

January 23, 2014

RE: State v. Antonio Gordon
Appellate Case No. 2013-000975

Please find enclosed a motion for the
Appointment of Counsel. Opposing Counsel have
been served. Due to SCDC have refused to
issue me legal paper can you please be kind
enough to send me a copy of the motion?

I have copies of the Attachments.

Thanks

Antonio Gordon
1-23-2014

RECEIVED

JAN 27 2014

SC Court of Appeals

State of South Carolina
In The Court of Appeals

Appeal from York County
General Sessions Court
John C. Hayes, III Presiding Judge

Appellate Case No.: 2013-000975

Indictment Nos.: 1998-65-46-2847, 2849, 2850, 2851, 2852

The state

Respondent,

vs.

Antonio Gordon,

Appellant.

Motion for the Appointment of Counsel
based upon after discovered evidence

Appellant hereby Petition this Court for the appointment of Counsel. This Court denied Appellant's motion for Appointment of Counsel on 9-16-2013. However, Appellant now have after discovered evidence that create a extraordinary circumstance that warrant the appointment of Counsel from his Rule 29(b) motion.

On 12-27-2013, the Appellant submitted a Complaint to the South Carolina Department of Correction, office of General Counsel and explained that I had a Criminal appeal in and there are "Cases" Cited in the Judge order of dismissal that will not Pull up on the law Library Computer. See Attachment (A)

On 1-2-2014, South Carolina Department of Correction office of General Counsel responded to Appellant's letter dated 12-27-2013. In this Correspondence "Christina Kellett" advise the Appellant, if the Cases is not within SCDC's legal research holdings, SCDC are not required to Provide Appellant the cases. See Attachment (b) This establish after discovered evidence that warrant the Appointment of Counsel.

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JAN 27 2014

SC Court of Appeals

Issues Presented

1. Should the Appellant be appointed Counsel where extraordinary circumstances exist that Appellant's Appeal will not be meaningful because he's Prohibited from researching cases cited in the Judge Order of Dismissal, by inadequate law Library within SCDC, which is out of Appellant's Control and reach?
2. Should the Appellant be appointed Counsel as those similar situated on Appeal from Rule 29 (b) motion?

Arguments

Appellant should be appointed Counsel where extraordinary circumstances exist that Appellant's Appeal will not be meaningful because he's Prohibited from researching cases cited in the Judge Order of dismissal, by inadequate Law Library within SCDC, which is out of Appellant's Control and reach.

Appellant assert due to the extraordinary circumstance, inadequate law library in SCDC which Prohibit Appellant from researching cases cited in the Judge Order of dismissal, he should be entitled to Counsel. See Attachment (A)(B)(C)

Federal Constitution does not mandate that state Provide avenues of appellate review of Criminal Convictions, but it is fundamental that, once established, these avenues must be kept free of unreasoned distinctions that can only impede open and equal access to Courts. Yohn v. Love, E. D. Pa. 1995, 887 F. Supp. 773, STAY denied, STAY granted, affirmed in Part, vacated in Part. 76 F.3d 508; North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (Holding A defendant's exercise of a right to Appeal must be free and unaffected. Id 395 at 724. In the Present Case Appellant will not have equal access to the Courts as Respondent because he cannot Present argument against case law the Judge used to dismiss his motion for New trial. See FN1 Likewise SCDC

will not fix or send these cases. Therefore, Due to the extraordinary Circumstances Appellant respectfully requesting this Court to Appoint Counsel under § 17-3-360(3) and § 17-3-370; Ex Parte Brown, 393 S.C. 214, 711 S.E.2d 899 (2011); S.C.D.S.S. v. Tharp, 312 S.C. 243, 246, 439 S.E.2d 854, 857 (1994).

FN After Appellant submitted the letter to General Counsel dated 12-7-2013, Appellant attempted to research the following cases cited in the Order of Dismissal and could not. Turnbull v. Commissioner of Social Security, 2009 WL 688911, reported, W. D. PA, 2009; Santini v. Town of Ellington, unreported, 2000 WL 1918015; West v. State, 725 So.2d 872 (Mass. 1958), Attachment C Page 21 Order of Dismissal

The Appellant should be appointed Counsel as those similar situated on Appeal from Rule 29(b) motion

Appellant assert that he should be appointed Counsel as those defendant's similar situated from a Rule 29(b) motion on Appeal. The Appellant Assert the Appellate Defense "Chief Attorney Robert Dudek" declined to accept representation of Appellant stating their office have a Policy of not representing indigent defendant's on Appeal from A Rule 29(b) motion. See Attachment (d) Appellant assert that this Policy is being Applied in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Due Process and Equal Protection Clause. In Robert H. Koon, Appellate Case No. 2011-200608, unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-216; (Appellate Defense represented Koon on Appeal from A Rule 29(b) motion); State v. Harris, 706 S.E.2d 526 (2011) (Appellate Defense represented Harris on Appeal from his Rule 29(b) motion); Mercer v. State, 672 S.E.2d 526 (2009) (Appellate Defense represented mercer on Appeal from A Rule 29(b) motion). Eventhough any of the Above cases give Proposition that Appellate Defense is to represent a indigent defendant on Appeal from a Rule 29(b) motion.

They still cannot apply their Policy of not representing indigent defendants on Appeal from a Rule 29(b) motion in a discriminatory manner. This violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See FN2 In any event if this Court refuse to Appoint Counsel Appellant's Fourteenth Amendment right to the United States Constitution will be violated. Therefore, Appellant ask this Court to Appoint Counsel under § 17-3-360 (3) and 17-3-370.

Finally Appellant ask this Court should it deny his motion for Appointment of Counsel, to hold briefing and any other motions in Abeyance until his 42 U.S.C. 1983 is adjudicated that Appellant will file if this Court deny this motion, on Denial of Equal Protection of the law, the failure of the Appellate Defense and this Court deliberate indifference to Appoint Counsel on Appellant's Rule 29(b) Appeal as those similar situated.

Conclusion

Appellant requesting counsel due to the extraordinary circumstances.

Antonio Gordon

1-23-2014

FN2 The Appellate Defense did not decline to represent Appellant because he wasn't indigent. The Purpose of the equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth is to secure every person within a states Jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S.Ct 1073 (2000)

State of South Carolina
In the Court of Appeals

Appeal from York County
General Sessions Court
John C. Hayes, III, Presiding Judge

Appellate Case No. 2013-000975

the State

Respondent

v.

Antonio Gordon

Appellant

Certificate of Service

The Appellant Antonio Gordon, Do hereby, Certifies and Penalty of Perjury, States I Place One Copy of motion for Appointment of Counsel, in the U.S. Postage mail, to opposing Counsel, Salley W. Elliott, Assistant Deputy Attorney General, office of the Attorney General, P.O. Box 11549, Columbia, SC 29211, this 23 day of January 2014. U.S.C. 1746

Antonio Gordon

1-23-2014

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JAN 27 2014
SC Court of Appeals

Request To Staff

12-27-2013

RE: Law Library Computer

Dear Cheron M. Hess:

I have been having complications with pulling up the following cases on the law Library computer. The air message states: Sorry cannot process.

