

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court

RECEIVED

APPEAL FROM RICHLAND COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas

NOV 05 2014

Robert E. Hood, Circuit Court Judge

S.C. SUPREME COURT

Case No. 2013-CP-40-07040

Joshua Sanborn, SCDC # 356032, Appellant


v.

State of South Carolina, Respondent.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Applicant Joshua Sanborn hereby appeals from the Order of the Honorable Robert E. Hood presiding Judge for the 5th Judicial Circuit, filed October 4, 2014 and received by counsel for the Applicant on October 31, 2014 in the matter of Joshua Sanborn v. State of South Carolina, Case No. 2013-CP-40-07040.

November 4, 2014


Kristy Goldberg
Attorney for Plaintiff

Law Office of Kristy Goldberg, LLC.
1720 Main Street, Suite 301
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Other Counsel of Record:
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Post Office Box 11549
Columbia, South Carolina 29211

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
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APPEAL FROM RICHLAND COUNTY
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Robert E. Hood, Circuit Court Judge

Case No. 2013-CP-40-07040

Joshua Sanborn, SCDC # 356032, Appellant

v.

State of South Carolina, Respondent.

PROOF OF SERVICE

Personally appeared before me, Kristy Goldberg, Esquire, who being duly sworn, deposes
and states:

She is the counsel of record for Applicant;

Service by mail is proper in this instance; and

She has served the NOTICE OF APPEAL on the following party on November 4, 2014 by
depositing one copy in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid:

Assistant Attorney General, Walt Whitmire
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Other Counsel of Record:
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF RICHLAND
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

CASE NUMBER: 2013CP4007040

Joshua #356032 Sanborn

State of South Carolina

PLAINTIFF(S)

DEFENDANT(S)

Submitted by: _____

Attorney for : Plaintiff Defendant or Self-Represented Litigant

DISPOSITION TYPE (CHECK ONE)

- JURY VERDICT.** This action came before the court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and a verdict rendered.
- DECISION BY THE COURT.** This action came to trial or hearing before the court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision rendered.
- ACTION DISMISSED (CHECK REASON):** Rule 12(b), SCRPC; Rule 41(a), SCRPC (Vol. Nonsuit);
 Rule 43(k), SCRPC (Settled); Other _____
- ACTION STRICKEN (CHECK REASON):** Rule 40(j), SCRPC; Bankruptcy;
 Binding arbitration, subject to right to restore to confirm, vacate or modify arbitration award; Other _____
- DISPOSITION OF APPEAL TO THE CIRCUIT COURT (CHECK APPLICABLE BOX):**
 Affirmed; Reversed; Remanded; Other _____

NOTE: ATTORNEYS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR NOTIFYING LOWER COURT, TRIBUNAL, OR ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OF THE CIRCUIT COURT RULING IN THIS APPEAL.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: See attached order (formal order to follow) Statement of Judgment by the Court:

ORDER INFORMATION

This order ends does not end the case.
Additional Information for the Clerk :

INFORMATION FOR THE PUBLIC INDEX

Complete this section below when the judgment affects title to real or personal property or if any amount should be enrolled. If there is no judgment information, indicate "N/A" in one of the boxes below.

Judgment in Favor of (List name(s) below)	Judgment Against (List name(s) below)	Judgment Amount To be Enrolled
		\$
		\$
		\$

If applicable, describe the property, including tax map information and address, referenced in the order:

The judgment information above has been provided by the submitting party. Disputes concerning the amounts contained in this form may be addressed by way of motion pursuant to the SC Rules of Civil Procedure. Amounts to be computed, such as interest or additional taxable costs not available at the time the form and final order are submitted to the judge may be provided to the clerk. Note: Title abstractors and researchers should refer to the official court order for judgment details.

Circuit Court Judge _____ Judge Code _____ Date _____

For Clerk of Court Office Use Only

This judgment was entered on the _____ day of _____, 20____ and a copy mailed first class or placed in the appropriate attorney's box on this 24 October 2014 to attorneys of record or to parties (when appearing pro se) as follows:

Joshua #356032 Sanborn

Kristy Grafton Goldberg

Megan E. Harrigan

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE PLAINTIFF(S)

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE DEFENDANT(S)

Court Reporter _____

Clerk of Court



STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)
)
 COUNTY OF RICHLAND)
)
 Joshua Sanborn,)
 S.C.D.C. No.365032,)
)
 Applicant,)
)
 v.)
)
 State of South Carolina,)
)
 Respondent.)

