

No. 13-_____

In the Supreme Court of the United States

QUASHON MIDDLETON, Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Respondent.

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JUL - 3 2014

S.C. Supreme Court

***ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT***

APPENDIX

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APPENDIX

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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court

The State, Respondent,

v.

Quashon Middleton, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2011-196767

Appeal From Colleton County
Perry M. Buckner, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 27358
Heard March 20, 2013 – Filed February 26, 2014

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Susan Barber Hackett, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Senior
Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott,
Assistant Attorney General William M. Blich, Jr., all of
Columbia, and Solicitor Isaac McDuffie Stone, III, of
Beaufort, for Respondent.

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SC OFFICE OF
APPELLATE LITIGENSE

CHIEF JUSTICE TOAL: Quashon Middleton (Appellant) appeals his convictions and sentences for two counts of attempted murder and one count of possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. We affirm.

FACTS

On September 28, 2010, Stephanie Mack was driving her vehicle in which Ryan Stephens was riding as a passenger. Mack stopped the vehicle at a school bus stop sign. They were 10-15 feet away from the school bus, facing the bus in the opposite lane, as kindergarten-aged children attempted to exit the bus. Appellant, driving a moped, approached Mack's stopped vehicle from the rear, and drove around to the passenger side. As he approached, he pulled out a gun and began firing into the passenger side of the vehicle, striking the vehicle repeatedly and shattering glass. He continued shooting into the vehicle as he rounded the front of the vehicle. Stephens testified that he and Mack were "laid back" in the seats at the time Appellant approached the vehicle, and he immediately jumped across Mack and into the driver's seat so that he could drive away. In the process, he struck Appellant with the vehicle. He stated these actions were the reasons that he and Mack were not shot and killed. Both Stephens and Mack testified that Appellant shot at them 5-7 times. None of the bullets struck Mack or Stephens. At trial, Mack testified that her only injuries were a few cuts from the broken glass. Stephens testified that he was upset by the incident but was not otherwise struck or injured in any way.

Appellant was charged with two counts of attempted murder and one count of possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. He requested a jury charge on the lesser-included offense of assault and battery in the first degree on both counts of attempted murder. The trial judge charged the jury on the lesser-included offense as to Mack but refused to charge the lesser-included offense as to Stephens.

ISSUE

Did the trial court err when it refused to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of assault and battery in the first degree?

ANALYSIS

Appellant argues that the trial judge erred in refusing to charge the jury on the lesser-included offense of assault and battery in the first degree as to Stephens and that this error requires reversal. We agree that the failure to charge the lesser-included offense was error; however, we find this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Appellant committed the crimes alleged in September 2010, three months after the Omnibus Crime Reduction and Sentencing Reform Act of 2010 (the Act), which substantially overhauled the state's criminal law, became effective. See generally Act No. 273, 2010 S.C. Acts 1937. Through the passage of the Act, the legislature abolished all common law assault and battery offenses and all prior statutory assault and battery offenses. In place of these offenses, the Act codifies attempted murder in section 16-3-29 and four degrees of assault and battery in section 16-3-600. See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 16-3-29 & 16-3-600 (Supp. 2012). The new degrees of assault and battery are, in descending order of severity, assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature (ABHAN), and assault and battery in the first, second, and third degrees. See generally *id.* § 16-3-600. Under the statute, ABHAN is a lesser-included offense of attempted murder. *Id.* § 16-3-600(B)(3). Assault and battery in the first degree is a lesser-included offense of both attempted murder and ABHAN. *Id.* § 16-3-600(C)(3). Further, assault and battery in the second and third degree are each lesser-included offenses of every preceding offense. *Id.* §§ 16-3-600(D)(3) & (E)(3).

At trial, Appellant requested that the judge instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of assault and battery in the first degree pursuant to section 16-3-600(C) as to both Mack and Stephens. That section provides, in relevant part:

(C)(1) A person commits the offense of assault and battery in the first degree if the person unlawfully:

(a) injures another person, and the act:

(i) involves nonconsensual touching of the private parts . . . with lewd and lascivious intent; or

(ii) occurred during the commission of a robbery, burglary, kidnapping, or theft; or

(b) offers or attempts to injure another person with the present ability to do so, and the act:

(i) is accomplished by means likely to produce death or great bodily injury;¹ or

(ii) occurred during the commission of a robbery, burglary, kidnapping, or theft.

