

VOLUME SIX

**STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE SUPREME COURT**

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**Appeal from Sumter County
R. Ferrell Cothran, Jr., Circuit Court Judge**

S.C. Supreme Court

STEPHEN COREY BRYANT,

PETITIONER,

V.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

RESPONDENT

APPELLATE CASE NO. 2013-000518

APPENDIX

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THE FOLLOWING EXHIBITS ARE ON FILE WITH THIS COURT:

PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT #8 (DISC)

1 had known for five or six months or so.

2 DR. CRAWFORD: Uh-huh.

3 MR. BRYANT: And I'm sitting here paying for

4 it and he just throws himself on me, like,

5 hey man, what's up. I'm like, damn, dude

6 what the fuck's going on. I don't even know

7 you and you coming at me like this. I mean,

8 he just put his hands on my shoulders and

9 came up to me. I mean, like we knowed each

10 other for years and I don't even know him.

11 You know, I never met him a day in my life.

12 DR. CRAWFORD: Uh-huh.

13 MR. BRYANT: I don't know. I figured -- I

14 could tell he was drunk because I could

15 smell it on him.

16 DR. CRAWFORD: And this is early Tuesday

17 morning?

18 MR. BRYANT: Yeah. And he wanted to go for

19 a ride. Well, not go for a ride but he

20 needed a ride.

21 DR. CRAWFORD: Do what?

22 MR. BRYANT: He needed a ride to get home on

23 McCrays Mill Road.

24 DR. CRAWFORD: He wanted a ride, okay.

25 MR. BRYANT: So, as I got to McCrays Mill

1 Road, he kept changing it up, talking about
2 let's go here or there or there or here.

3 I mean, I'm like, dude, I done took you
4 to McCrays Mill Road twice already. And you
5 tell me this ain't where you live. Now,
6 where do you live. He lives out this way.
7 I take him out this way. And we're going
8 out towards Wedgefield.

9 He tells me to pull off on this dirt
10 road. I pull down the dirt road and go on
11 down it. He says stop, he's got to take a
12 piss. Now, I'm getting real fucking
13 agitated.

14 I'm being nice to this dude giving him
15 a ride home when it's raining and
16 everything. Now, he's got me on this muddy
17 ass dirt road in the rain. So, I got out
18 and took a piss, too. Just decided to get
19 out the damn truck.

20 DR. CRAWFORD: You did what?

21 MR. BRYANT: I got out and took a leak, too.

22 DR. CRAWFORD: Okay.

23 MR. BRYANT: I remember him telling me he
24 was going to take me here or there or
25 someplace. And he was coming around my

1 truck pretty fast. And he was coming at me
2 like he was charging me. He was telling me
3 what I was going to do in an aggressive
4 tone, and he's coming at me pretty
5 aggressive. And there for a second I
6 thought he was going to try and overcome me
7 and take my truck.

8 DR. CRAWFORD: Okay.

9 MR. BRYANT: But I had that gun up under the
10 seat of my truck. And before he got to me,
11 I pulled it out.

12 DR. CRAWFORD: Okay. So, you were
13 protecting yourself?

14 MR. BRYANT: In that case, yes.

15 DR. CRAWFORD: And then you shot him?

16 MR. BRYANT: Yeah.

17 DR. CRAWFORD: And then what happened?

18 MR. BRYANT: I just left him there. I drove
19 off and went home.

20 DR. CRAWFORD: All right.

21 MR. BRYANT: And then I went to sleep. I
22 woke up and my girlfriend is in there. I
23 went in there and I just held her for the
24 fucking longest. I don't know what,
25 something was just telling me to hold her

1 for the longest.

2 By the time I got done holding her, the
3 phone rang and it was fucking SLED and every
4 damn body outside had the place fucking
5 surrounded.

6 DR. CRAWFORD: That was today?

7 MR. BRYANT: Yeah.

8 DR. CRAWFORD: Okay. I thought this was
9 early Tuesday morning. It was
10 early -- what's today, today's Wednesday
11 right?

12 MR. BRYANT: Yeah.

13 DR. CRAWFORD: So, it was early this morning
14 that he got shot?

15 MR. BRYANT: Yeah.

16 DR. CRAWFORD: Okay. When we were doing the
17 time thing, you had said -- at least that's
18 what I wrote down -- Monday was the incident
19 with that guy. And Tuesday, then you
20 said -- what I thought you said was, the
21 thing happen with that guy, you went to
22 sleep. You woke up at 1:00 in the morning
23 and went out.

24 MR. BRYANT: Yeah.

25 DR. CRAWFORD: And that would have been?

1 MR. BRYANT: That would have been last night
2 because I woke up this morning -- it was
3 last night. I woke up this morning.

4 DR. CRAWFORD: I'm so confused. I'm sorry.
5 Monday, during the day, the thing happened
6 with that guy, right?

7 MR. BRYANT: Uh-huh.

8 DR. CRAWFORD: So, what did you do on
9 Tuesday?

10 MR. BRYANT: Today is Wednesday, right? I
11 did --

12 DR. CRAWFORD: You see where I'm getting to?

13 MR. BRYANT: Yeah. We got a whole day of
14 time missing.

15 DR. CRAWFORD: Yeah. We've got the time
16 messed up.

17 MR. BRYANT: Yesterday I spent -- I was
18 fishing yesterday down at the Wateree River.
19 Yeah. I was down there fishing all day
20 yesterday.

21 DR. CRAWFORD: Got you. So, did you sleep
22 through Monday night?

23 MR. BRYANT: Maybe a couple hours.

24 DR. CRAWFORD: Okay. A couple hours. So,
25 then you went out fishing all day on

1 Tuesday?

2 MR. BRYANT: Yeah. I went down to Wateree
3 to fish. And there was a buddy of mine that
4 was already down there. His name was Lee.

5 DR. CRAWFORD: Okay.

6 MR. BRYANT: He was down there fishing. We
7 just sat down there for a while fishing,
8 smoking a couple joints, just relaxing.

9 DR. CRAWFORD: Okay. And then did SLED or
10 somebody interview you yesterday?

11 MR. BRYANT: Yeah. Yesterday evening when I
12 got home -- and this was in the evening. I
13 came home after fishing. And I went to the
14 convenience store and got some gas in the
15 little gas can and I came back.

16 DR. CRAWFORD: Uh-huh.

17 MR. BRYANT: I poured some gas in the mower
18 and I started cutting the grass. And while
19 I was in the middle of cutting grass, they
20 came around there and interviewed me about a
21 couple guys that tried to rob me a couple
22 weeks ago right down the road when I was out
23 for a walk.

24 DR. CRAWFORD: So, they weren't interviewing
25 you about these killings?

1 MR. BRYANT: Huh-uh.

2 DR. CRAWFORD: They didn't even ask you
3 about the killings?

4 MR. BRYANT: Huh-uh.

5 DR. CRAWFORD: They asked you about some
6 guys who tried to rob you?

7 MR. BRYANT: Yeah. And they cut me right
8 here with a razor knife.

9 DR. CRAWFORD: Okay. And then it was this
10 morning, you drove home after that incident
11 with the guy where he was doing crack and
12 stuff. And then so SLED surrounded the
13 house or something.

14 MR. BRYANT: No. SLED wasn't there. I woke
15 up like 1:40 something. It was like just
16 before 2:00. And I don't know, I was just
17 looking at her. And part of me told me to
18 just get up and just hold her. And I held
19 her for the fucking longest.

20 DR. CRAWFORD: Okay.

21 MR. BRYANT: And part of me felt like
22 something was getting ready to happen. And
23 it did.

24 DR. CRAWFORD: And then SLED showed up or
25 the police?

1 MR. BRYANT: Yeah. They made a phone call
2 and told me to come out with my hands up.
3 They had the place completely surrounded.
4 And that they did.

5 DR. CRAWFORD: Uh-huh. And that's -- and
6 you've been here ever since?

7 MR. BRYANT: Yes.

8 DR. CRAWFORD: Okay. Anything else coming
9 back to you about any of these incidents
10 that we've been talking about?

11 MR. BRYANT: But I would like to, if it's
12 possible, to go under hypnosis. Maybe you
13 can help get a lot of old stuff as well as
14 stuff that actually happened during these
15 cases out of me. As well as some old stuff
16 that needs to come out of me. So, I can get
17 it all out of me. And so I know what I'm
18 dealing with and facing with so I can talk
19 about it and get it out or whatever I got to
20 do. I just want it out of me.

21 DR. CRAWFORD: You just want it out of you.

22 MR. BRYANT: I want -- I don't want it to be
23 in me no more. I just want it out of me.

24 DR. CRAWFORD: I got you. I understand.

25 But during none of these killings, you were

1 hearing voices?

2 MR. BRYANT: No.

3 DR. CRAWFORD: Or seeing things?

4 MR. BRYANT: No.

5 DR. CRAWFORD: Or having flashbacks during
6 the killings?

7 MR. BRYANT: No. The only flashback I've
8 had was that one on Monday and that was
9 afterwards.

10 DR. CRAWFORD: Okay.

11 MR. BRYANT: I have to use the bathroom.

12 DR. CRAWFORD: Sure. We'll take a bathroom
13 break.

14 Let me just ask you a couple routine
15 things that we always do in these
16 examinations. Tell me what the date is
17 today.

18 MR. BRYANT: October 13, 2004.

19 DR. CRAWFORD: And where are we right now?

20 MR. BRYANT: Sumter County Sheriff's
21 Department.

22 DR. CRAWFORD: And I'm going to give you
23 three words -- and I know you're tired --
24 but try to remember these because I'm going
25 to ask you them in the few minutes: Cat,

1 San Francisco and airplane. Can you repeat
2 those for me?

3 MR. BRYANT: Cat, San Francisco and
4 airplane.

5 DR. CRAWFORD: Now, I'm going to try and
6 confuse you. But keep those in your mind if
7 you can. I want you to repeat some numbers
8 for me: One, three, five.

9 MR. BRYANT: One, three, five.

10 DR. CRAWFORD: Two, nine, eight, four.

11 MR. BRYANT: Two, nine, eight, four.

12 DR. CRAWFORD: Eight, six, one, three, two.

13 MR. BRYANT: Two, three, one, six, two.

14 DR. CRAWFORD: Nine, four, three, eight,
15 two.

16 MR. BRYANT: Nine, four, three, eight, two.

17 DR. CRAWFORD: Okay. I'm going to say some
18 numbers. I want you to say them backwards:
19 Two, five.

20 MR. BRYANT: Five, two.

21 DR. CRAWFORD: Nine, four, one.

22 MR. BRYANT: One, four, nine.

23 DR. CRAWFORD: Eight, six, one, three.

24 MR. BRYANT: Three, one, six, eight.

25 DR. CRAWFORD: Very good. Can you say in a

1 word how you would describe your mood right
2 now?

3 MR. BRYANT: In one word?

4 DR. CRAWFORD: Uh-huh. Or two words.

5 MR. BRYANT: Ready for it to be over with.

6 DR. CRAWFORD: And you're not suicidal?

7 MR. BRYANT: None whatsoever.

8 DR. CRAWFORD: Okay. And you want some
9 help. So, then you want me to make that
10 recommendation that you get help right away?

11 MR. BRYANT: Yeah.

12 DR. CRAWFORD: If I come up with some other
13 questions, when they're done talking with
14 you, would you mind if we talk again briefly
15 if I think of anything else?

16 MR. BRYANT: I don't mind.

17 DR. CRAWFORD: Great. Do you have any
18 questions for me right now?

19 MR. BRYANT: When will be the next time I
20 -- see or hear something?

21 DR. CRAWFORD: When they're done. We're
22 going to talk. I'm going to take a look at
23 the notes and think and stuff. But we will
24 definitely talk when they are finished.

25 MR. BRYANT: All right.

1 DR. CRAWFORD: Thank you very much. You
2 please hang in there. You are doing
3 everything you can.

4 (Tape ended.)
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The State of South Carolina



COPY

C. Kelly Jackson
Solicitor

SOLICITOR
Third Judicial Circuit
Sumter County Courthouse
141 North Main Street
Sumter, South Carolina 29150

Phone: (803) 436-2185
Fax: (803) 436-2236

November 13, 2007

The Honorable Thomas A. Russo
Circuit Court Judge
City County Complex
180 North Irby, MSC-O
Florence, South Carolina 29501-3456

RE: State vs. Stephen Corey Bryant

Dear Judge Russo:

In compliance with paragraph 2 of your Order dated October 30, 2007, this office is providing the Court with the following material:

1. Copies of discovery previously served on the defense;
2. Documents provided by law enforcement agencies separated by the Indictment number and the name of the victim; and
3. Miscellaneous items which do not necessarily pertain to a particular victim's case.

Should you have any questions about this information, please do not hesitate to contact me or Dudley Saleeby.

Sincerely,

C. Kelly Jackson
C. Kelly Jackson
Solicitor

CKJ:jmt

Enclosures





STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)
)
 COUNTY OF SUMTER)

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

Stephen Corey Bryant, #5252,)
)
 Applicant,)
 vs.)
)
 The State of South Carolina,)
)
 Respondent.)

C/A No. 2011-CP-43-901

AFFIDAVIT OF SGT. TRIPP MAYS

THE AFFIANT, AFTER BEING DULY SWORN, DOES DEPOSE AND STATE AS
 FOLLOWS:

1. I am Sgt. Tripp Mays. I am presently employed by the Sumter County Sheriff's Department as an investigator. In October 2004, I was also employed by the Sumter County Sheriff's Department, but as a patrol officer assigned the South Side of Sumter County.

2. I was informed by counsel for Respondent that Mr. Edward Gause has alleged that he spoke to me approximately one month prior to the October 2004 murders, and approximately one month after the October 2004 murders, about seeing Applicant in some distress at a Young's convenience store on Old Manning Road.

3. I knew Mr. Gause at that time as a county employee in public works vehicle maintenance. It would not be unusual for me to speak with Mr. Gause, and I would recognize him. Further, my assigned patrol area would have included the area around Young's convenience store on Old Manning Road.

4. However, I have no recollection of any conversations with Mr. Gause about Applicant either the month before or the month after the October 2004 murders. In fact, I have no recollection

of any conversations with Mr. Gause at any time concerning Mr. Gause seeing Applicant prior to the October 2004 murders.


5. I have no recollection of seeing and speaking with Applicant at the Young's convenience store on Old Manning Road at any time during the month of October 2004 or the month before.

6. I have no recollection of speaking to Mr. Gause about any young man (identified as Applicant or not) in some distress at a Young's convenience store on Old Manning Road.


7. Further, I have searched my call records for any calls involving Mr. Gause. I have found no call records for any interaction with Mr. Gause regarding a report of a young man in distress at a Young's convenience store on Old Manning Road. This would include the time periods approximately one month before the October 2004 murders and one month after the October 2004 murders. However, if Mr. Gause did not call for assistance, such a call or conversation would not be recorded. It would not warrant an official record as it was not an official call.

8. I understand that the evidentiary hearing for the above capital case is scheduled to begin October 1, 2012. I have advised counsel for Respondent that I will be out of the country that week on prearranged travel; however, I am scheduled to be back at work on Monday, October 8, 2012, and will be available for a deposition if necessary.

THE AFFLIANT FURTHER SAYETH NOT.


Sgt. Tripp Mays
Sumter County Sheriff's Department

SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS 22nd DAY OF
SEPTEMBER, 2012


NOTARY PUBLIC FOR SOUTH CAROLINA
My commission expires: 8-24-2017

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA	)	
	)	IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF SUMTER	)	
Stephen Corey Bryant, #5252,	)	C/A No. 2011-CP-43-901
	)	
	)	
Applicant,	)	
vs.	)	RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED
	)	ORDER OF DISMISSAL
The State of South Carolina,	)	
	)	
	)	
Respondent.	)	
_____	)	

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to the application for post-conviction relief filed May 10, 2011, as amended on May 21, 2012, and October 1, 2012. An evidentiary hearing on the allegations was held October 1-3, 2012, in the Sumter County Courthouse. Applicant was represented by Melissa J. Armstrong, Esq., and Heath P. Taylor, Esq. The State was represented by Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka and Senior Assistant Attorney General Melody J. Brown. After having reviewed the pleadings, the appellate court briefs, the record on appeal and opinion from the direct appeal, and having heard and weighed the testimony and other evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, this Court finds, for all the reasons set forth in the instant Order, that post-conviction relief must be denied.

I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Applicant, Stephen Corey Bryant, was indicted by a Sumter County grand jury on multiple charges: burglary in the second degree; two (2) counts of burglary in the first degree; arson in the

second degree; possession of a stolen handgun; three (3) counts of murder (Clifton Gailey, Willard Tietjen, Clarence Burgess); armed robbery; assault and battery with intent to kill (Correctional Officer Larry Justice); threatening life of public employee (Correctional Officer Thornwell Jones). Applicant was also indicted by a Richland County grand jury for assault and battery with intent to kill (Clifton Brown). The State sought the death penalty for the Tietjen murder. Applicant was initially represented by Jack D. Howle, Jr., Esq., and James H. Babb, Esq. Prior to resolution, Mr. Babb was removed due to an incapacitating medical condition and replaced, on July 18, 2008, by John D. Clarke, Esq. R. pp. 1309-1314.

On August 18, 2008, Applicant appeared before the Honorable Thomas A. Russo for a guilty plea. There were no plea negotiations as to sentence in the case. R. p. 1339; pp. 1345-46; pp. 1378-79. Applicant entered guilty pleas to the following crimes:

1. burglary in the second degree [2006-GS-43-696].
2. burglary in the first degree [2006-GS-43-697].
3. assault and battery with intent to kill [2004-GS-40-10096] [Richland County].
4. murder [2006-GS-43-698].
5. murder [2006-GS-43-699].
6. murder [2006-GS-43-700].
7. assault and battery with intent to kill [2006-GS-43-701].
8. threatening the life of a public employee [2006-GS-43-702].
9. armed robbery [2006-GS-43-699].

10. possession of stolen handgun [2006-GS-43-699].
11. burglary first degree [2006-GS-43-698].
12. arson, second degree [2006-GS-43-698].

R. pp. 1334-38.

The plea court determined that there was a sufficient factual basis for each of the guilty pleas.

R. pp. 1348-1381. Applicant affirmed the State's factual basis as correct as to each crime. R. pp. 1353, 1357, 1360, 1365, 1368, 1374, 1376, 1377. Judge Russo deferred sentencing.

On September 2, 2008 the sentencing proceeding began before Judge Russo on indictment 2006-GS-43-699 involving the murder of Willard Tietjen. The State had filed and served the Notice of Intent to seek the death penalty asserting the condition precedent of the statutory aggravating circumstances "murder was committed while in the commission of a robbery while armed with a deadly weapon." The State presented its evidence in aggravation through September 8, 2008. R. pp. 1-730.

The defense presented its evidence in mitigation. R. pp. 734-1000. The Applicant waived his right to testify. R. pp. 1002-1004. The State and defense made closing arguments to the Court. R. pp. 1005-1035.

Judge Russo sentenced the Applicant on September 11, 2008. He sentenced Bryant to thirty (30) days on 2006-GS-43-702 (threatening life of a public employee); twenty (20) years on 2004-GS-40-10096 (assault and battery with intent to kill); twenty (20) years on 2006-GS-43-701 (assault and battery with intent to kill); life imprisonment on 2006-GS-43-700 (murder); life imprisonment on 2006-GS-43-697 (burglary in the first degree); fifteen (15) years on 2006-GS-43-696 (burglary in the second degree); twenty-five (25) years on 2006-GS-43-698 (arson in the second degree); and life

(burglary in the first degree); and life (murder); on 2006-GS-43-699, five (5) years (possession of stolen handgun); thirty (30) years (armed robbery); and life (murder). Judge Russo found beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the statutory aggravating circumstance of “the defendant committed the murder while in the commission of a robbery while armed with a deadly weapon.” R. pp. 1049 - 1050. On the incident involving the death of Willard Tietjen, Judge Russo sentenced Bryant to “death by electrocution or lethal injection.” R. p. 1051.

Applicant filed a timely Notice of Appeal on September 19, 2008. On March 23, 2010, an Initial Brief of Appellant was filed by Senior Appellate Defender Joseph L. Savitz, asserting the following issue on appeal:

The sentencing judge committed reversible error by excluding testimony that Bryant’s aunt had been sexually abused by her father (Bryant’s paternal grandfather), who the defense alleged also began abusing Bryant at the age of seven, as this evidence was both relevant under Rules 401 and 404, SCRE, and mitigating under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Initial Brief of Appellant, p. 3.

Respondent made an Initial Brief of Respondent on August 6, 2010. Final Briefs were filed on September 16, 2010. Oral argument was held before the South Carolina Supreme Court on November 30, 2010. On January 7, 2011, the South Carolina Supreme Court issued its opinion affirming the convictions and sentences. *State v. Bryant (Stephen Corey)*, Op. No. 26906, 390 S.C. 638, 704 S.E.2d 344 (January 7, 2011). Applicant petitioned for rehearing which was denied on February 2, 2011. The Applicant did not seek certiorari in the United States Supreme Court in the direct appeal.

The Remittitur was issued on February 2, 2011. On February 4, 2011, appellate counsel made

a motion for stay of execution and for the appointment of a post-conviction relief judge pursuant to *In Re Stays of Execution in Capital Cases*, 321 S.C. 544, 471 S.E.2d 140 (1996). Respondents made a Return on February 7, 2011. On March 3, 2011, the South Carolina Supreme Court issued its stay order.

These post-conviction relief proceedings followed.

II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The pre-detention crimes in this case span a short time frame and demonstrate the inter-connectivity of the crimes, one to the other, by Applicant's own actions. The Court has considered the instant facts:

1. The Burglary of the Residence of Robert Dennis on Tuesday, October 5, 2004. It began on October 4, 2004. Bryant walked down the half mile dirt road to the Dennis home and told Mr. Dennis that his truck was stuck at the top of the driveway. Mr. Dennis offers help, and, although uneasy, takes him to the area and extracts the truck out of the bog. R. pp. 189-190. Bryant gives Mr. Dennis the name of "Carlos Bryan" and a false address. Mr. Dennis records a description of Applicant's truck- a 1990 GMC two-tone blue truck. R. pp. 1351-52, p. 191. The next day, Mr. Dennis left his home office at approximately 4:00 p.m., returning late that night. The day after that, he found that his home office had been burglarized. R. pp. 192-194. His lap, briefcase, and "a zipper bag with quite a bit of checks, money orders, and some cash" were missing from his office. Entry was made through a window. R. pp. 192-193. A shoeprint was raised outside the window which was sent to SLED. A subsequent search warrant of Applicant's home found a right shoe that matched the shoeprint. In addition, Mr. Dennis identified Applicant as the visitor after seeing his

picture in the newspaper and on television. R. pp. 195-196; pp. 1352-53.

2. The Burglary of James Ammons on Friday, October 8, 2004. James Ammons, like Mr. Dennis, lived in an isolated and remote area outside of Sumter. R. pp. 199-200. The morning of October 8th, Mr. Ammons took his daughter to school and traveled into Sumter for errands. R. p. 204. Mr. Ammons had allowed a friend, T. J. Hansen, to go deer-hunting on his property. Mr. Hansen's truck became stuck in the mud. Mr. Hansen went to Mr. Ammons' home around 11:30 a.m. for help. He noticed the sliding door was open and entered. He attempted to use the telephone but the telephone was dead. He walked to a neighbor's house to use the phone and call Mr. Ammon's cell phone. R. pp. 204-205; pp. 211-216. Mr. Hanson sees Mr. Ammons driving down the road and waves him over. Then he and Mr. Ammons returned to Ammons' home around 1:30 p.m. R. p. 205. The phone wires had been cut. The sliding door was open, and the television was off rather than on as Mr. Ammons left it, and his daughter's radio was off. Mr. Ammons went into his bedroom and found that his .40 caliber Smith and Wesson pistol had been stolen along with ammunition and registration papers. He called 911. R. pp. 205-209; pp. 1354-55.

Subsequently, as a result of an October 13th search, the gun, case, ownership papers and box of ammunition were recovered from Applicant's house. R. p. 1355-56; pp. 207-210. Applicant gave a series of statements claiming the gun was found in a dumpster and then asserted he found it at a home in Pinewood where he stopped when he was low on gas, slid open the door, and took the gun. R. pp. 1355-56; pp. 216-17. In another statement, Applicant admitted to cutting the telephone wires before he entered the home. R. p. 1357; p. 217.

3. Assault on Clinton Brown in Richland County on October 8, 2004. Clinton Brown was fishing with an acquaintance at the Billy Tolar Boating Landing off the Wateree River. R. pp.

247-248. Applicant came up to them, spoke to them, then left. The other fisherman left, as well. R. pp. 250-253. Applicant then returned, and came up behind Mr. Brown and shot him in the back. Applicant then left, having offered no assistance. R. pp. 254-255. Mr. Brown, bleeding, initially passed out. When he comes to, he struggled up to his truck and drove to Tuomey Hospital where he remained for over one week. R. pp. 1357-1360; pp. 254-56; pp. 259-262.

The bullet recovered from Mr. Brown ultimately matches the stolen Smith and Wesson. Applicant admitted the shooting to Roy Lee Lambert the day after the shooting. R. pp. 273-276. Mr. Lambert had bought a knife from Applicant, then saw the gun and offered to find a buyer. Applicant states, "its got blood on it." R. p. 275.¹

4. The murder of Cliff Gainey on October 9, 2004. Unlike the others, Applicant and Cliff Gainey knew each other. They were co-workers in construction, went fishing together and spent weekends with each other's family. R. p. 1362. On October 9, 2004, Applicant picked up Gainey from the mobile home he rented from his boss. They went to a convenience store to buy beer. The purchase is record on the store's camera. They drive off together and later arrived at a location on Bells Mill Road. Applicant shot Mr. Gainey three (3) times, left the body in the open, and drove off. A passerby, William Morton saw a truck with its lights speed away, then he saw the body. After checking vitals he called 911. R. pp. 285-286. There was no identification on the body and Mr. Gainey remained unidentified for nearly two days. R. pp. 290-291; p. 301. After shooting Mr. Gainey, Applicant returned to the Gainey home. He stole a television, VCR, sound system and

¹ Bryant gave statements asserting that he pulled the trigger and the bullet hit him in the back. R. pp. 280-281. He stated the victim charged him so he fired back with a second shot, but claimed he did not know if it hit him. R. p. 281.

aquarium. R. p. 317. Upon leaving, he set fire to the couch. R. 1362-64.

At 8:30, Mr. Gainey's ex-wife Linda Coker, and son, Christopher, arrived at the home and called the fire department. The fire department determined the fire was not accidental and also determined it began prior to 8:25 due to the damage of a clock. R. pp. 323-330. The family had been by previously at 7:30. R. pp. 307-311.

Connecting Applicant to the murder was the positive comparison of the shell casings at the scene, the convenience store video with Gainey, and the results of the search warrant of Applicant's home where the television, DVD, VCR, sound system and aquarium were found. R. pp. 336-337. Further, Applicant's girlfriend, Judy Justice, had been given a key from Applicant that was the key to Gainey's mobile home. R. pp. 337-338.

Applicant also gave a statement claiming he threw the wallet into a dumpster, showed a weapon to the victim, and took the items from the Gainey home. R. pp. 1364-65; pp. 340-44. In his last statement, Applicant admitted shooting Mr. Gainey after Mr. Gainey urinated then turned toward him. He stated: "I started freaking out." R. p. 344.

5. The murder of Willard Tietjen on Monday, October 11, 2004. Between 11:00 a.m. and 5:30 p.m., Willard Tietjen, a disabled 62 year old, was murdered in his home. He lived with his wife, Mildred, in a remote and isolated ranch house. R. pp. 1366-67; pp. 44-45. Mr. Tietjen, suffering from a bad heart condition and early onset of Alzheimer's, was a man of habit who stayed around his home due to his conditions. R. pp. 426-427, 473. His wife after leaving for work after breakfast, would begin calling on him around 4:30 p.m. R. p. 1367; p. 432. On October 11th, Mr. Tietjen spoke around 11:00 a.m. with a friend, Robert Summers. R. p. 1368; pp. 433-434; pp. 484-486. Subsequently, without apparent forced entry, Applicant entered the Tietjen home. In Applicant's

statement, he says he knocked on the door, asked for help because his truck had broken down, and Mr. Tietjen invited him inside. R. p. 1368. Ultimately, Applicant shots Mr. Tietjen nine (9) times. R. p. 1368. Applicant then went through Mr. Tietjen's wallet and took cash and some cards. R. p. 1368. He threw some cards around the living room floor, and pulled Mr. Tietjen's masonic ring off his finger. Applicant methodically went through each room in the house looking for items to steal. R. pp. 1368-1369. He took power tools, a knife, a medallion, a jug of change, hand tools, a bag to carry them in, walkie-talkies, cell-phone, silver certificates, jewelry, an ammo box, and other items. R. p. 1369. Applicant also took a drink from the refrigerator, smoked cigarettes, and smoked a cigar. R. p. 1369. In addition, Applicant wrote a note,² and went on the computer. R. p. 1369. Applicant is still in the home when Mrs. Tietjen made her daily call to check on her husband. R. p. 435. She tried to reach Mr. Tietjen on the land line, then calls his cell phone. Applicant answered and stated, "T.J. is dead." and admitted to her that he had killed Mrs. Tietjen's husband. R. p. 1369; pp. 436-437. She terminates the call then calls 911. She called her husband cell phone number again, and Applicant again answers. Applicant stated, "I told you T.J. is dead, and don't call again." R. p. 438; also Tr. pp. 659-660; p. 698. Mr. Tietjen's daughter, Kimberly Dees, also calls the cell phone and Applicant again admits killing her father. R. pp. 477-478. Kimberly's husband, Robert Dees, also calls, and the same sad inculpatory statement is given. R. p. 1369; pp. 481-482. These calls occur between 5:15 and 5:30 p.m.. Law enforcement was called after.

Forensic testing connected the shell casings and bullets from the Tietjen scene with the stolen handgun. R. p. 1370. Applicant's DNA was found on cigarette material within the house -- one

² The contents of the note/letter stated: "no more sick computer porn for this sick f____r. By the way, just keeping my promise to all. Good luck finding me. LMFAO." The note also stated "I find it funny, victim number five in two weeks." R. pp. 516-518.

sample was from a partially smoked cigarette retrieved from the right eye of the victim. R. pp. 594-595. His DNA is also matched to that on a pair of socks. R. p. 595. Handwriting analysis determines the note is consistent with Applicant's writing. R. p. 1370; p. 583. A videotape from a local Bi-Lo store showed Applicant using the change machine. Id. R. pp. 562-563, 569.

Items of stolen property were also recovered and connected to Applicant. R. pp. 546-552. Applicant sold the stolen knife to Roy Lambert – the same individual who heard Applicant admit to shooting Mr. Brown – and he turns it into police. R. pp. 274-276; pp. 572-573.

Applicant also gave inculpatory statements. R. pp. 607-615. He admitted the Tietjen robbery and taking items while still armed. He described acts done within the house and laid claim as the sole perpetrator. He then carried law enforcement to locations where he had deposited items. He admitted having conversations with the Tietjen family. R. p. 1371.

Mrs. Tietjen testified that her husband told her Friday, October 8th, a man came by the house looking for Kimberly Smith. She said her husband tried to assist the person with the use of the telephone book. R. pp. 430-431. When she had returned home on the 8th, she saw a truck in the driveway that she had assumed was a deer-hunter's truck. She recalled it to be a GMC and similar color to a photograph of the truck identified as Applicant's. R. pp. 430-431.

Dr. Joel Sexton, the forensic pathologist, testified about the extensive injuries to Mr. Tietjen. R. p. 109. The victim had nine (9) gunshot wounds and burns to the eyes and his beard. R. pp. 108-113. Two of the shots to the head were fatal. R. p. 112, ll 1-21.

6. The murder of Christopher Burgess on Wednesday, October 13, 2004. At approximately 1:30 a.m., thirty-five (35) year old Christopher Burgess rode a bicycle to the Foxville Road area in Manchester Forest. R. p. 1372. He came upon an Officer Benjamin Stiles and then

continued toward the mall. R. pp. 345-348. Around 4:20 a.m., Mr. Burgess ended up at a convenience store, the Kangaroo Market Express, where he is seen on video with Applicant. R. p. 353, Exhibit 103. Towanda Govan, an employee, knew both Burgess and Applicant by their coming into the store. R. p. 351. On that date, Govan recalled "Chris" coming in first and Applicant came in later. She saw them shake hands. R. p. 352. She recalled that it was around 4:20 a.m. R. pp. 354-355. Mr. Burgess left with Applicant after putting his bike into Applicant's truck. R. p. 1372. They eventually end up in the Foxville Road area. Similar to the Gainey incident, Bryant shot Mr. Burgess and left the unconcealed body in the road bed. Around 6:15 a.m., a deer hunter, Tony Jackson, saw the body in the roadway and called 911. R. pp. 358-360; p. 365.

Mr. Burgess had two (2) gunshot wounds - one through his left cheek that entered his brain and a second through his back that went through his heart and exited. R. p. 1373. The removed bullet and shell casing matched the stolen handgun. R. p. 1373. As noted, the videotape of the convenience store showed Applicant and Burgess together. Items that had been previously seen by law enforcement in Applicant's truck during an interview before this incident are found at the scene. R. pp. 1373-1374. Mr. Burgess' bicycle is recovered from the truck when the warrant is served. R. p. 1374

In Applicant's statements, he admitted shooting Mr. Burgess with the Smith and Wesson, knew the location, and described the body. R. p. 1374; pp. 376-79. Applicant declared in his statements that Mr. Burgess started making demands where he wanted Applicant to take him which, he stated, "pissed me off." He also stated he feared victim would take his truck from him, so he reached under the seat, grabbed the gun and shot him. R. pp. 378 - 379.

Post-Detention Crimes

After incarceration for the above described crimes, Applicant continued to inflict injury and generally perpetuate his violence and/or threats of violence. The Court has considered the following additional facts:

7. Threatening the life of Correctional Officer Thornwell Joe Jones at the Sumter-Lee Regional Detention Center on March 9, 2005. On March 9, 2005, Correctional Officer Cpl. Thornwell Jones and a nurse were passing out food trays and medication to the inmates. R. p. 1375. When they arrived at Applicant's cell, Applicant declared: "I's coming out of my cell when you open the door and I'm going to F____ you up." R. p. 1373; p. 383.³ They open the door and Applicant appeared - hands balled up and ready to fight. R. pp. 383-384. The officers took it seriously and Applicant finally stood down without striking the officer. R. pp. 1375-1376; pp. 383-384. Jones testified that he did not have problems with him after that date. R. p. 387.

8. The assault with intent to kill Correctional Officer Larry Justice on October 26, 2005. On October 26, 2005, Officer Larry Justice was in the process of retrieving dinner trays at the Sumter-Lee Regional Detention Center maximum security area. R. pp. 392-93. He approached Applicant's cell and Applicant placed his tray in the bag. R. p. 392. At that point Applicant sucker punched Justice multiple times. The officer's head is knocked against a wall and he fell to the ground. R. p. 393; p. 413. Applicant kicked and beat Officer Justice on the face and chest. R. p. 1377; pp. 413-14. Another officer witnessed this and called for assistance. R. pp. 413-416. Applicant then withdrew and went into this cell. R. pp. 416-417. Officer Justice suffered a broken

³ During the hearing, he testified that Applicant stated when I open his door he was "going to come out and go to my f____g ass because he ain't got nothing to lose." R. p. 383.

eye socket, broken nose, crushed sinus bones and a brain aneurysm. R. p. 1377; pp. 394-96. He has not worked since the incident. R. p. 401. He suffers headaches, nosebleeds, and he is required to walk with a cane to control his balance. R. p. 1377; pp. 395-96.

III.

ALLEGATIONS

Applicant filed an initial application on May 10, 2011, followed by amendments filed May 21, 2012, and October 1, 2012. The amendment filed October 1, 2012, represents Applicant's final amendment, and only the allegations reflected in that amendment are addressed herein. All prior allegations were withdrawn and/or abandoned, and are not addressed in this Order. The allegations from the final amendment are as follows:

- A. Ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eight and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the South Carolina Constitution and laws. Counsel failed to provide accurate advice to Applicant insofar as the likelihood of his possible sentence if tried by jury versus pleading guilty and receiving a judge sentencing. Applicant was given various pieces of advice concerning his entering a guilty plea and signed three (3) separate plea agreements contained in trial counsel's file. Ultimately, Applicant pleaded guilty to three counts of murder and other related charges in exchange for no consideration from the state. In effect, Mr. Bryant pleaded "straight up" to capital murder. Counsel was ineffective in that they told Applicant there was an "advantage" to pleading guilty in that he was lessening his chances of receiving a death sentence, when in fact he received nothing of benefit from the plea. Moreover, Counsel erroneously advised Applicant as to "statistical" evidence supporting the advice to plead guilty, when no such evidence existed to support the advice given. Counsel further misadvised Applicant as to the rules of evidence if he went to trial versus pleaded guilty. Advising a client to plead guilty under these circumstances was clearly unreasonable. Counsel's inaccurate advice induced Applicant to plead guilty and, but for this erroneous advice, Applicant would have not pled guilty but would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 684 (1984).

