

*Wesley E. Smith III*

465 North Nassau Street  
Charleston, South Carolina 29403  
(843)723-8598

November 3, 2014

**MEMORANDUM TO THE RECORDS**

CLERK

Honorable Jenny A. Kitchens  
South Carolina Court of Appeals  
1015 Sumter Street  
Columbia, South Carolina 29201

RE: Wesley Smith, Plaintiff v Charleston County School District, Defendant Case 2003-10-CP-4751


Dear Honorable Kitchens,

Below is the petitioner additional question in support of consideration concerning the court granting Writ of Certiorari and Informal Brief, petitioning, appealing, opposing and dissenting the lower case ruling of case 2003-CP-10-4751. This case in its present state, leaves objectionable inferences drawn from the ruling on the state docket of cases that raise question of a perceived constitutional, substantive and procedural error of law, that not governed in accordance with the expressly written English language governing the American society and the State of South Carolina constitution or the supporting memorandum of law, by precedents

**ADDITIONAL QUESTION PRESENTED**

3. The case of the honorable Doyet A Early III is supposed to be taken on its face as liberally being construed. Given reasons to believe the ruling is purely speculated and merely presumed is based on the fact that such ruling is not supported by any legal conclusion of law, the applicable law enforcement or agency with the supporting memorandum of law. How is this petitioner (that does not practice at law each day) supposed to liberally construe the adjudicators ruling which is not substantially supported by evidence or by law memorandum, when the fact a discriminative and or prejudicial remark to Mr. Wesley Edward Smith III is when the order itself says on the face "dismissed with prejudice", not considered unbiased constitutionally, substantively and procedurally which are the relevant requirement related which affords the protections of due process, not an error of law

Sincerely, Person of legal Interest in that case

  
Wesley Edward Smith III

**PROOF OF SERVICE**

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
In The Supreme Court

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APPEAL FROM CHARLESTON COUNTY  
Court of Common Pleas

Doyet A. Early, Circuit Court Judge

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November 29, 2007

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Case No. 2003-CP-10-4751

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Mr. Wesley Edward Smith, III

Petitioner

v.

Charleston County School District, et al,

Respondent

Below is the petitioner additional question in support of consideration concerning the court granting Writ of Certiorari and Informal Brief, petitioning, appealing, opposing and dissenting the lower case ruling of case 2003-CP-10-4751. This case in its present state, leaves objectionable inferences drawn from the ruling on the state docket of cases that raise question of a perceived constitutional, substantive and procedural error of law, that not governed in accordance with the expressly written English language governing the American society and the State of South Carolina constitution or the supporting memorandum of law, by precedents.

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says on the face "dismissed with prejudice", not considered unbiased constitutionally, substantively and procedurally which are the relevant requirement related which affords the protections of due process, not an error of law

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PROOF OF SERVICE


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I, Mr. Wesley Edward Smith, III on 3 November 2014 submits supporting legal memorandum of law, the Petitioner Additional constitutional question to support granting his Writ of Certiorari Notice to proceed Informa Pauperis based on the court rule for granting such entrances or acceptances and Informal brief and notice of court orders on review, by first class mail to all parties represented as listed in this action to the following;

To; Mr. Daniel Frank Blanchard III  
151 Meeting Street 3rd floor  
Charleston, South Carolina 29403

November 3 2014

Respectfully Submitted

  
Mr. Wesley Edward Smith III  
465 N. Nassau Street  
Charleston, South Carolina 29403  
(843) 723-8598 Pro Se

# EXHIBIT B

## **SECTION 24. Victims' Bill of Rights**

(A) To preserve and protect victims' rights to justice and due process regardless of race, sex, age, religion, or economic status, victims of crime have the right to