S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-600(C)(1) (emphasis added). The trial judge agreed to charge the lesser-included offense of assault and battery in the first degree as to Mack, but he reasoned that because there was no evidence Stephens was injured, it would be inappropriate to instruct the lesser-included offense of assault and battery in the first degree as to Stephens. We find this was error.

The trial judge misconstrued the statutory definition of assault and battery in the first degree as requiring an injury to the victim. While subsection (a) does require an injury to the victim, assault and battery in the first degree also comprises subsection (b) of the statute. *See Brewer v. Brewer*, 242 S.C. 9, 14, 129 S.E.2d 736, 738 (1963) ("The word 'or' used in a statute, is a disjunctive particle that marks an alternative. The word 'or' used in a statute imports choice between two alternatives and as ordinarily used, means one or the other of two, but not both.") (citations omitted). Under subsection (b), "offer[ing] or attempt[ing] to injure a person with the present ability to do so by means likely to produce death or great bodily injury" constitutes assault and battery in the first degree. It is undisputed that the elements of subsection (b) are met in this case. Thus, the circuit court erred in refusing to charge the lesser-included offense of assault and battery in the first degree as to Stephens. *See State v. White*, 361 S.C. 407, 412, 605 S.E.2d 540, 542 (2004) ("A trial judge must charge a lesser included offense if there is any evidence from which the jury could infer the defendant committed the lesser rather than the greater offense."); *State v. Mathis*, 287 S.C. 589, 594, 340 S.E.2d 538, 541 (1986).

¹ "Great bodily injury" is defined as "bodily injury which causes a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ." S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-600(A)(1).

However, we find the circuit court's error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See *State v. Belcher*, 385 S.C. 597, 611, 685 S.E.2d 802, 809 (2009) ("Errors, including erroneous jury instructions, are subject to harmless error analysis.").

When considering whether an error with respect to a jury instruction was harmless, we must "determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict." *State v. Kerr*, 330 S.C. 132, 144-45, 498 S.E.2d 212, 218 (Ct. App. 1998) (citation omitted). "In making a harmless error analysis, our inquiry is not what the verdict would have been had the jury been given the correct charge, but whether the erroneous charge contributed to the verdict rendered." *Id.* Thus, whether or not the error was harmless is a fact-intensive inquiry. *State v. Jefferies*, 316 S.C. 13, 22, 446 S.E.2d 427, 432 (1994) ("We must review the facts the jury heard and weigh those facts against the erroneous jury charge to determine what effect, if any, it had on the verdict.") (citation omitted).²

² We do not disagree with the dissent that the failure to charge the lesser-included offense can be reversible error. However, we disagree that such failure is not subject to a harmless error analysis. As a practical matter, none of the cases cited by the dissent stand for the proposition that a harmless error analysis is inappropriate where the judge erroneously fails to charge the lesser included offense. See *State v. Pittman*, 373 S.C. 527, 572, 647 S.E.2d 144, 167 (2007) (refusing to reverse the lower court for failing to charge the lesser-included offense after weighing the evidence and finding it did not support an involuntary manslaughter charge); *Beck v. Alabama*, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) (overturning an Alabama law prohibiting a judge from ever instructing a jury on the lesser-included offense in capital cases, even where the evidence supported such a charge); *Hopper v. Evans*, 456 U.S. 605 (1982) (finding, in the wake of *Beck*, that the respondent was not prejudiced by the Alabama statute invalidated by *Beck*, even though the jury was not permitted to consider the lesser-included offense, because, under the facts, a charge on the lesser-included offense was not supported by the evidence). In our view, it is elemental that the failure to charge the lesser-included offense is subject to a harmless error analysis, and the cited authority does not compel a different conclusion. See *Neder v. United States*, 527 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1999) (concluding that erroneous jury instruction that fails to charge an element of an offense was subject to a harmless error analysis and stating that the test for determining whether a constitutional error is harmless is "whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the

