

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE SUPREME COURT

Certiorari to Greenville County

G. Edward Welmaker, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 2014-UP-385 (S.C. Ct. App. filed 11/5/2014)

11-GS-23-7681

RECEIVED

JAN 16 2015

SC Court of Appeals

THE STATE,

RESPONDENT,

V.

RALPH B. HAYES,

PETITIONER

Appellate Case No. 2012-213261

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

SUSAN B. HACKETT
Appellate Defender

South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense
Division of Appellate Defense
PO Box 11589
Columbia, S. C. 29211-1589
(803) 734-1343

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER.

INDEX

INDEX 1

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL.....2

QUESTION PRESENTED3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.....4

ARGUMENT

The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s denial of
Petitioner’s motion for directed verdict where the only evidence
presented by the prosecution was that Petitioner allegedly confided
in a stranger that he was distraught because he saw the deceased
had been murdered in their apartment, but took no action to report
the murder to the police.5

CONCLUSION 18

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

Counsel for Petitioner certifies that the petition for rehearing was made and finally ruled on by the Court of Appeals on December 17, 2014. App. 15-16.

QUESTION PRESENTED

Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the trial judge's denial of Petitioner's motion for directed verdict where the only evidence presented by the prosecution was that Petitioner allegedly confided in a stranger that he was distraught because he saw the deceased had been murdered in their apartment, but took no action to report the murder to the police?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

During its October 2011 term, a Greenville County grand jury indicted Petitioner for murder and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime in a single indictment (2011-GS-23-7681). R. 287. The matter proceeded to trial before the Honorable G. Edward Welmaker and a jury on October 15, 2012. Judy Munson and Wanda Adams represented the state, Caroline Horlbeck and Teal Johnson represented Petitioner. R. 1. The jury convicted Petitioner of both charges. R. 281, lines 7 – 15. Judge Welmaker sentenced Petitioner to life imprisonment for the murder charge and to five years' imprisonment for the weapons charge. R. 283, lines 11 – 17.

Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal, which was perfected. On November 5, 2014, the Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentences in an unpublished one-paragraph opinion. State v. Hayes, 2014-UP-385 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Nov. 5, 2014); App. 1-2. On November 20, 2014, Petitioner filed a petition for rehearing. App. 3-14. The Court denied the petition in an order dated December 17, 2014. App. 15-16.

Petitioner now files this petition for writ of certiorari.

ARGUMENT

The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's denial of Petitioner's motion for directed verdict where the only evidence presented by the prosecution was that Petitioner allegedly confided in a stranger that he was distraught because he saw the deceased had been murdered in their apartment, but took no action to report the murder to the police.

Relevant facts

Prosecutor's Opening Statement

The prosecutor's opening statement demonstrated the paucity of evidence against Petitioner. Acknowledging that a jury would want evidence, such as "the defendant in possession of the murder weapon, the defendant confessing to law enforcement, her DNA on him; things of this nature," in order to convict, the prosecutor candidly admitted she had none. Rather, the evidence she would offer would be "some fingerprint evidence important for where things were found," "a little bit of DNA evidence only relating to [the deceased]," and a conversation between Petitioner and a homeless man. R. 2, lines 6 – R. 4, line 4.

The Prosecution's Evidence

On June 13, 2009, Barbara McNeil went to the apartment of the deceased, her sister, because she had not spoken to the deceased in over a week. R. 8, line 15 – R. 9, line 23. Importantly, McNeil found the door closed; but unlocked. R. 10, lines 1 – 3. On the door, McNeil found a note left for the deceased from the person who delivered her food. R. 17, lines 1 – 6. McNeil entered the apartment and found the deceased's body in an upstairs bathroom. R. 10, lines 15 – 18.

McNeil and Janie Ashmore, the deceased's mother, claimed that although Petitioner and the deceased had been in a romantic relationship for approximately five years and lived together,

they did not hear from Petitioner after the deceased's death. R. 12, lines 14 – 21; R. 15, lines 6 – 10; R. 17, line 25 – R. 18, line 9; R. 13, lines 9 – 17; R. 19, lines 9-10; R. 19, lines 16-23; R. 20, lines 3-5. However, the family of the deceased informed Christopher Miller, the lead investigator, that Petitioner and the deceased had an argument and Petitioner had left. R. 224, line 20 – R. 225, line 1. Additionally, McNeil and Ashmore admitted that the deceased had a drug problem. R. 13, line 20 – R. 14, line 2; R. 16, lines 20 – 23; R. 21, lines 3-5. Ashmore never got involved with any of the deceased's issues relating to her drug use and "never had to bail her out of any situations." R. 21, lines 6-10.

