Poston*, 331 S.C. 106, 113, 502 S.E.2d 86, 89 (1998). “Once the moving party has made out a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the respondent to establish his or her defense and inability to comply with the order.” *Widman*, 348 S.C. at 120, 557 S.E.2d at 705. “The determination of contempt ordinarily rests within the sound discretion of the [circuit court].” *Ex parte Kent*, 379 S.C. 633, 637, 666 S.E.2d 921, 923 (Ct. App. 2008).

“Courts, by exercising their contempt power, can award attorney’s fees under a compensatory contempt theory.” *Miller*, 375 S.C. at 463, 652 S.E.2d at 764.

In a civil contempt proceeding, a contemnor may be required to reimburse a complainant for the costs he incurred in enforcing the court’s prior order, including reasonable attorney’s fees. The award of attorney’s fees is not a punishment but an indemnification to the party who instituted the contempt proceeding. Thus, the court is not required to provide the contemnor with an opportunity to purge himself of these attorney’s fees in order to hold him in civil contempt.

Matter of Est. of Combis, 439 S.C. 485, 497, 888 S.E.2d 1, 7 (Ct. App. 2023) (quoting *Poston*, 331 S.C. at 114, 502 S.E.2d at 90).

ANALYSIS

“Courts have no more important function to perform in the administration of justice than to ensure their orders are obeyed. The appellate courts of this state have zealously defended the right of trial courts to vindicate their authority by way of contempt.” *State v. Bevilacqua*, 316 S.C. 122, 128, 447 S.E.2d 213, 216 (Ct. App. 1994). The Court must maintain order and decorum, *Stone v. Reddix-Small*s, 295 S.C. 514, 516, 369 S.E.2d 840, 841 (1988), and the power of contempt is essential to the enforcement of orders and to ensure the administration of justice, *Benedict v. Benedict*, 280 S.C. 508, 313 S.E.2d 56 (Ct. App. 1984). “Without such power . . . the administration of the law would be in continual danger of being thwarted by the lawless.” *Miller*, 375 S.C. at 453–54, 652 S.E.2d at 759 (quoting *In re Terry*, 128 U.S. at 303).

1. Ms. Matney was required by a valid subpoena to be deposed on March 27, 2026, at the noticed location and within the time limit set by the March 26, 2026 Order.

Within certain parameters, “[t]he Rules generally permit the party noticing the deposition to pick the deposition location.” *Solais v. Vesuvio’s II Pizza & Grill, Inc.*, No. 1:15CV227, 2015 WL 6110859, at *9 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 16, 2015) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(1) (“A party who wants to depose a person by oral questions must give reasonable written notice to every other party. The notice must state the time and place of the deposition . . . ”)).⁶ If a deponent wishes to be deposed at a different location, it is incumbent upon her to secure either an agreement with the noticing

⁶ In the absence of state precedent, South Carolina courts look to federal interpretations of similar procedural rules for persuasive guidance. *Maybank v. BB&T Corp.*, 416 S.C. 541, 565, 787 S.E.2d 498, 510 (2016) (“In construing the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, our Court looks for guidance to cases interpreting the federal rules.”).

party or seek a protective order from the court requiring that the deposition be held in a different location. *See James v. S.C. Dep't of Transp.*, 393 S.C. 440, 450, 711 S.E.2d 919, 925 (Ct. App. 2011) (holding expert witness was required to appear in South Carolina for deposition absent agreement or court order overriding location requirement).

The Parker's Defendants, as the noticing party, chose a law firm in Bluffton—the same location which was noticed in the first subpoena served on Ms. Matney on October 17, 2025, and in every subsequent subpoena.⁷ Further, it is undisputed that no order of this Court stayed, modified, or excused Ms. Matney's obligation to appear for her deposition at the noticed location on March 27th. At the April 7, 2026 hearing, Ms. Matney testified that she received and understood the Court's Orders denying her Motion to Quash and Motion to Reconsider and understood that, as a result, she was required to sit for a deposition at the noticed location. (April 7, 2026 Hr'g Tr. 12:7–13:21.)

Ms. Matney did not raise any objection to the deposition location in her original Motion to Quash or her Motion to Reconsider, and she acknowledged that, in her earlier affidavit, she did not identify any safety concerns about the noticed location as a basis for relief. (*Id.* 11:23–12:3.) It was not until March 20th, four days after her Motion for Reconsideration had been denied and less than one week before the scheduled deposition, that Ms. Matney for the first time raised any issue to the Parker's Defendants with the noticed location and demanded that the deposition be moved to a location of her choosing citing safety concerns. (Parker's Defs.' RTSC Mot. Ex. F – March 30, 2026 Letter from Ms. Matney's counsel.)⁸

⁷ Prior to Ms. Matney raising any issues with the noticed location, the Parker's Defendants offered an alternative location in Columbia, which she declined.

⁸ In her Emergency Motion, while Ms. Matney argued that her primary concern was security due to “persistent harassment,” she also raised an issue with the size of the noticed location and that it had only one bathroom. (Matney's Emergency Mot. at 4–5.) Ms. Matney subsequently argued that

On March 26th, Ms. Matney filed an Emergency Motion to Set Deposition Location. Notwithstanding the absence of any such order and her understanding that the prior orders required her to sit for the noticed deposition, Ms. Matney testified that she believed she was not required to appear at the noticed location because she had filed this Emergency Motion. (April 7, 2026 Hr’g Tr. 15:19–24, 18:13–19, 38:8–16.)⁹ However, as noted above, if a deponent wishes to be deposed at a different location, she must obtain either an agreement with the noticing party or a protective order from the court changing the deposition location. *See James*, 393 S.C. at 450, 711 S.E.2d at 925. Filing a motion is not an agreement or a court order and does not relieve a deponent of her obligation to abide by a lawful subpoena. Any other rule would allow deponents to evade being deposed by simply filing a motion at the eleventh hour. Thus, the pendency of Ms. Matney’s Emergency Motion did not excuse her from complying with the subpoena and March 26, 2026 Court Order.

Moreover, as the Court noted in its Order denying her Emergency Motion, Ms. Matney had five months to raise any issue with the noticed location, and her delay in raising the issue with the Court did not create an emergency. Ms. Matney argues that she did not raise the issue sooner because, until the Motion for Reconsideration was denied, it was unsettled as to whether she would have to be deposed at all. (Matney’s Obj. & Br. Opp. Mot. for Civil Contempt at 2, 7–8.) But Ms. Matney did not seek merely to quash the deposition in her prior motions; she raised numerous

her concern was that the bathroom was shared and open to anyone and, thus, presented a reasonable security risk. (Matney’s Obj. & Br. Opp. Mot. for Civil Contempt at 12 n.7.) Mr. Tinsley, however, testified at the April 7th hearing that the bathroom was locked and required a code. (April 7, 2026 Hr’g Tr. 100:16–18.) In any event, the Court finds that Ms. Matney’s stated concerns regarding the size of the noticed location and its bathrooms do not constitute good cause for her failure to appear for the noticed deposition.

⁹ The Court notes that it is troubled by Ms. Matney’s counsel’s tolerance and facilitation of her decision to disobey the subpoena and the Court’s Order.

other issues to the Court and sought relief that would only be necessary if she were to be deposed, including that the date of the deposition accommodate her work schedule and that the length and topics of the deposition be limited.

Ms. Matney argues that she has not acted with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law, which is necessary to support the finding of contempt. “Where a contemnor is unable, without fault on his part, to obey an order of the court, he is not to be held in contempt.” *Smith-Cooper v. Cooper*, 344 S.C. 289, 301, 543 S.E.2d 271, 277 (Ct. App. 2001). In *Smith-Cooper*, the court addressed a commonly recognized principle that a person cannot be held in contempt of court where he is financially unable to comply with a court-ordered support obligation. Where an order requires something that is impossible for a person to follow, the failure to adhere is not contemptuous behavior. *Id.* The inquiry in determining a willful act for contempt purposes is whether the party has a true choice as to whether to comply with the order. *See In re Brown*, 333 S.C. 414, 420, 511 S.E.2d 351, 355 (1998). Contumacious behavior which tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect may also support a finding of contempt. *Stone*, 295 S.C. at 516, 369 S.E.2d at 840.

When asked directly whether she decided not to go to the noticed location, Ms. Matney answered affirmatively. (April 7, 2026 Hr’g Tr. 52:9–19.) Attending the deposition at the noticed location was not impossible. Ms. Matney had a true choice. Ms. Matney had the ability to appear for the deposition at the noticed location and she and her counsel chose to appear at a different location willfully and refused to attend the deposition at the noticed location.¹⁰ Based upon the foregoing, there is clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Matney’s failure to appear was not the

¹⁰ Ms. Matney testified that she had access to transportation, was physically able to attend the deposition, and was neither hospitalized nor physically unable to travel. (April 7, 2026 Hr’g Tr. 20:11–21, 21:3–5.)

result of confusion, mistake, or inability, but rather was a deliberate decision to disregard the subpoena and the Court's March 16, 2026 Order requiring that she be deposed within 14 days.

2. Ms. Matney has failed to establish a valid defense or inability to comply with the Subpoena and March 16, 2026 Order.

Having determined that there is clear and convincing evidence establishing contempt, the Court must now determine if Ms. Matney has a valid defense or was unable to comply with the subpoena and March 16, 2026 Order. *Widman*, 348 S.C. at 120, 557 S.E.2d at 705 ("Once the moving party has made out a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the respondent to establish his or her defense and inability to comply with the order."). Notwithstanding her delay in raising the issue, the Court must consider Ms. Matney's stated justification for her failure to appear—*i.e.*, her assertion that she did not feel safe at the noticed location—to determine if she can establish that she had cause not to appear for her deposition.