In *Arnold v. State*, a death penalty case, the Court found that the trial judge unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof to the co-defendants by charging the jury that malice could be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon in the commission of the murder. 309 S.C. 157, 163-65, 420 S.E.2d 834, 837-38 (1992). However, the Court held that this unconstitutional instruction was harmless in view of the evidence presented. *Id.* at 171-72, 420 S.E.2d at 842. In so holding, the Court looked to the evidence and found that there was no indication that the jury based their verdict on the erroneous part of the charge. *Id.* at 170-71, 420 S.E.2d at 841 ("Throughout the jury charge on malice, the trial judge continually reminded the jurors to base their verdict on all the evidence presented and to establish the fact beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, we cannot assume that the jurors based their verdict on the presumption that malice existed with the use of a deadly weapon. A reasonable juror would have listened to all of the instructions and evaluated all of the evidence. Further, it is clear that the presumption of malice from the use of a deadly weapon beyond a reasonable doubt did not contribute to the verdict in this case. The direct evidence of the brutality of each of the participants is overwhelming The testimony established malice well beyond a presumption."); *cf. Jefferies*, 316 S.C. 13, 22, 446 S.E.2d 427, 432 (1994) ("Having determined the source of the jury's confusion, we must review the facts the jury actually heard and weigh those facts against the erroneous jury charge to determine what effect, if any, it had on the verdict.") (citation omitted).

The same analysis applies here. In the instant case, the evidence adduced at trial demonstrates that, notwithstanding the failure to charge the lesser-included offense, the only conclusion established by the evidence is that Appellant was guilty of attempted murder, given the facts that Appellant deliberately drove up to the passenger window and shot into the vehicle at least five times, and Stephens testified that the only reason he and Mack were not injured is because he had the wherewithal to jump into the driver's seat and run Appellant off the road. In our view, there is no other way to construe the evidence in this case but that Appellant was attempting to kill Stephens and Mack. *See* S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-29 ("A person who, with intent to kill, attempts to kill another person with malice aforethought, either expressed or implied, commits the offense of attempted murder."). Therefore, we hold any error in failing to charge the lesser-included offense harmless because the erroneous instruction did not contribute to the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.

verdict obtained") (citations omitted).

CONCLUSION

The trial court erred when it refused to charge the jury on a lesser included offense of assault and battery in the first degree, but this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, Appellant's convictions and sentences are

AFFIRMED.

**BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., concur. PLEICONES, J.,
dissenting in a separate opinion.**

JUSTICE PLEICONES: I respectfully dissent and would hold that the refusal to give a jury charge on a lesser-included offense that is supported by the evidence is always reversible error and not subject to harmless error analysis. Here, despite holding that the evidence entitled appellant to the charge on first degree assault and battery, the majority nonetheless holds "Appellant could only have been convicted of attempted murder under the facts" It is not our prerogative to weigh the evidence and usurp the jury's function. The failure to give a lesser included offense where it is both supported by the evidence and requested by the defendant is *ipso facto* reversible error. *E.g. State v. Pittman*, 373 S.C. 527, 647 S.E.2d 144 (2007) (refusal to charge lesser offense supported by the evidence is an error of law requiring reversal); *see Hopper v. Evans*, 456 U.S. 605 (1982); *Beck v. Alabama*, 447 U.S. 625 (1980).

The majority relies upon *Neder v. United States*, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), a decision which is irrelevant to the question before us today. In *Neder*, the defendant was charged with tax fraud, having underreported his income by five million dollars. An element of tax fraud is materiality, an issue the trial court erroneously considered and ruled on as a matter of law. On appeal, the issue was whether the failure to charge the jury on materiality was harmless error. The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held the failure to charge the jury on this element of the offense was harmless since materiality was not contested by the defendant, and since the evidence of it was overwhelming. It was these facts that allowed the majority of the Supreme Court to conclude the omitted jury charge "beyond a reasonable doubt . . . did not contribute to the verdict" In this case, however, there was evidence of the lesser offense, and it is only by weighing the evidence that the majority can conclude the failure to charge was harmless. Assuming we would follow *Neder* if the circumstances warranted it, this is not a case where an uncontested element of a crime was not charged to the jury, but rather one where the evidence would have supported a conviction for a lesser offense, a decision the jury was entitled to make.

I respectfully dissent and would reverse and remand for a new trial.

The Supreme Court of South Carolina

The State, Respondent,

v.

Quashon Middleton, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2011-196767





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
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ORDER

The Petition for Rehearing filed in the above entitled matter is denied.

	_____	C.J.
	_____	J.
	_____	J.
	_____	J.

I would grant the Petition for Rehearing.

	_____	J.
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Columbia, South Carolina

April 2, 2014

cc:

Salley W. Elliott, Esquire

William M. Blich, Jr., Esquire

~~Susan Barber Hackett, Esquire~~

Isaac McDuffie Stone, III, Esquire

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE SUPREME COURT

THE STATE,

RESPONDENT,

V.

