

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE SUPREME COURT

---

Certiorari to Horry County

Edward B. Cottingham, Circuit Court Judge

---

Opinion No. 2014-UP-348 (S.C. Ct. App. filed 10/1/2014)

12-GS-26-00730

---

THE STATE,

RESPONDENT,

V.

ANTHONY JACKSON,

PETITIONER

---

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI  
TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

---

DAVID ALEXANDER  
Appellate Defender

South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense  
Division of Appellate Defense  
PO Box 11589  
Columbia, S. C. 29211-1589  
(803) 734-1343

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER.

**RECEIVED**

JAN 12 2015

**SC Court of Appeals**

INDEX

INDEX.....1  
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL.....2  
QUESTIONS PRESENTED.....3  
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.....4  
ARGUMENT .....5  
CONCLUSION .....21

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

Counsel for petitioner certifies that the petition for rehearing was made and finally ruled on by the Court of Appeals on 12/12/2014.

## QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1.

When a defendant alerts the court he wishes to represent himself, may the court postpone the exercise of his constitutional right until after critical stages of the trial?

2.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's ruling that the defendant freely and voluntarily gave a statement to law enforcement after the police officer threatened the defendant that "there would be a difference" in his treatment if he failed to cooperate?

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On February 23, 2012, an Horry County grand jury indicted Anthony Jerome Jackson (“Jackson”) for first degree burglary. R. 387. On April 5, 2012, a hearing was held before the Honorable Larry B. Hyman. April 5, 2012 R. 1. At this hearing, Jackson was represented by Ronald W. Hazzard. April 5, 2012 R. 1. Martin D. Spratlin and Bradley C. Richardson represented the State. April 5, 2012 R. 1. On September 12, 2012, another hearing was held in the case before the Honorable J. Derham Cole. September 12, 2012 R. 17. At this hearing, Eric J. Fox represented Jackson. September 12, 2012 R. 17.

On October 11, 2012, another pretrial hearing was held before the Honorable Edward B. Cottingham. October 11, 2012 R. 31. Fox represented Jackson. At this hearing, Judge Cottingham ruled, *inter alia*, that a statement given by Jackson to law enforcement was admissible. October 11, 2012 R. 64, ll. 9 – 25.

On November 13-15, 2012, Jackson was tried before Judge Cottingham and a jury. R. 68. Martin D. Spratlin and Joshua D. Holford represented the State. R. 68. Eric Fox initially appeared on behalf of Jackson, but Jackson represented himself during the trial. R. 68. R. 146, l. 20 – 148, l. 1. The jury convicted Jackson of first degree burglary. R. 377, l. 24 – 378, l. 6. The State previously served a notice of intent to seek life without parole on Jackson and this was the sentence he received. R. 382, l. 18 – 384, l. 9. Jackson appealed.

On September 10, 2014, a panel of the Court of Appeals consisting of Chief Judge Few, Judge Thomas, and Judge Lockemy heard oral argument. App. 1. On October 1, 2014, the court issued an unpublished *per curiam* opinion affirming appellant’s conviction. App. 1. Jackson’s petition for rehearing was denied on December 12, 2014. App. 13. This petition follows.

## ARGUMENT

1.

When a defendant alerts the court he wishes to represent himself, the court may not postpone the exercise of his constitutional right until after critical stages of the trial.

### Reasons for Granting Certiorari

Since this case presents a novel issue of constitutional law, compelling reasons exist for granting certiorari. Rule 242(b)(1) and (4), SCACR. The Court of Appeals recognized this case presents a novel constitutional issue. In its unpublished opinion, the court stated, “**While South Carolina courts have not ruled on this specific issue**, we discovered no cases explicitly prohibiting a trial court from delaying its ruling on a *Faretta*<sup>1</sup> motion.” App. 2 (emphasis added). This Court should take up this important issue and provide guidance for the lower courts when they are confronted with a defendant asserting his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself.