- B. Constitutional violation of assistance of counsel in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Lead counsel failed to participate in discussions with Applicant concerning whether Applicant should plead guilty. South Carolina law provides to capital defendants the right to two (2) counsel. Applicant was denied two counsel during a critical stage of his trial, that being the discussion and decision leading him to enter a plea of guilty. This error amounts to a denial of counsel as recognized in United States v. Cronin, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) or was ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 684 (1984).
- C. Ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the South Carolina Constitution and law. Counsel failed to object to the solicitor's improper closing argument during the penalty phase of trial. The Solicitor implored the trial judge to sentence Applicant to death to send a community "message." These types of closing arguments have been condemned by the South Carolina courts and constitute reversible error. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 684 (1984).
- D. Denial of Due Process, Effective Assistance of Counsel and Violation of Prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution due to trial court's refusal to allow Applicant the opportunity to present after-discovered witness testimony relevant to his mental health and mitigation, while allowing the state to present additional evidence in aggravation of punishment after the state had rested its case in aggravation. Trial Counsel failed to object to the trial court's erroneous decision to allow the state to introduce additional victim impact testimony. The trial court's actions were improper, and required an objection from defense counsel. Failure to object was deficient and prejudicial, as capital defendants have an absolute right to confront and/or rebut the evidence against them offered in support of a sentence of death. The above errors and omissions were prejudicial and require that Applicant's death sentence be reversed and his case remanded for a new sentencing trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 669 (1984), Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
- E. Denial of Effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, due to trial counsel's failure to proffer or otherwise preserve the issue of the trial court's denial of trial counsel's request to provide testimony from Edward Goss, who became known as a potential witness after the defense had completed the anticipated evidence in mitigation. Assuming, arguendo, that the above issue was preserved for appellate review, then Applicant was

denied effective appellate counsel for appellate counsel's failure to raise this issue. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 669 (1984). Edward Goss's after-trial statement to law enforcement establishes the materiality of what he had to offer on behalf of Mr. Bryant at trial. The absence of Mr. Goss's testimony was prejudicial to Mr. Bryant. This Court should reverse Mr. Bryant's death sentence [and] remand this case for resentencing.

- F. Denial of Due Process of Law and Right to a Fair Trial due to the State's failure to comply with the requirements of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Edward Goss was a witness to Applicant's mental derangement just prior to the time of the crimes. This fact was witnessed by Law Enforcement Office[r] Tripp Mayes, who saw Applicant in this state and had a conversation with Edward Goss. After Bryant's arrest, which was widely published in the Sumter area papers, but prior to Bryant's trial, Mr. Goss recalled a conversation with Officer Mayes, during which they discussed the fact of their being witnesses to Bryant's bizarre behavior just prior to the murders. Officer Mayes and/or the Solicitor's Office failed to disclose the information concerning Applicant's mental state and/or the existence of Edward Goss as a witness who could provide evidence favorable to the defense. Brady v. Maryland, *Id.* This failure was prejudicial, as the issue of Bryant's mental state was essentially the centerpiece of the defense case in mitigation. Given this fact, the state's failure to turn over this type of evidence cannot be held harmless. Prejudice is manifest and Applicant's sentence should be reversed.

- G. Denial of Due Process of law and a fair trial due to the state's non-disclosure of evidence relevant to the Defense case in mitigation of punishment, evidence that was part and parcel of the circumstances of the crime related to the Tietjen Homicide, evidence that corroborated Mr. Bryant's statements to law enforcement concerning the facts leading up to the Tietjen homicide. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The state was repeatedly asked for discovery and, in turn, the state repeatedly played a game of cat and mouse with the defense team, asking them what they – the defense – thought the state had not turned over. The state, it turns out, was in possession of forensic computer reports and evidence from SLED agent David Givens. Agent Givens' examination of Mr. Tietjen's home computer revealed a history of visits to teen (and various other) porn websites. This examination further revealed that Tietjen had been "surfing" porn at least as early as June, 14, 2004. Agent Givens' casenotes reflect he had a discussion with the state about his investigation of Tietjen's computer on October 25, 2004. Defense counsel was never provided with any documentation about the pornography found on Tietjen's computer. The defense team scrambled to find this kind of evidence because Mr. Bryant told SLED forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Pam

Crawford, that he saw pornography on Tietjen's computer on the day of the killing. (March 25, 2004 Transcript of Interview by Dr. Pam Crawford of Stephen Corey Bryant, at pp. 95-98). Mr. Bryant also told defense forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Donna Schwartz-Watts, that he had seen porn on the computer and, due to his personal history of sex abuse by both male and female family members, felt sexually threatened during the time he committed each of the offenses, including the one committed at the Tietjen home. (See Record on Appeal (hereinafter "ROA", p. 834, line 2-p. 835, line 23).

The prejudice to Bryant created by the state's failure to disclose evidence of pornography use by Tietjen was exacerbated by the state's cross-examination of defense witnesses Dr. Marti Loring and Dr. Donna Schwartz-Watts. The state repeatedly attacked the opinions rendered by both of these witnesses due to their having a lack of "corroboration" and having to rely on Mr. Bryant. Prejudice to Mr. Bryant is obvious in this situation.

Even after thoroughly attacking defense witnesses for their uncorroborated opinions, the state was not finished with making use of the evidence of pornography discovered on Tietjen's computer. And so, during closing arguments to the judge, the Solicitor remarked that Bryant "got on their computer and began to visit porn sites by his choosing, not sites from T.J. and Mildred." (ROA at 1020, lines 7-9). Based on Agent Givens' findings, the state knew, or should have known, that Tietjen, not Bryant, had an affinity for porn. Bryant's computer was examined and no evidence of pornography was ever found. Tietjen's computer had pornography on it dating back to June, 2004, which was approximately four (4) months prior to Bryant ever meeting Tietjen. The State knew, or should have known, the real facts and disclosed them to the defense. Yet, what actually happened was the state urged the Court to sentence Bryant to death based on the false allegation that Mr. Bryant, in an extreme act of indifference, surfed porn on the Tietjen's computer sometime after killing Mr. Tietjen. This is the type of misrepresentation of fact that, whether intentional or simply through negligence/ignorance of the facts, has been condemned by the United States Supreme Court as so egregious that reversal is required. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), U.S. v. Giglio, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).

Finally, the state's misuse of non-disclosed evidence of pornography denied Applicant his right of rebuttal, which is a fundamental due process protection to ensure no one is sentenced to death on the basis of information they could not confront and challenge. The state's Brady/Napue/Giglio violation led to this result and requires reversal of Applicant's death sentence. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977).

IV. DISCUSSION

This Court has had the opportunity to review the record and has heard the testimony and other evidence adduced at the post-conviction relief evidentiary hearing. This Court specifically notes that it has had the opportunity to observe the witnesses presented at the evidentiary hearing, closely pass upon their credibility, and weigh their testimony accordingly. Moreover, this Court heard closing argument at the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing and, additionally, requested, received and considered proposed order from both parties which further reflects the parties positions. After considering Applicant's and Respondents' arguments, the testimony at the evidentiary hearing, and reviewing the record, I find that I must deny the application for post-conviction relief. Set forth below are the relevant findings of fact and conclusions of law as required under S.C. Code § 17-27-80 (1985) as to each individual allegation:

A.

Allegation Counsel Failed to Provide Accurate Advice on Guilty Plea.

Applicant complains counsel failed to provide proper advice concerning "the likelihood of his possible sentence if tried by jury versus pleading guilty and receiving a judge sentencing." (Second Amended Application, filed October 1, 2012, p. 2). Applicant further complains that counsel failed to provide reasonable representation in advising Applicant to plead "'straight up' to capital murder," and that there was any "'advantage' to pleading guilty in that the was lessening his chances of receiving a death, when in fact he received nothing of benefit from the plea." (Second Amended Application, filed October 1, 2012, p. 2). Lastly, Applicant complains counsel misadvised him in regard to a relaxation of the "rules of evidence if he went to trial versus pleading." (Second

Amended Application, filed October 1, 2012, p. 3). This Court find that Applicant made a knowing and intelligent decision to plead guilty based on reasonable advice of counsel. Applicant is not entitled to any relief.

The possibility of entering a guilty plea was explored long the guilty plea in this case, and well before Mr. Babb was relieved and Mr. Clark was appointed counsel. The record shows three proffers of tender of guilty plea were prepared. (See Applicant's 12, 13, 14). Further, a transcript from April 3, 2008, reflects that a tender of guilty plea was offered in conjunction with the request "to permit the defendant to plead guilty and have a jury determine sentence." R. p. 1215. In particular, counsel argued: "Part of his defense and a great impact on the sentence he may receive is the presentation of this evidence in mitigation .. the right to tender that guilty plea is evidence of mitigation. R. p. 1217. Counsel further argued:

... Considerable attention is given - - and we've cited this in here various articles and cases with impact of a defendant pleading is show to be significant on a jury in rendering a sentence. Pleading guilty is in itself a major mitigating factor. It shows he takes responsibility for his actions. Because, Your Honor, a jury may well assume that the defendant is not talking such responsibility when he is forced to plead not guilty to retain his right to a jury trial. I mean, it's a conundrum. And beyond that, it does not deny he State from offering any evidence in regard to defendant's role in the crime at sentencing. ...

R. p. 1218.

At the PCR hearing, Mr. Howle testified that he and Mr. Babb had advised that Applicant would be more likely to receive life if the judge would hear the gruesome facts of the case as opposed to a jury. He recalled seeing the statistics which Mr. Babb had researched and obtained, but maintained, simply from his own perspective, that they were right to advise Applicant he would have a more significant chance to receive life with the judge rather than a jury. Mr. Howle also testified that Mr. Clark was involved with the decision to plead guilty, and did not recall Mr. Clark

questioning the decision. Mr. Babb testified that he was concerned that Applicant would not be able to show remorse which may affect the sentence.

Further, Mr. Babb testified at the PCR hearing that he was keenly aware of the constitutional challenge to the statute of giving up the right to a jury for sentencing when entering a plea. He litigated the issue until it was ultimately resolved against the defense in another, unrelated case. Mr. Babb also testified that his professional opinion was that if Applicant could not show remorse, he was likely to get death. He underscored the importance of his challenge to the statute to allow Applicant the benefit of pleading guilty to show acceptance of responsibility, testifying that stayed in touch with the lawyers in the *Inman* case where the issue was previously submitted. That issue was litigated but ultimately resolved against the defendant's position. *See State v. Inman*, 395 S.C. 539, 720 S.E.2d 31 (2011), *citing State v. Allen*, 386 S.C. 93, 687 S.E.2d 21 (2009), *cert denied*, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 3329 (2010). Further, Mr. Babb testified that requested and received statistics which he included in the proffer from either Robert Lominack, Esq., or Teresa Norris, Esq., both of whom are acknowledged capital defense attorneys, and the statistics supported that a defendant would be more likely to be sentenced to death by jury if maintained he was not guilty.

Mr. Clark testified at the PCR hearing that he meet with Applicant the day of the appointment, and also meet with him at Mr. Clark's office in discussing the possibility of the plea. Mr. Clark testified that the general thought was that it was highly unlikely that the defense would receive any plea offers from the State and Applicant's "gesture" of taking responsibility may be of benefit to him. Mr. Clark testified that the team was "leaning" toward a plea when he came on the case, that the rationale was explained to him and he agreed. Mr. Clark underscored the concern that the "nature of the crime" and the general circumstances would likely evoke great sympathy from a

jury, but a judge is called upon to hear and deal with such circumstances on a regular basis – a judge would not be “so shocked” or show outrage as certain members of the community in general.

Applicant testified at the evidentiary hearing, as well. He testified that it was “the plan” for his to go to trial, but that he made the decision to plead guilty on advice of counsel. Applicant testified that counsel told him that the plea was the “best opportunity” to avoid death. He also testified that counsel advise him if he went to trial the State could “play fast and loose” with the rules of evidence. He also acknowledges signing the tender of guilty plea and sentencing sheets. Applicant testified that he fully understood if he pleaded guilty that Judge Russo would sentence him instead of a jury. Applicant testified that he discussed the plea option with all three counsel. Applicant testified that while he was not promised a sentence, he was promised “more likely than not” he would not receive a death sentence. He testified that he was aware there were no guarantees. Applicant testified that he plead guilty on advice of counsel.

This Court also accepted an affidavit from Teresa Norris, Esq., Ms. Norris avers that she does not recall providing statistics to Mr. Babb, and does not agree with the conclusions based on those statistics.

To establish that Sixth Amendment counsel was ineffective, a PCR applicant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and but for counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. at 694; *Simpson v. Moore*, 367 S.C. 587, 595-96, 627 S.E.2d 701, 706 (2006). “In the context of a guilty plea, the petitioner must demonstrate that his trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and ‘that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would

have insisted on going to trial.” *Burket v. Angelone*, 208 F.3d 172, 189 (4th Cir. 2000), *quoting Hill v. Lockhart*, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome” of the trial. *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 694. Relief will not be granted on showing of mere error. Prejudice must also be shown. *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 687. The standard of “prejudice” differs depending upon whether it is related to guilt phase issues or penalty phase issues. In order to prove “prejudice” in the guilt phase, an applicant must show that but for counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability the result of the trial would have been different. *Johnson v. State*, 325 S.C. 182, 480 S.E.2d 733 (1997). In *Jones v. State*, the Court instructed that prejudice may be found in a capital sentencing proceeding when “there is a reasonable probability that, absent [counsel’s] errors, the sentencer – including an appellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the evidence – would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” 332 S.C. 329, 333, 504 S.E.2d 822, 824 (1998), *quoting Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. at 695.

“Before deciding whether to plead guilty, a defendant is entitled to “the effective assistance of competent counsel.”” *Padilla v. Kentucky*, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1480-81 (2010), *quoting McMann v. Richardson*, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). This situation is somewhat unique in that there is no suggestion that a trial would have been an option for finding Applicant not guilty. Applicant testified that he knew either way he would be found guilty and would be sentenced either to life without the possibility of parole or death. Applicant repeatedly confessed, and had no basis to contest those multiple statements. Moreover, Applicant had the murder weapons and items stolen in the various break-ins. Further still, he was captured on video right before Mr. Gainey’s murder, and again on video before Mr. Burgess’ murder. Additionally, the facts of the Mr. Tietjen’s murder,

the mutilation of the body, the bloody and obscene notes, would likely be very difficult for a jury to hear. Applicant and counsel considered the whole of the case in deciding to plead guilty. Though Applicant now contests the accuracy of the statistics counsel relied upon, those statistics are but part of the counsel's consideration. Mr. Howle testified those statistics were gathered by Mr. Babb, but, independent of those statistics, Mr. Howle believed that Applicant's best opportunity would be before a more neutral figure – a judge rather than jury. Mr. Clark also testified that that was his belief as well – especially here where particularly heinous facts would be presented. Mr. Babb was convinced that Applicant needed to demonstrate as much remorse as possible to have hope of avoiding a death sentence. Thus, the record supports that all counsel – Mr. Howle, Mr. Babb, and Mr. Clark – agreed with the reasoning of entering the plea in this particular case. Further, the record shows that Applicant agreed that allowing the judge to hear the case was in his best interest, and, particularly, that counsel significantly consulted with Applicant, covering varied and specific aspects of pleading guilty. See Respondent Exhibit 1.

Simply, the best hope does not equate to a guarantee of securing a desired result. The advice of counsel in this case constituted well-reasoned strategy, not solely based on statistics, but on experience and knowledge of the community jurors. The plea was knowingly and voluntarily given with reasonable advice of well-experienced counsel.

Applicant has failed in his burden of proof.

B.

Allegation of Denial of Counsel or Ineffective Assistance Based on Deprivation of Two Attorneys During a Critical Stage of Trial.

Applicant complains he was denied two counsel, as required by state statute, during “the

discussion and decision leading him to enter a plea of guilty.” (Second Amended Application, filed October 1, 2012, p. 3). He alleges this failure resulted in deprivation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel citing *United States v. Cronin*, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) and *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 684 (1984). (Second Amended Application, filed October 1, 2012, p. 3). Applicant has failed to show any error.

“The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution compel every State to provide counsel to indigent criminal defendants.” *Bailey v. State*, 309 S.C. 455, 459, 424 S.E.2d 503, 506 (1992), citing *Gideon v. Wainwright*, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The record firmly supports that Applicant was not deprived of his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Mr. Howle consistently represented Applicant from before the notice of intent to seek the death penalty was filed, through the plea and filing of the notice of intent to appeal. Thus, Applicant has failed to show a deprivation of constitutionally guaranteed counsel. See *Cronin*, 466 U.S. at 659 (prejudice is presumed where there “is the complete denial of counsel”). Applicant does not appear to contest this fact at all; rather, he argues that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel should encompass the right to two counsel as provided by statute. This Court rejects such a suggestion.

S.C. Code § 16-3-26 (B) (1), upon which Applicant relies, (see Second Amended Application, filed October 1, 2012, p. 3, “South Carolina laws provides to capital defendants the right to two (2) counsel”), provides for the appointment of two attorneys to represent an indigent capital defendant. The requirement of appointment of two attorneys in the capital setting derives from statute, not the Constitution. *Id. Accord United States v. Blankenship*, 548 F.2d 1118, 1121 (4th Cir. 1976) (distinguishing statutory right to counsel from constitutional right: “Nothing in section 3005 indicates that the constitutional requirement that a defendant be afforded effective

assistance of counsel may not be satisfied in a capital case by the appointment of a single attorney; that section merely provides authority for the court to assign additional counsel when necessary in a capital case.”). Again, Applicant has failed to show a deprivation of constitutionally guaranteed counsel. Moreover, counsel had failed to show deprivation of his statutory right to counsel.

This Court has reviewed the transcript for the substitution of counsel hearing held July 18, 2008. See R. p. 1309. At the hearing, Mr. Howle confirmed that he had consistently represented Applicant “since the charges were initially brought against him,” and, specifically, had continued representing him after notice that the State intended to seek death. R. p. 1311. (See also R. pp. 1054-1056, reflecting Mr. Howle’s representation of Applicant at the December 21, 2004 preliminary hearing). Further, Mr. Howle advised the court that Mr. Babb had been appointed as second chair after the notice was served, “and he has diligently worked on this case all that period of time.” R. p. 1311. In fact, the record is replete with evidence of diligently pursuing discovery, experts and expert funding, and even preparing for trial in April 2008, before the trial was stayed pursuant to the Supreme Court of South Carolina to resolve a pending superceding action challenging the constitutionality of the statute requiring a waiver of jury sentencing to plead guilty. See R. pp. 1158-1202; pp. 1206-1214; pp. 1224-1230; pp. 1233-1307. Due to medical concerns, however, Mr. Babb was not able to continue his representation (though testimony at the PCR evidentiary hearing confirmed that he was available for consultation with counsel, and a general aid to Applicant due to their well established relationship). R. p. 1312. At the July 18, 2008 hearing, Mr. Howle stated: “Mr. Bryant is aware of this and signed a consent on July 11th.” R. p. 1312. The trial judge noted, “I appreciate the fact that Mr. Bryant has been consulted on that and that he has, in fact, submitted this consent for release, although I don’t know that that’s required, but I do appreciate it.” R. p.

1312. The trial judge directly addressed Applicant at the hearing and confirmed his understanding of the substitution, and that he had no “opposition to that.” R. p. 1313. Further, the trial judge confirmed that Mr. Clark was “qualified and certified” to serve as counsel in a capital case, and that he was willing to accept the appointment. R. p. 1313. Further still, the trial judge confirmed at the July 18, 2008 hearing that the case was then scheduled to be heard “the weeks of September 1st and September 8th” and that neither Mr. Howle nor Mr. Clark saw any reason or cause that the schedule could not be maintained. R. p. 1314. Mr. Howle confirmed that Mr. Clark had been given a disc the day before the hearing with “everything on it.” R. p. 1316. The trial judge allowed Mr. Clark time to review the materials asked, “if any issue does arise for you review of those materials, [to] notify the Court as soon as possible.” R. p. 1316. Mr. Clark agreed to do so. R. p. 1317. Additionally, both Mr. Howle and Mr. Clark confirmed that the pre-trial hearings the week of August 25th would not pose a problem. R. pp. 1318-1320.

As Applicant correctly states, the decision to plead guilty has been held to be a critical stage in a criminal case. *See, e.g., Missouri v. Frye*, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1405 (2012) (“Critical stages include arraignments, postindictment interrogations, postindictment lineups, and the entry of a guilty plea.”); *Iowa v. Tovar*, 541 U.S. 77, 81 (2004) (“The entry of a guilty plea, whether to a misdemeanor or a felony charge, ranks as a ‘critical stage’ at which the right to counsel adheres.”). The record does not show that Applicant was ever deprived of his right to counsel during the decision to plead guilty. In particular, this Court notes the continuity in counsel’s representation – essentially, Mr. Howle provided the anchor to the representation, demonstrating Applicant was never without counsel during any of his capital proceedings. Moreover, Mr. Babb’s testimony indicates that he committed tremendous time and resources in preparing the case, along with Mr.

Howle, prior to his disability preventing further representation. Additionally, Mr. Clark admittedly had limited time to be involved in the case, but this Court notes that he was given all the discovery, meet with the client, and, while he testified his conversations were not so detailed and diverse as they would have been had he had years on the case instead of months, he nonetheless confirmed that he engaged in discussion, agreed with the rationale of the plea, and actively prepared and participated in the sentencing proceedings.

This Court notes that Applicant has not complained counsel was deficient in regard to plea negotiations or advice on a plea offer. *See Frye*, 132 S.Ct. at 1408 (“as a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused.”); *Lafler v. Cooper*, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (acknowledging a defendant may show ineffective assistance where advice “has caused the rejection of a plea leading to a trial and a more severe sentence”). Indeed, Mr. Clark acknowledge that the possibility of any negotiations in this case were slim to none. Rather, Applicant has complained merely that two counsel were not appointed at a critical stage – the decision to enter the plea. In the plainest of terms, the record shows that Applicant was represented throughout the process. Further, counsel has been deemed ineffective in their advice on the guilty plea option. (See Issue A, *supra*).

Applicant has failed to show a deprivation of counsel.

C.

Allegation Counsel Was Ineffective in Failing to Objection to Solicitor’s Closing Argument Asking the Judge to Send a Message to the Community.

Applicant complains counsel was ineffective in failing to object to that portion of the

Solicitor's closing requesting "the trial judge sentence Applicant to death to send a community 'message'." (Second Amended Application, filed October 1, 2012, p. 3). Applicant relies on the following portion of the solicitor's closing:

Judge Russo, I don't envy the position you're in one bit; but as James Aiken said, you have to make hard decisions and live with them and it takes moral courage. You represent our community in the trial and it's the function of a capital sentencing jury to express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death. And let there be no doubt, Stephen Corey Bryant through his attorneys [is] going to present himself to the Court [in] the most pathetic manner that he possibly can. And one more time, Judge, he's gonna say, sir, would you help me please. And I ask you to send a message as a representative of our community to *Stephen Corey Bryant* with what you now know. Judge, tell him no. Thank you.

R. pp. 1026-1027 (emphasis added).

Applicant's argument meets a first and insurmountable hurdle in that the argument was not to send a message to the "community," but a message to Applicant. The cases cited by Applicant in regard to sending a community message simply do not apply to the circumstance of this case. Applicant has failed to show any deficient performance in regard to the cited comment.

Without doubt, a solicitor's closing argument should be premised on seeking justice and he is "bound to the rules of fairness" in making his argument. *See State v. Northcutt*, 372 S.C. 207, 222, 641 S.E.2d 873, 881 (2007). *See also Vasquez v. State*, 388 S.C. 447, 458, 698 S.E.2d 561, 566 (2010), *quoting Northcutt*, 372 S.C. at 222, 641 S.E.2d at 881 ("[s]olicitors are bound to the rules of fairness in their closing arguments"); *State v. Finklea*, 388 S.C. 379, 386, 697 S.E.2d 543, 547 (2010) ("While the solicitor should prosecute vigorously, his duty is not to convict a defendant but to see justice done."). "[T]he solicitor's closing argument must be carefully tailored so as not to appeal to the personal bias of the juror, nor be calculated to arouse his passion or prejudice."

Finklea, 388 S.C. at 386, 697 S.E.2d at 547.

Mr. Howle testified at the PCR hearing that he was aware of cases criticizing the “send a message to the community” requests. The failure to object was not based upon lack of knowledge. This Court finds credible and reasonable Mr. Howle’s testimony at the PCR hearing that the fact that a judge was hearing argument rather than a jury was a factor to consider in whether to objection. As Mr. Howle indicated, it would seem unnecessary to ask the judge to disregard the comment. It is especially unnecessary here as there is no reasonable basis for an objection.

“The justifications supporting imposition of the death penalty are retribution and deterrence.” *State v. Allen*, 386 S.C. 93, 99, 687 S.E.2d 21, 24 (2009), citing *Gregg v. Georgia*, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976). A solicitor must be allowed to argue that the case presented supports the penalty he seeks. See, e.g., *State v. Cain*, 297 S.C. 497, 509, 377 S.E.2d 556, 562 (1988) (“The ... challenged comments here, when viewed in the context of the entire summation, were no more than recommendations by the solicitor as to the appropriateness of the death penalty based on evidence adduced at trial. The ‘send a message’ argument here certainly did not rise to the level of arousing juror passion or prejudice.”). The solicitor here tailored his argument to the specific facts of this case, the character of the defendant, and the facts supported by the record, as he was required to do:

The State’s closing arguments must be confined to evidence in the record and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. *Id.* “A solicitor has a right to state his version of the testimony and to comment on the weight to be given such testimony.” *Randall v. State*, 356 S.C. 639, 642, 591 S.E.2d 608, 610 (2004).

Vasquez, 388 S.C. at 458, 698 S.E.2d at 566.

The exact comment at issue here, when viewed in context, reflects the solicitor alluded to Applicant’s shown propensity to “ask for help” in seeking access to homes in order to commit

burglary and/or murder. See *State v. Northcutt*, 372 S.C. at 222, 641 S.E.2d at 881 (“We must review the argument in the context of the entire record.”). The “message” was merely to tell the Applicant “no,” *i.e.*, to reject the claims in mitigation and sentence him to death for his heinous crimes, not merely to send a message to the community in general. Thus, the comment – squarely tied to Applicant – was not in the least improper. See generally *State v. Allen*, 386 S.C. at 99-100, 687 S.E.2d at 24 (“We do not find the trial court’s imposition of the death sentence in this case to be the result of any arbitrary factor. In reading the entirety of the court’s colloquy, it is clear that the sentence was premised primarily on retribution to this particular defendant, and the fact that the murders were deliberate, premeditated and cruel”).

Further, to the extent Applicant contends the solicitor’s request to act for the community, *i.e.*, “I ask you to send a message as a representative of our community,” that request is not improper either. See *State v. Daniels*, ___ S.C. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2012 WL 4801526 *2 (2012) (“A charge that the jury is acting for the community, however, is not similar to a Golden Rule argument in that it does not ask the jury to consider the victim’s perspective.”). Though the Supreme Court of South Carolina, by footnote in the concurring opinion in *Daniels*, cautioned that such a request to a jury may border on a “Golden Rule” argument as it “carries the same connotation and effect,” *State v. Daniels*, ___ S.C. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2012 WL 4801526 n. 2 (Toal, CJ. Concurring), as Mr. Howled noted, this argument was to the judge, not a jury. Further, the referenced comments in context show there was not an appeal to bias, prejudice or emotion, but an acknowledgment of the exercise of the community conscience – a permissible argument even in jury settings. See *United States v. Ebron*, 683 F.3d 105, 145-146 (5th Cir. 2012) (“The challenged arguments here were not clear appeals to the jury’s passions and prejudices. Nor were they plainly intended to inflame the

jury. Instead, these arguments appeared to have invited the jury to take on the permissible task of acting as the conscience of the community on the question of the appropriate sentence for Ebron.”); *United States v. Davis*, 609 F.3d 663, 688 (5th Cir. 2012), *quoting Jackson v. Johnson*, 194 F.3d 641, 655 & nn. 54-56 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[a]lthough the prosecution may not appeal to the jury’s passions and prejudices, the prosecution may appeal to the jury to act as the conscience of the community.”). The United States Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he State has in a capital sentencing proceeding a strong interest in having the jury ‘express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death.’” *Lowenfield v. Phelps*, 484 U.S. 231, 238 (1988), *quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois*, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968). Moreover, our State Supreme Court has even found that “[g]eneral deterrence arguments are admissible in the penalty phase of a capital trial.” *State v. Shuler*, 353 S.C. 176, 189, 577 S.E.2d 438, 444 (2003). Upon careful review, this Court finds nothing of impropriety in the solicitor’s comments. Further, if some impropriety could be found, Applicant is still not entitled to relief based on the overwhelming evidence of guilt and circumstances of aggravation. *Daniels, supra*. See also *Sinisterra v. United States*, 600 F.3d 900, 911 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding no reasonable probability of a different result where there was substantial evidence supporting the jury’s findings the case warranted death).

To establish that Sixth Amendment counsel was ineffective, a PCR applicant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and but for counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. at 694; *Simpson v. Moore*, 367 S.C. 587, 595-96, 627 S.E.2d 701, 706 (2006). “Relief will not be granted on showing of mere error. Prejudice must also be shown. *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 687. When “there is a reasonable probability that, absent [counsel’s]

errors, the sentencer – including an appellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the evidence – would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” *Jones v. State, supra*. Having conducted this reweighing of the evidence, this Court finds Applicant has again failed to carry his burden of proof. When compared to the evidence available for mitigation, especially the diagnosis of PTSD and reports of sexual abuse, though clearly evidence to be consider, such evidence does not overtake the extraordinary level of malice and callousness, particularly the taunting of the Tietjen family members and the senseless shooting of Mr. Brown and the multiple murder victims.

In sum, viewing the comments in context, this Court finds Applicant has failed to show any basis for an objection. Consequently, he has failed to show deficient performance. Alternatively, if error should be found, such error, in context of the entire case, still fails to afford relief. *Jones, supra*. Applicant’s allegation of error is without merit. He is not entitled to any relief.

D.

Allegation Applicant Was Improperly Denied Right to Present Additional Evidence in Mitigation While the State Was Allowed to Present Additional Evidence in Aggravation.

Applicant complains that counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the plea judge’s decision “to allow the state to introduce additional victim impact testimony” without affording an opportunity “to confront and/or rebut the evidence” thereby treating the state and defense differently to Applicant’s detriment. (Second Amended Application, filed October 1, 2012, p. 3). Again, Applicant has failed to show he is entitled to relief.

Applicant has failed to prove a factual basis for his claim. The guilty plea to all the charges was August 18, 2008. R. p. 1323-1352; pp. 1334-1338. Sentencing was deferred on all charges until

the capital sentencing proceeding was held. R. p. 1384. The judge noted for the record in concluding the hearing, “the purpose of today’s hearing was simply to allow Mr. Bryant to enter his plea and there was no, never any intention to take any testimony today, that it was just simply for the matter of entering a plea. ” R. p. 1384. The judge continued, “we’re scheduled for the week of September 2nd and the following week should we need it. We will proceed with a trial on the sentencing phase and at that time, of course, the Court will take testimony and any motions or anything that we need to address at that time.” R. p. 1384. The receipt of statements from the victims was simply reserved for presentation at sentencing.

In allegation D, the Applicant contends that it was a denial of due process and ineffective assistance of counsel for the failure of the trial court to prevent the admission after the conclusion of arguments for and against the death penalty of victim impact evidence from non-capital crime victims prior to the sentencing for the non-capital crimes. R. pp. 1041- 1047. Respondent submits that the procedure used by Judge Russo was consistent with the Victim Bill of Rights and use of victim impact evidence for non-capital crimes. S.C. Code Ann. Section 16-3-1550 (C) . This Court agrees.

The record reveals that after the parties had completed the arguments on death penalty sentencing and addressing the information concerning the Gause issue, the trial judge then addressed the fact that they were proceeding to the sentencing phase of the case. R. p. 1040. He then inquired of the prosecution and the defense if they were ready and they stated that they were. Judge Russo next made inquiry with the state if there was any additional evidence regarding sentencing and individuals who wished to be heard. Solicitor Jackson stated individuals would like to speak on the particular cases that Bryant had pled. Without objection, Mr. Ammons, who home had been broken

into made an impact statement. R. pp. 1042-1044. Chris Gainey, son of assault victim Cliff Gainey made a victim impact statement. R. p. 1044. Robbie Burgess, brother of victim Chris Burgess also made an impact statement. R. p. 1045-46. No objection was made to any of the statements nor was any request for cross-examination made by the defense.

At that point, Judge Russo asked whether there was any further presentation by the defense regarding sentencing or if anyone wished to address the court on Bryant's behalf. R. pp 1046-47. Counsel Howle stated he had spoken with the family before they had left and did not emotionally wish to be present that date. Counsel stated that they reiterate the mitigation previously presented. R. p. 1046. Lastly, inquiry was made of Bryant. After conferring, counsel stated that Bryant did not wish to speak, but reference was made to the letter that he wrote to the victim's family in the Tietjen case. R. p. 1047.

In the proceeding before this Court, the Solicitor's office asserted that it was not going to put up victim impact evidence at the time of the entry of the guilty plea, but was leaving the victim impact evidence in the crimes where the death penalty was not sought, until after the death penalty proceeding. He stated that this procedure was understood and agreed to by the parties and the Court. Plea counsel for Bryant stated that in hindsight, they should have objected. However, upon inquiry by this Court, it was unclear what the objection to the proceeding should have been in allowing the presentation of the victim impact evidence in open court, albeit after the conclusion of the argument in the death penalty case.

South Carolina law provides in Section 16-3-1550:

- F) The circuit or family court **must hear or review any victim impact statement, whether written or oral, before sentencing.** Within a reasonable period of time before sentencing, the prosecuting agency must make available to the defense any written victim impact statement **and the court must allow the defense an**

opportunity to respond to the statement. However, the victim impact statement must not be provided to the defense until the defendant has been found guilty by a judge or jury. The victim impact statement and its contents are not admissible as evidence in any trial.

Code 1976 § 16-3-1550.

Here, while current counsel for Applicant asserts that there is a preference for hearing all victim impact evidence concerning crimes that the death penalty is not sought during the penalty phase proceeding, he has been unable to articulate how this was either error under state or federal law. To the contrary, this impact evidence could have been presented at the time the plea was entered, before the penalty had begun consistent with South Carolina law. Although the evidence could have been presented during the penalty phase, nothing requires it to have been done at that time for the non-capital crimes. There is no state law error.

Contrary to the claims of the Applicant, this evidence was not related to the sentencing for the capital crime, but for the non-capital crimes. Here, the Applicant had the opportunity to confront the impact witnesses prior to the sentence in their non-capital cases. No request was made to examine them which is authorized under state law. The victims had the statutory right to be heard and the defense had the right to respond. This Court is constrained to find that plea counsel was not ineffective for failing to make an objection to the entry of this evidence under either prong of Strickland v. Washington, supra. Further, there is no constitutional violation where there is an opportunity to be heard and confront the evidence prior to the sentencing for their crimes, independent of the capital case.

Applicant has failed in his burden.

*E.****Allegation of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Failing to Properly Proffer Evidence to Preserve the Gause Issue for Appeal; or, Alternatively, Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel in Failing to Present the Issue on Appeal.***

Applicant complains that counsel failed to “proffer or otherwise preserve the issue of the trial court’s denial of trial counsel’s request to provide testimony from Edward [Gause,]⁴ who became known as a potential witness after the defense had completed the anticipated evidence in mitigation.” (Second Amended Application, filed October 1, 2012, p. 4). Alternatively, Applicant complains that if the issue should be deemed preserved, appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to present the issue. (Second Amended Application, filed October 1, 2012, p. 4). Neither complaint has merit.

This Court has reviewed the guilty plea transcript where reference is made to Mr. Gause. Mr. Howle brought the matter to the sentencing judge’s attention as soon as he received the information from Mr. Gause, and specifically requested time to investigate, all prior to the judge imposing sentence:

Your Honor, before we begin, one thing I did want to address the Court about. When I came in this morning to my office there was a message on the answering machine from someone who indicated that they had some information they thought was really important and wanted to talk to us. Ms. Spivey, my office manager, called that number that was left and the man who left the message was not there, it was his wife. And she related some things. I won’t say what they were yet other than I guess the message, you can call it after-discovered testimony. I don’t know why they waited till last night to call. But also related that apparently she had called your home and spoken to your wife. I’m not even – I don’t know if you’re aware of that, Your Honor. But your wife indicated well obviously I cannot talk to the judge about

⁴ Mr. Gause testified at the hearing. His name is misspelled in the initial pleadings. The Court, in this discussion, will use the correct spelling “Gause” as opposed to “Goss.” However, the Court is referring to the same individual.

anything you want to tell me. The circumstances of what the individual related was involved in meeting him before these murders happened and coming up and just want to talk to him, said he needed help, ...

