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SC Court of Appeals

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)
)
COUNTY OF CHARLESTON)

THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
CASE NO. 03-CP-10-4751

WESLEY SMITH,)

Plaintiff,)

-vs)

CHARLESTON COUNTY SCHOOL)
DISTRICT and MR. TOWNSEND,)

Defendants.)

ORDER

BY
JULIE J. ARMSTRONG
CLERK OF COURT
2006 MAR 20 AM 11:13

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This matter came before this Court for a hearing on March 7, 2006, involving the Defendants Charleston County School District's (hereinafter "CCSD") and Anderson Townsend's (hereinafter "Townsend") Motion for Summary Judgment as to all of Plaintiff Wesley Smith's (hereinafter "Smith") causes of action. For the reasons expressed herein-below, this Court finds that the motion should be granted in part and denied in part as follows:

1. Summary judgment is hereby granted as to Plaintiff Smith's first cause of action for "intentional infliction of emotional distress" or "outrage" against Defendant Townsend because Plaintiff Smith has not offered admissible evidence satisfying each of the elements of his claim. See Ford v. Huison, 276 S.C. 157, 276 S.E.2d 776 (1981), (holding that elements of "intentional infliction of emotional distress" claim are: (1) the defendant intentionally or recklessly inflicted severe emotional distress or was certain or substantially certain that such distress would result from his conduct; (2) the conduct was so extreme and outrageous as to exceed all possible bounds of decency and must be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community; (3) the actions of the defendant caused the plaintiff emotional distress;

and (4) the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it).

The admissible evidence before the Court shows that the alleged misconduct by Defendant Townsend was not "extreme and outrageous." Todd v. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 283 S.C. 155, 321 S.E.2d 602 (Ct. App. 1984), quashed in part on other grounds, 287 S.C. 190, 336 S.E.2d 472 (1985). Additionally, Plaintiff Smith has not produced any admissible evidence showing that Defendant Townsend acted with the intent to harm or with any recklessness. Finally, Plaintiff Smith has not shown that Defendant Townsend's alleged misconduct caused him to suffer emotional distress which was so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.

Further, the two-year statute of limitations under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-110, applies to Defendant Townsend's alleged misconduct because Plaintiff Smith has not offered admissible evidence showing that Defendant Townsend acted outside the scope of his official duties. Plateau v. Harrelson, 355 S.C. 197, 209, 584 S.E.2d 413, 419 (Ct. App. 2003). Plaintiff Smith amended his initial Complaint to add Defendant Townsend as a party. Plaintiff Smith served Defendant Townsend with the Amended Complaint on July 6, 2004, which is more than two years after Plaintiff Smith discovered or knew of the events upon which his claims are based. Accordingly, the claim for "intentional infliction of emotional distress" is time-barred under the statute of limitations.

There is no genuine issue as to any material fact and Defendant Townsend is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to Plaintiff Smith's first cause of action for "intentional infliction of emotional distress."

2. Summary judgment is hereby granted as to Plaintiff Smith's second cause of action for "breach of contract accompanied by fraudulent intent" against Defendant CCSD because such a claim is not permitted under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act. The cause of action for "breach of contract accompanied by fraudulent intent" requires a showing that the defendant acted with a fraudulent intent and the intent to injure the plaintiff. See Floyd v. Country Squire Mobile Homes, Inc., 287 S.C. 51, 336 S.E.2d 502 (Ct. App. 1985); Harper v. Ethridge & Fann, 290 S.C. 112, 348 S.E.2d 374 (Ct. App. 1986). The Tort Claims Act provides that a governmental entity such as a school district cannot be held liable for "employee conduct . . . which constitutes actual fraud, actual malice, intent to harm, or a crime involving moral turpitude." S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-60(17). Accordingly, the cause of action alleging breach of contract accompanied by fraud is barred as a matter of law.

Additionally, assuming *arguendo* that the Tort Claims Act was inapplicable and Plaintiff Smith produced evidence that Defendant CCSD breached an employment contract with him, Plaintiff Smith has not offered admissible evidence showing that Defendant CCSD breached any such contract with a fraudulent intent or that Defendant CCSD committed any fraudulent act accompanying the alleged breach of contract. See Minter v. GOCT, Inc., 322 S.C. 525, 473 S.E.2d 67 (Ct. App. 1996); Foxfire Village Inc. v. Black & Veatch, 304 S.C. 366, 404 S.E.2d 912 (Ct. App. 1991).