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
 FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
 C.A. No. 2013-CP-40-07040

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
 (with prejudice)

2014 OCT 20 PM 14:58
 COURT REPORTER
 COURT REPORTER

This matter reaches this Court by way of an Application for Post-Conviction Relief (PCR) filed on November 19, 2013. Respondent filed its Responsive Pleadings on February 24, 2014. An evidentiary hearing into the matter was convened on September 3, 2014 at the Richland County Courthouse. Applicant was present and was represented by Kristy Goldberg, Esq., while Respondent was represented by Walt Whitmire, Esq., of the Office of the Attorney General. Applicant and trial counsel testified.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Applicant is presently confined in the South Carolina Department of Corrections pursuant to orders of commitment of the Richland County Clerk of Court. Applicant was represented by Luke Shealey, Esq., and subsequently represented by Mark Sawyer, Jr., Esq at the time of the guilty plea. (counsel). After waiving presentment to the Richland County Grand Jury, Applicant appeared before the Honorable Diane S. Goodstein and pled guilty to attempted burglary, second-degree (2013-GS-40-4589) and drugs / manuf., poss. of other sub. in Sched. I, II, II or flunitrazepam or analogue, w.i.t.d., first-offense (Illegal Drugs Possession) (2013-GS-40-858). Judge Goodstein sentenced Applicant to a term of imprisonment not to exceed six (6) years

pursuant to the Youthful Offender Act (YOA). Applicant did not appeal his sentences or convictions.

At the PCR hearing, Applicant proceeded on the limited allegations that he is being held in custody unlawfully for:

1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
 - a. Failure to investigate the victim's statement and mount a defense to the element of "without consent" necessary to prove the offense of burglary;
 - b. Failure to timely provide Applicant a physical copy of the State's discovery disclosures;
 - c. Failure to adequately advise Applicant of the sentencing exposure carried by the State's plea offer;
 - d. Failure to request the Plea Judge impose a probationary sentence during the mitigation phase of the plea hearing.

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY PRESENTED AT THE PCR HEARING

Applicant testified that he is requesting this Court grant him relief in full knowledge and appreciation that the vacation of his current conviction and sentence would revive the original attempted burglary, first-degree, and distribution of a controlled substance charges. Applicant testified counsel Sawyer inherited his case from the original appointed attorney, Attorney Shealey, because he left the Public Defender's Office during the pendency of the case. He stated that counsel's representation began one month prior to the plea. He stated he was in pre-trial detention during the course of counsel's representation. He explained that a violation of the conditions of his bond resulted in the pre-trial detention. Applicant stated that counsel met with him one time prior to the plea. He recalled that counsel brought his file to the meeting but was uncertain if counsel referenced it.

Applicant stated that counsel did not provide him with a copy of the State's discovery disclosures until the morning of the plea. He asserted that he was in a holding cell when he first received the discovery materials and did not have the present ability to review them. Based on

his recent *post hoc* review of the victim's statement regarding the attempted burglary from those discovery materials, he now claims he would have rejected the State's plea offer and proceeded to trial. He offered the victim's statement, over Respondent's objection, and asserted that it evidenced the State's inability to prove all the requisite elements of attempted burglary. See Applicant's Exhibit 1. In particular, he asserted the statement in question shows that he was an invitee to the victim's residence. Applicant, over Respondent's objection, also asserted that counsel did not object to the sentencing sheet's recitation of the incorrect offense. Accordingly to Applicant, S.C. Code Sec. 16-11-311 does not include a subsection for attempt. He claimed counsel never discussed the merits of any defenses to the charged with him. Applicant did not contest the State's case or his culpability on the possession of a controlled substance charge. He stated that he untruthfully admitted his guilt at the plea because he was content to accept the favorable plea offer that counsel had elicited for him. He stated that counsel promised him he would request a probationary sentence during the mitigation phase of the plea hearing but did act accordingly.

Applicant testified that counsel's advice led him to believe that he would receive a probationary sentence if he pled guilty. He stated that the novelty of General Sessions Court overwhelmed his cognitive abilities to grasp the import of his plea colloquy despite the Plea Judge advising him that the plea exposed him to a potential fifteen year term of imprisonment. Applicant explained that he thought he would walk out of the Courthouse with a probationary sentence because this was first adult conviction. He stated that he requested counsel file a motion to withdraw the plea on his behalf because he was "not happy with what went on."

Counsel testified to his course of conduct during the representation. Counsel recalled Applicant's case and had reviewed his file in anticipation of testifying at Applicant's PCR

hearing. Counsel was appointed to Applicant's case during his five and a half year career with the Public Defender's Office. He explained the circumstances surrounding his involvement as the substituted counsel. He explained his Office's standard policies and procedures concerning transfer cases that dictated that the departing attorneys draft transfer memos on his pending cases. He also explained the transition was eased by his Office's utilization of an in-house notation system.