### Relevant Facts

From the very beginning of this case, Anthony Jerome Jackson (“Jackson”) told the court he was unhappy with his attorney. R. 15, ll. 12 – 22. At an April 5, 2012, hearing, Jackson attempted to plead guilty. R. 11, ll. 6 – 9. Jackson – not his attorney – begged the trial judge to accept a plea deal offered by the State that would result in a sentence of between seven and ten years, but asked to delay sentencing for two weeks so that he could finish his GED classes at the county jail. R. 8, ll. 7 – 9, l. 12. Judge Hyman agreed. R. 9, ll. 11 – 12. But during the plea colloquy when Jackson told Judge Hyman that he was dissatisfied with the services of his attorney, the plea hearing stopped. R. 15, ll. 12 – 23. Jackson ultimately went to trial. He was accused of stealing a credit card from a hotel room in Myrtle Beach. R. 175, l. 2 – 176, l. 15. He received a sentence of life imprisonment

without the possibility of parole for taking a credit card and using it to buy \$28.89 worth of food from a pancake house for himself and other homeless people. R. 315, l. 11 – 316, l. 13. R. 311, ll. 6 – 21.

*The September 12, 2012, Hearing Before Judge Cole*

After the hearing before Judge Hyman, Jackson next appeared before Judge Cole with a different lawyer, Eric Fox (“Fox”). R. 20, ll. 8 – 9. Jackson told Judge Cole that he did not understand the reason he was before the court that day. R. 20, ll. 10 – 13. Judge Cole told Jackson about a plea offer extended by the State. R. 20 l. 14 – 21 l. 13. When asked if he had enough time to confer with Fox about whether to accept the State’s offer, Jackson replied, “No, I ain’t had that much time; it just came and just proposed it to me and that was it.” R. 21, ll. 15 – 20.

Fox was a public defender appointed when Jackson’s previous attorney took a position in another county. R. 22, ll. 2 – 11. By the time of this hearing, the State’s offer had changed to a plea that would result in a sentence of zero to fifteen years’ imprisonment. R. 23, l. 19 – 24, l. 17. Jackson was confused about the offers and his charges. R. 26, l. 10 – 27, l. 17. After answering the court that he understood English “[a] little bit,” Judge Cole told him, “Okay, all right, you don’t want to accept the offer; you want a trial; you want a jury trial? Take him back and we’ll give him a jury trial.” R., 19 23 – 12, l. 2. Before removing Jackson, the State served him with a notice of intent to seek life without parole. R. 28, ll. 5 – 22. Fox never said a word during the entire hearing.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).

<sup>2</sup> The transcript records Fox speaking on page 9, but this is a typographical error. It is clear from the text that the solicitor is speaking because he refers to “Mr. Fox” several times. R.25, l. 10 – 26, l. 9.

*The Denno Hearing Before Judge Cottingham*

Fox represented Jackson at a pretrial hearing held before Judge Cottingham on October 11, 2012. R. 31. The original purpose of the hearing was to determine whether a statement given by Jackson was admissible pursuant to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). Before the Denno hearing began, Fox told Judge Cottingham that Jackson wanted to address the court. R. 39, ll. 3 – 9. Jackson first told the court he wanted a different lawyer. R. 39, ll. 19 – 20. Jackson had two pending burglary charges. R. 39, l. 19 – 40, l. 1. Jackson stated, “I was talking to [Fox] out there in the conference room and he don’t even know which burglary that I’m going to trial on....” R.39, l. 23 – 40, l. 1. Jackson said, “I’m not satisfied with my counsel.” R. 40, ll. 14 – 15.

Judge Cottingham then attempted to convince Jackson that Fox was a very capable attorney and that he needed representation. R. 40, ll. 16 – 12, l. 41. Jackson replied, “I don’t want him on my case.” R. 42, l. 12. Judge Cottingham replied, “Well, I don’t care what you want, **the decision is mine.**” R. 42, ll. 13 – 14 (emphasis added). Jackson replied, “Let the record be known that I don’t want him on my case.” R. 42, ll. 15 – 16. Judge Cottingham responded, “Well, let the record be known too, that I offered you to represent yourself or hire your own lawyer. Absent that, Mr. Fox is going to be your lawyer.” R. 42, ll. 17 – 19.

The trial judge then conducted a colloquy with the attorneys and discussed a plea offer. R. 43, l. 21 – 44, l. 45. Judge Cottingham asked Jackson to confirm whether he had declined a previous plea offer. R. 44, ll. 10 – 15. Jackson replied, “I don’t even understand what he’s still on my case. I don’t understand –” R. 44, l. 16 – 17. The trial judge told Jackson, “I’m not asking you now.” R. 44, l. 18. Without inquiring further as to whether Jackson wanted to represent himself or conducting a colloquy pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), Judge Cottingham conducted the Denno hearing with Fox representing Jackson. R.45, l. 21 – 46, l. 7.