Officer Ashleigh Swanson was the first police officer on the scene in response to the 911 call. R. 77, lines 13 – 22; R. 78, lines 17 – 19. However, the fire department personnel had already entered the residence prior to her arrival. R. 78, lines 11 – 16; R. 81, lines 16 – 20. Swanson found the deceased partially naked upstairs in a bathroom. Although Swanson saw blood in the bathroom, she saw no blood outside the bathroom. R. 79, lines 1 – 8. R. 82, lines 15 – 16; R. 82, lines 20 – 23.

The pathologist testified that the deceased was stabbed twenty-eight times. R. 88, lines 15 – 21. Most of the wounds were superficial. R. 90, lines 22 – 25. However, several stab wounds traumatized the diaphragm and the pleural cavity, which resulted in the deceased being unable to expand her lungs. R. 91, lines 6 – 23. The toxicology results revealed that the deceased had ingested cocaine. R. 92, lines 1 – 10. R. 100, lines 15 – 24. The pathologist opined that the deceased had been dead for days, and a reasonable estimate would be anywhere from three to five days. R. 99, lines 20 – 22. On cross-examination, he testified that it was possible

that she had died six days prior, but that it was unlikely due to the state of decomposition. R. 100, lines 4 – 9.¹

Anthony Murdaugh, who lived near the deceased in June of 2009, recalled seeing her during the week of June 7, 2009. The deceased's locked herself out of her apartment and went to Murdaugh's home for help. Murdaugh assured the deceased that the landlord would return to the complex soon. R. 106, lines 12 – 19; R. 107, line 25 – R. 108, line 10. Murdaugh did not recall the actual date or even the day that this event occurred, but upon prompting from the prosecutor agreed that it may have been Sunday, June 7, 2009. Also, he was unsure of what time of day this occurred, but testified that it was early in the day. R. 108, lines 11 – 21. Murdaugh never saw the deceased again. R. 109, lines 20 – 21. Thus, the last time anyone saw the deceased alive was on June 7, 2009, and her body was found on June 13, 2009.

Jo Lynn Wood also lived in the apartments near the deceased in June 2009. R. 114, lines 6 – 16; R. 115, lines 9 – 14. Wood recalled seeing the deceased approximately a week and a half before her body was found when, during the early morning hours, the deceased had gone to Wood's apartment trying to sell shampoo. R. 115, lines 17 – 23. After the deceased's body was found, Wood informed the police that she had seen Petitioner going in and out of the apartment twice at night during the previous week. R. 117, lines 2 – 4; R. 117, lines 5 – 9; R. 117, lines 17 – 23. On cross-examination, Wood clarified that it was not unusual for her to see Petitioner at the apartment at night. In fact, she saw him on a weekly basis around the same time. R. 123, lines 8 – 11; R. 123, lines 23.

¹ The deceased's body was found on June 13, 2009, and the autopsy was performed on June 15, 2009. Based on the pathologist's estimate, the death occurred between June 7, 2009 and June 10, 2009.

In June 2009, Larry White was homeless and living on the streets in Greenville. He chose to be homeless because he “like[d] to explore and go from state-to-state, seeing how other states [are] and then compare it to [his] state.” R. 24, lines 10 – 18. White claimed that he talked to Petitioner on a particularly hot day in June as he sat on a shaded bench behind Able Body, a labor hall. He recalled it was a Sunday because Able Body was closed. He could not remember the date, but agreed with the prosecutor who suggested it was June 9, 2009.² R. 24, lines 22 – 24. R. 25, lines 2-22. R. 27, lines 7 – 12. He saw a young man, whom he identified as Petitioner, drinking a beer and crying. When White asked what was wrong, the man allegedly responded “I done fucked up bad, real bad.” R. 25, line 24 – R. 26, line 3. White claimed Petitioner said, “It’s going to fuck my sister up when I tell her what I done.” R. 26, lines 15 – 17. In response to White’s questioning, Petitioner explained “I went in the house and found my girl dead, man. The dope boys cut my girl all up, pulled her panties down to her ankles and put her in the bathtub.” R. 26, lines 18 – 20; R. 29, lines 12 – 14. Upon seeing the deceased, Petitioner ran out the house. When White asked why he did not call the police, Petitioner responded that the police would think he had committed the crime because it was his girlfriend. R. 26, lines 21 – 24; R. 28, lines 15 – 24.