Edwin Goss was the individual who when we called the number the person who answered said she was Mrs. Goss. Said he - - the police officer drove up. He went over to Mr. Goss, talked to him, said this guy come up to me, he's kind of rambling, he says he needs help, doesn't know what he's going to do. The officer - - don't know the officer name, wife did not know. She said Mr. Goss would call back and tell me. But talking to the officer the officer went over to talk to Stephen, came back and said he just - - I don't think, he's just kind of rambling, I don't see anything. Fellow didn't pay anymore attention and then apparently through seeing some of the pictures in the paper or whatever, left this message last night on the answering machine and we didn't see it till this morning. I have certainly not talked with him. I did not talk with the wife. So I can't verify all that, but obviously if he had contacted us earlier and realized the incident I feel certain we would have called him as a witness and present the mitigation because I think it was material what he said. It would certainly go to state of mind to mental condition before these offenses happened. And to that extent, Your Honor, I guess we move to reopen to allow that person to testify. And like I say, I haven't had the opportunity to talk with him. I didn't even know his name until this morning and have not been able to contact him, only had that conversation with his wife.

R. pp. 1037-1038.

The judge acknowledged that the witness had called his home, had spoken to his wife, and left a message that he lived in Sumter and that it was "very urgent that he speak" to the judge about Applicant. R. pp. 1038-1039. The judge noted he "was going to share that with you this morning ... not knowing that apparently he called your office as well" R. p. 1039. However, the judge found that "this case has been going on for some time" and "[b]oth sides have had amply opportunity to present the evidence...." R. p. 1039. He acknowledged the defense "position that this is evidence that was just recently discovered, but found:

... at this stage we don't even know if it's evidence. We don't know if it will be anything that's admissible. We don't even know what it is. And I'm going to deny the request to reopen the case and certainly would note any exceptions that you would have to that ruling....

R. p. 1039.

Mr. Howle added:

Your Honor, I would just ask you note the objection because, like I said, specifically what was related to me from the wife talking to - - Ms. Spivey who then talked to me was that he was seeking help when he did that and I just felt that was testimony we certainly would have presented had we known it.

R. pp. 1039-1040.

Mr. Howle testified at the PCR hearing that after sentencing, he had an investigator take a statement from Mr. Gause. However, that statement was not offered in any post-trial motion.⁵ Whether the judge abused his discretion in declining to reopen the defense case was not an issue raised on appeal.

At the PCR evidentiary hearing, Mr. Howle testified that he could not recall precisely his actions in regard to the information, but recalled the information went to Applicant's acting irrationally approximately one month before the murders. Appellate counsel, Joseph L. Savitz, Esq., testified that he was the former chief attorney at Appellate Defense⁶ and had also worked as a Senior Appellate Defender with the agency. His practice and position required that he be assigned approximately half of all capital appeals that were handled by Appellant Defense. Mr. Savitz testified that he reviewed the entire transcript to determine which issues to raise in the appeal and decided to raise only the issue regarding excluding the defense testimony from the Applicant's aunt that she had been sexually abused by her father. He testified that the record appeared to indicate that Mr.

⁵ In fact, such a statement was not offered at the PCR evidentiary hearing, and has not been reviewed or considered by this Court.

⁶ The Commission on Indigent Defense, Division of Appellate Defense – the State agency that is charged with the representation of indigent criminal defendants on appeal.

Gause's expected testimony was "somewhat vague and unconnected" to the incident. He testified the record reflected a situation "too vague for me to do anything." However, Mr. Savitz also testified that he would not have reason to abandon a meritorious issue, and, if he had the appeal again, we would raise the issue as the issue previously raised did not support relief. Mr. Savitz testified that the failure to raise the issue was not from neglect, or from failure to review the transcript – he simply didn't think it was an issue that should be raised.

Applicant presented Mr. Edward Gause at the PCR hearing. Mr. Gause – a former Charleston City police officer, and a Sumter County employee for approximately seventeen (17) years – testified that he saw a shirtless young man "playing in the sand" at a Young's convenience store approximately one month before the murders. When Mr. Gause stopped at the store, the young man approached him and asked if Mr. Gause was the "man he was supposed to see." The young man indicated he was having "weird thoughts," though he did not specify what the thoughts were. Mr. Gause attempted to help the young man by advising him to pray and referring him to an officer, Sgt. Tripp Mays, who Mr. Gause testified was at the convenience store. Later, Mr. Gause saw the young man walk off with several young girls "fussing" at him. According to Mr. Gause, he then spoke to Sgt. Mays about the incident. At some point after, and due to media coverage, Mr. Gause identified the young man as Applicant. Mr. Gause testified that he later talked to Sgt. Mays who agreed that "they" had seen Applicant.

This Court also received the affidavit of Sgt. Mays. Sgt. Mays averred that he knows Mr. Gause, but has no recollection of such an event taking place – either at the store with the young man or a subsequent conversation about the young man being Applicant. Sgt. Mays averred that he searched his call records around the month before the murders and the month after the October 2004

murders. Sgt. Mays averred he found no call records to support “any interaction with Mr. Gause regarding a report of a young man in distress at a Young’s convenience on Old Manning Road,” in Sumter. (Mays Affidavit, p. 2).

As first matter, this Court finds that Applicant has failed to show that trial counsel was ineffective in his handling of the late information from Mr. Gause. Mr. Howle promptly brought the matter to the Court’s attention and requested the ability to present Mr. Gause. Mr. Howle underscored that the testimony was expected to go to Applicant’s mental state which was a major portion of the mitigation case. Mr. Howle had no further information to give the Court to further bolster his request as Mr. Gause had only made a late disclosure to the defense. Applicant has failed to establish *Strickland* error.

As a second matter, this Court finds that Applicant has failed to show that appellate counsel was ineffective in his decision not to raise the issue in the direct appeal. A defendant is entitled to a due process right of effective assistance in his first appeal. *Evitts v. Lucey*, 469 U.S. 387 (1985). The *Strickland* deficient performance and prejudice test applies to determine the merits of any claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. *Smith v. Robbins*, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000); *Bennett v. State*, 383 S.C. 303, 309, 680 S.E.2d 273, 276 (2009). However, “it is difficult to demonstrate that counsel was incompetent” as for the most part, deficient performance may be shown “only when ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented....” *Smith v. Robbins*, 528 U.S. at 288, quoting *Gray v. Greer*, 800 F.2d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 1986). “To prove prejudice, the applicant must show that, but for counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability he would have prevailed on appeal.” *Anderson v. State*, 354 S.C. 431, 434, 581 S.E.2d 834, 835 (2003). Like Sixth Amendment counsel, to effect a fair review of counsel’s performance, a reviewing court must “eliminate the

distorting effects of hindsight” and attempt “to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 689; *Butler v. State*, 286 S.C. 444-45, 334 S.E.2d 815 (1985).

This Court notes that Mr. Savitz was candid that, in hindsight, he would raise the issue simply because the one he did raise was not successful. However, that is a classic case of hindsight reasoning and does not support relief. Moreover, Mr. Savitz, an experience attorney particularly in capital appeals, made his professional review of the record and determined not to raise the issue. There is no indication of neglect or inadvertence. *Lawrence v. Branker*, 517 F.3d 700, 709 (4th Cir. 2008), citing *Bell v. Jarvis*, 236 F.3d 149, 164 (4th Cir.2000) (en banc) (“Effective assistance of appellate counsel does not require the presentation of all issues on appeal that may have merit....”); *Tisdale v. State*, 357 S.C. 474, 594 S.E.2d 166 (2004) (rejecting conclusion of PCR judge that “Effective Appellate Counsel has an obligation to raise all meritorious issues on appeal”). Moreover, Applicant has failed to show this issue was a “stronger” issue than the one raised. *Smith v. Robbins*, *supra*. As Mr. Savitz stated, the proffer of testimony was vague and not clearly connected to any of the crimes. Further, there was evidence in the record that Applicant had reported issues to his probation officer and family prior to the trial, and even had sought counseling and help before the crimes. See R. pp 145; 182; 762-763; 789-790; 821-824; 956. This was known to the defense, presented by the defense, and used by the defense psychiatrists in consideration of Applicant’s mental state. See R. pp. 789-790; 821-824; 956.

Further, if Applicant could show deficient performance by counsel, he has not shown prejudice. This Court has considered the testimony of Mr. Gause and finds the testimony cannot be given any significant weight. On cross-examination, Mr. Gause admitted that his memory was

somewhat faulty in some respects, that he was “not sure on the time,” and even testified at one point that he may have spoken to Sgt. Mays after sentencing. He also, at another point, testified that he did not connect the young man to Applicant until the day of sentencing. Further, Mr. Gause was unclear as to when he identified Applicant or why he waited from the initial media coverage (around 2004) to the sentencing (in September 2008) to contact the defense. Of particular note, as to the identification itself, Mr. Gause did not recall any tattoos or other identifying marks. Applicant has a very visible on his left chest that was clearly obvious at the PCR hearing from the neck opening of Applicant’s prison issued jumpsuit (a fact Applicant conceded in his own testimony at the PCR hearing). Further still, Mr. Gause did not recall a blue truck (such as the one Applicant used in his crimes) anywhere near the convenience store, or any other identifying aspect independent of the facial recognition. Lastly, while Dr. Schwartz-Watts testified at the PCR hearing that, essentially, any corroborating evidence is evidence she would like to have, there is no indication that having his vague report would have affected any mitigation strategy or diagnosis.

The dissimilarity of a shirtless wanderer compared to Applicant’s clear requests for help and timely followup to mental health professionals as reported by the probation officer, admitted by Applicant and clearly stated in the record, leads this Court to conclude it simply cannot give great weight to the testimony that Applicant was the man Mr. Gause saw. Neither can the Court find that the lack of this testimony negatively affected the decision to plead guilty, or, for that matter, any aspect of the case in mitigation.

In sum, Applicant has failed to demonstrate deficient performance of counsel. However, even if deficient performance may be show, Applicant has failed to demonstrate *Strickland* prejudice. Consequently, Applicant is not entitled to any relief.

*F.**Allegation of Brady Violation Concerning Edward Gause.*

Applicant complains that the Gause information was known to law enforcement – specifically Officer Tripp Mays of the Sumter County Sheriff's Department – and should have been disclosed during discovery. (Second Amended Application, filed October 1, 2012, p. 4). Again, Applicant's case fails factually. Applicant has failed to show any material information regarding Mr. Gause was known to prosecution and that there was a non-disclosure of such information.

"A *Brady* claim is based upon the requirement of due process" and "is complete if the accused can demonstrate (1) the evidence was favorable to the accused, (2) it was in the possession of or known to the prosecution, (3) it was suppressed by the prosecution, and (4) it was material to guilt or punishment." *Gibson v. State*, 334 S.C. 515, 524, 514 S.E.2d 320, 324 (1999), citing *Kyles v. Whitley*, 514 U.S. 419, 432-42 (1995); *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); *State v. Von Dohlen*, 322 S.C. 234, 241, 471 S.E.2d 689, 693 (1996). "*Brady* requires the State to disclose evidence in its possession favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment." *State v. Von Dohlen*, 322 S.C. at 241, 471 S.E.2d at 693, citing *Pennsylvania v. Ritchie*, 480 U.S. 39 (1987); *Clark v. State*, 315 S.C. 385, 434 S.E.2d 266 (1993). "Impeachment or exculpatory evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." *Id* citing *United States v. Bagley*, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).

At the PCR hearing, as noted above, Mr. Gause testified that he did not contact the solicitor or law enforcement at or about the time of the hearing, rather, he contacted only the defense and the judge. Moreover, this Court accepted the affidavit of Sgt. Mays. Sgt. Mays avers he has no record

or independent recollection of ever speaking with Mr. Gause about Applicant. Further, Applicant produced no evidence that the solicitor had any indication of Mr. Gause's possible testimony. While knowledge may be imputed to the State in certain circumstances, *see Von Dohlen*, 322 S.C. at 241, 471 S.E.2d at 693, Applicant here has not established there was any knowledge to impute. Even so, Applicant has also failed to show the evidence would have made a difference if disclosed.

When considering a *Brady* violation in the context of a guilty, the relevant question for determining whether the information is material is whether "there is a reasonable probability that, but for the government's failure to disclose *Brady* evidence, the defendant would have refused to plead guilty and gone to trial." *Gibson v. State*, 334 S.C. at 525-526, 514 S.E.2d at 325. As noted above, Mr. Gause admitted in his testimony that his recollection was faulty in some respects, and his identification of Applicant is suspect given that the shirtless individual Mr. Gause saw did not have any tattoos or identifying marks, while Applicant has very visible tattoos, including one on his chest.

The essence of securing the disclosure is to ensure a fair proceeding. *Id.* Applicant has failed to show that a *Brady* violation occurred. But further still, he has failed to show that had he had the known of the potential Gause testimony prior to his sentencing proceeding, that he would not have pleaded guilty. Further, there is nothing in the testimony that is exculpatory of the murders or any of the other crimes. Further still, the record shows that the defense carefully investigated Applicant's mental health and employed two psychiatrist – Dr. Donna Schwartz-Watts and Dr. Margaret Melikian – to evaluate Applicant. See R. pp. 1328-1331. Applicant has failed to show the lack of the possibility of considering and/or presenting this testimony would have negatively affected the fairness of the proceedings.

Applicant has failed to carry his burden of proof

G.***Allegation of Denial of Due Process and Fair Trial Due to State's
Non-Disclosure of Evidence in Discovery***

In allegation G, the Applicant contends that there was non-disclosure of evidence concerning the computer analysis by the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division. In particular, he contended in the allegation that information seized on the computer corroborated Bryant's statements to the police. In allegation G, as filed on October 1, 2012, he asserts that the non-disclosed computer analysis revealed that Tietjen (or whoever had access) had been browsing visiting pornography sites as early as June 2004 according to the computer's internet history. Bryant claims that he had given statements that he saw pornography on Tietjen's computer that date. Bryant asserts in the allegation that he had told defense psychiatrist that with his history of sex abuse, he felt sexually threatened during the time of the offenses. They contend generally that had they known about this computer evidence, it would have impacted upon their case. For the reasons set forth below, this Court must conclude that the Applicant did not meet his burden of proof.

The Statements About Computer Use

SLED Agent Barton testified at the PCR hearing about the series of statements the Applicant made concerning whether he had viewed Tietjen's computer and the timing of the viewing. In particular, he confirmed the following :

Statements by Bryant concerning Tietjen's computer:

1. October 13, 2004 - Bryant gave a statement discussing the Masons with Tietjen. He claimed the victim was showing him things about the Masons and bragging. Bryant stated that the

victim was disturbed and threatened by what he knew about the Masons. Bryant stated that "I remember the man telling me he wishes he was young like me because he liked young girls. I remember looking at the man's computer and seeing pornography. I'm not sure, but I think I'm having flashbacks of being on the computer and seeing a young girl with a horse in her." Also ROA 609, 1 8-13.

2. On October 13, 2004, in Dr. Crawford's questioning of Bryant, Bryant stated:

Mr. Bryant: We talked for a couple hours. And somewhere along the lines, it seemed - - and I'm remembering - - something about some kind of pornography about how he likes them - - he was saying how he wished he was my age again because he likes them young.

Then he got to talking about the pornography and there's all kind of different web-sites on his computer, if I'm not mistaken. I'm not sure. I'm just now remembering this.

Dr. Crawford: That's fine. Just whatever comes to you. So, he started talking about some pornography web-sites he had?

Mr. Bryant: Yeah.

Dr. Crawford: Okay.

Mr. Bryant: And somehow I remember - - I'm thinking it was afterwards that he was there. That I had somehow gotten on his computer and actually seen it for myself what all there

was.

Dr. Crawford: Okay.

Mr. Bryant: And there was actually a picture taken on his computer under saved history from where he looked at from where a girl was fucking a horse.

Dr. Crawford: Uh-huh.

Mr. Bryant: And that really disturbed me.

Dr. Crawford: uh-huh. That was after he was dead?

Mr. Bryant: If I'm not mistaken. I'm pretty sure it was.

Dr. Crawford: How long did you spend over there?

Mr. Bryant: We talked for a good two hours.

Crawford Interview, p. 95-96.

In the same interview he described that Tietjen got agitated about him knowing Masonic information and when Bryant went up to go to the bathroom, he was hit in the back of the head by Tietjen. (97). Bryant stated at that point, he turned around and reached for his gun. (98). He next recalled candles around the house for his spirit. Concerning writing something down, Bryant stated that the victim was not true to his brotherhood or himself "by having such lust or desires when it comes to his sexual side. He recalled writing something down about it base on what they had talked about, not because of what he later saw on the computer. He told Dr. Crawford that he may done something to the eyes."

Bryant stated that 'I'm pretty sure he was dead when I looked on his computer. Crawford, p. 104, ll. 14-19. He recalled saying that he had to see the pictures for himself that Tietjen had talked about he looked on his computer.' Id. 104. He stated: "eyes go stray, poke them out." See also Crawford, p. 108.

Bryant stated he had flashbacks after he killed him and described "it was like me just sitting there looking at the computer screen, seeing these f-ing pictures. And looking at him and thinking there's no way this man could be looking at stuff like that." Id. 109.

He stated the only flashback he had was after the killing. Crawford, p. 125.

3. In the October 15-16, 2004 Statement, Bryant stated:

Also, during the time on Oct. 11th Tietjen was also talking about how he wished he was my age cause he liked young girls and everything, and he was talking about some websites he looked up, and later before I left his house I got on to his computer and noticed the password batteries and it came on and I looked under history to see if what he said was true and so it was, more sights than I can count of nude young girls, especially one with a horse inside her. . . .

Oct. 15, 2004, p. 5. ROA 613, l. 13-24.

Agent Barton clarified that there was a mistake in his investigative report that "they had been looking at pornography on Tietjen's computer." Investigative Report, p. 9. He stated that after reviewing the actual statements this was incorrect, although there is information about Bryant and Tietjen talking about it.

Agent Barton also confirmed that in the search warrant, information that they ha received from Bryant's girlfriend, Judge Justice, who had reported that she had problems with Bryant's use of internet porn which had led to a rift in their relationship. She stated Bryant would erase his internet history.

In Dr. Donna Schwartz-Watts evaluation, she described his account of the death of Mr. Tietjen stating that Tietjen became agitated with him because of Bryant's knowledge of the Masons and that Bryant was agitated with Tietjen because he had made sexual innuendos about younger girls. after being struck in the head with a Mason ring, Bryant killed him, cried, lit candles and robbed Tietjen. Watts report, p. 12. She reported "while looking on his desk, used his computer and found pornographic images of a young girl being molested by an animal. He states he then remembers doing something to his eyes and writing a note." Watts Report, p. 12-13. In his testimony before this Court, Dr. Watts confirmed that he reported that he looked at the computer after the killing.

During his mitigation testimony before Judge Russo, Dr. Watts summarized her report concerning the Tietjen murder. ROA 833-834. She testified that: "after he shot him, while looking on a computer that he found some images that upset him on the computer." ROA p. 834, ll 12-17.

Testimony was presented that the perpetrator left a note at the Tietjen crime scene. The note stated: "no more sick computer porn for this sick f-r." "By the way just keeping my promise to all." See also,

The State's duty to disclose evidence favorable to the defendant is addressed by Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). “The suppression by the [State] of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. In South Carolina, an individual asserting a Brady violation must demonstrate that the evidence: (1) was favorable to the accused; (2) was in the possession of or known by the prosecution; (3) was suppressed by the State; and (4) was material to the accused's guilt or innocence or was impeaching. Riddle v. Ozmint, 369 S.C. 39, 44, 631 S.E.2d 70, 73 (2006).⁷ The court in Riddle recognized the United States Supreme Court's emphasis on the prosecutor's responsibility for fair play. Riddle, 369 S.C. at 46, 631 S.E.2d at 74. In describing this responsibility, the court stated:

The prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure. This is as it should be. Such disclosures will serve to justify trust in the prosecutor as the representative ... of a sovereignty ... whose interest ... in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. And it will tend to preserve the criminal trial, as distinct from the prosecutor's private deliberations, as the chosen forum for ascertaining the truth about criminal accusations.

Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As such, it is imperative for prosecutors to abide by this rule as “[o]ur judicial system relies upon the integrity of the participants.” *Id.*

Whether the prosecutor's failure to reveal evidence pursuant to Brady is due to negligence or an intentional act is irrelevant because a court may find a Brady violation regardless of the good or

⁷ Likewise, under Rule 5, SCRCrimP, defendants, upon request, are entitled to disclosure of their statements, criminal records, and any documents or tangible objects material to the preparation of their defense or intended for use by the prosecution. Rule 5(a)(1), SCRCrimP. For purposes of Rule 5, “material” is used in the same context as it is in a Brady analysis. *State v. Kennerly*, 331 S.C. 442, 453, 503 S.E.2d 214, 220 (Ct.App.1998). Once there is a Rule 5 violation, a court will only reverse “where the defendant suffered prejudice as a result of the violation.” *Id.* 331 S.C. at 453–54, 503 S.E.2d at 220.

bad faith of the prosecutor. Gibson v. State, 334 S.C. 515, 528, 514 S.E.2d 320, 327 (1999). Because Brady is founded upon a sense of fairness and justice, the focus in a Brady analysis should not be on the misconduct of the prosecutor, but rather on the fairness of the procedure. *Id.* As noted in Brady, “[t]he principle ... is not punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused. Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair[.]” *Id.* (quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194). “If the suppression of evidence results in constitutional error, it is because of the character of the evidence, not the character of the prosecutor.” *Id.* (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)).

Evidence considered favorable to the defendant includes both exculpatory and impeachment evidence and extends to evidence that is not in the actual possession of the prosecution, but also to evidence known by others acting on the government's behalf, including the police. Moreover, “[e]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); accord Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433–34, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995); see also Riddle, 369 S.C. at 45, 631 S.E.2d at 73 (“The question is not whether petitioner would more likely have been acquitted had this evidence been disclosed, but whether, without this impeachment evidence, he received a fair trial ‘resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.’ ” (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555)); State v. Hill, 368 S.C. 649, 661, 630 S.E.2d 274, 280–81(2006) (stating evidence is material if the cumulative effect of the suppressed evidence results in a reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the

proceeding would have been different); Fradella v. Town of Mount Pleasant, 325 S.C. 469, 479, 482 S.E.2d 53, 58 (Ct.App.1997) (“A defendant shows a Brady violation by demonstrating that ‘favorable evidence could [have been presented] to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.’ ”).

ANALYSIS

Former Third Circuit Solicitor Kelly Jackson testified that he had contacts with SLED and the law enforcement agencies prior to the trial. He stated that SLED Agents Bo Barton, David Caldwell, and Mark Creech were his contacts. He was also aware that Agent David Givens was the person who did the computer analysis. Solicitor Jackson stated he wanted the computers analyzed. He stated the report that he received from SLED indicated on Tietjen’s computer and Bryant’s computer stated: “nothing of evidentiary value was identified. In addition no evidence was identified that would have suggested Bryant had prior contact with any of the victims.” March 15, 2005 Report. Jackson testified that he never received the diskette from SLED Givens which included the Encase Reports and other data from the computer analysis.

He stated that he sought all material for disclosure to the defense. He declared that he provided the defense everything he received from SLED. He stated that he was not specifically advised about the existence of any internet browsing history related to pornography sites or the existence of any adult pornography on the computer. He also stated Deputy Solicitor Saleeby was primary on the Tietjen case.

Deputy Solicitor Saleeby testified similarly that they never received the Givens disc with the computer analysis of the Bryant and Tietjen computers. Upon reviewing the materials at the

hearing, Saleeby stated if they had received them, he would have forwarded it to the defense team. He stated that there was no reason not to send it. He asserted that it cut both ways. He noted the report, contrary to Bryant's statements, found no child pornography or bestiality photographs. Also, the material may in fact corroborate the fact that Bryant was on the scene. Saleeby's only recollection about the computers was that he was advised that there was nothing of evidentiary value.

SLED Agent Givens testified that he performed an analysis on the Tietjen computer and created an image gallery and ran an Encase report which he placed on a diskette. Agent Givens testified that reviewing the material, he did not see any child pornography or bestiality. He confirmed that on October 21, 2004, he reported after viewing the images "no child porn or bestiality photos located", located adult porn in Temp Internet files, and located several pornographic movies within the program files.

It was developed, contrary to initial assertion by Applicant, that the browsing history in the report reflected possible internet pornography sites were visited the day before the incident, not contemporaneous within the incident based upon the computers clock compared to real time.

Agent Barton stated that he asked Givens to see if there was child porn on the computer due to the assertions by Bryant. However, he confirmed he was not trying to limit Givens search. He stated he learned there was no child porn or communication between the Tietjen and Bryant computers. Barton stated that he never received the CD from Givens and did not provide it to the Solicitor's Office. He stated he was not aware of the existence of the internet history at that time.

This Court finds that the Applicant has failed to prove the materiality prong of Brady v.

Maryland, supra. and Kyles v. Whitley, supra. It is undisputed in the record that complete report of SLED Agent Givens analysis on the Tietjen computer which revealed the internet history from the prior day and the existence of adult pornography on the computer was not provided to defense prior to the sentencing proceedings. Additionally, it is uncontested that the defense requested all exculpatory and mitigating evidence.

This Court must find that the Applicant has failed to show a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the State disclosed to the defense the complete report of Agent Givens. First, it is uncontested in the statements and the evidence presented that Bryant did not claim to have viewed any images on the victim's computer until after he had killed Mr. Tietjen. In his statements, he even declared that he had to turn on the computer using the password. Therefore, the existence or non-existence of internet porn on the computer was not a "trigger" to the death of Tietjen. To the contrary, the record is full of evidence from Bryant's statements about his discussions with Tietjen concerning girls. Further, it did not corroborate his comment about seeing bestiality because Agent Givens review could not locate any such images. However, to the extent the mere existence of prior internet browsing the previous day by someone on Tietjen's computer other than Bryant corroborates his version is difficult to connect. It merely supports that Tietjen may have had discussions with Bryant about it. However, it is as likely that Bryant, with knowledge of temporary internet files, could have browsed those histories himself after the death when he claimed to have turned on the computer.

Similarly, Dr. Watts had information from the numerous statements and her own interview about the impact of the discussions with Bryant, including when and what he claimed to see on the computer. What Dr. Watts would additionally learn is that there was no bestiality,

the particular item the Applicant claimed to view, in the computer's image. It is difficult how this additional information would have impacted the assessment by Dr. Watts. What is more clear is that at sentencing, when the statements about the pornography discussions were presented, ROA p. 609, ll. 9-13, or within Dr. Watts' testimony, the existence of the comments were not under factual dispute.

According to Dr. Watts, it would have corroborated her conclusions. However, she also stated that her conclusions did not change based upon the information about Tietjen's computer. She still would have given the same assessment of the existence of mental illness and the particular mental illness she diagnosed. Further, there is no showing that the extensive social history that was presented would have been changed. To the contrary, the results of each were the same.

Now, however, the evidence from the computer analysis suggests that there was no bestiality and child pornography on the computer, contrary to what Bryant claimed. The evidence at the scene, though, reflects that the perpetrator had an opinion about the victim and what was on the computer. The question about what he saw and did not see is not resolved within this new information. The Applicant has failed to show its materiality under Brady.

Counsel Jack Howle testified the defense was interested in the existence of evidence of pornography, possibly to establish pornography was a "trigger" for the Tietjen homicide. However, Howle, like Babb could not explain how the presence of pornography on the victim's computer which did not include the images he described in his statements would have corroborated the defense. Similarly, he could not explain how the claimed viewing after the death would be a trigger for the death. Former Counsel Babb claimed the non-disclosure of

pornography by SLED was prejudicial because their mitigation was based on his mental illness from childhood sexual abuse and trauma, that resulted in Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. He claimed that the pornography would corroborate Bryant's account that he killed Tietjen because of a "trigger" based on discussing and/or viewing pornography with Tietjen. However, he ignores that the so-called trigger would only have happened after the death. While Jackson did question corroboration about the child sexual abuse, he did not challenge any lack of corroboration about the pornography - a point that Babb missed at the PCR hearing. He further ignores that the computer assessment does not fully corroborate the Applicant's versions because it did not support the existence of either child pornography or bestiality - matters that were not challenged before Judge Russo. The Court also notes that Bryant testified at the PCR hearing and did not present any evidence that he viewed the internet history or other particular images on the computer.

The Applicant has claimed it may have triggered his post-mortem abuse of Mr. Tietjen's eyes. The record reveals that this theory was fully presented within his statements to Dr. Crawford and was given to the defense and their experts. The fact of the presence on the computer of some images, but not the particular images he had described of child pornography or bestiality and their non-disclosure does not mandate a new sentencing proceeding under Brady. Although this Court agrees with the Applicant, as well as the prosecution, that the material should have been disclosed and provided to each of them prior to trial, the failure of it being provided to the defense does not undermine confidence in the sentencing by Judge Russo.

As represented by the Applicant, the triggering event in the victim's death, according to the Applicant's statements went to the discussion about the Masons and his reaction to the

assault. The pornography issue then and now was a two-edge sword, reflecting his presence at the scene, yet his alleged disgust at pornography was disputed by his own history on the internet according to a prior girlfriend. The mental health experts were aware of his statements to the police and to them concerning the effect the discussion by Tietjen he claimed to have affected his actions. The malicious actions of Mr. Bryant on Mr. Tietjen and his family, in the face of the other admitted murders and assaults, are not changed by the mere presence of images or browsing history on Mr. Tietjen's computer. The Applicant has failed to show a reasonable probability that had the images been disclosed that the result of the proceeding would have been different and resulted in a life sentence. It must be dismissed.

V.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the application for post-conviction relief is denied in its entirety. Applicant has failed to show error, or if he established error, he failed to show prejudice such as would support the granting of either a new guilt proceeding, or a new sentencing proceeding.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

1. The post-conviction relief application is **DENIED AND DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE**; and,
2. Applicant is to remain in Respondent's custody and his sentence shall be carried out.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

_____, South Carolina.
_____, 2012.

The Honorable Ralph F. Cothran, Jr.
Presiding Judge

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COUNTY OF SUMTER THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

Stephen Corey Bryant, #52321

C/A No. 2011-CP-43-901

Applicant,

vs.

ORDER

The State of South Carolina,

Respondent.

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to the application for post-conviction relief filed May 10, 2011, as amended on May 21, 2012 and October 1, 2012. An evidentiary hearing on the allegations was held October 1-3, 2012 in the Sumter County Courthouse. Applicant was represented by Melissa J. Armstrong, Esq., and Heath P. Taylor, Esq. The State was represented by Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka and Senior Assistant Attorney General Melody J. Brown. After having reviewed the pleadings, the appellate court briefs, the record on appeal and opinion from the direct appeal, and having heard and weighed the testimony and other evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, this Court finds, for all the reasons set forth in the instant Order, that post-conviction relief must be denied.

I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Applicant, Stephen Corey Bryant, was indicted by a Sumter County grand jury on multiple charges: burglary in the second degree; two (2) counts of burglary in the first degree; arson in the second degree; possession of a stolen handgun; three (3) counts of murder (Clifton Gainey,

Willard Tietjen, Clarence Burgess); armed robbery; assault and battery with intent to kill (Correctional Officer Larry Justice); threatening life of public employee (Correctional Officer Thornwell Jones). Applicant was also indicted by a Richland County grand jury for assault and battery with intent to kill (Clifton Brown). The State sought the death penalty for the Tietjen murder. Applicant was initially represented by Jack D. Howle, Jr., Esq., and James H. Babb, Esq. Prior to resolution, Mr. Babb was removed due to an incapacitating medical condition and replaced, on July 18, 2008 by John D. Clarke, Esq. R. pp. 1309-1314.

On August 18, 2008 Applicant appeared before the Honorable Thomas A. Russo for a guilty plea. There were no plea negotiations as to sentence in the case. R. p. 1339; pp. 1345-46; pp. 1378-79. Applicant entered guilty pleas to the following crimes:

1. burglary in the second degree [2006-GS-43-696].
2. burglary in the first degree [2006-GS-43-697].
3. assault and battery with intent to kill [2004-GS-40-10096] [Richland County].
4. murder [2006-GS-43-698].
5. murder [2006-GS-43-699].
6. murder [2006-GS-43-700].
7. assault and battery with intent to kill [2006-GS-43-701].
8. threatening the life of a public employee [2006-GS-43-702].
9. armed robbery [2006-GS-43-699].
10. possession of stolen handgun [2006-GS-43-699].
11. burglary first degree [2006-GS-43-698].

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12. arson, second degree [2006-GS-43-698].

R. pp. 1334-38.

The plea court determined that there was a sufficient factual basis for each of the guilty pleas. R. pp. 1348-1381. Applicant affirmed the State's factual basis as correct as to each crime. R. pp. 1353, 1357, 1360, 1365, 1368, 1374, 1376, 1377. Judge Russo deferred sentencing.

On September 2, 2008 the sentencing proceeding began before Judge Russo on indictment 2006-GS-43-699 involving the murder of Willard Tietjen. The State had filed and served the Notice of Intent to seek the death penalty asserting the condition precedent of the statutory aggravating circumstances "murder was committed while in the commission of a robbery while armed with a deadly weapon." The State presented its evidence in aggravation through September 8, 2008. R. pp. 1-730.

The defense presented its evidence in mitigation. R. pp. 734-1000. Applicant waived his right to testify. R. pp. 1002-1004. The State and defense made closing arguments to the Court. R. pp. 1005-1035.

Judge Russo sentenced Applicant on September 11, 2008. He sentenced Applicant to thirty (30) days on 2006-GS-43-702 (threatening life of a public employee); twenty (20) years on 2004-GS-40-10096 (assault and battery with intent to kill); twenty (20) years on 2006-GS-43-701 (assault and battery with intent to kill); life imprisonment on 2006-GS-43-700 (murder); life imprisonment on 2006-GS-43-697 (burglary in the first degree); fifteen (15) years on 2006-GS-43-696 (burglary in the second degree); twenty-five (25) years on 2006-GS-43-698 (arson in the second degree); and life (burglary in the first degree); and life (murder); on 2006-GS-43-699, five (5) years (possession of stolen handgun); thirty (30) years (armed robbery); and life (murder). Judge Russo found beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the statutory

aggravating circumstance of "the defendant committed the murder while in the commission of a robbery while armed with a deadly weapon." R. pp. 1049 - 1050. On the incident involving the death of Willard Tietjen, Judge Russo sentenced Bryant to "death by electrocution or lethal injection." R. p. 1051.

Applicant filed a timely Notice of Appeal on September 19, 2008. On March 23, 2010 an Initial Brief of Appellant was filed by Senior Appellate Defender Joseph L. Savitz, asserting the following issue on appeal:

The sentencing judge committed reversible error by excluding testimony that Bryant's aunt had been sexually abused by her father (Bryant's paternal grandfather), who the defense alleged also began abusing Bryant at the age of seven, as this evidence was both relevant under Rules 401 and 404, SCRE, and mitigating under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Initial Brief of Appellant, p. 3.

Respondent made an Initial Brief of Respondent on August 6, 2010. Final Briefs were filed on September 16, 2010. Oral arguments were held before the South Carolina Supreme Court on November 30, 2010. On January 7, 2011 the South Carolina Supreme Court issued its opinion affirming the convictions and sentences. *State v. Bryant (Stephen Corey)*, Op. No. 26906, 390 S.C. 638, 704 S.E.2d 344 (January 7, 2011). Applicant petitioned for rehearing which was denied on February 2, 2011. Applicant did not seek certiorari in the United States Supreme Court in the direct appeal.

The Remittitur was issued on February 2, 2011. On February 4, 2011 appellate counsel made a motion for stay of execution and for the appointment of a post-conviction relief judge pursuant to *In Re Stays of Execution in Capital Cases*, 321 S.C. 544, 471 S.E.2d 140 (1996).

Respondents made a Return on February 7, 2011. On March 3, 2011 the South Carolina Supreme

Court issued its stay order. These post-conviction relief proceedings followed.

II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The pre-detention crimes in this case span a short time frame and demonstrate the inter-connectivity of the crimes, one to the other, by Applicant's own actions. The Court has considered the instant facts:

1. The Burglary of the Residence of Robert Dennis on Tuesday, October 5, 2004. It began on October 4, 2004. Applicant walked down the half mile dirt road to the Dennis home and told Mr. Dennis that his truck was stuck at the top of the driveway. Mr. Dennis offers help, and, although uneasy, takes him to the area and extracts the truck out of the bog. R. pp. 189-190. Bryant gives Mr. Dennis the name of "Carlos Bryan" and a false address. Mr. Dennis records a description of Applicant's truck as a 1990 GMC two-tone blue truck. R. pp. 1351-52, p. 191. The next day, Mr. Dennis left his home office at approximately 4:00 p.m., returning late that night. The day after that, he found that his home office had been burglarized. R. pp. 192-194. His laptop, briefcase, and "a zipper bag with quite a bit of checks, money orders, and some cash" were missing from his office. Entry was made through a window. R. pp. 192-193. A shoeprint was raised outside the window which was sent to SLED. A subsequent search warrant of Applicant's home found a right shoe that matched the shoeprint. In addition, Mr. Dennis identified Applicant as the visitor after seeing his picture in the newspaper and on television. R. pp. 195-196; pp. 1352-53.