Fox cross-examined the State's witness at the Denno hearing. R. 60, l. 12 – 62, l. 16. Fox made a limited argument supporting his motion to suppress the statement. R. 63, ll. 13 – 23. The trial court refused to suppress the statement. R.64, ll. 8 – 25. The trial judge concluded the hearing by urging Jackson to cooperate with Fox, but telling him that he was “not entitled to have the benefit of his advice every day between now and date of trial.” R. 65, ll. 11 – 24.

*The Issue of Jackson's Self-Representation at Trial*

After the solicitor called the case, Fox told Judge Cottingham that Jackson wanted to address the court. R. 75, ll. 14 – 15. Jackson told the trial judge that he did not want Fox representing him. R. 75, ll. 19 – 22. Jackson said, “I'll represent myself.” R. 75, ll. 19 – 22.

The trial judge attempted to convince Jackson to keep Fox as his attorney. R. 76, l. 1 – 10, l. 12. Jackson replied:

**I'll represent myself, I rather represent myself. If I'm going to get life I rather get take, get life for myself, I don't need no help.**

R. 77, ll. 13 – 15 (emphasis added). The trial judge then asked Jackson several questions about his ability to represent himself and whether he was prepared for trial. R. 77, l. 19 – 81, l. 9. Judge Cottingham warned Jackson that it would be “extremely dangerous in this most serious offense for you to represent yourself.” R. 78, ll. 18 – 20. He told Jackson he was facing life imprisonment. R. 78, l. 17 – 24.

The discussion regarding Jackson's self-representation ceased when the trial judge was unable to get a copy of the Faretta decision from the solicitor. R. 81, ll. 9 – 13. Judge Cottingham said, “Okay, well let's go ahead, be finding it and let's go ahead with the other issue while your staff is finding the case for me. All right let's go forward with the identification matter.” R. 81, l. 25 –

82, l. 3. The trial judge said, “Mr. Fox, I’m going to leave you in the case for this important matter.” R. 83, ll. 12 – 13.

The court then ruled:

And after this after I hear any motions if he still wants to represent himself I’m going to let him do it in his peril. I would urge him not to do it but the law is clear if he insists he’s got that right, but I do want you [Fox] to stay with him **in this important part of the proceedings** to protect his interest.

R. 83, ll. 15 – 20 (emphasis added). The State’s first witness was sworn for a Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972) hearing. Before the State questioned the witness, the following occurred:

THE COURT: Mr. Jackson, I’ll deal with whether or not you want to represent yourself after this but –

DEFENDANT JACKSON: I still do.

THE COURT: This is [an] important legal matter that you need your lawyer to look into.

DEFENDANT JACKSON: **I’ll represent myself, I don’t need him, I don’t trust him.**

THE COURT: **Well I’ll deal with that in a minute.**

R. 83, l. 24 – 84, l. 7 (emphasis added). The court then conducted the Biggers hearing with Fox representing Jackson and questioning the witnesses. R. 84, l. 12 – 126, l. 6.

During the Biggers hearing, the State presented the testimony of a Myrtle Beach police officer and a waitress at the pancake house. R. 84, ll. 14 – 16. R. 99 ll. 15 – 20. The police officer, Jeffery Thomas (“Thomas”) responded to a call of a suspicious person at a hotel. R. 85, l. 17 – 21. The officer spoke with the occupants of the room and obtained a description of the man who entered the room claiming to be a hotel security guard. R. 85, l. 22 – 21, l. 12. He also viewed the hotel security video. R. 88, ll. 13 – 89, l. 4. One of the room’s occupants told the officer that his credit card had been used twice at the pancake house. R. 89, ll. 5 – 15. The officer went to the pancake

house and spoke with the waitress, Tara Maenner (“Maenner”). R. 90, ll. 1 – 13. Maenner provided copies of credit card receipts showing charges to the victim’s account and gave the officer a description of the man who used the credit card. R. 90, ll. 1 – 23.