Even on direct examination, White admitted that Petitioner did not state that he had hurt the deceased or committed the crime. White related only that Petitioner continued to cry during their conversation. R. 27, lines 1 – 12. The prosecutor continued to press White regarding what Petitioner could have done that was so bad. R. 27, lines 13 – 14. White responded that Petitioner “hesitated for a while,” then looked at White, “did like this on the table,” and said “but you ain’t never killed nobody.” R. 27, lines 15 – 18; R. 40, lines 12 – 16.

² June 9, 2009 was a Tuesday. R. 66, lines 7 – 13.

White further claimed that Petitioner said he was going to Kentucky and had purchased a bus ticket for the trip. Although White was unable to see the location or the time on the ticket, he did observe a Greyhound bus ticket in Petitioner's possession. R. 28, lines 2 – 5; R. 70, lines 10 – 12; R. 70, lines 16 – 22.³

A couple of days later, White overheard other people discussing the murder of a young lady while at the labor hall. The people explained that she had been “cut up and stabbed real, real bad.” R. 32, lines 17 – 22. Upon hearing that a woman had been stabbed, White thought of his alleged conversation with Petitioner. R. 32, line 24 – R. 33, line 4. White was forced to admit that in addition to overhearing the conversation among other homeless individuals regarding the murder, he also saw police officers showing a photograph of an individual and asking for help to solve a crime. R. 40, line 17 – R. 41, line 10. White, however, denied ever seeing the photograph. R. 46, lines 1 – 4; R. 49, lines 1 – 7. Despite this assertion at trial, White was forced to admit that he told police he “did not really look at the picture at first” when the officers were displaying it. R. 50, lines 11 – 18; R. 56, lines 10 – 16. Additionally, White informed police that he told the employee of the labor hall that the man in the photograph shown by the police was the same man he had talked to a week earlier. R. 52, lines 10 – 15; R. 56, lines 17 – 24.

Sometime later in the month of June, White asked an employee of the labor hall to call the police. Although White was unable to recall when he actually spoke to the police or even when he decided to speak to the police, he agreed with the prosecutor that it was probably around June 18, 2009. White gave a formal statement at the conclusion of his two to four hour

³ An officer testified that in September 2010, he picked up Petitioner from New York and returned him to Greenville, South Carolina. R. 5, line 5 – R. 6, line 16.

interview. R. 33, lines 4 – 9; R. 33, lines 12 – 23; R. 34, lines 18 – 20. White testified his formal statement provided a true and accurate account of his conversation with Petitioner. R. 35, lines 9 – 22; R. 40, lines 5 – 10. White selected Petitioner’s photograph from a photographic lineup. R. 36, lines 5 – 8; R. 37, lines 10 – 21. Additionally, White identified Petitioner in court. R. 38, lines 18 – 23. White claimed that he got involved in the case because he was “brought up in a church” and “brought up to do the right thing.” R. 41, lines 21 – 22.

No physical evidence connected Petitioner to the murder. Christopher Gray, a latent print examiner, testified that prints from the toilet in the bathroom where the deceased’s body was found were identified as being made by Petitioner. Specifically, Petitioner’s left palm print was recovered from the exterior top of the toilet lid in two areas and Petitioner’s right palm print was recovered from the exterior top of the bathtub. R. 132, line 13 – R. 134, line 2. On cross-examination, Gray clarified that the prints were found on toilet tank lid and none of the prints were in blood. R. 135, line 17 – R. 136, lines 10; R. 137, lines 1 – 3.

Jonathan Hamilton, a crime scene investigator, found a single droplet of blood at the entrance way on the floor and a single droplet of blood on the kitchen floor. R. 144, line 22 – R. 145, line 3.⁴ The deceased’s body was wedged between the toilet and the tub. R. 169, lines 11 – 18. Hamilton found suspected blood on the toilet lid which indicated to him that at one point the lid had been up. R. 170, lines 3 – 17. Adrienne Hefney, a SLED DNA analyst, tested the swabs that were collected from the single droplet of blood on the floor of the entryway and from the kitchen floor. R. 193, lines 12 – 17. The profiles developed from the swabs indicated female DNA. R. 194, lines 7 – 11. Jagannadha Kandala, a DNA analyst with the Greenville County

⁴ Miller, the lead investigator, did not even see the blood at the very bottom of the steps near the entryway when he entered. R. 215, lines 1-4.