2. The Burglary of James Ammons on Friday, October 8, 2004. James Ammons, like Mr. Dennis, lived in an isolated and remote area outside of Sumter. R. pp. 199-200. On the morning of October 8, 2004 Mr. Ammons took his daughter to school and

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traveled into Sumter for errands. R. p. 204. Mr. Ammons had allowed a friend, T. J. Hansen, to go deer-hunting on his property. Mr. Hansen's truck became stuck in the mud. Mr. Hansen went to Mr. Ammons' home around 11:30 a.m. for help. He noticed the sliding door was open and entered. He attempted to use the telephone but the telephone was dead. He walked to a neighbor's house to use the phone and call Mr. Ammon's cell phone. R. pp. 204-205; pp. 211-216. Mr. Hanson sees Mr. Ammons driving down the road and waves him over. Then he and Mr. Ammons returned to Mr. Ammons' home around 1:30 p.m. R. p. 205. The phone wires had been cut. The sliding door was open, and the television was off rather than on as Mr. Ammons left it, and his daughter's radio was off. Mr. Ammons went into his bedroom and found that his .40 caliber Smith and Wesson pistol had been stolen along with ammunition and registration papers. He called 911. R. pp. 205-209; pp. 1354-55.

Subsequently, as a result of an October 13th search, the gun, case, ownership papers and box of ammunition were recovered from Applicant's house. R. p. 1355-56; pp. 207-210. Applicant gave a series of statements claiming the gun was found in a dumpster and then asserted he found it at a home in Pinewood where he stopped when he was low on gas, slid open the door, and took the gun. R. pp. 1355-56; pp. 216-17. In another statement, Applicant admitted to cutting the telephone wires before he entered the home. R. p. 1357; p. 217.

3. Assault on Clinton Brown in Richland County on October 8, 2004. Clinton Brown was fishing with an acquaintance at the Billy Tolar Boating Landing off the Wateree River. R. pp. 247-248. Applicant came up to them, spoke to them, and then left. The other fisherman left, as well. R. pp. 250-253. Applicant then returned, and came up behind Mr. Brown and shot him in the back. Applicant then left, having offered no assistance. R. pp. 254-255. Mr. Brown, bleeding, initially passed out. When he came to, he struggled up to his truck and drove to Tuomey

Hospital where he remained for over one week. R. pp. 1357-1360; pp. 254-56; pp. 259-262.

The bullet recovered from Mr. Brown ultimately matches the stolen Smith and Wesson. Applicant admitted the shooting to Roy Lee Lambert the day after the shooting. R. pp. 273-276. Mr. Lambert had bought a knife from Applicant, then saw the gun and offered to find a buyer. Applicant states, "It's got blood on it." R. p. 275.¹

4. **The murder of Cliff Gainey on October 9, 2004.** Unlike the others, Applicant and Cliff Gainey knew each other. They were co-workers in construction, went fishing together and spent weekends with each other's family. R. p. 1362. On October 9, 2004 Applicant picked up Gainey from the mobile home he rented from his boss. They went to a convenience store to buy beer. The purchase is recorded on the store's camera. They drive off together and later arrive at a location on Bells Mill Road. Applicant shot Mr. Gainey three (3) times, left the body in the open, and drove off. A passerby, William Morton saw a truck with its lights on speed away, then he saw the body. After checking vitals he called 911. R. pp. 285-286. There was no identification on the body and Mr. Gainey remained unidentified for nearly two days. R. pp. 290-291; p. 301. After shooting Mr. Gainey, Applicant returned to the Gainey home. He stole a television, VCR, sound system and aquarium. R. p. 317. Upon leaving, he set fire to the couch. R. 1362-64.

At 8:30 p.m., Mr. Gainey's ex-wife Linda Coker, and son, Christopher, arrived at the home and called the fire department. The fire department determined the fire was not accidental and also determined it began prior to 8:25 p.m. due to the damage of a clock. R. pp. 323-330. The

¹ Bryant gave statements asserting that he pulled the trigger and the bullet hit him in the back. R. pp. 280-281. He stated the victim charged him so he fired back with a second shot, but claimed he did not know if it hit him. R. p. 281.

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family had been by previously at 7:30 p.m. R. pp. 307-311.

Connecting Applicant to the murder was the positive comparison of the shell casings at the scene, the convenience store video with Gainey, and the results of the search warrant of Applicant's home where the television, DVD, VCR, sound system and aquarium were found. R. pp. 336-337. Further, Applicant's girlfriend, Judy Justice, had been given a key from Applicant that was the key to Gainey's mobile home. R. pp. 337-338.

Applicant also gave a statement claiming he threw the wallet into a dumpster, showed a weapon to the victim, and took the items from the Gainey home.. R. pp. 1364-65; pp. 340-44. In his last statement, Applicant admitted shooting Mr. Gainey after Mr. Gainey urinated then turned toward him. He stated: "I started freaking out." R. p. 344.

5. The murder of Willard Tietjen on Monday, October 11, 2004. Between 11:00 a.m. and 5:30 p.m., Willard Tietjen, a disabled 62 year old, was murdered in his home. He lived with his wife, Mildred, in a remote and isolated ranch house. R. pp. 1366-67; pp. 44-45. Mr. Tietjen, suffering from a bad heart condition and early onset of Alzheimer's, was a man of habit who stayed around his home due to his conditions. R. pp. 426-427, 473. His wife after leaving for work after breakfast, would begin calling on him around 4:30 p.m. R. p. 1367; p. 432. Around 11:00 a.m. on October 11, 2004 Mr. Tietjen spoke with a friend, Robert Summers. R. p. 1368; pp. 433-434; pp. 484-486. Subsequently, without apparent forced entry, Applicant entered the Tietjen home. In Applicant's statement, he says he knocked on the door, asked for help because his truck had broken down, and Mr. Tietjen invited him inside. R. p. 1368. Ultimately, Applicant shots Mr. Tietjen nine (9) times. R. p. 1368. Applicant then went through Mr. Tietjen's wallet and took cash and some cards. R. p. 1368. He threw some cards around the living room floor, and pulled Mr. Tietjen's masonic ring off his finger. Applicant methodically

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went through each room in the house looking for items to steal. R. pp. 1368-1369. He took power tools, a knife, a medallion, a jug of change, hand tools, a bag to carry them in, walkie-talkies, cell-phone, silver certificates, jewelry, an ammo box, and other items. R. p. 1369. Applicant also took a drink from the refrigerator, smoked cigarettes, and smoked a cigar. R. p. 1369. In addition, Applicant wrote a note² and went on Mr. Tietjen's computer. R. p. 1369. Applicant was still in the home when Mrs. Tietjen made her daily call to check on her husband. R. p. 435. She tried to reach Mr. Tietjen on the land line, then called his cell phone. Applicant answered the cell phone and stated, "T.J. is dead." and admitted to her that he had killed Mr. Tietjen. R. p. 1369; pp. 436-437. She terminates the call then calls 911. She called her husband's cell phone number again, and Applicant again answers. Applicant stated, "I told you T.J. is dead, and don't call again." R. p. 438; also Tr. pp. 659-660; p. 698. Mr. Tietjen's daughter, Kimberly Dees, also calls the cell phone and Applicant again admits killing her father. R. pp. 477-478. Kimberly's husband, Robert Dees, also calls, and the same sad inculpatory statement is given. R. p. 1369; pp. 481-482. These calls occur between 5:15 p.m. and 5:30 p.m. Law enforcement was called after.

Forensic testing connected the shell casings and bullets from the Tietjen scene with the stolen handgun. R. p. 1370. Applicant's DNA was found on cigarette material within the house – one sample was from a partially smoked cigarette retrieved from the right eye of the victim. R. pp. 594-595. His DNA is also matched to an ankle sock recovered from Mr. Tietjen's living room. R. p. 595. Handwriting analysis determines the note is consistent with Applicant's

² The contents of the note/letter stated: "no more sick computer porn for this sick f____r. By the way, just keeping my promise to all. Good luck finding me. LMFAO." The note also stated "I find it funny, victim number five in two weeks." R. pp. 516-518.

writing. R. p. 1370; p. 583. A videotape from a local Bi-Lo store showed Applicant using the change machine. Id. R. pp. 562-563, 569. Items of stolen property were also recovered and connected to Applicant. R. pp. 546-552. Applicant sold the stolen knife to Roy Lambert – the same individual who heard Applicant admit to shooting Mr. Brown – and he turned the knife into the police. R. pp. 274-276; pp. 572-573.

Applicant also gave inculpatory statements. R. pp. 607-615. He admitted the Tietjen robbery and taking items while still armed. He described acts done within the house and laid claim as the sole perpetrator. He then carried law enforcement to locations where he had deposited items. He admitted having conversations with the Tietjen family. R. p. 1371.

Mrs. Tietjen testified that her husband told her Friday, October 8, 2004 that a man came by the house looking for Kimberly Smith. She said her husband tried to assist the person with the use of the telephone book. R. pp. 430-431. When she had returned home on the 8th, she saw a truck in the driveway that she had assumed was a deer-hunter's truck. She recalled it to be a GMC and similar color to a photograph of the truck identified as Applicant's. R. pp. 430-431.

Dr. Joel Sexton, the forensic pathologist, testified about the extensive injuries to Mr. Tietjen. R. p. 109. The victim had nine (9) gunshot wounds and burns to the eyes and his beard. R. pp. 108-113. Two of the shots to the head were fatal. R. p. 112, ll. 1-21.



6. **The murder of Christopher Burgess on Wednesday, October 13, 2004.** At approximately 1:30 a.m., thirty-five (35) year old Christopher Burgess rode a bicycle to the Foxville Road area in Manchester Forest. R. p. 1372. He came upon an Officer Benjamin Stiles and then continued toward the mall. R. pp. 345-348. Around 4:20 a.m., Mr. Burgess ended up at a convenience store, the Kangaroo Market Express, where he is seen on the surveillance video with Applicant. R. p. 353, Exhibit 103. Towanda Govan, an employee, knew both Burgess and Applicant by their coming into the store. R. p. 351. On that date, Govan recalled "Chris" coming in first and Applicant came in later. She saw them shake hands. R. p. 352. She recalled that it was around 4:20 a.m. R. pp. 354-355. Mr. Burgess left with Applicant after putting his bike into Applicant's truck. R. p. 1372. They eventually end up in the Foxville Road area. Similar to the Gainey incident, Applicant shot Mr. Burgess and left the unconcealed body in the road bed. Around 6:15 a.m., a deer hunter, Tony Jackson, saw the body in the roadway and called 911. R. pp. 358-360; p. 365.

Mr. Burgess had two (2) gunshot wounds - one through his left cheek that entered his brain and a second through his back that went through his heart and exited. R. p. 1373. The removed bullet and shell casing matched the stolen handgun. R. p. 1373. As noted, the videotape of the convenience store showed Applicant and Burgess together. Items that had been previously seen by law enforcement in Applicant's truck during an interview before this incident are found at the scene. R. pp. 1373-1374. Mr. Burgess' bicycle is recovered from the truck when the warrant is served. R. p. 1374

In Applicant's statements, he admitted shooting Mr. Burgess with the Smith and Wesson, knew the location of the shooting, and described Mr. Burgess' body. R. p. 1374; pp. 376-79. Applicant declared in his statements that Mr. Burgess started making demands where he wanted

Applicant to take him which, he stated, "pissed me off." He also stated he feared victim would take his truck from him, so he reached under the seat, grabbed the gun and shot him. R. pp. 378 - 379.

Post-Detention Crimes

After incarceration for the above described crimes, Applicant continued to inflict injury and generally perpetuate his threats or acts of violence. The Court has considered the following additional facts:

7. Threatening the life of Correctional Officer Thornwell Joe Jones at the Sumter-Lee Regional Detention Center on March 9, 2005. On March 9, 2005 Correctional Officer Cpl. Thornwell Jones and a nurse were passing out food trays and medication to the inmates. R. p. 1375. When they arrived at Applicant's cell, Applicant declared: "I's coming out of my cell when you open the door and I'm going to F____ you up." R. p. 1373; p. 383.³ They open the door and Applicant appeared - hands balled up and ready to fight. R. pp. 383-384. The officers took it seriously and Applicant finally stood down without striking the officer. R. pp. 1375-1376; pp. 383-384. Jones testified that he did not have problems with him after that date. R. p. 387.

8. The assault with intent to kill Correctional Officer Larry Justice on October 26, 2005. On October 26, 2005 Officer Larry Justice was in the process of retrieving dinner trays at the Sumter-Lee Regional Detention Center maximum security area. R. pp. 392-93. He approached Applicant's cell and Applicant placed his tray in the bag. R. p. 392. At that point Applicant sucker punched Justice multiple times. The officer's head is knocked against a wall

³ During the hearing, he testified that Applicant stated when I open his door he was "going to come out and go to my f____g ass because he ain't got nothing to lose." R. p. 383.

and he fell to the ground. R. p. 393; p. 413. Applicant kicked and beat Officer Justice on the face and chest. R. p. 1377; pp. 413-14. Another officer witnessed this and called for assistance. R. pp. 413-416. Applicant then withdrew and went into this cell. R. pp. 416-417. Officer Justice suffered a broken eye socket, broken nose, crushed sinus bones and a brain aneurysm. R. p. 1377; pp. 394-96. He has not worked since the incident. R. p. 401. He suffers headaches, nosebleeds, and he is required to walk with a cane to control his balance. R. p. 1377; pp. 395-96.

III.

ALLEGATIONS

Applicant filed an initial application on May 10, 2011, followed by amendments filed May 21, 2012 and October 1, 2012. The amendment filed October 1, 2012 represents Applicant's final amendment, and only the allegations reflected in that amendment are addressed herein. All prior allegations were withdrawn or abandoned, and are not addressed in this Order. The allegations from the final amendment are as follows:

- A. Ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eight and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the South Carolina Constitution and laws. Counsel failed to provide accurate advice to Applicant insofar as the likelihood of his possible sentence if tried by jury versus pleading guilty and receiving a judge sentencing. Applicant was given various pieces of advice concerning his entering a guilty plea and signed three (3) separate plea agreements contained in trial counsel's file. Ultimately, Applicant pleaded guilty to three counts of murder and other related charges in exchange for no consideration from the state. In effect, Mr. Bryant pleaded "straight up" to capital murder. Counsel was ineffective in that they told Applicant there was an "advantage" to pleading guilty in that he was lessening his chances of receiving a death sentence, when in fact he received nothing of benefit from the plea. Moreover, Counsel erroneously advised Applicant as to "statistical" evidence supporting the advice to plead guilty, when no such evidence existed to support the advice given. Counsel further misadvised Applicant as to the rules of evidence if he went to trial versus pleaded guilty. Advising a client to plead guilty under these circumstances was clearly unreasonable. Counsel's inaccurate advice induced Applicant to plead guilty and, but for

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this erroneous advice, Applicant would have not pled guilty but would have insisted on going to trial. *Hill v. Lockhart*, 474 U.S. 52 (1985); *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 684 (1984).

- B. Constitutional violation of assistance of counsel in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Lead counsel failed to participate in discussions with Applicant concerning whether Applicant should plead guilty. South Carolina law provides to capital defendants the right to two (2) counsel. Applicant was denied two counsel during a critical stage of his trial, that being the discussion and decision leading him to enter a plea of guilty. This error amounts to a denial of counsel as recognized in *United States v. Cronin*, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) or was ineffective under *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 684 (1984).
- C. Ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the South Carolina Constitution and law. Counsel failed to object to the solicitor's improper closing argument during the penalty phase of trial. The Solicitor implored the trial judge to sentence Applicant to death to send a community "message." These types of closing arguments have been condemned by the South Carolina courts and constitute reversible error. *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 684 (1984).
- D. Denial of Due Process, Effective Assistance of Counsel and Violation of Prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution due to trial court's refusal to allow Applicant the opportunity to present after-discovered witness testimony relevant to his mental health and mitigation, while allowing the state to present additional evidence in aggravation of punishment after the state had rested its case in aggravation. Trial Counsel failed to object to the trial court's erroneous decision to allow the state to introduce additional victim impact testimony. The trial court's actions were improper, and required an objection from defense counsel. Failure to object was deficient and prejudicial, as capital defendants have an absolute right to confront and/or rebut the evidence against them offered in support of a sentence of death. The above errors and omissions were prejudicial and require that Applicant's death sentence be reversed and his case remanded for a new sentencing trial. *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 669 (1984), *Gardner v. Florida*, 430 U.S. 349 (1977).

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- E. Denial of Effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, due to trial counsel's failure to proffer or otherwise preserve the issue of the trial court's denial of trial counsel's request to provide testimony from Edward Goss, who became known as a potential witness after the defense had completed the anticipated evidence in mitigation. Assuming, arguendo, that the above issue was preserved for appellate review, then Applicant was denied effective appellate counsel for appellate counsel's failure to raise this issue. *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 669 (1984). Edward Goss's after-trial statement to law enforcement establishes the materiality of what he had to offer on behalf of Mr. Bryant at trial. The absence of Mr. Goss's testimony was prejudicial to Mr. Bryant. This Court should reverse Mr. Bryant's death sentence [and] remand this case for resentencing.
- F. Denial of Due Process of Law and Right to a Fair Trial due to the State's failure to comply with the requirements of *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Edward Goss was a witness to Applicant's mental derangement just prior to the time of the crimes. This fact was witnessed by Law Enforcement Officer[r] Tripp Mayes, who saw Applicant in this state and had a conversation with Edward Goss. After Bryant's arrest, which was widely published in the Sumter area papers, but prior to Bryant's trial, Mr. Goss recalled a conversation with Officer Mayes, during which they discussed the fact of their being witnesses to Bryant's bizarre behavior just prior to the murders. Officer Mayes and/or the Solicitor's Office failed to disclose the information concerning Applicant's mental state and/or the existence of Edward Goss as a witness who could provide evidence favorable to the defense. *Brady v. Maryland, Id.* This failure was prejudicial, as the issue of Bryant's mental state was essentially the centerpiece of the defense case in mitigation. Given this fact, the state's failure to turn over this type of evidence cannot be held harmless. Prejudice is manifest and Applicant's sentence should be reversed.
- G. Denial of Due Process of law and a fair trial due to the state's non-disclosure of evidence relevant to the Defense case in mitigation of punishment, evidence that was part and parcel of the circumstances of the crime related to the Tietjen Homicide, evidence that corroborated Mr. Bryant's statements to law enforcement concerning the facts leading up to the Tietjen homicide. *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The state was repeatedly asked for discovery and, in turn, the state repeatedly played a game of cat and mouse with the defense team, asking them what they – the defense – thought the state had not turned over. The state, it turns out, was in possession of forensic computer reports and evidence from SLED agent David Givens. Agent Givens' examination of Mr. Tietjen's home computer revealed a history of visits to teen (and various other) porn websites. This examination further revealed that Tietjen had been

"surfing" porn at least as early as June, 14, 2004. Agent Givens' casenotes reflect he had a discussion with the state about his investigation of Tietjen's computer on October 25, 2004. Defense counsel was never provided with any documentation about the pornography found on Tietjen's computer. The defense team scrambled to find this kind of evidence because Mr. Bryant told SLED forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Pam Crawford, that he saw pornography on Tietjen's computer on the day of the killing. (March 25, 2004 Transcript of Interview by Dr. Pam Crawford of Stephen Corey Bryant, at pp. 95-98). Mr. Bryant also told defense forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Donna Schwartz-Watts, that he had seen porn on the computer and, due to his personal history of sex abuse by both male and female family members, felt sexually threatened during the time he committed each of the offenses, including the one committed at the Tietjen home. (See Record on Appeal (hereinafter "ROA", p. 834, line 2-p. 835, line 23).

The prejudice to Bryant created by the state's failure to disclose evidence of pornography use by Tietjen was exacerbated by the state's cross-examination of defense witnesses Dr. Marti Loring and Dr. Donna Schwartz-Watts. The state repeatedly attacked the opinions rendered by both of these witnesses due to their having a lack of "corroboration" and having to rely on Mr. Bryant. Prejudice to Mr. Bryant is obvious in this situation.

Even after thoroughly attacking defense witnesses for their uncorroborated opinions, the state was not finished with making use of the evidence of pornography discovered on Tietjen's computer. And so, during closing arguments to the judge, the Solicitor remarked that Bryant "got on their computer and began to visit porn sites by his choosing, not sites from T.J. and Mildred." (ROA at 1020, lines 7-9). Based on Agent Givens' findings, the state knew, or should have known, that Tietjen, not Bryant, had an affinity for porn. Bryant's computer was examined and no evidence of pornography was ever found. Tietjen's computer had pornography on it dating back to June, 2004, which was approximately four (4) months prior to Bryant ever meeting Tietjen. The State knew, or should have known, the real facts and disclosed them to the defense. Yet, what actually happened was the state urged the Court to sentence Bryant to death based on the false allegation that Mr. Bryant, in an extreme act of indifference, surfed porn on the Tietjen's computer sometime after killing Mr. Tietjen. This is the type of misrepresentation of fact that, whether intentional or simply through negligence/ignorance of the facts, has been condemned by the United States Supreme Court as so egregious that reversal is required. *Napue v. Illinois*, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), *U.S. v. Giglio*, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).

Finally, the state's misuse of non-disclosed evidence of pornography denied

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Applicant his right of rebuttal, which is a fundamental due process protection to ensure no one is sentenced to death on the basis of information they could not confront and challenge. The state's *Brady/Napue/Giglio* violation led to this result and requires reversal of Applicant's death sentence. *Gardner v. Florida*, 430 U.S. 349 (1977).

Second Amended Applicant for Post-Conviction Relief, filed October 1, 2012, pp. 2-6.

IV. DISCUSSION

This Court has had the opportunity to review the record and has heard the testimony and other evidence adduced at the post-conviction relief evidentiary hearing. This Court specifically notes that it has had the opportunity to observe the witnesses presented at the evidentiary hearing, closely pass upon their credibility, and weigh their testimony accordingly. Moreover, this Court heard closing argument at the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing and, additionally, requested, received and considered proposed order from both parties which further reflects the party's positions. After considering Applicant's and Respondents' arguments, the testimony at the evidentiary hearing, and reviewing the record, I find that I must deny the application for post-conviction relief. Set forth below are the relevant findings of fact and conclusions of law as required under S.C. Code § 17-27-80 (1985) as to each individual allegation:

A.

Allegation Counsel Failed to Provide Accurate Advice on Guilty Plea.

Applicant complains counsel failed to provide proper advice concerning "the likelihood of his possible sentence if tried by jury versus pleading guilty and receiving a judge sentencing." (Second Amended Application, filed October 1, 2012, p. 2). Applicant further complains that counsel failed to provide reasonable representation in advising Applicant to plead "'straight up' to capital murder," and that there was any "'advantage' to pleading guilty in that the was lessening

his chances of receiving a death, when in fact he received nothing of benefit from the plea.” (Second Amended Application, filed October 1, 2012, p. 2). Lastly, Applicant complains counsel misadvised him in regard to a relaxation of the “rules of evidence if he went to trial versus pleading.” (Second Amended Application, filed October 1, 2012, p. 3). This Court finds that Applicant made a knowing and intelligent decision to plead guilty based on reasonable advice of counsel. Applicant is not entitled to any relief.

The possibility of entering a guilty plea was explored long before the guilty plea in this case, and well before Mr. Babb was relieved and Mr. Clark was appointed counsel. The record shows three proffers of tender of guilty plea were prepared. (See Applicant’s 12, 13, and 14). Further, a transcript from April 3, 2008 reflects that a tender of guilty plea was offered in conjunction with the request “to permit the defendant to plead guilty and have a jury determine sentence.” R. p. 1215. In particular, counsel argued: “Part of his defense and a great impact on the sentence he may receive is the presentation of this evidence in mitigation ... the right to tender that guilty plea is evidence of mitigation.” R. p. 1217. Counsel further argued:

... Considerable attention is given - - and we’ve cited this in here various articles and cases with impact of a defendant pleading is show to be significant on a jury in rendering a sentence. Pleading guilty is in itself a major mitigating factor. It shows he takes responsibility for his actions. Because, Your Honor, a jury may well assume that the defendant is not talking such responsibility when he is forced to plead not guilty to retain his right to a jury trial. I mean, it’s a conundrum. And beyond that, it does not deny he State from offering any evidence in regard to defendant’s role in the crime at sentencing. ...

R. p. 1218.

At the PCR hearing, Mr. Howle testified that he and Mr. Babb had advised that Applicant would be more likely to receive life if a judge would hear the gruesome facts of the case as opposed to a jury. He recalled seeing the statistics which Mr. Babb had researched and obtained,

but maintained, simply from his own perspective, that they were right to advise Applicant he would have a more significant chance to receive life with the judge rather than a jury. Mr. Howle also testified that Mr. Clark was involved with the decision to plead guilty, and did not recall Mr. Clark questioning the decision. Mr. Babb testified that he was concerned that Applicant would not be able to show remorse which may affect the sentence.

Further, Mr. Babb testified at the PCR hearing that he was keenly aware of the constitutional challenge to the statute of giving up the right to a jury for sentencing when entering a plea. He litigated the issue until it was ultimately resolved against the defense in another unrelated case. Mr. Babb also testified that his professional opinion was that if Applicant could not show remorse, he was likely to get death. He underscored the importance of his challenge to the statute to allow Applicant the benefit of pleading guilty to show acceptance of responsibility, testifying that he stayed in touch with the lawyers in the *Inman* case where the issue was previously submitted. That issue was litigated but ultimately resolved against the defendant's position. See *State v. Inman*, 395 S.C. 539, 720 S.E.2d 31 (2011), citing *State v. Allen*, 386 S.C. 93, 687 S.E.2d 21 (2009), *cert denied*, __ U.S. __, 130 S.Ct. 3329 (2010). Further, Mr. Babb testified that he requested and received statistics which he included in the proffer from either Robert Lominack, Esq., or Teresa Norris, Esq., both of whom are acknowledged capital defense attorneys, and the statistics supported that a defendant would be more likely to be sentenced to death by jury if maintained he was not guilty.

Mr. Clark testified at the PCR hearing that he meet with Applicant the day of the appointment, and also meet with him at Mr. Clark's office in discussing the possibility of the plea. Mr. Clark testified that the general thought was that it was highly unlikely that the defense would receive any plea offers from the State and Applicant's "gesture" of taking responsibility may be of

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benefit to him. Mr. Clark testified that the team was "leaning" toward a plea when he came on the case and that the rationale was explained to him, which he agreed with. Mr. Clark underscored the concern that the "nature of the crime" and the general circumstances would likely evoke great sympathy from a jury, but a judge is called upon to hear and deal with such circumstances on a regular basis and would not be "so shocked" or show outrage as certain members of the community may.

Applicant testified at the evidentiary hearing, as well. He testified that it was "the plan" to go to trial, but that he made the decision to plead guilty on advice of counsel. Applicant testified that counsel told him that the plea was the "best opportunity" to avoid death. He also testified that counsel advised him if he went to trial the State could "play fast and loose" with the rules of evidence. He also acknowledges signing the tender of guilty plea and sentencing sheets. Applicant testified that he fully understood if he pleaded guilty that Judge Russo would sentence him instead of a jury. Applicant testified that he discussed the plea option with all three counsel. Applicant testified that while he was not promised a sentence, he was promised "more likely than not" he would not receive a death sentence. He testified that he was aware there were no guarantees.

This Court also accepted an affidavit from Teresa Norris, Esq. Ms. Norris avers that she does not recall providing statistics to Mr. Babb and does not agree with the conclusions based on those statistics.

To establish ineffective counsel under the Sixth Amendment, a PCR applicant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. at 694; *Simpson v. Moore*, 367 S.C. 587, 595-96,

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627 S.E.2d 701, 706 (2006). "In the context of a guilty plea, the petitioner must demonstrate that his trial counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and 'that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" *Burket v. Angelone*, 208 F.3d 172, 189 (4th Cir. 2000), quoting *Hill v. Lockhart*, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome" of the trial. *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 694. Relief will not be granted on showing of mere error. Prejudice must also be shown. *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 687. The standard of "prejudice" differs depending upon whether it is related to guilt phase issues or penalty phase issues. In order to prove "prejudice" in the guilt phase, an applicant must show that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability the result of the trial would have been different. *Johnson v. State*, 325 S.C. 182, 480 S.E.2d 733 (1997). In *Jones v. State*, the Court instructed that prejudice may be found in a capital sentencing proceeding when "there is a reasonable probability that, absent [counsel's] errors, the sentencer – including an appellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the evidence – would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death." 332 S.C. 329, 333, 504 S.E.2d 822, 824 (1998), quoting *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. at 695.

"Before deciding whether to plead guilty, a defendant is entitled to 'the effective assistance of competent counsel.'" *Padilla v. Kentucky*, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1480-81 (2010), quoting *McMann v. Richardson*, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). This situation is somewhat unique in that there is no suggestion that a trial would have been an option for finding Applicant not guilty. Applicant testified that he knew either way he would be found guilty and would be sentenced either to life without the possibility of parole or death. Applicant repeatedly confessed, and had no basis to contest those multiple statements. Moreover, Applicant had the murder weapons and items stolen

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in the various break-ins. Further still, he was captured on video right before Mr. Gainey's murder, and again on video before Mr. Burgess' murder. Additionally, the facts of Mr. Tietjen's murder, the mutilation of the body, the bloody and obscene notes, would likely be very difficult for a jury to hear. Applicant and counsel considered the whole of the case in deciding to plead guilty. Though Applicant now contests the accuracy of the statistics counsel relied upon, those statistics are but part of the counsel's consideration. Mr. Howle testified those statistics were gathered by Mr. Babb, but, independent of those statistics, Mr. Howle believed that Applicant's best opportunity would be before a more neutral figure – a judge rather than jury. Mr. Clark also testified that that was his belief as well – especially here where particularly heinous facts would be presented. Mr. Babb was convinced that Applicant needed to demonstrate as much remorse as possible to have hope of avoiding a death sentence. Thus, the record supports that all counsel – Mr. Howle, Mr. Babb, and Mr. Clark – agreed with the reasoning of entering the plea in this particular case. Further, the record shows that Applicant agreed that allowing the judge to hear the case was in his best interest, and, particularly, that counsel significantly consulted with Applicant, covering varied and specific aspects of pleading guilty. See Respondent Exhibit 1.

Simply, the best hope does not equate to a guarantee of securing a desired result. The advice of counsel in this case constituted well-reasoned strategy, not solely based on statistics, but on experience and knowledge of the community jurors. The plea was knowingly and voluntarily given with reasonable advice of well-experienced counsel. Applicant has failed in his burden of proof.

B.

Allegation of Denial of Counsel or Ineffective Assistance Based on Deprivation of Two Attorneys During a Critical Stage of Trial.

Applicant complains he was denied two counsel, as required by state statute, during “the discussion and decision leading him to enter a plea of guilty.” (Second Amended Application, filed October 1, 2012, p. 3). He alleges this failure resulted in deprivation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel citing *United States v. Cronin*, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) and *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 684 (1984). (Second Amended Application, filed October 1, 2012, p. 3). Applicant has failed to show any error.

“The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution compel every State to provide counsel to indigent criminal defendants.” *Bailey v. State*, 309 S.C. 455, 459, 424 S.E.2d 503, 506 (1992), citing *Gideon v. Wainwright*, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The record firmly supports that Applicant was not deprived of his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Mr. Howle consistently represented Applicant from before the filing of the notice of intent to seek the death penalty through the plea and filing of the notice of intent to appeal. Thus, Applicant has failed to show a deprivation of constitutionally guaranteed counsel. See *Cronin*, 466 U.S. at 659 (prejudice is presumed where there “is the complete denial of counsel”). Applicant does not appear to contest this fact at all; rather, he argues that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel should encompass the right to two counsel as provided by statute. This Court rejects such a suggestion.

S.C. Code § 16-3-26 (B) (1), upon which Applicant relies, (see Second Amended Application, filed October 1, 2012, p. 3, “South Carolina laws provides to capital defendants the right to two (2) counsel”), provides for the appointment of two attorneys to represent an indigent capital defendant. The requirement of appointment of two attorneys in the capital setting derives from statute, not the Constitution. *Id.* Accord *United States v. Blankenship*, 548 F.2d 1118, 1121 (4th Cir. 1976) (distinguishing statutory right to counsel from constitutional right: “Nothing in

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section 3005 indicates that the constitutional requirement that a defendant be afforded effective assistance of counsel may not be satisfied in a capital case by the appointment of a single attorney; that section merely provides authority for the court to assign additional counsel when necessary in a capital case.”). Again, Applicant has failed to show a deprivation of constitutionally guaranteed counsel. Moreover, counsel had failed to show deprivation of his statutory right to counsel.

This Court has reviewed the transcript for the substitution of counsel hearing held July 18, 2008. See R. p. 1309. At the hearing, Mr. Howle confirmed that he had consistently represented Applicant “since the charges were initially brought against him,” and, specifically, had continued representing him after notice that the State intended to seek the death penalty. R. p. 1311. (See also R. pp. 1054-1056, reflecting Mr. Howle’s representation of Applicant at the December 21, 2004 preliminary hearing). Further, Mr. Howle advised the court that Mr. Babb had been appointed as second chair after the notice was served “and he has diligently worked on this case all that period of time.” R. p. 1311. In fact, the record is replete with evidence of diligently pursuing discovery, experts and expert funding, and even preparing for trial in April 2008, before the trial was stayed pursuant to the Supreme Court of South Carolina to resolve a pending superceding action challenging the constitutionality of the statute requiring a waiver of jury sentencing to plead guilty. See R. pp. 1158-1202; pp. 1206-1214; pp. 1224-1230; pp. 1233-1307. Due to medical concerns, however, Mr. Babb was not able to continue his representation (though testimony at the PCR evidentiary hearing confirmed that he was available for consultation with counsel and to act as a general aid to Applicant due to their well-established relationship). R. p. 1312. At the July 18, 2008 hearing, Mr. Howle stated: “Mr. Bryant is aware of this and signed a consent on July 11th.” R. p. 1312. The trial judge noted, “I appreciate the fact that Mr. Bryant has been consulted on that and that he has, in fact, submitted this consent for release, although I



don't know that that's required, but I do appreciate it." R. p. 1312. The trial judge directly addressed Applicant at the hearing and confirmed his understanding of the substitution, and that he had no "opposition to that." R. p. 1313. Further, the trial judge confirmed that Mr. Clark was "qualified and certified" to serve as counsel in a capital case, and that he was willing to accept the appointment. R. p. 1313. Further still, the trial judge confirmed at the July 18, 2008 hearing that the case was then scheduled to be heard "the weeks of September 1st and September 8th" and that neither Mr. Howle nor Mr. Clark saw any reason or cause that the schedule could not be maintained. R. p. 1314. Mr. Howle confirmed that Mr. Clark had been given a disc the day before the hearing with "everything on it." R. p. 1316. The trial judge allowed Mr. Clark time to review the materials and asked, "if any issue does arise from you review of those materials, [to] notify the Court as soon as possible." R. p. 1316. Mr. Clark agreed to do so. R. p. 1317. Additionally, both Mr. Howle and Mr. Clark confirmed that the pre-trial hearings the week of August 25th would not pose a problem. R. pp. 1318-1320.

As Applicant correctly states, the decision to plead guilty has been held to be a critical stage in a criminal case. *See, e.g., Missouri v. Frye*, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1405 (2012) ("Critical stages include arraignments, postindictment interrogations, postindictment lineups, and the entry of a guilty plea."); *Iowa v. Tovar*, 541 U.S. 77, 81 (2004) ("The entry of a guilty plea, whether to a misdemeanor or a felony charge, ranks as a 'critical stage' at which the right to counsel adheres."). The record does not show that Applicant was ever deprived of his right to counsel during the decision to plead guilty. In particular, this Court notes the continuity in counsel's representation – essentially, Mr. Howle provided the anchor to the representation, demonstrating Applicant was never without counsel during any of his capital proceedings. Moreover, Mr. Babb's testimony indicates that he committed tremendous time and resources in

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preparing the case, along with Mr. Howle, prior to his disability preventing further representation. Additionally, Mr. Clark admittedly had limited time to be involved in the case, but this Court notes that he was given all the discovery, met with the client, and, while he testified his conversations were not so detailed and diverse as they would have been had he had years on the case instead of months, he nonetheless confirmed that he engaged in discussion, agreed with the rationale of the plea, and actively prepared and participated in the sentencing proceedings.