QUASHON G. MIDDLETON,

APPELLANT

Appeal from Colleton County

Perry M. Buckner, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 27358

PETITION FOR REHEARING

On February 26, 2014, this Court affirmed Appellant's convictions for two counts of attempted murder and one count of possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. State v. Middleton, Op. No. 27358 (filed Feb. 26, 2014). Pursuant to Rule 221(a), SCACR, Appellant respectfully asks this Court to rehear the matter due to the Court's application of harmless error to the trial judge's failure to charge the jury concerning a lesser-included offense was supported by the evidence.

This Court erred in applying harmless error analysis to this type of error and in supplanting its view of the facts for the jury's view of the facts. Although this Court held the trial judge's

refusal to charge the jury on the lesser-included offense of assault and battery in the first degree was erroneous, this Court found the error harmless. In doing so, this Court supplanted its view of the facts for that of the jury by holding “the evidence adduced at trial demonstrate[d] that, notwithstanding the failure to charge the lesser-included offense, the only conclusion established by the evidence [was] that Appellant was guilty of attempted murder, given the facts.” Further, this Court stated “[i]n our view, there is no other way to construe the evidence in this case but that Appellant was attempting to kill Stephens and Mack.” Specifically, this Court evaluated and weighed the evidence presented, which required an evaluation and determination of the credibility of witnesses, whom the Court had no opportunity to view.

The facts presented at trial clearly demonstrated Appellant’s right to have the jury charged as to the lesser-included offense as this Court held, and Appellant makes no challenge to this holding of the Court. On the afternoon of September 28, 2010, Stephanie Mack was driving down Brittlebank Road in Colleton County with Ryan Stephens as her passenger. R. 43 lines 13-23; R. 61 lines 11-20. The pair stopped as a school bus in the on-coming lane stopped. R. 44 lines 2-4; R. 62 lines 10-12. Stephens and Mack claimed that Appellant, riding on a moped, drove up behind Mack and Stephens and brandished a gun. R. 44 lines 7-22; R. 62 lines 12-14. The pair further claimed that Appellant shot in the direction of Mack’s car. R. 44 lines 4-9; R. 62 lines 16-17.¹ Despite the close confines of the car and the alleged gunfire, Mack somehow

¹ The South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) tested the gunshot residue (GSR) kits collected by local law enforcement. According to Kathleen Woodward with SLED, “[t]he quantities of metals found in [Appellant’s] kit [did] not indicate the presence of gunshot residue.” R. 104 lines 18-21. However, the GSR kit from Mack’s right and left palms provided “quantities of metals that may be associated with gunshot residue.” R. 104 line 23-25; R. 105 lines 2-3. Similarly, “the quantities of metals found on the right palm of [Stephens’] hand may be associated with gunshot residue.” R. 105 lines 7-9. Likewise, the metals found on Stephens’ left palm and back of his left hand “may be associated with gunshot residue.” R. 105 lines 11-14.

managed to switch seats with Stephens. R. 47 lines 9-15; R. 55 line 23 – R. 56 line 10; R. 62 lines 19-20; R. 70 lines 20-21; R. 76 lines 12-14. While Appellant allegedly continued to shoot, Stephens sped off hitting Appellant's leg. R. 47 lines 16-22; R. 62 lines 22-24.² Mack and Stephens then drove to Stephens' home. R. 48 lines 11-12; R. 64 lines 2-4.

At trial, the prosecutor asked Mack "Were you hurt in any way?" R. 48 line 17. Mack responded "No, ma'am." R. 48 line 18. The prosecutor followed up with "Any glass hit you?" and Mack responded "I had a couple of cuts from the glass." R. 48 lines 19-20.

The judge agreed to charge the lesser-included offenses of assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature and assault and battery in the first degree as to Mack. R. 116 line 21 – R. 117 line 1. However, Judge Buckner refused to charge the lesser-included offense of assault and battery in the first degree as to Stephens because there was "no battery involved" with Stephens. R. 117 lines 2-3.³

There is no question that assault and battery in the first degree is a lesser-included offense of attempted murder. S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-600(C)(3). A jury charge to a lesser-included offense is required when the evidence warrants such an instruction. State v. Geiger, 370 S.C. 600, 606, 635 S.E.2d 669, 673 (Ct. App. 2006). South Carolina law mandates a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense when there is any evidence from which it could be inferred that the

² The paramedic testified that Appellant stated he had been run over and the people in the car had been shooting at him. R. 38 lines 2-6. Appellant was in significant pain according to the paramedic due to a possible leg fracture. R. 34 lines 6-10; R. 36 lines 22 – R. 37 line 1. Appellant was transported to the emergency room. R. 38 lines 19-21; R. 41 lines 3-4.