Officer Thomas went outside and “spotted someone fitting the description a half block away.” R. 91, ll. 2 – 8. He detained Jackson. R. 91, ll. 2 – 8. Officer Thomas had another policeman bring Maenner to the scene and said she “did positively identify him.” R. 92, ll. 15 – 22. At this point, Fox objected. R. 92, l. 23. Jackson interjected, “Can he ask did the victims identify me?” R. 92, ll. 24 – 25. Judge Cottingham told Jackson, “No, sir, you let your lawyer do this at this time, proceed.” R. 93, ll. 1 – 2. Fox then cross-examined Officer Thomas. R. 94, l. 8 – 98, l. 2.

Maenner testified she recognized the defendant because he had been in the pancake house “a time or two.” R. 100, ll. 3 – 16. She gave an in-court identification of Jackson. R. 104, ll. 2 – 23. Fox then cross-examined Maenner. R. 104, l. 24 – 106, l. 12. The State also called the hotel room’s two occupants who could not positively identify Jackson as the man who entered their room. R. 107, l. 7 – 125, l. 1. Fox conducted the cross-examinations. R. 107, l. 7 – 125, l. 1. After hearing argument from Fox (not Jackson), the trial court refused to suppress Maenner’s in-court identification. R. 125, l. 22 – 126, l. 6.

By the end of the Biggers hearing, the court had obtained copies of several cases to use in questioning Jackson and in advising him regarding the dangers of self-representation. R. 126, l. 9 – 127, l. 21. The trial judge conducted an extended discussion with Jackson. R. 127, l. 20 – 140, l. 19. After the discussion, the court said that it had “exhaustively warned [Jackson] of the dangers” and asked if he still wanted to represent himself. R. 140, ll. 20 – 25. Jackson said, “Yes, sir, I represent, I don’t understand what’s going on but I, I’ll talk for myself.” R. 141, ll. 1 – 3. After further discussion, during which Jackson offered to plead guilty even if it meant life without parole,

the trial judge ruled, “No, sir, we are going to trial. I’m going to let you represent yourself.” R. 141 l. 4 – 142, l. 21.

The jury entered the courtroom. R. 146, ll. 16 – 19. The trial judge told the jury that Jackson would represent himself and they could not make any adverse inference from that fact. R. 147 ll. 9 – 13. Despite his ruling that Jackson would represent himself and informing the jury of this ruling, the trial judge then had Fox participate in voir dire instead of Jackson. R. 148, l. 2 – 88, l. 20. Jackson did not speak during voir dire. R. 148, l. 2 – 155, l. 20. At no point did the trial judge ask Jackson whether he wanted to represent himself during voir dire. R. 148, l. 2 – 155, l. 20. Without obtaining Jackson’s assent on the record, Judge Cottingham said, “All right, Mr. Fox, I’ve permitted you to sit here and assist the defendant in the selection of the jury only, but do you have any further inquiry?” R. 154, l. 17 – 19. Fox then proposed an additional voir dire question. R. 154, ll. 20 – 23.

After voir dire, the trial judge told the jury, “And the defendant is representing himself, I’ve asked Mr. Fox to assist in the selection of the jury process and the defendant is agreeing to that; is that correct? R. 155, ll. 13 – 16. Fox (not Jackson) replied, “Yes, Your Honor.” R. 155, l. 17. The trial judge did not obtain Jackson’s consent to Fox selecting the jury on the record. Fox then exercised Jackson’s strikes and selected the jury. R. 155, l. 18 – 165, l. 18. The trial then began and Jackson made his opening statement and examined the State’s witnesses. R. 179, l. 11 – 180, l. 8.

### *The Evidence at Trial*

Two golfers from Pennsylvania and Connecticut were awakened in their Myrtle Beach hotel room by a man entering through the room’s sliding glass door. R. 181, ll. 1 – 3. R. 181, ll. 17 – 24. R. 182, ll. 7 – 15. R. 187, l. 20 – 189, l. 8. The man told them he was with hotel security. R. 188 l, ll. 5 – 10. He shined a light and showed them a badge. R. 188, ll. 11 – 13. The man called the front

desk and said everything was “all clear.” R. 188, l. 17 – 19. He had the golfer lock the sliding glass door and then exited the room. R. 188, ll. 19 – 22. The golfer noticed that the man picked up a pair of pants and left the room with them. R. 188, ll. 22 – 24.