This Court notes that Applicant has not complained counsel was deficient in regard to plea negotiations or advice on a plea offer. *See Frye*, 132 S.Ct. at 1408 (“as a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused.”); *Lafler v. Cooper*, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (acknowledging a defendant may show ineffective assistance where advice “has caused the rejection of a plea leading to a trial and a more severe sentence”). Indeed, Mr. Clark acknowledge that the possibility of any negotiations in this case were slim to none. Rather, Applicant has complained merely that two counsel were not appointed at a critical stage – the decision to enter the plea. In the plainest of terms, the record shows that Applicant was represented throughout the process. Further, counsel has been deemed effective in their advice on the guilty plea option. (See Issue A, *supra*). Applicant has failed to show a deprivation of counsel.

C.

Allegation Counsel Was Ineffective in Failing to Objection to Solicitor’s Closing Argument Asking the Judge to Send a Message to the Community.

Applicant complains counsel was ineffective in failing to object to that portion of the Solicitor’s closing requesting “the trial judge sentence Applicant to death to send a community

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‘message.’” (Second Amended Application, filed October 1, 2012, p. 3). Applicant relies on the following portion of the solicitor’s closing:

Judge Russo, I don’t envy the position you’re in one bit; but as James Aiken said, you have to make hard decisions and live with them and it takes moral courage. You represent our community in the trial and it’s the function of a capital sentencing jury to express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death. And let there be no doubt, Stephen Corey Bryant through his attorneys [is] going to present himself to the Court [in] the most pathetic manner that he possibly can. And one more time, Judge, he’s gonna say, sir, would you help me please. And I ask you to send a message as a representative of our community to *Stephen Corey Bryant* with what you now know. Judge, tell him no. Thank you.

R. pp. 1026-1027 (emphasis added).

Applicant’s argument meets a first and insurmountable hurdle in that the argument was not to send a message to the “community,” but a message to Applicant. The cases cited by Applicant in regard to sending a community message simply do not apply to the circumstance of this case. Applicant has failed to show any deficient performance in regard to the cited comment.

Without doubt, a solicitor’s closing argument should be premised on seeking justice and he is “bound to [the] rules of fairness” in making his argument. *See State v. Northcutt*, 372 S.C. 207, 222, 641 S.E.2d 873, 881 (2007). *See also Vasquez v. State*, 388 S.C. 447, 458, 698 S.E.2d 561, 566 (2010), quoting *Northcutt*, 372 S.C. at 222, 641 S.E.2d at 881 (“[s]olicitors are bound to the rules of fairness in their closing arguments”); *State v. Finklea*, 388 S.C. 379, 386, 697 S.E.2d 543, 547 (2010) (“While the solicitor should prosecute vigorously, his duty is not to convict a defendant but to see justice done.”). “[T]he solicitor’s closing argument must be carefully tailored so as not to appeal to the personal bias of the juror, nor be calculated to arouse his passion or prejudice.” *Finklea*, 388 S.C. at 386, 697 S.E.2d at 547.

Mr. Howle testified at the PCR hearing that he was aware of cases criticizing the “send a

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message to the community” requests and that the failure to object was not based upon lack of knowledge. This Court finds credible and reasonable Mr. Howle’s testimony at the PCR hearing that the fact that a judge was hearing the closing arguments rather than a jury was a factor to consider in whether to object. As Mr. Howle indicated, it would seem unnecessary to ask the judge to disregard the comment. It is especially unnecessary here as there is no reasonable basis for an objection.

“The justifications supporting imposition of the death penalty are retribution and deterrence.” *State v. Allen*, 386 S.C. 93, 99, 687 S.E.2d 21, 24 (2009), citing *Gregg v. Georgia*, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976). A solicitor must be allowed to argue that the case presented supports the penalty he seeks. See, e.g., *State v. Cain*, 297 S.C. 497, 509, 377 S.E.2d 556, 562 (1988) (“The ... challenged comments here, when viewed in the context of the entire summation, were no more than recommendations by the solicitor as to the appropriateness of the death penalty based on evidence adduced at trial. The ‘send a message’ argument here certainly did not rise to the level of arousing juror passion or prejudice.”). The solicitor here tailored his argument to the specific facts of this case, the character of the defendant, and the facts supported by the record, as he was required to do:

The State’s closing arguments must be confined to evidence in the record and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. *Id.* “A solicitor has a right to state his version of the testimony and to comment on the weight to be given such testimony.” *Randall v. State*, 356 S.C. 639, 642, 591 S.E.2d 608, 610 (2004).

Vasquez, 388 S.C. at 458, 698 S.E.2d at 566.

The exact comment at issue here, when viewed in context, reflects the solicitor alluded to Applicant’s shown propensity to “ask for help” in seeking access to homes in order to commit burglary and/or murder. See *State v. Northcutt*, 372 S.C. at 222, 641 S.E.2d at 881 (“We must

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review the argument in the context of the entire record.”). The “message” was merely to tell the Applicant “no,” *i.e.*, to reject the claims in mitigation and sentence him to death for his heinous crimes, not merely to send a message to the community in general. Thus, the comment – squarely tied to Applicant – was not in the least improper. *See generally State v. Allen*, 386 S.C. at 99-100, 687 S.E.2d at 24 (“We do not find the trial court’s imposition of the death sentence in this case to be the result of any arbitrary factor. In reading the entirety of the court’s colloquy, it is clear that the sentence was premised primarily on retribution to this particular defendant, and the fact that the murders were deliberate, premeditated and cruel.”).

Further, to the extent Applicant contends the solicitor’s request to act for the community, *i.e.*, “I ask you to send a message as a representative of our community,” that request is not improper either. *See State v. Daniels*, ___ S.C. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2012 WL 4801526 *2 (2012) (“A charge that the jury is acting for the community, however, is not similar to a Golden Rule argument in that it does not ask the jury to consider the victim’s perspective.”). Though the Supreme Court of South Carolina, by footnote in the concurring opinion in *Daniels*, cautioned that such a request to a jury may border on a “Golden Rule” argument as it “carries the same connotation and effect,” *Id.* at *8 n. 2 (Toal, CJ. Concurring), as Mr. Howled noted, this argument was to the judge, not a jury. Further, the referenced comments in context show there was not an appeal to bias, prejudice or emotion, but an acknowledgment of the exercise of the community conscience – a permissible argument even in jury settings. *See United States v. Ebron*, 683 F.3d 105, 145-146 (5th Cir. 2012) (“The challenged arguments here were not clear appeals to the jury’s passions and prejudices. Nor were they plainly intended to inflame the jury. Instead, these arguments appeared to have invited the jury to take on the permissible task of acting as the conscience of the community on the question of the appropriate sentence for Ebron.”); *United*

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States v. Davis, 609 F.3d 663, 688 (5th Cir. 20120), quoting *Jackson v. Johnson*, 194 F.3d 641, 655 & nn. 54-56 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[a]lthough the prosecution may not appeal to the jury’s passions and prejudices, the prosecution may appeal to the jury to act as the conscience of the community.”). The United States Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he State has in a capital sentencing proceeding a strong interest in having the jury ‘express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death.’” *Lowenfield v. Phelps*, 484 U.S. 231, 238 (1988), quoting *Witherspoon v. Illinois*, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968). Moreover, our State Supreme Court has even found that “[g]eneral deterrence arguments are admissible in the penalty phase of a capital trial.” *State v. Shuler*, 353 S.C. 176, 189, 577 S.E.2d 438, 444 (2003). Upon careful review, this Court finds nothing of impropriety in the solicitor’s comments. Further, if some impropriety could be found, Applicant is still not entitled to relief based on the overwhelming evidence of guilt and circumstances of aggravation. *Daniels, supra*. See also *Sinisterra v. United States*, 600 F.3d 900, 911 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding no reasonable probability of a different result where there was substantial evidence supporting the jury’s findings the case warranted death).

To establish that counsel was ineffective under the Sixth Amendment, a PCR applicant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and but for counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. at 694; *Simpson v. Moore*, 367 S.C. 587, 595-96, 627 S.E.2d 701, 706 (2006). When “there is a reasonable probability that, absent [counsel’s] errors, the sentencer – including an appellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the evidence – would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” *Jones v. State, supra* at 333. Having conducted this reweighing of the evidence, this Court finds Applicant has again failed to carry his burden of

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proof. When compared to the evidence available for mitigation, especially the diagnosis of PTSD and reports of sexual abuse, though clearly evidence to consider, such evidence does not overtake the extraordinary level of malice and callousness, particularly the taunting of the Tietjen family members and the senseless shooting of Mr. Brown and the multiple murder victims.

In sum, viewing the comments in context, this Court finds Applicant has failed to show any basis for an objection. Consequently, he has failed to show deficient performance of his representation. Alternatively, if error should be found, such error, in context of the entire case, still fails to afford relief. *Jones, supra*. Applicant's allegation of error is without merit.

D.

Allegation Applicant Was Improperly Denied Right to Present Additional Evidence in Mitigation While the State Was Allowed to Present Additional Evidence in Aggravation.

Applicant complains that counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the plea judge's decision "to allow the state to introduce additional victim impact testimony" without affording an opportunity "to confront and/or rebut the evidence" thereby treating the state and defense differently to Applicant's detriment. (Second Amended Application, filed October 1, 2012, p. 3). Again, Applicant has failed to show he is entitled to relief.

Applicant has failed to prove a factual basis for his claim. The guilty plea to all the charges was August 18, 2008. R. p. 1323-1352; pp. 1334-1338. Sentencing was deferred on all charges until the capital sentencing proceeding was held. R. p. 1384. The judge noted for the record in concluding the hearing, "the purpose of today's hearing was simply to allow Mr. Bryant to enter his plea and there was no, never any intention to take any testimony today, that it was just simply for the matter of entering a plea." R. p. 1384. The judge continued, "we're scheduled for the week of September 2nd and the following week should we need it. We will proceed with a

trial on the sentencing phase and at that time, of course, the Court will take testimony and any motions or anything that we need to address at that time.” R. p. 1384. The receipt of statements from the victims was simply reserved for presentation at sentencing.

In allegation D, Applicant contends that it was a denial of due process and ineffective assistance of counsel for the failure of the trial court to prevent the admission after the conclusion of arguments for and against the death penalty of victim impact evidence from non-capital crime victims prior to the sentencing for the non-capital crimes. R. pp. 1041- 1047. Respondent submits that the procedure used by Judge Russo was consistent with the Victim Bill of Rights and use of victim impact evidence for non-capital crimes. S.C. Code Ann. Section 16-3-1550 (C). This Court agrees.

The record reveals that after the parties had completed the arguments on death penalty sentencing and addressing the information concerning the Gause issue, the trial judge then addressed the fact that they were proceeding to the sentencing phase of the case. R. p. 1040. He then inquired of the prosecution and the defense if they were ready and they stated that they were. Judge Russo next made inquiry with the state if there was any additional evidence regarding sentencing and individuals who wished to be heard. Solicitor Jackson stated individuals would like to speak on the particular cases that Applicant had pled. Without objection, Mr. Ammons, who home had been broken into made an impact statement. R. pp. 1042-1044. Chris Gainey, son of assault victim Cliff Gainey made a victim impact statement. R. p. 1044. Robbie Burgess, brother of victim Chris Burgess also made an impact statement. R. pp. 1045-46. No objection was made to any of the statements nor was any request for cross-examination made by the defense.

At that point, Judge Russo asked whether there was any further presentation by the defense regarding sentencing or if anyone wished to address the court on Applicant's behalf. R. pp.

1046-47. Counsel Howle stated he had spoken with the family before they had left and did not emotionally wish to be present that date. Counsel stated that they reiterate the mitigation previously presented. R. p. 1046. Lastly, inquiry was made of Applicant. After conferring, counsel stated that Applicant did not wish to speak, but reference was made to the letter that he wrote to the victim's family in the Tietjen case. R. p. 1047.

In the proceeding before this Court, the Solicitor's office asserted that it was not going to put up victim impact evidence at the time of the entry of the guilty plea, but was leaving the victim impact evidence in the crimes where the death penalty was not sought, until after the death penalty proceeding. He stated that this procedure was understood and agreed to by the parties and the Court. Plea counsel for Applicant stated that in hindsight, they should have objected. However, upon inquiry by this Court, it was unclear what the objection to the proceeding should have been in allowing the presentation of the victim impact evidence in open court, albeit after the conclusion of the argument in the death penalty case.

South Carolina law provides in Section 16-3-1550:

- F) **The circuit or family court must hear or review any victim impact statement, whether written or oral, before sentencing.** Within a reasonable period of time before sentencing, the prosecuting agency must make available to the defense any written victim impact statement **and the court must allow the defense an opportunity to respond to the statement.** However, the victim impact statement must not be provided to the defense until the defendant has been found guilty by a judge or jury. The victim impact statement and its contents are not admissible as evidence in any trial.

S.C. Code 1976 § 16-3-1550.

Here, while current counsel for Applicant asserts that there is a preference for hearing all victim impact evidence concerning crimes that the death penalty is not sought during the penalty phase proceeding, he has been unable to articulate how this was either error under state or federal

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law. To the contrary, this impact evidence could have been presented at the time the plea was entered, before the penalty had begun consistent with South Carolina law. Although the evidence could have been presented during the penalty phase, nothing requires it to have been done at that time for the non-capital crimes. There is no state law error.

Contrary to the claims of Applicant, this evidence was not related to the sentencing for the capital crime, but for the non-capital crimes. Here, Applicant had the opportunity to confront the impact witnesses prior to the sentence in their non-capital cases. No request was made to examine them which is authorized under state law. The victims had the statutory right to be heard and the defense had the right to respond. This Court is constrained to find that plea counsel was not ineffective for failing to make an objection to the entry of this evidence under either prong of *Strickland v. Washington, supra*. Further, there is no constitutional violation where there is an opportunity to be heard and confront the evidence prior to the sentencing for their crimes, independent of the capital case. Applicant has failed in his burden.

E.

Allegation of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Failing to Properly Proffer Evidence to Preserve the Gause Issue for Appeal; or, Alternatively, Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel in Failing to Present the Issue on Appeal.

Applicant complains that counsel failed to “proffer or otherwise preserve the issue of the trial court’s denial of trial counsel’s request to provide testimony from Edward [Gause,]⁴ who became known as a potential witness after the defense had completed the anticipated evidence in mitigation.” (Second Amended Application, filed October 1, 2012, p. 4). Alternatively,

⁴ Mr. Gause testified at the hearing. His name is misspelled in the initial pleadings. The Court, in this discussion, will use the correct spelling “Gause” as opposed to “Goss.” However, the Court is referring to the same individual.

Applicant complains that if the issue should be deemed preserved, appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to present the issue. (Second Amended Application, filed October 1, 2012, p. 4). Neither complaint has merit.

This Court has reviewed the guilty plea transcript where reference is made to Mr. Gause. Mr. Howle brought the matter to the sentencing judge's attention as soon as he received the information from Mr. Gause, and specifically requested time to investigate, all prior to the judge imposing sentence:

Your Honor, before we begin, one thing I did want to address the Court about. When I came in this morning to my office there was a message on the answering machine from someone who indicated that they had some information they thought was really important and wanted to talk to us. Ms. Spivey, my office manager, called that number that was left and the man who left the message was not there, it was his wife. And she related some things. I won't say what they were yet other than I guess the message, you can call it after-discovered testimony. I don't know why they waited till last night to call. But also related that apparently she had called your home and spoken to your wife. I'm not even -- I don't know if you're aware of that, Your Honor. But your wife indicated well obviously I cannot talk to the judge about anything you want to tell me. The circumstances of what the individual related was involved in meeting him before these murders happened and coming up and just want to talk to him, said he needed help, ...

Edwin Goss was the individual who when we called the number the person who answered said she was Mrs. Goss. Said he -- the police officer drove up. He went over to Mr. Goss, talked to him, said this guy come up to me, he's kind of rambling, he says he needs help, doesn't know what he's going to do. The officer -- don't know the officer name, wife did not know. She said Mr. Goss would call back and tell me. But talking to the officer the officer went over to talk to Stephen, came back and said he just -- I don't think, he's just kind of rambling, I don't see anything. Fellow didn't pay anymore attention and then apparently through seeing some of the pictures in the paper or whatever, left this message last night on the answering machine and we didn't see it till this morning. I have certainly not talked with him. I did not talk with the wife. So I can't verify all that, but obviously if he had contacted us earlier and realized the incident I feel certain we would have called him as a witness and present the mitigation because I think it was material what he said. It would certainly go to state of mind to mental condition before these offenses happened. And to that extent, Your Honor, I guess we move to reopen to allow that person to testify. And like I say, I haven't had the opportunity to talk with him. I didn't even know his name until this morning and

have not been able to contact him, only had that conversation with his wife.

R. pp. 1037-1038.

The judge acknowledged that the witness had called his home, had spoken to his wife, and left a message that he lived in Sumter and that it was "very urgent that he speak" to the judge about Applicant. R. pp. 1038-1039. The judge noted he "was going to share that with you this morning ... not knowing that apparently he called your office as well." R. p. 1039. However, the judge found that "this case has been going on for some time" and "[b]oth sides have had ample opportunity to present the evidence...." R. p. 1039. He acknowledged the defense's "position that this is evidence that was just recently discovered, but found:

... at this stage we don't even know if it's evidence. We don't know if it will be anything that's admissible. We don't even know what it is. And I'm going to deny the request to reopen the case and certainly would note any exceptions that you would have to that ruling....

R. p. 1039.

Mr. Howle added:

Your Honor, I would just ask you note the objection because, like I said, specifically what was related to me from the wife talking to - - Ms. Spivey who then talked to me was that he was seeking help when he did that and I just felt that was testimony we certainly would have presented had we known it.

R. pp. 1039-1040.

Mr. Howle testified at the PCR hearing that after sentencing, he had an investigator take a statement from Mr. Gause. However, that statement was not offered in any post-trial motion.⁵ Whether the judge abused his discretion in declining to reopen the defense case was not an issue raised on appeal.

⁵ In fact, such a statement was not offered at the PCR evidentiary hearing, and has not been reviewed or considered by this Court.

At the PCR evidentiary hearing, Mr. Howle testified that he could not recall precisely his actions in regard to the information, but recalled the information went to Applicant's acting irrationally approximately one month before the murders. Appellate counsel, Joseph L. Savitz, Esq., testified that he was the former chief attorney at Appellate Defense⁶ and had also worked as a Senior Appellate Defender with the agency. His practice and position required that he be assigned approximately half of all capital appeals that were handled by Appellant Defense. Mr. Savitz testified that he reviewed the entire transcript to determine which issues to raise in the appeal and decided to raise only the issue regarding excluding the defense testimony from Applicant's aunt that she had been sexually abused by her father. He testified that the record appeared to indicate that Mr. Gause's expected testimony was "somewhat vague and unconnected" to the incident. He testified the record reflected a situation "too vague for me to do anything." However, Mr. Savitz also testified that he would not have reason to abandon a meritorious issue, and, if he had the appeal again, we would raise the issue as the issue previously raised did not support relief. Mr. Savitz testified that the failure to raise the issue was not from neglect, or from failure to review the transcript – he simply didn't think it was an issue that should be raised.

Applicant presented Mr. Edward Gause at the PCR hearing. Mr. Gause – a former Charleston City police officer, and a Sumter County employee for approximately seventeen (17) years – testified that he saw a shirtless young man "playing in the sand" at a Young's convenience store approximately one month before the murders. When Mr. Gause stopped at the store, the young man approached him and asked if Mr. Gause was the "man he was supposed to see." The


⁶ The Commission on Indigent Defense, Division of Appellate Defense – the State agency that is charged with the representation of indigent criminal defendants on appeal.

young man indicated he was having "weird thoughts," though he did not specify what the thoughts were. Mr. Gause attempted to help the young man by advising him to pray and referring him to an officer, Sgt. Tripp Mays, who Mr. Gause testified was at the convenience store. Later, Mr. Gause saw the young man walk off with several young girls "fussing" at him. According to Mr. Gause, he then spoke to Sgt. Mays about the incident. At some point after, and due to media coverage, Mr. Gause identified the young man as Applicant. Mr. Gause testified that he later talked to Sgt. Mays who agreed that "they" had seen Applicant.

This Court also received the affidavit of Sgt. Mays. Sgt. Mays averred that he knows Mr. Gause, but has no recollection of such an event taking place – either at the store with the young man or a subsequent conversation about the young man being Applicant. Sgt. Mays averred that he searched his call records around the month before the murders and the month after the October 2004 murders. Sgt. Mays averred he found no call records to support "any interaction with Mr. Gause regarding a report of a young man in distress at a Young's convenience on Old Manning Road," in Sumter. (Mays Affidavit, p. 2).

As first matter, this Court finds that Applicant has failed to show that trial counsel was ineffective in his handling of the late information from Mr. Gause. Mr. Howle promptly brought the matter to the Court's attention and requested the ability to present Mr. Gause. Mr. Howle underscored that the testimony was expected to go to Applicant's mental state which was a major portion of the mitigation case. Mr. Howle had no further information to give the Court to further bolster his request as Mr. Gause had only made a late disclosure to the defense. Applicant has failed to establish *Strickland* error.

As a second matter, this Court finds that Applicant has failed to show that appellate counsel was ineffective in his decision not to raise the issue in the direct appeal. A defendant is entitled to



a due process right of effective assistance in his first appeal. *Evitts v. Lucey*, 469 U.S. 387 (1985). The *Strickland* deficient performance and prejudice test applies to determine the merits of any claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. *Smith v. Robbins*, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000); *Bennett v. State*, 383 S.C. 303, 309, 680 S.E.2d 273, 276 (2009). However, “it is difficult to demonstrate that counsel was incompetent” as for the most part, deficient performance may be shown “only when ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented....” *Smith v. Robbins*, 528 U.S. at 288, quoting *Gray v. Greer*, 800 F.2d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 1986). “To prove prejudice, the applicant must show that, but for counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability he would have prevailed on appeal.” *Anderson v. State*, 354 S.C. 431, 434, 581 S.E.2d 834, 835 (2003). Like Sixth Amendment counsel, to effect a fair review of counsel’s performance, a reviewing court must “eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight” and attempt “to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 689; *Butler v. State*, 286 S.C. 444-45, 334 S.E.2d 815 (1985).

This Court notes that Mr. Savitz was candid that, in hindsight, he would raise the issue simply because the one he did raise was not successful. However, that is a classic case of hindsight reasoning and does not support relief. Moreover, Mr. Savitz, an experienced attorney, particularly in capital appeals, made his professional review of the record and determined not to raise the issue. There is no indication of neglect or inadvertence. *Lawrence v. Branker*, 517 F.3d 700, 709 (4th Cir. 2008), citing *Bell v. Jarvis*, 236 F.3d 149, 164 (4th Cir.2000) (en banc) (“Effective assistance of appellate counsel does not require the presentation of all issues on appeal that may have merit....”); *Tisdale v. State*, 357 S.C. 474, 594 S.E.2d 166 (2004) (rejecting conclusion of PCR judge that “Effective Appellate Counsel has an obligation to raise all

meritorious issues on appeal"). Moreover, Applicant has failed to show this issue was a "stronger" issue than the one raised. *Smith v. Robbins, supra*. As Mr. Savitz stated, the proffer of testimony was vague and not clearly connected to any of the crimes. Further, there was evidence in the record that Applicant had reported issues to his probation officer and family prior to the trial, and even had sought counseling and help before the crimes. See R. pp 145; 182; 762-763; 789-790; 821-824; 956. This was known to the defense, presented by the defense, and used by the defense psychiatrists in consideration of Applicant's mental state. See R. pp. 789-790; 821-824; 956.

Further, if Applicant could show deficient performance by counsel, he has not shown prejudice. This Court has considered the testimony of Mr. Gause and finds the testimony cannot be given any significant weight. On cross-examination, Mr. Gause admitted that his memory was somewhat faulty in some respects, that he was "not sure on the time," and even testified at one point that he may have spoken to Sgt. Mays after sentencing. He also, at another point, testified that he did not connect the young man to Applicant until the day of sentencing. Further, Mr. Gause was unclear as to when he identified Applicant or why he waited from the initial media coverage (around 2004) to the sentencing (in September 2008) to contact the defense. Of particular note, as to the identification itself, Mr. Gause did not recall any tattoos or other identifying marks. Applicant has a very visible tattoo on his left chest that was clearly obvious at the PCR hearing from the neck opening of Applicant's prison issued jumpsuit (a fact Applicant conceded in his own testimony at the PCR hearing). Further still, Mr. Gause did not recall a blue truck (such as the one Applicant used in his crimes) anywhere near the convenience store, or any other identifying aspect independent of the facial recognition. Lastly, while Dr. Schwartz-Watts testified at the PCR hearing that, essentially, any corroborating evidence is evidence she would

like to have, there is no indication that having his vague report would have affected any mitigation strategy or diagnosis.

In sum, Applicant has failed to demonstrate deficient performance of counsel. However, even if deficient performance may be show, Applicant has failed to demonstrate *Strickland* prejudice. Consequently, Applicant is not entitled to any relief.

F.

Allegation of Brady Violation Concerning Edward Gause.

Applicant complains that the Gause information was known to law enforcement – specifically Officer Tripp Mays of the Sumter County Sheriff's Department – and should have been disclosed during discovery. (Second Amended Application, filed October 1, 2012, p. 4). Again, Applicant's case fails factually. Applicant has failed to show any material information regarding Mr. Gause was known to the prosecution and that there was a non-disclosure of such information.

"A *Brady* claim is based upon the requirement of due process" and "is complete if the accused can demonstrate (1) the evidence was favorable to the accused, (2) it was in the possession of or known to the prosecution, (3) it was suppressed by the prosecution, and (4) it was material to guilt or punishment." *Gibson v. State*, 334 S.C. 515, 524, 514 S.E.2d 320, 324 (1999), *citing* *Kyles v. Whitley*, 514 U.S. 419, 432-42 (1995); *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); *State v. Von Dohlen*, 322 S.C. 234, 241, 471 S.E.2d 689, 693 (1996). "*Brady* requires the State to disclose evidence in its possession favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment." *State v. Von Dohlen*, 322 S.C. at 241, 471 S.E.2d at 693, *citing* *Pennsylvania v. Ritchie*, 480 U.S. 39 (1987); *Clark v. State*, 315 S.C. 385, 434 S.E.2d 266 (1993). "Impeachment or exculpatory evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed

to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” *Id* citing *United States v. Bagley*, 473 U.S. 667 (1985). At the PCR hearing, as noted above, Mr. Gause testified that he did not contact the solicitor or law enforcement at or about the time of the hearing, rather, he contacted only the defense and the judge. Moreover, this Court accepted the affidavit of Sgt. Mays. Sgt. Mays avers he has no record or independent recollection of ever speaking with Mr. Gause about Applicant. Further, Applicant produced no evidence that the solicitor had any indication of Mr. Gause’s possible testimony. While knowledge may be imputed to the State in certain circumstances, *see Von Dohlen*, 322 S.C. at 241, 471 S.E.2d at 693, Applicant here has not established there was any knowledge to impute. Even so, Applicant has also failed to show the evidence would have made a difference if disclosed.

When considering a *Brady* violation in the context of a guilty plea, the relevant question for determining whether the information is material is whether “there is a reasonable probability that, but for the government’s failure to disclose *Brady* evidence, the defendant would have refused to plead guilty and gone to trial.” *Gibson v. State*, 334 S.C. at 525-526, 514 S.E.2d at 325. As noted above, Mr. Gause admitted in his testimony that his recollection was faulty in some respects and his identification of Applicant is suspect given that the shirtless individual Mr. Gause saw did not have any tattoos or identifying marks, while Applicant has very visible tattoos. Applicant has failed to show that had he known of the potential Gause testimony prior to his sentencing proceeding, that he would not have plead guilty. Further, there is nothing in the testimony that is exculpatory of the murders or any of the other crimes. Further still, the record shows that the defense carefully investigated Applicant’s mental health and employed two psychiatrists — Dr. Donna Schwartz-Watts and Dr. Margaret Melikian — to evaluate Applicant. See R. pp. 1328-1331. Applicant has failed to show that a *Brady* violation occurred.

G.

Allegation of Denial of Due Process and Fair Trial Due to State's Non-Disclosure of Evidence in Discovery

In allegation G, Applicant contends that there was non-disclosure of evidence concerning the computer analysis by the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division. In particular, he contended that information seized on the computer corroborated Applicant's statements to the police. In allegation G, as filed on October 1, 2012, he asserts that the non-disclosed computer analysis revealed that Mr. Tietjen (or whoever had access) had been browsing pornography sites as early as June 2004 according to the computer's internet history. Applicant claims that he had given statements that he saw pornography on Mr. Tietjen's computer that date. Applicant asserts in the allegation that he had told defense psychiatrist that with his history of sex abuse, he felt sexually threatened during the time of the offenses. They contend generally that had they known about this computer evidence, it would have impacted upon their case. For the reasons set forth below, this Court must conclude that Applicant did not meet his burden of proof.

The Statements About Computer Use

SLED Agent Barton testified at the PCR hearing about the series of statements Applicant made concerning whether he had viewed Mr. Tietjen's computer and the timing of the viewing. In particular, he confirmed the following:

Statements by Applicant concerning Mr. Tietjen's computer:

1. October 13, 2004 - Bryant gave a statement that he had discussions about the Masons with Tietjen. He claimed the victim was showing him things about the Masons and bragging. Bryant stated that the victim was disturbed and threatened by what he knew about the Masons. Bryant stated that "I remember the man telling me he wishes he was

young like me because he liked young girls. I remember looking at the man's computer and seeing pornography. I'm not sure, but I think I'm having flashbacks of being on the computer and seeing a young girl with a horse in her." Also ROA 609, l. 8-13.

2. On October 13, 2004, in Dr. Crawford's questioning of Bryant, Bryant stated:

Mr. Bryant: We talked for a couple hours. And somewhere along the lines, it seemed - - and I'm remembering - - something about some kind of pornography about how he likes them - - he was saying how he wished he was my age again because he likes them young.

Then he got to talking about the pornography and there's all kind of different web-sites on his computer, if I'm not mistaken. I'm not sure. I'm just now remembering this.

Dr. Crawford: That's fine. Just whatever comes to you. So, he started talking about some pornography web-sites he had?

Mr. Bryant: Yeah.

Dr. Crawford: Okay.

Mr. Bryant: And somehow I remember - - I'm thinking it was afterwards that he was there. That I had somehow gotten on his computer and actually seen it for myself what all there was.

Dr. Crawford: Okay.

Mr. Bryant: And there was actually a picture taken on his computer under saved history from where he looked at from where a girl was fucking a horse.

Dr. Crawford: Uh-huh.

Mr. Bryant: And that really disturbed me.

Dr. Crawford: uh-huh. That was after he was dead?

Mr. Bryant: If I'm not mistaken. I'm pretty sure it was.

Dr. Crawford: How long did you spend over there?

Mr. Bryant: We talked for a good two hours.

Crawford Interview, p. 95-96.

In the same interview he described that Tietjen got agitated about him knowing Masonic information and when Bryant went up to go to the bathroom, he was hit in the back of the head by Tietjen. (97). Bryant stated at that point, he turned around and reached for his gun. (98). He next recalled candles around the house for his spirit. Concerning writing something down, Bryant stated that the victim was not true to his brotherhood or himself "by having such lust or desires when it comes to his sexual side. He recalled writing something down about it base on what they had talked about, not because of what he later saw on the computer. He told Dr. Crawford that he may done something to the eyes."

Bryant stated that "I'm pretty sure he was dead when I looked on his computer. Crawford, p. 104, ll. 14-19. He recalled saying that he had to see the pictures for himself that Tietjen had talked about he looked on his computer." Id. 104. He stated: "eyes go stray, poke them out." See also Crawford, p. 108.

Bryant stated he had flashbacks after he killed him and described "it was like me just sitting there looking at the computer screen, seeing these f-ing pictures. And looking at him and thinking there's no way this man could be looking at stuff like that." Id. 109.

He stated the only flashback he had was after the killing. Crawford, p. 125.

3. In the October 15-16, 2004 Statement, Bryant

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stated:

Also, during the time on Oct. 11th Tietjen was also talking about how he wished he was my age cause he liked young girls and everything, and he was talking about some websites he looked up, and later before I left his house I got on to his computer and noticed the password batteries and it came on and I looked under history to see if what he said was true and so it was, more sights than I can count of nude young girls, especially one with a horse inside her. . . .

Oct. 15, 2004, p. 5. ROA 613, l. 13-24.

Agent Barton clarified that there was a mistake in his investigative report that "they had been looking at pornography on Tietjen's computer." Investigative Report, p. 9. He stated that after reviewing the actual statements this was incorrect, although there is information about Applicant and Mr. Tietjen talking about it.

Agent Barton also confirmed that the search warrant contained information provided by Applicant's girlfriend, Judy Justice. Ms. Justice reported that she had problems with Applicant's use of internet porn which had led to a rift in their relationship. She also stated Applicant would erase his internet history.

In Dr. Donna Schwartz-Watts evaluation, she described Applicant's account of the death of Mr. Tietjen stating that Mr. Tietjen became agitated with him because of his knowledge of the Masons and that Applicant was agitated with Mr. Tietjen because he had made sexual innuendos about younger girls. Then after being struck in the head with a Mason ring, he killed him, cried, lit candles and robbed Mr. Tietjen. Watts report, p. 12. She reported "while looking on his desk, [he] used his computer and found pornographic images of a young girl being molested by an animal. He states he then remembers doing something to his eyes and writing a note." Watts Report, p. 12-13. In his testimony before this Court, Dr. Watts confirmed that he reported that he

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looked at the computer after the killing.

During his mitigation testimony before Judge Russo, Dr. Watts summarized her report concerning the Tietjen murder. ROA 833-834. She testified that: "after he shot him, while looking on a computer that he found some images that upset him on the computer." ROA p. 834, ll. 12-17.

Testimony was presented that the perpetrator left a note at the Tietjen crime scene. The note stated: "no more sick computer porn for this sick f-r." "By the way just keeping my promise to all."

The State's duty to disclose evidence favorable to the defendant is addressed by *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). "The suppression by the [State] of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment." *Brady*, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. In South Carolina, an individual asserting a *Brady* violation must demonstrate that the evidence: (1) was favorable to the accused; (2) was in the possession of or known by the prosecution; (3) was suppressed by the State; and (4) was material to the accused's guilt or innocence or was impeaching. *Riddle v. Ozmint*, 369 S.C. 39, 44, 631 S.E.2d 70, 73 (2006).⁷ The court in *Riddle* recognized the United States Supreme Court's emphasis on the prosecutor's responsibility for fair play. *Riddle*, 369 S.C. at 46, 631 S.E.2d at 74. In describing this responsibility, the court stated:

⁷ Likewise, under Rule 5, SCRCP, defendants, upon request, are entitled to disclosure of their statements, criminal records, and any documents or tangible objects material to the preparation of their defense or intended for use by the prosecution. Rule 5(a)(1), SCRCP. For purposes of Rule 5, "material" is used in the same context as it is in a *Brady* analysis. *State v. Kennerly*, 331 S.C. 442, 453, 503 S.E.2d 214, 220 (Ct.App.1998). Once there is a Rule 5 violation, a court will only reverse "where the defendant suffered prejudice as a result of the violation." *Id.* 331 S.C. at 453-54, 503 S.E.2d at 220.

[T]he prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure. This is as it should be. Such disclosures will serve to justify trust in the prosecutor as the representative ... of a sovereignty ... whose interest ... in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. And it will tend to preserve the criminal trial, as distinct from the prosecutor's private deliberations, as the chosen forum for ascertaining the truth about criminal accusations.

Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As such, it is imperative for prosecutors to abide by this rule as “[o]ur judicial system relies upon the integrity of the participants.” *Id.*

Whether the prosecutor's failure to reveal evidence pursuant to *Brady* is due to negligence or an intentional act is irrelevant because a court may find a *Brady* violation regardless of the good or bad faith of the prosecutor. *Gibson v. State*, 334 S.C. 515, 528, 514 S.E.2d 320, 327 (1999).

Because *Brady* is founded upon a sense of fairness and justice, the focus in a *Brady* analysis should not be on the misconduct of the prosecutor, but rather on the fairness of the procedure. *Id.* As noted in *Brady*, “[t]he principle ... is not punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused. Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair[.]” *Id.* (quoting *Brady*, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194). “If the suppression of evidence results in constitutional error, it is because of the character of the evidence, not the character of the prosecutor.” *Id.* (quoting *United States v. Agurs*, 427 U.S. 97, 110, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)).