Counsel explained the posture of Applicant's case when he inherited it. Counsel independently investigated and evaluated the State's evidence against Applicant. Counsel apprised Applicant of the charges, sentencing exposure, State's discovery disclosures and evidence. Upon cross-examination concerning Applicant's Exhibit 1, counsel reiterated that the victim's statement did not establish a meritorious defense on the element of consent. Counsel explained that a new act had formed when Applicant attempted to force entry into the victim's residence. He noted that *post hoc* evaluation of the victim's statement would not have changed his impression concerning the strength of the State's case and subsequent plea advice to Applicant. Counsel stated that he had several discussions with Applicant prior to the plea. Counsel explained that Applicant wanted to plead guilty as quickly as possible.

Counsel noted that Attorney Shealey had already initiated plea negotiations with the solicitor. The solicitor made a favorable offer that allowed Applicant the opportunity to receive a sentence under the Youthful Offender Act. Counsel conveyed the terms of the offer and advised Applicant on the constitutional implications of pleading guilty. Counsel stated that Applicant accepted the offer and wanted to immediately enter it before a Judge. He testified that his goal was to negotiate a plea offer from the solicitor that provided Applicant the opportunity to be sentenced under the Youthful Offender Act.

Counsel advised Applicant that he could not guarantee the Court would suspend the YOA sentence on probation but counsel would agree to request probation. Counsel noted that Applicant's demeanor and comments did not leave him with the impression that Applicant entered the plea with the expectation that he would receive a probationary sentence. He noted that his mitigation strategy changed upon the Plea Judge's disposition and assurances that she would impose an active YOA sentence. Counsel made the strategic decision to ask for a split probationary sentence on the attempted burglary sentence because it would have exposed Applicant to a lesser sentence in Corrections under the YOA guidelines. Furthermore, he stated he had no reason to believe that Applicant involuntarily pled guilty. However, counsel filed the bifurcated post-plea motion just because Applicant desired it. He explained that Applicant wrote him a letter on the matter. Counsel further explained that attempted burglary sentencing sheet did not have any errors that affected Applicant's sentence.

APPLICABLE LAW

In a post-conviction relief action, the Applicant bears the burden of proving the allegations in their application. Butler v. State, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985). Where the application alleges ineffective assistance of counsel as a ground for relief, the Applicant must prove that "counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, (1984); Butler, 286 S.C. at 441, 334 S.E.2d at 813.

The proper measure of performance is whether the attorney provided representation within the range of competence required in criminal cases. The courts presume that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. The Applicant must

overcome this presumption in order to receive relief. Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 386 S.E.2d 624 (1989).

The reviewing court applies a two-pronged test in evaluating allegations of ineffective assistance of plea counsel. First, the Applicant must prove that counsel's performance was deficient. Under this prong, the court measures an attorney's performance by its "reasonableness under professional norms." Cherry, 300 S.C. at 117, 386 S.E.2d at 625, citing Strickland, *supra*. Second, counsel's deficient performance must have prejudiced the Applicant such that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Cherry, 300 S.C. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This Court has reviewed the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing, observed the witnesses presented at the hearing, passed upon their credibility, and weighed the testimony accordingly. Further, this Court reviewed the Clerk of Court records regarding the subject convictions, the Applicant's records from the South Carolina Department of Corrections, the application for post-conviction relief, the transcripts and documents from the prior proceedings, and, and legal arguments of counsel. Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. §17-27-80 (2003), this Court makes the following findings of fact based upon all of the probative evidence presented.

As a matter of general impression, this Court finds Applicant has readily failed to meet his burden to prove that counsel was either deficient or ineffective on the allegations before the Court. This Court finds counsel's testimony to be credible while finding Applicant's testimony to lack credibility. Applicant's conclusory and defective *post hoc* attacks on counsel's performance have done nothing to alter Strickland's underlying presumption of constitutionally effective assistance of counsel. Instead, the exercise showed Applicant made the knowing, intelligent, and

voluntary decision to enter a favorable guilty plea pursuant to counsel's sound performance and advice that mirrors his reputation as an excellent criminal defense lawyer.

A.