U.S. V. Lambert, 603 F.2d 808 (10th Cir. 1979)

U.S. V. Forrest, 356 F.Supp. 343 (W.D. Mich. 1973)

Roseborough V. State, 311 Ga. App. 530, 716 S.E.2d 530 (2011)

State V. Turco, 108 S.W.3d 244 (Tenn. 2003)

I need to research these cases for my Criminal appeal that's in the Court of Appeals Case No.: 2013-000975.
Thanks.

RECEIVED

Antonia Gordon

DEC 31 2013

GENERAL COUNSEL

Attachment (A)

**SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
RESPONSE TO INMATE CORRESPONDENCE**

INMATE: Antonio Gordon
SCDC #: 259798
INSTITUTION: Evans CI
FROM: Christina Kellett
DATE: 1-2-14
RE: Correspondence dated 12-27-13

I am in receipt of your correspondence requesting cases. Please access these cases through the automated law library. If it is within SCDC's legal research holdings, you will be able to obtain through this system. If it is not within SCDC's legal research holdings, we are not required to provide to you.

S/



Christina Kellett
Administrative Assistant

Attachment (b)

15

Attachment C

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA) IN THE COURT OF GENERAL
) CERTIFIED TRUE COPY) SESSIONS
 COUNTY OF YORK) 2013 APR 22 AM 10:52) SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
)) 2008-GS46-2847, 2849, 2850,
)) 1998 2851, and 2852
)) *mc*
 State of South Carolina) DAVID HAMILTON)
) CLERK OF COURT)
) YORK COUNTY, SC)
))
 v.) **ORDER DENYING MOTION**
) **FOR A NEW TRIAL**
 Antonio Gordon,)
)
 Defendant)
 _____)

This matter comes before the Court by way of the Defendant's Motion for a New Trial Based on After-Discovered Evidence pursuant to Rule 29(b), SCRCrimP, filed November 21, 2012. An evidentiary hearing into the matter was convened on March 4, 2013, and March 8, 2013, at the Moss Justice Center in York County. The Defendant was present and represented by Jeremy Thompson, Esquire. The State was represented by Deputy Solicitor Willy Thompson.

At the hearing, counsel for both parties presented argument to the Court. The Court also had the opportunity to review the following records: The transcript of the pretrial hearings, the guilty pleas, and the sentencing of Antonio Gordon, Monta Gordon, and Terrance McCreary which occurred over a period of several days in July of 1999; all of the written sworn statements given by Antonio Gordon, Monta Gordon, Terrance McCreary, and Gary Moffatt to various members of the Rock Hill Police Department on July 23, 1998; the PCR transcript of the sworn testimony of Antonio Gordon from a hearing held on July 29, 2003; the PCR transcript of the sworn testimony of Monta Gordon from a hearing held on September 4, 2003; the written plea agreement entered into by Monta Gordon on July 16, 1999; the sworn written statement of Monta Gordon dated August 6, 2012, and provided by Antonio Gordon; the PCR transcript of the sworn testimony of Terrance McCreary from a hearing held on December 16, 2002; the

Jeff

sworn written statement of Terrance McCreary dated July 13, 2012, and provided by Antonio Gordon; the PCR transcript of the sworn testimony of Daniel D'Agostino from a PCR hearing held on December 1, 2009; the Maxton Order dismissing Antonio Gordon's most recent PCR application signed by the Honorable Lee S. Alford and dated January 4, 2010; and other documents that will not be addressed in this order.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Defendant is currently incarcerated in the South Carolina Department of Corrections. He was indicted in October of 1998 by the York County Grand Jury for Murder (1998-GS46-02847), three counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Violent Crime (1998-GS46-02847a; 1998-GS46-01949a; 1998GS46-1950a), two counts of Attempted Armed Robbery (1998-GS46-02849; 1998-GS46-02850), Criminal Conspiracy (1998-GS46-02851), and Possession of a Pistol by a Person Under Twenty-One (1998-GS46-02852). Daniel D'Agostino, Esquire, represented the Applicant.

A hearing on the Defendant's motion to suppress was held on July 12, 14, and 16, 1999. On July 16, 1999, following the suppression hearing, the Defendant pled guilty as indicted. On July 19, 1999, the Honorable John C. Hayes, III, sentenced the Defendant to confinement for thirty (30) years for Murder; five (5) years for Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Violent Crime; five (5) years for Criminal Conspiracy; five (5) years for Possession of a Pistol by a Person under Twenty-One, all to run concurrently; and ten (10) years for each count of Attempted Armed Robbery, one running concurrent and one running consecutive to the thirty (30) year sentence for Murder. This was a negotiated guilty plea to a cumulative forty (40) years confinement.

The Defendant filed a timely notice of Appeal and an Anders brief was submitted on his behalf pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Of note, the Defendant filed a *pro se* brief in which he raised the issue of probable cause to arrest based on an “informant’s” statement to law enforcement allegedly given without being advised of her rights. The “Informant” to whom the Defendant was referring was Chyneca Dixon, his girlfriend at the time he committed the murder. The Defendant also contended that both he and the informant were under age and should not have been questioned by law enforcement outside the presence of a parent or attorney. As a result, he argued, the informant’s statement was inadmissible because it was obtained illegally and could not have established probable cause for his arrest. The South Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed the Applicant’s appeal. State v. Gordon, 2000-UP-747 (S.C. Ct. App. Filed December 6, 2000). The remittitur was issued on January 9, 2001.

The Defendant subsequently filed a PCR application originally dated June 20, 2001, and amended on May 8, 2003 (2000-CP46-1414). An evidentiary hearing was held on July 29, 2003. Tara D. Shurling, Esquire, represented the Defendant, who was present at the hearing. Jeanette C. Vanginhoven of the South Carolina Attorney General’s Office represented the State. The Defendant alleged his guilty plea was involuntary and that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to discuss with him evidence of a palm print found on the victim’s car door. The Defendant specifically contended that defense counsel failed to investigate or discuss with him “the fact that the palm print on the victim’s car door was unidentified until the time of pre-trial,” and that the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) never tested the palm print. On August 20, 2003, the Honorable J. Ernest Kinard issued an Order denying and dismissing the application. The Defendant subsequently made a “Motion for Rehearing /Motion for

Reconsideration of the Facts” on December 9, 2003. The Honorable J. Ernest Kinard dismissed the Defendant’s motion by written Order filed December 15, 2003.

The Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari appealing the Order dismissing his first PCR action. On July 21, 2005, the South Carolina Supreme Court issued an Order denying the petition. The remittitur was issued on August 9, 2005.

On July 6, 2004, while his appeal from the denial of his first PCR action was still pending, the Defendant filed a second PCR application (2004-GS46-1700). The Defendant raised issues previously raised in his first PCR action, including allegations that his guilty plea was involuntary and that defense counsel was ineffective. On December 30, 2004, the Honorable Lee S. Alford issued a conditional Order of Dismissal in which he expressed the intent to summarily dismiss the application because the Defendant failed to comply with the filing procedures of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act as set forth in S.C. Code Ann. §17-27-45(A) and §17-27-90, and because the application was in improper successive action, but granted the Defendant twenty (20) days to show why the order should not become final. The Defendant did not respond to the conditional order of dismissal. Thereafter, by Order dated May 20, 2005, the Honorable Lee S. Alford denied and dismissed the Defendant’s second PCR action.