Department of Public Safety tested three areas of the deceased's shirt. R. 202, line 16 – R. 204, line 13. Dr. Kandala developed partial profiles from the shirt samples. R. 205, lines 3 – 10. Dr. Kandala compared the partial profiles developed from the shirt samples with the profiles developed by SLED from the entrance way and the kitchen floor. Dr. Kandala opined that the DNA from the shirt samples matched the DNA from the blood spots found on the floor. R. 205, line 11 – R. 206, line 3.

Prosecutor's Closing Argument

The prosecutor's closing argument reinforced the lack of evidence against Petitioner. The prosecutor began by referring to the "tons of raw emotion" displayed by the deceased's family and the "horrific images" entered into evidence by the prosecution. R. 244, line 24 – R. 245, line 1. In referring to the evidence to indicate that Petitioner was the actual perpetrator, the prosecutor noted that this was not a case where Petitioner was found standing over the deceased's body with a bloody knife. Despite this lack of direct evidence, the prosecutor argued that evidence indicated Petitioner was the perpetrator. R. 247, lines 3 – 11. The prosecutor argued that Murdaugh had seen the deceased on Sunday morning, June 7 at 10 a.m. and no one had seen her after that date. R. 247, lines 12 – 16. Thus, the last time she was seen alive was on June 7 and her body was found on June 13, meaning she died sometime between June 7 and June 10. The prosecutor then turned to the testimony of White. Allegedly, Petitioner told White that his girlfriend was dead because she had been stabbed repeatedly by the dope man. Petitioner allegedly said the deceased's mother had paid for her drug debts previously, but the deceased's mother blew this "out of the water" when she testified she had never paid off drug debts for the deceased. The prosecutor made the feeble argument that Petitioner's alleged response to White's question about what could he have done that was so bad, which was "you ain't never killed

nobody,” was an indication that Petitioner had killed the deceased. R. 247, line 17 – R. 248, line 15; R. 249, lines 17 – 23. The prosecutor also relied upon the testimony of Wood, who claimed she saw Petitioner at least twice around the time of the deceased death to place Petitioner in the area. R. 249, line 24 – R. 250, line 18.

Concerning the physical evidence, the prosecutor referred to Petitioner’s palm print found on top of the toilet and on top of the tub and asked the jury why the prints would be there. R. 252, line 19 – R. 253, lines 6. The prosecutor, without any evidence to support her, argued that Petitioner dropped blood belonging to the deceased at the bottom of the stairs and in the kitchen. R. 253, lines 7 – 14.

The prosecution concluded by noting the police had not been able “to come up with anybody that they can point the finger to, say, maybe this person did this.” As a result, “[t]he only suspect was in, and is now, [Petitioner].” R. 253, lines 14 – 24. The prosecutor was so desperate for a conviction in light of the lack of evidence against Petitioner, she even showed the jury a photograph of the victim, which had not been admitted into evidence, during her closing argument. Again, the prosecutor was appealing to the emotions of the jury because she had no evidence against Petitioner. R. 255, line 14 – R. 260, line 3.⁵

Motion for Directed Verdict

At the close of the state’s case, Petitioner moved for a directed verdict of acquittal. R. 241, lines 6 – 8. Specifically, Petitioner argued that the state had failed to present substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tended to prove his guilt. Petitioner argued that the evidence,

⁵ Petitioner objected and moved for a mistrial based upon the prosecutor’s misconduct. The judge sustained Petitioner’s objection and issued a curative instruction to the jury. R. 260, lines 8-20.

at best, showed “mere suspicion.” R. 242, lines 10 – 18. The state responded simply that “there [was] enough evidence - - from which the jury could rightfully convict” Petitioner. R. 242, lines 21 – 25. The trial judge found there existed “sufficient evidence, taking it as a whole, direct and circumstantial, for the jury to make a decision on this.” Thus, he denied Petitioner’s motion. R. 243, lines 1 – 6.

After the jury returned guilty verdicts, Petitioner renewed her previous motions. R. 282, lines 9-10. The judge responded: “Well, I think the jury has spoken on this case. As I said before, I think there is – certainly was sufficient direct evidence and substantial circumstantial evidence for a jury to make this determination, rather than I. I believe the jury has spoken. I will deny your motion, respectfully.” R. 282, lines 11-16.