- (1) be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity, and to be free from intimidation, harassment, or abuse, throughout the criminal and juvenile justice process, and informed of the victim's constitutional rights, provided by statute,
- (2) be reasonably informed when the accused or convicted person is arrested, released from custody, or has escaped;
- (3) be informed of and present at any criminal proceedings which are dispositive of the charges where the defendant has the right to be present,
- (4) be reasonably informed of and be allowed to submit either a written or oral statement at all hearings affecting bond or bail,
- (5) be heard at any proceeding involving a post-arrest release decision, a plea, or sentencing;
- (6) be reasonably protected from the accused or persons acting on his behalf throughout the criminal justice process,
- (7) confer with the prosecution, after the crime against the victim has been charged, before the trial or before any disposition and informed of the disposition;
- (8) have reasonable access after the conclusion of the criminal investigation to all documents relating to the crime against the victim before trial;
- (9) receive prompt and full restitution from the person or persons convicted of the criminal conduct that caused the victim's loss or injury, including both adult and juvenile offenders;
- (10) be informed of any proceeding when any post-conviction action is being considered, and be present at any post-conviction hearing involving a post-conviction release decision;
- (11) a reasonable disposition and prompt and final conclusion of the case;
- (12) have all rules governing criminal procedure and the admissibility of evidence in all criminal proceedings protect victims' rights and have these rules subject to amendment or repeal by the legislature to ensure protection of these rights

(B) Nothing in this section creates a civil cause of action on behalf of any person against any public employee, public agency, the State, or any agency responsible for the enforcement of rights and provision of services contained in this section. The rights created in this section may be subject to a writ of mandamus, to be issued by any justice of the Supreme Court or circuit court judge to require compliance by any public employee, public agency, the State, or any agency responsible for the enforcement of the rights and provisions of these services contained in this section, and a wilful failure to comply with a writ of mandamus is punishable as contempt.

(C) For purposes of this section:

- (1) A victim's exercise of any right granted by this section is not grounds for dismissing any criminal proceeding or setting aside any conviction or sentence

(2) "Victim" means a person who suffers direct or threatened physical, psychological, or financial harm as the result of the commission or attempted commission of a crime against him. The term "victim" also includes the person's spouse, parent, child, or lawful representative of a crime victim who is deceased, who is a minor or who is incompetent or who was a homicide victim or who is physically or psychologically incapacitated.

(3) The General Assembly has the authority to enact substantive and procedural laws to define, implement, preserve, and protect the rights guaranteed to victims by this section, including the authority to extend any of these rights to juvenile proceedings.

(4) The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights for victims shall not be construed to deny or disparage others granted by the General Assembly or retained by victims. (1998 Act No. 259 )

**SECTION 25. Hunting and fishing**

The traditions of hunting and fishing are valuable parts of the state's heritage, important for conservation, and a protected means of managing nontreatened wildlife. The citizens of this State have the right to hunt, fish, and harvest wildlife traditionally pursued, subject to laws and regulations promoting sound wildlife conservation and management as prescribed by the General Assembly. Nothing in this section shall be construed to abrogate any private property rights, existing state laws or regulations, or the state's sovereignty over its natural resources.

HISTORY 2011 Act No. 20, Section 1, eff May 5, 2011.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA )  
 )  
COUNTY OF CHARLESTON )  
  
WESLEY SMITH, )  
 )  
Plaintiff, )  
 )  
-vs )  
 )  
CHARLESTON COUNTY SCHOOL )  
DISTRICT and MR. TOWNSEND, )  
 )  
Defendants. )

THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS  
NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT  
CASE NO. 03-CP-10-4751

ORDER

FILED  
2007 NOV 29 PM 3:39  
JULIE J. ARMSTRONG  
CLERK OF COURT

This matter came before this Court for a hearing on November 9, 2007, involving the Motion for Sanctions filed on October 10, 2007 by the Defendants Charleston County School District (hereinafter "CCSD") and Anderson Townsend (hereinafter "Townsend") pursuant to S.C. R. CIV. PRO. 11(a) and S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-36-10 *et seq.* (South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanctions Act).

Daniel F. Blanchard, III of Rosen, Rosen & Hagood, LLC appeared for the Defendants. Plaintiff Wesley Smith appeared *pro se*. After considering the arguments and submissions of the parties, this Court hereby makes the following findings of fact and/or conclusions of law:

PROCEDURAL & FACTUAL BACKGROUND

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1. This lawsuit arises out of Plaintiff Wesley Smith's (hereinafter "Smith") termination from employment with the CCSD on November 29, 2001. The CCSD had hired Mr. Smith for the 2001-02 school year to work as a tactical officer at the Military Magnet School. Anderson Townsend was the principal at the school and was Mr. Smith's direct supervisor.