There is no genuine issue as to any material fact and Defendant Townsend is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to Plaintiff Smith's second cause of action for "breach of contract accompanied by fraudulent intent."

3. Summary judgment is hereby denied as to Plaintiff Smith's third cause of action for "breach of contract" against Defendant CCSD. Defendant CCSD argues that summary

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Complaint against the CCSD¹ included, *inter alia*, claims for slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages against the CCSD. The CCSD filed a Motion to Dismiss on December 15, 2003 asserting that the claims for slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages against the CCSD are barred as a matter of law under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-78-110 *et seq.*

3. By Consent Order filed on June 14, 2004, Mr. Smith voluntarily withdrew his claims for slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages against the CCSD and agreed to submit an Amended Complaint removing those claims. On June 23, 2004, Mr. Smith filed an Amended Complaint asserting four causes of action: (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress against Mr. Townsend; (2) breach of contract accompanied by fraudulent intent against the CCSD; (3) breach of contract against the CCSD; and (4) third party interference with a contract against Mr. Townsend.

4. By Order filed on March 20, 2006, Circuit Judge R. Markley Dennis, Jr. granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Defendants as to Mr. Smith's first, second, and fourth causes of action of the Amended Complaint. However, Judge Dennis denied the motion as to the third cause of action for breach of contract against the CCSD on the grounds that it would be premature to dismiss that claim at that point in time, but also granted the CCSD leave to refile the motion after additional discovery was conducted.

5. On May 3, 2006, after conducting additional discovery, the CCSD filed a Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment seeking dismissal of Mr. Smith's single remaining cause of action for breach of contract against the CCSD.

6. On July 19, 2006, without objection from Mr. Smith, Mr. Smith's legal counsel

¹ Although the caption of the original Complaint referred to "Mr. Townsend" as a named defendant, Mr. Smith never served Mr. Townsend with the original Complaint. Mr. Townsend did not answer or respond to the original Complaint.

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(Mr. Johnson and Ms. Hunt) were relieved from the case. Mr. Smith did not obtain new counsel, but continued *pro se*.

7. On January 10, 2007, without a hearing, Circuit Judge Perry Buckner granted Mr. Smith's *ex parte* Motion to Proceed *in forma pauperis*.

8. By Order filed on March 27, 2007, Circuit Judge Deadra L. Jefferson granted the CCSD's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed Mr. Smith's only remaining cause of action for breach of contract against the CCSD.

9. On April 11, 2007, Mr. Smith filed a Motion for Reconsideration involving Judge Jefferson's Order.

10. By Order filed on July 2, 2007, Judge Jefferson denied Mr. Smith's Motion for Reconsideration, thereby ending his claims in the Circuit Court.

11. On July 3, 2007, Mr. Smith filed a Motion to Proceed *in forma pauperis* and a Notice of Appeal with the South Carolina Court of Appeals.

12. On July 18, 2007, Judge Jasper Cureton of the South Carolina Court of Appeals filed an Order denying the Mr. Smith's Motion to Proceed *in forma pauperis*. Additionally, the Clerk of the Court of Appeals wrote Mr. Smith on July 18, 2007 advising him as follows: "The appellant is notified that he must provide an Amended Notice of Appeal, with Proof of Service on opposing counsel, and the One Hundred (\$100.00) dollar Notice of Appeal filing fee within ten (10) days of the date of this letter or it may result in the dismissal of your appeal." Mr. Smith thereafter failed to comply with the Clerk of Court's letter.

13. On August 2, 2007, the Court of Appeals filed an Order dismissing Mr. Smith's appeal. Mr. Smith did not appeal this Order or file a petition to reinstate his appeal.

14. On August 21, 2007, the Court of Appeals filed an Order of Remittitur stating in

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part: "No Petition for Reinstatement having been filed in the above matter since issuance of this Court's Order dated August 2, 2007, IT IS SO ORDERED that the above appeal be and hereby is dismissed and REMITTED to the Clerk of Court for Charleston County." This Order was filed with the Circuit Court on August 23, 2007. Mr. Smith did not appeal this Order.