The Defendant then filed a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus on December 22, 2005 (2:05-3327-MBS-RSC) and an amendment to his federal habeas corpus action on April 14, 2006. On October 16, 2006, Federal Magistrate Judge Robert S. Carr entered his Report and Recommendation that habeas relief should be denied. On October 30, 2006, the Defendant filed an “Objection to Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge.” The Defendant raised the probable cause issue regarding his arrest. Specifically, the Defendant contended that his warrantless arrest was unlawful because law enforcement only found probable cause to arrest

him based on statements given to them “by a minor whose [sic] parents were not present during questioning.” In essence, he asserted that law enforcement’s reliance on Chyneca Dixon’s statement to establish probable cause led to an unlawful arrest that violated his Fourth Amendment rights. He also claimed that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him that by pleading guilty he waived his right to challenge the lawfulness of his arrest or the statements he made to law enforcement after he was arrested. On February 16, 2007, the Honorable Margaret B. Seymour entered an Order dismissing the Defendant’s petition without prejudice to permit him to exhaust all State remedies.

Subsequently, the Defendant filed a state petition for writ of habeas corpus on January 3, 2006 (2006-CP46-0010). He then filed an amendment to the state habeas corpus action on January 23, 2007, to which he attached Chyneca Dixon’s two statements given to law enforcement on July 23, 1998. The Defendant alleged that law enforcement did not have probable cause to arrest him because the police relied on Chyneca Dixon’s statement to law enforcement that she gave as a result of being threatened outside the presence of her parents. The Defendant asserted that the police should not have questioned Chyneca Dixon (“the minor”) outside the presence of her attorney or parents, and that because she was the “probable cause provider,” both of their statements to law enforcement, as well as the Defendant’s arrest, were all unlawful. The Honorable John C. Hayes, III, denied and dismissed the Defendant’s state habeas corpus petition with prejudice by written order dated April 30, 2007, and filed on June 1, 2007.

The Defendant then filed a Rule 60(b) motion in which he alleged a conflict of interest with the Honorable John C. Hayes, III, who was original sentencing judge at the Defendant’s guilty plea. The Defendant also claimed that the order dismissing his state habeas corpus action did not advise him of right to appeal the order. On January 31, 2008, the Honorable Roger L.

Couch granted the Defendant's Rule 60(b) motion to reconsider, amend, and clarify, and issued a written order finding that the Defendant was without prejudice to bring a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the original jurisdiction of the South Carolina Supreme Court.

On January 9, 2009, the Defendant filed his third PCR application. He amended the application on May 19, 2009. The Defendant attached two written statements given by Chyneca Dixon (hereinafter "Chyneca") and her mother, Geraldine Dixon (hereinafter "Ms. Dixon"), on January 20, 2008. The statements were given to an investigator who interviewed them on behalf of the Defendant. The Applicant alleged that he was being held in custody unlawfully for the following reasons:

1. Newly Discovered Evidence;
2. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel;
3. Prosecutorial Misconduct;
4. Brady Violation;
5. Involuntary Guilty Plea;
6. Defense counsel failed to challenge Defendant's statements on the ground that there was no probable cause for the arrest and that Defendant's "statement's was [sic] the fruit of the poisonous tree" with regard to the illegal arrest; and
7. Personal Jurisdiction

The State made its return and motion to dismiss on July 27, 2009, asserting that the application must be summarily dismissed as an improper successive action and as having been filed after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. The Honorable John C. Hayes, III, issued a conditional order of dismissal on August 24, 2009, in which Judge Hayes expressed the intent to summarily dismiss the application because the Defendant failed to comply with the filing procedures of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act as set forth in S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-

45(A) and § 17-27-90, and because the application was an improper successive action, but granted the Defendant twenty (20) days to show why the order should not become final. The State also filed a motion to restrict future filings on November 19, 2009, pursuant to In re Theron Maxton, 325S.C. 3, 478 S.E.2d 679 (1996). The Defendant did not file a response to the conditional order of dismissal. A hearing into the State's motion for summary dismissal was convened on December 1, 2009. At the hearing, the State proceeded on a motion to dismiss all of the Defendant's claims as procedurally barred by the statute of limitations and successiveness. The State also argued that the two written statements included with the application were not newly discovered evidence, and that any alleged newly discovered evidence was nonetheless barred by the statute of limitations. The State also made a verbal motion to restrict the Defendant from filing another PCR application in the future under In re Theron Maxton, 325 S.C. 3, 478 S.E.2d 679 (1996).

At the hearing, the Defendant, through counsel, acknowledged that he filed a lengthy application in this case, and that he was only proceeding at the hearing with the newly discovered evidence claim and with an issue regarding the palm print found on the victim's car. Specifically, the Defendant asserted that he discovered new evidence that law enforcement coerced and threatened Chyneca into giving her initial statements, outside the presence of her mother, and that those statements implicated him in the crimes. He contended that because Chyneca's statements were threatened and coerced, they could not have established probable cause to arrest him. Therefore, the Defendant asserted, his arrest was unlawful and any incriminating statements he gave to law enforcement subsequent to his arrest were the "fruit of the poisonous tree."

The Defendant also raised an issue regarding the palm print obtained from the victim's car. He claimed that he has attempted to obtain certain documents from SLED regarding the palm print that allegedly show he was "not necessarily" the shooter, but that he has been unable to obtain those documents partly as a result of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel during his first PCR action. The Defendant also maintained that defense counsel was ineffective because he never had the palm print tested by his own expert. The Defendant also claimed that he attempted to raise this issue during his first PCR hearing, but he was "coerced into waiting the issue" at his first PCR hearing by PCR counsel.

After the December 1, 2009, hearing, the Honorable Lee S. Alford made the following findings:

1. Geraldine Dixon's testimony was not credible.
2. The evidence presented by Antonio Gordon was not newly discovered.
3. Chyneca Dixon's testimony was false and she was available to testify at trial.
4. Antonio Gordon's allegations regarding the palm print are not material or relevant.
5. The testimony of Antonio Gordon's defense counsel, Daniel D'Agostino, was credible, and any coercion or intimidation that may have accompanied Chyneca Dixon's statements to law enforcement was not a significant factor in Antonio Gordon's decision to plead guilty.

On January 4, 2010, the Honorable Lee S. Alford issued an order dismissing Antonio Gordon's application for post-conviction relief with prejudice. The Court further ordered that Antonio Gordon "is prohibited from filing any future application for post-conviction that raises the same grounds raised in this action, any grounds raised in a prior action, or any allegations the Applicant could have raised."

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This Court has also had the opportunity to hear the testimony of Antonio Gordon, Monta Gordon, and Terrance McCreary, as well as, the arguments of counsel presented at the hearings on March 4, 2013, and March 8, 2013.

First, Antonio Gordon proffered the testimony of Monta Gordon. Monta Gordon is the brother of Antonio Gordon. Monta Gordon testified that on August 6, 2012, someone visited him in the South Carolina Department of Corrections and took a sworn statement from him.