2. Following his termination, Mr. Smith initiated this lawsuit on November 14, 2003 through his legal counsel (Chalmers Johnson, Esquire and Bonnie Hunt, Esquire). His original

Complaint against the CCSD<sup>1</sup> included, *inter alia*, claims for slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages against the CCSD. The CCSD filed a Motion to Dismiss on December 15, 2003 asserting that the claims for slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages against the CCSD are barred as a matter of law under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-78-110 *et seq.*

3. By Consent Order filed on June 14, 2004, Mr. Smith voluntarily withdrew his claims for slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages against the CCSD and agreed to submit an Amended Complaint removing those claims. On June 23, 2004, Mr. Smith filed an Amended Complaint asserting four causes of action: (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress against Mr. Townsend; (2) breach of contract accompanied by fraudulent intent against the CCSD; (3) breach of contract against the CCSD; and (4) third party interference with a contract against Mr. Townsend.

4. By Order filed on March 20, 2006, Circuit Judge R. Markley Dennis, Jr. granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Defendants as to Mr. Smith's first, second, and fourth causes of action of the Amended Complaint. However, Judge Dennis denied the motion as to the third cause of action for breach of contract against the CCSD on the grounds that it would be premature to dismiss that claim at that point in time, but also granted the CCSD leave to refile the motion after additional discovery was conducted.

5. On May 3, 2006, after conducting additional discovery, the CCSD filed a Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment seeking dismissal of Mr. Smith's single remaining cause of action for breach of contract against the CCSD.

6. On July 19, 2006, without objection from Mr. Smith, Mr. Smith's legal counsel

<sup>1</sup> Although the caption of the original Complaint referred to "Mr. Townsend" as a named defendant, Mr. Smith never served Mr. Townsend with the original Complaint. Mr. Townsend did not answer or respond to the original Complaint.

(Mr. Johnson and Ms. Hunt) were relieved from the case. Mr. Smith did not obtain new counsel, but continued *pro-se*.

7. On January 10, 2007, without a hearing, Circuit Judge Perry Buckner granted Mr. Smith's *ex parte* Motion to Proceed *in forma pauperis*.

8. By Order filed on March 27, 2007, Circuit Judge Deadra L. Jefferson granted the CCSD's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed Mr. Smith's only remaining cause of action for breach of contract against the CCSD.

9. On April 11, 2007, Mr. Smith filed a Motion for Reconsideration involving Judge Jefferson's Order.

10. By Order filed on July 2, 2007, Judge Jefferson denied Mr. Smith's Motion for Reconsideration, thereby ending his claims in the Circuit Court.

11. On July 3, 2007, Mr. Smith filed a Motion to Proceed *in forma pauperis* and a Notice of Appeal with the South Carolina Court of Appeals.

12. On July 18, 2007, Judge Jasper Cureton of the South Carolina Court of Appeals filed an Order denying the Mr. Smith's Motion to Proceed *in forma pauperis*. Additionally, the Clerk of the Court of Appeals wrote Mr. Smith on July 18, 2007 advising him as follows: "The appellant is notified that he must provide an Amended Notice of Appeal, with Proof of Service on opposing counsel, and the One Hundred (\$100.00) dollar Notice of Appeal filing fee within ten (10) days of the date of this letter or it may result in the dismissal of your appeal." Mr. Smith thereafter failed to comply with the Clerk of Court's letter.

13. On August 2, 2007, the Court of Appeals filed an Order dismissing Mr. Smith's appeal. Mr. Smith did not appeal this Order or file a petition to reinstate his appeal.

14. On August 21, 2007, the Court of Appeals filed an Order of Remittitur stating in

part: "No Petition for Reinstatement having been filed in the above matter since issuance of this Court's Order dated August 2, 2007, IT IS SO ORDERED that the above appeal be and hereby is dismissed and REMITTED to the Clerk of Court for Charleston County." This Order was filed with the Circuit Court on August 23, 2007. Mr. Smith did not appeal this Order.

15. Following the dismissal of Mr. Smith's claims in the Circuit Court and the dismissal of his appeal in the Court of Appeals, Mr. Smith has filed numerous pleadings and documents in the Circuit Court in which he attempts to relitigate his same claims against the Defendants. These documents include, but are not limited to, a "Notice of Appeal," "Affidavit of Wesley Edward Smith III," and "Introduction and Plaintiff's Supporting Memorandum" filed on October 2, 2007; an "Amended Certificate of Service" and purported subpoenas *duces tecum* addressed to Mr. Townsend and Dr. Ronald McWhirt (Superintendent of the CCSD) filed on October 4, 2007; a "Motion for New Trial" filed on October 15, 2007; a "Plaintiff's Amended Certificate of Service (Modification)" filed on October 19, 2007; a "Plaintiff's Request: Motion for Subpoena Production of Documents (*duces tecum*) to Support Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial" filed on November 1, 2007; a "Plaintiff's Notice of Motion for Monetary Relief of Summary Judgment Order Against Defendant and Sanctions with Memorandum and Law Argument to Support Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial" dated November 5, 2007; and a "Plaintiff's Supporting Memorandum to the Record for Sanction Levied Against the Defense in this Action" dated November 8, 2007.