The golfer gave chase. R. 188, ll. 24 – 25. The man told the golfer he had heard that marijuana was being consumed in the room and was checking the pants for drugs. R. 188, l. 24 – 189, l. 5. The golfer took the man back to the room. R. 189, ll. 1 – 8. The man looked around and then left. R. 189, ll. 5 – 6. Once the man left, one of the golfers noticed his wallet was missing. R. 189, ll. 6 – 8. Neither golfer could identify Jackson as the man they encountered in their room. R. 200, l. 22 – 201, l. 8. R. 216, ll. 7 – 8.

By the time the police arrived, the golfer was already on the telephone canceling his credit cards. R. 197, l. 18 – 198, l. 1. As he was canceling a card, the company informed him the card had just been used at a nearby pancake house. R. 199, ll. 7 – 20. The golfer informed the police. R. 199, l. 21 – 200, l. 3. As recounted in the Biggers hearing, Officer Thomas went to the pancake house, met with the waitress, and subsequently arrested Jackson. R. 221, l. 14 – 223, l. 14.

The morning following his arrest, Jackson was questioned by Detective Paul Clothier (“Clothier”). R. 289, ll. 2 – 11. Detective Clothier made an audio recording of Jackson’s interrogation. R. 290, ll. 1 – 6. During the interrogation, Jackson admitted taking the credit card from the hotel room. R. 313, ll. 12 – 16. The detective confronted Jackson with two charges made at the pancake house which totaled \$28.89. R. 315, ll. 11 – 24. Jackson admitted making the charges on credit cards when he bought food for himself and other homeless people. R. 316, ll. 1 – 16.

Jackson made his own closing argument. R. 350, l. 24 – 352, l. 17. He argued that no one had seen him commit the burglary. R. 351, ll. 9 – 10. Jackson also argued that his statement to law

enforcement was coerced and the police lied to him about the evidence to get him to confess. R. 352, ll. 6 – 10. During deliberations, the jury requested to hear a portion of the audio recording of Jackson’s interrogation. R. 373, ll. 12 – 20. While the trial record does not conclusively show at what point the jury had the recording stopped, the trial judge immediately re-charged them on the law concerning whether a statement is freely and voluntarily made. R. 375, l. 24 – 376, l. 9. After continuing deliberations, the jury returned a guilty verdict. R. 377, l. 24 – 378 11, l. 6.

### **Discussion**

The Court of Appeals erred in deciding that a trial judge may postpone the Sixth Amendment right of self-representation. The trial court refused to let Jackson represent himself during the Denno hearing, the Biggers hearing, voir dire, and jury selection. “The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975). “The right to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails.” Id. at 819-20. “To thrust counsel upon the accused, against his considered wish, thus violates the logic of the Amendment.” Id. at 820.

In Faretta, the defendant “weeks before trial” told the judge he wanted to represent himself. Id. at 835. The trial judge originally ruled that the defendant could represent himself, but later reversed his decision after the defendant was unable to satisfactorily answer technical questions concerning the law. Id. at 808-10. The United States Supreme Court reversed. The Court held, “We need make no assessment of how well or poorly Faretta had mastered the intricacies of the hearsay rule in the California code provisions that govern the challenges of potential jurors on voir dire. For his technical legal knowledge, as such, was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.” Id. at 836.

Just as in Faretta, Jackson told the trial court weeks before trial that he did not want Fox to represent him. R. 44, l. 16 – 17. When the trial court indicated that Fox would conduct the Denno hearing, Jackson said, “I don’t even understand what he’s still on my case. I don’t understand –.”R. 44, l. 16 – 17. This was after the trial judge made an incorrect statement of law and told Jackson the decision of whether he would represent himself was the court’s to make. R. 42, ll. 13 – 14. The trial judge therefore erred when it did not make any further inquiry into Jackson’s desire to represent himself at the Denno hearing and forced Fox’s unwanted representation among him.