Monta Gordon's statement reads as follows:

I, Monta Gordon, having been duly sworn, depose and say that my brother Antonio "Tonio" Gordon and two others was together in July of 1998. I am the person who fired the shot that killed the man who died. I was the only person with a gun. My brother Tonio did not have a gun nor did he fire any gun that night. I alone am the only one who killed the victim. I told the police Tonio fired the shot because he was a juvenile and I was an adult. I was on probation. As a juvenile I figured Tonio would get a lesser sentence. I never discussed robbing or killing anybody with Tonio. I was the only person with a gun that night and I fired the only shot that night.

During his testimony Monta Gordon admitted that this August 6, 2012, statement was the first statement that he gave admitting to being the "shooter". He went on to testify that he would have given this statement back in 1999 if someone had asked him. However, Monta Gordon's prior sworn statements and testimony tell a completely different story.

Monta Gordon was arrested a few hours after the Murder of Erik Krenn and gave a sworn statement to the Rock Hill Police that same morning. In his statement dated July 23, 1998, Monta Gordon admitted he rode around in Antonio Gordon's car with Antonio Gordon, Terrence McCreary, and Gary Moffatt during the time leading up to the murder. Terrence McCreary was driving and they were all with McCreary when McCreary stopped to pick up his pistol. They then went to McCreary's grandmother's house to pick up more bullets for the pistol. According to Monta Gordon, McCreary thought the victims were in a stolen car and McCreary "was going

to steal the car from them.” Monta Gordon’s statement goes on to say that just after the victims pulled their car into a driveway, McCreary pulled up past the victims then backed up blocking the victim’s car. Monta Gordon specifically told the police that McCreary gave the pistol to Antonio Gordon and told Antonio “that they were going to rob them.” Monta’s statement then states that McCreary and Antonio got out of their car, went over to the victim’s car and tried to get the victim out of his car. Then Monta’s statement details that when the victim tried to drive off, “my brother Antonio shot the driver one time.”

During Monta Gordon’s guilty plea to Murder, Attempted Armed Robbery (2 counts), and Conspiracy on July 16, 1999, Monta Gordon agreed with the facts as stated on the record by the solicitor which specifically included the fact that Antonio Gordon shot and killed Erik Krenn (Plea Transcript beginning at page 189, L 18, and ending on page 192, L 8). It should also be noted that these facts are the same facts to which Monta Gordon agreed to testify had any of his codefendants gone to trial (Written Plea Agreement dated July 16, 1999, and Plea Transcript page 179, LL 12-19).

At sentencing on July 19, 1999, when the Court gave Monta Gordon the opportunity to address the Court, Monta Gordon said,

I’m sorry for the Krenn family for this accident that happened. We knowed that it was a big mistake in our life because as teenagers we had a lot to live for, but now since the indictment we have nothing to live for but to serve the time for the crime that we did. I want to say I’m sorry for my family for letting them go through the situation I’m in and all that. Hopefully Mr. Krenn will forgive us one day for the sin we did. (Plea Transcript page 202, LL 7-18)

Monta Gordon’s apology in his own words at sentencing certainly re-enforces his original statement and the original statements of his codefendant that they acted together in committing this horrible crime.

On September 4, 2003, Monta Gordon gave sworn testimony at his PCR hearing. When testifying about the statement he gave the police on the day of the murder, Monta Gordon confirmed that McCreary told Antonio Gordon to "just get" the victim's car and that Antonio Gordon got the pistol from McCreary and "jumped out" of Antonio's car. Monta also confirmed again that Antonio Gordon was the shooter (PCR Transcript page 39, L 6 to page 40, L 23). Monta Gordon's testimony at his PCR only differed when he claimed, "By the time I jumped out of the car to go stop him [Antonio], like I say, I was already, you know, on twenty years suspended on three years probation, so I wasn't looking for any trouble. When I jumped out, I jumped out to stop my brother, but it was too late." (PCR Transcript page 39, LL 6-18). (It should be noted that during the March hearing for Antonio Gordon, Monta Gordon admitted that he was only facing three year on a probation violation not twenty years as he had testified.) Monta Gordon bemoans to the PCR Court that, "I'm locked up for something I know I didn't do." (PCR Transcript page 50, LL19-20). Monta Gordon goes on to testify that Antonio has said "from day one that I [Monta] didn't have nothing to do with it, that I [Monta] was trying to stop him [Antonio]." (PCR Transcript page 51, LL 4-8).

Monta Gordon now claims that the reason he blamed Antonio was because Antonio was a juvenile and he thought Antonio would get a lesser sentence. I find this new claim to be completely without merit. Monta Gordon has an extensive juvenile record as noted in his plea transcript (Plea Transcript page 197, LL 10-24) and is intimately familiar with the juvenile court system. It was immediately obvious that none of the defendants in this case were treated as juveniles. Certainly, when the State sought to try all of the defendants together in 1999, there could be no mistake that no one was treated as a juvenile. Yet, Monta Gordon continued point to Antonio Gordon as the shooter at his plea, in his plea agreement and in his September 4, 2003,

PCR testimony after Antonio Gordon had been sentenced to 40 years. It is the opinion of this Court that Monta Gordon's new "exonerating" testimony is a complete fabrication.

Second, Antonio Gordon proffered the testimony of Terrance McCreary. Terrance McCreary is a cousin of Antonio Gordon. Terrance McCreary testified that on July 13, 2012, someone visited him in the South Carolina Department of Corrections and took a sworn statement from him. In this statement Terrance McCreary claims,

I am not represented by counsel at this time. I am doing time in SCDC for a Murder that occurred in July 1998 in York County. At the time of the Murder I was driving Antonio Gordon's car. When we first encountered the victims, Monte + Antonio got out of the car. Monte had a gun, Antonio did not. The incident occurred behind me so I did not see what happened. I heard one or two shots. Monte + Antonio returned to the car. Monte still had the pistol. They got in the car. While in the York County Jail Monte + I discussed blaming Antonio for the shooting since he was a juvenile. At no time that night did I see Antonio with a gun. Antonio has never told me he did the shooting.

This July 13, 2012, statement is the first time Terrance McCreary insinuated Antonio Gordon might not be the shooter and the first time that he claimed Monta Gordon possessed the pistol during the robbery and murder. It should be noted that Terrance McCreary states the shooting occurred behind him and he did not see what happened. Terrance McCreary's prior sworn statements and testimony completely contradict this 2012 statement.

Like all of his co-defendants, Terrence McCreary gave a written sworn statement to a Rock Hill Police Detective on the day of the murder (July 23, 1998). In this sworn statement immediately after the crime, Terrance McCreary states, "I then said man if I had the gun I would rob them guys." He says Antonio Gordon and Gary Moffatt got out of the car and Antonio went over to the driver's side of the victim's car. According to McCreary, Antonio asked the victims if they had marijuana and money and whether their car was stolen. McCreary then says, "Monta and I was telling them [Antonio and Gary] to come on and lets go, then we heard the gun fire. Antonio and Gary then ran and got back in the car. We began asking Antonio why did he do

that, and he was pointing the gun at all of us.” McCreary also talks about how he picked up the gun shortly before the crime—a fact that is confirmed in the original statements given to the Rock Hill Police Department by each of the four defendants in this case. However, when McCreary testified in Antonio Gordon’s March 2013, hearing, McCreary denied ever touching the gun.