Evidence considered favorable to the defendant includes both exculpatory and impeachment evidence and extends to evidence that is not in the actual possession of the prosecution, but also to evidence known by others acting on the government's behalf, including the police. Moreover, “evidence at issue is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” *United States v. Bagley*, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985);

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accord *Kyles v. Whitley*, 514 U.S. 419, 433–34, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995); see also *Riddle*, 369 S.C. at 45, 631 S.E.2d at 73 (“The question is not whether petitioner would more likely have been acquitted had this evidence been disclosed, but whether, without this impeachment evidence, he received a fair trial ‘resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.’” (quoting *Kyles*, 514 U.S. at 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555)); *State v. Hill*, 368 S.C. 649, 661, 630 S.E.2d 274, 280–81(2006) (stating evidence is material if the cumulative effect of the suppressed evidence results in a reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different); *Fradella v. Town of Mount Pleasant*, 325 S.C. 469, 479, 482 S.E.2d 53, 58 (Ct.App.1997) (“A defendant shows a *Brady* violation by demonstrating that ‘favorable evidence could [have been presented] to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.’”).

In this case, Former Third Circuit Solicitor Kelly Jackson testified that he had contacts with SLED and law enforcement agencies prior to the trial. He stated that SLED Agents Bo Barton, David Caldwell, and Mark Creech were his contacts. He was also aware that Agent David Givens was the person who did the computer analysis. Solicitor Jackson stated he wanted the computers analyzed. He stated the report that he received from SLED indicated that both Mr. Tietjen’s computer and Applicant’s computer contained “nothing of evidentiary value ... In addition no evidence was identified that would have suggested Bryant had prior contact with any of the victims.” March 15, 2005 Report. Jackson testified that he never received the diskette from SLED Agent Givens which included the Encase Reports and other data from the computer analysis.

He stated that he sought all material for disclosure to the defense. He declared that he provided the defense everything he received from SLED. He stated that he was not specifically

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advised about the existence of any internet browsing history related to pornography sites or the existence of any adult pornography on the computer. He also stated Deputy Solicitor Saleeby was primary on the Tietjen case.

Deputy Solicitor Saleeby testified similarly that they never received the Givens disc with the computer analysis of Applicant's and Mr. Tietjen's computers. Upon reviewing the materials at the hearing, Mr. Saleeby stated if they had received them, he would have forwarded it to the defense team. He stated that there was no reason not to send it. He asserted that it cut both ways. He noted the report, contrary to Applicant's statements, found no child pornography or bestiality photographs. Also, the material may in fact corroborate the fact that Applicant was on the scene. Mr. Saleeby's only recollection about the computers was that he was advised that there was nothing of evidentiary value.

SLED Agent Givens testified that he performed an analysis on Mr. Tietjen's computer and created an image gallery and ran an Encase report which he placed on a diskette. Agent Givens testified that he reviewed the material and did not see any child pornography or bestiality. He confirmed that on October 21, 2004 when he reported "no child porn or bestiality photos located." However, Agent Givens did locate adult porn in Temp Internet files and located several pornographic movies within the program files.

It was also developed through Mr. Given's testimony and review of the Encase Report that the browsing history reflected possible internet pornography sites were visited the day before the incident, not contemporaneous within the incident based upon the computers clock compared to real time, which is contrary to the initial assertion made by Applicant

Agent Barton stated that he asked Agent Givens to see if there was child porn on the computer due to the assertions by Applicant. However, he confirmed he was not trying to limit

Agent Givens search. He stated he learned there was no child porn or communication between the Tietjen and Bryant computers. Agent Barton stated that he never received the CD from Agent Givens and did not provide it to the Solicitor's Office. He stated he was not aware of the existence of the internet history at that time.

This Court finds that Applicant has failed to prove the materiality prong of *Brady v. Maryland, supra.* and *Kyles v. Whitley, supra.* It is undisputed in the record that a complete report of SLED Agent Givens analysis on the Tietjen computer which revealed the internet history from the prior day and the existence of adult pornography on the computer was not provided to defense prior to the sentencing proceedings. Additionally, it is uncontested that the defense requested all exculpatory and mitigating evidence.

However, this Court must find that Applicant has failed to show a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the State disclosed to the defense the complete report of Agent Givens. First, it is uncontested in the statements and the evidence presented that Applicant did not claim to have viewed any images on the victim's computer until after he had killed Mr. Tietjen. In his statements, he even declared that he had to turn on the computer using the password. Therefore, the existence or non-existence of internet porn on the computer was not a "trigger" to the death of Mr. Tietjen. To the contrary, the record is full of evidence from Applicant's own statements about his discussions with Mr. Tietjen concerning girls. Further, it did not corroborate his comment about seeing bestiality because Agent Givens review could not locate any such images. However, to the extent the mere existence of prior internet browsing the previous day by someone on Tietjen's computer other than Applicant corroborates his version is difficult to connect. It merely supports that Mr. Tietjen may have had discussions with Applicant about it. However, it is as likely that Applicant, with knowledge of

temporary internet files, could have browsed those histories himself after the death when he claimed to have turned on the computer.

Similarly, Dr. Watts had information from numerous statements and her own interview about the impact of the discussions Applicant had with Mr. Tietjan, including when and what he claimed to see on the computer. What Dr. Watts would additionally learn is that there was no bestiality, the particular item Applicant claimed to view, in the computer's image. It is difficult to know how this additional information would have impacted the assessment by Dr. Watts but she did indicate that the additional information would have corroborated her conclusions. Thus, Applicant has failed to show its materiality under Brady.

Counsel Jack Howle testified the defense was interested in the existence of evidence of pornography, possibly to establish pornography was a "trigger" for the Tietjen homicide. However, Mr. Howle, like Mr. Babb, could not explain how the presence of pornography on the victim's computer which did not include the images he described in his statements would have corroborated the defense. Similarly, he could not explain how the claimed viewing after the death of Mr. Tietjen would be a trigger for the murder. Former Counsel Babb claimed the non-disclosure of pornography by SLED was prejudicial because their mitigation was based on his mental illness from childhood sexual abuse and trauma that resulted in Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. He claimed that the pornography would corroborate Applicant's account that he killed Mr. Tietjen because of a "trigger" based on discussing and/or viewing pornography with Mr. Tietjen. However, he ignores that the so-called trigger would only have happened after the death. While Mr. Jackson did question corroboration about the child sexual abuse, he did not challenge any lack of corroboration about the pornography - a point that Mr. Babb missed at the PCR hearing. He further ignores that the computer assessment does not fully corroborate Applicant's version

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because it did not support the existence of either child pornography or bestiality - matters that were not challenged before Judge Russo. The Court also notes that Applicant testified at the PCR hearing and did not present any evidence that he viewed the internet history or other particular images on the computer.

Applicant has claimed it may have triggered his post-mortem abuse of Mr. Tietjen's eyes. The record reveals that this theory was fully presented within his statements to Dr. Crawford and was given to the defense and their experts. The fact of the presence on the computer of some images, but not the particular images he had described of child pornography or bestiality and their non-disclosure does not mandate a new sentencing proceeding under *Brady*. Although this Court agrees with Applicant, as well as the prosecution, that the material should have been disclosed and provided to each of them prior to trial, the failure of it being provided to the defense does not undermine confidence in the sentencing by Judge Russo.

As represented by Applicant, the triggering event in the victim's death, according to Applicant's statements went to the discussion about the Masons and his reaction to the assault. The pornography issue then and now was a two-edge sword, reflecting his presence at the scene, yet his alleged disgust at pornography was disputed by his own history on the internet according to a prior girlfriend. The mental health experts were aware of his statements to the police and to them concerning the effect the discussion with Tietjen he claimed to have had and how it affected his actions. The malicious actions of Applicant on Mr. Tietjen and his family, in the face of the other admitted murders and assaults, are not changed by the mere presence of images or browsing history on Mr. Tietjen's computer. Applicant has failed to show a reasonable probability that had the images been disclosed that the result of the proceeding would have been different and resulted in a life sentence. It must be dismissed.




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CONCLUSION


Based on the foregoing, the application for post-conviction relief is denied in its entirety. Applicant has failed to show error, or if he established error, he failed to show prejudice such as would support the granting of either a new guilt proceeding, or a new sentencing proceeding.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

1. The post-conviction relief application is **DENIED AND DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE**; and,
2. Applicant is to remain in Respondent's custody and his sentence shall be carried out.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 _____, South Carolina.
Dec. 4, 2012.


The Honorable Ralph F. Cothran, Jr.
Presiding Judge

RECORDED 2013 FEB 22 PM 2:05 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS JAMES C. CAMPBELL CLERK OF COURT SUMTER COUNTY, S.C.	
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA COUNTY OF SUMTER Stephen Corey Bryant, Applicant, v. State of South Carolina, Respondent.	 C/A No.: 11-CP-43-901 Objections to Final Order Denying Post-Conviction Relief Pursuant to Rule 59(e)

Applicant, by and through undersigned counsel, hereby objects to the ruling of this Court denying and dismissing his claims for post-conviction relief.

As an initial matter, Applicant objects to the Court's almost complete reliance on the Respondent's proposed Order denying relief, which, after a few minor and cosmetic changes, was proclaimed the ruling of this Court. The South Carolina Supreme Court has strongly disapproved of this practice, encouraging the Circuit Courts to "draft their own findings of fact and conclusions of law." *Hall v. Catoe*, 360 S.C. 353, 365, 601 S.E.2d 335, 341 (2004). This stance is in accord with our statutory law related to both capital and non-capital post-conviction relief cases. See S.C. Code Section 17-27-80 ("The court shall make specific findings of fact, and state expressly its conclusions of law, relating to each issue presented"); S.C. Code Section 17-27-160(D)(governing capital post-conviction relief cases: "the hearing judge in writing shall make specific findings of fact and state expressly the judge's conclusions of law relating to each issue.").

Applicant further objects to the Court's fact findings beginning on page 17 of the Order and continuing through until the end of the Order at page 54. Neither counsel for applicant and respondent nor this Court has benefit of a transcript of the post-conviction relief proceedings. Without specific reference to the record, it is impossible to ascertain which "facts" are accurate and which are inaccurate. Applicant asks this Court to hold ruling in this matter in abeyance pending receipt of the post-conviction relief transcript, after the receipt of which the Court can then make specific fact findings based on its own independent consideration of the evidence and testimony adduced at the hearing of October 1-3, 2012.

Applicant further objects and asks this Court to reconsider its ruling on the merits and law of the issues presented in the following particulars:

Issue "A": This Court misapprehended or overlooked the following:

- (1) The "statistics" referred to by defense counsel did not exist then, or now, and were contrary to the advice provided by Ms. Norris and cited extensively in her Affidavit (p. 19, Order). Further, Howle did not testify he "recalled seeing the statistics" (p. 18, Order) because they don't exist;
- (2) The Court found "unique" that Applicant was unlikely to be found not guilty if he went to trial. Applicant believes the Court misapprehends the nature of capital cases in that most capital defendants are found guilty at trial, as few, if any prosecutors, would seek a sentence of death if a not guilty verdict was even remotely likely to occur at trial.
- (3) Finally, as to this issue, this Court has failed to address the law concerning counsel's duty to provide accurate advice and, when counsel provides

inaccurate advice leading the client to plead guilty, counsel has engaged in providing ineffective assistance. *Hill v. Lockhart*, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).

- (4) This Court should reconsider its ruling and reverse Applicant's plea of guilt.

Issue "B": This Court misapprehended or overlooked the following:

- (1) This Court misapprehended the time lead counsel Clarke had to prepare for Mr. Bryant's trial or plea, stating Clarke had "months" to represent Applicant, when, in fact, the record reveals Clarke had 30 days to prepare for Applicant's trial or plea and sentencing phase.
- (2) This Court misunderstood Issue B, insofar as Applicant was not claiming he had no counsel, but rather that he was denied two counsel for advice prior to entering his guilty plea. Attorney Clarke had thirty days to prepare prior to Applicant entering his guilty plea. Clarke acknowledged he had less time than he would in an ordinary case, and a capital murder is no ordinary case.
- (3) This issue is inter-related to Issue A in that Applicant received erroneous advice about "statistics" and lose rules of evidence, and this might have been avoided had Clarke been afforded sufficient time to review the plea proffers and conduct some independent research, rather than relying on non-existent statistics and flawed information from prior counsel.
- (4) This Court should reconsider its ruling and reverse Applicant's plea of guilt.

Issue "C": Applicant relies on his prior arguments, law and fact and asks this Court to reconsider its ruling.

Issue "D": This Court misapprehended the law and facts relevant to this claim and ruled erroneously on the merits of the claim, for the following reasons:

- (1) The Victim's Bill of Rights statute does not trump the Eighth Amendment protections of the United States Constitution, and is not a proper basis upon which to allow the state to run roughshod over the defense during the sentencing phase of a capital trial.
- (2) Defense counsel testified they should have objected due to the obvious unfairness of the state being allowed to admit victim impact evidence after the close of all the evidence, while the defense was denied an opportunity to present after-discovered evidence in mitigation. Such a lopsided pair of rulings offends the Eighth Amendment, Due Process and the right to a fair trial under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the South Carolina Constitution and Laws, as well as the guarantee of effective counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, South Carolina Constitution and laws.
- (3) This Court erred in finding "Applicant had the opportunity to confront the impact witnesses prior to the sentence in their non-capital cases." (Page 34, Order). The additional witnesses offered by the state were not under oath, and not subject to cross-examination.
- (4) This Court appears to misapprehend the rules and safeguards applicable in capital sentencing proceedings and failed to address Applicant's constitutional claim under *Gardner v. Florida*, 430 U.S. 349 (1977).

- (5) This Court should reconsider its ruling, and reverse Applicant's death sentence.

Issue "E": This Court misapprehended the law and facts relevant to this claim and ruled erroneously on the merits of the claim, for the following reasons:

- (1) Appellate counsel's testimony he did not raise the issue because it was "vague" does not amount to a reasonable strategic basis;
- (2) Appellate counsel's testimony he should have raised the issue amounts to an admission of ineffective assistance;
- (3) Prejudice was established by the testimony of Howle, who was adamant that this testimony bolstered their claims for mitigation;
- (4) Prejudice was established by the testimony of Dr. Donna Schwartz-Watts, who was repeatedly attacked for lacking corroboration for her findings, as Gause's observations corroborated the extreme mental illness Applicant suffered from prior to the time of his crimes;
- (5) Whatever tattoos Applicant may have are not "clearly visible" and were not so at the hearing. Applicant admitted to having tattoos, but no date was ever established as to when he had the tattoos made;
- (6) This Court failed to address *State v. Owens*, 346 S.C. 637 (2001), a case directly on point where a death sentence was vacated when counsel was not afforded reasonable time to investigate newly discovered evidence relevant to the penalty phase.
- (7) This Court should reconsider its ruling, and reverse Applicant's death sentence.

Issue "F": This Court misapprehended the law and facts relevant to this claim and ruled erroneously on the merits of the claim, for the following reasons:

- (1) Applicant established by testimony of Edward Gause that Sgt. Mayes was a witness to the prior incident involving Applicant having been seen in a demented and crazed state just prior to the crimes.
- (2) The Court failed to make findings of fact as to the conflict between Gause's live, in-person testimony and the affidavit of Officer Tripp Mayes, disclaiming any memory of what occurred as between Gause, Applicant and Mayes.
- (3) This Court did not analyze this claim as to the punishment phase aspects, but focused on the fact that the Gause information did not go to the trial or guilt-or-innocence phase. This focus is incorrect, as Applicant's claim relates to the punishment phase only.
- (4) This Court ignored the devastating effects of lack of corroboration by Dr. Watts on her credibility at trial. Dr. Watts testified she was damaged in her role as a testifying expert because she did not have "corroboration" of Applicant's statements to her, which statements formed the core of her diagnosis and testimony.
- (5) This Court erred in denying this claim and in failing to address the actual merits of this claim.
- (6) This Court should reconsider its ruling, and reverse Applicant's death sentence.


Issue "G": This Court misapprehended the law and facts relevant to this claim and ruled erroneously on the merits of the claim, for the following reasons:

- (1) This Court, by relying on the state's proposed order for its focus, improperly ignored the testimony of Dr. Watts and, rather, focused on Applicant's interrogation by Dr. Crawford.
- (2) This Court ignored Dr. Watts' testimony during PCR that her diagnosis of pornography as a trigger was based on the topic, not the fact of when visual images were first seen. The mere topic of pornography and sex with minors was enough to "trigger" Applicant to respond with violence, become paranoid and attack Tietjen.
- (3) This Court made conflicting and inconsistent findings of fact and law, specifically finding Dr. Watts said the porn would corroborate her testimony, and then finding the porn was nonetheless immaterial under *Brady*.
- (4) This Court further erred in relying on Respondent's continued misconstruing of the porn as not being a "trigger" based upon when it was viewed—before or after the killing of Mr. Tietjen—and ignoring that even trial counsel believed there case was damaged by the non-disclosure.
- (5) Finally, this Court seems to have adopted the Respondent's nonsensical argument that porn evidence was a "double edged" sword because it would prove Applicant was present at the scene. (Order at p. 53). This is an absurd basis for arguing lack of materiality, as no one ever disputed Applicant's presence at the Tietjen home.

(6) This Court should reconsider its ruling, and reverse Applicant's death sentence.

Conclusion

For all of the foregoing reasons, Applicant moves this Court to reconsider its ruling, make neutral and independent fact-findings based on the actual trial record and grant relief for all the reasons previously stated in this document and Applicant's Proposed Order, and Applicant's Amended Application for Post-Conviction Relief.



Melissa J. Armstrong, Esquire
4431 Sylvan Drive
Columbia, S.C. 29206
(803) 467-4541.

This ⁴⁴~~20~~ day of Feb., 2012.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA **RECORDED** IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
 COUNTY OF SUMTER 2013 FEB 19 } AM 11:38 FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
 Case No.: 2011-CP-43-0901

Stephen Corey Bryant, #5252

JAMES D. CAMPBELL
 CLERK OF COURT
 SUMTER COUNTY, S.C.

Applicant,

vs.

ORDER DENYING APPLICANT'S
 RULE 59(E) MOTION.

State of South Carolina,

Respondent.

Procedural History

This Court held an evidentiary hearing on Stephen Corey Bryant's (Applicant) Application for Post Conviction Relief (PCR) on October 1-3, 2012. After weighing the testimony and other evidence presented during the hearing, Applicant's Application for PCR was denied. Applicant subsequently filed a Rule 59(e) Motion. Having reviewed the issues raised in the Rule 59(e) motion, this Court finds, for all the reasons set forth in this Order, the Rule 59(e) motion is denied.

Allegations

The Rule 59(e) motion objects to the findings of the Court on all allegations listed in Applicants PCR motion. The allegations from the PCR Application are as follows:

- A. Ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eight and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the South Carolina Constitution and laws. Counsel failed to provide accurate advice to Applicant insofar as the likelihood of his possible sentence if tried by jury versus pleading guilty and receiving a judge sentencing. Applicant was given various pieces of advice concerning his entering a guilty plea and signed three (3) separate plea agreements contained in trial counsel's file. Ultimately, Applicant pleaded guilty to three counts of murder and other related charges in exchange for no consideration from the state. In effect, Mr. Bryant pleaded "straight up" to capital murder. Counsel was ineffective in that they told Applicant there was an "advantage" to pleading guilty in that he was lessening his chances of receiving a death sentence, when in fact he received nothing of benefit from the plea. Moreover, Counsel erroneously advised Applicant as to "statistical" evidence supporting the advice to plead guilty, when no such evidence existed to support the advice given. Counsel further misadvised Applicant as to the rules of evidence if he went to trial versus pleaded guilty.

Advising a client to plead guilty under these circumstances was clearly unreasonable. Counsel's inaccurate advice induced Applicant to plead guilty and, but for this erroneous advice, Applicant would have not pled guilty but would have insisted on going to trial. *Hill v. Lockhart*, 474 U.S. 52 (1985); *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 684 (1984).

- B. Constitutional violation of assistance of counsel in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Lead counsel failed to participate in discussions with Applicant concerning whether Applicant should plead guilty. South Carolina law provides to capital defendants the right to two (2) counsel. Applicant was denied two counsel during a critical stage of his trial, that being the discussion and decision leading him to enter a plea of guilty. This error amounts to a denial of counsel as recognized in *United States v. Cronin*, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) or was ineffective under *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 684 (1984).
- C. Ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the South Carolina Constitution and law. Counsel failed to object to the solicitor's improper closing argument during the penalty phase of trial. The Solicitor implored the trial judge to sentence Applicant to death to send a community "message." These types of closing arguments have been condemned by the South Carolina courts and constitute reversible error. *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 684 (1984).
- D. Denial of Due Process, Effective Assistance of Counsel and Violation of Prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution due to trial court's refusal to allow Applicant the opportunity to present after-discovered witness testimony relevant to his mental health and mitigation, while allowing the state to present additional evidence in aggravation of punishment after the state had rested its case in aggravation. Trial Counsel failed to object to the trial court's erroneous decision to allow the state to introduce additional victim impact testimony. The trial court's actions were improper, and required an objection from defense counsel. Failure to object was deficient and prejudicial, as capital defendants have an absolute right to confront and/or rebut the evidence against them offered in support of a sentence of death. The above errors and omissions were prejudicial and require that Applicant's death sentence be reversed and his case remanded for a new sentencing trial. *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 669 (1984), *Gardner v. Florida*, 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
- E. Denial of Effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, due

to trial counsel's failure to proffer or otherwise preserve the issue of the trial court's denial of trial counsel's request to provide testimony from Edward Goss, who became known as a potential witness after the defense had completed the anticipated evidence in mitigation. Assuming, arguendo, that the above issue was preserved for appellate review, then Applicant was denied effective appellate counsel for appellate counsel's failure to raise this issue. *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 669 (1984). Edward Goss's after-trial statement to law enforcement establishes the materiality of what he had to offer on behalf of Mr. Bryant at trial. The absence of Mr. Goss's testimony was prejudicial to Mr. Bryant. This Court should reverse Mr. Bryant's death sentence [and] remand this case for resentencing.

- F. Denial of Due Process of Law and Right to a Fair Trial due to the State's failure to comply with the requirements of *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Edward Goss was a witness to Applicant's mental derangement just prior to the time of the crimes. This fact was witnessed by Law Enforcement Office[r] Tripp Mayes, who saw Applicant in this state and had a conversation with Edward Goss. After Bryant's arrest, which was widely published in the Sumter area papers, but prior to Bryant's trial, Mr. Goss recalled a conversation with Officer Mayes, during which they discussed the fact of their being witnesses to Bryant's bizarre behavior just prior to the murders. Officer Mayes and/or the Solicitor's Office failed to disclose the information concerning Applicant's mental health and/or the existence of Edward Goss as a witness who could provide evidence favorable to the defense. *Brady v. Maryland, Id.* This failure was prejudicial, as the issue of Bryant's mental health was essentially the centerpiece of the defense case in mitigation. Given this fact, the state's failure to turn over this type of evidence cannot be held harmless. Prejudice is manifest and Applicant's sentence should be reversed.
- G. Denial of Due Process of law and a fair trial due to the state's non-disclosure of evidence relevant to the Defense case in mitigation of punishment, evidence that was part and parcel of the circumstances of the crime related to the Tietjen Homicide, evidence that corroborated Mr. Bryant's statements to law enforcement concerning the facts leading up to the Tietjen homicide. *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The state was repeatedly asked for discovery and, in turn, the state repeatedly played a game of cat and mouse with the defense team, asking them what they – the defense – thought the state had not turned over. The state, it turns out, was in possession of forensic computer reports and evidence from SLED agent David Givens. Agent Givens' examination of Mr. Tietjen's home computer revealed a history of visits to teen (and various other) porn websites. This examination further revealed that Tietjen had been "surfing" porn at least as early as June, 14, 2004. Agent Givens'

R. J. E.

casenotes reflect he had a discussion with the state about his investigation of Tietjen's computer on October 25, 2004. Defense counsel was never provided with any documentation about the pornography found on Tietjen's computer. The defense team scrambled to find this kind of evidence because Mr. Bryant told SLED forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Pam Crawford, that he saw pornography on Tietjen's computer on the day of the killing. (March 25, 2004 Transcript of Interview by Dr. Pam Crawford of Stephen Corey Bryant, at pp. 95-98). Mr. Bryant also told defense forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Donna Schwartz-Watts, that he had seen porn on the computer and, due to his personal history of sex abuse by both male and female family members, felt sexually threatened during the time he committed each of the offenses, including hte one committed at the Teitjen home. (See Record on Appeal (hereinafter "ROA", p. 834, line 2-p. 835, line 23).

The prejudice to Bryant created by the state's failure to disclose evidence of pornography use by Tietjen was exacerbated by the state's cross-examination of defense witnesses Dr. Marti Loring and Dr. Donna Schwartz-Watts. The state repeatedly attacked the opinions rendered by both of these witnesses due to their having a lack of "corroboration" and having to rely on Mr. Bryant. Prejudice to Mr. Bryant is obvious in this situation.

Even after thoroughly attacking defense witnesses for their uncorroborated opinions, the state was not finished with making use of the evidence of pornography discovered on Tietjen's computer. And so, during closing arguments to the judge, the Solicitor remarked that Bryant "got on their computer and began to visit porn sites by his choosing, not sites from T.J. and Mildred." (ROA at 1020, lines 7-9). Based on Agent Givens' findings, the state knew, or should have known, that Tietjen, not Bryant, had an affinity for porn. Bryant's computer was examined and no evidence of pornography was ever found. Tietjen's computer had pornography on it dating back to June, 2004, which was approximately four (4) months prior to Bryant ever meeting Tietjen. The State knew, or should have known, the real facts and disclosed them to the defense. Yet, what actually happened was the state urged the Court to sentence Bryant to death based on the false allegation that Mr. Bryant, in an extreme act of indifference, surfed porn on the Teitjen's computer sometime after killing Mr. Tietjen. This is the type of misrepresentation of fact that, whether intentional or simply through negligence/ignorance of the facts, has been condemned by the United States Supreme Court as so egregious that reversal is required. *Napue v. Illinois*, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), *U.S. v. Giglio*, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).

Finally, the state's misuse of non-disclosed evidence of pornography denied Applicant his right of rebuttal, which is a fundamental due process

protection to ensure no one is sentenced to death on the basis of information they could not confront and challenge. The state's *Brady/Napue/Giglio* violation led to this result and requires reversal of Applicant's death sentence. *Gardner v. Florida*, 430 U.S. 349 (1977).

Second Amended Applicant for Post-Conviction Relief, filed October 1, 2012, pp. 2-6.

DISCUSSION

This Court has had the opportunity to re-review the record of the PCR Hearing. After considering Applicant's Rule 59(e) arguments, the Court must deny the motion. Set forth below are the relevant findings of fact and conclusions of law as to each individual allegation:

A.

Allegation Counsel Failed to Provide Accurate Advice on Guilty Plea.

Applicant contends that this Court misapprehended and overlooked the following issues:

1. The "statistics" referred to by defense counsel did not exist then, or now, and were contrary to the advice provided by Ms. Norris and cited extensively in her Affidavit (p. 19, Order). Further, Howle did not testify he "recalled seeing the statistics" (p. 18, Order) because they don't exist;
2. The Court found "unique" that Applicant was unlikely to be found not guilty if he went to trial. Applicant believes the Court misapprehends the nature of capital cases in that most capital defendants are found guilty at trial, as few, if any prosecutors, would seek a sentence of death if a not guilty verdict was even remotely likely to occur at trial.
3. Finally, as to this issue, this Court has failed to address the law concerning counsel's duty to provide accurate advice and, when counsel provides inaccurate advice leading the client to plead guilty, counsel has engaged in providing ineffective assistance. *Hill v. Lockhart*, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).

Applicant contends that "statistics" never existed and Applicant's trial counsel never utilized statistics in trying to determine whether or not Applicant should plea or go to trial. This Court disagrees. Mr. Howle testified at the PCR hearing that he utilized statistics, as well as other factors, when he recommended to Applicant that he should plea. Mr. Babb also testified that he received statistics from either Ms. Norris or Mr. Lominack and they were used, as well as other factors, to determine if Applicant should plea rather than proceed to trial. Therefore, the record supports the existence and use of "statistics" by defense counsel in determining whether or not to plead guilty.

Applicant contends that this Court found it "unique" that Applicant was unlikely to be found not guilty if he went to trial. This Court disagrees. Applicant has misconstrued the context of "unique" as used by this Court. The Court found it "unique" that Applicant was not

arguing the traditional definition of “prejudice.” Normally, in order to prove “prejudice” in the guilt phase of a trial, an applicant must show that but for counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability the result of the trial would have been different. Johnson v. State, 325 S.C. 182, 480 S.E.2d 733 (1997). In this case, Applicant believed he would be found guilty at trial so there was no reasonable probability that the outcome would be different.

Finally, Applicant alleges that counsel were ineffective because they provided inaccurate advice to Applicant. This Court disagrees. We find the original denial of the PCR application provides sufficient facts and analysis to show that counsel provided sufficient advice to the Applicant throughout their representation.

B.

Allegation of Denial of Counsel or Ineffective Assistance Based on Deprivation of Two Attorneys During a Critical Stage of Trial.

Applicant contends that this Court misapprehended and overlooked the following issues:

1. This Court misapprehended the time lead counsel Clarke had to prepare for Mr. Bryant’s trial or plea, stating Clarke had “months” to represent Applicant, when, in fact, the record reveals Clarke had 30 days to prepare for Applicant’s trial or plea and sentencing phase.
2. This Court misunderstood Issue B, insofar as Applicant was not claiming he had no counsel, but rather that he was denied two counsel for advice prior to entering his guilty plea. Attorney Clarke had thirty days to prepare prior to Applicant entering his guilty plea. Clarke acknowledged he had less time than he would in an ordinary case, and a capital murder is no ordinary case.
3. This issue is inter-related to Issue A in that Applicant received erroneous advice about “statistics” and lose rules of evidence, and this might have been avoided had Clarke been afforded sufficient time to review the plea proffers and conduct some independent research, rather than relying on non-existent statistics and flawed information from prior counsel.

Applicant contends that this Court misconstrued the time Mr. Clarke had to prepare for Applicant’s trial or plea. This Court disagrees. The record reflects that Mr. Clarke was appointed on July 18, 2008 to replace Mr. Babb. The guilty plea was held Aug 18, 2008 and the sentencing phase was Sept 2, 2008. Therefore, Clarke had a month to prepare for the guilt phase and about 6 weeks to prepare for the sentencing phase. The use of “months” may have been an oversight in the Order denying the PCR Application, the error was de minimus and the record shows Mr. Clarke represented Applicant longer than a month before the plea and sentencing phases ended.

Applicant contends that this Court did not misunderstand Issue B. This Court disagrees. Applicant had continual dual representation during both the guilt and penalty phase. Mr. Clarke testified that he was pulled into the case after the defense team had already decided to plead guilty. Mr. Clarke also testified, that while he wasn't on the case very long, he also believed pleading guilty could benefit Applicant because it could act as a mitigating factor. Mr. Clarke also testified that he recalls speaking about pleading guilty and the ramifications that pleading would entail. Therefore, the record shows that Applicant had two counsel throughout his guilty and penalty phase.

Applicant contends that he received erroneous advice about "statistics." This Court disagrees. The "statistics" issue is discussed in detail under Issue A of this Order.

C.

Allegation Counsel Was Ineffective in Failing to Object to Solicitor's Closing Argument Asking the Judge to Send a Message to the Community.

Applicant contends that his prior arguments are sufficient to overturn the Court's prior Order denying the PCR application. This Court disagrees as stated in the denial of the PCR application and this Order.

D.

Allegation Applicant Was Improperly Denied Right to Present Additional Evidence in Mitigation While the State Was Allowed to Present Additional Evidence in Aggravation.

Applicant contends that this Court misapprehended and overlooked the following issues:

1. The Victim's Bill of Rights statute does not trump the Eighth Amendment protections of the United States Constitution, and is not a proper basis upon which to allow the state to run roughshod over the defense during the sentencing phase of a capital trial.
2. Defense counsel testified they should have objected due to the obvious unfairness of the state being allowed to admit victim impact evidence after the close of all the evidence, while the defense was denied an opportunity to present after-discovered evidence in mitigation. Such a lopsided pair of rulings offends the Eighth Amendment, Due Process and the right to a fair trial under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the South Carolina Constitution and Laws, as well as the guarantee of effective counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, South Carolina Constitution and laws.
3. This Court erred in finding "Applicant had the opportunity to confront the impact witnesses prior to the sentence in their non-capital cases." (Page 34, Order). The additional witnesses offered by the state were not under oath, and not subject to cross-examination.
4. This Court appears to misapprehend the rules and safeguards applicable in capital sentencing proceedings and failed to address Applicant's constitutional claim under *Gardner v. Florida*, 430 U.S. 349 (1977).

The Applicant contends that the Court allowed the Victim Bill of Rights to circumvent the Applicant's 8th Amendment rights during the sentencing phase. This Court disagrees. As stated in the denial of the PCR application, Judge Russo followed both the Victim Bill of Rights and the 8th Amendment.

The Applicant contends that it was inherently unfair that the prosecution was allowed to use victim impact statements while the defense was not allowed to present after-discovered evidence in the form of testimony by Mr. Gause. This Court disagrees. The use of the victim impact statements was proper as discussed above and in the Order denying the PCR application. The refusal to allow the after-discovered evidence was within the sound discretion of the court. Additionally, Applicant contends that main purpose of the testimony of Mr. Gause is to corroborate the testimony of Dr. Schwartz-Watts regarding Applicant's mental health. This Court finds that there was sufficient corroboration of Applicant's mental health within the record even without Mr. Gause's testimony. The defense utilized two doctors to ascertain the mental health of Applicant. The Court also asked Dr. Schwartz-Watts during the PCR hearing if Applicant's behavior at the PCR hearing was the same as it was during the guilty and sentencing phases of his trial. Dr. Schwartz-Watts stated that Applicant behaved the same way at both the PCR hearing and the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. The Court's reasoning for this question was to ensure that Judge Russo observed the same behavior at trial that was observed during the PCR hearing because it was clear Applicant suffered from some form of mental illness. Therefore, Applicant's mental health was never really in question during the trial or the PCR hearing and Mr. Gause's testimony would not have been needed to corroborate the testimony of Dr. Schwartz-Watts.

Applicant contends that this Court erred in stating "Applicant had the opportunity to confront the impact witnesses prior to the sentence in their non-capital cases." This Court disagrees. As stated in the Order denying the PCR application, "No request was made to examine [the witnesses] which is authorized under state law. The victims had the statutory right to be heard and the defense had the right to respond." Therefore, Applicant did have the opportunity to confront and respond to the impact witnesses which satisfies the requirements of *Gardner*.

E.

Allegation of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Failing to Properly Proffer Evidence to Preserve the Gause Issue for Appeal; or, Alternatively, Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel in Failing to Present the Issue on Appeal.

Applicant contends that this Court misapprehended and overlooked the following issues:

1. Appellate counsel's testimony he did not raise the issue because it was "vague" does not amount to a reasonable strategic basis;
2. Appellate counsel's testimony he should have raised the issue amounts to an admission of ineffective assistance;
3. Prejudice was established by the testimony of Howle, who was adamant that this testimony bolstered their claims for mitigation;
4. Prejudice was established by the testimony of Dr. Donna Schwartz-Watts, who was repeatedly attacked for lacking corroboration for her findings, as Gause's observations corroborated the extreme mental illness Applicant suffered from prior to the time of his crimes;
5. Whatever tattoos Applicant may have are not "clearly visible" and were not so at the hearing. Applicant admitted to having tattoos, but no date was ever established as to when he had the tattoos made;
6. This Court failed to address *State v. Owens*, 346 S.C. 637 (2001), a case directly on point where a death sentence was vacated when counsel was not afforded reasonable time to investigate newly discovered evidence relevant to the penalty phase.

Applicant claims that not raising an issue because it was "vague" does not amount to reasonable strategic basis. This court disagrees. As stated in the denial of the PCR application, failure to not raise the "vague" issue did not meet the *Strickland* test for ineffective counsel.

Applicant claims that when Appellant counsel testified that he should have raised the issue on appeal, Appellant Counsel was admitting ineffective counsel. This court disagrees. As stated in the denial of the PCR application, hindsight reasoning does not amount to ineffective counsel.

Applicant claims that prejudice was established by the testimony of Mr. Howle. This court disagrees. As stated in the denial of the PCR application and this Order, failure to include the testimony of Mr. Gause was not prejudicial.

Applicant claims that prejudice was established by the testimony of testimony of Dr. Donna Schwartz-Watts. This court disagrees. As stated in the denial of the PCR application and this Order, failure to include the testimony of Mr. Gause was not prejudicial and Applicant's mental health was never really in question.

Applicant claims that any tattoos that Applicant may have were not visible at the PCR hearing. This court disagrees. This Court noticed a tattoo on the Applicants chest and the Applicant admitted to the tattoo while testifying at the PCR hearing.