Jury Deliberations

The jury expressed its confusion on being asked to determine Petitioner’s guilt based upon the paucity of evidence when it inquired whether Petitioner was right-handed or left-handed and sought guidance regarding the level of murder with which Petitioner was charged. R. 277, lines 4-9; R. 284 (jury note). The judge responded that the jury had all of the evidence and re-instructed the jury concerning the elements of murder. R. 278, line 2 – R. 280, line 17.

Discussion

A defendant is entitled to a directed verdict when the prosecution fails to provide evidence of the offense charged. State v. Brown, 103S.C. 437, 88 S.E.2d 1 (1916); State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006); State v. McHoney, 344 S.C. 85, 97, 544 S.E.2d 30, 36 (2001). “If there is any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused,” the trial judge may deny the motion for directed verdict. State v. Lollis, 343 S.C. 580, 584, 541 S.E.2d 254, 256 (2001); State v. Pinckney, 339 S.C. 346,

349, 529 S.E.2d 526, 527 (2000); State v. Martin, 340 S.C. 597, 533 S.E.2d 572 (2000). When the prosecution relies exclusively on circumstantial evidence, the trial judge must direct a verdict in the defendant's favor unless there is any substantial circumstantial evidence which reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the defendant or from which his guilt may be fairly and logically deduced. State v. Bostick, 392 S.C. 134, 139, 708 S.E.2d 774, 776 (2011); State v. Mitchell, 341 S.C. 406, 535 S.E.2d 126 (2000). Likewise, a directed verdict is appropriate when the evidence produced "merely raises a suspicion the accused is guilty." Lollis, 343 S.C. at 584, 541 S.E.2d at 256; State v. Arnold, 361 S.C. 386, 389-390, 605 S.E.2d 529, 531 (2004); State v. Schrock, 283 S.C. 129, 132, 322 S.E.2d 450, 451-452 (1984); State v. Muhammed, 338 S.C. 22, 524 S.E.2d 637 (Ct. App. 1999). Our courts define suspicion as "a belief or opinion as to guilt based upon facts or circumstances which do not amount to proof." Lollis, 343 S.C. at 584, 541 S.E.2d at 256; State v. Hyder, 242 S.C. 372, 131 S.E.2d 96 (1963).

In Mitchell, 341 S.C. at 409, 535 S.E.2d at 127, this Court held the lower court erred in failing to direct a verdict where the only evidence presented against the defendant was his fingerprint at the scene of the burglary. Likewise, the Lollis Court directed a verdict of acquittal in the defendant's favor where the state presented no direct evidence that Lollis was involved in setting fire to his home. The only circumstantial evidence against Lollis was that his wife admitted to the arson, he had placed valuables in storage prior to the fire, he possessed a key to the storage unit, and he allegedly had financial troubles. This Court found this evidence insufficient. Lollis, 343 S.C. at 584-585, 541 S.E.2d at 256-257.

In State v. Odems, 395 S.C. 582, 720 S.E.2d 48 (2012), this Court held the defendant was entitled to a directed verdict based upon a lack of substantial circumstantial evidence that the defendant was involved in the burglary. Although Odems was in a car with other individuals who

admittedly burglarized a home, the state failed to provide substantial circumstantial evidence that Odems was present during the home invasion. The witness who saw individuals at the home claimed she saw two, not three as were found in the car. Fingerprints collected from the stolen goods did not match Odems, but matched the other individuals in the car. One of the individuals who admitted his involvement claimed Odems was picked up after the burglary at a gas station. Id. at 588, 720 S.E.2d at 51. As explained by this Court, although our courts have abandoned the traditional circumstantial evidence jury charge, the language of the charge is instructive in making a directed verdict determination. The traditional charge provided:

Every circumstance relied upon by the State be proven beyond a reasonable doubt; and ... all of the circumstances proven be consistent with each other and taken together, point conclusively to the guilt of the accused to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis.

Id. at 590, 720 S.E.2d at 52 (quoting State v. Hernandez, 382 S.C. 620, 626 n.2, 677 S.E.2d 603, 606 n.2 (2009)).