Terrance McCreary plead guilty on July 16, 1999, to Accessory before the fact to Murder and Accessory after the fact to Murder. In addition to waiving all of his rights and pleading guilty under oath, McCreary agreed to the facts of the case as stated by the solicitor. McCreary agreed that he obtained the gun and ammunition, that he gave the gun to Antonio Gordon, that he suggested they rob the victims, and that Antonio Gordon shot Erik Krenn (Plea Transcript page 171, L 13 to page 173, L 1). In addition, the record reflects that Terrance McCreary, as part of a plea agreement, agreed to testify against his co-defendants to facts as stated at the time of his guilty plea (Plea Transcript page 163, LL 5-19 and page 168, LL 10-19).

On December 16, 2002, Terrance McCreary gave sworn testimony at his own PCR hearing. During his PCR hearing Terrance McCreary testified under oath that he did not understand what was happening at his guilty plea and he actually never plead guilty (PCR Transcript page 11, L 5 to page 15, L 17, and page 19, LL 10-15, and page 26, L 9 to page 27, L 6). Nowhere in the PCR transcript did McCreary mention anything about Monta Gordon being the shooter in this case. The Plea transcript and Court paperwork make it clear that Terrance McCreary freely, voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered guilty pleas in this case and agreed to the facts stated on the record. It is an obvious fabrication for Terrance McCreary to deny entering a guilty plea and attempt to change the facts of this case.

Like Monta Gordon, Terrance McCreary also makes a new claim that he blamed Antonio for the shooting because Antonio was a juvenile. During his testimony in Antonio Gordon's March 8, 2013, hearing, Terrence McCreary claimed that about six months after his arrest, he spoke with Monta Gordon in the York County Detention Center and they decided to blame Antonio for the shooting because Antonio was a juvenile. However, both Monta Gordon and Terrace McCreary gave sworn statements long before this on the day of the murder implicating Antonio as the shooter. In addition, Terrance McCreary has an extensive juvenile record as noted in his plea transcript (Plea Transcript page 197, L 25 to Page 198, L 9). Like Monta Gordon, McCreary is intimately familiar with the juvenile court system. It was immediately obvious that none of the defendants were treated as a juvenile. Certainly, six months after arrest when this "blame it on the juvenile" discussion allegedly took place, neither McCreary nor Monta Gordon could have been of the opinion that Antonio would be prosecuted as a juvenile. Then, almost a year after the crime, when the State was trying the defendants together at same time in General Sessions Court, there is no way anyone could have thought that Antonio would be tried as a juvenile. Instead of telling this "new" story at that time, McCreary plead guilty confirming his original statement to the police and agreeing to testify against Antonio Gordon. This Court finds that Terrance McCreary's attempt to bolster his "new" testimony with this "juvenile" claim is also a complete fabrication.

Finally, Antonio Gordon proffered his own testimony during the March 8, 2013, motion for a new trial based on after discovered evidence. Antonio Gordon claimed for the first time that he was not the shooter. Instead he claimed his brother, Monta Gordon, was the shooter. In fact, Antonio Gordon claimed he tried to stop his brother from robbing and shooting the victims and that he had no idea Monta was going to try and rob or shoot anyone. Just like the "new"

John H. H. H.

testimony of Monta Gordon and Terrance McCreary, Antonio's "new" testimony is completely contradicted by his prior sworn statements and testimony.

Antonio Gordon gave two written sworn statements to the Rock Hill Police on the day of the Murder (July 23, 1998). The first statement was given that morning and the second was given that afternoon at the same time Terrance McCreary was giving his statement to a different Rock Hill Detective. In his first statement, Antonio claimed that during the robbery he went over to the victim's car with Monta and Terrance and that Terrance shot the victim. Later that same day Detective John Thickens of the Rock Hill Police Department spoke with Antonio Gordon and took Antonio's second statement. Detective Thickens told Antonio that there were some discrepancies in Antonio's first statement compared to the information the police had collected. Then, without telling Antonio what those discrepancies were, Detective Thickens asked Antonio if he wanted someone else to go to jail for what Antonio had done (Plea/pretrial hearing Transcript page 50, L 22 to page 51, L 3, John Thickens Direct Testimony). Antonio responded by telling Detective Thickens that he did not want anyone else to be penalized for something he did and Antonio agreed to give a second statement (Plea/pretrial hearing Transcript page 51, LL 5-11).

In his second written sworn statement, Antonio Gordon admitted that he was the shooter. He said that McCreary gave him the gun and told him "to get the BMW [victim's car]." He also described that Terrance McCreary was driving and pulled Antonio's car up into a position that blocked the victim's car in the driveway. Then Antonio says, "I went up to the drivers window and I told them I wanted their money. They say they din't [sic] have no money. I was holding the gun pointed at them sideways like. I told them to get out the car because my boy want [sic] the car. Monte was standing next to me and Gary got out and went around the other side of the

car. They wouldn't get out the car and started backing up. I had the gun pointed at them and then it went off." These pertinent facts match very closely with the facts Terrance McCreary gave in his original statement to a different detective at the same time that Antonio gave his statement.

On July 16, 1999, Antonio Gordon entered a guilty plea to Murder, Attempted Armed Robbery (2 counts), Conspiracy, Possession of a Pistol by a person under 21 years of age and Possession of a Firearm during the commission of a violent crime (3 counts) and received a negotiated sentence of 40 years. Antonio Gordon listened to the Court go over each indictment one by one and plead guilty to each indictment. Antonio Gordon then listened as the State relayed the facts to the Court, and Antonio Gordon agreed to the facts presented. Antonio Gordon agreed that he had discussed robbing the victim and stealing the victim's car with Terrance McCreary, that he used the pistol during the robbery attempt, that he and Monta went to the victim's car window and attempted to steal the car, that Antonio's palm print was lifted off the driver's door of the victim's car, that he fired the deadly shot, and that he admitted to his girlfriend, Chyenca Dixon, that he was the shooter (Plea Transcript page 187, L15 to page 189, L 5). Antonio Gordon also has a lengthy criminal record including a number of impeachable offenses (Plea Transcript page 192, LL 7-21). Like his co-defendants, Antonio Gordon was very familiar with the juvenile court system. Antonio Gordon undoubtedly knew immediately that he was not being treated as a juvenile.