Applicant claims that *Owens* is a case directly on point and this Court should grant Applicant's PCR application. This Court disagrees. While it is true in *Owens* that the Supreme Court vacated a death sentence when defense counsel was not given reasonable time to investigate newly discovered evidence, Applicant misapplies the Court's reasoning. In *Owens*, the Solicitor served defense counsel with a "Supplemental Notice of Aggravation" on the first day of the sentencing hearing. *Id.* at 653. The Supplemental Notice of Aggravation alleged that Owens murdered a fellow inmate ("Lee") between the guilt and sentencing phases of his trial and that the State was going to admit Owen's statement confessing to the murder of Lee. Defense counsel objected because they did not have sufficient time to rebut the statement. The trial court allowed the admission as a mitigating factor and the Jury sentenced Owen to death. Two days after sentencing Owen to death, *The Greenville News* released a story that another inmate was also arrested for the murder of Lee. Defense counsel made a motion for new trial based on the after discovered evidence. Defense Counsel argued that had they been able to tell the jury about the other inmate involved in the murder of Lee, "the impact of [Owen's] confession would have been diluted." *Id.* at 658. The trial Judge denied the motion and the defense counsel appealed. The Supreme Court found

counsel had little, if any, meaningful opportunity to investigate the circumstances surrounding Lee's death. Because of the capital nature of the proceeding and given the timing of appellant's statement, we find due process necessitated a brief, perhaps twenty-four hour, continuance to allow defense counsel the opportunity to interview the inmates and personnel at the detention center. Further, without a fair opportunity to counter the statement, appellant's graphic rendition of the brutal details of Lee's death was highly prejudicial. Although reversals of the refusal to grant a continuance are as 'rare as the proverbial hens' teeth,' under the most unusual circumstances presented here, this is one of those rare cases.

Id. at 664-65.

In this case, the Court finds the failure to allow Mr. Gause to testify during mitigation doesn't qualify as "one of those rare cases." *Id.* at 665. Mr. Gause's testimony is not related to any of the crimes that the Applicant committed. Additionally, the lack of testimony of Mr. Gause could hardly be described as highly prejudicial. Defense counsel stated Mr. Gause's testimony could be utilized in mitigation to show "mental condition before [the] offenses happened." *R.* pp. 1038. However, as stated previously in this Order, the mental health of Applicant was clear from his behavior during both the trial and PCR hearing.

F.

Allegation of Brady Violation Concerning Edward Gause.

Applicant contends that this Court misapprehended and overlooked the following issues:

1. Applicant established by testimony of Edward Gause that Sgt. Mayes was a witness to the prior incident involving Applicant having been seen in a demented and crazed state just prior to the crimes.
2. The Court failed to make findings of fact as to the conflict between Gause's live, in-person testimony and the affidavit of Officer Tripp Mayes, disclaiming any memory of what occurred as between Gause, Applicant and Mayes.
3. This Court did not analyze this claim as to the punishment phase aspects, but focused on the fact that the Gause information did not go to the trial or guilt-or-innocence phase. This focus is incorrect, as Applicant's claim relates to the punishment phase only.
4. This Court ignored the devastating effects of lack of corroboration by Dr. Watts on her credibility at trial. Dr. Watts testified she was damaged in her role as a testifying expert because she did not have "corroboration" of Applicant's statements to her, which statements formed the core of her diagnosis and testimony.
5. This Court erred in denying this claim and in failing to address the actual merits of this claim.
6. This Court should reconsider its ruling, and reverse Applicant's death sentence.

Applicant claims he established Sgt. Mays as a witness to Applicant's mental health through Mr. Gause's testimony. This court disagrees. As stated in the denial of the PCR application, Sgt. Mays submitted an affidavit stating that he has no record or independent recollection of ever speaking with Mr. Gause about the Applicant.

Applicant claims that this Court failed to make a finding of fact regarding the conflict between Mr. Gause's live testimony and the affidavit of Sgt. Mays. This court disagrees. The denial of the PCR application discusses the difference between Mr. Gause's testimony and the affidavit of Sgt. Mays. *See Order of Dismissal pp. 38-39.*

Applicant claims that this Court failed to analyze Mr. Gause's live testimony as to the punishment phase of the trial. This court disagrees. The denial of the PCR application acknowledges that Defense counsel planned on utilizing Mr. Gause's testimony as mitigation evidence in the penalty phase of the trial.

Applicant again claims that the lack of corroboration for Dr. Schwartz-Watts was devastating. This Court disagrees. As stated in the denial of the PCR Application and this Order, corroboration was not needed because the mental health of Applicant was obvious at the trial and the PCR hearing.

AGC/

G.

Allegation of Denial of Due Process and Fair Trial Due to State's Non-Disclosure of Evidence in Discovery

Applicant contends that this Court misapprehended and overlooked the following issues:

1. This Court, by relying on the state's proposed order for its focus, improperly ignored the testimony of Dr. Watts and, rather, focused on Applicant's interrogation by Dr. Crawford.
2. This Court ignored Dr. Watts' testimony during PCR that her diagnosis of pornography as a trigger was based on the topic, not the fact of when visual images were first seen. The mere topic of pornography and sex with minors was enough to "trigger" Applicant to respond with violence, become paranoid and attack Tietjen.
3. This Court made conflicting and inconsistent findings of fact and law, specifically finding Dr. Watts said the porn would corroborate her testimony, and then finding the porn was nonetheless immaterial under *Brady*.
4. This Court further erred in relying on Respondent's continued misconstruing of the porn as not being a "trigger" based upon when it was viewed—before or after the killing of Mr. Tietjen—and ignoring that even trial counsel believed there case was damaged by the non-disclosure.
5. Finally, this Court seems to have adopted the Respondent's nonsensical argument that porn evidence was a "double edged" sword because it would prove Applicant was present at the scene. (Order at p. 53). This is an absurd basis for arguing lack of materiality, as no one ever disputed Applicant's presence at the Tietjen home.

Applicant claims that this Court ignored the testimony of Dr. Schwartz-Watts. This court disagrees. The denial of the PCR application and this Order make it clear that the testimony of Dr. Schwartz-Watts was considered.

Applicant claims that this Court ignored the testimony of Dr. Schwartz-Watts regarding porn as a trigger was not related to actual computer images of porn but rather the topic of porn. This court disagrees. The denial of the PCR application discusses porn as a trigger "based on discussing and/or viewing pornography with Mr. Tietjen." Order of Dismissal pp. 55.

Applicant claims that this Court was inconsistent regarding the existence of pornography. This Court disagrees. As stated in the denial of the PCR application, even with the corroboration of the existence of the pornography, Dr. Schwartz-Watts stated that her conclusions on the mental health of the Applicant would not have changed. Additionally, as stated in this Order, no corroboration was needed for the mental health of the Applicant because of Applicant's behavior during the trial and PCR hearing.

286 Applicant claims that this Court made a mistake by misconstruing the pornography as being a "trigger" and ignoring the fact that trial counsel believed the non-disclosure was

damaging to their case. This Court disagrees. The denial of the PCR application states Mr. Howle and Mr. Babb both said they could have used the pornography evidence. Additionally, the denial of the PCR application discusses in detail the reasons for denying the PCR application on the ground of non-disclosure of porn evidence.


Applicant claims referencing the pornography evidence as a "double edged" sword is an absurd basis for arguing lack of materiality. This Court disagrees. Applicant has misconstrued this Court's analysis. The Court was merely noting that the existence of porn benefited both the State's case and the Defense's case because it placed the Applicant at the scene and was a potential trigger for his actions. The materiality of the porn was discussed in the denial of the PCR Application and the Court re-emphasizes the analysis in the denial of the PCR Application. See Order of Dismissal pp. 55-56.

Based on the foregoing, the Applicant's Rule 59(e) motion is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

At Manning, South Carolina

Dated: July 14, 2013


R. Ferrell Cothran, Presiding Judge

RECORDED FORM 4

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF SUMTER
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

2012 DEC -3 PM 1:43

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
CASE NUMBER 2011CP4300901

Stephen Corey Bryant

JAMES C. CAMPBELL
CLERK OF COURT
SUMTER COUNTY, S.C.

South Carolina State of

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
OF ORIGINAL FILED

Sandra C. Dickson
DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT
SUMTER COUNTY
SOUTH CAROLINA

PLAINTIFF(S)

DEFENDANT(S)

Submitted by: Clerk of Court

Attorney for: ☐ Plaintiff ☐ Defendant
☐ Self-Represented Litigant

DISPOSITION TYPE (CHECK ONE)

- ☐ **JURY VERDICT.** This action came before the court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and a verdict rendered.
- ☐ **DECISION BY THE COURT.** This action came to trial or hearing before the court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision rendered.
- ☐ **ACTION DISMISSED (CHECK REASON):** ☐ Rule 12(b), SCRCP; ☐ Rule 41(a), SCRCP (Vol. Nonsuit);
☐ Rule 43(k), SCRCP (Settled); ☐ Other: _____
- ☐ **ACTION STRICKEN (CHECK REASON):** ☐ Rule 40(j) SCRCP; ☐ Bankruptcy;
☐ Binding arbitration, subject to right to restore to confirm, vacate or modify arbitration award; ☐ Other: _____
- ☐ **DISPOSITION OF APPEAL TO THE CIRCUIT COURT (CHECK APPLICABLE BOX):**
☐ Affirmed; ☐ Reversed; ☐ Remanded; ☐ Other: _____

NOTE: ATTORNEYS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR NOTIFYING LOWER COURT, TRIBUNAL, OR ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OF THE CIRCUIT COURT RULING IN THIS APPEAL.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

☐ See attached order; (formal order to follow)☐ Statement of Judgment by the Court:

See attached Order.

ORDER INFORMATION

This order ☐ ends ☐ does not end the case.

Additional Information for the Clerk:

INFORMATION FOR THE JUDGMENT INDEX

Complete this section below when the judgment affects title to real or personal property or if any amount should be enrolled. If there is no judgment information, indicate "N/A" in one of the boxes below.

Judgment in Favor of (List name(s) below)	Judgment Against (List name(s) below)	Judgment Amount To be Enrolled (List amount(s) below)

If applicable, describe the property, including tax map information and address, referenced in the order:

The judgment information above has been provided by the submitting party. Disputes concerning the amounts contained in this form may be addressed by way of motion pursuant to the SC Rules of Civil Procedure. Amounts to be computed such as interest or additional taxable costs not available at the time the form and final order are submitted to the judge may be provided to the clerk. Note: Title abstractors and researchers should refer to the official court order for judgment details.

	2144	12/3/2012
Circuit Court Judge	Judge Code	Date

For Clerk of Court Office Use Only


This judgment was entered on , and a copy mailed first class or placed in the appropriate attorney's box on , to attorneys of record or to parties (when appearing pro se) as follows:

Heath Preston Taylor 3618 Sunset Blvd., Ste. D West
Columbia, SC 29169

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE PLAINTIFF(S)

Alan McCrory Wilson PO Box 11549 Columbia, SC
292111549

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE DEFENDANT(S)



James C. Campbell - Clerk of Court

Court Reporter

WITNESSES

SHERIFF'S OFFICE

Turner

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
OF ORIGINAL FILE
R. Baker
DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT
SUMTER COUNTY
SOUTH CAROLINA

ARREST WARRANT NUMBER

H905196

D/A: 1/11/05

ACTION OF GRAND JURY

Tim Bell

Shawna H. Smith

Foreperson of Grand Jury

Date: 07/20/2006

VERDICT

Foreperson of Petit Jury

Date:

DOCKET NO. 2006-GS-43- 696

The State of South Carolina

County of SUMTER

COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS

JULY TERM 2006

THE STATE

vs.

STEPHEN COREY BRYANT

Indictment for

BURGLARY (2nd Degree)

C. KELLY JACKSON, SOLICITOR

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)
COUNTY OF SUMTER)

INDICTMENT FOR
BURGLARY (2nd Degree)

At a Court of General Sessions, convened on July 20, 2006, the Grand Jurors of
SUMTER County present upon their oath:

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
OF ORIGINAL FILE
B. J. Jackson
DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT
SUMTER COUNTY
SOUTH CAROLINA

That STEPHEN COREY BRYANT did in Sumter County on or about October 5, 2004, enter the dwelling of Robert T. Dennis without consent and with the intent to commit a crime therein, in violation of Section 16-11-312 (A), South Carolina Code of Laws (1976), as amended.

Against the peace and dignity of the State, and contrary to the statute in such case made and provided.

C. Kelly Jackson
SOLICITOR

2652

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COUNTY OF SUMTER

STATE VS.

STEPHEN COREY BRYANT

AKA:

Race: White

Sex: Male

Age: 27

DOB: [REDACTED]

SS#: [REDACTED]

Address: [REDACTED] Sumter, SC 29150

DL#

SID# [REDACTED]

IN THE COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS

INDICTMENT/CASE#: 2006-GS-43-0696

A/W#: H905196

Date of Offense: October 05, 2004

S.C. Code §: 16-11-0312

CDR Code #: 0080

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
OF ORIGINAL FILESENTENCE SHEET
DEPUTY CLERK OF COURTIn disposition of the said indictment comes now the Defendant who was ☐ CONVICTED OF or ☒ PLEADS SUMTER COUNTY
TO: BURGLARY (2ND DEGREE) SOUTH CAROLINAin violation of § 16-11-312(A) of the S.C. Code of Laws, bearing CDR Code # 01 01 8 10☒ NON-VIOLENT ☐ VIOLENT ☐ SERIOUS ☐ MOST SERIOUS ☐ Mandatory GPS (CSC w/minor 1st or Lewd Act) ☐ §17-25-45The charge is: ☒ As Indicted, ☐ Lesser Included Offense, ☐ Defendant Waives Presentment to Grand Jury. (Defendant initial)The plea is: ☒ Without Negotiations or Recommendation, ☐ Negotiated Sentence, ☐ Recommendation by the State

ATTEST:

Solicitor

Defendant

Attorney for Defendant

SC Bar #

WHEREFORE, the Defendant is committed to the ☒ State Department of Corrections, ☐ County Detention Center,for a determinate term of 15 days/months/years or ☐ under the Youthful Offender Act not to exceed _____ years

and/or to pay a fine of \$ _____; provided that upon the service of _____ days/months/years and/or payment of \$ _____; plus

costs and assessments as applicable*; the balance is suspended with probation for _____ months/years and subject to South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services standard conditions of probation, which are incorporated by reference.

☒ CONCURRENT or ☐ CONSECUTIVE to sentence on: _____☐ The Defendant is to be given credit for time served pursuant to S.C. Code §24-13-40 to be calculated and applied by the State Department of Corrections.☐ The Defendant is to be placed on Central Registry of Child Abuse and Neglect pursuant to S.C. Code §17-25-135.

SPECIAL CONDITIONS:

☐ RESTITUTION: ☐ Deferred, ☐ Defendant Waives Hearing, ☐ Ordered

PTUP

Total: \$ _____ plus 20% fee: \$ _____

Payment Terms:

☐ set by SCDPPPS

Recipient:

*Fine:	\$
§14-1-206 (Assessments 107.5%)	\$
§14-1-211(A)(1) (Conv. Surcharge)	\$100 \$100.00
§14-1-211(A)(2) (DUI Surcharge)	\$100 \$
§56-5-2995 (DUI Assessment)	\$12 \$
§35.13 (Public Def/Prob)	\$500 \$
§73.3, 1B TP (Law Enforce. Funding)	\$25 \$25.00
§33.7, 1B TP (Drug Court Surcharge)	\$100 \$
§50-21-114(BUI Breath Test Fee)	\$50 \$
§56-5-2942(J) (Vehicle Assessment)	\$40/ea \$
3% to County (if paid in installments)	\$ 390
§90.11 TP (SCCJA Surcharge)	\$5 \$7.20
TOTAL	\$133.90

_____ days/hours Public Service Employment

Obtain GED

Attend Voc. Rehab. or Job Corp.

May serve W/E beginning _____

Substance Abuse Counseling _____

Random Drug/Alcohol Testing _____

Fine may be pd. in equal, consecutive weekly/monthly

pmts. of \$ _____ beginning _____

\$ _____ paid to Public Defender Fund

Other: _____

☐ Appointed PD or appointed other counsel, §35.13 TP
Requires \$500 be paid to Clerk during probation.

PRESIDING JUDGE

Judge Code: 2111411Sentence Date: 9-11-08

Court Reporter:

SCCA/217 (10/2007)

2653
SHERIFF'S OFFICE
Turner
CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
OF ORIGINAL FILE
B. Baker
DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT
SUMTER COUNTY
SOUTH CAROLINA

DOCKET NO. 2006-GS-43- 1697
The State of South Carolina
County of SUMTER

COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS

JULY TERM 2006

THE STATE
vs.

STEPHEN COREY BRYANT

ARREST WARRANT NUMBER

H782547

D/A: 10/14/04

ACTION OF GRAND JURY

True Bill
Sheppard R. Bryant
Foreperson of Grand Jury
Date: 07/20/2006

VERDICT

Foreperson of Petit Jury
Date:

Indictment for

BURGLARY (1st Degree)

C. KELLY JACKSON, SOLICITOR

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)
COUNTY OF SUMTER)

INDICTMENT FOR
BURGLARY (1st Degree)

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
OF ORIGINAL FILE

At a Court of General Sessions, convened on July 20, 2006, the Grand Jurors of
DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT
SUMTER COUNTY
SOUTH CAROLINA

That STEPHEN COREY BRYANT did in Sumter County on or about October 8, 2004, enter the dwelling of James Allen Ammons without consent and with the intent to commit a crime therein and while in the dwelling and/or in immediate flight was armed with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a Smith and Wesson Model 4046 semi-automatic .40 caliber handgun, in violation of Section 16-11-311(A)(1)(d), South Carolina Code of Laws (1976), as amended.

Against the peace and dignity of the State, and contrary to the statute in such case made and provided.

P. Kelly Jackson
SOLICITOR

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS

COUNTY OF SUMTER

INDICTMENT/CASE#: 2006-GS-43-0697

STATE VS.

STEPHEN COREY BRYANT

AW#: H782547

Date of Offense: October 08, 2004

S.C. Code §: 16-11-0311

CDR Code #: 0079

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
OF ORIGINAL FILE

AKA:

Race: White

Sex: Male

Age: 27

DOB: [REDACTED]

SS#: [REDACTED]

Address: [REDACTED], SC 29150

DL#

SID# [REDACTED]

Barbara Hanger
 SENTENCE SHEET
 SUMTER COUNTY
 SOUTH CAROLINA

In disposition of the said indictment comes now the Defendant who was ☐ CONVICTED OF or ☒ PLEADSTO: BURGLARY (1st DEGREE)in violation of § 16-11-311 of the S.C. Code of Laws, bearing CDR Code # 0101719☐ NON-VIOLENT☒ VIOLENT☐ SERIOUS☒ MOST SERIOUS☐ Mandatory GPS (CSC
w/minor 1st or Lewd Act)☐ §17-25-45The charge is: ☒ As Indicted, ☐ Lesser Included Offense, ☐ Defendant Waives Presentment to Grand Jury. (Defendant initial)The plea is: ☒ Without Negotiations or Recommendation, ☐ Negotiated Sentence, ☐ Recommendation by the State

ATTEST:

P. Keef Jackson
 Solicitor

[Signature]
 Defendant

[Signature] 2727
 Attorney for Defendant SC Bar # 64291

WHEREFORE, the Defendant is committed to the ☒ State Department of Corrections, ☐ County Detention Center,for a determinate term of Life w/o Parole days/months/years or ☐ under the Youthful Offender Act not to exceed _____ years

and/or to pay a fine of \$ _____; provided that upon the service of _____ days/months/years and/or payment of \$ _____; plus

costs and assessments as applicable*; the balance is suspended with probation for _____ months/years and subject to South

Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services standard conditions of probation, which are incorporated by reference.

☒ CONCURRENT or ☐ CONSECUTIVE to sentence on: _____☐ The Defendant is to be given credit for time served pursuant to S.C. Code §24-13-40 to be calculated and applied by the State Department of Corrections.☐ The Defendant is to be placed on Central Registry of Child Abuse and Neglect pursuant to S.C. Code §17-25-135.

SPECIAL CONDITIONS:

☐ RESTITUTION: ☐ Deferred, ☐ Defendant Waives Hearing, ☐ Ordered

Total: \$ _____ plus 20% fee: \$ _____

Payment Terms:

☐ set by SCDPPPS

Recipient:

*Fine: \$ _____

§14-1-206 (Assessments 107.5%) \$ _____

§14-1-211(A)(1) (Conv. Surcharge) \$100 \$100.00

§14-1-211(A)(2) (DUI Surcharge) \$100 \$ _____

§56-5-2995 (DUI Assessment) \$12 \$ _____

§35.13 (Public Def/Prob) \$500 \$ _____

§73.3, 1B TP (Law Enforce. Funding) \$25 \$25.00

§33.7, 1B TP (Drug Court Surcharge) \$100 \$ _____

§50-21-114(BUI Breath Test Fee) \$50 \$ _____

§56-5-2942(J) (Vehicle Assessment) \$40/ea \$ _____

3% to County (if paid in installments) \$3.90 \$3.90

§90.11 TP (SCCJA Surcharge) \$5 \$5.00

TOTAL \$133.90

PTUP

_____ days/hours Public Service Employment

Obtain GED

Attend Voc. Rehab. or Job Corp.

May serve W/E beginning _____

Substance Abuse Counseling _____

Random Drug/Alcohol Testing _____

Fine may be pd. in equal, consecutive weekly/monthly

pmts. of \$ _____ beginning _____

\$ _____ paid to Public Defender Fund

Other: _____

☐ Appointed PD or appointed other counsel, §35.13 TP
Requires \$500 be paid to Clerk during probation.

James C. Campbell
 Clerk of Court/ Deputy Clerk
 Court Reporter: *Grace Herten*
Frances A. Bakist May
 SCCA/217 (10/2007)

PRESIDING JUDGE

Judge Code: 211411Sentence Date: 9-11-08

WITNESSES

SHERIFF'S OFFICE

Turner

SLED

Barton

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
OF ORIGINAL FILE

B. Baker

DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT
SUMTER COUNTY
SOUTH CAROLINA

ARREST WARRANT NUMBER

H782548 (1); H782549 (2)

H782557 (3)

D/A: 10/14/04

ACTION OF GRAND JURY

True Bill

Shepherd H. Smith

Foreperson of Grand Jury

Date: *07/20/2006*

VERDICT

Foreperson of Petit Jury

Date:

DOCKET NO. 2006-GS-43- 698

The State of South Carolina

County of SUMTER

COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS

JULY TERM 2006

THE STATE

vs.

STEPHEN COREY BRYANT

Indictment for

MURDER, BURGLARY (1st Degree),
ARSON (2nd Degree) AND POSSESSION
OF STOLEN HANDGUN

C. KELLY JACKSON, SOLICITOR

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)
)
 COUNTY OF SUMTER)

INDICTMENT FOR
 MURDER, BURGLARY (1st Degree),
 ARSON (2nd Degree) AND POSSESSION
 OF STOLEN HANDGUN

At a Court of General Sessions, convened on July 20, 2006, the Grand Jurors of
 SUMTER County present upon their oath:

COUNT ONE – MURDER

That STEPHEN COREY BRYANT did in Sumter County on or about October 9, 2004, feloniously, wilfully and with malice aforethought, either expressed or implied, kill one Clifton Dale Gainey by means of shooting him with a .40 caliber handgun, and that the said Clifton Dale Gainey did die as a proximate result thereof.

COUNT TWO – BURGLARY (1st Degree)

That STEPHEN COREY BRYANT did in Sumter County on or about October 9, 2004, enter the dwelling of Clifton Dale Gainey without consent and with the intent to commit a crime therein and said defendant entered or remained in said dwelling in the nighttime, in violation of Section 16-11-311(3), South Carolina Code of Laws (1976), as amended.

COUNT THREE – ARSON (2nd Degree)

That STEPHEN COREY BRYANT did in Sumter County on or about October 9, 2004, violate Section 16-11-110 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as amended, in that he did wilfully and maliciously set fire to or burn or cause to be burned the dwelling of Clifton Dale Gainey.

COUNT FOUR – POSSESSION OF STOLEN HANDGUN

That STEPHEN COREY BRYANT in Sumter County on or about October 9, 2004, was in possession of a stolen handgun, to-wit: a Smith and Wesson Model 4046 semi-automatic .40 caliber pistol stolen from James Allen Ammons on or about October 8, 2004, in violation of Section 16-23-30(c), Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as amended.

Against the peace and dignity of the State, and contrary to the statute in such case made and provided.

P. Kelly Jackson
 SOLICITOR

2658

1 of 3

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COUNTY OF SUMTER

STATE VS.

STEPHEN COREY BRYANT

AKA:

Race: White

Sex: Male

Age: 27

DOB: [REDACTED]

SS#: [REDACTED]

Address: [REDACTED], SC 29150

DL#

SID# [REDACTED]

IN THE COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS

INDICTMENT/CASE#: 2006-GS-43-0698

A/W#: H782557

Date of Offense: October 09, 2004

S.C. Code §: 16-11-0110(A)

CDR Code #: 2550

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
OF ORIGINAL FILE

SENTENCE SHEET

Barbara Shapen
DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT
SUMTER COUNTY
SOUTH CAROLINAIn disposition of the said indictment comes now the Defendant who was ☐ CONVICTED OF or ☒ PLEADSTO: CT#3 ARSON (2ND DEGREE)in violation of § 16-11-110(B) of the S.C. Code of Laws, bearing CDR Code # 2151511☐ NON-VIOLENT☒ VIOLENT☒ SERIOUS☐ MOST SERIOUS☐ Mandatory GPS (CSC
w/minor 1st or Lewd Act)☐ §17-25-45The charge is: ☒ As Indicted, ☐ Lesser Included Offense, ☐ Defendant Waives Presentment to Grand Jury. (Defendant initial)The plea is: ☒ Without Negotiations or Recommendation, ☐ Negotiated Sentence, ☐ Recommendation by the State.

ATTEST:

P. Keeg Jackson
Solicitor[Signature]
Defendant[Signature] 2727
Attorney for Defendant SC Bar # 642910WHEREFORE, the Defendant is committed to the ☒ State Department of Corrections, ☐ County Detention Center,for a determinate term of 25 days/months/years or ☐ under the Youthful Offender Act not to exceed _____ years

and/or to pay a fine of \$ _____; provided that upon the service of _____ days/months/years and/or payment of \$ _____; plus

costs and assessments as applicable*; the balance is suspended with probation for _____ months/years and subject to South

Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services standard conditions of probation, which are incorporated by reference.

☒ CONCURRENT or ☐ CONSECUTIVE to sentence on: _____☐ The Defendant is to be given credit for time served pursuant to S.C. Code §24-13-40 to be calculated and applied by the State Department of Corrections.☐ The Defendant is to be placed on Central Registry of Child Abuse and Neglect pursuant to S.C. Code §17-25-135.

SPECIAL CONDITIONS:

☐ RESTITUTION: ☐ Deferred, ☐ Defendant Waives Hearing, ☐ Ordered

Total: \$ _____ plus 20% fee: \$ _____

Payment Terms:

☐ set by SCDPPPS

Recipient:

*Fine: \$ _____

§14-1-206 (Assessments 107.5%) \$ _____

§14-1-211(A)(1) (Conv. Surcharge) \$100 \$ 100.00

§14-1-211(A)(2) (DUI Surcharge) \$100 \$ _____

§56-5-2995 (DUI Assessment) \$12 \$ _____

§35-13 (Public Def/Prob) \$500 \$ _____

§73.3, 1B TP (Law Enforce. Funding) \$25 \$ 25.00

§33.7, 1B TP (Drug Court Surcharge) \$100 \$ _____

§50-21-114(BUI Breath Test Fee) \$50 \$ _____

§56-5-2942(J) (Vehicle Assessment) \$40/ea \$ _____

3% to County (if paid in installments) \$ 3.40§90.11 TP (SCCJA Surcharge) \$5 \$ 5.00TOTAL \$ 133.40

PTUP

_____ days/hours Public Service Employment

Obtain GED

Attend Voc. Rehab. or Job Corp.

May serve W/E beginning _____

Substance Abuse Counseling _____

Random Drug/Alcohol Testing _____

Fine may be pd. in equal, consecutive weekly/monthly

pmts. of \$ _____ beginning _____

\$ _____ paid to Public Defender Fund

Other: _____

☐ Appointed PD or appointed other counsel, §35-13 TP
Requires \$500 be paid to Clerk during probation.

PRESIDING JUDGE

Judge Code: 2111411Sentence Date: 9-11-08

Court Reporter:

SCCA/217 (10/2007)

James C. Campbell
Clerk of Court/Deputy Clerk

Grace Hurley (8-18-08)

Frances A. Bakis-Ray

2 of 3

SOUTH CAROLINA

COUNTY OF SUMTER

VS.

STEPHEN COREY BRYANT

AKA:

Race: White

Sex: Male

Age: 27

DOB: [REDACTED]

SS#: [REDACTED]

Address: [REDACTED] SC 29150

DL#

SID# [REDACTED]

AW#: H782548

Date of Offense: October 09, 2004

S.C. Code §: 16-03-0010, 0020

CDR Code #: 0116

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
OF ORIGINAL FILE

SENTENCE SHEET

DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT

SUMTER COUNTY

In disposition of the said indictment comes now the Defendant who was ☐ CONVICTED OF or ☒ PLEADS SOUTH CAROLINATO: LT#1 - MURDERin violation of § 16-3-1010 of the S.C. Code of Laws, bearing CDR Code # 01111111☐ NON-VIOLENT☒ VIOLENT☐ SERIOUS☒ MOST SERIOUS☐ Mandatory GPS (CSC☐ §17-25-45w/minor 1st or Lewd Act)The charge is: ☒ As Indicted, ☐ Lesser Included Offense, ☐ Defendant Waives Presentment to Grand Jury. (Defendant initial)The plea is: ☒ Without Negotiations or Recommendation, ☐ Negotiated Sentence, ☐ Recommendation by the State.

ATTEST:

C. Kees Jackson
Solicitor[Signature]
Defendant[Signature]
Attorney for Defendant
SC Bar # 2727
64296WHEREFORE, the Defendant is committed to the ☒ State Department of Corrections, ☐ County Detention Center,for a determinate term of Life w/o Parole days/months/years or ☐ under the Youthful Offender Act not to exceed _____ years

and/or to pay a fine of \$ _____; provided that upon the service of _____ days/months/years and/or payment of \$ _____; plus

costs and assessments as applicable*; the balance is suspended with probation for _____ months/years and subject to South

Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services standard conditions of probation, which are incorporated by reference.

☒ CONCURRENT or ☐ CONSECUTIVE to sentence on: _____☐ The Defendant is to be given credit for time served pursuant to S.C. Code §24-13-40 to be calculated and applied by the State Department of Corrections.☐ The Defendant is to be placed on Central Registry of Child Abuse and Neglect pursuant to S.C. Code §17-25-135.

SPECIAL CONDITIONS:

] RESTITUTION: ☐ Deferred, ☐ Defendant Waives Hearing, ☐ Ordered

Total: \$ _____ plus 20% fee: \$ _____

Payment Terms:

] set by SCDPPPS _____

Recipient:

Fine: \$ _____

4-1-206 (Assessments 107.5%) \$ _____

4-1-211(A)(1) (Conv. Surcharge) \$100 \$ 100.00

4-1-211(A)(2) (DUI Surcharge) \$100 \$ _____

6-5-2995 (DUI Assessment) \$12 \$ _____

5.13 (Public Def/Prob) \$500 \$ _____

3.3, 1B TP (Law Enforce. Funding) \$25 \$ 25.00

3.7, 1B TP (Drug Court Surcharge) \$100 \$ _____

0-21-114(BUI Breath Test Fee) \$50 \$ _____

6-5-2942(J) (Vehicle Assessment) \$40/ea \$ _____

to County (if paid in installments) \$ 3.400.11 TP (SCCJA Surcharge) \$5 \$ 5.00TAL \$ 132.40

PTUP

_____ days/hours Public Service Employment

Obtain GED

Attend Voc. Rehab. or Job Corp.

May serve W/E beginning _____

Substance Abuse Counseling _____

Random Drug/Alcohol Testing _____

Fine may be pd. in equal, consecutive weekly/monthly

pmts. of \$ _____ beginning _____

\$ _____ paid to Public Defender Fund

Other: _____

☐ Appointed PD or appointed other counsel, \$35.13 TP
Requires \$500 be paid to Clerk during probation.

PRESIDING JUDGE

Judge Code: 2111411Sentence Date: 9-11-08

Court Reporter:

Clerk of Court/Deputy Clerk

Grace Hurler (410)Frances A. Bakist-Ray

2660

3 of 3

SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS

INDICTMENT/CASE#: 2006-GS-43-0696

COUNTY OF SUMTER

STATE VS.

STEPHEN COREY BRYANT

AKA:

Race: White

Sex: Male

Age: 27

DOB: [REDACTED]

SS#: [REDACTED]

Address: [REDACTED] SC 29150

DL#

SID# [REDACTED]

AW#: H782549

Date of Offense: October 09, 2004

S.C. Code §: 16-11-0311

CDR Code #: 0079

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
SENTENCE SHEET
OF ORIGINAL FILEIn disposition of the said indictment comes now the Defendant who was ☐ CONVICTED OF or ☒ PLEADSTO: CH 2 BUNGLAW 1st DEGREEin violation of § 16-11-311(A)(3) of the S.C. Code of Laws, bearing CDR Code # 61☐ NON-VIOLENT☒ VIOLENT☐ SERIOUS☒ MOST SERIOUS☐ Mandatory GPS (CSC☐ §17-25-45w/minor 1st or Lewd Act)The charge is: ☒ As Indicted, ☐ Lesser Included Offense, ☐ Defendant Waives Presentment to Grand Jury. (Defendant initial)The plea is: ☒ Without Negotiations or Recommendation, ☐ Negotiated Sentence, ☐ Recommendation by the State.

ATTEST:

P. Kelle Jackson
Solicitor[Signature]
Defendant[Signature] 2727
Attorney for Defendant SC Bar #
64296WHEREFORE, the Defendant is committed to the ☒ State Department of Corrections, ☐ County Detention Center,for a determinate term of Life w/o Parole days/months/years or ☐ under the Youthful Offender Act not to exceed _____ years

and/or to pay a fine of \$ _____; provided that upon the service of _____ days/months/years and/or payment of \$ _____; plus

costs and assessments as applicable*; the balance is suspended with probation for _____ months/years and subject to South

Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services standard conditions of probation, which are incorporated by reference.

☒ CONCURRENT or ☐ CONSECUTIVE to sentence on: _____☐ The Defendant is to be given credit for time served pursuant to S.C. Code §24-13-40 to be calculated and applied by the State Department of Corrections.☐ The Defendant is to be placed on Central Registry of Child Abuse and Neglect pursuant to S.C. Code §17-25-135.

SPECIAL CONDITIONS:

☐ RESTITUTION: ☐ Deferred, ☐ Defendant Waives Hearing, ☐ Ordered

PTUP

Total: \$ _____ plus 20% fee: \$ _____

Payment Terms: _____

☐ set by SCDPPTS

Recipient: _____

*Fine: \$ _____

\$14-1-206 (Assessments 107.5%) \$ _____

\$14-1-211(A)(1) (Conv. Surcharge) \$100 \$100.00

\$14-1-211(A)(2) (DUI Surcharge) \$100 \$ _____

\$56-5-2995 (DUI Assessment) \$12 \$ _____

\$35.13 (Public Def/Prob) \$500 \$ _____

\$73.3, 1B TP (Law Enforce. Funding) \$25 \$25.00

\$33.7, 1B TP (Drug Court Surcharge) \$100 \$ _____

\$50-21-114(BUI Breath Test Fee) \$50 \$ _____

\$56-5-2942(J) (Vehicle Assessment) \$40/ea \$ _____

3% to County (if paid in installments) \$390 \$ _____

\$90.11 TP (SCCJA Surcharge) \$5 \$5.00

TOTAL \$1339.00

_____ days/hours Public Service Employment

Obtain GED

Attend Voc. Rehab. or Job Corp.

May serve W/E beginning

Substance Abuse Counseling

Random Drug/Alcohol Testing

Fine may be pd. in equal, consecutive weekly/monthly

pmts. of \$ _____ beginning

\$ _____ paid to Public Defender Fund.

Other: _____

☐ Appointed PD or appointed other counsel, \$35.13 TP.
Requires \$500 be paid to Clerk during probation.

PRESIDING JUDGE

Judge Code: 2111411Sentence Date: 9-11-08Court Reporter: Grace Hurley (8-18-08)

SCCA/217 (10/2007)

Frederic A. Bickis-Bau

DOCKET NO. 2006-GS-43- 699

The State of South Carolina

County of SUMTER

COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS

JULY TERM 2006

THE STATE

vs.