Ms. Matney's asserted safety concerns were based primarily on the alleged online harassment by one individual, James Seidel, who Ms. Matney described as a stalker and a convicted felon. (Matney's Obj. & Br. Opp. Mot. for Civil Contempt at 13.)¹¹ Ms. Matney argued that his "social media obsession is subjectively extremely concerning" to her and her husband. (*Id.* at 15.)

Reviewing the examples Ms. Matney filed with the Court, Mr. Seidel's online conduct involved critical comments and what can best be described as mocking or taunting directed at Ms. Matney. (Matney's Obj. & Br. Opp. Mot. for Civil Contempt, Ex. 13.) However, none of the posts filed with the Court concerning Mr. Seidel contained any physical threats towards her. Further,

¹¹ The Court notes that Mr. Seidel was not convicted of a violent offense. He pleaded guilty to misusing federal loan money during the COVID-19 pandemic and was sentenced to a five-year probationary term.

there is no evidence in the record that Mr. Seidel's purported harassment has been the subject of any criminal prosecution or civil litigation. At the April 7th hearing, Ms. Matney testified that, prior to March 27th, she had not filed a police report or obtained a restraining order against Mr. Seidel. (April 7, 2026 Hr'g Tr. 47:2–10.) Ms. Matney testified she was in the process of taking out a restraining order against him. (*Id.*) However, at the June 22, 2026 hearing, Ms. Matney acknowledged that she had not yet sought or obtained such an order against Mr. Seidel.

While she argued in her Emergency Motion that she has online harassers who show up at public appearances and court proceeding and send her mail and text messages, at the June 22nd hearing, Ms. Matney acknowledged that the alleged harassment by Mr. Seidel has been entirely online and Mr. Seidel has not attempted to contact her directly or in person. At this hearing, Mr. Bland likewise testified that he was not aware of Mr. Seidel making any physical threats to Ms. Matney. Ms. Matney has also argued that the Parker's Defendants had connections with Mr. Seidel and were disclosing information to him about the deposition which contributed to her fear for her safety at the noticed location. (Obj. & Br. Opp. Mot. for Civil Contempt at 14.) But Ms. Matney relies solely on information and belief and "well-sourced rumors," as there is no persuasive evidence in the record to support her assertion. (*Id.*)

As for the noticed location, Ms. Matney was unable to articulate any specific, concrete safety threat unique to the noticed location that would excuse compliance with the subpoena. At the April 7th hearing, Ms. Matney testified that she was scared of going to the noticed location because she does not trust a lot of people and she felt like the deposition at the noticed location was a "trap." (April 7, 2026 Hr'g Tr. 34:13–18, 77:13–19.) She further testified that if the deposition took place at the noticed location, she would have made sure the entry was secure and brought her security guard to make sure nobody was hiding nearby. (*Id.* 76:23–77:12.) Thus,

nothing prevented her from taking these security measures at the noticed location. As she subsequently acknowledged, the security guard that she hired for the deposition could have accompanied her to the noticed location (*id.* 32:16–19, 77:10–12), and he presumably would have secured the location as Ms. Matney desired.¹²

Additionally, Ms. Matney’s posts on social media, which were entered into evidence at the April 7th hearing, are inconsistent with her argument that she did not appear because she believed that she would be in imminent danger at the noticed location. Ms. Matney has posted that she does not think the Parker’s Defendants have the right to depose her and she is fighting back. She has expressed her defiance for the Court and its orders, characterizing the denial of her Motion to Quash as “bullsh**.” She posted that she would rather go to jail than sit in the same room as counsel for the Parker’s Defendants for this deposition. After refusing to appear for her deposition, she made posts celebrating that she stood her ground and that the deposition did not take place.¹³

While she may have been more comfortable at her desired location, her attorney’s office, the Court finds Ms. Matney’s testimony that she feared for her safety to such an extent that she

¹² The Court further observes that the Parker’s Defendants offered to conduct the deposition at the Maynard Nexsen office in Columbia, which would have provided the security Ms. Matney desired, as it is located on the 7th floor of a bank building with limited access and security guards. (Matney’s Emergency Mot. at 4.) Ms. Matney declined, arguing that she should not have to travel to Columbia, despite subsequently offering Eric Bland’s office in the Columbia / Lexington, South Carolina area or her counsel’s office in Charlotte, North Carolina, as alternatives after this RTSC Motion was filed. (Matney’s Resp. to RTSC Mot. at 10 & Ex. 10.) Prior to the deposition, the Parker’s Defendants also offered to conduct the deposition at a hotel in Bluffton and split the costs. (Matney’s Emergency Mot. at 4.) Ms. Matney, however, insisted on the location she had unilaterally chosen in Bluffton.

¹³ To be clear, Ms. Matney generally has a First Amendment right to state her opinions about this case, the parties, and the Court on social media and during her podcasts and those posts do not form the basis for the Court’s finding of contempt. However, the First Amendment does not preclude the Court from considering these posts which have been attached to pleadings or otherwise appropriately before this Court when assessing Ms. Matney’s credibility and whether she had just cause for her willful failure to appear at the noticed location.

could not attend a deposition at the noticed location, a law firm in Bluffton, with a security guard, and surrounded by her attorneys, is not credible. Moreover, there is no persuasive evidence in the record to support Ms. Matney's repeated assertions that the Parker's Defendants and their attorneys pursued her deposition to harass and bully her.

Finally, Ms. Matney has stressed in filings and during hearings that she is a non-party who has nothing to do with this case. She has repeatedly represented to the Court that she has no relevant information related to this litigation, except for reporting on it, and that the Parker's Defendants and their attorneys are using her deposition and this contempt proceeding to harass or punish her for her reporting on the Murdaugh case and to silence her. (*See, e.g.*, Matney's Obj. & Br. Opp. Mot. for Civil Contempt at 19; Matney's Reply to Opp. to Emergency Mot. at 3, 16 n.10, 22; April 7, 2026 Hr'g Tr. 43:7–9.)¹⁴ However, these assertions lack evidentiary support. And, in denying Ms. Matney's Motion to Quash and her Motion for Reconsideration, the Court already determined that Ms. Matney's deposition testimony was relevant and the deposition was to proceed. Depositions are a normal part of the civil discovery process and, again, there is no persuasive evidence before this Court which would support Ms. Matney's allegations that she is being harassed or unjustly treated by the Parker's Defendants or their counsel.

Importantly, this contempt proceeding arose from Ms. Matney's own conduct. Had she appeared for her deposition at the noticed location on March 27th or accepted the alternative

¹⁴ Ms. Matney has repeated this narrative on her podcasts and on social media, attacking the Parker's Defendants' attorneys and, occasionally, the Court itself. Chief Justice John Kittredge recently noted the issue facing the judiciary of "half-truths and false narratives that circulate on social media, podcasts, and other outlets masquerading as journalism, attacking . . . our justice system," and observed that ethical restraints prohibit judges from responding "no matter how false or outrageous the allegation may be." (April 15, 2026 State of the Judiciary Address Tr. 6:10–6:50.) However, when the same narratives are presented to the Court and entered into evidence, as has been done here, the Court has a duty to assess their validity—and it has done so to the extent appropriate in considering and weighing all of the evidence here.

locations offered by the Parker's Defendants, she would not be before the Court on a contempt motion.

Ms. Matney's stated reason for failing to comply—that the noticed location was not sufficiently safe for her—is not supported by the evidence or any credible testimony. Moreover, as discussed above, filing an Emergency Motion, absent a stay or order granting relief, did not excuse her compliance with the subpoena or with this Court's prior orders. Accordingly, based on all of the evidence before this Court, the Court finds that there is clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Matney's failure to appear for her deposition at the noticed location on March 27, 2026, was without adequate excuse or cause and constitutes willful disobedience of both a valid subpoena and this Court's March 16, 2026 Order. The Court's conclusion is reinforced by Ms. Matney's conduct and online commentary referenced in filings and exhibits which demonstrate a lack of appropriate respect for the authority of the courts of this state.

3. Having found Ms. Matney in civil contempt, the Court orders her to reimburse the Parker's Defendants for the costs they incurred in enforcing the subpoena and the Court's prior order, including reasonable attorney's fees.

The Court finds Ms. Matney's Motion to Quash, although denied, was filed as a matter of right. However, as made clear by the Court's Order denying her Motion to Quash (as well as the Court's rulings on her subsequent motions referenced herein), all of Ms. Matney's follow-on filings lacked merit and the Parker's Defendants prevailed on all of them.

More specifically, a motion for reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy that is not intended to provide a dissatisfied litigant with a second opportunity to relitigate issues already decided by the Court. Rather, reconsideration is generally appropriate only where there has been an intervening change in controlling law, newly discovered evidence, or a clear error of law resulting in manifest injustice. Ms. Matney's Motion for Reconsideration satisfied none of these

standards. Instead, her request for reconsideration merely recycled arguments previously rejected by the Court. Similarly, her Motion for Emergency Relief was unsupported by any genuine emergency. The alleged circumstances either were created by her own conduct or were known well before the filing of the motion. Courts consistently reject attempts to manufacture “emergency” circumstances in order to obtain expedited review or evade compliance with court orders. *See, e.g., CX Reinsurance Co. Ltd. v. Johnson*, 352 F.R.D. 132, 135 & n.5 (D. Md. 2018) (criticizing defendant’s “repeated use of the word ‘emergency’”; explaining that “an emergency is a sudden and serious event or an unforeseen change in circumstances that calls for immediate action to avert, control, or remedy harm”; holding that defendant’s “Emergency Motion” was merely “a discovery complaint” (citation modified)); *Cardoza v. Bloomin’ Brands, Inc.*, 141 F. Supp. 3d 1137, 1143 (D. Nev. 2015) (“Emergency motions ‘are not intended to save the day for parties who have failed to present requests when they should have.’” (quoting *In re Intermagnetics Am., Inc.*, 101 B.R. 191, 193 (C.D. Cal. 1989))); *Allstate Ins. Co. v. Nassiri*, No. 2:08-CV-369 JCM (GWF), 2011 WL 4905639, at *1 (D. Nev. Oct. 14, 2011) (overruling objections to magistrate judge order finding emergency motion to quash subpoena was untimely when three-weeks’ notice was provided for deposition but motion to quash was filed only three business days before deposition).