Before any substantive portion of the trial began, Jackson made an unequivocal demand that he be allowed to represent himself. Jackson said, “I’ll represent myself, I don’t need [Fox], I don’t trust him.” R. 83, l. 24 – 84, l. 7. “To force a lawyer on a defendant can only lead him to believe that the law contrived against him.” Id. at 834. The trial judge ultimately determined that Jackson would represent himself, but inexplicably refused to allow him to do so until after the Biggers hearing, voir dire, and jury selection. This also was error that requires reversal. State v. Barnes, 704 S.C. 27, 753 S.E.2d 545 (2014).

In Barnes, a capital defendant unequivocally told the trial court that he wanted to represent himself. Id. at 31-34, 753 S.E.2d at 547-49. The trial court refused to allow the defendant to represent himself after his own psychiatrist testified that while he was competent to stand trial, he was not competent to waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id. This Court ruled that no such higher standard of competency exists and reversed. Id. at 4-5. The Court held, “So long as the defendant makes his request prior to trial, the only proper inquiry is that mandated by Faretta.” Id. citing State v. Winkler, 388 S.C. 574, 698 S.E.2d 596 (2010).

No prejudice inquiry or harmless error analysis may be conducted because the erroneous denial of a Faretta request is a structural error. Barnes at 37, 753 S.E.2d at 550-51. See also

McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984). The Barnes Court did not perform any harmless error analysis. Barnes at 37, 753 S.E.2d at 550-51. Once it determined that a Faretta error occurred, it summarily reversed. Id.

Any argument that the Faretta error is not structural in this case must fail because it cannot be disputed that a Denno hearing, Biggers hearing, voir dire, and jury selection are critical portions of the trial. This analysis is similar to that used to determine whether a defendant has a right to be present at any particular stage of a criminal proceeding. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934). A defendant has a guaranteed right to be present at a critical stage of a criminal proceeding when his presence bears on his opportunity to defend his case. Id. at 106. This right extends to voir dire and jury selection. United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 872 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996). It also extends to pretrial hearings where witnesses are questioned. United States v. Hamilton, 391 F.3d 1066, 1071 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2004) (holding suppression hearing where government presented the testimony of a police officer was a critical stage); People v. Williams, 726 N.E.2d 641, 643-44 (Ill. Ct. App. 2000) (“A hearing at which evidence is presented against a defendant involves substantial rights and therefore entitles a defendant to be present); McGinnis v. State, 430 S.E.2d 618, 621-22 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (“Therefore, we hold that it constitutes prejudicial error to conduct an evidentiary suppression hearing in the defendant’s absence.”). The right to be present extends to post-indictment lineups and therefore logically extends to a Biggers hearing. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967) (holding constitutional right to be present extends to post-indictment lineups).

The trial court allowed Jackson to exercise his constitutional right to defend himself, but did so too late. Judge Cottingham warned Jackson of the dangers of self-representation and concluded that he understood them. R. 141, l. 4 – 142, l. 21. However, the record shows no reason

excusing the trial court's refusal to allow Jackson to represent himself when he first informed the Court of his wish to do so. The trial court's decision to force representation upon an unwilling Jackson at critical stages of the trial constitutes a structural error that requires reversal.

The Court of Appeals correctly understood that the right to self-representation is a fundamental right, but erred in concluding that the lack of controlling authority for this exact situation equated to discretion for the trial judge to postpone Jackson's exercise of his fundamental right. This does not constitute an adequate reason to deny appellant relief.

The cases cited by the Court of Appeals do not support the proposition that when the right to self-representation has been asserted, it can be postponed. In Nelson v. Alabama, 292 F.3d 1291 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002), the defendant sent the trial judge a letter informing the court that he wished to represent himself at a capital sentencing proceeding. Id. at 1294. The trial judge allowed the defendant to represent himself without conducting a Faretta hearing. Id. The issue on appeal was whether a Faretta hearing was required, not the postponement of the defendant's right to self-representation. Id. at 1295. At no point did the court force a lawyer upon the defendant. Id.

United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d 553 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) does not concern postponement of the right to self-representation, but a complete denial. In Frazier-El, the trial judge denied the defendant's request to proceed *pro se* because of the defendant's vacillation and dilatory tactics. Id. at 560. The court found the defendant was more interested in "a manipulation of the system than an unequivocal desire to invoke his right of self-representation." Id. The defendant told the court he wanted a new attorney who would argue the court lacked jurisdiction over him because he was a member of the "Moorish Science Temple." Id. Jackson never made any such frivolous statements, his request to represent himself was unequivocal and ultimately granted, albeit too late.