³ Judge Buckner issued this ruling despite trial counsel pointing out that the statute contemplated this charge when "there is an offering, or attempting to injure another person, the first part of the statute for assault and battery in the first degree says in A – the person commits this if the person unlawfully, A, injures another person and the act either applies to one or two. And then it says B, offers or attempts to injure another person with the present ability to do so." R. 117 lines 12-21.

lesser, rather than the greater, offense was committed. State v. Watson, 349 S.C. 372, 375, 563 S.E.2d 336, 337 (2002); see also State v. Gourdine, 322 S.C. 396, 398, 472 S.E.2d 241, 241 (1996). In other words, the evidence must allow “a rational inference” that the defendant committed the lesser offense. Geiger, 370 S.C. at 607, 635 S.E.2d at 673. In determining whether such a rational inference exists the court must examine the totality of evidence. Id. As this Court explained in State v. Patterson, 337 S.C. 215, 233, 522 S.E.2d 845, 854 (Ct. App. 1999), “[i]n order to justify a charge of a lesser included offense, the evidence must be capable of sustaining either the greater or the lesser offense, depending on the jury’s view of the facts.”

In its brief, the state admitted Appellant was entitled to the instruction on the lesser-included offense as to Stephens but argued any error was harmless. BOR 3-4. Unfortunately, this Court agreed with the state that a harmless error analysis was applicable when the trial judge failed to instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense. This was error as explained by the dissent. Appellant is aware of no case decided by this Court holding the defendant was entitled to an instruction on a lesser-included offense, but finding the error harmless or even applying a harmless error analysis to such an error. None of the cases cited by this Court states that harmless error applies when the defendant was entitled to the charge on the lesser-included offense, but the trial court failed to provide one. In State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 572, 647 S.E.2d 144, 167 (2007), this Court held the defendant was not entitled to an instruction on involuntary manslaughter because the record contained no evidence upon which a jury could find the killings were unintentional and the result of recklessness. Clearly, this was not a decision in which this Court determined Pittman was entitled to the instruction, but failure to give it was harmless error. Likewise, in Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605 (1982), the United States Supreme Court held the defendant was not prejudiced by Alabama’s unconstitutional statute because the

evidence failed to support a charge on the lesser-included offense. These cases are wholly inapplicable to the issue presented in Appellant's case. Furthermore, as explained by the dissent, Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), which was cited by the majority, does not hold that harmless error analysis applies to a failure to charge the jury on a lesser-included offense. Instead, in Neder, the Court held the trial court's error to charge the jury as to materiality, an element of the charge against Neder, was harmless in light of the facts presented.

Nevertheless, Neder is instructive for determining when harmless error analysis applies. Although most errors, even constitutional ones, are subject to harmless error analysis, some errors are not. When an error is structural, the error requires an automatic reversal. Neder, 527 U.S. at 8. "Those cases ... contain a 'defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.'" Id. (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991)). These "'errors infect the entire trial process.'" Id. (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630 (1993)). Such errors "'necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair.'" Id. (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986)). The High Court's decision in Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638 (1980) explained that Alabama's statutory prohibition on charging juries in capital cases as to lesser-included offenses was a violation of capital defendants' rights to due process. The state conceded that under Alabama's law, Beck was entitled to a charge on a lesser-included based upon the evidence presented, but the statutory prohibition prevented the judge from issuing the instruction. Id. at 630 n. 5. Beck is instructive in demonstrating that where a jury is denied the opportunity to consider a lesser-included offense, the error is not subject to harmless error.

In Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313 (1896), the Supreme Court reversed a conviction for capital murder where the trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the lesser-

included offense of manslaughter. Of importance to the matter presented herein, the Court did not consider whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense, where the evidence supported the charge, the trial judge "passed upon the strength, credibility, and tendency of the evidence, and decided, as a matter of law, what, it seems to us, would generally be regarded as a question of fact." Id. at 315-316. When a matter "is not to be so asserted, as a matter of law, then it becomes a question of fact in such case, and that question must be answered by the jury." Id. at 322. "Whether the witnesses told the truth in regard to such circumstances is not for the court to say, nor is it for the court to decide upon the weight to be given to them, if proper for the consideration of the jury." Id. Although a trial judge may be satisfied from the evidence that

the person doing the killing was actuated by malice; that he was not in any such passion as to lower the grade of the crime from murder to manslaughter by reason of any absence of malice; and yet, if there be any evidence fairly tending to bear upon the issue of manslaughter, it is the province of the jury to determine from all the evidence what the condition of the mind was, and to say whether the crime was murder or manslaughter.

Id. at 323.

In State v. Roof, 298 S.C. 351, 380 S.E.2d 828, (1989), this Court reversed the defendant's conviction for murder where the trial judge instructed the jury it may convict the defendant's co-defendant, who had been charged with murder, on the lesser-included offense of accessory after the fact, but did not give the jury that option for the defendant and the evidence presented against the two was the same. The defendant and co-defendant gave identical statements to law enforcement implicating the other in the murder, but inculcating the writer as an accessory. Id. at 352-353, 380 S.E.2d at 829. The co-defendant testified at trial consistent with his written statement. Id. at 353, 380 S.E.2d at 829. At the conclusion of the trial, the judge instructed the jury on murder and accessory as to the co-defendant, but refused to charge

accessory as to the defendant. Id. This Court held that “by giving the accessory charge as to [co-defendant], the court improperly implied that the court itself gave greater weight to [co-defendant]’s credibility.” Id. The jury instruction option “was tantamount to a comment by the court on the dispositive factual issue here – witness credibility.” Id. at 353-354, 380 S.E.2d at 829. This reasoning applies in Appellant’s case. The trial court’s refusal to give the lesser-included offense to one victim and not the other likely gave the jury an impression of the judge’s view of the facts.

The error presented in Appellant’s case is one involving structural error because it affected the framework in which the trial proceeded. It denied the jury the ability to consider a lesser-included offense, which the evidence supported. This error infected the entire trial process and rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. Therefore, the failure to charge the jury as to a lesser-included offense was not subject to harmless error analysis where the evidence supported giving the charge to the jury.

This Court’s conclusion that the evidence presented entitled Appellant to a charge on first degree assault and battery, but that the failure to give such a charge was harmless because “the only conclusion established by the evidence is that Appellant was guilty of attempted murder” is inconsistent and illogical. No precedent supports this Court’s decision. If Appellant were entitled to the instruction on the lesser-included offense in light of the evidence before the jury, then the facts would have allowed the jury to convict Appellant of the lesser-included offense, rejecting attempted murder.

Respectfully submitted,

Susan B. Hackett

Susan B. Hackett
Appellate Defender

This 13th day of March, 2014.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE SUPREME COURT

Appeal from Colleton County

Perry M. Buckner, Circuit Court Judge

THE STATE,

RESPONDENT,

v.

QUASHON G. MIDDLETON,

APPELLANT

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned attorney hereby certifies that a true copy of the Petition for Rehearing in the above-entitled case has been served upon William M. Blich, Jr., Esquire, at the Rembert Dennis Building, 1000 Assembly Street, Room 519, Columbia, SC 29201, and Mr. Quashon G. Middleton, at Lee Correctional Institution, 990 Wisacky Highway, Bishopville, SC 29010, this 13th day of March, 2014.

Susan B. Hackett

Susan B. Hackett
Appellate Defender

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 13th day
of March, 2014.

[Signature] (L.S.)

Notary Public for South Carolina

My Commission Expires: October 30, 2022.

In the Supreme Court of the United States

QUASHON MIDDLETON, Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Respondent.


***ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT***

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that copies of the petition for writ of certiorari and appendix in this case have been served upon opposing counsel for Respondent, the State of South Carolina, William Blicht, by mailing copies in envelopes properly addressed with postage prepaid to the Office of the Attorney General, P.O. Box 11549, Columbia, SC 29211 on this 1st day of July, 2014. Counsel is also today, July 1, 2014, sending a copy of the petition for writ of certiorari and appendix to opposing counsel by e-mail to: wblitch@scag.gov.


SUSAN B. HACKETT
Counsel of Record

SWORN TO BEFORE me this 1st day
of July 2014.


_____(L.S.)
Notary Public for South Carolina
My Commission Expires: October 30, 2022.