Ms. Matney’s multiple motions and supporting memoranda have required the Parker’s Defendants to devote substantial time and resources responding to arguments that lack merit and have previously been adjudicated. These unnecessary filings imposed financial burdens on the Parker’s Defendants that would not have been incurred but for Ms. Matney’s conduct.

As noted above, in a civil contempt proceeding, the Court may order a contemnor to reimburse a complainant for the costs he incurred in enforcing the court’s prior order, including reasonable attorney’s fees. *Matter of Est. of Combis*, 439 S.C. at 497, 888 S.E.2d at 7. The award

of attorney's fees is not a punishment but an indemnification to the party who instituted the contempt proceeding. *Id.* The correct measure for attorney's fees awards in civil contempt cases focuses on the reasonableness of the fees sought and the benefit obtained without regard to the financial impact of the award. *Miller v. Miller*, 375 S.C. 443, 463, 652 S.E.2d 754, 764 (Ct. App. 2007). Fee awards in contempt cases serve to reimburse a party for the reasonable fees and costs incurred to enforce a court order, not to punish. *Poston v. Poston*, 331 S.C. 106, 114, 502 S.E.2d 86, 90 (1998).

Such sanctions are necessary to protect the integrity of the judicial process. The judicial system depends upon parties respecting subpoenas and utilizing motions practice in good faith. Allowing a contemnor to disrespect court orders and file legally and factually unsupported motions without consequence encourages continued abuse of the process and undermines the authority of the Court. Having found there is clear and convincing evidence establishing Ms. Matney's civil contempt, the Court orders her to reimburse the Parker's Defendants for the costs they incurred in enforcing the subpoena and the Court's prior order, including reasonable attorney's fees.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Parker's Defendants' Motion to hold Ms. Matney in contempt for willfully failing to comply with a duly issued subpoena and the Orders of this Court is **GRANTED**.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Ms. Matney shall pay the Parker's Defendants' reasonable expenses and attorney's fees and costs, incurred as a result of her willful and intentional failure to appear for the March 27, 2026 deposition, the aborted deposition, and the filing and prosecution of the Motion for Rule to Show Cause, Ms. Matney's Emergency Motion to Set the Deposition Location, Ms. Matney's Motion for Reconsideration, and preparation for and appearances at the May 15, 2026 and June 22, 2026 Contempt hearings, along with any pleadings

or correspondence related thereto. The Parker's Defendants submitted under seal three affidavits and three itemized billing statements¹⁵ related to these proceedings of such attorney fees and costs, requesting a total award of \$310,533.39. After applying the *Miller* and *Poston* factors, **this Court awards the Parkers Defendant's \$171,500.00 for attorney's fees and costs, of which \$39,900.00 is awarded to the law firm of Bannister, Wyatt, and Stalvey, LLC; \$45,950.00 is awarded to the law firm of Deborah B. Barbier, LLC; and \$85,650 is awarded to the law firm of Maynard Nexsen, PC.** This award represents a 44.7% percent reduction of the total fees and costs originally requested by the Parker's Defendants.

The Court also believes that a fine, in addition to the above-referenced costs and expenses, is necessary here to deter similar conduct in the future and to promote respect for the law. The Court therefore imposes a fine of **\$5,000.00**, with said fine due and payable within sixty days of the date of this Order.

The Court retains jurisdiction to impose such additional sanctions as may be necessary to ensure compliance with this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

[Judge's electronic signature on following page]

¹⁵ The attorney fees and cost affidavits and the itemized billing statements provided under seal to this Court came from the law firms of (1) Bannister, Wyatt, and Stalvey, LLC; (2) Deborah B. Barbier, LLC; and (3) Maynard Nexsen, PC.



Hampton Common Pleas

Case Caption: Renee S. Beach , plaintiff, et al VS Gregory M. Parker , defendant, et al

Case Number: 2021CP2500392

Type: Order/Other

It is so Ordered.

s/ R. Keith Kelly - 2165

FORM 4

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF Spartanburg
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

CASE NO. 2026CP4204208

Renee S. Beach et al
PLAINTIFF(S)

Gregory M. Parker et al
DEFENDANT(S)

DISPOSITION TYPE (CHECK ONE)

- ☐ **JURY VERDICT.** This action came before the court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and a verdict rendered.
- ☒ **DECISION BY THE COURT.** This action came to trial or hearing before the court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision rendered.
- ☐ **ACTION DISMISSED** (CHECK REASON): ☐ Rule 12(b), SCRCPP; ☐ Rule 41(a), SCRCPP (Vol. Nonsuit); ☐ Rule 43(k), SCRCPP (Settled);
☐ Other
- ☐ **ACTION STRICKEN** (CHECK REASON): ☐ Rule 40(j), SCRCPP; ☐ Bankruptcy;
☐ Binding arbitration, subject to right to restore to confirm, vacate or modify arbitration award;
☐ Other
- ☐ **STAYED DUE TO BANKRUPTCY**
- ☐ **DISPOSITION OF APPEAL TO THE CIRCUIT COURT** (CHECK APPLICABLE BOX):
☐ Affirmed; ☐ Reversed; ☐ Remanded;
☐ Other

NOTE: ATTORNEYS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR NOTIFYING LOWER COURT, TRIBUNAL, OR ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OF THE CIRCUIT COURT RULING IN THIS APPEAL.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: ☐ See attached order (formal order to follow) ☒ Statement of Judgment by the Court:

Please see below.

ORDER INFORMATION

This order ☐ ends ☒ does not end the case.

☒ See Page 2 for additional information.

For Clerk of Court Office Use Only

This judgment was electronically entered by the Clerk of Court as reflected on the Electronic Time Stamp, and a copy mailed first class to any party not proceeding in the Electronic Filing System on 10/13/2026 .

Vicky Ward-Dismissed
Mandy Matney

NAMES OF TRADITIONAL FILERS SERVED BY MAIL

Court Reporter:

E-Filing Note: The date of Entry of Judgment is the same date as reflected on the Electronic File Stamp and the clerk's entering of the date of judgment above is not required in those counties. The clerk will mail a copy of the judgment to parties who are not E-Filers or who are appearing pro se. See Rule 77(d), SCRCP.

THIS MATTER came on for review before the Honorable R. Keith Kelly upon Non-Party Mandy Matney's Motion to Reconsider the Court's Contempt Order and Confidentiality Order entered on July 13, 2026. The Motion was filed on August 2, 2026, pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the SCRCP. In lieu of oral argument, the Court exercises its discretion under Rule 59(f), SCRCP, to resolve the Motion on the parties' written submissions. See also Pollard v. County of Florence, 314 S.C. 397, 401-02, 444 S.E.2d 534, 536 (Ct. App. 1994).

After careful consideration of the Motion, the written submissions, the record, and applicable law, the Court finds that no material fact or controlling principle of law was overlooked in its prior rulings and that no error of fact or law warrants altering, amending, or vacating either challenged order.

NOW, THEREFORE, and based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED that Non-Party Mandy Matney's Motion to Reconsider filed on August 2, 2026, is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.



Spartanburg Common Pleas

Case Caption: Renee S. Beach , plaintiff, et al VS Gregory M. Parker , defendant, et al
Case Number: 2026CP4204208
Type: Order/Electronic Form 4

It is so Ordered.

s/ R. Keith Kelly - 2165

FORM 4

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF Spartanburg
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

CASE NO. 2026CP4204208

Renee S. Beach et al
PLAINTIFF(S)

Gregory M. Parker et al
DEFENDANT(S)

DISPOSITION TYPE (CHECK ONE)

- ☐ **JURY VERDICT.** This action came before the court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and a verdict rendered.
- ☒ **DECISION BY THE COURT.** This action came to trial or hearing before the court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision rendered.
- ☐ **ACTION DISMISSED** (*CHECK REASON*): ☐ Rule 12(b), SCRPC; ☐ Rule 41(a), SCRPC (Vol. Nonsuit); ☐ Rule 43(k), SCRPC (Settled);
☐ Other
- ☐ **ACTION STRICKEN** (*CHECK REASON*): ☐ Rule 40(j), SCRPC; ☐ Bankruptcy;
☐ Binding arbitration, subject to right to restore to confirm, vacate or modify arbitration award;
☐ Other
- ☐ **STAYED DUE TO BANKRUPTCY**
- ☐ **DISPOSITION OF APPEAL TO THE CIRCUIT COURT** (*CHECK APPLICABLE BOX*):
☐ Affirmed; ☐ Reversed; ☐ Remanded;
☐ Other

NOTE: ATTORNEYS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR NOTIFYING LOWER COURT, TRIBUNAL, OR ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OF THE CIRCUIT COURT RULING IN THIS APPEAL.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: ☐ See attached order (formal order to follow) ☒ Statement of Judgment by the Court:

Please see below.

ORDER INFORMATION

This order ☐ ends ☒ does not end the case.

☒ See Page 2 for additional information.

For Clerk of Court Office Use Only

This judgment was electronically entered by the Clerk of Court as reflected on the Electronic Time Stamp, and a copy mailed first class to any party not proceeding in the Electronic Filing System on 09/11/2026 .

John Arthur Jones
Jody Clinton Lyles for Private Investigations Services Group, Llc, Henry Rosado, Max Fratoddi
Roberts

NAMES OF TRADITIONAL FILERS SERVED BY MAIL

Court Reporter:

E-Filing Note: The date of Entry of Judgment is the same date as reflected on the Electronic File Stamp and the clerk's entering of the date of judgment above is not required in those counties. The clerk will mail a copy of the judgment to parties who are not E-Filers or who are appearing pro se. See Rule 77(d), SCRCP.