Much of the language in Swan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 77 (Ky. 2012) supports appellant's position. The court stated, "Perhaps more importantly, once a defendant invokes his right to proceed *pro se*, in whole or part, the trial court is required to hold the Faretta hearing and allow the defendant to exercise the right, if at all possible." Swan at 93. The defendant in Swan did not make an unequivocal assertion of his right to represent himself and he abandoned the claim. Id. at 94. At no point of the proceedings did the court force an attorney on the defendant after an unequivocal assertion of the right to self-representation. Id.

Even more supportive of Jackson's case is State v. Madsen, 229 P.3d 714 (Wash. 2010). In Madsen, the trial court deferred the defendant's first request to represent himself to give him the opportunity to consult with another attorney. Madsen at 716. The opinion does not reflect that any proceedings were held after this deferral and the next hearing, which was held for the express reason of determining the defendant's right to proceed *pro se*. Id. In fact, the Madsen court's holding was that the trial court **erred in deferring ruling** at this hearing after the defendant's second request because the defendant's request was unequivocal. Id. at 718-19. The court's holding, which runs expressly counter to the language quoted in the opinion, was:

Although the trial court's duties of maintaining the courtroom and the orderly administration of justice are extremely important, the right to represent oneself is a fundamental right explicitly enshrined in the Washington Constitution and implicitly contained in the United States Constitution. **The value of respecting this right outweighs any resulting difficulty in the administration of justice.**

Id. at 719 (emphasis added). "[P]articipation by standby counsel without the defendant's consent should not be allowed to destroy the jury's perception that the defendant is representing himself." McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 178 (1984). "The defendant's appearance in the status of one conducting his own defense is important in a criminal trial, since the right to appear

*pro se* exists to affirm the accused's individual dignity and autonomy.” Id. This Court should grant certiorari.

2.

The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's ruling that the defendant freely and voluntarily gave a statement to law enforcement after the police officer threatened the defendant that “there would be a difference” in his treatment if he failed to cooperate.

### Relevant Facts

Jackson was arrested at 2:00 AM. R. 51, ll. 1 – 5. At 9:10 AM, Officer Clothier began interrogating Jackson.<sup>3</sup> R. 51, ll. 1 – 5. When asked if he was under the influence of alcohol or drugs, Jackson told Officer Clothier that he “done slept it off.” R. 302, ll. 10 – 12. Officer Clothier did not ask what type of intoxicants Jackson consumed or any other questions related to his intoxication and proceeded to explain to Jackson his rights. R. 302, l. 13 – 303, l. 19. Jackson told Detective Clothier that he did not understand his charges. R. 303, l. 12 – 304, l. 10.

When Jackson told the detective he did not have any credit cards, the officer said the following:

Okay. Well, what were you doing with his credit card then? See, I don't like liars. I'm, I'm trying to help you and—and when somebody is honest with me in an interview I make a note of it when this case gets transferred to the Solicitor's Office. Okay? There's a point where I tell the Solicitor, yeah, he cooperated. **I wouldn't mind you helping him out for, for whatever reason.** I can't promise you that, but that's what I put in there. Okay. **Or I put in there—refused to cooperate. There's a difference, okay? So let's stop with the B.S.** that you asked me for a cigarette and tell me what happened. It's that easy. He's a man, fess up and just tell me what happened. Okay? **It goes a lot easier; it goes quicker if, if you're honest and you tell me what happened.** So let's start all over again. Start from the beginning and tell me what happened. If you want to take your time to gather your thoughts, that's fine. It's—just be a man. Fess

---

<sup>3</sup> The interrogation was transcribed by the court reporter during the trial.

up. It's okay. It's all right. It just shows that you're a man and you're willing to help.

R. 306, l. 17 – 307, l. 11 (emphasis added). Jackson then began talking about entering the hotel room. R. 307, l. 12 – 308, l. 15.