15. Following the dismissal of Mr. Smith's claims in the Circuit Court and the dismissal of his appeal in the Court of Appeals, Mr. Smith has filed numerous pleadings and documents in the Circuit Court in which he attempts to relitigate his same claims against the Defendants. These documents include, but are not limited to, a "Notice of Appeal," "Affidavit of Wesley Edward Smith III," and "Introduction and Plaintiff's Supporting Memorandum" filed on October 2, 2007; an "Amended Certificate of Service" and purported subpoenas *duces tecum* addressed to Mr. Townsend and Dr. Ronald McWhirt (Superintendent of the CCSD) filed on October 4, 2007; a "Motion for New Trial" filed on October 15, 2007; a "Plaintiff's Amended Certificate of Service (Modification)" filed on October 19, 2007; a "Plaintiff's Request: Motion for Subpoena Production of Documents (*duces tecum*) to Support Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial" filed on November 1, 2007; a "Plaintiff's Notice of Motion for Monetary Relief of Summary Judgment Order Against Defendant and Sanctions with Memorandum and Law Argument to Support Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial" dated November 5, 2007; and a "Plaintiff's Supporting Memorandum to the Record for Sanction Levied Against the Defense in this Action" dated November 8, 2007.

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16. In the above-referenced pleadings and documents, Mr. Smith attempts to relitigate claims based on the same facts and events at issue in his Amended Complaint, which was previously dismissed, and further attempts to assert multiple new causes of action or legal theories against the CCSD based on the same events and factual allegations at issue in Mr.

Smith's original claims. As examples, the pleadings entitled "Introduction and Plaintiff's Supporting Memorandum," "Motion for New Trial," and "Plaintiff's Amended Certificate of Service (Modification)" request a judgment against the CCSD for monetary damages in the amount of \$3.5 million for alleged defamation, damages in the amount of \$600,000.00 under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, and punitive damages of \$3.5 million based on events surrounding his termination from the CCSD.

17. On October 10, 2007, the Defendants filed a Motion for Sanctions pursuant to S.C. R. Civ. PRO. 11(a) and S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-36-10 *et seq.* and also filed an Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Award of Sanctions.

18. As reflected above, Mr. Smith has continued to file pleadings attempting to relitigate his claims even after service of the Defendants' Motion for Sanctions.

LAW & ANALYSIS

19. "Where there has been an appeal, 'final disposition of the case' occurs when the remittitur is filed in the circuit court." McDowell v. S.C. Dept' of Soc. Serv., 300 S.C. 24, 386 S.E.2d 280 (Ct. App. 1989); see Christy v. Christy, 317 S.C. 145 452 S.E.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1994) ("The final disposition of a case occurs when the remittitur is returned by the clerk of the appellate court and filed in the lower court. Until that time, the case is pending on appeal.").

20. By virtue of the Court of Appeals's Order dismissing Mr. Smith's appeal and the remittitur sending the case back to the Circuit Court, the prior Circuit Court Orders granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendants as to all of Mr. Smith's causes of action are final and the case has been finally disposed of. Mr. Smith's claims against the Defendants have been ended and are final.

21. "Matters decided by the appellate court cannot be reheard, reconsidered, or

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relitigated in the trial court, even under the guise of a different form.” Ackerman v. McMillan, 324 S.C. 440, 477 S.E.2d 267 (Ct. App. 1996). “The decision of the appellate court is final as to all questions decided” and “[i]t is the duty of the trial court to follow the decision of the appellate court.” Id.

22. Although Mr. Smith is *pro se*, this is not an excuse for filing frivolous pleadings with the Court and continuing a frivolous action. Goodson v. American Bankers Ins. Co., 295 S.C. 400, 368 S.E.2d 687, 689 (Ct. App. 1988) (“Lack of familiarity with legal proceedings is unacceptable and the court will not hold a layman to any lesser standard than is applied to an attorney.”); McCall v. A-T-O Inc., 276 S.C. 143, 276 S.E.2d 529, 530 (1981) (The South Carolina Supreme Court “has never held laymen to a lesser standard than attorneys.”).

23. S.C. R. CIV. PRO. 11(a) provides that “[t]he signature of an attorney or party [on a pleading] constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion or other paper, that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.” Rule 11(a) further states that “[i]f a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this Rule, the court, upon motion of upon its own initiative, may impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion or other paper, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”

24. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-36-10(A)(4) of the South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanctions Act also states as follows:

(A)(4) An attorney or pro se litigant participating in a civil or administrative action or defense may be sanctioned for:

(a) filing a frivolous pleading, motion, or document if:

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- (i) the person has not read the frivolous pleading, motion, or document;
- (ii) a reasonable attorney in the same circumstances would believe that under the facts, his claim or defense was clearly not warranted under existing law and that a good faith or reasonable argument did not exist for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law;
- (iii) a reasonable attorney presented with the same circumstances would believe that the procurement, initiation, continuation, or defense of a civil cause was intended merely to harass or injure the other party; or
- (iv) a reasonable attorney presented with the same circumstances would believe the pleading, motion, or document is frivolous, interposed for merely delay, or merely brought for any purpose other than securing proper discovery, joinder of parties, or adjudication of the claim or defense upon which the proceedings are based;

(b) making frivolous arguments a reasonable attorney would believe were not reasonably supported by the facts; or

(c) making frivolous arguments that a reasonable attorney would believe were not warranted under the existing law or if there is no good faith argument that exists for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.

25. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-36-10(B) & (G) of the Act further state in relevant part:

(B)(1) If a document . . . does not otherwise comply with this section, it must be stricken unless it is . . . amended to comply with this section after the omission is called to the attention of the attorney or the party.

(2) If . . . an attorney or pro se litigant has violated subsection (A)(4), the court, upon its own motion or motion of a party, may impose upon the person in violation any sanction which the court considers just, equitable, and proper under the circumstances.

(G) Sanctions may include:

(1) an order for the party represented by an attorney or pro se litigant to pay the reasonable costs and attorney's fees of the prevailing party under a motion pursuant to this section. Costs shall include, but not be limited to, the following: the time required of the prevailing party by the frivolous proceeding, and travel expenses, mileage, parking, costs of reports, and

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any additional reasonable consequential expenses of the prevailing party resulting from the frivolous proceeding;

(2) an order for the attorney to pay a reasonable fine to the court; or

(3) a directive of a nonmonetary nature, including injunctive relief, designed to deter a future frivolous action or an action in bad faith.

26. This Court finds that, by virtue of Mr. Smith's filing of the above-referenced pleadings and documents with this Court following the dismissal of his appeal, Mr. Smith has improperly attempted to relitigate claims based on the same facts and events at issue in his Amended Complaint, which was previously dismissed, and has further attempted to assert multiple new causes of action or legal theories against the CCSD based on the same operative events and factual allegations that were raised in his previous claims.

27. Additionally, this Court finds that Mr. Smith has attempted to relitigate claims for slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages against the CCSD in direction contravention of the Consent Order filed on June 14, 2004 (in which Mr. Smith withdrew the exact same claims from this case) and when such claims are clearly barred as a matter of law under the provisions of the South Carolina Tort Claims Act.

28. This Court further finds that Mr. Smith has asserted and continued to assert claims that are frivolous, baseless, and which are clearly barred under existing law, are not warranted under existing law, are not supported by the facts or the law, and are not supported by good grounds. This Court further finds that Mr. Smith has continued to pursue these baseless and frivolous claims against the Defendants without a good ground for doing so; for the purpose of harassing or injuring the Defendants; for the purpose of delay; and/or for a purpose other than that of securing proper discovery, joinder of parties, or adjudication of the claim.

29. This Court finds that, as a direct result of Mr. Smith's actions and these frivolous

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proceedings, the Defendants have incurred attorney's fees and litigation costs in defending against the claims. Defendants have submitted an affidavit of counsel supporting an award of \$1,480.00 in attorney's fees and \$25.00 in court costs, or a total of \$1,505.00.

30. Based on the factors enumerated in Baron Data Systems, Inc. v. Loter, 297 S.C. 382, 377 S.E.2d 296 (1989), and this Court's review of the file in this litigation, the difficulty of the services rendered, the time necessarily expended, the result accomplished, the professional standing of counsel, and fees customarily charged in this area for similar legal services, this Court finds that an award of \$1,505.00 in attorney's fees and costs is reasonable and appropriate.

31. As observed in the unpublished opinion in Gobbi v. SunTrust Mortgage, Op. No. 2006-UP-243 (S.C. Ct. App. filed May 16, 2006), and based on S.C. R. CIV. PRO. 63, this Court has jurisdiction to review and reverse Judge Buckner's prior Order filed on January 10, 2007 granting Mr. Smith's *ex parte* Motion to Proceed *in forma pauperis*. Judge Buckner is no longer assigned to this judicial circuit.

32. In Gobbi, the Court of Appeals held that a judge may deny a party *in forma pauperis* status based on a specific finding that the party has repeatedly filed abusive and frivolous pleadings. See also In re Maxton, 325 S.C. 3, 478 S.E.2d 679, 679 (1996). This Court finds that Mr. Smith has repeatedly filed pleadings and documents in this Court involving the same matters that are frivolous, non-meritorious, and abusive of the litigation process. Accordingly, this Court finds that Judge Buckner's prior Order granting *in forma pauperis* status to Mr. Smith should be reversed and rescinded because of Mr. Smith's repetitive filings that are frivolous, non-meritorious, and abusive.