THIS MATTER came on for review before the Honorable R. Keith Kelly upon Non-Party Mandy Matney's Motion for Leave to Deposit Funds with the Clerk of Court Pursuant to Rule 67, SCRCP. The Motion seeks leave to deposit the monetary sanctions imposed by this Court's Order entered on July 13, 2026, with the Clerk of Court for Hampton County.

This Court has reviewed the Motion, the Parker's Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition, and the relevant documents of record, along with the applicable law. Upon consideration of the foregoing, the Court finds that the circumstances presented do not warrant granting leave to deposit the funds as requested.

AND IT APPEARING TO THE COURT that, after careful consideration, the Motion should be denied;

NOW, THEREFORE, and based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED as follows:

1. Non-Party Mandy Matney's Motion for Leave to Deposit Funds with the Clerk of Court Pursuant to Rule 67, SCRCP, is hereby DENIED in its entirety.

IT IS SO ORDERED.



Spartanburg Common Pleas

Case Caption: Renee S. Beach , plaintiff, et al VS Gregory M. Parker , defendant, et al
Case Number: 2026CP4204208
Type: Order/Electronic Form 4

It is so Ordered.

s/ R. Keith Kelly - 2165

EXHIBIT 4

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FORM 4

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF Spartanburg
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

CASE NO. 2026CP4204208

Renee S. Beach et al
PLAINTIFF(S)

Gregory M. Parker et al
DEFENDANT(S)

DISPOSITION TYPE (CHECK ONE)

- ☐ **JURY VERDICT.** This action came before the court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and a verdict rendered.
- ☒ **DECISION BY THE COURT.** This action came to trial or hearing before the court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision rendered.
- ☐ **ACTION DISMISSED** (CHECK REASON): ☐ Rule 12(b), SCRCP; ☐ Rule 41(a), SCRCP (Vol. Nonsuit); ☐ Rule 43(k), SCRCP (Settled);
☐ Other
- ☐ **ACTION STRICKEN** (CHECK REASON): ☐ Rule 40(j), SCRCP; ☐ Bankruptcy;
☐ Binding arbitration, subject to right to restore to confirm, vacate or modify arbitration award;
☐ Other
- ☐ **STAYED DUE TO BANKRUPTCY**
- ☐ **DISPOSITION OF APPEAL TO THE CIRCUIT COURT** (CHECK APPLICABLE BOX):
☐ Affirmed; ☐ Reversed; ☐ Remanded;
☐ Other

NOTE: ATTORNEYS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR NOTIFYING LOWER COURT, TRIBUNAL, OR ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OF THE CIRCUIT COURT RULING IN THIS APPEAL.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: ☐ See attached order (formal order to follow) ☒ Statement of Judgment by the Court:

Please see below.

ORDER INFORMATION

This order ☐ ends ☒ does not end the case.

☒ See Page 2 for additional information.

For Clerk of Court Office Use Only

This judgment was electronically entered by the Clerk of Court as reflected on the Electronic Time Stamp, and a copy mailed first class to any party not proceeding in the Electronic Filing System on 09/11/2026 .

Vicky Ward-Dismissed
Mandy Matney

NAMES OF TRADITIONAL FILERS SERVED BY MAIL

Court Reporter:

E-Filing Note: The date of Entry of Judgment is the same date as reflected on the Electronic File Stamp and the clerk's entering of the date of judgment above is not required in those counties. The clerk will mail a copy of the judgment to parties who are not E-Filers or who are appearing pro se. See Rule 77(d), SCRCP.

THIS MATTER came before the Court upon consideration of the arguments of counsel concerning the sixty-day payment deadline set forth in this Court's July 13, 2026, Contempt Order.

AND IT APPEARING TO THE COURT that, after careful consideration, a temporary stay of the payment deadline is appropriate;

NOW, THEREFORE, it is ORDERED that the sixty-day deadline for payment set forth in this Court's July 13, 2026 Contempt Order is hereby STAYED for forty-five (45) days from the entry of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.



Spartanburg Common Pleas

Case Caption: Renee S. Beach , plaintiff, et al VS Gregory M. Parker , defendant, et al
Case Number: 2026CP4204208
Type: Order/Electronic Form 4

It is so Ordered.

s/ R. Keith Kelly - 2165

EXHIBIT 5

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA	)	IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF SPARTANBURG	)	SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
	)	
	)	C/A No. 2026CP4204208
Renee S. Beach, Phillip Beach, Robin	)	
Beach, Savannah Tuten, and Seth Tuten,	)	
Plaintiffs,	)	AMANDA MATNEY’S MOTION TO
	)	STAY ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT
v.	)	PURSUANT TO RULE 62, SCRCP
	)	
Gregory M. Parker, Gregory M. Parker,	)	
Inc. d/b/a Parker’s Corporation, Blake	)	
Greco, Jason D’Cruz, Vicky Ward, Max	)	
Fratoddi, Henry Rosado, and Private	)	
Investigation Services Group, LLC,	)	
Defendants.	)	
	)	

Pursuant to Rule 62(b), SCRCP, non-party Amanda “Mandy” Matney (“Ms. Matney”), by and through undersigned counsel, moves the Court to stay execution of its July 13, 2026 Order finding her in contempt (the “Order”), including the \$171,500.00 award of attorney’s fees and costs and the \$5,000.00 fine, pending the Court’s ruling on her Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider that Order.

Ms. Matney first raised this request informally. On July 20, 2026, undersigned counsel wrote the Court and asked that the time limit for payment of any funds under the Order be held in abeyance until no sooner than sixty days after the Court issued an order on her anticipated Rule 59(e) motion. The Court advised through its law clerk on July 21, 2026 that it was not agreeable to that request. That exchange is attached as Exhibit A. The request was made by email, before the Rule 59(e) motion was filed, and without a formal motion or any offer of security. Ms. Matney now brings the issue to the Court properly under Rule 62(b).

The Rule 59(e) motion was filed August 2, 2026. The Parker’s Defendants filed their response in opposition on August 18, 2026, and Ms. Matney submitted her reply on September 4,

EXHIBIT 5

2026. The 59(e) Motion is still pending. The sixty-day period set by the Order expires September 11, 2026. That deadline will pass before the Court rules on the motion that may alter, amend, or vacate the obligation.

Rule 62(b), SCRCP, permits the Court, in its discretion and on such conditions for the security of the adverse party as are proper, to stay the execution of or any proceedings to enforce a judgment pending disposition of a motion made under Rule 59. Ms. Matney does not want to disobey the Court's order, but she wants to maintain the ability to challenge the court's finding on appeal.

Ms. Matney has separately moved for leave to deposit the funds with the Clerk of Court pursuant to Rule 67, SCRCP, and that motion is also pending. She does not oppose reasonable conditions to secure the award while the Rule 59(e) motion is decided.

For these reasons, Ms. Matney respectfully asks the Court to stay execution of the Order, including the award of attorney's fees and costs and the \$5,000.00 fine, until the Court rules on her Rule 59(e) motion.

Respectfully submitted,

s/ Stuart Axelrod
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EXHIBIT 5

46

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September 9, 2026

Exhibit A-- Matney's Rule 62 Motion

Wednesday, September 9, 2026 at 10:42:48 AM Eastern Daylight Time

Subject: RE: Beach et al v. Parker et al Case No.: 2021-CP-25-00392 [IMAN-NPDOCUMENTS.FID17518047]
Date: Tuesday, July 21, 2026 at 11:33:07 AM Eastern Daylight Time
From: Kelly, R. Keith Law Clerk (Anthony Sita)
To: Tristan Shaffer
CC: John M. Grantland, Rhett D. Ricard, Kelly, R. Keith, Kelly, R. Keith Secretary (Christine B. Thomas), Mark C. Moore, Deborah Barbier, Lindahl, Rebecca K., Bannister, James W., Mark Tinsley, Tabor Vaux, John Nichols, Brad Hutto, Susan P. McWilliams, Cheryl D. Shoun, Jessica Chitkara, nedtupper@tgdcpa.com, Drew Radeker, Taylor Smith, sarah@harrisonfirm.com, Alex Stalvey, Ashley.Byars@cherokeecountysc.com, McBee, Brandy, Renee Dillon, meredith@bannonlawgroup.com, jdjacobus@murphygrantland.com
Attachments: image001.png, image002.png

Good Morning, Mr. Shaffer,

I hope all is well and thank you for reaching out. A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 20 days after receipt of written notice of the entry of the order.

Regarding your request that the time limit for the payment of any funds be held in abeyance until no sooner than 60 days after the Court issues an order related to your pending Rule 59(e) motion, the Court is not agreeable to that request.

Kind Regards,

Anthony J. Sita

Law Clerk to the Honorable R. Keith Kelly

South Carolina 7th Judicial Circuit Court
 180 Magnolia St., Spartanburg, SC 29306
 Office: 864-596-2400

From: Tristan Shaffer <tristan@gotaxelrod.com>

Sent: Monday, July 20, 2026 7:27 PM

To: Kelly, R. Keith Law Clerk (Anthony Sita) <kkellylc@sccourts.org>

Cc: John M. Grantland <jgrantland@murphygrantland.com>; Rhett D. Ricard <rricard@maynardnexsen.com>; Kelly, R. Keith <kkellyj@sccourts.org>; Kelly, R. Keith Secretary (Christine B. Thomas) <kkellysc@sccourts.org>; Mark C. Moore <MMoore@maynardnexsen.com>; Deborah Barbier <dbb@deborahbarbier.com>; Lindahl, Rebecca K. <rebecca.lindahl@katten.com>; Bannister, James W. <jbannister@bannisterwyatt.com>; Mark Tinsley <mark@goodingandgooding.com>; Tabor Vaux <tabor.vaux@vmblawfirm.com>; John Nichols <john@bluesteinattorneys.com>; Brad Hutto <cbhutto@williamsattys.com>; Susan P. McWilliams <SMcWilliams@maynardnexsen.com>; Cheryl D. Shoun <CShoun@maynardnexsen.com>; Jessica Chitkara <jchitkara@murphygrantland.com>; nedtupper@tgdcpa.com; Drew Radeker <drew@harrisonfirm.com>; Taylor Smith <taylor@harrisonfirm.com>; sarah@harrisonfirm.com; Alex Stalvey <AStalvey@bannisterwyatt.com>; Ashley.Byars@cherokeecountysc.com; McBee, Brandy <brandy.mcbee@cherokeecountysc.com>; Renee Dillon <rdillon@murphygrantland.com>; meredith@bannonlawgroup.com; jdjacobus@murphygrantland.com

ELECTRONICALLY FILED - 2026 Sep 09 11:08 AM - SPARTANBURG - COMMON PLEAS - CASE#2026CP4204208

Exhibit A-- Matney's Rule 62 Motion

Subject: Re: Beach et al v. Parker et al Case No.: 2021-CP-25-00392 [IMAN-NPDOCUMENTS.FID17518047]

***** EXTERNAL EMAIL:** This email originated from outside the organization. Please exercise caution before clicking any links or opening attachments. ***

Anthony,

I hope this email finds you well. I have been asked to assist Mandy Matney in preparing a Motion to Alter or Amend.