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16. In the above-referenced pleadings and documents, Mr. Smith attempts to relitigate claims based on the same facts and events at issue in his Amended Complaint, which was previously dismissed, and further attempts to assert multiple new causes of action or legal theories against the CCSD based on the same events and factual allegations at issue in Mr.

Smith's original claims. As examples, the pleadings entitled "Introduction and Plaintiff's Supporting Memorandum," "Motion for New Trial," and "Plaintiff's Amended Certificate of Service (Modification)" request a judgment against the CCSD for monetary damages in the amount of ~~\$3.5 million for alleged defamation~~, damages in the amount of ~~\$600,000.00~~ under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, and punitive damages ~~of \$3.5 million based on~~ events surrounding his termination from the CCSD.

17. On October 10, 2007, the Defendants filed a Motion for Sanctions pursuant to S.C. R. CIV. PRO. 11(a) and S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-36-10 *et seq.* and also filed an Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Award of Sanctions.

18. As reflected above, Mr. Smith has continued to file pleadings attempting to relitigate his claims even after service of the Defendants' Motion for Sanctions.

#### LAW & ANALYSIS

19. "Where there has been an appeal, 'final disposition of the case' occurs when the remittitur is filed in the circuit court." McDowell v. S.C. Dept' of Soc. Serv., 300 S.C. 24, 386 S.E.2d 280 (Ct. App. 1989); *see Christy v. Christy*, 317 S.C. 145 452 S.E.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1994) ("The final disposition of a case occurs when the remittitur is returned by the clerk of the appellate court and filed in the lower court. Until that time, the case is pending on appeal").

20. By virtue of the Court of Appeals's Order dismissing Mr. Smith's appeal and the remittitur sending the case back to the Circuit Court, the prior Circuit Court Orders granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendants as to all of Mr. Smith's causes of action are final and the case has been finally disposed of. Mr. Smith's claims against the Defendants have been ended and are final.

21. "Matters decided by the appellate court cannot be reheard, reconsidered, or

~~relitigated in the trial court, even under the guise of a different form~~" Ackerman v. McMillan, 324 S.C. 440, 477 S.E.2d 267 (Ct. App. 1996). "The decision of the appellate court is final as to all questions decided" and "[i]t is the duty of the trial court to follow the decision of the appellate court." Id.

22. Although Mr. Smith is *pro se*, ~~this is not an excuse for filing frivolous pleadings with the Court and continuing a frivolous action.~~ Goodson v. American Bankers Ins. Co., 295 S.C. 400, 368 S.E.2d 687, 689 (Ct. App. 1988) (~~"Lack of familiarity with legal proceedings is unacceptable and the court will not hold a layman to any lesser standard than is applied to an attorney."~~); McCall v. A-T-O Inc., 276 S.C. 143, 276 S.E.2d 529, 530 (1981) (~~"The South Carolina Supreme Court 'has never held laymen to a lesser standard than attorneys.'"~~)

23. S.C. R. CIV. PRO. 11(a) provides that "[t]he signature of an attorney or party [on a pleading] constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay." Rule 11(a) further states that "[i]f a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this Rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, may impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee."

24. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-36-10(A)(4) of the South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanctions Act also states as follows:

(A)(4) An attorney or pro se litigant participating in a civil or administrative action or defense may be sanctioned for:

(a) filing a frivolous pleading, motion, or document if:

~~relitigated in the trial court even under the guise of a different form.~~ Ackerman v. McMillan, 324 S.C. 440, 477 S.E.2d 267 (Ct. App. 1996). "The decision of the appellate court is final as to all questions decided" and "[i]t is the duty of the trial court to follow the decision of the appellate court." Id.