Applicant has failed to meet his burden to prove counsel's performance was ineffective or even lacking for failing to further investigate the attempted burglary victim's statement in mounting a defense to that charge. "This Court has stated previously that criminal defense attorneys have a duty to undertake a reasonable investigation, which at a minimum includes interviewing potential witnesses and making an independent investigation of the facts and circumstances of the case." Ard v. Catoe, 372 S.C. 318, 331, 642 S.E.2d 590, 596 (2007). This Court agrees with counsel's affirmation that the victim's statement did not negate the element of "without consent" necessary to prove the offense of attempted burglary. Counsel correctly noted that Applicant's efforts to force entry into the residence after he discharged the stun gun on the victim constituted a new act to that certainly established the State's case on the element in question. Regardless, the solicitor told the Plea Judge that the State intended to prove that Applicant arrived at the residence and entered the illegal narcotics transaction with the motive to deceive the victim in order to commit the burglary. See State v. Dixon, 337 S.C. 455, 459, 523 S.E.2d 784, 786 (Ct. App. 1999). Thus, Applicant has failed to produce credible testimony or evidence here in contrast to the ample and convincing evidence of his guilt that permeates the Record before this Court. See Holden v. State, 393 S.C. 565, 573, 713 S.E.2d 611, 615 (2011). ("In determining guilty plea issues, it is proper to consider the guilty plea transcript as well as evidence at the PCR hearing."). This Court also finds that Applicant's assertion that the sentencing sheet was defective because it purportedly lists the incorrect statute is facially without merit. Applicant argued that his statute reflects that he was convicted of §16-11-0312 for

Burglary 2nd when it should reflect that he was convicted of Attempt under §16-1-80. An Attempted Burglary 2nd, regardless of the statute written on the sentencing sheet, is legally treated the same as a Burglary 2nd and the CDR code does not change. As a result of Applicant's complete failure to prove counsel's performance here was deficient and resulted in prejudice, Applicant similarly fails to meet his burden to prove Strickland's prejudice prong on these two allegations. See Kolle v. State, 386 S.C. 578, 588, 690 S.E.2d 73, 78 (2010). Therefore, this allegation is readily denied and dismissed.

B.

Applicant's allegation that counsel was ineffective for failing to provide him a physical copy of the State's discovery disclosures is defective and facially conclusory. "A conclusory unsupported allegation without evidence that a different result is probable is deficient." U.S. v. Popoola, 881 F.2d 811, 813 (9th Cir. 1989). Applicant testified that he had previously received a copy of his discovery related to the controlled substance charge from attorney Shealey, and he received the discovery related to the Burglary charge on the day of his guilty plea in the holding cell and did not have time to read it prior to his guilty plea. During testimony counsel Sawyer confirmed that he received the Burglary discovery from the State a week or two prior to the guilty plea. Counsel testified that he had ample time to review this discovery. Counsel testified that the day of Applicant's plea he gave him a copy of the discovery and read and reviewed it fully with Applicant in person. Counsel also testified that he told Applicant that he was not required to plead guilty that particular day but he could if he wanted to and felt prepared. Counsel testified that his advice to Applicant to accept the guilty plea was based on his review of the evidence and a further *post hoc* review of these documents does not change his opinion as to whether the Applicant had any meritorious defenses or would have been convicted at trial.

Applicant has produced no credible evidence to call into question Strickland's deficiency prong. In contrast, this Court finds counsel's testimony that Applicant was insistent on a speedy plea and that counsel had no reason to question Applicant's intelligent, knowing, and voluntary decision on the matter to be credible and convincing. Therefore, this allegation is denied and dismissed.

C.

This Court finds Applicant has failed to meet his burden to prove counsel's performance in advising him on the terms and conditions of the plea offer, in particular the sentencing exposure, was deficient. "Before a court can accept a guilty plea, a defendant must be advised of the constitutional rights he or she is waiving. The Due Process Clause requires guilty pleas be entered into voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. In addition to the requirements of Boykin, a defendant entering a guilty plea must be aware of the nature and crucial elements of the offense, the maximum and any mandatory minimum penalty, and the nature of the constitutional rights being waived." Anderson v. State, 342 S.C. 54, 57, 535 S.E.2d 649, 651 (2000) (internal citations omitted). This Court finds Applicant's testimony unconvincing and incredible compared to counsel's credible testimony that Applicant was fully aware of the sentencing exposure that the plea carried. Furthermore, this Court notes that Applicant has already asserted this claim, albeit in a slightly different posture, at his post-plea motion hearing. As a result, substantial import is placed upon the Plea Judge's findings in denying Applicant's motion to withdraw his plea. See State v. Dorce, 320 S.C. 480, 483, 465 S.E.2d 772, 773 (Ct. App. 1995) ("The trial judge was presented with contradicting testimony, and it was within his province, as the trier of fact, to weigh the credibility of the evidence presented to determine which witnesses he deemed credible."). Similar to Applicant's assertion that his guilty plea was involuntary that

he made at the post-plea hearing, Applicant's allegation here is a merely a product of wishful thing. See Wolfe v. State, 326 S.C. 158, 485 S.E.2d 367, 370 (1997). Thus, this Court finds that Applicant has failed to produce a legitimate reason that would allow this Court to depart from the nearly irrefutable presumption of truthfulness in the statements and assurances he made at his plea. Therefore, this allegation is denied and dismissed.