Detective Clothier then lied to Jackson and told him he had a fingerprint match from the hotel balcony. R. 308, l. 16 – 309, l. 3. R. 320, ll. 15 – 19. He also lied and told Jackson he had seen a video of him using the credit card at the pancake house. R. 310, ll. 3 – 10. Jackson told him, "I'm getting nervous." R. 310, l. 1. R. 320, l. 20 – 321, l. 1. Detective Clothier replied, "But if you lie it makes it worse." R. 310, ll. 17 – 18. The officer also told Jackson he would "put in there" that he had a drug problem and "want[ed] some sort of help." R. 314, ll. 4 – 12.

Following Detective Clothier's testimony and the playing of the audio recording, Fox moved to have the statement suppressed. R. 63, ll. 13 – 23. Fox told the court, "I'll go ahead and make the motions, Your Honor, to—the motion, I guess, is to suppress the statement. Your Honor, could make the finding, you heard the testimony as to its voluntariness." R. 63, ll. 13 – 23. Judge Cottingham ruled the statement was admissible and made "without duress, hope or promise." R. 64, ll. 14 – 17.

### **Discussion**

The detective's statement that "There's a difference, okay?" to Jackson was a threat. While police officers may inform suspects that news of their cooperation will be relayed to the solicitor, they may not threaten consequences for the refusal to cooperate. In State v. Osborne, 301 S.C. 363, 392 S.E.2d 178 (1990), the court held that the sheriff's admission that Osborne would be charged with withholding information or giving the police officer a false statement if she was not forthcoming mandated suppression of her confession. Osborne was told "you don't have to say

anything, but if you withhold evidence, you can be charged with a crime.” State v. Osborne, 301 S.C. at 366, 392 S.E.2d at 179. See also State v. Rochester, 301 S.C. 196, 391 S.E.2d 244 (1990).

In Rochester, the Supreme Court held that a confession “may not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, or obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, or by the exertion of improper influence.” Rochester at 200, 391 S.E.2d at 246-47 (internal quotations omitted). The Court found that a polygraph examiner telling the defendant it would be in his best interest to tell the truth was neither a threat nor a promise. This was nonetheless a factor to consider when determining whether appellant’s statement was a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary tendered confession under the totality of the circumstances. See State v. Hook, 348 S.C. 401, 559 S.E.2d 856 (Ct. App. 2001); State v. Peake, 291 S.C. 138, 139, 352 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1987).


In Hook, this Court held that the defendant’s statement to his probation officer was inadmissible because his agent expressly threatened to revoke the defendant’s probationary sentence unless he told the truth. This Court noted that statements given pursuant to threats or under inherently coercive circumstances are not admissible. See Mincey v. Arizona 437 U.S. 385, 398, 399 (1978); Minnesota v. Murphy 465 U.S. 420, 427 (1984).

The officer’s assertion that there would be a “difference” if Jackson failed to cooperate meant that he would be treated more harshly. Jackson clearly felt threatened by this statement. This “difference” in treatment is similar to the threats of consequences in Osborne and Hook. The fact that it was a threat can be seen from its consequences. Immediately after Detective Clothier made this threat, Jackson began making incriminating statements. Detective Clothier’s threat was not “slight” and the Court of Appeals erred in affirming.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant certiorari with the ultimate relief of reversing petitioner's conviction and granting him a new trial.

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'David Alexander', written over a horizontal line.

David Alexander  
Appellate Defender

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER.

This 12th day of January, 2015

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
IN THE SUPREME COURT

---

Certiorari to Horry County  
Edward B. Cottingham, Circuit Court Judge

---

Opinion No. 2014-UP-348 (S.C. Ct. App. filed 10/1/2014)  
12-GS-26-00730

---

**RECEIVED**  
JAN 12 2015  
**SC Court of Appeals**

THE STATE,

RESPONDENT,

v.

ANTHONY JACKSON,


PETITIONER

---

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

---


I certify that a true copy of the petition for writ of certiorari and a copy of the appendix, in this case has been served on Jennifer Ellis Roberts, Esquire, AR Rembert Dennis Building, 1000 Assembly Street, Room 519, Columbia, SC 29201, The S.C. Court of Appeals, and Mr. Anthony Jackson #138454, Lieber Correctional Institution, PO Box 205, Ridgeville, SC 29472, this 12th day of January, 2015.



David Alexander  
Appellate Defender

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 12th day  
of January, 2015.

 (L.S.)

Notary Public for South Carolina  
My Commission Expires: July 3, 2023.