

sentence. State v. Gilliard, Op. No.2004-UP-296 (S.C. Ct. App. filed May 5, 2004). The Applicant subsequently filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which was denied by the South Carolina Supreme Court on July 8, 2004. On August 19, 2004, the South Carolina Supreme Court denied the Applicant's petition for rehearing.

Applicant subsequently filed an application for post conviction relief on February 15, 2005 (2005-CP-10-0619). The Applicant alleged that she was being held in custody unlawfully for the following reasons:

1. "Trial counsel was ineffective in preparing and representing me at trial."
2. "Lackadaisical effort by Appellate Defender Attorney Robert M. Dudek."

The Respondent made its Return on August 16, 2005. An evidentiary hearing into the matter was convened on March 14, 2007 and reconvened on June 14, 2007 at the Charleston County Courthouse. The Applicant was present at the hearing and was represented by William Runyon, Esquire. Jeanette Van Ginhoven, Esquire, of the South Carolina Attorney General's Office represented the Respondent. The Honorable Roger M. Young denied and dismissed the application with prejudice by written Order filed July 23, 2007.

In her current application for post conviction relief, the Applicant alleges she is being held involuntarily for the following reasons:

1. Subject matter jurisdiction.
 - a. "Co-defendant pled guilty to Murder and Arm Robbery before my trial."
2. "Dismissal of indictment, pre-indictment delay 18 USCA."
3. Entrapment.
 - a. "Presence at crime scene, Co-defendant plea. Miranda Right."
4. "Nolle Pross. 5th Amendment USCA."
5. "Self Incrimination."
6. Ineffective assistance of counsel.
 - a. "Attorney failed to charge jury on Nolle Pross. and indictments."

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II.

This Court finds that the current application for post-conviction relief must be summarily dismissed because it is successive to her prior applications for post-conviction relief. S.C. Code Ann. §17-27-90 provides that:

All grounds for relief available to an application under this chapter must be raised in his original, supplemental or amended Application. Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any other proceeding Applicant has taken to secure relief, may not be the basis for a subsequent Application, unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental or amended Application.

Successive applications are disfavored and the burden is on Applicant to establish that any new ground raised in a subsequent application could not have been raised by him in a previous application. Foxworth v. State, 275 S.C. 615, 274 S.E.2d 415 (1981); Aice v. State, 305 S.C. 448, 409 S.E.2d 392 (1991); Arnold v. State/Plath v. State, 309 S.C. 157, 420 S.E.2d 834 (1992).

This Court finds that the current allegations were or could have been raised in the proceedings based on Applicant's prior application for post-conviction relief and thus the current application is successive and barred under S.C. Code § 17-27-90. Applicant has failed to establish sufficient reason why she could not have raised his current allegations in her previous application for post-conviction relief; therefore, she has failed to meet the burden imposed upon her. Land v. State, 274 S.C. 243, 262 S.E.2d 735 (1980); Aice v. State, 409 S.E.2d 392 (1991); Arnold v. State/Plath v. State, 420 S.E.2d 834 (1992).



This Court finds, further, that this Application for Post-Conviction Relief should be summarily dismissed for failure to comply with the filing procedures of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act. S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-10 to -160. S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-45(a) reads as follows:

An application for relief filed pursuant to this chapter must be filed within one year after the entry of a judgment of conviction or within one year after the sending of the remittitur to the lower court from an appeal or the filing of the final decision upon an appeal, whichever is later.

The South Carolina Supreme Court has held that the statute of limitations shall apply to all applications filed after July 1, 1996. Peloquin v. State, 321 S.C. 468, 469 S.E.2d 606 (1996). The Applicant was convicted of the offenses she challenges in this Application on June 1, 2001. This Application was filed on January 17, 2012, which was almost 10 years after the statutory filing period had expired.

A motion for summary judgment may properly be used to raise the defense of statute of limitations. McDonnell v. Consolidated School District of Aiken, 315 S.C. 487, 445 S.E.2d 638 (1994). In addition, S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-70(c) (2003) authorizes the Court to "grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of [an] application when it appears from the pleadings ... that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Therefore, this Court finds that the application for post-conviction relief should be summarily dismissed for failure to file within the time mandated by statute and for being successive.

Additionally, this Court intends to summarily dismiss the application as barred by the doctrine of *res judicata*. *Res judicata* prohibits subsequent actions by the same parties on the same issues. Bell v. Bennett, 307 S.C. 286, 414 S.E.2d 786 (Ct. App. 1992). A final judgment on the merits in a prior action bars subsequent consideration of those issues in a new action. Foran v.

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USAA Casualty Ins. Co., 311 S.C. 189, 427 S.E.2d 918 (Ct. App. 1993). *Res judicata* also bars any issues that could have been raised in the former action. Id.

The Applicant had a full opportunity to litigate all current allegations in prior proceedings and did in fact make similar allegations in her prior application for relief. The other grounds present allegations that could have been raised in those prior proceedings. The public interest in finality of judgments requires that litigation must eventually come to an end. Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, the Court will summarily dismiss these claims as barred by *res judicata*.

Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-70(b), the Court intends to dismiss this Application with prejudice unless the Applicant provides specific reasons, factual or legal, why the Application should not be dismissed in its entirety. The Applicant is granted twenty (20) days from the date of service of this Order upon him to show why this Order should not become final. The Applicant shall file any reasons he may have with the Charleston County Clerk of Court and shall serve opposing counsel at the following address:

Office of the Attorney General
Attn: Ashleigh Wilson, Esquire
P.O. Box 11549
Columbia, South Carolina 29211

AND IT IS SO ORDERED this _____ day of _____, 2013.

ROGER M. YOUNG, SR.
Chief Administrative Judge
Ninth Judicial Circuit Court

_____, South Carolina