At sentencing on July 19, 1999, when the Court gave Antonio Gordon the opportunity to address the Court, Antonio Gordon said, "I'm sorry for my actions that I, took place and the crime. I'm sorry for his family. And all the people that I done hurt during this situation." (Plea Transcript page 202, LL 1-6). At no time during the pretrial hearings or the plea hearing did

Antonio Gordon say anything denying he was the shooter or claiming that Monta Gordon was the shooter. However, Antonio Gordon's trial counsel, Daniel D'Agostino, testified on December 1, 2009, in one of Antonio Gordon's many PCR hearings saying, "Antonio, I couldn't put him on the stand. He confessed to me what happened. His whole—you know, he told me he did it. There was no way to put him on the stand." (PCR Transcript page 75, LL 9-11). As he continued to testify about Antonio, Mr. D'Agostino went on to say, "His testimony, if he would have testified, was he was high on marijuana and he shot the boy. Now, I don't know what I could have done at trial with that." (PCR Transcript page 76, L 25 to page 77, L 4). Not only did Antonio Gordon confess to the police that he was the shooter and admit at his guilty plea that he was the shooter, he confided in his attorney that he was the shooter.

The lengthy procedural history of this case details seemingly endless attempts by Antonio Gordon to overturn his guilty plea over the course of more than 13 years. This Court is obligated to point out that despite the many hearings and motions various courts have entertained on Antonio Gordon's behalf, this is the first time that Antonio Gordon has claimed he was not the shooter and that Monta Gordon was the shooter. In fact the same can be said regarding the "new" testimony of Monta Gordon and Terrance McCreary. Neither Monta nor Terrance made these claims before in any of their own PCR or appeal proceedings. It is a clear fact that Antonio Gordon knew whether he was the shooter the moment this crime occurred. It is inconceivable that Antonio Gordon would wait until now, over 14 years since the crime, to make this claim if he was truly not the shooter. This Court finds Antonio Gordon's new claims to be completely fabricated and unsupported by any reliable evidence.

Gary Moffatt is the fourth co-defendant in this case. He is the only co-defendant who is not a relative of Antonio Gordon. Gary Moffatt also gave a sworn written statement to the Rock

Hill Police on the day of the murder. In his sworn statement Gary Moffatt said that Terrance McCreary got the pistol, that McCreary and Antonio talked about robbing the victims, that McCreary gave the pistol to Antonio Gordon just before Antonio got out of the car to rob the victims, that Monta followed Antonio out of the car, that Antonio demanded money from the victims, and that Antonio shot the driver. Gary Moffatt entered into a plea agreement with the State and agreed to testify against the other defendants. During Antonio Gordon's March 2013 hearing, Antonio Gordon testified that Gary Moffatt would not change his statement and testify for Antonio. Each of the four defendants involved in this case have remained constant since 1998 in pointing out Antonio Gordon as the shooter until this current Motion by Antonio Gordon for a New Trial Based on After-Discovered Evidence.

Antonio Gordon, Monta Gordon, and Terrance McCreary have each pursued their respective appeals and PCR applications. Only now, when all other avenues have failed, do these three co-defendants and relatives make this fantastic new claim which contradicts all of their previous claims. It is obvious to this Court that these new claims are complete fabrications capping off a string of attempts to escape responsibility for the horrible actions of each of these defendants on July 23, 1998.

A Motion for a New Trial cannot be used to challenge the validity of a plea of guilty. 58 Am. Jur. 2d. New Trial § 18; U.S. v. Lambert, 603 F.2d 808 (10th Cir. 1979); U.S. v. Forrest, 356 F. Sup. 343 (W.D. Mich. 1973); Roseborough v. State, 311 Ga. App. 530, 716 S.E.2d. 530 (2011); State v. Turco, 108 S.W. 3d 244 (Tenn. 2003) at Footnote 2.

The South Carolina Supreme Court did not reach the issue of plea vs. trial in State v. DeAngelis, 256 S.C. 364, 182 S.E.2d 732 (S.Ct. 1971). In DeAngelis, the lower court was

affirmed based on its denial of DeAngelis' Motion for a New Trial on the insufficiency of DeAngelis' affidavits in support of his Motion for a New Trial.¹

In Jamison v. State, Opinion 2012-UP-437 (Ct. App. 2012), the Court of Appeals strings out five cases in support of the Post-Conviction Relief trial judge's granting of post-conviction relief based on after-discovered evidence from a guilty plea. The Court's ruling does not confront and thus does not directly rule on the right of a defendant to seek a new trial from a guilty plea. In Jamison, the only issue raised on appeal was the State's argument that Jamison's post-conviction relief petition was successive. I find Jamison does not stand for the proposition that a defendant can seek a new trial of a guilty plea.

In Jamison, at the end of the string of cases, the Court cites this language from DeAngelis, "there are cases that motions of this character should be entertained and granted in order that wrongs done may be remedied." This statement follows this statement, "the courts do not look with favor upon applications for new trials on the ground of after-discovered evidence." The "character," the former quote addresses, is not a motion for a new trial from a guilty plea as in Antonio Gordon's case; rather, it is a motion for a new trial based on after-discovered evidence, where the defendant made a timely general sessions motion to withdraw his plea prior to his sentencing. This is not the case for Mr. Gordon, and he should not be awarded a new trial.

Even if a Motion for a New Trial based on after-discovered evidence was available to Antonio Gordon, he would still not be entitled to relief based on the merits of the motion.

Of note from DeAngelis is this language:

It is the fixed rule that the credibility of newly-discovered evidence offered in support of a motion for a new trial is a matter for determination by the circuit judge to whom it is offered. In him; not this court, resides the power to weigh such evidence; and, his

¹ The Supreme Court notes the trial judge granted his denial on the voluntariness of the plea at the top of 256 S.C. 369. However, a reading of the case reveals the Court focused solely on the denial based on the lack of affidavits.

judgment thereabout will not be disturbed except for error of law or abuse of discretion. (*citing State v. Parker*, 249 S.C. 139, 153 S.E.2d 183 (S.Ct. 1967), a trial case).

I find the issue of credibility lies with this Court and I find that neither Antonio Gordon, Monta Gordon, nor Terrance McCreary are worthy of belief.

I find Monta Gordon's testimony that he, not Antonio Gordon, was the shooter in the case at issue to be totally lacking in credibility. This is true not only because he is, in my opinion, innately not credible, but based on the evidence previously presented by all of the participants in this case through statements to law enforcement, testimony under oath, and colloquy with trial judges.

As to Terrance McCreary, even if he were worthy of belief, which he is not, his testimony would only be that Monta get out of and after he, Mr. McCreary, heard a shot, got back into the car holding a gun at both times.

Likewise, I find Antonio Gordon's testimony at the hearing on his motion to totally lack credibility. This is based on the observations below. Additionally, as the moving party, his testimony is self-serving and completely inconsistent with his own previous statements, testimony, and plea, as well as the previous statements, testimony, and pleas of Monta Gordon and Terrance McCreary.

Also, weighing against the believability of Antonio, Monta, and Terrance's testimony is the under oath testimony by Antonio Gordon's trial counsel, Dan D'Agostino, that Antonio Gordon confessed that "he did it." (PCR Trial Transcript page 75, LL 5-11). This not only reflects negatively on Monta and Terrance's credibility, along with reflecting negatively on Antonio Gordon's, it bolsters Antonio Gordon's plea of guilty and his confessions to law enforcement and the trial judge.