It appears that the Court's Order Granting Parker's Defendants' Motion for Contempt was signed on July 10, 2026, but not clocked until July 13, 2026. I want to confirm that pursuant to the newly amended Rule 59(e), the Motion to Alter or Amend will be due on Monday, August 3, 2026. Please confirm that this is consistent with the Court's understanding of the applicable deadline.

Additionally, the Court's Order allows for payment within 60 days. I would ask that any time limit for the payment of any funds pursuant to the Order be held in abeyance until no sooner than 60 days after the Court issues an order related to Matney's Motion to Alter or Amend. Please advise if the Court agreeable to this abeyance.

Thank you for considering these requests.

Tristan Shaffer

Get [Outlook for Mac](#)

Kelly, R. Keith Law Clerk (Anthony Sita) <kkellylc@sccourts.org>

Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2026 8:50:01 AM

To: Meredith Bannon <meredith@bannonlawgroup.com>

Cc: John M. Grantland <jgrantland@murphygrantland.com>; Rhett D. Ricard <rricard@maynardnexsen.com>; Kelly, R. Keith <kkellyj@sccourts.org>; Kelly, R. Keith Secretary (Christine B. Thomas) <kkellysc@sccourts.org>; Mark C. Moore <MMoore@maynardnexsen.com>; Deborah Barbier <dbb@deborahbarbier.com>; Lindahl, Rebecca K. <rebecca.lindahl@katten.com>; Bannister, James W. <jbannister@bannisterwyatt.com>; Mark Tinsley <mark@goodingandgooding.com>; Tabor Vaux <tabor.vaux@vmblawfirm.com>; John Nichols <john@bluesteinattorneys.com>; Brad Hutto <cbhutto@williamsattys.com>; Susan P. McWilliams <SMcWilliams@maynardnexsen.com>; Cheryl D. Shoun <CShoun@maynardnexsen.com>; Jessica Chitkara <jchitkara@murphygrantland.com>; nedtupper@tgdcpa.com <nedtupper@tgdcpa.com>; Drew Radeker <drew@harrisonfirm.com>; Taylor Smith <taylor@harrisonfirm.com>; sarah@harrisonfirm.com <sarah@harrisonfirm.com>; Alex Stalvey <ASTalvey@bannisterwyatt.com>; Ashley.Byars@cherokeecountysc.com <ashley.byars@cherokeecountysc.com>; McBee, Brandy <brandy.mcbee@cherokeecountysc.com>; Renee Dillon <rdillon@murphygrantland.com>; JD Jacobus

EXHIBIT 6

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA	)	IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
	)	FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
COUNTY OF HAMPTON	)	
	)	
RENEE S. BEACH, PHILLIP BEACH,	)	
ROBIN BEACH, SAVANNAH TUTEN,	)	C/A No. 2021-CP-25-00392
AND SETH TUTEN,	)	
	)	
Plaintiffs,	)	
	)	MOTION FOR LEAVE TO DEPOSIT
v.	)	FUNDS WITH THE CLERK OF
	)	COURT PURSUANT TO RULE 67,
GREGORY M. PARKER, GREGORY M.	)	SCRCP
PARKER, INC. d/b/a PARKER'S	)	
CORPORATION, BLAKE GRECO,	)	
JASON D'CRUZ, VICKY WARD, MAX	)	
FRATODDI, HENRY ROSADO, AND	)	
PRIVATE INVESTIGATION SERVICES	)	
GROUP, LLC,	)	
	)	
Defendants.	)	

Non-party Amanda "Mandy" Matney ("Ms. Matney"), by and through undersigned counsel, moves this Court under Rule 67, SCRCP, for leave to deposit the full amount of the July 13, 2026, contempt sanction into the custody of the Clerk of Court for Hampton County. Lunashark Media, LLC will tender those funds to the Clerk on Ms. Matney's behalf. In support, Ms. Matney states as follows:

BACKGROUND

On July 13, 2026, the Court entered its Order Granting Parker's Defendants' Motion for Contempt (the "Order"). The Order found non-party Ms. Matney in contempt for failing to comply with a subpoena. The Order directed Ms. Matney to pay the Parker Defendants \$171,500.00 in attorneys' fees and costs, and it imposed a \$5,000.00 fine payable within sixty days. Together the total sanction was \$176,500.00.

EXHIBIT 6

On August 2, 2026, Ms. Matney filed a Motion to Reconsider the order holding her in contempt. If the Motion to Reconsider is denied, Ms. Matney intends to appeal the contempt order. Ms. Matney seeks to avoid further sanctions but also wants to preserve her right to appeal. *See Chappell v. Chappell*, 282 S.C. 376, 377, 318 S.E.2d 590, 591 (Ct. App. 1984) (“The payment of a fine imposed in contempt proceedings also waives the right of review.”).

The contempt sanction is a money judgment; therefore, it arguably accrues post-judgment interest. S.C. Code Ann. § 34-31-20(B) provides that “[a]ll money decrees and judgments of courts enrolled or entered shall draw interest according to law.” To prevent that interest from accruing during reconsideration and any appeal, Lunashark Media, LLC has agreed to assist Ms. Matney by depositing the full judgment amount with the Hampton County Clerk of Court.

On July 27, 2026, Ms. Matney tried to accomplish the deposit by consent. Counsel prepared a proposed consent order allowing Lunashark Media, LLC to deposit the full judgment amount with the Hampton County Clerk of Court, and providing that the deposit would not waive Ms. Matney's right to move for reconsideration or to appeal. On July 28, 2026, Attorney Moore indicated that the Parker Defendants were unable to consent. Therefore, Ms. Matney brings this motion so that the deposit can proceed with the notice and leave of the Court.

Rule 67, SCRCF, governs deposits into court. It provides that “[i]n an action in which any part of the relief sought is a judgment for a sum of money . . . a party, upon notice to every other party, and by leave of court, may deposit with the court all or any part of such sum or thing, whether or not that party claims all or any part of the sum or thing.” Rule 67, SCRCF. Money paid into court under the rule is “deposited as directed by the court” and “withdrawn only upon the check of the clerk of court in favor of the party to whom the order of the court directs.” *Id.*

EXHIBIT 6

The Supreme Court has found that a judgment debtor's deposit of the judgment into court, pending the debtor's own appeal, stops the accrual of post-judgment interest — provided the debtor complies with Rule 67. *Russo v. Sutton*, 317 S.C. 441, 443–44, 454 S.E.2d 895, 896–97 (1995). In *Russo*, the Court reasoned that such a rule "encourages the debtor to pay the judgment and assures the judgment creditor the funds will be available at the conclusion of the appeal." *Id.* at 444, 454 S.E.2d at 896. The Court grounded that holding in its earlier decisions recognizing that a judgment debtor may prevent the accrual of interest by paying the judgment into court under an order of the court.

The holding comes with a condition. To stop interest, "a debtor must comply with the plain language of Rule 67." *Russo*, 317 S.C. at 444, 454 S.E.2d at 897. The debtor in *Russo* deposited the judgment with the clerk of court unilaterally, with only a notation that the funds were being deposited to stay interest. *Id.* at 442–43, 454 S.E.2d at 895–96. Because he "failed to give notice to [the creditor] that the funds were being deposited, and failed to obtain leave of the circuit court prior to depositing the funds," the Court held his "unilateral deposit of the funds insufficient to stop accrual of the interest." *Id.* at 444–45, 454 S.E.2d at 897.

This motion gives the Parker Defendants notice of Ms. Matney's intentions. This motion also seeks leave of the Court to deposit under Rule 67. That is the procedure *Russo* prescribes. Once the Court grants leave and the full judgment amount is deposited with the Clerk, post-judgment interest stops accruing while Ms. Matney pursues reconsideration and any appeal. *See Bakala v. Bakala*, 352 S.C. 612, 632, 576 S.E.2d 156, 167 (2003) ("Where payment has been ordered and not appealed, and a contempt order is issued to compel payment, a deposit of funds under Rule 67 will not constitute a purge.").

EXHIBIT 6

Granting this motion prejudices no one. The deposit places the full judgment amount in the custody and control of the Clerk of Court, where it will be available to the Parker Defendants if the judgment is upheld.

For these reasons, Ms. Matney respectfully requests that the Court order the following:

- (1) Allowing the full judgment amount of \$176,500.00 to be deposited with the Clerk of Court for Hampton County pursuant to Rule 67, SCRPC;
- (2) Allowing the funds to be tendered by Lunashark Media, LLC on Ms. Matney's behalf;
- (3) Directing that the deposited funds be held by the Clerk and withdrawn only upon further order of the Court;
- (4) Providing that, upon deposit, the accrual of post-judgment interest on the contempt sanction be considered stopped as of July 27, 2026; and
- (5) Providing that the deposit does not waive Ms. Matney's right to move for reconsideration or to appeal the contempt order.