In State v. Bostick, 392 S.C. 134, 141, 708 S.E.2d 774, 778 (2011), this Court held the prosecution failed to present substantial circumstantial evidence of Bostick's guilt. Rather, the state's evidence was capable of producing only a suspicion of Bostick's guilt. Id. Although the police found items belonging to the victim in a burn pile behind the home of Bostick's mother, the Court held no evidence linked Bostick to the evidence in the burn pile and the prosecution presented no testimony that Bostick had control over the burn pile. Id. at 137-141, 708 S.E.2d at 775-778. The only other evidence presented against Bostick was that he had a chemical pattern that matched gasoline on his shoes and gasoline was used to start the fire at the victim's home, and DNA from blood on Bostick's jeans excluded ninety-nine percent of the population, but the expert could not testify the DNA matched the victim. Id. at 142, 708 S.E.2d at 778.

The prosecution presented no direct evidence against Petitioner and very little circumstantial evidence. No physical evidence connected Petitioner to the crime. The prosecution established only that a connection existed between the deceased and Petitioner, but established no connection between Petitioner and the deceased's death. Petitioner and the deceased had been in a romantic relationship for five years around the time of the deceased's death. The two lived together in the apartment where the deceased's body was found. Not surprisingly, Petitioner's prints were found in the apartment where he lived. Not surprisingly, the deceased's family did not see Petitioner after the deceased's death because Petitioner and the deceased had argued, broken up, and Petitioner had left the deceased's death. Not surprisingly, Petitioner was seen at the apartment where he lived at the usual time and place where his neighbor saw him.

The only evidence the prosecution presented that showed Petitioner even had knowledge of the deceased's death was the testimony of White. However, even White's testimony only established that Petitioner knew about the murder and did not report it, not that he had any involvement in the death. The Court of Appeals held that a defendant stating "It's done" required the jury to infer what the defendant meant by both the words "it" and "done." Thus, the state was circumstantial evidence requiring the jury to make inferences in order to arrive at a conclusion. See State v. Rogers, 405 S.C. 554, 564, 748 S.E.2d 265, 270 (2013). Clearly, any of Petitioner's alleged statements to White would require multiple inferences by the jurors to determine their meaning. Thus, Petitioner's alleged statements do not amount to direct evidence and must be evaluated as circumstantial evidence.


Importantly, Petitioner did not admit guilt to White or confess to participation of any sort. Very telling of the prosecutor's weak case was the repeated resort to appeal to the "raw emotion" of the jury in her closing argument, including displaying a photograph of the deceased, which was not

from the crime scene and was clearly inadmissible victim impact evidence, asking the jury for justice of the deceased who was a mother, daughter, and sister.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner respectfully requests this Court grant the petition for writ of certiorari and order full briefing on the issue presented.

Respectfully submitted,


Susan B. Hackett
Appellate Defender

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER.

This 16th day of January, 2015

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE SUPREME COURT

Certiorari to Greenville County

G. Edward Welmaker, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 2014-UP-385 (S.C. Ct. App. filed 11/5/2014)
11-GS-23-7681

THE STATE,

RESPONDENT,


V.

RALPH B. HAYES,

PETITIONER

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a true copy of the petition for writ of certiorari and a copy of the appendix, in this case has been served on Kaycie S. Timmons, Esquire, at the Rembert Dennis Building, 1000 Assembly Street, Room 519, Columbia, SC 29201, Mr. Ralph B. Hayes #320369, at Lieber Correctional Institution, PO Box 205, Ridgeville, SC 29472 and the S.C. Court of Appeals this 16th day of January, 2015.


Susan B. Hackett
Appellate Defender

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 16th day
of January, 2015.


_____(L.S.)

Notary Public for South Carolina

My Commission Expires: October 30, 2022



Division of Appellate Defense
1330 Lady Street, Suite 401
Columbia, South Carolina 29201-3332
Post Office Box 11589
Columbia, South Carolina 29211-1589
Telephone: (803) 734-1330
Facsimile: (803) 734-1397

Robert M. Dudek, Chief Appellate Defender
Wanda H. Carter, Deputy Chief Appellate Defender

RECEIVED

JAN 16 2015

SC Court of Appeals

January 13, 2015

Kaycie S. Timmons, Esquire
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Post Office Box 11549
Columbia, South Carolina 29211

Re: The State v. Ralph B. Hayes

Dear Kaycie:

Enclosed are two copies of the petition for writ of certiorari and the appendix in the above case that I filed with the S.C. Supreme Court today.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me.

Sincerely,

Susan B. Hackett
Appellate Defender

SBH/smf

Enclosures

cc: Court of Appeals