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24. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-36-10(A)(4) of the South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanctions Act also states as follows:

(A)(4) An attorney or pro se litigant participating in a civil or administrative action or defense may be sanctioned for:

(a) filing a frivolous pleading, motion, or document if:

- (i) the person has not read the frivolous pleading, motion, or document;
- (ii) a reasonable attorney in the same circumstances would believe that under the facts, his claim or defense was clearly not warranted under existing law and that a good faith or reasonable argument did not exist for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law;
- (iii) a reasonable attorney presented with the same circumstances would believe that the procurement, initiation, continuation, or defense of a civil cause was intended merely to harass or injure the other party; or
- (iv) a reasonable attorney presented with the same circumstances would believe the pleading, motion, or document is frivolous, interposed for merely delay, or merely brought for any purpose other than securing proper discovery, joinder of parties, or adjudication of the claim or defense upon which the proceedings are based;

(b) making frivolous arguments a reasonable attorney would believe were not reasonably supported by the facts; or

(c) making frivolous arguments that a reasonable attorney would believe were not warranted under the existing law or if there is no good faith argument that exists for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.

25. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-36-10(B) & (G) of the Act further state in relevant part:

(B)(1) If a document . . . does not otherwise comply with this section, it must be stricken unless it is . . . amended to comply with this section after the omission is called to the attention of the attorney or the party.

(2) If . . . an attorney or pro se litigant has violated subsection (A)(4), the court, upon its own motion or motion of a party, may impose upon the person in violation any sanction which the court considers just, equitable, and proper under the circumstances.

(G) Sanctions may include:

(1) an order for the party represented by an attorney or pro se litigant to pay the reasonable costs and attorney's fees of the prevailing party under a motion pursuant to this section. Costs shall include, but not be limited to, the following: the time required of the prevailing party by the frivolous proceeding, and travel expenses, mileage, parking, costs of reports, and

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any additional reasonable consequential expenses of the prevailing party resulting from the frivolous proceeding;

(2) an order for the attorney to pay a reasonable fine to the court; or

(3) a directive of a nonmonetary nature, including injunctive relief, designed to deter a future frivolous action or an action in bad faith.

26. This Court finds that, by virtue of Mr. Smith's filing of the above-referenced pleadings and documents with this Court following the dismissal of his appeal, Mr. Smith has improperly attempted to relitigate claims based on the same facts and events at issue in his Amended Complaint, which was previously dismissed, and has further attempted to assert multiple new causes of action or legal theories against the CCSD based on the same operative events and factual allegations that were raised in his previous claims.

27. Additionally, this Court finds that Mr. Smith has attempted to relitigate claims for slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages against the CCSD in direction contravention of the Consent Order filed on June 14, 2004 (in which Mr. Smith withdrew the exact same claims from this case) and when such claims are clearly barred as a matter of law under the provisions of the South Carolina Tort Claims Act

28. This Court further finds that Mr. Smith has asserted and continued to assert claims that are frivolous, baseless, and which are clearly barred under existing law, are not warranted under existing law, are not supported by the facts or the law, and are not supported by good grounds. This Court further finds that Mr. Smith has continued to pursue these baseless and frivolous claims against the Defendants without a good ground for doing so; for the purpose of harassing or injuring the Defendants; for the purpose of delay; and/or for a purpose other than that of securing proper discovery, joinder of parties, or adjudication of the claim.

29. This Court finds that, as a direct result of Mr. Smith's actions and these frivolous

proceedings, the Defendants have incurred attorney's fees and litigation costs in defending against the claims. Defendants have submitted an affidavit of counsel supporting an award of \$1,480.00 in attorney's fees and \$25.00 in court costs, or a total of \$1,505.00.

30. Based on the factors enumerated in Baron Data Systems, Inc. v. Loter, 297 S.C. 382, 377 S.E.2d 296 (1989), and this Court's review of the file in this litigation, the difficulty of the services rendered, the time necessarily expended, the result accomplished, the professional standing of counsel, and fees customarily charged in this area for similar legal services, this Court finds that an award of \$1,505.00 in attorney's fees and costs is reasonable and appropriate.

31. As observed in the unpublished opinion in Gobbi v. SunTrust Mortgage, Op. No. 2006-UP-243 (S.C. Ct. App. filed May 16, 2006), and based on S.C. R. CIV. PRO. 63, this Court has jurisdiction to review and reverse Judge Buckner's prior Order filed on January 10, 2007 granting Mr. Smith's *ex parte* Motion to Proceed *in forma pauperis*. Judge Buckner is no longer assigned to this judicial circuit.