D.

Last this Court finds that Applicant has failed to meet his burden to prove counsel's decision not to request a full probationary sentence during the mitigation phase of the plea constituted deficient performance. The United States Supreme Court has written the prejudice standard here as, "but for counsel's deficiency, there is a reasonable probability that [the applicant] would have received a different sentence." Porter v. McCollum, 558, U.S. 30 (2009).

This Court finds that counsel executed a sound and timely strategy to only request a split probationary sentence based on the Plea Judge's posture. See Whitehead v. State, 308 S.C. 119, 417 S.E.2d 529 (1992) ("Where, as here, counsel articulates a valid reason for employing certain strategy, such conduct will not be deemed ineffective assistance of counsel."). Regardless, the Plea Judge's thorough comments that explained her reasoning in sentencing Applicant essentially negated even the prospect of prejudice here. See Cuffle v. Goldsmith, 906 F.2d 385,388 (9th Cir. 1990) (Counsel is not required to argue a claim refuted by the record.). Therefore, this allegation is denied and dismissed and found to be without merit.

E.

Except as discussed above, this Court finds that the Applicant affirmatively abandons the remaining allegations set forth in his application at the hearing. A waiver is a voluntary and intentional abandonment or relinquishment of a known right. Janasik v. Fairway Oaks Villas

Horizontal Property Regime, 307 S.C. 339, 415 S.E.2d 384 (1992). A waiver may be express or implied. "An implied waiver results from acts and conduct of the party against whom the doctrine is invoked from which an intentional relinquishment of a right is reasonably inferable." Lyles v. BMI, Inc., 292 S.C. 153, 158-59, 355 S.E.2d 282 (Ct. App. 1987). The Applicant's failure to address these issues at the hearing indicates a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of his right to do so. Therefore, any and all remaining allegations are denied and dismissed.

CONCLUSION

Based on all the forgoing, this Court finds and concludes that the Applicant has not established any constitutional violations or deprivations that would require this Court to grant his application for post-conviction relief. Therefore, this application for post-conviction relief must be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

This Court notes that Applicant must file and serve a notice of intent to appeal within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Order to secure the appropriate appellate review. See Rule 203, SCACR. Rule 71.1(g), SCRCR; Bray v. State, 336 S.C. 137, 620 S.E.2d 743 (2005), for the obligation of Applicant's counsel to file and serve notice of appeal. The Applicant's attention is also directed to South Carolina Appellate Court Rule 243 for appropriate procedures after notice has been timely filed.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED

1. That the Application for Post-Conviction Relief must be denied and dismissed with prejudice; and
2. Applicant must be remanded to the custody of Respondent

AND IT IS SO ORDERED this 20 day of OCT, 2014.

Robert E. Hood

ROBERT E. HOOD
Presiding Judge
Fifth Judicial Circuit

Columbia, South Carolina

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fcr

LAW OFFICE OF
Kristy Grafton Goldberg, LLC

ATTORNEY AT LAW

November 4, 2014

RECEIVED

NOV 05 2014

S.C. SUPREME COURT

The Honorable Daniel E. Shearouse
Clerk of Court, South Carolina Supreme Court
Post Office Box 11330
Columbia, South Carolina 29211

RE: Joshua Sanborn, SCDC # 356032, vs. State of South Carolina
Appeal of Case No. 2013-CP-40-07040


Dear Mr. Shearouse,

Enclosed for filing is a Notice of Appeal in the above referenced case. Also enclosed are a certificate of service and a copy of the original court order which is to be challenged on appeal. I would appreciate it if you could file the Notice of Appeal and mail a date-stamped copy back to me in the enclosed pre-stamped envelope.

By copy of this letter I am informing the Office of Appellate Defense of this Appeal so that they may begin representation of Mr. Sanborn, as I was appointed as counsel in this matter. I am also hereby requesting that Appellate Defense obtain a copy of the court transcript within the time required by this court.

Please let me know if you have any questions or concerns regarding this matter.

Respectfully,


Kristy Goldberg

CC: Walt Whitmire
Assistant Attorney General
Post Office Box 11549
Columbia, South Carolina 29211-1549



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The Honorable Daniel E. Shearouse
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