Respectfully submitted,

s/ Stuart Axelrod
Stuart M. Axelrod (S.C. Bar 14678)
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4701 Oleander Drive
Myrtle Beach, SC 29577
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EXHIBIT 6

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August 3, 2026

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COUNTY OF HAMPTON

RENEE S. BEACH, PHILLIP BEACH,
ROBIN BEACH, SAVANNAH TUTEN,
AND SETH TUTEN,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GREGORY M. PARKER, GREGORY
M. PARKER, INC. d/b/a PARKER'S
CORPORATION, BLAKE GRECO,
JASON D'CRUZ, MAX FRATODDI,
HENRY ROSADO, AND PRIVATE
INVESTIGATION SERVICES GROUP,
LLC,

Defendants.

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

C/A No. 2021-CP-25-00392

**PARKER'S DEFENDANTS'
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
NON-PARTY MANDY MATNEY'S
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO DEPOSIT
FUNDS WITH THE CLERK OF COURT
PURSUANT TO RULE 67, SCRCF**

INTRODUCTION

Defendants Gregory M. Parker, Gregory M. Parker, Inc. d/b/a Parker's Corporation, Blake Greco, and Jason D'Cruz (collectively, the "Parker's Defendants") respectfully submit this Memorandum in Opposition to Non-Party Amanda "Mandy" Matney's Motion for Leave to Deposit Funds with the Clerk of Court Pursuant to Rule 67, SCRCF (the "Motion"). The Motion fails at the threshold: Rule 67 extends only to "a party," and Ms. Matney is a non-party contemnor. Even if the Rule could somehow apply to her, every consideration bearing on the Court's discretion weighs against granting her leave: she (1) contests both the contempt finding and the amount of the sanctions; (2) makes no claim that she will be unable to pay later; and (3) is unlikely to succeed on the merits. Rule 67 exists to protect judgment creditors. It is not a device by which Ms. Matney, a non-party contemnor, may deposit funds with the Clerk, suspend the Parker's Defendants'

statutory right to post-judgment interest, and continue litigating the Contempt Order cost-free. The Motion should be denied.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On July 13, 2026, this Court entered its Order Granting Parker's Defendants' Motion for Contempt against non-party Mandy Matney (the "Contempt Order"), finding her in civil contempt for willfully failing to appear for her deposition at the noticed location on March 27, 2026. As a sanction, the Court awarded \$171,500.00 in attorneys' fees and costs—\$39,900.00 to Bannister, Wyatt, and Stalvey; \$45,950.00 to Deborah B. Barbier, LLC; and \$85,650.00 to Maynard Nexsen PC—and imposed a \$5,000.00 fine payable within sixty days for a total sanction of \$176,500.00.

Ms. Matney has not paid the sanctions. The Parker's Defendants declined to consent to her proposed modification of the Contempt Order's clear instructions on July 28, 2026. On August 2, 2026, she filed a Rule 59(e) Motion to Reconsider the Contempt Order, challenging the contempt finding, the fee awards, and the fine. The next day, she filed this Motion, seeking leave to deposit \$176,500.00 with the Clerk of Court (funds to be tendered on her behalf by Luna Shark Media, LLC¹) and asking the Court to stop the accrual of post-judgment interest retroactively to July 27, 2026, a full week before the Motion was filed and before any notice was given or leave of court obtained.

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 67, SCRCF, provides that "[i]n an action in which any part of the relief sought is a judgment for a sum of money," "a party, upon notice to every other party, and by leave of court, may deposit with the court all or any part of such sum or thing." A deposit is thus available only

¹ Ms. Matney refers to her own company as Lunashark Media, LLC, but the registered name of her company with the South Carolina Secretary of State's office is actually Luna Shark Media, LLC.

to a party, only upon notice, and only “by leave of court,” i.e. language confirming that a Rule 67 deposit is not a matter of right but calls for the exercise of judicial discretion. *See Davis v. Agape Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., Inc.*, UP Op. No. 2022-UP-094, 2022 WL 702579, at *4 (S.C. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2022) (unpublished) (affirming denial of leave to deposit funds under Rule 67 to stay the accrual of post-judgment interest).

The Rule operates for the benefit of the judgment creditor by encouraging the debtor to pay and assuring that the funds will be available at the conclusion of an appeal. *Russo v. Sutton*, 317 S.C. 441, 444, 454 S.E.2d 895, 896 (1995). And whatever its proper uses, Rule 67 “may not be used as a means of altering the legal duties of the parties.” *Bakala v. Bakala*, 352 S.C. 612, 632, 576 S.E.2d 156, 167 (2003).

The stakes of a deposit are set by statute: money judgments “must draw interest according to law” at the statutory rate. S.C. Code Ann. § 34-31-20(B). Post-judgment interest runs to the benefit of a prevailing party “as a matter of course,” *Hunting v. Elders*, 359 S.C. 217, 229, 597 S.E.2d 803, 809 (Ct. App. 2004), and the interest is designed to encourage the important policy interest of prompt payment of court-ordered debts. *See Casey v. Casey*, 311 S.C. 243, 245, 428 S.E.2d 714, 715 (1993); *see also Calhoun v. Calhoun*, 339 S.C. 96, 102, 529 S.E.2d 14, 17 (2000). Only full compliance with the “plain language” of Rule 67, including the discretionary leave of court, can suspend that statutory right. *Russo*, 317 S.C. at 444, 454 S.E.2d at 897.

ARGUMENT

I. Ms. Matney, a non-party contemnor, cannot invoke Rule 67.

Rule 67 permits “a party, upon notice to every other party, and by leave of court,” to deposit funds with the court. It unambiguously applies only to parties. It is undisputed that Ms. Matney is not a party to this action, and Rule 67 does not apply to her under any plain language interpretation

of the rule. She is a non-party contemnor, sanctioned for willfully failing to comply with her obligations as a deposition witness, and she cites no authority extending Rule 67 to non-parties. The Rule's scope provision confirms the limitation: Rule 67 applies "[i]n an action in which any part of the relief sought is a judgment for a sum of money." The sanctions here were not "relief sought" in the action between Plaintiffs and the Parker's Defendants; they arose from an ancillary contempt proceeding occasioned entirely by Ms. Matney's own conduct, with which the Court is all too familiar.

Ms. Matney's own authority confirms the point. *Russo*—on which she relies for the proposition that a Rule 67 deposit stops the accrual of interest—requires compliance with the "plain language" of the Rule. 317 S.C. at 444, 454 S.E.2d at 897. That plain language extends only to "a party" in an action seeking a money judgment, and does not include a non-party contemnor resisting a contempt sanction arising from unnecessary ancillary proceedings she alone necessitated. Because Ms. Matney cannot satisfy the Rule's threshold requirements, she cannot invoke Rule 67 and the Motion fails at the outset.

II. Even if Rule 67 were available, the Court should exercise its discretion to deny leave.

The question before the Court is not whether a proper Rule 67 deposit can ever stop the accrual of interest; it is whether the Court should exercise its discretion to grant leave on the facts before it. In *Davis*, though unpublished, the Court of Appeals set forth a persuasive framework for the Court to utilize when analyzing whether to exercise that discretion. 2022 WL 702579, at *4. Applying *Davis* to the record in this case, the Court should decline to exercise its discretion and deny leave. Moreover, three independent lines of authority also compel the same answer: leave should be denied.

A. Every *Davis* factor weighs against leave.

In *Davis*, the Court of Appeals held that “there is no automatic right to the stay of the accrual of interest on appeal under Rule 62(d), SCRCPP” and that “the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Agape’s motion to stay the accrual of post-judgment interest under either Rules 62(b) or 67, SCRCPP.” 2022 WL 702579, at *4. The trial court considered three factors: (1) there was no allegation the debtor would be unable to pay later; (2) the debtor was unlikely to succeed on the merits; and (3) the debtor contested both liability and amount. *Id.* “Weighing these factors, the trial court found staying the interest would prejudice the Estate, and therefore, it would not penalize the Estate by granting Agape’s motion.” *Id.*

The Court of Appeals found no error. In those circumstances, the Court of Appeals explained, pausing interest works a “prejudice” against the judgment creditor:

Rule 67, SCRCPP, benefits the judgment creditor by “encourag[ing] the debtor to pay the judgment and assur[ing] the judgment creditor the funds will be available at the conclusion of the appeal.” However, when the trial court concludes there is a likelihood the debtor will be able to pay the judgment after the debtor’s appeal has not succeeded on the merits, this benefit turns into prejudice for the judgment creditor by pausing the judgment creditor’s statutory right to post-judgment accrual of interest during the pendency of the debtor’s appeal.

Id. (quoting *Russo*, 317 S.C. at 444, 454 S.E.2d at 896).

Every factor applies here with equal or greater force and supports the Court denying leave. Ms. Matney contests both the contempt finding and the amount of the sanctions through her Rule 59(e) Motion. She has made no showing (and indeed, no allegation) that she would be unable to pay later. And she is unlikely to succeed on the merits given this Court’s well-reasoned findings in a twenty-two-page order. Her assertion that “granting this motion prejudices no one” thus fails on its face. Pausing interest *is* the prejudice, because it suspends compensation to which the

Parker's Defendants are statutorily entitled "as a matter of course." *Hunting*, 359 S.C. at 229, 597 S.E.2d at 809.

B. Rule 67 may not be used to alter Ms. Matney's duty to pay the Parker's Defendants directly.

Ms. Matney's reliance on *Bakala* is misplaced, and the decision actually cuts against her. There, a husband held in contempt for failing to pay a sum "*directly* to [his spouse]" deposited an uncontested amount with the court and argued that the deposit purged his contempt. 352 S.C. at 632, 576 S.E.2d at 166 (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that "Rule 67 may not be used as a means of altering the legal duties of the parties" and that the husband's deposit "does nothing but delay payment of funds that are legally due. This is not the intent of Rule 67." *Id.* at 632, 576 S.E.2d at 167 (citing *Renaissance Enters., Inc. v. Ocean Resorts, Inc.*, 334 S.C. 324, 513 S.E.2d 617 (1999)).

