

**THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.**

**THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals**

State of South Carolina, Respondent,

v.

Mario Ramos Hinojos, Defendant,

and

Richard G. Thompson, d/b/a All-Out-Bail Bonding, as
Surety, Accredited Property and Casualty Ins., as Surety,

Of whom Richard G. Thompson, d/b/a All-Out-Bail
Bonding, and Accredited Property and Casualty Ins. are
the Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2013-000567

Appeal From Greenville County
Alexander S. Macaulay, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2014-UP-254
Submitted April 1, 2014 – Filed June 25, 2014

AFFIRMED

Robert T. Williams, Sr. and Benjamin Allen Stitely, both
of Williams Hendrix Steigner & Brink, PA, of Lexington,
for Appellants.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, and Assistant
Deputy Attorney General S. Creighton Waters, all of
Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Richard G. Thompson, d/b/a All-Out-Bail Bonding and Accredited Property and Casualty Insurance (All-Out), appeals the trial court's order estreating \$66,666.66 of Mario Ramos Hinojos's bond, arguing (1) the trial court erred by estreating the bond following an amendment to section 17-15-20(B) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2013) and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by failing to fully address the factors from *Polk*.¹ We affirm.

1. Because this court previously decided the issue of estreatment in this case,² the trial court properly refused to consider this issue on remand. *See Prince v. Beaufort Mem'l Hosp.*, 392 S.C. 599, 606, 709 S.E.2d 122, 126 (Ct. App. 2011) ("Matters decided by the appellate court cannot be reheard, reconsidered, or relitigated in the trial court, even under the guise of a different form." (internal quotation marks omitted)); *id.* at 605, 709 S.E.2d at 125 ("A trial court has no authority to exceed the mandate of the appellate court on remand." (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)); *Sloan Constr. Co. v. Southco Grassing, Inc.*, 395 S.C. 164, 169, 717 S.E.2d 603, 606 (2011) ("[A] party is precluded from relitigating, after an appeal, matters that were . . . raised on appeal, but expressly rejected by the appellate court." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2. We find the trial court fully addressed the factors from *Polk*; therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. *See State v. Policao*, 402 S.C. 547, 552, 741 S.E.2d 774, 776 (Ct. App. 2013) ("The trial court's estreatment of a bond forfeiture will not be set aside unless there has been an abuse of discretion."); *State v. McClinton*, 369 S.C. 167, 170, 631 S.E.2d 895, 896 (2006) (explaining an abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's ruling is based on an error of law or without evidentiary support).

AFFIRMED.³

¹ *Ex parte Polk*, 354 S.C. 8, 579 S.E.2d 329 (Ct. App. 2003).

² *State v. Hinojos*, 393 S.C. 517, 713 S.E.2d 351 (Ct. App. 2011).

³ We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.

WILLIAMS, KONDUROS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.