J. 7/14/20

The Court must address language from State v. Mercer, 381 S.C. 149, 672 S.E.2d 556 (S.Ct. 2009), which the undersigned finds confusing and hard to work into its analysis. In Mercer, the court examined whether or not the trial judge had abused his discretion on ruling on a motion for a new trial based on after-discovered evidence. After affirming that the credibility determination lies with the trial judge, the Court states "... we are sensitive to the notion that a mere finding of a witness's lack of credibility does not complete the analysis, because a witness may lack persuasive credibility and still create reasonable doubt."² Credibility is "the quality that makes something (as a witness or some evidence) worthy of belief." Black's Law Dictionary, 7th Ed., p. 374. "Persuade" means "to induce to undertake a course of action or embrace a point of view by means of argument, reasoning on entreaty." The American Heritage College dictionary, 4th Ed., p. 1039.

The statement above seems to imply that there are degrees of credibility and that the Court must look at not only whether or not a witness is worthy of belief, but whether a witness is artful enough to lie effectively to the point of creating reasonable doubt. As shown below, that is not the case.

A Westlaw search finds nine cases using the term "persuasive credibility" in addition to Mercer. Turnbull v. Commissioner of Social Security, 2009 WL 688911, reported, W.D. Pa. 2009; Kershner v. Massanari, 16 Fed. App. 606 (Cal 2001); Santini v. Town of Ellington, unreported, 2000 WL 1918015; West v. State, 725 So. 2d 872 (Mass. 1958); Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F3d 980; People v. Manning, 156 A.D.2d 220 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept. 1989); U.S. v. Johnson, 713 F.2d 755 (C.A. Ga. 1983); U.S. v. Stein, 437 F.2d 755 (C.A. Ind. 1971). None of these cases defined the term, but rather, as noted below, seem to use the term for comparison.

² Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 108 S. Ct. 2320, 101 L.Ed 2d 155 (1988) cited in the paragraph with the "persuasive credibility" statement deals with a jury instruction on "residual doubt" and not on the issue of credibility.

The above cases seem to establish that "persuasive credibility" is a weighing of credibility between witnesses, i.e. not whether or not one witness or others are credible but which of the credible witnesses is more credible. The weighing of credibility is an essential component of jury deliberation. However, here it is for the Court, sitting without a jury, to determine whether a witness is credible or lacks credibility. In the instant case the Court, at least as to the issues material to consideration of Antonio Gordon's motion, must first determine whether a witness has any credibility on the material issues. Here, the Court finds none of the three witnesses who testified before the Court in the hearing of Antonio Gordon's Motion for a New Trial based on after-discovered evidence have any credibility as to their testimony that Monta Gordon, not Antonio Gordon, fired the fatal shot in this case.

Antonio Gordon's claim is that, even though he has, since the day of the shooting, known he was not the shooter, the newly-surfaced exonerating testimony of Monta Gordon and Terrance McCreary is "newly discovered" evidence. That the two accomplices now have changed their versions of the events of the night of the killing is new. Though new, it is not new evidence. The new versions are dramatically opposed to all of the previous evidence presented by Antonio Gordon, Monta Gordon and Terrance McCreary. The Court has already established that it does not find Monta Gordon and Terrance McCreary credible and so affirmatively finds their recantations and current testimony to be fabrications. The exonerating testimonies of Monta Gordon and Terrance McCreary were not evidence available to Antonio Gordon at the time he entered his plea. However, Antonio Gordon knew the truth at the time of his plea, affirmed the truth to his attorney, affirmed the truth to law enforcement and affirmed the truth to the plea judge. That, for whatever reasons, Monta Gordon and Terrance McCreary are changing their

prior, numerous admissions, the change does not create evidence which did not exist at the time Antonio Gordon entered his plea of guilt.

Here, there is no after-discovered "evidence" of any nature. What is now on the table is two accomplices fabricating testimony in an effort to allow Antonio Gordon to attempt to flip 180 degrees from his own version of the events of the night of the shooting in hopes that he can be tried not as the shooter, but solely as an accomplice³ or as an innocent bystander.

CONCLUSION


Based on the foregoing, this Court finds and concludes that Antonio Gordon's Motion for a New Trial Based on After-Discovered Evidence is hereby denied and dismissed because a Motion for a New Trial cannot be used to challenge the validity of a guilty plea. Furthermore, had a Motion for a New Trial been available to Antonio Gordon, this Court still finds and concludes the motion is without merit and must be denied and dismissed. This Court finds the new testimony of Antonio Gordon, Monta Gordon and Terrance McCreary to be fabricated and further finds each of these individuals to be wholly without credibility. In addition, the Court finds that the testimony and evidence presented by the defendant in support of his motion are not after-discovered evidence.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. That the Defendant's motion for a New Trial Based on After-Discovered Evidence must be denied and dismissed; and
2. That the Defendant must be remanded to the custody of the State to serve his sentence.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED this ^{22nd} ~~27th~~ day of April, 2013.

³ The Court need not, based on its ruling herein, further comment on accomplice liability and its possible application to the facts which are undisputed.


THE HONORABLE JOHN C. HAYES, III
Chief Administrative Judge
Sixteenth Judicial Circuit

H 24

York, South Carolina

COPY

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In the Court of Appeals

APPEAL FROM YORK COUNTY
Court of General Sessions

John C. Hayes, III, Circuit Court Judge

Appellate Court Case No. 2013-000975
Circuit Court Case No. 1998-GS-46-2847; 2849; 2850; 2851; 2852

Attachment (d)

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

RESPONDENT,

v.

ANTONIO GORDON,

APPELLANT.

MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL

JEREMY A. THOMPSON
Attorney and Counselor at Law

Law Office of Jeremy A. Thompson, LLC
P.O. Box 12891
Columbia, SC 29211
(803) 779-2555
(803) 779-2556 FAX

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

NOW COMES undersigned counsel in the above-captioned action, respectfully moving this Honorable Court to relieve him as counsel for the Appellant in this appeal. In support of this motion, undersigned counsel would show unto this Honorable Court the following:

This appeal arises out of the denial of a Rule 29(b), SCRCrimP, motion. Undersigned counsel was retained to represent the Appellant in the circuit court, but undersigned counsel's fee agreement explicitly stated that the agreement did not include an appeal. Undersigned counsel, however, in accordance with his interpretation of Rule 264(a), SCACR, and his general practice, filed the notice of appeal with this Court and provided an explanation pursuant to Rule 203(d)(1)(B)(iv), SCACR. Undersigned counsel notified the Appellant in writing as well as by telephone on several occasions that he would move to be relieved as counsel if he was not retained to handle the appeal or if alternative representation was not secured.


Undersigned counsel has also taken steps to protect the Appellant in the hopes that he would not have to proceed *pro se* before this Court. Undersigned counsel assisted the Appellant by providing him with an affidavit of indigency. The Appellant returned the completed affidavit of indigency to undersigned counsel, and undersigned counsel, in turn, provided the completed affidavit to Appellate Defense. After much discussion with Robert M. Dudek, Chief Appellate Defender, regarding the case, Appellate Defense declined to accept representation on the basis that they have a policy of not representing indigent defendants proceeding on appeals from the denial of Rule 29(b) motions. Undersigned counsel has also waited as long as is practicable in an attempt to avoid having to file this motion in the hopes that the Appellant will be able to retain undersigned counsel to represent him in this appeal. However, as of this writing, undersigned counsel has not been hired to represent the Appellant on appeal to this Court.