33. Further, as held in Judge Cureton's Order filed on July 18, 2007, which denied Mr. Smith's motion to proceed *in forma pauperis* in the Court of Appeals, Mr. Smith has the

burden of showing that his right to proceed *in forma pauperis* rests upon a statute or a fundamental constitutional right. No such right exists in this case. Therefore, this Court finds that Mr. Smith has failed to demonstrate the necessary prerequisites for proceeding *in forma pauperis*. See Ex parte: Martin v. State, 321 S.C. 533, 471 S.E.2d 134 (1995) (motions to proceed *in forma pauperis* may be granted only when specifically authorized by statute or required by constitutional provisions).

CONCLUSION

Based on the above findings of fact and/or conclusions of law, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendants' Motion for Sanctions filed on October 10, 2007 is hereby GRANTED; and

FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Plaintiff Wesley Smith is hereby ordered to pay \$1,505.00 to the Defendant Charleston County School District as a monetary sanction for filing frivolous pleadings and documents with this Court; and

FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Plaintiff Wesley Smith's frivolous pleadings are hereby stricken and dismissed with prejudice, including the "Notice of Appeal," "Affidavit of Wesley Edward Smith III," and "Introduction and Plaintiff's Supporting Memorandum" filed on October 2, 2007; the "Amended Certificate of Service" and purported subpoenas *duces tecum* filed on October 4, 2007; the "Motion for New Trial" filed on October 15, 2007; the "Plaintiff's Amended Certificate of Service (Modification)" filed on October 19, 2007; the "Plaintiff's Request: Motion for Subpoena Production of Documents (*duces tecum*) to Support Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial" filed on November 1, 2007; the "Plaintiff's Notice of Motion for Monetary Relief of Summary Judgment Order Against Defendant and Sanctions with Memorandum and Law Argument to Support Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial" dated November

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5, 2007; the "Plaintiff's Supporting Memorandum to the Record for Sanction Levied Against the Defense in this Action" dated November 8, 2007; and any other pleadings filed after the dismissal of the Plaintiff's claims that attempt to relitigate the same facts, events, or claims; and

FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the prior Order filed in this Court on January 10, 2007, which granted Plaintiff Wesley Smith's Motion to Proceed *in forma pauperis*, is hereby rescinded and canceled; and


FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Plaintiff Wesley Smith is hereby enjoined, restrained, and prohibited from filing any new or further lawsuits, complaints, pleadings, motions, petitions, writs, or other similar documents in this Court that seek money damages or other legal or equitable relief arising from the same facts or events referenced in the Complaint filed in this case on November 14, 2003 or in the Amended Complaint filed in this case on June 23, 2004; and

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FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Clerk of Court shall serve a copy of this Order upon all parties to this action and shall note or record in the file of this case that Plaintiff Wesley Smith's claims have been disposed of and are final; and

FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that willful disobedience of the non-monetary requirements of this Order by any party to this action shall constitute contempt of Court subjecting the offending party to an appropriate penalty or punishment; and

AND IT IS SO ORDERED!



The Honorable Doyet A. Early, III
Presiding Circuit Court Judge

Bamberg, South Carolina.

This 20th day of November, 2007.

Wesley E. Smith J.J.J.
465 North Nassau Street
Charleston, South Carolina 29403
(843)723-8598

**LETTER TO CLERK OF LOWER COURT
FILING NOTICE OF APPEAL**

March 24, 2014


CLERK
Honorable Julie J. Armstrong
100 Broad Street Suite 106
Charleston, South Carolina 29401

RE: Wesley Smith, Plaintiff v Charleston County School District, Defendant Case 2003-10-CP-4751

Dear Honorable Clerk Armstrong;

Enclosed for filing is a notice of appeal in the above case.

Sincerely, Person of legal Interest in that case


Mr. Wesley Edward Smith III
Wesley Edward Smith III
465 N. Nassau Street
Charleston, South Carolina 29403
(843)723-8598
Appellant Pro Se

cc: Mr. Daniel F. Blanchard, III
134 Meeting Street Suite 200
~~Greenville~~, South Carolina 29403
Attorney for Respondent

C. (make)

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