32. In Gobbi, the Court of Appeals held that a judge may deny a party *in forma pauperis* status based on a specific finding that the party has repeatedly filed abusive and frivolous pleadings. See also In re Maxton, 325 S.C. 3, 478 S.E.2d 679, 679 (1996). This Court finds that Mr. Smith has repeatedly filed pleadings and documents in this Court involving the same matters that are frivolous, non-meritorious, and abusive of the litigation process. Accordingly, this Court finds that Judge Buckner's prior Order granting *in forma pauperis* status to Mr. Smith should be reversed and rescinded because of Mr. Smith's repetitive filings that are frivolous, non-meritorious, and abusive.

33. Further, as held in Judge Cureton's Order filed on July 18, 2007, which denied Mr. Smith's motion to proceed *in forma pauperis* in the Court of Appeals, Mr. Smith has the

*SP500  
TRIAL*  
burden of showing that his right to proceed *in forma pauperis* rests upon a statute or a

fundamental constitutional right. No such right exists in this case. Therefore, this Court finds

that Mr. Smith has failed to demonstrate the necessary prerequisites for proceeding *in forma*

*pauperis*. See *Ex parte: Martin v. State*, 321 S.C. 533, 471 S.E.2d 134 (1995) (motions to

proceed *in forma pauperis* may be granted only when specifically authorized by statute or

required by constitutional provisions).

### CONCLUSION

Based on the above findings of fact and/or conclusions of law, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendants' Motion for Sanctions filed on October 10, 2007 is hereby GRANTED; and

FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Plaintiff Wesley Smith is hereby ordered to pay \$1,505.00 to the Defendant Charleston County School District as a monetary sanction for filing frivolous pleadings and documents with this Court; and

FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Plaintiff Wesley Smith's frivolous pleadings are hereby stricken and dismissed with prejudice, including the "Notice of Appeal," "Affidavit of Wesley Edward Smith III," and "Introduction and Plaintiff's Supporting Memorandum" filed on October 2, 2007; the "Amended Certificate of Service" and purported subpoenas *duces tecum* filed on October 4, 2007; the "Motion for New Trial" filed on October 15, 2007; the "Plaintiff's Amended Certificate of Service (Modification)" filed on October 19, 2007; the "Plaintiff's Request: Motion for Subpoena Production of Documents (*duces tecum*) to Support Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial" filed on November 1, 2007; the "Plaintiff's Notice of Motion for Monetary Relief of Summary Judgment Order Against Defendant and Sanctions with Memorandum and Law Argument to Support Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial" dated November

5, 2007; the "Plaintiff's Supporting Memorandum to the Record for Sanction Levied Against the Defense in this Action" dated November 8, 2007; and any other pleadings filed after the dismissal of the Plaintiff's claims that attempt to relitigate the same facts, events, or claims; and

FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the prior Order filed in this Court on January 10, 2007, which granted Plaintiff Wesley Smith's Motion to Proceed *in forma*


*pauperis*, is hereby rescinded and canceled; and

FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Plaintiff Wesley Smith is hereby enjoined, restrained, and prohibited from filing any new or further lawsuits, complaints, pleadings, motions, petitions, writs, or other similar documents in this Court that seek money damages or other legal or equitable relief arising from the same facts or events referenced in the Complaint filed in this case on November 14, 2003 or in the Amended Complaint filed in this case on June 23, 2004; and


FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Clerk of Court shall serve a copy of this Order upon all parties to this action and shall note or record in the file of this case that Plaintiff Wesley Smith's claims have been disposed of and are final; and

FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that willful disobedience of the non-monetary requirements of this Order by any party to this action shall constitute contempt of Court subjecting the offending party to an appropriate penalty or punishment; and



AND IT IS SO ORDERED!

  
The Honorable Doyet A. Early, III  
Presiding Circuit Court Judge

Bamberg, South Carolina.  
This 20<sup>th</sup> day of November, 2007.

ALBERT G. JULIE ARMSTRONG  
JULIE J. ARMSTRONG (SEAL)  
CLERK, C.P., G.S. & F.C.  
By   
DEPUTY CLERK

Mr. Wesley Edward Smith III  
465 N, Nassau Street  
Charleston, South Carolina 29403



Honorable Jenny A. Kitchen  
South Carolina Court of Appeals  
1015 Sumter Street  
Columbia, South Carolina 29201

29201 83748 0376