STEPHEN COREY BRYANT

Indictment for
MURDER, ARMED ROBBERY
AND POSSESSION OF A STOLEN
HANDGUN

C. KELLY JACKSON, SOLICITOR

WITNESSES

SHERIFF'S OFFICE

Turner

SLED

Barton

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
OF ORIGINAL FILE

B. Bean
DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT
SUMTER COUNTY
SOUTH CAROLINA

ARREST WARRANT NUMBER

H782551 (1); H782558 (2)

H782559 (3)

D/A: 10/14/04

ACTION OF GRAND JURY

Shirley R. Smith
Foreperson of Grand Jury

Date: *07/20/2006*

VERDICT

Foreperson of Petit Jury

Date:

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)
)
 COUNTY OF SUMTER)

INDICTMENT FOR
 MURDER, ARMED ROBBERY
 AND POSSESSION OF A
 STOLEN HANDGUN

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
 OF ORIGINAL FILE

At a Court of General Sessions, convened on July 20, 2006, the Grand Jurors of

SUMTER County present upon their oath:

DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT
 SUMTER COUNTY
 SOUTH CAROLINA

COUNT ONE – MURDER

That STEPHEN COREY BRYANT did in Sumter County on or about October 11, 2004, feloniously, wilfully and with malice aforethought, either expressed or implied, kill one Willard Tietjen by means of shooting him with a .40 caliber handgun, and that the said Willard Tietjen did die as a proximate result thereof.

COUNT TWO – ARMED ROBBERY

That STEPHEN COREY BRYANT did in Sumter County on or about October 11, 2004, violate Section 16-11-330(A) of the Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as amended, while armed with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a .40 caliber handgun, did feloniously take from Willard Tietjen in the presence of Willard Tietjen, by means of force or intimidation goods or monies of the said Willie Tietjen, such goods or monies being described: currency, change, camera, knife, jewelry, tools, cell phone and other personal belongings.

COUNT THREE – POSSESSION OF A STOLEN HANDGUN

That STEPHEN COREY BRYANT in Sumter County on or about October 11, 2004, was in possession of a stolen handgun, to-wit: a Smith and Wesson Model 4046 semi-automatic .40 caliber pistol stolen from James Allen Ammons on or about October 8, 2004, in violation of Section 16-23-30(c), Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as amended.

Against the peace and dignity of the State, and contrary to the statute in such case made and provided.

P. Kelly Jackson
 SOLICITOR

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COUNTY OF SUMTER
STATE VS.

STEPHEN COREY BRYANT

AKA:

Race: White

Sex: Male

Age: 27

DOB: [REDACTED]

SS#: [REDACTED]

Address: [REDACTED]

SC 29150

DL#

SID# [REDACTED]

IN THE COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS

INDICTMENT/CASE#: 2006-GS-43-0699

AW#: H782551

Date of Offense: October 11, 2004

S.C. Code §: 16-03-0010, 0020

CDR Code #: 0116

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
OF ORIGINAL FILE

SENTENCE SHEET

DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT

In disposition of the said indictment comes now the Defendant who was ☐ CONVICTED OF or ☒ PLEADS SUMTER COUNTY

TO: CT#1 - MURDER

SOUTH CAROLINA

in violation of § 16-3-10/20 of the S.C. Code of Laws, bearing CDR Code # 011116

☐ NON-VIOLENT

☒ VIOLENT

☐ SERIOUS

☒ MOST SERIOUS

☐ Mandatory GPS (CSC

w/minor 1st or Lewd Act)

☐ §17-25-45

The charge is: ☒ As Indicted, ☐ Lesser Included Offense, ☐ Defendant Waives Presentment to Grand Jury. (Defendant initial)

The plea is: ☒ Without Negotiations or Recommendation, ☐ Negotiated Sentence, ☐ Recommendation by the State.

ATTEST:

C. Keel Jackson
Solicitor

Stephen C. Bryant
Defendant

[Signature]
Attorney for Defendant

2727
SC Bar # 64296

WHEREFORE, the Defendant is committed to the ☒ State Department of Corrections, ☐ County Detention Center,

for a determinate term of DEATH AS PROVIDED BY LAW days/months/years or ☐ under the Youthful Offender Act not to exceed _____ years.

and/or to pay a fine of \$ _____; provided that upon the service of _____ days/months/years and/or payment of \$ _____; plus

costs and assessments as applicable*; the balance is suspended with probation for _____ months/years and subject to South

Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services standard conditions of probation, which are incorporated by reference.

☒ CONCURRENT or ☐ CONSECUTIVE to sentence on: _____

☐ The Defendant is to be given credit for time served pursuant to S.C. Code §24-13-40 to be calculated and applied by the State Department of Corrections.

☐ The Defendant is to be placed on Central Registry of Child Abuse and Neglect pursuant to S.C. Code §17-25-135.

SPECIAL CONDITIONS:

☐ RESTITUTION: ☐ Deferred, ☐ Defendant Waives Hearing, ☐ Ordered

Total: \$ _____ plus 20% fee: \$ _____

Payment Terms: _____

☐ set by SCDPPPS _____

Recipient: _____

*Fine: \$ _____

§14-1-206 (Assessments 107.5%) \$ _____

§14-1-211(A)(1) (Conv. Surcharge) \$100 \$100.00

§14-1-211(A)(2) (DUI Surcharge) \$100 \$ _____

§56-5-2995 (DUI Assessment) \$12 \$ _____

§35.13 (Public Def/Prob) \$500 \$ _____

§73.3, 1B TP (Law Enforce. Funding) \$25 \$25.00

§33.7, 1B TP (Drug Court Surcharge) \$100 \$ _____

§50-21-114(BUI Breath Test Fee) \$50 \$ _____

§56-5-2942(J) (Vehicle Assessment) \$40/ea \$ _____

3% to County (if paid in installments) \$ _____

§90.11 TP (SCCJA Surcharge) \$5 \$5.00

TOTAL \$133.40

PTUP

_____ days/hours Public Service Employment

Obtain GED

Attend Voc. Rehab. or Job Corp.

May serve W/E beginning _____

Substance Abuse Counseling _____

Random Drug/Alcohol Testing _____

Fine may be pd. in equal, consecutive weekly/monthly

pmts. of \$ _____ beginning _____

\$ _____ paid to Public Defender Fund

Other: _____

☐ Appointed PD or appointed other counsel, §35.13 TP
Requires \$500 be paid to Clerk during probation.

PRESIDING JUDGE

Judge Code: _____

Sentence Date: _____

Court Reporter: _____

SCCA/217 (10/2007)

2664

2 of 3

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF SUMTER
STATE VS.
STEPHEN COREY BRYANT

AKA:
Race: White Sex: Male Age: 27
DOB: [REDACTED] SS#: [REDACTED]

Address: [REDACTED] SC 29150

DL# [REDACTED] SID# [REDACTED]

IN THE COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS

INDICTMENT/CASE#: 2006-GS-43-0699

AW#: H782558

Date of Offense: October 11, 2004

S.C. Code §: 16-11-0330(A)

CDR Code #: 0139

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
OF ORIGINAL FILE

Barbara Shaper
SENTENCE SHEETER OF COURT
SUMTER COUNTY
SOUTH CAROLINA

In disposition of the said indictment comes now the Defendant who was ☐ CONVICTED OF or ☒ PLEADS

TO: CH2 - ARMED ROBBERY

in violation of § 16-11-330(A) of the S.C. Code of Laws, bearing CDR Code # 0111319

☐ NON-VIOLENT ☒ VIOLENT ☐ SERIOUS ☒ MOST SERIOUS ☐ Mandatory GPS (CSC w/minor 1st or Lewd Act) ☐ \$17-25-45

The charge is: ☒ As Indicted, ☐ Lesser Included Offense, ☐ Defendant Waives Presentment to Grand Jury. (Defendant initial)

The plea is: ☒ Without Negotiations or Recommendation, ☐ Negotiated Sentence, ☐ Recommendation by the State.

ATTEST:

E. Kelly Jackson Solicitor *Stephen C. Bryant* Defendant *Barbara Shaper* Attorney for Defendant SC Bar # 2727
64296

WHEREFORE, the Defendant is committed to the ☒ State Department of Corrections, ☐ County Detention Center,

for a determinate term of 30 days/months/years or ☐ under the Youthful Offender Act not to exceed _____ years

and/or to pay a fine of \$ _____; provided that upon the service of _____ days/months/years and/or payment of \$ _____; plus

costs and assessments as applicable*; the balance is suspended with probation for _____ months/years and subject to South

Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services standard conditions of probation, which are incorporated by reference.

☒ CONCURRENT or ☐ CONSECUTIVE to sentence on: _____

☐ The Defendant is to be given credit for time served pursuant to S.C. Code §24-13-40 to be calculated and applied by the State Department of Corrections.

☐ The Defendant is to be placed on Central Registry of Child Abuse and Neglect pursuant to S.C. Code §17-25-135.

SPECIAL CONDITIONS:

☐ RESTITUTION: ☐ Deferred, ☐ Defendant Waives Hearing, ☐ Ordered

Total: \$ _____ plus 20% fee: \$ _____

Payment Terms:

☐ set by SCDPPPS

Recipient:

*Fine:	\$
\$14-1-206 (Assessments 107.5%)	\$
\$14-1-211(A)(1) (Conv. Surcharge)	\$100
\$14-1-211(A)(2) (DUI Surcharge)	\$100
\$56-5-2995 (DUI Assessment)	\$12
\$35.13 (Public Def/Prob)	\$500
\$73.3, 1B TP (Law Enforce. Funding)	\$25
\$33.7, 1B TP (Drug Court Surcharge)	\$100
\$50-21-114(BUI Breath Test Fee)	\$50
\$56-5-2942(J) (Vehicle Assessment)	\$40/ea
3% to County (if paid in installments)	\$390
\$90.11 TP (SCCJA Surcharge)	\$5
TOTAL	\$13390

_____ days/hours Public Service Employment

Obtain GED

Attend Voc. Rehab. or Job Corp.

May serve W/E beginning

Substance Abuse Counseling

Random Drug/Alcohol Testing

Fine may be pd. in equal, consecutive weekly/monthly

pmts. of \$ _____ beginning

\$ _____ paid to Public Defender Fund

Other:

☐ Appointed PD or appointed other counsel, \$35.13 TP
Requires \$500 be paid to Clerk during probation.

PRESIDING JUDGE

Judge Code:

Sentence Date:

James C. Campbell
Clerk of Court/Deputy Clerk (plus)

Court Reporter: *Gracia Hurling (8-18-08)*

SCCA/217 (10/2007) *James A. Patis-Rou*

3 of 3

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS

INDICTMENT/CASE#: 2006-GS-43-0699

COUNTY OF SUMTER
STATE VS.

STEPHEN COREY BRYANT

AKA:

Race: White

Sex: Male

Age: 27

DOB: [REDACTED]

SS#: [REDACTED]

Address: [REDACTED] SC 29150

DL#

SID# [REDACTED]

AW#: H782559

Date of Offense: October 11, 2004

S.C. Code §: 16-23-0490

CDR Code #: 0549

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
OF ORIGINAL FILEBarbara Shaper
SENTENCE SHEET
CLERK OF COURT
SUMTER COUNTY
SOUTH CAROLINAIn disposition of the said indictment comes now the Defendant who was ☐ CONVICTED OF or ☒ PLEADSTO: 1st - POSSESSION OF A STOLEN HAND GUNIn violation of § 16-23-30 (C) of the S.C. Code of Laws, bearing CDR Code # 21 31614☒ NON-VIOLENT ☐ VIOLENT ☐ SERIOUS ☐ MOST SERIOUS ☐ Mandatory GPS (CSC w/minor 1st or Lewd Act) ☐ §17-25-45The charge is: ☒ As Indicted, ☐ Lesser Included Offense, ☐ Defendant Waives Presentment to Grand Jury. (Defendant initial)The plea is: ☐ Without Negotiations or Recommendation, ☐ Negotiated Sentence, ☐ Recommendation by the State.

ATTEST:

C. Kelly Jackson Solicitor [Signature] Defendant [Signature] Attorney for Defendant 2727 SC Bar # 64296

WHEREFORE, the Defendant is committed to the ☒ State Department of Corrections, ☐ County Detention Center,for a determinate term of 5 days/months/years or ☐ under the Youthful Offender Act not to exceed _____ years

and/or to pay a fine of \$ _____; provided that upon the service of _____ days/months/years and/or payment of \$ _____; plus

costs and assessments as applicable*; the balance is suspended with probation for _____ months/years and subject to South

Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services standard conditions of probation, which are incorporated by reference.

☒ CONCURRENT or ☐ CONSECUTIVE to sentence on: _____☐ The Defendant is to be given credit for time served pursuant to S.C. Code §24-13-40 to be calculated and applied by the State Department of Corrections.☐ The Defendant is to be placed on Central Registry of Child Abuse and Neglect pursuant to S.C. Code §17-25-135.

SPECIAL CONDITIONS:

☐ RESTITUTION: ☐ Deferred, ☐ Defendant Waives Hearing, ☐ Ordered

Total: \$ _____ plus 20% fee: \$ _____

Payment Terms:

☐ set by SCDPPPS

Recipient: _____

*Fine: \$ _____

§14-1-206 (Assessments 107.5%) \$ _____

§14-1-211(A)(1) (Conv. Surcharge) \$100 \$100.00

§14-1-211(A)(2) (DUI Surcharge) \$100 \$ _____

§56-5-2995 (DUI Assessment) \$12 \$ _____

§35.13 (Public Def/Prob) \$500 \$ _____

§73.3, 1B TP (Law Enforce. Funding) \$25 \$25.00

§33.7, 1B TP (Drug Court Surcharge) \$100 \$ _____

§50-21-114(BUI Breath Test Fee) \$50 \$ _____

§56-5-2942(J) (Vehicle Assessment) \$40/ea \$ _____

3% to County (if paid in installments) \$3.90 \$3.90

§90.11 TP (SCCJA Surcharge) \$5 \$5.00

TOTAL \$133.90

PTUP

_____ days/hours Public Service Employment

Obtain GED

Attend Voc. Rehab. or Job Corp.

May serve W/E beginning

Substance Abuse Counseling

Random Drug/Alcohol Testing

Fine may be pd. in equal, consecutive weekly/monthly

pmts. of \$ _____ beginning

\$ _____ paid to Public Defender Fund

Other: _____

☐ Appointed PD or appointed other counsel, \$35.13 TP
Requires \$500 be paid to Clerk during probation.

PRESIDING JUDGE

Judge Code: 2111411Sentence Date: 9-11-08Court Reporter: Grace Nurlan (8-18-08)SCCA/217 (10/2007) Francis A. [Signature]

WITNESSES

SHERIFF'S OFFICE

Turner

SLED

Barton

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
OF ORIGINAL FILE
R. Allen Shaffer
DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT
SUMTER COUNTY
SOUTH CAROLINA

ARREST WARRANT NUMBER

H782553

D/A: 10/14/04

ACTION OF GRAND JURY

True Bill

Sherwood H. Smith

Foreperson of Grand Jury

Date:

07/20/2006

VERDICT

Foreperson of Petit Jury

Date:

DOCKET NO. 2006-GS-43-

700

The State of South Carolina

County of SUMTER

COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS

JULY TERM 2006

THE STATE

vs.

STEPHEN COREY BRYANT

Indictment for

MURDER AND POSSESSION OF
A STOLEN HANDGUN

C. KELLY JACKSON, SOLICITOR

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)
)
 COUNTY OF SUMTER)

INDICTMENT FOR
 MURDER AND POSSESSION OF
 A STOLEN HANDGUN

At a Court of General Sessions, convened on July 20, 2006; the Grand Jurors of
 SUMTER County present upon their oath:

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
 OF ORIGINAL FILE

COUNT ONE – MURDER

Barbara Harper
 DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT

That STEPHEN COREY BRYANT did in Sumter County on or about October 13, 2004, feloniously, wilfully and with malice aforethought, either expressed or implied, kill one Clarence Burgess by means of shooting him with a .40 caliber handgun, and that the said Clarence Burgess did die as a proximate result thereof.

COUNT TWO – POSSESSION OF A STOLEN HANDGUN

That STEPHEN COREY BRYANT in Sumter County on or about October 13, 2004, was in possession a stolen handgun, to-wit: a Smith and Wesson Model 4046 semi-automatic .40 caliber pistol stolen from James Allen Ammons on or about October 8, 2004, in violation of Section 16-23-30(c), Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as amended.

Against the peace and dignity of the State, and contrary to the statute in such case made and provided.

P. Kelly Jackson
 SOLICITOR

2668

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COUNTY OF SUMTER

STATE VS.

STEPHEN COREY BRYANT

AKA:

Race: White

Sex: Male

Age: 27

DOB: [REDACTED]

SS#: [REDACTED]

Address: [REDACTED], SC 29150

DL#

SID# [REDACTED]

IN THE COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS

INDICTMENT/CASE#: 2006-GS-43-0700

A/W#: H782553

Date of Offense: October 13, 2004

S.C. Code §: 16-03-0010, 0020

CDR Code #: 0116

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
OF ORIGINAL FILE

SENTENCE SHEET

DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT

SUMTER COUNTY
SOUTH CAROLINAIn disposition of the said indictment comes now the Defendant who was ☐ CONVICTED OF or ☒ PLEADSTO: 1st - MURDERin violation of § 16-3-10/20 of the S.C. Code of Laws, bearing CDR Code # 0111116☐ NON-VIOLENT☒ VIOLENT☐ SERIOUS☒ MOST SERIOUS☐ Mandatory GPS (CSC
w/minor 1st or Lewd Act)☐ §17-25-45The charge is: ☒ As Indicted, ☐ Lesser Included Offense, ☐ Defendant Waives Presentment to Grand Jury. (Defendant initial)The plea is: ☒ Without Negotiations or Recommendation, ☐ Negotiated Sentence, ☐ Recommendation by the State.

ATTEST:

E. K. Jackson
SolicitorStephen C. Bryant
Defendant[Signature]
Attorney for Defendant2727
SC Bar #WHEREFORE, the Defendant is committed to the ☒ State Department of Corrections, ☐ County Detention Center,for a determinate term of Life w/o Parole days/months/years or ☐ under the Youthful Offender Act not to exceed _____ years

and/or to pay a fine of \$ _____; provided that upon the service of _____ days/months/years and/or payment of \$ _____; plus

costs and assessments as applicable*; the balance is suspended with probation for _____ months/years and subject to South

Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services standard conditions of probation, which are incorporated by reference.

☒ CONCURRENT or ☐ CONSECUTIVE to sentence on: _____☐ The Defendant is to be given credit for time served pursuant to S.C. Code §24-13-40 to be calculated and applied by the State Department of Corrections.☐ The Defendant is to be placed on Central Registry of Child Abuse and Neglect pursuant to S.C. Code §17-25-135.

SPECIAL CONDITIONS:

☐ RESTITUTION: ☐ Deferred, ☐ Defendant Waives Hearing, ☐ Ordered

Total: \$ _____ plus 20% fee: \$ _____

Payment Terms:

☐ set by SCDPPPS

Recipient:

*Fine:	\$
§14-1-206 (Assessments 107.5%)	\$
§14-1-211(A)(1) (Conv. Surcharge)	\$100
§14-1-211(A)(2) (DUI Surcharge)	\$100
§56-5-2995 (DUI Assessment)	\$12
§35.13 (Public Def/Prob)	\$500
§73.3, 1B TP (Law Enforce. Funding)	\$25
§33.7, 1B TP (Drug Court Surcharge)	\$100
§50-21-114 (BUI Breath Test Fee)	\$50
§56-5-2942(J) (Vehicle Assessment)	\$40/ea
3% to County (if paid in installments)	\$390
§90.11 TP (SCCJA Surcharge)	\$5
TOTAL	\$13340

PTUP

_____ days/hours Public Service Employment

Obtain GED

Attend Voc. Rehab. or Job Corp.

May serve W/E beginning _____

Substance Abuse Counseling _____

Random Drug/Alcohol Testing _____

Fine may be pd. in equal, consecutive weekly/monthly

pmts. of \$ _____ beginning _____

\$ _____ paid to Public Defender Fund

Other: _____

☐ Appointed PD or appointed other counsel, §35.13 TP
Requires \$500 be paid to Clerk during probation.

PRESIDING JUDGE

Judge Code: 12 11 14 11Sentence Date: 9-11-08

Court Reporter:

SCCA/217 (10/2007)

2669

WITNESSES

SHERIFF'S OFFICE

Florence

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
OF ORIGINAL FILE

R. Anderson

DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT
SUMTER COUNTY
SOUTH CAROLINA

ARREST WARRANT NUMBER

H980297

D/A: 10/27/05

ACTION OF GRAND JURY

True Bill
Shepherd H. Smith

Foreperson of Grand Jury

Date:

07/20/2006

VERDICT

Foreperson of Petit Jury

Date:

DOCKET NO. 2006-GS-43-

701

The State of South Carolina

County of SUMTER

COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS

JULY TERM 2006

THE STATE

vs.

STEPHEN COREY BRYANT

Indictment for

ASSAULT AND BATTERY WITH
INTENT TO KILL

C. KELLY JACKSON, SOLICITOR

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)
COUNTY OF SUMTER)

INDICTMENT FOR
ASSAULT AND BATTERY WITH
INTENT TO KILL

At a Court of General Sessions, convened on July 20, 2006, the Grand Jurors of
SUMTER County present upon their oath:

That STEPHEN COREY BRYANT did in Sumter County on or about October 26, 2005, violate Section 16-3-620 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as amended, in that he did commit an unlawful act of a violent nature to the person of another, to-wit: Corrections Officer Larry Justice of the Sumter-Lee Regional Detention Center, with malice aforethought, either express or implied, by hitting him with his fists and kicking him which resulted in a broken cheek bone, eye socket and nose.

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
OF ORIGINAL FILE

Barbara Shapiro
DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT
SUMTER COUNTY
SOUTH CAROLINA

Against the peace and dignity of the State, and contrary to the statute in such case
made and provided.

P. Kelly Jackson
SOLICITOR

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COUNTY OF SUMTER

STATE VS.

STEPHEN COREY BRYANT

AKA:

Race: White

Sex: Male

Age:

DOB: [REDACTED]

Address: [REDACTED] SC 29150

DL#

SID# [REDACTED]

IN THE COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS

2671

INDICTMENT/CASE#: 2006-GS-43-0701

AW#: H980297

Date of Offense: October 26, 2005

S.C. Code §: 16-03-0620

CDR Code #: 0014

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
OF ORIGINAL FILE

Barbara Shaper
SENTENCE SHEET
CLERK OF COURT
SUMTER COUNTY
SOUTH CAROLINA

In disposition of the said indictment comes now the Defendant who was ☐ CONVICTED OF or ☒ PLEADS

TO: Assault and Battery with Intent to Kill

in violation of § 16-3-620 of the S.C. Code of Laws, bearing CDR Code # 0 0 1 4

☐ NON-VIOLENT

☒ VIOLENT

☐ SERIOUS

☒ MOST SERIOUS

☐ Mandatory GPS (CSC
w/minor 1st or Lewd Act)

☐ §17-25-45

The charge is: ☒ As Indicted, ☐ Lesser Included Offense, ☐ Defendant Waives Presentment to Grand Jury. (Defendant initial)

The plea is: ☒ Without Negotiations or Recommendation, ☐ Negotiated Sentence, ☐ Recommendation by the State.

ATTEST:

C. Keeg Jackson
Solicitor

Stephen C. Bryant
Defendant

[Signature]
Attorney for Defendant
SC Bar # 2727 64296

WHEREFORE, the Defendant is committed to the ☒ State Department of Corrections, ☐ County Detention Center,

for a determinate term of 20 days/months/years or ☐ under the Youthful Offender Act not to exceed _____ years

and/or to pay a fine of \$ _____; provided that upon the service of _____ days/months/years and/or payment of \$ _____; plus

costs and assessments as applicable*; the balance is suspended with probation for _____ months/years and subject to South

Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services standard conditions of probation, which are incorporated by reference.

☒ CONCURRENT or ☐ CONSECUTIVE to sentence on: _____

☐ The Defendant is to be given credit for time served pursuant to S.C. Code §24-13-40 to be calculated and applied by the State Department of Corrections.

☐ The Defendant is to be placed on Central Registry of Child Abuse and Neglect pursuant to S.C. Code §17-25-135.

SPECIAL CONDITIONS:

☐ RESTITUTION: ☐ Deferred, ☐ Defendant Waives Hearing, ☐ Ordered

Total: \$ _____ plus 20% fee: \$ _____

Payment Terms:

☐ set by SCDPPPS

Recipient:

*Fine: \$ _____

§14-1-206 (Assessments 107.5%) \$ _____

§14-1-211(A)(1) (Conv. Surcharge) \$100 \$ 120.00

§14-1-211(A)(2) (DUI Surcharge) \$100 \$ _____

§56-5-2995 (DUI Assessment) \$12 \$ _____

§35-13 (Public Def/Prob) \$500 \$ _____

§73.3, 1B TP (Law Enforce. Funding) \$25 \$ 25.00

§33.7, 1B TP (Drug Court Surcharge) \$100 \$ _____

§50-21-114(BUI Breath Test Fee) \$50 \$ _____

§56-5-2942(J) (Vehicle Assessment) \$40/ea \$ _____

3% to County (if paid in installments) \$ 3.90

§90.11 TP (SCCJA Surcharge) \$5 \$ 5.00

TOTAL \$ 133.90

PTUP

_____ days/hours Public Service Employment

Obtain GED

Attend Voc. Rehab. or Job Corp.

May serve W/E beginning

Substance Abuse Counseling

Random Drug/Alcohol Testing

Fine may be pd. in equal, consecutive weekly/monthly

pmts. of \$ _____ beginning

\$ _____ paid to Public Defender Fund

Other:

☐ Appointed PD or appointed other counsel, §35-13 TP
Requires \$500 be paid to Clerk during probation.

PRESIDING JUDGE

Judge Code:

Sentence Date:

2 1 1 4 1 1
9-11-08

Court Reporter:

Clerk of Court/Deputy Clerk (Plea)

Grace Hurley (8-13-08)

Francis A. Bakis-Ray

SCCA/217 (10/2007)

WITNESSES

SHERIFF'S OFFICE

Burnish

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
OF ORIGINAL FILE

B. Baker

DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT
SUMTER COUNTY
SOUTH CAROLINA

ARREST WARRANT NUMBER

H783314

D/A: 3/16/05

ACTION OF GRAND JURY

Thomas Bill
Shannon D. Smith
Foreperson of Grand Jury

Date: 07/20/2006

VERDICT

Foreperson of Petit Jury

Date:

DOCKET NO. 2006-GS-43- 702

The State of South Carolina

County of SUMTER

COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS

JULY TERM 2006

THE STATE

vs.

STEPHEN COREY BRYANT

Indictment for

THREATENING LIFE OF
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE

C. KELLY JACKSON, SOLICITOR

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)
)
 COUNTY OF SUMTER)

INDICTMENT FOR
 THREATENING LIFE OF
 PUBLIC EMPLOYEE

At a Court of General Sessions, convened on July 20, 2006, the Grand Jurors of

SUMTER County present upon their oath:

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
 OF ORIGINAL FILE

Barbara Shaper
 DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT
 SUMTER COUNTY
 SOUTH CAROLINA

That STEPHEN COREY BRYANT did in Sumter County on or about March 9, 2005, violate Section 16-3-1040 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as amended, in that he did knowingly and wilfully deliver or convey to Corporal Thornwell Jones, a public employee, to-wit: correction officers of the Sumter-Lee Regional Detention Center, a verbal communication which contained a threat to take the life of or inflict bodily harm upon the said Thornwell Jones.

Against the peace and dignity of the State, and contrary to the statute in such case made and provided.

P. Kelly Jackson
 SOLICITOR

2674

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COUNTY OF SUMTER

STATE VS.

STEPHEN COREY BRYANT

AKA:

Race: White

Sex: Male

Age: 27

DOB: [REDACTED]

SS#: [REDACTED]

Address: [REDACTED] SC 29150

DL#

SID# [REDACTED]

IN THE COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS

INDICTMENT/CASE#: 2006-GS-43-0702

AW#: H783314

Date of Offense: March 09, 2005

S.C. Code §: 16-03-1040(B),(D) CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
OF ORIGINAL FILE

CDR Code #: 2605

Barbara Hager
CLERK OF COURT
SUMTER COUNTY
SOUTH CAROLINAIn disposition of the said indictment comes now the Defendant who was ☐ CONVICTED OF or ☐ PLEADS

TO: THREATENING LIFE OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE

in violation of § 16-3-1040 of the S.C. Code of Laws, bearing CDR Code # 2161015

☒ NON-VIOLENT ☐ VIOLENT ☐ SERIOUS ☐ MOST SERIOUS ☐ Mandatory GPS (CSG w/minor 1st or Lewd Act) ☐ §17-25-45The charge is: ☒ As Indicted, ☐ Lesser Included Offense, ☐ Defendant Waives Presentment to Grand Jury. (Defendant initial)The plea is: ☒ Without Negotiations or Recommendation, ☐ Negotiated Sentence, ☐ Recommendation by the State.

ATTEST:

C. K. Jackson
Solicitor[Signature]
Defendant[Signature] 2727
Attorney for Defendant SC Bar # 64296WHEREFORE, the Defendant is committed to the ☐ State Department of Corrections, ☒ County Detention Center,for a determinate term of 30 days/months/years or ☐ under the Youthful Offender Act not to exceed _____ years

and/or to pay a fine of \$ _____; provided that upon the service of _____ days/months/years and/or payment of \$ _____; plus

costs and assessments as applicable*; the balance is suspended with probation for _____ months/years and subject to South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services standard conditions of probation, which are incorporated by reference.

☒ CONCURRENT or ☐ CONSECUTIVE to sentence on: _____☒ The Defendant is to be given credit for time served pursuant to S.C. Code §24-13-40 to be calculated and applied by the State Department of Corrections.

Time Served

☐ The Defendant is to be placed on Central Registry of Child Abuse and Neglect pursuant to S.C. Code §17-25-135.

SPECIAL CONDITIONS:

☐ RESTITUTION: ☐ Deferred, ☐ Defendant Waives Hearing, ☐ Ordered

Total: \$ _____ plus 20% fee: \$ _____

Payment Terms:

☐ set by SCDPPPS

Recipient:

*Fine: \$ _____

§14-1-206 (Assessments 107.5%) \$ _____

§14-1-211(A)(1) (Conv. Surcharge) \$100 \$100.00

§14-1-211(A)(2) (DUI Surcharge) \$100 \$ _____

§56-5-2995 (DUI Assessment) \$12 \$ _____

§35-13 (Public Def/Prob) \$500 \$ _____

§73.3, 1B TP (Law Enforce. Funding) \$25 \$25.00

§33.7, 1B TP (Drug Court Surcharge) \$100 \$ _____

§50-21-114(BUI Breath Test Fee) \$50 \$ _____

§56-5-2942(J) (Vehicle Assessment) \$40/ea \$ _____

3% to County (if paid in installments) \$540 \$ _____

§90.11 TP (SCCJA Surcharge) \$5 \$500

TOTAL \$1334.00

PTUP

_____ days/hours Public Service Employment

Obtain GED

Attend Voc. Rehab. or Job Corp.

May serve W/E beginning _____

Substance Abuse Counseling _____

Random Drug/Alcohol Testing _____

Fine may be pd. in equal, consecutive weekly/monthly

pmts. of \$ _____ beginning _____

\$ _____ paid to Public Defender Fund

Other: _____

☐ Appointed PD or appointed other counsel, §35.13 TP
Requires \$500 be paid to Clerk during probation.

PRESIDING JUDGE

Judge Code: 2111411

Sentence Date: 9-11-08

Court Reporter:

Clerk of Court/Deputy Clerk

Grace Hurley (7-18-08)

Frances A. Bakis-Ray

CCA/217 (10/2007)

WITNESSES

(S) J. S. Smith, RCSD

John A. G. Schmitt, RCSD / (S)

ARREST WARRANT NUMBER

H743237

FOREPERSON OF GRAND JURY

TRUE BILL

Foreperson of Grand Jury
Date

DEC 14 2004

VERDICT

Foreperson of Petit Jury
Date

DOCKET NO. 2004-GS-40-10096

The State of South Carolina

County of Richland

42

COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS

DECEMBER TERM 2004

THE STATE

VS.

STEPHEN BRYANT

Indictment for

ASSAULT AND BATTERY WITH
INTENT TO KILL

SC Code: 16-3-530

CDR Code: 0014

Class: C-Felony

After being fully advised as to my legal rights, I hereby waive my right to the Grand Jury.

Defendant

I hereby appear in my own proper person and plead guilty to the within Indictment or to

Defendant

Witness:

C.C.C. PLS. AND G.S.

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
OF ORIGINAL FILE

John A. G. Schmitt
C.C.C. PLS. AND G.S.
RICHLAND COUNTY
SOUTH CAROLINA

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

INDICTMENT

COUNTY OF RICHLAND

ASSAULT AND BATTERY WITH INTENT TO KILL

At a Court of General Sessions, convened on December 15, 2004 the Grand Jurors of Richland County present upon their oath:

That STEPHEN C. BRYANT did in Richland County on or about October 8, 2004 with malice aforethought commit an assault and battery upon one Clinton Brown with intent to kill the said victim. All in violation of S.C. Code Section 16-3-620.

Against the peace and dignity of the State, and contrary to the statute in such case made and provided.

Warren B. Giese
WARREN B. GIESE, SOLICITOR

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE
CLERK OF COURT
RICHLAND COUNTY
SOUTH CAROLINA

RECEIVED

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COUNTY OF RICHLAND

STATE

VS
STEPHEN COREY BRYANT

ARA:

Race/White

Sex Male

Age:

DOB:

SSN:

Address:

SC 29150

DL#

SID#

IN THE COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS

INDICTMENT CASE# 2004 GS-10-10096

AW# H743237

Date of Offense: October 08, 2004

S.C. Code § 16-3-620

CDR Code # 0014

SENTENCE SHEET

In disposition of the said indictment comes now the Defendant who was ☐ CONVICTED OF or ☒ PLEADS
TO Simple and Battery with Intent to KillIn violation of § 16-3-620 of the S.C. Code of Laws, bearing CDR Code # 010114☐ NON-VIOLENT ☒ VIOLENT ☐ SERIOUS ☒ MOST SERIOUS ☐ Mandatory GPS (CSO
w/minor 1st or Lowd Act) ☐ §17-25-15The charge is: ☒ As Indicted ☐ Lesser Included Offense ☐ Defendant Waives Presentment to Grand Jury (Defendant Initial)
The plea is: ☒ Without Negotiations or Recommendation ☐ Negotiated Sentence ☐ Recommendation by the StateATTEST: P. Kere Jackson [Signature]
Clerk of Court DefendantWHEREFORE, the Defendant is committed to the ☒ State Department of Corrections ☐ County Detention Center
for a determinate term of 20 days/months/years or ☐ Under the Youthful Offender Act not to exceed _____ years

and/or to pay a fine of \$ _____ provided that upon the service of _____ days/months/years and/or payment of \$ _____ (plus

costs and assessments as applicable, the balance is suspended with probation for _____ months/years and subject to South

Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services standard conditions of probation, which are incorporated by reference.

☒ CONCURRENT or ☐ CONSECUTIVE to sentence on _____☐ The Defendant is to be given credit for time served pursuant to S.C. Code §24-13-40 to be calculated and applied by the State

Department of Corrections.

☐ The Defendant is to be placed on Central Registry of Child Abuse and Neglect pursuant to S.C. Code §17-25-135.☒ RESTITUTION: ☐ Deferred ☐ Defendant Waives Hearing ☐ Ordered ☐ PIUP
Total: \$ _____ plus 20% fee: \$ _____

Payment Terms: _____ day(s)/hour(s) Public Service Employment

☒ Set by SCDDPPS: _____ Obtain GED

Repayment: _____ Alter/Voc Rehab or Job Corp

Fine: _____ May serve W/E Beginning

\$14,120 (Assessments: 07.5%) \$ _____ Substance Abuse Counseling

\$14,121 (A)(1) (Conv/Surcharge) \$300 \$160.00 Random Drug/Alcohol Testing

\$14,121 (A)(2) (DUI Surcharge) \$100 \$ _____ Fine may be pd. in equal, consecutive weekly/monthly

\$56,628 (DUI Assessment) \$12 \$ _____ pmts. of \$ _____ beginning

\$35,13 (Public Def/Prob) \$500 \$ _____ Other: _____ paid to Public Defender Fund

\$73,118 TP (Law Entrance Funding) \$25 \$25.00

\$35,118 TP (Drug Court Surcharge) \$100 \$ _____

\$50,211 (BUI Breath Test Fee) \$50 \$ _____

\$96,254 (J) (Vehicle Assessment) \$40/ea \$ _____

3% to County (if paid in installments) \$ _____

\$90,011 TP (GCDJA Surcharge) \$5 \$5.00

TOTAL \$ _____

Appointed PO or appointed other counsel §15-13-TP
Requires \$500 to be paid to Clerk during probationPRESIDING JUDGE: _____ Judge Code: _____ Sentence Date: 9-11-08Clerk of Court Deputy Clerk: [Signature]
Court Reporter: [Signature]
Court Reporter: [Signature]