Having taken every possible step to avoid having to move to be relieved as counsel, and having no available alternative, undersigned counsel hereby respectfully requests that this Court relieve him as counsel for the Appellant in this matter. In accordance with Rule 264(b), SCACR, undersigned counsel is serving a copy of this motion on both opposing counsel and the Appellant on today's date. Undersigned counsel would also request that the time limits for ordering the transcript from the lower court be stayed during the pendency of this motion.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, having set forth his grounds, undersigned counsel respectfully requests that this Court relieve him as counsel in this matter pursuant to Rule 264, SCACR.

Respectfully submitted,



JEREMY A. THOMPSON
Attorney and Counselor at Law

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jeremyatlaw@yahoo.com

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

This 29th day of July, 2013.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In the Court of Appeals

APPEAL FROM YORK COUNTY
Court of General Sessions

John C. Hayes, III, Circuit Court Judge

Appellate Court Case No. 2013-000975
Circuit Court Case No. 1998-GS-46-2847; 2849; 2850; 2851; 2852

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

RESPONDENT,

v.

ANTONIO GORDON,

APPELLANT.


CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that one copy of the Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel in the above-entitled case has been served upon opposing counsel, Salley W. Elliott, Assistant Deputy Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, P.O. Box 11549, Columbia, SC 29211, by depositing in the U.S. mail with proper postage, this 29th day of July, 2013.



JEREMY A. THOMPSON
ATTORNEY FOR THE APPELLANT

SWORN TO BEFORE me this 29th day
of July, 2013.



(L.S.)
Notary Public for South Carolina

My Commission Expires: 7/10/2022

RECEIVED

JAN 27 2014

SC Court of Appeals

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

Appeal from York County
John C. Hayes, III, Circuit Court Judge

Appellate Case No. 2013-000975
Indictment Nos. 1998-GS-46-2847; 2849; 2850; 2851; 2852

THE STATE,

Respondent,


v.

ANTONIO GORDON,

Attachment (d)

Appellant

RETURN TO MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL

 The Respondent, State of South Carolina, hereby makes a Return to the Motion to be Relieved as Counsel by Jeremy A. Thompson. For the reasons set forth below, Respondent takes no position concerning the request to be relieved and alternately leaves it to the Court's discretion on whether to appoint the Division of Appellate Defense or Mr. Thompson or require the Appellant to appear pro se.

I.

In the motion, counsel Thompson declares the following:

1. He was retained by Appellant specifically limited to handling the Rule 29 Motion for new trial hearing in Circuit Court and expressly not retained as part of the retainer for an appeal.


RECEIVED

JAN 27 2014

SC Court of Appeals

2. Counsel Thompson filed a Notice of Appeal and Rule 203(d)(1)(B)(iv) explanation to preserve Gordon's appellate rights from the denial of the motion by Judge Hayes pursuant to SCACR Rule 264.
3. The Appellant has failed to retain Thompson (or any other person) to handle the appeal.
4. Chief Attorney Robert Dudek of the South Carolina Division of Appellate Defense advised Thompson that his agency does not handle Rule 29 appeals by indigent convicted defendants by policy.
5. To preserve the appeal, the Appellant must order the hearing transcript by August 1, 2013 per July 2, 2013 letter from the Clerk of Court. He seeks these limits to be stayed pending resolution of the motion.

II.



In State v. Clinkscales, 318 S.C. 513, 458 S.E.2d 548 (1995), the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a convicted defendant was not entitled to appointment of counsel for a hearing on a motion for new trial based on after-discovered evidence. The Court reasoned that a new trial motion was not a critical stage. The Court opined that the constitutional right to counsel extends only to the first right of appeal, citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987). Clinkscales, 318 S.C. at 515, 458 S.E.2d at 549. See U.S. v. Berger, 375 F.3d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004)(right to counsel does not extend to post-conviction, post-appeal Rule 33 motions), U.S. v. Harrington, 410 F.3d 598, 600 (9th Cir. 2005)(right to appointed counsel does not extend to motion for new trial after conclusion of direct appeal).

A review of the Defense of Indigents Act, S.C. Code § 17-3-5, et.seq., does not expressly provide for a statutory right to appointed counsel in a Rule 29 motion for new trial on the basis of

after-discovered evidence¹ or an appeal from such a proceeding. This case in Circuit Court arose from a Rule 29 motion, not an application pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act, § 17-27-10.

At the outset, Respondent asserts that there is no constitutional or statutory right to appointed counsel in this appeal. However, the Respondent recognizes that the Court has the authority, but not the requirement under § 17-3-360(3) and § 17-3-370 to appoint counsel in appeals from motions for new trial. See Ex Parte Brown, 393 S.C. 214, 711 S.E.2d 899 (2011). It has been stated that the court has the inherent power to appoint counsel for indigents. Ex Parte Dibble, 279 S.C. 592, 319 S.E.2d 440 (1983). But see S.C.D.S.S. v. Tharp, 312 S.C. 243, 246, 439 S.E.2d 854, 857 (1994).

III.

23 Respondent takes no position concerning counsel Thompson and whether withdrawal is approved pursuant to SCACR, Rule 264. Respondent further note that should the Court authorize the withdrawal, the Respondent leaves it to the Court's discretion on whether to appoint and who to appoint under the cited authorities.

Respondent would request that if the Court authorizes withdrawal and requires the Appellant to proceed pro se, that Appellant be required to strictly comply with the appellate court rules concerning briefing and preparation of the Record on Appeal set forth in SCACR Rules 207 through 222.

¹ Respondent notes that the Uniform Post-Conviction Relief Act, § 17-27-20(a)(5) have been interpreted to allow claims of after-discovered evidence to be presented. See Hayden v. State, 278 S.C. 610, 299 S.E.2d 854 (1983). This Act allows for the appointment of counsel. S.C. Code § 17-2760, and Appellate Defense handles these appeals pursuant to their Act.

WHEREFORE, Respondent has made Return to the Motion to Be Relieved.

Respectfully submitted,


ALAN WILSON
Attorney General

JOHN W. McINTOSH
Chief Deputy Attorney General

DONALD J. ZELENKA
Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General
S.C. Bar #5758

ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT

By:


Donald J. Zelenka

3
14
P.O. Box 11549
Columbia, SC 29211

August 8, 2013

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

Appeal from York County
John C. Hayes, III, Circuit Court Judge

Appellate Case No. 2013-000975
Indictment Nos. 1998-GS-46-2847; 2849; 2850; 2851; 2852

THE STATE,

Respondent,

v.

ANTONIO GORDON,

Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, **Donald J. Zelenka**, hereby certify that I have served Respondent's **Return to Motion**

to Be Relieved as Counsel on:

Jeremy A. Thompson, Esquire
P. O. Box 12891
Columbia, South Carolina 29201


Antonio Gordon, #259798
Evans Correctional Institution
610 Highway 9 West
Bennettsville, SC 29512

RECEIVED

JAN 27 2014

SC Court of Appeals

by depositing a copies in the United States Mail this 9th day of August, 2013.



DONALD J. ZELENKA
Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General