Bakala also lacked the feature that dooms Ms. Matney's Motion under *Davis*: the contemnor there "never contested the original order [to] pay." *Id.* Ms. Matney, unsurprisingly, contests everything. And, as in *Bakala*, the operative order here directs payment to the Parker's Defendants *directly*, not a deposit with the Clerk. Ms. Matney seeks to accomplish precisely what *Bakala* forbids, i.e. to alter her present duty to pay funds that are legally due by interposing the court registry while she litigates the propriety of the Contempt Order.

C. Federal authority historically reserves Rule 67 for genuinely contested funds, not contesting debtors.

Federal decisions construing the materially identical federal rule generally reserve Rule 67 for cases where the depositing party does not claim any interest in the funds and the issue is who

is entitled to contested funds.² In *Alstom Caribe, Inc. v. George P. Reintjes Co., Inc.*, 484 F.3d 106 (1st Cir. 2007), the First Circuit explained that “[t]he core purpose of Rule 67 is to relieve a party who holds a contested fund from responsibility for disbursement of that fund among those claiming some entitlement thereto,” so “it follows logically that a district court should not grant a Rule 67 motion unless the question of entitlement is genuinely in dispute.” *Id.* at 113 (citing Wright & Miller, *Federal Practice & Procedure* § 2991 (2d ed. 1997)). Historically, the device was only to be employed when the debtor conceded liability, but there was a dispute about which party in the dispute should be paid. *Id.*

Ms. Matney concedes nothing. She filed a Rule 59(e) Motion challenging the contempt finding in its entirety one day before filing this Motion. There is no contested fund and there are no competing claimants. There is only a contemnor who, again unsurprisingly, does not want to comply with this Court’s July 13, 2026 Order. That is precisely the scenario in which courts should exercise discretion to deny a deposit with the court.

III. Granting leave would nullify the Parker’s Defendants’ statutory right to post-judgment interest and reward delay.

Post-judgment interest is neither optional nor a windfall; the Parker’s Defendants have an automatic right to post-judgment interest. It “must” accrue by statute, S.C. Code Ann. § 34-31-20(B), and it compensates the Parker’s Defendants for the time value of money during the period they are deprived of funds that are rightfully theirs—a deprivation caused entirely by Ms. Matney’s litigation tactics. The statute exists to encourage judgment debtors to pay promptly. *Casey*, 311 S.C. at 245, 428 S.E.2d at 715. Allowing Ms. Matney to deposit the funds with the Clerk while

² Because Rule 67 “is substantially the same as the federal rule allowing a deposit into court,” South Carolina courts look to federal authority in construing it. *Renaissance Enters., Inc. v. Ocean Resorts, Inc.*, 334 S.C. 324, 327, 513 S.E.2d 617, 619 (1999).

she pursues reconsideration and appeal would eliminate her only incentive to pay as ordered and would deprive the Parker's Defendants of the very protection the statute provides.

Nor is Ms. Matney a losing litigant pursuing an appeal in good faith. She is a non-party who willfully defied this Court's processes, was found in contempt, and now contests that finding while maneuvering to avoid its full financial consequences. This Motion is simply the latest in her pattern of obfuscating the point to avoid compliance with her obligations. The Court should not reward that conduct by relieving her of the interest obligation which the legislature imposed precisely to discourage.

IV. The specific relief requested is improper on its own terms.

A. Interest cannot be stopped retroactively to July 27, 2026.

Ms. Matney asks the Court to stop interest as of July 27, 2026, a full week before she filed the Motion. On that date, the "plain language" of Rule 67 had not been satisfied. *Russo*, 317 S.C. at 444, 454 S.E.2d at 897. There is no showing that notice had been given to all parties, and, more importantly, she had not obtained leave from the Court or deposited the funds with the Clerk on July 27, 2026. The Parker's Defendants declined her proposed course of action on July 28, 2026, and she did not file this Motion until August 3, 2026. Interest cannot be stopped retroactively to an arbitrary date on which none of the Rule's conditions had been met. Granting the request would reward Ms. Matney for the very delay she now seeks to escape and would render Rule 67's notice and leave requirements meaningless.

B. Payment by Luna Shark Media, LLC would give Ms. Matney the benefit of payment without paying.

The Contempt Order directs Ms. Matney to pay the sanctions. Her request that Luna Shark Media, LLC be authorized to tender the funds raises an obvious question as to whether Ms. Matney herself is complying with this Court's order at all. Compounding the problem, the arrangement

would allow her to insist that *she* has not paid the sanctions, preserving her appellate rights under *Chappell v. Chappell*, 282 S.C. 376, 318 S.E.2d 378 (Ct. App. 1984), while simultaneously capturing the interest-stopping benefit of payment. The Court should not facilitate an attempt to have it both ways.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Parker's Defendants respectfully request that this Court: (1) decline to exercise its discretion and deny Ms. Matney's Motion for Leave to Deposit Funds in its entirety; (2) order that the statutory post-judgment interest continue to accrue on the sanctions awarded in the Contempt Order; and (3) grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

s/ Mark C. Moore

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*Attorneys For Defendants Gregory M. Parker,
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Corporation, Jason D'cruz, and Blake Greco*

August 18, 2026
Columbia, South Carolina

EXHIBIT 8

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA	)	IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF SPARTANBURG	)	SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
	)	
	)	C/A No. 2026CP4204208
Renee S. Beach, Phillip Beach, Robin	)	
Beach, Savannah Tuten, and Seth Tuten,	)	
Plaintiffs,	)	AMANDA MATNEY’S REPLY IN SUPPORT
	)	OF HER MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
v.	)	DEPOSIT FUNDS WITH THE CLERK OF
	)	COURT PURSUANT TO RULE 67, SCRCP
Gregory M. Parker, Gregory M. Parker,	)	
Inc. d/b/a Parker’s Corporation, Blake	)	
Greco, Jason D’Cruz, Vicky Ward, Max	)	
Fratoddi, Henry Rosado, and Private	)	
Investigation Services Group, LLC,	)	
Defendants.	)	
	)	

Amanda “Mandy” Matney (“Ms. Matney”), by and through undersigned counsel, respectfully submits this Reply in support of her Motion for Leave to Deposit Funds with the Clerk of Court pursuant to Rule 67, SCRCP, and in reply to the Parker’s Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition filed August 18, 2026 (the “Opposition”).

Based on the authority already cited in her motion, Ms. Matney respectfully submits that she or the company she's associated with may deposit funds pursuant to Rule 67. Ms. Matney believes that the arguments made by the Parker defendants lack any merit and the authority cited is inapposite to the present situation. To the extent that the court would like a reply, Ms. Matney submits the following:

I. MS. MATNEY IS A “PARTY” TO THE CONTEMPT PROCEEDING

The Parker Defendants argue that Ms. Matney may not exercise any rights under Rule 67 because she is a non-party witness and not a party to the action itself. The Black's Law Dictionary definition of "party" Includes the following: “One by or against whom a lawsuit is brought; anyone

EXHIBIT 8

who both is directly interested in a lawsuit and has a right to control the proceedings, make a defense, or appeal from an adverse judgment.” Party, *Black's Law Dictionary* (12th ed. 2024).

Although Ms. Matney is not a party to the causes of action contained in the Complaint which initiated the current lawsuit, she certainly fits the definition of a party as it applies to the contempt proceeding against her. As to the contempt proceeding, she has been ordered to pay a substantial amount of fines and fees she's directly interested in the lawsuit as a result. She also has the right to present defenses and appeal the adverse judgment as it relates to the contempt proceedings. Therefore, Miss Matney is a non-party to the dispute between plaintiff and defendant, but she is a party to her own contempt proceeding.

Counsel has been unable to locate any case in South Carolina, or in any other state which would deny a party to a contempt proceeding to exercise the rules of civil procedure. Therefore, Rule 67 should apply.

II. THERE ARE NO “DAVIS FACTORS” WHICH SHOULD BE APPLIED, THE PARKER DEFENDANTS ARE ASKING THE COURT TO VIOLATE RULE 268(D)(2), SCACR BY CRAFTING A FACTOR TEST FROM AN UNPUBLISHED CASE.

Under the Opposition’s Section II-A they argue “Every *Davis* factor weighs against leave [to deposit funds].” (Resp. in Opp. 5). While Ms. Matney disagrees wholeheartedly with the underlying factual assertion in this statement,¹ this is not a valid factor test which should be applied

¹ To the extent that the court would actually want Ms. Matney to acknowledge this factor test from an unpublished opinion, Ms. Matney would submit the arguments already raised in her Motion to Reconsider and in the Reply to the Opposition’s Response as rebuttal to “Davis Factors” 1 and 2.

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to this case. This entire argument derives from an unpublished opinion. *See Davis v. Agape Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., Inc.*, Op. No. 2022-UP-094 (S.C. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2022).

“Memorandum opinions and unpublished orders have no precedential value and should not be cited except in proceedings in which they are directly involved.” Rule 268(d)(2), SCACR. Unlike some courts, South Carolina appellate courts do not want their unpublished opinions to even be cited in a proceeding that is unrelated to that particular case. Therefore, they certainly shouldn't form the basis of a test which should be applied to make determinations on how the court should exercise its discretion.

The opposition is asking the court to violate Rule 268 SCACR. Therefore, the Court should completely disregard the Opposition’s Arguments related to the “*Davis* factors.”

III. THE PARKER DEFENDANTS ARE ASKING TO APPLY RULE 67 AS A SWORD, NOT A SHIELD.

Rule 67 and the post-judgment interest statute both exist to protect judgment creditors. Rule 67 benefits the creditor by “encourag[ing] the debtor to pay the judgment and assur[ing] the judgment creditor the funds will be available at the conclusion of the appeal.” *Russo v. Sutton*, 317 S.C. 441, 444, 454 S.E.2d 895, 896 (1995). Post-judgment interest compensates the creditor for the delay in payment and encourages prompt payment. *See Casey v. Casey*, 311 S.C. 243, 245, 428 S.E.2d 714, 715 (1993). Both are shields. The Parker Defendants ask the Court to let them use these protections as a sword.

Ms. Matney offers to do exactly what these protections are meant to secure. She proposes to have placed the full sanction — \$176,500.00, every dollar of it — in the custody of the Clerk

EXHIBIT 8

now, before her appeal is decided. That deposit gives the Parker Defendants the precise benefit *Russo* describes: their money, in full, available the moment this matter is finally resolved. If the purpose of the rule is to assure the creditor that the funds will be there at the end of the appeal, that purpose is satisfied the day the money is deposited.

However, it is clear, the Parker Defendants do not want security. Instead they want leverage. South Carolina law puts Ms. Matney to a hard choice. If she pays the sanction to stop the interest, she waives her right to appeal it. *Chappell v. Chappell*, 282 S.C. 376, 318 S.E.2d 590 (Ct. App. 1984). If she preserves her appeal, the statutory interest clock runs against \$176,500.00 for as long as the appeal takes — potentially years — turning her exercise of a legal right into a penalty. This is the exact position the Parker Defendants want Ms. Matney in—give up your appeal, or risk additional penalties. Rule 67 is the mechanism that allows potential debtors to relieve that pressure and encourages payment of debt. It lets a judgment debtor secure the creditor without paying directly, and without the payment being treated as a surrender of the right to appeal.

Appellate relief in South Carolina is often partial. Ms. Matney has raised strong grounds against the Contempt Order in her Rule 59(e) motion, but a litigant with meritorious issues should not be forced to bet that a multi-year appeal will erase the entire sanction before she can afford to test it. Interest accruing at the statutory rate on \$176,500.00 over the life of an appeal. The Parker Defendants seek to use this as a deterrent, deployed to make the appeal too expensive to bring. Post-judgment interest was enacted to compensate creditors and encourage prompt payment, not to punish litigants for exercising their constitutional rights to appeal.

Granting leave protects the Parker Defendants more than denying it does. Luna Shark Productions, LLC is presently willing and able to front the entire \$176,500.00 on Ms. Matney's

EXHIBIT 8

behalf. There is no guarantee that will be true when the appellate courts finish with this matter years from now. A deposit now places the full sum beyond that uncertainty and guarantees the Parker Defendants their recovery if the Contempt Order stands. Denying leave secures them nothing. It keeps the interest running and gambles that the funds will still be available later.

Bakala held that Rule 67 “may not be used as a means of altering the legal duties of the parties,” where a contemnor deposited funds and claimed the deposit purged his contempt and relieved him of his duty to pay his spouse directly. *Bakala v. Bakala*, 352 S.C. 612, 632, 576 S.E.2d 156, 167 (2003). Ms. Matney asks for nothing of the kind. She does not claim the deposit purges her contempt, and she does not seek to escape or reduce what she owes. She offers to secure the full amount while she appeals — not to alter a duty, but to guarantee it.

The Court should not let the interest statute be turned from a shield for the creditor into a sword against the appellant. Granting leave gives the Parker Defendants everything the law entitles them to — their money, secured and available — and denies them only the coercive premium to which they are not entitled. Leave should be granted.

IV. MS. MATNEY WOULD NOT OPPOSE THE THE COURT ORDERING THAT THE MONEY BE DEPOSITED INTO AN INTEREST-BEARING ACCOUNT.

Although not binding authority, in the unpublished case cited by the Parker Defendants, the Court of Appeals in Davis stated, Court of Appeals stated, “While nothing in our Rule 67 requires the court to place the funds in an interest-bearing account, the court has the discretion to do so.” *See Davis v. Agape Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., Inc.*, Op. No. 2022-UP-094 (S.C. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2022). Although this is not binding precedent, counsel is unaware of any authority that would prevent the court from placing the funds in an interest-bearing account.

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To the extent that the Court would find that it has the authority to require that the funds be deposited into an interest-bearing account, Ms. Matney would not object to the funds being deposited into such an account. This would alleviate any concern that the Parker Defendants have concerning not being entitled to receive interest in the funds in the course of the appeal.

V. THE RETROACTIVITY DISPUTE SHOULD NOT OBSCURE THE LEAVE QUESTION

Ms. Matney proposed this arrangement to the Parker's Defendants on or about July 27, 2026; they declined on July 28; this Motion followed within days on August 2, 2026. The interval the Opposition now seeks to monetize was substantially of its authors' making. Ms. Matney requests that any interest cease as of July 27, 2026; in the alternative, as of the Motion's filing date; in the further alternative, as of the date of actual deposit. Even the last alternative captures the Motion's essential purpose, and the Court should not permit a dispute over a few weeks' interest to defeat leave altogether.

CONCLUSION

Ms. Matney respectfully requests that the Court grant leave for Luna Shark Productions, LLC² to deposit \$176,500.00 with the Clerk of Court and direct that interest cease as of July 27, 2026 or an alternative date per Section IV, and grant such other and further relief as is just and proper.

(Signature Page Follows)

² In the initial filing of Miss Matney's Motion to Deposit Funds Pursuant to Rule 67 SCRC, counsel misidentified the party willing to pay as "Lunashark Media, LLC". However, the proper party named in the order should be "Luna Shark Productions, LLC".

Respectfully submitted,

s/ Stuart Axelrod

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
September 4, 2026

STATE OF COLORADO)
) AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID MOSES
 COUNTY OF)
 JEFFERSON)
 _____)

Personally appeared before me the undersigned, David Moses, who, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:


1. I am over eighteen (18) years of age, of sound mind, and competent to make this Affidavit. The facts stated here are based on my personal knowledge and on business records of Luna Shark Productions, LLC kept in the ordinary course of its business.
2. I am the President and Executive Producer of Luna Shark Productions, LLC ("LUNASHARK®"), a South Carolina limited liability company with its principal office in Denver, Colorado. I am a co-founder of Luna Shark Productions, LLC.
3. In my capacity as President and manager, I am authorized to execute this Affidavit on LUNASHARK®'s behalf.
4. By Order dated July 13, 2026, the Circuit Court held Amanda Matney in civil contempt and ordered her to pay attorney's fees of \$171,500.00 and a fine of \$5,000.00, for a total of \$176,500.00 (the "Contempt Order").
5. LUNASHARK® has, as of the date of this Affidavit, immediately available funds in excess of \$176,500.00. LUNASHARK® is willing to deposit these funds on behalf of Ms. Matney.
6. If the South Carolina Court of Appeals so orders, within 10 days, I affirm that LUNASHARK® will deposit the sum of \$176,500.00 in the appropriate clerk's account, or with such other officer as this Court directs. It is my intention that these funds will be held in the custody of the Court pending final resolution of this appeal and disbursed only upon court order.
7. If the Contempt Order is reversed, vacated, or modified, LUNASHARK® requests that the deposited funds, or any portion not ordered paid, be returned to LUNASHARK®.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.




 David Moses

SWORN to and subscribed before me this 27 day of October, 2026.

 (L.S.) Notary Public for the State of Colorado

Printed Name: Hadley Lin Gregory

My Commission Expires: 06-29-2027



RECEIVED

Oct 28 2026

SC Court of Appeals

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

Appeal from Hampton County
R. Keith Kelly, Circuit Court Judge

EX PARTE: AMANDA MATNEY,

APPELLANT,

RENEE S. BEACH, PHILLIP BEACH, ROBIN BEACH, SAVANNAH
TUTEN, AND SETH TUTEN,

PLAINTIFFS,

V.

GREGORY M. PARKER, GREGORY M. PARKER, INC. D/B/A
PARKER'S CORPORATION, BLAKE GRECO, JASON D'CRUZ,
VICKY WARD, MAX FRATODDI, HENRY ROSADO, AND
PRIVATE INVESTIGATION SERVICES GROUP, LLC,

DEFENDANTS,

OF WHOM GREGORY M. PARKER, GREGORY M. PARKER, INC.
D/B/A PARKER'S CORPORATION, BLAKE GRECO, AND JASON
D'CRUZ ARE THE

RESPONDENTS.

Appellate Case No.: 2026-002291

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned counsel certifies that on October 28, 2026, he served Appellant's Petition for Writ of Supersedeas and Motion for Leave to Deposit Funds and to Suspend Post-Judgment Interest, together with its Verification and Exhibits 1 through 9, on counsel for Respondents by email at the addresses listed below.

s/ Tristan Shaffer

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October 28, 2026

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Attorneys for Respondents Gregory M. Parker, Gregory M. Parker, Inc. d/b/a Parker's Corporation, Blake Greco, and Jason D'Cruz

Wednesday, October 28, 2026 at 5:01:49 PM Eastern Daylight Time

Subject: Ex Parte: Amanda Matney, Appellate Case No. 2026-002291 - Petition for Writ of Supersedeas - Service by Email

Date: Wednesday, October 28, 2026 at 4:55:30 PM Eastern Daylight Time

From: Tristan Shaffer

To: mmoore@maynardnexsen.com, smcwilliams@maynardnexsen.com, ccopeland@maynardnexsen.com, cshoun@maynardnexsen.com, rricard@maynardnexsen.com, jbannister@bannisterwyatt.com, astalvey@bannisterwyatt.com, dbb@deborahbarbier.com, nedtupper@tgdcpa.com

CC: Eric S. Bland, Ronnie Richter, Kelsey Manemeit

Attachments: Matney - Petition for Supersedeas with Exhibits 1-9.pdf

Please find the attached document which is being filed with the Court of Appeals.

Thank you

Tristan Shaffer

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